Court filing
Motion for Forfeiture of Property with Brief In Supportby USA as to Carl Delano Torjagbo — USA v. Torjagbo (Dkt. 253, N.D. Ga. No. 1:22-cr-00171)
Filed January 15, 2026 in USA v. Torjagbo; one of 189 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2026-01-15 |
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC · Doc. 253 · 2026-01-15 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARL DELANO TORJAGBO A/K/A
KARL LUCIUS DELANO
Criminal Action No.
1:22-cr-00171-MLB
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY ORDER OF FORFEITURE
The United States of America, by Theodore S. Hertzberg, United States
Attorney, and Kelly K. Connors, Assistant United States Attorney, for the
Northern District of Georgia, respectfully moves the Court, pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b), for a preliminary order of forfeiture against
the Defendant, Carl Delano Torjagbo, also known as Karl Lucius Delano
(“Defendant”), following a jury verdict of guilty. In support, the government
shows the Court the following:
1. Relevant Procedural History
On July 1, 2025, a grand jury, sitting in the Northern District of Georgia,
returned a ten-count third superseding indictment, charging Defendant Torjagbo
with one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (Count One), two
counts of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Counts Two through Three),
three counts of concealment money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (Counts Four through Six), and four counts of transactional
money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Counts Seven through Ten)
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based on a Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loan fraud scheme and tax fraud
scheme. Specifically, the government alleged in Count One that Defendant
Torjagbo defrauded Chase Bank when he signed and submitted to Chase Bank a
fraudulent PPP loan application on behalf of his fake company, Kremkov
Industries. (Doc. 198, ¶ 13.) The government alleged in Counts Two through Three
that Defendant Torjagbo committed wire fraud when he electronically filed two
fraudulent U.S. individual income tax returns for tax year 2020, claiming
substantial earnings and withholdings related to Kremkov Industries. (Id., ¶ 18.)
The government lastly alleged in Counts Four through Ten that Defendant
Torjagbo laundered the proceeds of the bank fraud scheme and wire fraud scheme
through various monetary transactions, including purchases of real property and
vehicles. (Id., ¶¶ 35-37.)
The third superseding indictment included a forfeiture provision, notifying
Defendant Torjagbo that, upon conviction, the United States would seek to forfeit
all property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained, directly or
indirectly, as a result of the bank fraud offense, all property, real or personal,
constituting, or derived from, proceeds traceable to the wire fraud offenses and
any property, real or personal, involved in any money laundering offenses, or any
property traceable to such property. The forfeiture provision further identified the
property below as subject to forfeiture upon conviction of the charged offenses:
FUNDS:
a. Approximately $1,141.89 in funds seized from PNC Bank account
ending 9499 held in the name of Kremkov Industries.
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b. Approximately $1,750,018.12 in funds seized from PNC Bank account
ending 9849 held in the name of Carl Torjagbo.
(“Subject Funds”).
VEHICLES:
a. 2022
BMW
M850xi,
Vehicle
Identification
Number:
WBAGV8C06NCH96608.
b. 2021 Land Rover Range Rover Velar Sports Utility Vehicle, Vehicle
Identification Number: SALYM2FU7MA302651.
c. 2014 Lamborghini Aventador, Vehicle Identification Number:
ZHWUC1ZD3ELA02216,
(“Subject Vehicles”).
REAL PROPERTY:
a. 5114 Greythorne Lane, Marietta, Cobb County, Georgia 30068, and all
buildings and appurtenances thereto.
b. 101 Holt Drive, Acworth, Cherokee County, Georgia 30101, and all
buildings and appurtenances thereto.
c. Tract 4 Fiber Drive, Cartersville, Bartow County, Georgia 30120, and
all buildings and appurtenances thereto,
(“Subject Real Property”).
(collectively, “Subject Property”). The forfeiture provision also notified Defendant
Torjagbo that the Government would seek a forfeiture money judgment upon
conviction.
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The jury trial began on July 21, 2025, and, on July 25, 2025, the jury returned a
verdict finding Defendant Torjagbo guilty on all counts. Defendant Torjagbo
waived a jury determination of forfeiture as to the Subject Funds, Subject Vehicles,
and Subject Real Property, consenting to this Court making such determination.
Because the evidence at trial showed that the requisite nexus exists between the
Subject Property and the offenses of conviction, the government respectfully
requests that the Court enter a preliminary order of forfeiture directing forfeiture
of said property. The evidence at trial also demonstrated that Defendant Torjagbo
obtained $6,366,240.76 in proceeds and property as a result of his offenses of
conviction. Accordingly, the Government also asks the Court to set forth in the
preliminary order of forfeiture a forfeiture money judgment in the amount of
$6,366,240.76.
2. Argument and Citation of Authority
A. Legal Framework for the Entry of a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture
Pursuant to Rule 32.2(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a]s
soon as practical after a verdict or finding of guilty . . . on any count in an
indictment or information regarding which criminal forfeiture is sought, the court
must determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable
statute.” If the government establishes the “requisite nexus” between property
that the government seeks to forfeit and an offense of conviction, the Court “must
promptly enter a preliminary order of forfeiture” that directs the forfeiture of such
property, “without regard to any third party’s interest in the property.” See Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) & (b)(2)(A). If the government seeks a forfeiture money
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judgment, the Court also must set forth the amount of the forfeiture money
judgment in the preliminary order of forfeiture. See id.
While a defendant may request that a trial jury determine whether specific
property is forfeitable or waive the determination in order to allow the court to
make the determination, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(5)(A), a court has sole
responsibility for determining the applicability and amount of a forfeiture money
judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Esformes, 60 F.4th 621, 639 (11th Cir. 2023)
(interpreting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 to require “two types of forfeiture
determinations” . . . “forfeiture of an amount of money” as determined by the court
and forfeiture of “specific property” as determined by the trial jury); United States
v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1278 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We remain persuaded that the
court, not a jury, should determine the amount of a money judgment forfeiture”).
A defendant may only be ordered to pay a forfeiture money judgment equal to the
amount of proceeds that he, himself, actually acquired. See Honeycutt v. United
States, 581 U.S. 443, 454 (2017) (finding that a forfeiture money judgment pursuant
to 21 U.S.C. § 853 “is limited to property the defendant himself actually acquired
as the result of the crime”); see also United States v. Hatum, 969 F.3d 1156, 1164–65
(11th Cir. 2020) (finding that a forfeiture money judgment under 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(1) that included the total amount of funds laundered did not violate
Honeycutt, even though the defendant money launderer did not personally retain
all of the funds).
A court may base its forfeiture determination, including the amount of a
forfeiture money judgment, on “evidence already in the record,” and “any
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additional evidence or information submitted by the parties and accepted by the
court as relevant and reliable.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(1)(B).
The “court must enter the preliminary order sufficiently in advance of
sentencing to allow the parties to suggest revisions or modifications before the
order becomes final as to the defendant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B). Moreover,
if a court is unable to “calculate the total amount of the money judgment, the court
may enter a forfeiture order that . . . states that the order will be amended . . . when
. . . the amount of the money judgment has been calculated.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.2(b)(2)(C)(iii). Any third party’s interest in property that has been forfeited as
to a defendant is exclusively determined in the ancillary proceeding under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 32.2(c). However, “no ancillary proceeding is required to the extent that
the forfeiture consists of a money judgment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1).
The government must prove forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence.
United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1277-1278 (11th Cir. 2003).
B. The Applicable Forfeiture Statutes Mandate Forfeiture.
The government sought forfeiture under each of the offenses of conviction,
including the imposition of a forfeiture money judgment. (Doc. 198, at pp. 13-17.)
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.2(b)(1)(A), this Court must now
“determine what property is subject to forfeiture under the applicable forfeiture
statute.” As detailed below, the applicable forfeiture statutes mandate forfeiture
of proceeds or property. See Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1162 (“The Supreme Court has
made clear that when Congress provides that a district court ‘shall order’
forfeiture, it ‘could not have chosen stronger words to express its intent that
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forfeiture be mandatory’”) (citing United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607
(1989)).
1. Upon a Conviction for Bank Fraud, the Applicable Forfeiture Statute
Mandates the Forfeiture of Proceeds Constituting or Derived from the
Offense.
18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A) authorizes forfeiture upon a conviction for bank fraud
and, therefore, guides the Court’s determination as to what property is subject to
forfeiture under Count One. This forfeiture statute provides that a court “shall
order” a person found guilty of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, among other
criminal offenses, to forfeit “any property constituting, or derived from, proceeds
the person obtained directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 982(a)(2)(A).
2. Upon a Conviction for Wire Fraud, the Applicable Forfeiture Statute
Mandates Forfeiture of Proceeds Traceable to the Offense.
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), as incorporated by 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c),1 authorizes
forfeiture upon a conviction for wire fraud and, therefore, guides the Court’s
determination as to what property is subject to forfeiture under Count Two. These
forfeiture statutes provide that a court “shall order” a person found guilty of a
“specified unlawful activity,” such as wire fraud, to forfeit “[a]ny property, real or
1 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) governs property subject to civil forfeiture. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(c) grants a court authority to forfeit in criminal matters property subject to
civil forfeiture.
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personal, which constitutes or is derived from proceeds traceable to” the specified
unlawful activity. Wire fraud is a specified unlawful activity.2
3. Upon a Conviction for Money Laundering, the Applicable Forfeiture
Statute Mandates Forfeiture of Property Involved In the Offense.
18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) authorizes forfeiture upon a conviction for money
laundering and, therefore, guides the Court’s determination as to what property
is subject to forfeiture under Counts Four through Ten. This forfeiture statute
provides that a court “shall order” a person found guilty of an offense under 18
U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 or 1960” to forfeit “any property, real or personal, involved in
such offense, or any property traceable to such property.”
Property “involved in” a money laundering offense or “property traceable to
such property” consists of “that money or property which was actually laundered
(the corpus), along with any commissions or fees paid to the launderer and any
property used to facilitate the laundering offense.” Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1162.
(internal quotation and citation omitted). “Involved in” property also includes
those money laundering transactions where “the transaction had the purpose of
concealing the proceeds….” Hasson, 333 F.3d at 1279. Property facilitates an
offense “if it makes the prohibited conduct less difficult or more or less free from
obstruction or hindrance.” United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1368 (11th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 “Specified unlawful activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) is defined in 18
U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7), which also expressly incorporates RICO predicates listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1).
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C. The Requisite Nexus Exists Between the Offenses of Conviction and the
Subject Property and, as a Result, the Subject Property Must Be Forfeited.
1. $1,141.89 in Funds Seized from PNC Bank Account Number Ending
9499 and $1,750,018.12 in Funds Seized from PNC Bank Account
Number Ending 9849 Should Be Forfeited as Proceeds of the Bank
Fraud and Wire Fraud Offenses.
The government seeks to forfeit $1,141.89 in funds that the FBI seized from PNC
Bank account number ending 9499 and $1,750,018.12 in funds that the FBI seized
from PNC Bank account number ending 9849. Both assets are proceeds of the bank
fraud scheme proved in Count One and wire fraud scheme in Count Two for
which Defendant Torjagbo was convicted and, as a result, should be forfeited.
The facts proved at trial showed that, on or about February 16, 2021, Defendant
Torjagbo submitted a false and fraudulent PPP loan application to Chase Bank on
behalf of his sham mining company, Kremkov Industries. The application was
approved, and on March 29, 2021, $9,554,425 was deposited into JPMorgan Chase
Bank account number ending 8755 (“JPMC 8755”), titled in the name of Kremkov
Industries LLC.
On April 8, 2021, Defendant Torjagbo withdrew $3 million of these fraudulent
PPP loan proceeds, via check made payable to Kremkov Industries, and deposited
the check into the account from which funds were seized by the government, that
is, PNC Bank account number ending 9499, titled in the name of Kremkov
Industries LLC, on April 9, 2021 (“PNC 9499”).3
3 JPMorgan Chase clawed back the remaining $6,544,515 in fraudulent PPP loan
proceeds on May 18, 2021.
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A few weeks later, on April 27, 2021, Defendant Torjagbo deposited $3.3 million
in proceeds from the tax fraud scheme into PNC 9499. These fraud proceeds
resulted from Defendant Torjagbo’s filing of fraudulent income tax returns.
Specifically, on or about February 13, 2021, Defendant Torjagbo electronically filed
two fraudulent Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Returns with the IRS,
reporting, among other things, fictitious wages, withholdings, and nonpassive
losses for Kremkov Industries. As established at trial, as a result of the fraudulent
tax return alleged in Count Two, the IRS issued a refund check in the amount of
$3,366,240.76. On April 27, 2021, Defendant Torjagbo deposited this check into
PNC 9499.
The evidence at trial further established that after Defendant Torjagbo
deposited fraud proceeds into PNC 9499, he transferred the proceeds to another
bank account that he controlled. Specifically, on April 19, 2021, Defendant
Torjagbo transferred $100,000 from PNC 9499 to a different account that he
controlled, which is the second account that the government seized funds from,
that is, PNC Bank account number ending 9849, titled in the name of Carl Torjagbo
(“PNC 9849”). Approximately three weeks later, on May 11, 2021, Defendant
Torjagbo transferred the vast majority of the remaining funds in PNC 9499—$6
million—to PNC 9849.
The FBI seized the Subject Funds, pursuant to federal seizure warrants, on May
12, 2022. From the time of the deposit of the fraud proceeds until the seizures, there
were no other significant deposits into PNC 9499 or PNC 9849.
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Because the preponderance of the evidence shows a sufficient nexus between
the Subject Funds and an offense of conviction, that is, Counts One and Two, this
Court should enter a preliminary order of forfeiture as to the Seized Funds.
Attached hereto for the Court’s convenience is Government Trial Exhibits 501 and
502, which summarize the flow of the fraudulent PPP loan proceeds and tax fraud
proceeds into and through Defendant Torjagbo’s various accounts.
2. The Subject Real Property and Subject Vehicles Should Be Forfeited
as Property Traceable to the Money Laundering.
As discussed above, and proven at trial, PNC 9849 and PNC 9499 were funded
with proceeds of the PPP loan fraud scheme and tax fraud scheme. Defendant
Torjagbo dissipated the fraud proceeds from these accounts through various
means, including by purchasing vehicles and real property and transferring
$1,560,000 to Bank of America account number ending 1199 (“Bank of America
1199”) to purchase additional vehicles and real property. (See Gov. Trial Exs. 501-
502.)
As relevant here, Defendant Torjagbo purchased each piece of the Subject Real
Property and each Subject Vehicles identified below—that are the objects of the
money laundering offenses for which Defendant Torjagbo was convicted—using
proceeds of the fraudulent PPP loan scheme and tax fraud scheme from PNC 9849
and Bank of America 1199. Accordingly, each item is traceable to a money
laundering offense and, therefore, forfeitable under 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).
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Count
Date
Originating Bank
Account
Subject Property
5
10/27/2021
PNC 9849
Tract
4
Fiber
Drive,
Cartersville, Bartow County,
Georgia 30120
6
3/7/2021
Bank of America
1199
101
Holt
Drive,
Acworth
Georgia
7
5/28/2021
PNC 9849
5114
Greythorne
Lane,
Marietta Georgia
8
8/04/2021
PNC 9849
2021 Land Range Rover Velar
9
1/24/2022
Bank of America
1199
2022 BMW M850i
10
4/22/2022
Bank of America
1199
2014 Lamborghini Aventador
D. A Forfeiture Money Judgment in the Amount of $6,366,240.76 Should Be
Imposed Against Defendant Torjagbo.
The Eleventh Circuit has long recognized that the Government is entitled to
forfeiture money judgments. See, e.g., Hatum, 969 F.3d at 1156 (“. . . our Court
approved forfeiture money judgment judgments against defendants convicted of
money laundering. . . And . . . we explained that money that is the proceeds of a
criminal offense constitutes a defendant’s interest in property and is subject to
forfeiture via an in personam money judgment”) (citations and quotations omitted);
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United States v. Baker, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 6149, *7-8 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2022)
(“Courts can impose forfeiture of cash proceeds resulting from a crime by a money
judgment or order”); United States v. Padron, 527 F.3d 1156, 1162 (11th Cir. 2008) (“.
. . it is equally clear that the federal rules explicitly contemplate the entry of money
judgments in criminal forfeiture cases”). The Eleventh Circuit also has held that
the Government is entitled to a personal forfeiture money judgment in addition to
any other specific property that may be subject to forfeiture. See, e.g., Esformes, 60
F.4th at 639 (affirming forfeiture of specific property as determined by the trial jury
and a forfeiture money judgment as determined by the district court).
A forfeiture money judgment does not require an exact calculation. Rather,
district courts may use general points of reference as a starting point for a
forfeiture calculation and make “reasonable extrapolations supported by the
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Vico, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6579
at *20 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2016) (citing United States v. Prather, 456 F. App'x 622, 626
(8th Cir. 2012); see United States v. Dennis, 41 F.4th 732, 746 (5th Cir. 2022)
(reasonable estimates for calculating criminal forfeiture permissible); United States
v. Vance, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33034, *33 (6th Cir. 2021) (district courts may "use
general points of reference as a starting point" for a forfeiture calculation and
"make reasonable extrapolations" supported by a preponderance of the evidence);
United States v. Peithman, 917 F.3d 635,651 (8th Cir. 2019) ("district courts may use
general points of reference as a starting point for a forfeiture calculation and make
reasonable extrapolations supported by a preponderance of the evidence"); United
States v. Roberts, 660 F.3d 149, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) (. . . “the law does not demand
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC Document 253 Filed 01/15/26 Page 13 of 15
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mathematical exactitude in calculating the proceeds subject to forfeiture. Indeed,
because the purpose of forfeiture is punitive rather than restitutive, district courts
are not required to conduct an investigative audit to ensure that a defendant is not
deprived of a single farthing more than his criminal acts produced. Rather, district
courts may use general points of reference as a starting point for a forfeiture
calculation and make reasonable extrapolations supported by a preponderance of
the evidence”) (citations and quotations omitted). However, the amount of the
money judgment should represent the “full amount of illegal proceeds irrespective
of whether monies are in the defendant’s possession at the time the court makes
findings regarding forfeiture.” United States v. McKay, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2007).
Here, the amount of the money judgment can be calculated exactly. As the
government proved at trial, Defendant Torjagbo fraudulently obtained a
$9,554,425 PPP loan and withdrew $3,000,000 of the funds before JPMC clawed
back the remainder. He also obtained a $3,366,240.76 fraudulent tax refund check
from the IRS. All of the fraud proceeds were deposited into bank accounts solely
controlled by Defendant Torjagbo. Accordingly, $6,366,240.76 represents the
amount of proceeds that Defendant Torjagbo personally received from the two
fraudulent schemes of which he was convicted and a forfeiture money judgment
in this amount is appropriate.4
4 If the Court orders forfeiture of the Subject Funds seized from PNC 9499 and
PNC 9849, totaling $1,751,160.01, the Court may reduce the amount of the
forfeiture money judgment to account for these Funds. The resulting amount of
the forfeiture money judgment would be $4,615,080.75.
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Conclusion
For all the foregoing reasons, the United States respectfully requests that the
Court issue a preliminary order of forfeiture that (1) directs forfeiture of the Subject
Property, and (2) sets forth a forfeiture money judgment in the amount of
$6,366,240.76.
Prior to sentencing, the United States will provide to the Court a proposed
preliminary order of forfeiture.
Respectfully submitted,
THEODORE S. HERTZBERG
United States Attorney
/s/KELLY K. CONNORS
Assistant United States Attorney
Georgia Bar No. 504787
Kelly.Connors@usdoj.gov
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