Court filing

Joint Proposed Jury Instructions — USA v. Alexandra Acosta (Dkt. 54.1)

Filed May 23, 2024 in USA v. Alexandra Acosta; one of 136 filings from this case.

Record facts

Court	U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida
Filed	2024-05-23

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 0:23-cr-60170-RNS · Doc. 54-1 · 2024-05-23 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-60170-CR-SCOLA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

ALEXANDRA ACOSTA,

Defendant.
/

JOINT PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 1 of 56

P1
Preliminary Instructions – Criminal Cases
Members of the Jury:
Now that you have been sworn, I need to explain some basic
principles about a criminal trial and your duty as jurors. These are
preliminary instructions. At the end of the trial I will give you more
detailed instructions.
Duty of jury:
It will be your duty to decide what happened so you can
determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the crime
charged in the superseding indictment. At the end of the trial, I will
explain the law that you must follow to reach your verdict. You must
follow the law as I explain it to you even if you do not agree with the
law.
What is evidence:
You must decide the case solely on the evidence presented here
in the courtroom. Evidence can come in many forms. It can be
testimony about what someone saw or heard or smelled. It can be an
exhibit admitted into evidence. It can be someone’s opinion. Some
evidence proves a fact indirectly, such as a witness who saw wet grass
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 2 of 56

outside and people walking into the courthouse carrying wet
umbrellas. Indirect evidence, sometimes called circumstantial
evidence, is simply a chain of circumstances that proves a fact. As
far as the law is concerned, it makes no difference whether evidence
is direct or indirect. You may choose to believe or disbelieve either
kind and should give every piece of evidence whatever weight you
think it deserves.
What is not evidence:
Certain things are not evidence and must not be considered. I
will list them for you now:
• Statements and arguments of the lawyers. In their
opening statements and closing arguments, the lawyers
will discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence;
• Questions and objections of the lawyers. The lawyers’
questions are not evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers
are evidence. You should not think that something is true
just because a lawyer’s question suggests that it is. For
instance, if a lawyer asks a witness, “you saw the
defendant hit his sister, didn’t you?” – that question is no
evidence whatsoever of what the witness saw or what the
defendant did, unless the witness agrees with it.
There are rules of evidence that control what can be received
into evidence. When a lawyer asks a question or offers an exhibit and
a lawyer on the other side thinks that it is not permitted by the rules
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 3 of 56

of evidence, that lawyer may object. If I overrule the objection, then
the question may be answered or the exhibit received. If I sustain the
objection, then the question cannot be answered, and the exhibit
cannot be received. Whenever I sustain an objection to a question,
you must ignore the question and not try to guess what the answer
would have been.
Sometimes I may order that evidence be stricken and that you
disregard or ignore the evidence. That means that when you are
deciding the case, you must not consider that evidence.
Some evidence is admitted only for a limited purpose. When I
instruct you that an item of evidence has been admitted for a limited
purpose, you must consider it only for that limited purpose and no
other.
Credibility of witnesses:
In reaching your verdict, you may have to decide what testimony
to believe and what testimony not to believe. You may believe
everything a witness says, or part of it, or none of it. In considering
the testimony of any witness, you may take into account:
• The opportunity and ability of the witness to see or hear
or know the things testified to;
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 4 of 56

• The witness’s memory;
• The witness’s manner while testifying;
• The witness’s interest in the outcome of the case and any
bias or prejudice;
• Whether other evidence contradicted the witness’s testimony;
• The reasonableness of the witness’s testimony in light of
all the evidence; and
• Any other factors that bear on believability.
I will give you additional guidelines for determining
credibility of witnesses at the end of the case.
Rules for criminal cases:
As you know, this is a criminal case. There are three basic rules
about a criminal case that you must keep in mind.
First, the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
The superseding indictment against the defendant brought by the
government is only an accusation, nothing more. It is not proof of
guilt or anything else. The defendant therefore starts out with a clean
slate.
Second, the burden of proof is on the government until the very
end of the case. The defendant has no burden to prove her innocence
or to present any evidence, or to testify. Since the defendant has the
right to remain silent and may choose whether to testify, you cannot
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 5 of 56

legally put any weight on a defendant’s choice not to testify. It is not
evidence.
Third, the government must prove the defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. I will give you further instructions on this point
later, but bear in mind that the level of proof required is high.
Conduct of the jury:
Our law requires jurors to follow certain instructions regarding
their personal conduct in order to help assure a just and fair trial. I
will now give you those instructions:
1. Do not talk, either among yourselves or with anyone
else, about anything related to the case. You may tell the
people with whom you live and your employer that you are
a juror and give them information about when you will be
required to be in court, but you may not discuss with them
or anyone else anything related to the case.
2. Do not, at any time during the trial, request, accept,
agree to accept, or discuss with any person, any type of
payment or benefit in return for supplying any information
about the trial.
3. You must promptly tell me about any incident you know
of involving an attempt by any person to improperly
influence you or any member of the jury.
4. Do not visit or view the premises or place where the
charged crime was allegedly committed, or any other
premises or place involved in the case. And you must not
use Internet maps or Google Earth or any other program
or device to search for a view of any location discussed in
the testimony.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 6 of 56

5. Do not read, watch, or listen to any accounts or
discussions related to the case which may be reported by
newspapers, television, radio, the Internet, or any other
news media.
6. Do not attempt to research any fact, issue, or law related
to this case, whether by discussions with others, by library
or Internet research, or by any other means or source.
In this age of instant electronic communication and research, I
want to emphasize that in addition to not talking face to face with
anyone about the case, you must not communicate with anyone
about the case by any other means, including by telephone, text
messages, email, Internet chat, chat rooms, blogs, or social-
networking websites and apps such as Facebook, Instagram,
Snapchat, YouTube, or Twitter. You may not use any similar
technology of social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned
it here.
You must not provide any information about the case to anyone
by any means whatsoever, and that includes posting information
about the case, or what you are doing in the case, on any device or
Internet site, including blogs, chat rooms, social websites, or any
other means.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 7 of 56

You also must not use Google or otherwise search for any
information about the case, or the law that applies to the case, or the
people involved in the case, including the defendant, the witnesses,
the lawyers, or the judge. It is important that you understand why
these rules exist and why they are so important:
Our law does not permit jurors to talk with anyone else about
the case, or to permit anyone to talk to them about the case, because
only jurors are authorized to render a verdict. Only you have been
found to be fair and only you have promised to be fair – no one else
is so qualified.
Our law also does not permit jurors to talk among themselves
about the case until the court tells them to begin deliberations,
because premature discussions can lead to a premature final
decision.
Our law also does not permit you to visit a place discussed in
the testimony. First, you can’t be sure that the place is in the same
condition as it was on the day in question. Second, even if it were in
the same condition, once you go to a place discussed in the testimony
to evaluate the evidence in light of what you see, you become a
witness, not a juror. As a witness, you may now have a mistaken view
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 8 of 56

of the scene that neither party may have a chance to correct. That is
not fair.
Finally, our law requires that you not read or listen to any news
accounts of the case, and that you not attempt to research any fact,
issue, or law related to the case. Your decision must be based solely
on the testimony and other evidence presented in this courtroom.
Also, the law often uses words and phrases in special ways, so it’s
important that any definitions you hear come only from me, and not
from any other source. It wouldn’t be fair to the parties for you to
base your decision on some reporter’s view or opinion, or upon other
information you acquire outside the courtroom.
These rules are designed to help guarantee a fair trial, and our
law accordingly sets forth serious consequences if the rules are not
followed. I trust that you understand and appreciate the importance
of following these rules, and in accord with your oath and promise, I
know you will do so.
Taking notes:
Moving on now, if you wish, you may take notes to help you
remember what witnesses said. If you do take notes, please keep
them to yourself until you and your fellow jurors go to the jury room
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 9 of 56

to decide the case. Do not let note-taking distract you so that you do
not hear other answers by witnesses. When you leave the courtroom,
your notes should be left in the jury room. Whether or not you take
notes, you should rely on your own memory of what was said. Notes
are to assist your memory only. They are not entitled to any greater
weight than your memory or impression about the testimony.
Course of the trial:
The trial will now begin. First, the government will make an
opening statement, which is simply an outline to help you
understand the evidence as it comes in. Next, the defendant’s
attorney may, but does not have to, make an opening statement.
Opening statements are neither evidence nor argument.
The government will then present its witnesses, and counsel for
the defendant may cross-examine them. Following the government’s
case, the defendant may, if she wishes, present witnesses whom the
government may cross-examine. After all the evidence is in, the
attorneys will present their closing arguments to summarize and
interpret the evidence for you, and I will instruct you on the law. After
that, you will go to the jury room to decide your verdict.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 10 of 56

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-60170-CR-SCOLA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

ALEXANDRA ACOSTA,

Defendant.
/

COURT’S INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY

Members of the Jury:
It’s my duty to instruct you on the rules of law that you must
use in deciding this case. After I’ve completed these instructions, you
will go to the jury room and begin your discussions – what we call
your deliberations.
You must decide whether the Government has proved the
specific facts necessary to find the Defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 11 of 56

B2.1
The Duty to Follow Instructions And the Presumption of
Innocence

Your decision must be based only on the evidence presented
here. You must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy for
or prejudice against the Defendant or the Government.
You must follow the law as I explain it – even if you do not agree
with the law – and you must follow all of my instructions as a whole.
You must not single out or disregard any of the Court's instructions
on the law.
The superseding indictment or formal charge against a
defendant isn’t evidence of guilt. The law presumes every defendant
is innocent. The Defendant does not have to prove her innocence or
produce any evidence at all. The Government must prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. If it fails to do so, you must find the
Defendant not guilty.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L. Ed. 2d
368 (1970) (The due process clause protects all criminal defendants
“against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged.”); see also Harvell v. Nagle, 58 F.3d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir.
1995), reh’g denied, 70 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 1995).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 12 of 56

B2.2
The Duty to Follow Instructions and the Presumption of
Innocence
When a Defendant Does Not Testify
Your decision must be based only on the evidence presented
during the trial. You must not be influenced in any way by either
sympathy for or prejudice against the Defendant or the Government.
You must follow the law as I explain it – even if you do not agree
with the law – and you must follow all of my instructions as a whole.
You must not single out or disregard any of the Court's instructions
on the law.
The superseding indictment or formal charge against a
defendant isn’t evidence of guilt. The law presumes every defendant
is innocent. The Defendant does not have to prove her innocence or
produce any evidence at all. A defendant does not have to testify, and
you cannot consider in any way the fact that the Defendant did not
testify. The Government must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
If it fails to do so, you must find the Defendant not guilty.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1539 (11th Cir. 1992) (Birch,
J., concurring) (“defendant who does not testify is entitled to
instruction that no inference may be drawn from that election”); see
also United States v. Veltman, 6 F.3d 1483, 1493 (11th Cir. 1993)
(Court was “troubled” by “absence of instruction on the presumption
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 13 of 56

of innocence at the beginning of the trial…. Although the court
charged the jury on the presumption before they retired to deliberate,
we believe it extraordinary for a trial to progress to that stage with
nary a mention of this jurisprudential bedrock.”).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 14 of 56

B3
Definition of “Reasonable Doubt”

The Government's burden of proof is heavy, but it doesn’t have
to prove a Defendant's guilt beyond all possible doubt. The
Government's proof only has to exclude any “reasonable doubt”
concerning the Defendant's guilt.
A “reasonable doubt” is a real doubt, based on your reason and
common sense after you’ve carefully and impartially considered all
the evidence in the case.
“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt” is proof so convincing that
you would be willing to rely and act on it without hesitation in the
most important of your own affairs. If you are convinced that the
Defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, say so.
If you are not convinced, say so.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451 (11th Cir. 1993), opinion
readopted on rehearing, 5 F.3d 495 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1054, 114 S. Ct. 1615, 128 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1994) approves this
definition and instruction concerning reasonable doubt; see also
United States v. Morris, 647 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1981); Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 127 L. Ed. 2d 583 (1994)
(discussing “reasonable doubt” definition and instruction).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 15 of 56

B4
Consideration of Direct and Circumstantial Evidence;
Argument of Counsel; Comments by the Court

As I said before, you must consider only the evidence that I have
admitted in the case. Evidence includes the testimony of witnesses
and the exhibits admitted. But, anything the lawyers say is not
evidence and isn’t binding on you.
You shouldn’t assume from anything I’ve said that I have any
opinion about any factual issue in this case. Except for my
instructions to you on the law, you should disregard anything I may
have said during the trial in arriving at your own decision about the
facts.
Your own recollection and interpretation of the evidence is what
matters.
In considering the evidence you may use reasoning and
common sense to make deductions and reach conclusions. You
shouldn’t be concerned about whether the evidence is direct or
circumstantial.
“Direct evidence” is the testimony of a person who asserts that
he or she has actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eyewitness.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 16 of 56

“Circumstantial evidence” is proof of a chain of facts and
circumstances that tend to prove or disprove a fact. There’s no legal
difference in the weight you may give to either direct or
circumstantial evidence.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

United States v. Clark, 506 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 967, 95 S. Ct. 1957, 44 L. Ed. 2d 454 (1975) approves the
substance of this instruction concerning the lack of distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence; see also United States v.
Barnette, 800 F.2d 1558, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986), reh’g denied, 807
F.2d 999 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 935, 107 S. Ct. 1578,
94 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1987) (noting that the “test for evaluating
circumstantial evidence is the same as in evaluating direct evidence”)
(citing United States v. Henderson, 693 F.2d 1028, 1030 (11th Cir.
1982)).

United States v. Hope, 714 F.2d 1084, 1087 (11th Cir. 1983) (“A trial
judge may comment upon the evidence as long as he instructs the
jury that it is the sole judge of the facts and that it is not bound by
his comments and as long as the comments are not so highly
prejudicial that an instruction to that effect cannot cure the error.”)
(citing United States v. Buchanan, 585 F.2d 100, 102 (5th Cir. 1978)).
See also United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075 (11th Cir. 1990).

United States v. Granville, 716 F.2d 819, 822 (11th Cir. 1983) notes
that the jury was correctly instructed that the arguments of counsel
should not be considered as evidence (citing United States v. Phillips,
664 F.2d 971, 1031 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also United States v. Siegel,
587 F.2d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1979).

For an alternative description of evidence, see Preliminary Instruction,
“what is evidence.”

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 17 of 56

B5
Credibility of Witnesses

When I say you must consider all the evidence, I don’t mean
that you must accept all the evidence as true or accurate. You should
decide whether you believe what each witness had to say, and how
important that testimony was. In making that decision you may
believe or disbelieve any witness, in whole or in part. The number of
witnesses testifying concerning a particular point doesn’t necessarily
matter.
To decide whether you believe any witness I suggest that you
ask yourself a few questions:
• Did the witness impress you as one who was telling the
truth?

• Did the witness have any particular reason not to tell
the truth?

• Did the witness have a personal interest in the outcome
of the case?

• Did the witness seem to have a good memory?

• Did the witness have the opportunity and ability to
accurately observe the things he or she testified about?

• Did the witness appear to understand the questions
clearly and answer them directly?

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 18 of 56

• Did the witness's testimony differ from other testimony
or other evidence?

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 19 of 56

B6.3
Impeachment of Witnesses Because of Inconsistent Statements
(Defendant with No Felony Conviction Testifies)
You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence that a
witness testified falsely about an important fact. And ask whether
there was evidence that at some other time a witness said or did
something, or didn’t say or do something, that was different from the
testimony the witness gave during this trial.
But keep in mind that a simple mistake doesn’t mean a witness
wasn’t telling the truth as he or she remembers it. People naturally
tend to forget some things or remember them inaccurately. So, if a
witness misstated something, you must decide whether it was
because of an innocent lapse in memory or an intentional deception.
The significance of the misstatement may depend on whether the
misstatement was about an important fact or about an unimportant
detail. A defendant has a right not to testify.
But since the Defendant did testify, you should decide whether
you believe the Defendant’s testimony in the same way as that of any
other witness.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 20 of 56

B8
Introduction to Offense Instructions

The superseding indictment charges 4 separate crimes, called
“counts,” against the Defendant. Each count has a number. You’ll be
given a copy of the superseding indictment to refer to during your
deliberations.
Count 1 charges that the Defendant knowingly and willfully
conspired to defraud the United States by submitting false
information to the Small Business Administration in relation to a
Paycheck Protection Program loan.
Counts 2–4 charge that Defendant committed what are called
“substantive offenses,” specifically that the Defendant made or
caused to be made false statements to the Small Business
Administration. I will explain the law governing those substantive
offenses in a moment.
But first note that the Defendants are not charged in Count 1
with committing a substantive offense – they are charged with
conspiring to commit that offense.
I will also give you specific instructions on conspiracy.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 21 of 56

B8.1
Conjunctively Charged Counts
Where a statute specifies multiple alternative ways in which an
offense may be committed, the superseding indictment may allege
the multiple ways in the conjunctive, that is, by using the word “and.”
If only one of the alternatives is proved beyond a reasonable doubt,
that is sufficient for conviction, so long as you agree unanimously as
to that alternative.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
“[I]t is well-established . . . that a disjunctive statute may be pleaded
conjunctively and proved disjunctively.” United States v. Williams,
790 F.3d 1240, 1245 n.2 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.
Haymes, 610 F.2d 309, 310 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing United States v.
Quiroz-Carrasco, 565 F.2d 1328, 1331 (5th Cir. 1978)); see also
Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)
(adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit issued on or before September 30, 1981).
In other words, “when a defendant is charged in an indictment
conjunctively with alternative means or alternative mental states,
any one of which will satisfy an element of the crime, the ‘jury
instruction may properly be framed in the disjunctive’ without a
constructive amendment taking place.” United States v. Mozie, 752
F.3d 1271, 1284 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Simpson,
228 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)). “The rule applies not only to
alternative acts that satisfy a statutory element, but also to
alternative mental states that may satisfy an element.” Id. (citing
Haymes, 610 F.2d at 310–11).
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 22 of 56

“This is not only a permissible practice but also a common one.” Id.
(quoting United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1343 n.3 (11th Cir.
2014)) (“Prosecutors can and frequently do . . . charge alternative
elements in the conjunctive and prove one or more of them in the
disjunctive, which is constitutionally permissible.”); see also
Simpson, 228 F.3d at 1300.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 23 of 56

B9.1A
Knowingly; Willfully – General
The word “knowingly” means that an act was done voluntarily
and intentionally and not because of a mistake or by accident.
The word “willfully” means that the act was committed
voluntarily and purposely, with the intent to do something the law
forbids; that is, with the bad purpose to disobey or disregard the law.
While a person must have acted with the intent to do something the
law forbids before you can find that the person acted “willfully,” the
person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that her conduct
may be violating.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
The definition of willfulness in this instruction can be used in most
cases where willfulness is an element. For crimes requiring a
particularized knowledge of the law being violated, such as tax and
currency-structuring cases, use 9.1B’s definition of willfulness.
The Committee in its most recent revisions to the pattern instructions
has changed the approach to how “willfully” should be charged in the
substantive offenses which include it as an essential element of the
offense. The previous editions of the pattern instructions included
the following definition that historically has been used in most cases:
The word “willfully,” as that term has been used from time
to time in these instructions, means that the act was
committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific
intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with
bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 24 of 56

Although this definition has been useful as a general definition that
encompasses many different aspects of the legal concept of
“willfulness” in a concise and straightforward manner, the Committee
has concluded, along with every other Circuit Pattern Instruction
Committee that has considered the issue, that the definition is not
accurate in every situation. A review of the case law reveals how the
courts have struggled with the meaning of “willfulness” as a mens rea
requirement for substantive criminal offenses. See Bryan v. United
States, 524. U.S. 184, 189-92 (1998) (“The word ‘willfully’ is
sometimes said to be ‘a word of many meanings’ whose construction
is often dependent on the context in which it appears.” (citing Spies
v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943))); see also Ratzlaf v. United
States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994); United States v. Phillips, 19 F.3d
1565, 1576-84 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting the difficulty in defining
“willfully” and discussing the term in various contexts), amended to
correct clerical errors, 59 F.3d 1095 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1978) (noting, inter alia, that
“willfully” has “defied any consistent interpretation by the courts”);
see generally United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980) (“Few
areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition
of the mens rea requirement for any particular crime.”).
Based on the case law, the Committee has concluded that the
criminal offenses that expressly include “willfulness” as an essential
element can be divided into two broad categories. For the first
category (Instruction 9.1A, which encompasses most offenses)
“willfully” is defined to require that the offense be committed
voluntarily and purposely with the intent to do something unlawful.
However, the person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that
his or her conduct may be violating. This definition is narrower than
the traditional definition that has been used in our pattern charges
in the past, but the Committee believes that this narrower definition
is required under the law. See, e.g. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S.
184 (1998) (holding that the term “willfully” in 18 U.S.C. §§
922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof that the Defendant knew
that his conduct was generally unlawful, but does not require that
the Defendant knew of the specific licensing requirement that he was
violating).
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 25 of 56

The second category of criminal offenses that have “willfulness” as an
essential element have a heightened mens rea requirement. For this
limited class of offenses, the Government must prove more than the
Defendant knew that his conduct was done with a bad purpose to
disobey the law in general. The Government must prove that the
Defendant had an intent to violate a known legal duty, that is with
the specific intent to do something the law forbids. For these offenses,
the Committee recommends that the definition of “willfully” in
Instruction 9.1B be given to the jury. These offenses include currency
structuring statutes and certain tax laws, which tend to involve
“highly technical statutes that present[] the danger of ensnaring
individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” Bryan, 524
U.S. at 194. see, e.g., Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. at 149
(holding that with respect to 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a) and the monetary
transaction provisions that it controls, the Government must prove
that the Defendant acted willfully, i.e., with specific knowledge that
the structuring of currency transactions in which he was engaged
was unlawful); Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1991)
(explaining that due to the complexity of tax laws, there is an
exception to the general rule that “ignorance of the law or a mistake
of law is no defense to criminal prosecution,” and “[t]he term ‘willfully’
[as used in certain federal criminal tax offenses] connot[es] a
‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty’” (first citing
United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); and then citing
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360-61 (1973))). In Cheek, the
Supreme Court found error in the trial court’s instruction to the jury
that in order for the Defendant’s belief that he was not violating the
law to be a defense, his good-faith belief must have been objectively
reasonable. 498 U.S. at 203. The Court further explained, however,
that “a defendant’s views about the validity of the tax statutes are
irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and need not be heard by the
jury, and, if they are, an instruction to disregard them would be
proper.” Id. at 206.
The Committee observes that the required mental state may be
different even for different elements of the same crime. This
possibility should be considered when determining what definition of
mens rea should be charged. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S.
419, 423 n.5 (1985).
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 26 of 56

Note: If the Defendant raises a good faith defense, it may be
appropriate to give Special Instruction 9 [Good Faith Defense to
Willfulness (as under the Internal Revenue Code)] or Special
Instruction 18 [Good Faith Reliance Upon Advice of Counsel].

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 27 of 56

B9.2
On or About a Particular Date
You’ll see that the superseding indictment charges that a crime
was committed “on or about” a certain date. The Government doesn’t
have to prove that the offense occurred on an exact date. The
Government only has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed on a date reasonably close to the date alleged.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
United States v. Creamer, 721 F.2d 342, 343 (11th Cir. 1983), “on or
about” language upheld in case in which alibi defense was used by
the defendant; the court “rejected the contention that time becomes
a material element of a criminal offense merely because the defense
of alibi is advanced.” See also United States v. Reed, 887 F.2d 1398
(11th Cir. 1989), reh’g denied, 891 F.2d 907 (1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1080, 110 S. Ct. 1136, 107 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1990).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 28 of 56

Witness Preparation
It is entirely proper for a lawyer to talk to a witness about what
testimony the witness would give if called to the courtroom. The
witness should not be discredited by talking to a lawyer about his or
her testimony.
SOURCE:
Johnson v. Dugger, 817 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1987); Santiago
Sanchez Defuentes v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 801, 808 (11th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Esformes, 16-cr-20549-RNS, DE 1216 at 32.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 29 of 56

B10.2
Caution: Punishment
(Single Defendant, Multiple Counts)
Each count of the superseding indictment charges a separate
crime. You must consider each crime and the evidence relating to it
separately. If you find the defendant guilty or not guilty of one crime,
that must not affect your verdict for any other crime.
I caution you that the defendant is on trial only for the specific
crimes charged in the superseding indictment. You’re here to
determine from the evidence in this case whether the defendant is
guilty or not guilty of those specific crimes.
You must never consider punishment in any way to decide
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. If you find the defendant
guilty, the punishment is for the Judge alone to decide later.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
There may be cases in which the last sentence of the first paragraph
of this instruction is inappropriate and should be deleted. This may
occur, for example, in prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (RICO
offenses) or 21 U.S.C. § 848 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise
offenses) where the indictment is structured so that a conviction of
one count or counts (sometimes called “predicate offenses”) is
necessary to a conviction of another count or counts.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 30 of 56

S1.2
Testimony of Accomplice or Codefendant with Plea Agreement

You must consider some witnesses’ testimony with more
caution than others.
In this case, the Government has made a plea agreement with
a Codefendant in exchange for his testimony. Such “plea bargaining,”
as it’s called, provides for the possibility of a lesser sentence than the
Codefendant would normally face. Plea bargaining is lawful and
proper, and the rules of this court expressly provide for it.
But a witness who hopes to gain more favorable treatment may
have a reason to make a false statement in order to strike a good
bargain with the Government.
So while a witness of that kind may be entirely truthful when
testifying, you should consider that testimony with more caution
than the testimony of other witnesses.
And the fact that a witness has pleaded guilty to an offense isn’t
evidence of the guilt of any other person.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

United States v. Solomon, 856 F.2d 1572, 1578-79 (11th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1070, 109 S. Ct. 1352, 103 L. Ed. 2d 820
(1989).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 31 of 56

S2.1
Statement of a Defendant

If the Government offers evidence that a Defendant made a
statement or admission to someone after being arrested or detained,
you must consider that evidence with caution and great care.
You must decide for yourself (1) whether the Defendant made
the statement, and (2) if so, how much weight to give to it. To make
these decisions, you must consider all the evidence about the
statement – including the circumstances under which it was made.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

See United States v. Clemons, 32 F.3d 1504, 1510 (11th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1801, 131 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1995).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 32 of 56

S4.1
Similar Acts Evidence
(Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid.)
During the trial, you heard evidence of acts allegedly done by
the Defendant on other occasions that may be similar to acts with
which the Defendant is currently charged. This evidence is admitted
and may be considered by you for the limited purpose of assisting
you in determining whether the Defendant had the state of mind or
intent necessary to commit the crime charged in the superseding
indictment, the Defendant had a motive or the opportunity to commit
the acts charged in the superseding indictment, the Defendant acted
according to a plan or in preparation to commit a crime, or the
Defendant committed the acts charged in the superseding indictment
by accident or mistake.
You may not consider this evidence for any other purpose.
The Defendant is currently on trial only for the crimes charged
in the superseding indictment. You may not convict a person simply
because you believe that person may have committed an act in the
past that is not charged in the superseding indictment.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
Rule 404. [Fed. R. Evid.] Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 33 of 56

* * * * *
(b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts.
(1) Prohibited Uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.
(3) Notice in a Criminal Case. In a criminal case,
the prosecutor must:
(A) provide reasonable notice of any such
evidence that the prosecutor intends to
offer at trial, so that the defendant has a
fair opportunity to meet it;
(B) articulate in the notice the permitted
purpose for which the prosecutor intends
to offer the evidence and the reasoning
that supports the purpose; and
(C) do so in writing before trial — or in any
form during trial if the court, for good
cause, excuses lack of pretrial notice.

United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)
discusses at length the tests to be applied in admitting or excluding
evidence under Rule 404(b); and, more specifically, the different
standards that apply depending upon the purpose of the evidence,
i.e., to show intent versus identity, for example. See id. at 911 n.15.
Both the Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit have expressly
endorsed the Beechum test. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S.
681 (1988); United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1992)
(en banc).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 34 of 56

S5
Note-taking

You’ve been permitted to take notes during the trial. Most of you
– perhaps all of you – have taken advantage of that opportunity.
You must use your notes only as a memory aid during
deliberations. You must not give your notes priority over your
independent recollection of the evidence. And you must not allow
yourself to be unduly influenced by the notes of other jurors.
I emphasize that notes are not entitled to any greater weight
than your memories or impressions about the testimony.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 35 of 56

O13.1
General Conspiracy Charge
18 U.S.C. § 371
It’s a separate Federal crime for anyone to conspire or agree with
someone else to do something that would be another Federal crime if
it was actually carried out.
A “conspiracy” is an agreement by two or more people to commit
an unlawful act. In other words, it is a kind of “partnership” for
criminal purposes. Every member of a conspiracy becomes the agent
or partner of every other member.
The Government does not have to prove that all the people
named in the superseding indictment were members of the plan, or
that those who were members made any kind of formal agreement.
The Government does not have to prove that the members
planned together all the details of the plan or the “overt acts” that the
superseding indictment charges would be carried out in an effort to
commit the intended crime.
The heart of a conspiracy is the making of the unlawful plan
itself followed by the commission of any overt act. The Government
does not have to prove that the conspirators succeeded in carrying
out the plan.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 36 of 56

The Defendant can be found guilty of this crime only if all the
following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) two or more persons in some way agreed to try to
accomplish a shared and unlawful plan;
(2) the Defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the plan
and willfully joined in it;
(3) during the conspiracy, one of the conspirators
knowingly engaged in at least one overt act as described in
the superseding indictment; and
(4) the overt act was committed at or about the time alleged
and with the purpose of carrying out or accomplishing
some object of the conspiracy.
An “overt act” is any transaction or event, even one that may be
entirely innocent when viewed alone, that a conspirator commits to
accomplish some object of the conspiracy
A person may be a conspirator without knowing all the details
of the unlawful plan or the names and identities of all the other
alleged conspirators.
If the Defendant played only a minor part in the plan but had a
general understanding of the unlawful purpose of the plan and
willfully joined in the plan on at least one occasion, that’s sufficient
for you to find the Defendant guilty.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 37 of 56

But simply being present at the scene of an event or merely
associating with certain people and discussing common goals and
interests doesn’t establish proof of a conspiracy. A person who
doesn’t know about a conspiracy but happens to act in a way that
advances some purpose of one doesn’t automatically become a
conspirator.
ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
18 U.S.C. § 371 provides:
If two or more persons conspire… to commit any offense
against the United States… and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each [shall be guilty of an offense against the United
States].
Maximum Penalty: Five (5) years imprisonment and applicable fine.
See United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181, 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Committee believes that the general definition of “willfully” in
Basic Instruction 9.1A would usually apply to this crime.
The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, expressly makes an
overt act an element of the offense. A conspiracy charged under other
conspiracy statutes may not include an overt act as an element. See,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 1349, 1956(h), 1962(d); and 21 U.S.C. §§ 846,
963. To the extent that district courts are relying on this instruction
as guidance for drafting an instruction for a different conspiracy
offense, the Committee cautions that the United States Supreme
Court has held in several circumstances that proof of an overt act is
not required when a conspiracy statute does not expressly contain
an overt act requirement. See Whitfield v. United States, 543 U.S.
209, 214 (2005) (finding no overt act requirement in 18 U.S.C. §
1956(h)); Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63 (1997) (same as to
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 38 of 56

18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)); United States v. Shabani 513 U.S. 10, 11 (1994)
(same as to 21 U.S.C. § 846). Reference to instructions related to
those statutes may provide useful guidance. See O74.5, O75.2,
O100.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 39 of 56

False Statements to the SBA
15 U.S.C. § 645(a)

It’s a Federal crime to make any false statement for the purpose
of obtaining a loan from to the U.S. Small Business Administration
(“SBA”) or for the purpose of influencing the action of the SBA in any
way. The Defendant can be found guilty of this crime only if all the
following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the defendant knowingly made any false statement; and

(2) the false statement was for the purpose of obtaining for
herself or for any applicant any loan or for the purpose of
influencing in any way the action of the SBA;

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
15 U.S.C. § 645(a); United States v. Condon, 132 F.3d 653, 656
(11th Cir. 1998) (discussing § 645 and noting it “fails to mention
materiality and expressly prohibits ‘any’ false statements made to
the SBA.”). The elements of this charge do not require materiality.
Condon, 132 F.3d at 655 (citing United States v. Wells, 519 U.S.
482 (1997)).

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 40 of 56

O51
Wire Fraud
18 U.S.C. § 1343
It’s a federal crime to use interstate wire, radio, or television
communications to carry out a scheme to defraud someone else.
The Defendant can be found guilty of this crime only if all the
following facts are proved beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) the Defendant knowingly devised or participated in a
scheme to defraud someone by using false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises;
(2) the false pretenses, representations, or promises were
about a material fact;
(3) the Defendant acted with the intent to defraud; and
(4) the Defendant transmitted or caused to be transmitted
by wire some communication in interstate commerce to
help carry out the scheme to defraud.
A “scheme to defraud” means any plan or course of action
intended to deceive or cheat someone out of money or property by
using false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.
A statement or representation is “false” or “fraudulent” if it is
about a material fact that the speaker knows is untrue or makes with
reckless indifference to the truth, and makes with the intent to
defraud. A statement or representation may be “false” or “fraudulent”
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 41 of 56

when it is a half-truth, or effectively conceals a material fact, and is
made with the intent to defraud.
A “material fact” is an important fact that a reasonable person
would use to decide whether to do or not do something. A fact is
“material” if it has the capacity or natural tendency to influence a
person’s decision. It doesn’t matter whether the decision-maker
actually relied on the statement or knew or should have known that
the statement was false.
To act with “intent to defraud” means to act knowingly and with
the
specific
intent
to
use
false
or
fraudulent
pretenses,
representations, or promises to cause loss or injury. Proving intent
to deceive alone, without the intent to cause loss or injury, is not
sufficient to prove intent to defraud.
The Government does not have to prove all the details alleged
in the superseding indictment about the precise nature and purpose
of the scheme. It also doesn’t have to prove that the material
transmitted by interstate wire was itself false or fraudulent; or that
using the wire was intended as the specific or exclusive means of
carrying out the alleged fraud; or that the Defendant personally made
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 42 of 56

the transmission over the wire. And it doesn’t have to prove that the
alleged scheme actually succeeded in defrauding anyone.
To “use” interstate wire communications is to act so that
something would normally be sent through wire, radio, or television
communications in the normal course of business.
Each separate use of the interstate wire communications as
part of the scheme to defraud is a separate crime.

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS
18 U.S.C. § 1343 provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,
transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio,
or television communication in interstate or foreign commerce,
any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice [shall be guilty of an offense
against the laws of the United States].
Maximum Penalty: Twenty (20) years’ imprisonment and applicable
fine. (If the violation affects a financial institution, or is in relation to
or in connection with a presidentially declared major disaster or
emergency, thirty (30) years’ imprisonment and $1 million fine.)
If the offense involved telemarketing, 18 U.S.C. § 2326 requires
enhanced imprisonment penalties:
A person who is convicted of an offense under section 1028,
1029, 1341, 1342, 1343, or 1344, or a conspiracy to commit
such an offense, in connection with the conduct of
telemarketing - -
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 43 of 56

(1) shall be imprisoned for a term of up to 5 years in
addition to any term of imprisonment imposed under any
of those sections, respectively; and
(2) in the case of an offense under any of those sections
that - -
(A) victimized ten or more persons over the age of
55; or
(B) targeted persons over the age of 55,
shall be imprisoned for a term of up to 10 years in addition to
any term of imprisonment imposed under any of those sections,
respectively.
An additional element is required under the Apprendi doctrine when
the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced
penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 or § 2326. If the alleged offense
involved telemarketing, or involved telemarketing and victimized 10
or more persons over age 55 or targeted persons over age 55, or the
scheme affected a financial institution, or is in relation to or in
connection with a presidentially declared major disaster or
emergency, the Court should consider including a fourth element for
that part of the offense and giving a lesser included offense
instruction for just the Section 1341 offense. Alternatively, an
instruction (to be used with a special interrogatory on the verdict
form) can address those statutory variations of the scheme:
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is guilty of using interstate [wire]
[radio] [television] communications facilities in
carrying out a scheme to defraud, then you
must also determine whether the Government
has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that [the
scheme was in connection with the conduct of
telemarketing] [the scheme was in connection
with the conduct of telemarketing and (a)
victimized ten or more persons over the age of
55, or (b) targeted persons over the age of 55]
[the scheme affected a financial institution] [the
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 44 of 56

scheme was in relation to, or in connection
with, a presidentially declared major disaster or
emergency].
Wire fraud requires showing (1) that the Defendant knowingly
devised or participated in a scheme to defraud; (2) that the Defendant
did so willfully and with an intent to defraud; and (3) that the
Defendant used interstate wires for the purpose of executing the
scheme. Langford v. Rite Aid of Ala., Inc., 231 F.3d 1308, 1312 (11th
Cir. 2000). Materiality is an essential element of the crimes of mail
fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud and must be decided by the jury.
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 144 L. Ed.
2d 35 (1999). The definition of materiality used here comes from that
decision and the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in the case upon
remand. United States v. Neder, 197 F.3d 1122, 1128-20 (11th Cir.
1999), cert. denied 530 U.S. 1261 (2000).
The instruction makes clear that deception alone does not constitute
a scheme to defraud; a defendant must intend to cause injury or loss.
See United States v. Takhalov, 827 F.3d 1307, 1315 (11th Cir. 2016),
altered in part on denial of rehearing by United States v. Takhalov,
838 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2016) (“A jury cannot convict a defendant
of wire fraud, then, based on misrepresentations amounting only to
a deceit.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
In wire fraud cases involving property rights, “the Government must
establish that the defendant intended to defraud a victim of money
or property of some value.” United States v. Cooper, 132 F.3d 1400,
1405 (11th Cir. 1998). State and municipal licenses in general are
not “property” for the purposes of this statute. Cleveland v. United
States, 531 U.S. 12, 15, 121 S. Ct. 365, 369, 148 L. Ed. 2d 221 (2000)
(addressing “property” for purposes of mail fraud statute).
The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are “given a similar
construction and are subject to the same substantive analysis.” Belt
v. United States, 868 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989).
See also United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, (11th Cir. 2009) and
discussion supra Offense Instruction 50.1.

Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 45 of 56

S8 (modified for fraud)
Deliberate Ignorance as Proof of Knowledge

If a defendant’s knowledge of a fact is an essential part of a
crime, it’s enough that the defendant was aware of a high probability
that the fact existed—unless the defendant actually believed the fact
didn’t exist.
“Deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge”—which is the
equivalent of knowledge—occurs, for example, if a defendant
possesses a package and believes it contains a controlled substance
but deliberately avoids learning that it contains the controlled
substance so he or she can deny knowledge of the package’s
contents.
So you may find that a defendant knew about the scheme to
defraud or false statements if you determine beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant (1) actually knew about the scheme to
defraud or false statements, or (2) had every reason to know but
deliberately closed her eyes.
But I must emphasize that negligence, carelessness, or
foolishness isn’t enough to prove that the defendant knew about the
scheme to defraud or the false statements.
Case 0:23-cr-60170-RNS Document 54-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 05/23/2024 Page 46 of 56

ANNOTATIONS AND COMMENTS

United States v. Stone, 9 F.3d 934, 937 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 833, 115 S. Ct. 111, 130 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1994), “deliberate
ignorance” instruction appropriate only when evidence in the record
shows that the Defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning the
truth.

United States v. Aleman, 728 F.2d 492, 494 (11th Cir. 1984), this
instruction should be given only if there are facts that suggest the
Defendant consciously avoided knowledge, not when the Defendant
has actual knowledge; see also United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d
1563, 1570-72 (11th Cir. 1991) (describing circumstances in which
deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate) and United States v.
Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1994) (approving a similar
instruction).

File and source

File: gov.uscourts.flsd.654235.54.1.pdf
Size: 423,673 bytes
SHA-256: 56cc3e2c2d97957b2fc6b168345a381a9c2a1a3fdeefc69e6cd24e6a000d8817
Our copy: gov.uscourts.flsd.654235.54.1.pdf
Original: PACER (login required)

Joint Proposed Jury Instructions — USA v. Alexandra Acosta (Dkt. 54.1)

Record facts

Full text

File and source

Related records