Court filing
Reply in Support of Joint Notice of Motion and Motion to Exclude — USA v. Ayvazyan et al. (Dkt. 439, C.D. Cal.)
Filed June 7, 2021 in USA v. Ayvazyan et al.; one of 233 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Central District of California |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2021-06-07 |
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:20-cr-00579-SVW · Doc. 439 · 2021-06-07 · Docket on CourtListener
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE DIGITAL DEVICE FILES
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Ashwin J. Ram (SBN 227513)
aram@steptoe.com
Michael A. Keough (SBN 327037)
mkeough@steptoe.com
Meghan L. Newcomer (pro hac vice)
mnewcomer@steptoe.com
Nicholas P. Silverman (pro hac vice)
nsilverman@steptoe.com
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1900
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 439-9400
Facsimile: (213) 439-9599
Counsel for Defendant Richard Ayvazyan
Fred G. Minassian (SBN 170974)
fgminassian@yahoo.com
LAW OFFICES OF FRED G.
MINASSIAN, INC.
101 N. Brand Ave, Suite 1970
Glendale, CA 91203
Telephone: (818) 240-2444
Counsel for Defendant Tamara Dadyan
John L. Littrell (SBN 221601)
jlittrell@bklwlaw.com
Ryan V. Fraser (SBN 272196)
rfraser@bklwlaw.com
BIENERT KATZMAN LITTRELL
WILLIAMS, LLP
601 W. 5th Street, Suite 720
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 528-3400
Facsimile: (949) 369-3701
Counsel for Defendant Marietta Terabelian
Thomas A. Mesereau Jr. (SBN 91182)
mesereau@mesereaulaw.com
MESEREAU LAW GROUP, P.C.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 300
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 651-9960
Jennifer J. Wirsching (SBN 263141)
wirschinglaw@outlook.com
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1935 Alpha Rd, Suite 216
Glendale, CA 91208
Telephone: (424) 902-9280
Counsel for Defendant Artur Ayvazyan
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD AYVAZYAN,
MARIETTA TERABELIAN,
ARTUR AYVAZYAN,
TAMARA DADYAN,
Defendants.
Case No. 20-cr-579 (SVW)
JOINT REPLY IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO EXCLUDE DIGITAL
DEVICE FILES FROM DEVICES
OBTAINED ON NOVEMBER 5,
2020
Hon. Stephen V. Wilson
Hearing Date: June 14, 2021
Time: 1:30 p.m.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1
II.
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 3
A.
THE GOVERNMENT VIOLATED THE WARRANTS’
REQUIREMENT THAT “THE SEARCH TEAM SHALL
COMPLETE THE SEARCH AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE BUT
NOT TO EXCEED 120 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF
EXECUTION OF THE WARRANT.” ........................................................ 3
1.
The Government Failed to Complete a Responsiveness
Review “as soon as practicable but not to exceed 120
days from the date of execution of the warrant” and
Failed to Secure a Valid Extension ................................................. 4
a.
The Extension Was Unlawfully Obtained and
Therefore Invalid ................................................................... 6
b.
Regardless of Any Extension, the Government
Failed to Complete Its Review “as soon as
practicable” ........................................................................... 9
2.
The Government Violated the Warrants’ Search
Protocol Requirement .................................................................... 14
3.
The Government Utilized Prosecutors Who Were Not
Part of the “Search Team” as Defined in ¶ 4.a of the
Warrants ........................................................................................ 16
B.
THE GOVERNMENT’S SEARCH WARRANT EXECUTION
WAS UNREASONABLE BECAUSE IT AMOUNTS TO A
GENERAL WARRANT ............................................................................ 18
C.
EXCLUSION IS PROPER UNDER RULE 16 AND THE
DISCOVERY CUT-OFF ORDER ............................................................. 20
D.
THE ELECTRONIC FILES SHOULD BE EXCLUDED DUE TO
KASTIGAR TAINT INFECTING THE REVIEW PROCESS .................. 21
III.
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................... 22
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Page(s)
Andresen v. Maryland,
427 U.S. 463 (1976) ..................................................................................................... 9
In re Apple iPhone, IMEI 013888003738427,
31 F. Supp. 3d 159 (D.D.C. 2014) ............................................................................. 14
Brock v. Roadway Express,
481 U.S. 252 (1987) ..................................................................................................... 6
Durham v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
No. 16-cv-8202 (ODW), 2017 WL 7661482 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2017) .................... 7
M.A.C. ex rel Garcia v. City of Los Angeles,
No. 16-cv-4477 (DMG) 2017 WL 10574306 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2017) ..................... 7
Giever v. City of Las Cruces,
No. 08-cv-155, 2010 WL 11626776 (D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2010) ................................... 16
Hall v. Tudbury,
35 F. App’x 428 (9th Cir. 2002) .................................................................................. 3
Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128 (1990) ..................................................................................................... 3
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm’n v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951) ..................................................................................................... 6
Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976) ..................................................................................................... 6
Plummer v. Camarillo,
No. 19-cv-7489 (PSG), 2019 WL 8226106 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2019) ...................... 7
In re Search Warrant (Cunnius),
770 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (W.D. Wash. 2011) ................................................................ 13
Simon v. City of New York,
893 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2018)........................................................................................... 3
In re Taylor,
567 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1977) ...................................................................................... 6
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United States v. Aboshady,
951 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020) .......................................................................................... 15
United States v. Bonner,
No. 12-cr-3429, 2013 WL 3829404 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2013) ................................. 15
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,
579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................. 8, 14
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc.,
621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ passim
United States v. Galpin,
720 F.3d 436 (2d Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................ 2
United States v. Ganias,
755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................ 6
United States v. Harris,
973 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1992) ..................................................................................... 21
United States v. Kirschenblatt,
16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926)........................................................................................... 5
United States v. Mapes,
59 M.J. 60 (C.A.A.F. 2003) ....................................................................................... 21
United States v. McDaniel,
482 F.2d 305 (8th Cir. 1973) ..................................................................................... 21
United States v. Microsoft,
56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ..................................................................................... 6
United States v. Penn,
647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980) ....................................................................................... 3
United States v. Phua,
No. 14-cr-249, 2015 WL 1281603 (D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2015) .................................... 14
United States v. Powell,
No. 19-cr-216, 2020 WL 2199758 (N.D. Ohio May 6, 2020) ................................... 16
United States v. Rice,
421 F. Supp. 871 (E.D. Ill. 1976) .............................................................................. 21
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United States v. Tamura,
694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982) ............................................................................. 5, 9, 19
Statutes
Cal. Penal Code § 830.1 .................................................................................................. 16
Other Authorities
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16 .......................................................................................................... 20
Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E) ........................................................................................... 20
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41 .................................................................................................... 4, 5, 7
Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(3) ................................................................................................... 7
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I.
INTRODUCTION
The government’s opposition advocates for government authority to execute a
general warrant of digital devices. The government seized smartphones containing “the
entirety of a person’s digital life,” then—rather than executing the responsiveness
review required by the warrants and seizing only items identified as responsive during
that review—held the devices for trial to ensure that any item it wanted to use as an
exhibit would be seized even if it was not immediately identified as responsive. See
May 21, 2021 Hr’g Tr. at 37 (Ram Decl. Ex. A) (prosecutors “now are in the process of
identifying which piece of information we’ll seize and use as exhibits at trial”). The
government’s approach—if permitted—would undermine the purpose of
responsiveness reviews to mimic on-site searches and enable the twenty-first century
version of the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was intended to prohibit. See
Mot. to Exclude Digital Device Files at 2-3, Dkt. 363 (describing cases forming the
“wellspring” of the Fourth Amendment).
But the search warrants in this case required more. The warrants followed Ninth
Circuit guidance by requiring that the government conduct a responsiveness review as
soon as practicable, implement a search protocol, and shield the prosecutors from
exposure to the data before it was seized. The government violated each of those
search warrant requirements, and its search is therefore effectively warrantless.
Because no exception is advocated by the government (and none applies), the
warrantless search is unconstitutional. The cases cited by the government’s
opposition—involving warrants that did not include the restrictions at issue in this
case—miss the point entirely. When government authority to search and seize is
conditioned on restrictions, the government is obligated to follow those conditions.
Enforcement of the restrictions is all the more important when dealing with vast and
purportedly probative electronic data. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug
Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (CDT III) (emphasizing the
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need for “greater vigilance” in cases of overseizing electronic data); United States v.
Galpin, 720 F.3d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasizing the need for “heightened
sensitivity” to Fourth Amendment requirements in the electronic context).
The government failed to follow and flagrantly disregarded the warrant
requirements. Bound to execute the search warrant by completing a responsiveness
review “as soon as is practicable,” the government had not even begun that
responsiveness review for any of the 49 devices seized when the 120-day deadline
came and went (or one and a half months later when the government identified the four
devices it now seeks to use). The government has no defense to the “as soon as is
practicable” clause. As to the 120-day deadline, the government relies on an
unlawfully obtained extension, which was heard on an ex parte, sealed basis without
any statutory permission and in violation of the defendants’ right to be heard on being
deprived of their property interests for an additional 120 days. The government’s
submission misrepresented the dangers of informing the magistrate judge, claiming that
knowledge that their phone search remained ongoing would somehow imperil the
government’s ability to seek a superseding indictment even though (1) the government
had already informed the defendants of its intent to supersede; and (2) after the
superseding indictment was returned, the government still refused to disclose the
extension and sealing filings, keeping them hidden for another two months.
The government likewise failed to comply with the warrant requirements for a
responsiveness review conducted with a search protocol and conducted by a “search
team” composed of law enforcement personnel, not government attorneys. Both of
these requirements came from Ninth Circuit guidance and the government provides no
excuse for failing to meet them.
The government seized 49 electronic devices. It should be held to a high
standard based on the degree of intrusiveness inherent in that seizure. The gross failure
to minimize that intrusiveness encompassing the failed responsiveness review, the ex
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parte extension, the failure to meet the discovery deadline, and the use of tainted
prosecutors to conduct a sham responsiveness review confirm the need for exclusion.
II.
ARGUMENT
A.
The Government Violated the Warrants’ Requirement that “The
search team shall complete the search as soon as practicable but not to
exceed 120 days from the date of execution of the warrant.”
The opening motion argued that exclusion of the digital device evidence was
proper because the government “violate[d] the terms of the warrant[s]” and therefore
conducted a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Mot. to
Exclude Digital Device Files § II.A, Dkt. 363; id. at 2 (“The government’s delayed
responsiveness review strategy violates the terms of the warrant….”); id. at 4-5 (laying
out the terms of the warrant and concluding that exclusion is merited by the
government’s failure to adhere to the limitations in the warrant).
It is black letter law that “If the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the
terms of a validly issued warrant or the character of the relevant exception from the
warrant requirement, the subsequent seizure is unconstitutional without more.” Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990); Hall v. Tudbury, 35 F. App’x 428, 431 (9th
Cir. 2002) (“Because the officers exceeded the scope of the warrants when then entered
Hall's motel room, [they] caus[ed] a warrantless entry into Hall’s private dwelling, [and
therefore] violated Hall's Fourth Amendment rights.”). This is because “[s]earches and
seizures that exceed the scope of the warrant are considered warrantless….” Simon v.
City of New York, 893 F.3d 83, 94 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Together, these principles yield the
commonsense rule that police officers must abide by the limitations set forth on the face
of a warrant they are executing.”); accord United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876, 882 n.7
(9th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (“The portion of a search that exceeds the scope of a warrant
is, of course, unwarranted.”).
The defense’s § II.A argument is therefore simple: the government violated the
warrants’ limitations, rendering their search “warrantless” and “unconstitutional
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without more.” Rather than respond to the argument about the warrants’ limitations,
the government responded to the argument that it wished the defendants had made:
whether the duration of the government’s search would have been reasonable in the
absence of an explicit search warrant restriction, and whether a search warrant
protocol is required under First Circuit law regarding cases that did not involve a
search warrant requiring such a protocol. With the exception of a dispute regarding
the Paragraph 4.a’s definition of “search team,” the government disregards that it
violated the terms of the warrants and effectively argues that if the warrants did not
contain these terms, then the government’s actions would be constitutional.
Search warrant restrictions are uniquely important in cases involving the mass
seizure of approximately 49 digital devices from family homes. The en banc Ninth
Circuit has encouraged judicial officers to exercise “greater vigilance … in striking the
right balance between the government’s interest in law enforcement and the right of
individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” CDT III, 621 F.3d at
1177. This is because temporary overseizures—while arguably necessary to search
electronic files—“create[] a serious risk that every warrant for electronic information
will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant.”
Id. at 1176. The search warrants in this case exercised vigilance by incorporating
limitations on the government’s execution. The problem is that the government did not
adhere to those limitations.
1.
The Government Failed to Complete a Responsiveness Review
“as soon as is practicable but not to exceed 120 days from the
date of execution of the warrant” and Failed to Secure a Valid
Extension
Rule 41 sets up a two-step process by which the government—instead of sitting
in a defendant’s home while it searches digital devices or bookcases for responsive
items—may temporarily overseize items to identify the portions that fall within the
scope of the warrant’s probable cause. Joint Mot. to Exclude Digital Device Files at 5,
Dkt. 363. This authorization does not guarantee that the government will find every
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single piece of evidence, cf. United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir.
1926) (Hand, J.) (some evidence “cannot be reached, except by a thorough search of all
that the offender has, to allow which would be to countenance exactly what the [Fourth
A]mendment was designed to prevent”); it merely substitutes for an on-site execution
procedure in order to protect individual property owners. See CDT III, 621 F.3d at
1171 (“The point of the Tamura procedures is to maintain the privacy of materials that
are intermingled with seizable materials, and to avoid turning a limited search for
particular information into a general search of office file systems and computer
databases.”). Judges are therefore explicitly empowered to impose deadlines. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 41 adv. comm. note (2009) (noting also the desire to avoid frequent requests
for additional time).
Whether or not those deadlines are constitutionally required is not the issue—at
least not in Argument II.A.1—and every case cited by the government is therefore
inapposite because each of them concerns only the reasonableness of search warrant
executions in cases that did not involve deadlines. The government proposed a
deadline of “as soon as is practicable but not to exceed 120 days from the date of
execution of the warrant.” The magistrate judge signed a warrant commanding the
government to obey that deadline. The government failed to even begin its review
process by the deadline and therefore seized zero (0) documents by the deadline.1 The
post-deadline seizures were therefore warrantless and should not be admitted at trial.
1 Indeed, as of a month and a half after the deadline, on April 26, 2021, the government had not begun
a responsiveness review of any of the four devices it proposed to use at trial. See Dkt. 391-5 (noting
that these devices were still in the filter team’s possession and had not yet gone through the
responsiveness review we now know to have been conducted by the prosecution team). The fact that
the government determined these were the four devices it wished to use before conducting a
responsiveness review to see what if anything could be seized from the devices implies that the
government was accessing the devices beyond the bounds of the warrant. It was not that the
government chose these devices because they were the only ones owned by the defendants; they were
a subset out of dozens of devices owned by the defendants in their own names chosen specifically
because of their contents. The government could not have known their contents without violating the
warrants and conducting a substantive evidentiary review before any responsiveness review.
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The determinative questions before the Court are therefore (a) whether the
government’s post-indictment, ex parte, sealed extension is valid; and (b) if so, whether
the government completed its responsiveness review “as soon as [wa]s practicable.” If
the answer to either question is “No,” then the government violated the terms of the
warrants and the resulting warrantless seizures should be suppressed and excluded from
evidence.
a.
The Extension Was Unlawfully Obtained and Therefore
Invalid
“Traditions of fairness that have long been honored in American jurisprudence
support the strongest possible presumption against ex parte proceedings.” Brock v.
Roadway Express, 481 U.S. 252, 278 (1987). Ex parte proceedings are disfavored both
because they are fundamentally unfair,2 and because they create the risk of erroneous
fact finding.3 For that reason, “Whenever the legal rights of individuals are to be
adjudicated, the presumption is against the use of secret proceedings.” Taylor, 567
F.2d at 1188.
The government effectively concedes that it cannot rebut the presumption against
using secret proceedings. The government’s extension application was a request to
deprive the litigants of a property interest: their right to exclude others from their
property.4 The initial warrant authorized a deprivation of 120 days, and the government
2 In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1187-88 (2d Cir. 1977) (“In camera proceedings are extraordinary
events in the constitutional framework because they deprive the parties against whom they are directed
of the root requirements of due process,” i.e., notice and a hearing); accord United States v. Microsoft,
56 F.3d 1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Ex parte communications generally are disfavored because
they conflict with a fundamental precept of justice: a fair hearing requires a reasonable opportunity to
know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them.”) (citation omitted).
3 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm’n v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“Secrecy is not congenial to truth-
seeking.”).
4 See, e.g., United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (government’s continued
possession of defendant’s data “was a meaningful interference with Ganias’s possessory rights in
those files and constituted a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”), rev’d en banc on
other grounds, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
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sought to institute a further deprivation. The Due Process Clause and fundamental
fairness therefore entitled the defendants to an opportunity to be heard, which, under
the presumption against ex parte proceedings was presumed to be a pre-deprivation
opportunity to be heard. “When, as here, the government comes into possession of
evidence by circumventing or willfully disregarding limitations in a search warrant, it
must not be allowed to benefit from its own wrongdoing by retaining the wrongfully
obtained evidence or any fruits thereof.” CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1174.
As the defendants’ opening brief pointed out, the legal underpinning of the
government’s sealing request was fundamentally flawed. The sealing request cited only
pre-indictment authority and did not reference a single statute under which it was
entitled to delay notice. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(3) (limiting delayed notice to delays
authorized by statute).5 The Opposition does not respond to, and therefore concedes,6
this argument that there is no legal authority for depriving an indicted defendant of
notice and the opportunity to be heard in this context.
The Opposition relies on the sealing application for its argument, cutting and
pasting the very text that misled the reviewing magistrate. The government urged the
magistrate to permit an extended seizure of property without notice or an opportunity to
be heard because making the application public would supposedly jeopardize the
5 The government argues that violations of Rule 41 do not require suppression unless there was
prejudice or deliberate disregard of the rule. Mem. Opp’n to Mot. to Exclude Digital Device Files at
11 n.2, Dkt. 391 (“Opp’n”). To be clear, the defense’s initial motion was to exclude based on
violations of the search warrant’s terms and consequent Fourth Amendment violations, not Rule 41
violations. The government, however, raises a good point: Suppression is independently merited on
the basis that the government violated rule 41, and the defendants hereby move for suppression on that
basis. Even though either would suffice, there was both prejudice and deliberate disregard for Rule
41’s terms. The prejudice is an extension and set of searches that would not have occurred but for the
government’s Rule 41 violations. The deliberate disregard is the government’s deliberate disregard of
Rule 41’s limitation on when notice can be withheld from property holders.
6 Plummer v. Camarillo, No. 19-cv-7489 (PSG), 2019 WL 8226106, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2019)
(“Arguments to which no response is supplied are deemed conceded.”); M.A.C. ex rel Garcia v. City
of Los Angeles, No. 16-cv-4477 (DMG) 2017 WL 10574306, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2017)
(“Plaintiffs do not respond to this point and have thereby conceded it.”); Durham v. Prudential Ins.
Co., No. 16-cv-8202 (ODW), 2017 WL 7661482, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2017) (“Plaintiff does not
respond to this argument, and therefore concedes it.”).
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forthcoming indictment because disclosing the application requesting more time to
conduct the responsiveness review could “alert[] additional subjects that the
investigation is ongoing.” Opp’n at 6 (quoting Dkt. 353 Ex. D). This representation
was nonsensical and the government withheld the information necessary for the
magistrate judge to understand why it was so:
The government withheld the fact that the “ongoing investigation” and intent to
add additional defendants had already been disclosed to the defendants.
The government withheld the fact that the defendants had already received not
just the search warrant but the underlying search warrant affidavits, which
contained far more information about the government’s investigation than the
application for additional time.
The government’s application had nothing to do with the additional subjects. It
concerned only extended time to search devices seized from the original four
defendants.
If the protective order was sufficient to ensure that the defendants did not share
the above information with the additional subjects—including the government’s
own statement that the investigation was ongoing—then it would, a fortiori, be
sufficient here, where the application had nothing to do with and did not indicate
a forthcoming indictment.
The government’s omissions and misrepresentations should not be allowed to accrue to
their advantage. To the contrary, in CDT II, the en banc Ninth Circuit instructed that
“omitting such highly relevant information altogether is inconsistent with the
government’s duty of candor in presenting a warrant application. A lack of candor in
this or any other aspect of the warrant application shall bear heavily against the
government in the calculus of any subsequent motion to return or suppress the seized
data.” United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 998-99 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (CDT II), opinion revised and superseded, CDT III. So too here.
The government engaged in disfavored ex parte, sealed litigation to deprive individual
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litigants of their property without due process or fundamental fairness. The
government should be held to the highest of standards and under any objective reading,
its submission failed to meet those standards.
But even if all of those points were not present, the government’s argument is
directly contradicted by the fact that it continued to hide its extension application and
sealing application for months after the superseding indictment was returned on March
9, 2021.7 If the justification for proceeding without notice or an opportunity to be heard
was the risk of endangering the superseding indictment—a dubious proposition for the
bulleted reasons above—then that justification was gone on March 9, 2021. Why did
the government continue to withhold the submissions from the property owners for 65
more days until May 13, 2021? There was never a need for the government to be heard
without notice to the property holders. The government just went ahead and did it
anyways because it had ceased thinking about the property holders’ rights.
b.
Regardless of Any Extension, the Government Failed to
Complete Its Review “as soon as practicable”
The requirement to complete a responsiveness review “as soon as practicable”
was consistent with the laudatory requirement to execute warrants “in a manner that
minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.” United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d
591, 595-96 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11
7 The government repeatedly chastises the defendants for not making a motion until the government
stopped obstinately withholding the core evidence for the motion: a description of the responsiveness
review and the submissions made to the Court. Prior to May 2020, the defendants attempted to inject
this issue into the Motion to Suppress Search Warrant Evidence, but the government refused to
disclose the status of its responsiveness review or its extension-related submissions. The defendants,
thinking that the responsiveness review had already been completed, asked the government for the
results of that review repeatedly. During the Friday May 21 hearing, the government finally admitted
on the record that it had not yet conducted a responsiveness review. May 21 Hrg Tr. at 29-30, 37-38
(attached hereto as Ram Decl. Ex. A) (“[We] now are in the process of identifying which pieces of
information we'll seize and use as exhibits at trial. … we’re in the process of making final decisions
about which ones we will use at trial.”).
during the Friday May 21 hearing, the defendants committed to filing by Monday May 24 and they
did so.
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(1976))). The government was required to move forward as quickly as possible, and in
that respect, it utterly failed. The government chose to seize approximately 49 digital
devices under the warrants at issue. The government did not begin a responsiveness
review—the review that is designed to mimic an on-site review of an item in a person’s
house—of any of the 49 devices within the 120-day period in the warrant. The
government concedes this fact; while the Opposition deceptively states that “only three
devices” had been subjected to the responsiveness review, Opp’n at 3, each of those
three devices were from the October 19, 2020 tainted Miami airport stop, not the
November 5 search warrant execution.8 This is not a case where a litigant exercised
best efforts but came up short; this is a case where—despite an explicit warrant
condition to the contrary—the government showed no sense of urgency and made no
effort to minimize the duration of its property seizure by completing its responsiveness
review as soon as practicable.
In their opening motion, the defendants explained how the government waited
two months after seizing the devices before even sending them to CART lab (the
government’s technical team), which violated the warrant provision requiring a
responsiveness review as soon as practicable. Since that motion was filed, the
government has produced additional documents revealing (at best) lethargy and the
utter misrepresentation that the January 6, 2021 Capitol fallout (months after the search
warrants were executed) had any effect on CART’s work, which was completed within
three weeks. To put it simply, the delay was the government trial team and FBI agents’
fault. When CART began receiving requests from the FBI agents and prosecutors in
January 2021, it promptly fulfilled those requests.
8 The three devices are identified as “black iPhone (model number A1660), barcode E6701411; yellow
iPhone, barcode E6701408; and mint green iPhone, barcode E4973575.” Dkt. 363 Ex. C ¶ 8.a (under
seal). Each of these three devices is listed in the table of the six digital devices seized at the Miami
airport on October 19, for which the government obtained a warrant on November 12, 2020. Id. ¶ 5
(table rows 5-7).
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The government does not defend its failure to begin reviewing the devices,
instead pointing to the extension submission and conclusively stating “[the d]efendants
do not seriously challenge” the extension’s rationale. To be clear, the government is
wrong. The extension’s rationales do not stand up to any level of scrutiny, particularly
in a case in which in the government was given 120 days instead of the more typical
60-day review period. See, e.g., CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1168-69 (noting that warrant gave
government computer personnel “a reasonable period of time not to exceed 60 days” to
complete responsiveness review of data seized from lab servers). The extension blames
two factors for its failure to complete (or even begin) the responsiveness reviews:
(1) CART and forensic processing; and (2) the filter review.
With respect to CART, the government’s March 4, 2021 submission complained
that CART’s forensic review “is time consuming. Agents cannot simply turn on
computers and review their contents because merely turning on a computer and
reviewing its contents changes the data on the computer. … The review also must be
conducted by agents who have received specialized training to ensure that the review is
done thoroughly and in a forensically sound fashion. This process takes substantial
time.” Dkt. 363 Ex. C ¶ 8.b. As a result, there was “a backlog in the imaging and
review process” that was exacerbated by the CART forensic team’s resources being
“stretched due to the huge influx of devices that were seized during investigations
arising out of the January 6, 2021 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C.”
Id. ¶ 8.d. Those were the government’s sealed, ex parte representations. But here are
the actual facts:
The government chose to execute search warrants at six homes on November 5,
2020 with the knowledge that an indictment had to be returned by November 17,
2020.
The government chose to use a dragnet approach during those November 5, 2020
search warrant executions, seizing approximately 49 devices over objection.
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For the rest of November 2020, the government made no effort to process the
November 5 devices.
For all of December 2020, the government made no effort to process the
November 5 devices, instead processing only the October 19 Miami devices from
December 16-21, 2020 (Dkt. 363-7 at 2).
The first request to process the November 5 devices produced in discovery
occurred on January 4, 2021, two months after the warrants were executed. The
majority of the November 5 devices appear to be processed in two days (January
11 and 27, 2021).
The “four digital devices” highlighted by the government9 were processed and
ready for review by January 27, 2021:
Device
Facts from Discovery
1B17
The request was not submitted until January 8, 2021. Ram Decl.
Ex. B (DOJ_PROD_0000164355). The device was not delivered
to CART until Jan. 14, 2021. Ram Decl. Ex. C
(DOJ_PROD_0000163721). Processing took 163 minutes;
completed on Jan. 27, 2021. Ram Decl. Ex. D
(DOJ_PROD_0000163719).
1B21
No passcode; processing completed as part of the Jan. 11, 2021
batch. Ram Decl. Ex. E at 1-4 (DOJ_PROD_0000163697).
1B81
Processing took 69 minutes; completed on Jan. 27, 2021. Ram
Decl. Ex. F (DOJ_PROD_0000163680).
1B85
Processing took 14 minutes; completed on Jan. 27, 2021. Ram
Decl. Ex. G (DOJ_PROD_0000163663)
9 Opp’n at 3. The government focuses on “four digital devices” instead of the 49 digital devices it
seized because at the end of April 2021, the government stated that it did not intend to use the
remaining 45 digital devices.
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As of April 26, 2021, the government had not begun the responsiveness review
of any of these four devices. See Dkt. 391-5 (noting that the filter team had the
devices).
Sometime between April 26, 2021 and May 26, 2021, the government’s trial
team lawyers conducted a responsiveness review.
The CART processing of these four devices was not requested until approximately
January 8, 2021 and it was completed by January 27, 2021. Yet somehow, the
responsiveness review had not even begun by April 26, 2021.
With respect to the government’s filter review excuse, that can be dismissed out
of hand. Ninth Circuit precedent has endorsed the practice of using a filter team to
conduct the responsiveness review, thereby obviating the need for a filter review. See,
e.g., CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1171-72 (noting that warrant required personnel uninvolved
in case to engage in responsiveness review and that this was an “important procedure”
“obviously designed to reassure the issuing magistrate that the government wouldn’t
sweep up large quantities of data”); In re Search Warrant (Cunnius), 770 F. Supp. 2d
1138, 1149-50 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (denying search warrant application in large part for
failure to utilize independent filter team). The government chose to ignore the Ninth
Circuit’s advice as to best practices and it must live with the consequences. Moreover,
the government has failed to demonstrate that any filter review actually caused the
months-long delay in this case. From January 27 through April 26, the defendants
received no communications about a filter review of the devices, no requests for a list
of filter terms or lawyers, and no indications that certain devices were clearing filter
and being rolled to the responsiveness review team.10 The proposition of delay due to a
filter review makes no sense in light of the facts, which demonstrate that the
10 Indeed, it would have been impossible for the trial team to select these four devices on April 26,
2021—which were not the only devices owned by the defendants and registered in their names—
unless they had already had access to the four devices’ contents. The trial team must have accessed
the four devices sometime before April 26 even though the filter team did not finish its purported
review until after that date.
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government had pre-filter access to the devices’ contents. Even if a filter review had
caused delay, however, it would be the government’s fault for injecting an additional
layer of review that could otherwise be conducted simultaneously with the
responsiveness review consistent with Ninth Circuit’s guidance. The government
decided to disregard Ninth Circuit guidance and did so contrary to the warrant’s “as
soon as practicable” requirement. Now the government must live with the
consequences of its decision.
2.
The Government Violated the Warrants’ Search Protocol
Requirement
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly encouraged judges to issue warrants requiring
search protocols designed to identify responsive documents without general rummaging
through electronic data. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1179 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring); accord
CDT II, 579 F.3d at 999; United States v. Phua, No. 14-cr-249 et al., 2015 WL 1281603
(D. Nev. Mar. 20, 2015) (“The court will not approve a search warrant for
electronically stored information that does not contain an appropriate protocol
delineating what procedures will be followed to address these Fourth Amendment
issues.”). The practice of engaging in a general review of the device’s files “should not
be used without specific authorization in the warrant ….” CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1179.
A search protocol is “an explanation of the scientific methodology the government will
use to separate what is permitted to be seized from what is not, will explain to the Court
how the government will decide where it is going to search.” In re Apple iPhone, IMEI
013888003738427, 31 F. Supp. 3d 159, 166 (D.D.C. 2014).
The search warrant in this case contained a search protocol requirement: a
defined search team was required to “conduct the search only by using search protocols
specifically chosen to identify only the specific items to be seized under the warrant.”
Warrants Attach. B ¶ 4.b. Thus, the government did not need ongoing court-approval
for its protocol, but it did need to have a protocol and the protocol had to be geared
towards separating files and identifying only responsive files. In United States v.
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Bonner, the court imposed a similar restriction, explaining that search protocols must be
“reasonably directed to identify data within the scope of the warrant ….” No. 12-cr-
3429, 2013 WL 3829404, at *19 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2013). Because the government’s
protocols amounted to exploratory rummaging, the court held that the government
failed to adhere to the warrant and violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.
In this case, the government has not followed the search protocol requirement at
all. The government’s March 4 extension request misconstrued the search protocol
requirement to affect only the pre-responsiveness review activities. Extension App’n
¶ 7, Dkt. 363 Ex. C (under seal). The government’s May 31 opposition ignored the
need for a search protocol requirement altogether, stating only “The government
reviewed the devices for documents that fall within the scope of the warrant.” Opp’n at
14. The government has effectively conceded that it failed to comply with the search
protocol requirement in the warrants. Suppression is therefore appropriate.
The government argues that its lack of a working search protocol does not
require suppression, relying on the First Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Aboshady,
951 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2020), a case in which no responsiveness review ever occurred and
the warrant imposed no search protocol requirement. Setting aside whether Aboshady
was correctly decided, it is completely inapplicable, because here the warrant did
require a responsiveness review and a search protocol.11 Every seizure the government
made violated the warrants’ search protocol requirement because there was no search
protocol. Therefore, under the government’s own tortured logic, suppression is
merited.
11 The Ninth Circuit has not endorsed—and would never endorse—the warrant or law enforcement
practice in Aboshady, which permits permanent seizures of entire email accounts without a
responsiveness review. See CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1179 (noting that such rummaging is prohibited
absent specific authorization in the warrant).
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3.
The Government Utilized Prosecutors Who Were Not Part of
the “Search Team” as Defined in ¶ 4.a of the Warrants
The government concedes that prosecutors have conducted the responsiveness
review. See Opp’n at 14. The sole dispute is, therefore, whether the warrants’
definition of “the search team” (¶ 4.a) included the prosecutors.
The warrants are clear that only “the search team” will conduct the
responsiveness review: “In searching …. [t]he search team will conduct the search only
by using search protocols specifically chosen to identify only specific items to be seized
under this warrant. []The search team may …. [list of permitted methods of executing
responsiveness review].” Warrants Attach. B ¶¶ 4, 4.b, 4.b.i-.iii. “The ‘search team’”
is a defined term meaning “law enforcement personnel” and “individuals assisting law
enforcement personnel.” Id. ¶ 4.a. If the search team determines that the device
contains data falling within the scope of the items to be seized, “the government” may
retain the entire device but may only access those items that have been seized. Id. ¶ 4.f.
“The review of the electronic data obtained pursuant to this warrant …. may include, in
addition to law enforcement officers and agents [i.e., the search team], attorneys for the
government,” including the prosecutors. Id. ¶ 5 (emphasis and bracketed text added);
see also Giever v. City of Las Cruces, No. 08-cv-155, 2010 WL 11626776, at *14
(D.N.M. Jan. 12, 2010) (prosecutor not considered a “law enforcement officer” under
state law); United States v. Powell, No. 19-cr-216, 2020 WL 2199758, at *2 (N.D. Ohio
May 6, 2020) (state law definition of “law enforcement officer” for warrant execution
purposes described as an officer or employee of an agency or subdivision with authority
to arrest individuals who violate the law); cf. Cal. Penal Code § 830.1 (defining “peace
officers” to include investigators in district attorneys’ offices and attorney general but
not the line prosecutors). The only constitutional option for an “independent review”
from the compulsory responsiveness review would be if it is a review of the results of
the responsiveness review, meaning a review of the data seized or obtained through the
responsiveness review. In essence, paragraph four mandates a responsiveness review
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conducted by the search team (which does not include attorneys for the government)
and paragraph five says that the results may be given as a whole (unremarkably) to the
attorneys for the government. Neither paragraph says that the search team includes
attorneys for the government.
The warrants’ exclusion of government attorneys from the responsiveness review
is consistent with Ninth Circuit guidance. In CDT III, two district court judges held
that the government had failed to adhere to an “important procedure in the warrant,
namely that ‘computer personnel’ conduct the initial review of the seized data and
segregate materials not the object of the warrant for return ….” 621 F.3d at 1171. The
en banc Court described this restriction with approval, noting that the use of a case
agent instead of a forensic specialist to conduct the responsiveness review “supports the
suspicion that representations in the warrant about the necessity for broad authority to
seize materials were designed to give the government access to the full list of
professional baseball players and their confidential drug testing records.” Id. at 1172.
As here, the government in CDT argued that it did not violate the warrant
“because the warrant didn’t specify that only computer personnel could examine the
seized files, and the case agent was therefore entitled to view them alongside the
computer specialist.” Id. The Court rejected this argument as “sophistry,” stating “[i]t
would make no sense to represent that computer personnel would be used to segregate
data if investigatory personnel were also going to access all the data seized. What
would be the point? … the representation in the warrant that computer personnel would
be used to examine and segregate the data was obviously designed to reassure the
issuing magistrate that the government wouldn't sweep up large quantities of data in the
hope of dredging up information it could not otherwise lawfully seize. … This was an
obvious case of deliberate overreaching by the government in an effort to seize data as
to which it lacked probable cause.” Id.
Paragraph 4 of the warrants here spent twelve subparagraphs describing a
“search” executed by a defined “search team.” Paragraph 5 provides that after the
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investigating agency delivers a copy of all of the seized or copied data to the attorneys
for the government, government attorneys and others not contained within the
definition of the search team may engage in “independent review.” The government
argues that Paragraph 5 should be read as authorizing a second, independent
responsiveness review, separate and apart from the “search” conducted by the “search
team” in Paragraph 4. The government’s proposed reading of the warrant would
eviscerate that definition and implicitly expand the search team—without using the
word “search team” or even “search”—to include any government personnel assisting
in the investigation regardless of role. Cf. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1171 (“One phrase in
the warrant cannot be read as eviscerating the other parts…”). A more logical reading
of the warrant is that—consistent with Ninth Circuit guidance—the warrant shields the
government attorneys from the raw, unfiltered devices and permits them to conduct an
“independent review” of the data that was “obtained pursuant to th[e] warrant,” i.e.,
obtained through the responsiveness review. Id. ¶ 5. As in CDT III, if the attorneys
were included in the search team executing the search warrant pursuant to ¶ 4.a, then it
would be pure sophistry to withhold them from the definition of “search team” and wait
until after ¶ 4.h dictates what occurs “[a]fter the completion of the search.”
B.
The Government’s Search Warrant Execution Was Unreasonable
Because It Amounts to a General Warrant
The government does not argue that its conduct is distinct from the execution of
a general warrant. Instead, it argues that it is allowed to delay responsiveness reviews
until trial because “because the act of copying devices essentially “freezes” the
evidence in time.” Opp’n at 11. The government’s argument, if accepted, would mean
that law enforcement is free to execute general warrants.
The government’s argument begins with a flawed premise: “the objective of a
search warrant is to provide prosecutors with evidence to use at trial.” Opp’n at 14. It
is not. The objective of a search warrant is to make lawful the otherwise unlawful
seizure of private property for the purpose of an authorized investigation. More to the
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point, the objective of a responsiveness review has nothing to do with trial evidence and
everything to do with protecting individual liberty. The objective of a responsiveness
review is to ensure that where Fourth Amendment rights are greatest—mass seizures of
private digital information—the government interests in things like trial evidence are
not paramount and are instead balanced against individual interests in privacy and
limiting government intrusions.
The en banc Ninth Circuit in CDT III provided on-point direction regarding the
purpose of responsiveness reviews: “The point of the Tamura procedures is to maintain
the privacy of materials that are intermingled with seizable materials, and to avoid
turning a limited search for particular information into a general search of office file
systems and computer databases.” 621 F.3d at 1170. The Ninth Circuit was
particularly concerned with the idea that the lack of stringent responsiveness review
rules would “create a powerful incentive for [law enforcement] to seize more rather
than less … Let’s take everything back to the lab, have a good look around and see
what we might stumble upon. This would make a mockery of Tamura and render the
carefully crafted [warrant] safeguards in the Central District warrant a nullity. All three
judges below rejected this construction, and with good reason.” CDT III, 621 F.3d at
1170 (en banc).
The government’s requests for broad authorization “creates a serious risk that
every warrant for electronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant,
rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant.” CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1176. If the
government can seize whole digital devices and retain them until it has finished
selecting its trial evidence, then the government can execute general warrants on digital
devices. The wrongfulness of a general warrant is not that the government gains
possession of a broad swath of information; it is that the government can use whatever
it wants from that broad swath against the information’s owner. That wrongfulness is
baked into the government’s search warrant execution strategy in this case and merits
suppression.
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C.
Exclusion is Proper Under Rule 16 and the Discovery Cut-Off Order
The discovery dispute comes down to a sleight of hand by the government.
During the May 21, 2021 hearing, the government argued to the Court that “the
defendants have all of this information, because we made available the report of the
phones … a searchable report.”12 This argument, however, rests on the government’s
faulty premise that the request for the portions of those phones seized from the
defendants is “essentially [a request to] identif[y] which documents we’re going to use
at trial.” Id. at 39. The government is wrong. The production of 49 entire digital
devices—terabytes worth of data without identification or individualized load files
enabling file-specific review, more than any non-government counsel could possibly
review—does not carry the government’s discovery obligation to produce the portions
of those devices obtained by the trial team.
Rule 16’s plain text requires not just that the government produce whole items
but that the government produce the “portions” of any items in the government’s
possession, custody, or control that the government has “obtained from” the defendant
or that are material to preparing the defense. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i), (iii). The
government cites to no precedent stating that it can produce 49 digital devices—even
though it only seized (and thereby obtained) a “portion[]” of those files. See Mot. to
Exclude at 15 (summarizing proceedings in United States v. Sadr that culminated in
government’s agreement to forgo similarly late-identified portions based on Rule 16).
While no prejudice is necessary to enforce the Court’s Discovery Order, see
Mot. to Exclude at 14-15 (collecting cases), the prejudice here is severe. The purpose
of the Court’s discovery order was to ensure that the defense would have time to
12 The reports are not functionally searchable. Due to the size of the reports (up to 60,000 pages),
word searches cause computer crashes. The reports have therefore required linear review to the extent
they have been reviewable at all. Regardless, the reports were produced as unlabeled needles in a
haystack of 49 digital devices that were not identified by code, telephone number, or similar device-
specific information. See, e.g., Feb. 1, 2021 Discovery Ltr. (production of 20 digital devices without
identifying information) (attached hereto as Ram Decl. Ex. H).
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prepare for trial involving over 20 TB of discovery. The defense has spent months
preparing and just over two weeks before trial, the government dumps what it claims is
“overwhelming evidence” (Opp’n at 1) that was neither present in the indictment, used
in the grand jury, or cited in early descriptions of the case. The defense must therefore
pivot all of its resources at the last second and struggle to prepare for what has
effectively become a trial by ambush. The Court has discretion to prevent this and hold
the government to the evidence that it produced by the discovery deadline.
D.
The Electronic Files Should Be Excluded Due to Kastigar Taint
Infecting the Review Process
The government’s responsiveness review was conducted by the same lawyers
who were tainted by information derived from compelled statements months earlier.
Kastigar taint is like ink. It does not dissipate with time; it only spreads. The
government claims that it was not influenced in any way by its tainted impressions of
the case. Opp’n at 18. Kastigar is a “heavy burden” particularly because the
government must prove that the tainted information was effectively “obliterated from
the prosecutor’s mind,” and barring such proof, the prosecutor’s actions are tainted.
United States v. McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Rice,
421 F. Supp. 871, 876 (E.D. Ill. 1976) (noting that “even an unconscious reaction is not
permitted in cases of this nature”); see also United States v. Harris, 973 F.2d 333, 338
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting that even if total obliteration is not required, dismissal was
proper because tainted information “may have played some part” in the selection of
which files to review,” may have made the government “more likely to find [a
probative] file,” or may have aided the government in understanding the file); United
States v. Mapes, 59 M.J. 60, 70 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (noting need to scrutinize witness’s
“motives and state of mind in cooperation” due to potential effects from tainted
information). The government’s responsiveness review—conducted between April 26,
2021 and May 26, 2021 was irreparably tainted by months of exposure to tainted
information.
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III.
CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment’s purpose is to prohibit general warrants. The Ninth
Circuit has warned of the “serious risk that every warrant for electronic information
will be come, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment irrelevant.”
CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1176. The warrants in this case contained provisions meant to
mitigate that serious risk. The government failed to adhere to some provisions and
deceived the Court to evade other provisions while boxing the defendants out of the
process altogether. Exclusion of the seized evidence is the only remedy that will
impress upon the government that it must adhere to the terms of the warrants it secures.
Dated: June 7, 2021
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Ashwin J. Ram
Ashwin J. Ram (SBN 227513)
aram@steptoe.com
Michael A. Keough (SBN 327037)
mkeough@steptoe.com
Meghan L. Newcomer (pro hac vice)
mnewcomer@steptoe.com
Nicholas P. Silverman (pro hac vice)
nsilverman@steptoe.com
STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1900
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 439-9400
Facsimile: (213) 439-9599
Counsel for Defendant Richard Ayvazyan
[SIGNATURES CONTINUE
ON NEXT PAGE]
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/s/ John L. Littrell
John L. Littrell (SBN 221601)
jlittrell@bklwlaw.com
Ryan V. Fraser (SBN 272196)
rfraser@bklwlaw.com
BIENERT KATZMAN LITTRELL
WILLIAMS, LLP
601 W. 5th Street, Suite 720
Los Angeles, CA 90071
Telephone: (213) 528-3400
Facsimile: (949) 369-3701
Counsel for Defendant Marietta Terabelian
/s/ Thomas A. Mesereau Jr.
Thomas A. Mesereau Jr. (SBN 91182)
mesereau@mesereaulaw.com
MESEREAU LAW GROUP, P.C.
10100 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 300
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Telephone: (310) 651-9960
Jennifer J. Wirsching (SBN 263141)
wirschinglaw@outlook.com
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1935 Alpha Rd, Suite 216
Glendale, CA 91208
Telephone: (424) 902-9280
Counsel for Defendant Artur Ayvazyan
/s/ Fred G. Minassian
Fred G. Minassian (SBN 170974)
fgminassian@yahoo.com
LAW OFFICES OF FRED G. MINASSIAN, INC.
101 N. Brand Ave, Suite 1970
Glendale, CA 91203
Telephone: (818) 240-2444
Counsel for Defendant Tamara Dadyan
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SIGNATURE ATTESTATION
Pursuant to Local Rule 5-4.3.4(a)(i), the filer attests that all signatories listed, and
on whose behalf the filing is submitted, concur in the filing’s content and have
authorized the filing.
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