Motion to Compel Arbitration and Opposition to Petition for Injunctive Relief — Fountainhead v. Womply

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Filing # 134425486 E-Filed 09/13/2021 09:14:40 AM

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 18™
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR
SEMINOLE COUNTY, FLORIDA

CIVIL DIVISION
CASE NO. 2021-CA-002143
FOUNTAINHEAD SBF,
Plaintiff,
VS.
OTO ANALYTICS, INC. d/b/a/ WOMPLY,
Defendant.

/

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF’S VERIFIED AMENDED PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
FOR EXPEDITED TEMPORARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Defendant Oto Analytics, Inc. d/b/a Womply (“Womply”), by and through its undersigned
counsel, files this: (i) motion to compel arbitration (the “Motion”) and (ii) opposition (the
“Opposition”) to Plaintiff Fountainhead SBF’s (“Fountainhead”) Verified Amended Petition for
Order to Show Cause for Expedited Temporary Injunctive Relief (the “Amended Petition”).

INTRODUCTION

This case is not properly before the Court. Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Petition
allege that Womply is in breach of a contract between the parties because it has not produced “loan
files” to Fountainhead and ask the Court to grant a mandatory injunction ordering Womply to
transmit electronic copies of the loan files to Fountainhead. The Court should not reach the merits
of Fountainhead’s claims because the parties’ dispute over the loan files is the subject of an
ongoing JAMS arbitration between the parties in California (the “Arbitration”). In the Arbitration,

Fountainhead demanded that the arbitrator enter a “declaratory” award ordering Womply to turn

*#%* E-FILED: GRANT MALOY, CLERK OF CIRCUIT COURT SEMINOLE COUNTY, FL 09/13/2021 09:14:40 AM.***#*

over the loan files. Because an arbitrator was appointed over a month ago, any request for
injunctive relief must be submitted to her. Inexplicably, Plaintiff has failed to do so. Instead, it
filed this Amended Petition seeking to have this Court alter the status quo by ordering Womply to
take action which would necessarily require a decision on key issues in the arbitration, including
the meaning of the undefined term “loan file” in the parties’ contract and the obligations the parties
have with respect to such files.

Once an arbitrator is appointed, the Florida Arbitration Act prohibits a Court from issuing
provisional remedies (like those sought here) unless the plaintiff shows that the matter is urgent
and that the arbitrator is unable to act. Fla. Stat. § 682.031(2)(b) (“After an arbitrator is appointed
and is authorized and able to act [... | [a] party to an arbitration proceeding may move the court for
a provisional remedy only if the matter is urgent and the arbitrator is not able to act timely or the
arbitrator cannot provide an adequate remedy.”) (emphasis added). Here, Fountainhead merely
dropped a footnote in its Amended Petition informing the Court of the already pending arbitration,
without addressing whether the arbitrator can provide an adequate remedy. Likewise, as more
fully explained herein, the governing JAMS rules require that “emergency” relief be determined
by the appointed arbitrator. Accordingly, the Court should not (and cannot) rule here.
Fountainhead’s Petition should be denied, and this case should be dismissed or stayed in order to
give the required deference to the pending arbitration.

In any event, even if it were proper for this Court to consider the merits of Fountainhead’s
claims (it is not), Fountainhead’s Petition should be denied. Fountainhead does not even come
close to meeting the extraordinarily high standard for a mandatory injunction, including because
Fountainhead fails to articulate any irreparable harm that it may suffer absent injunctive relief.

And, to the extent Fountainhead actually suffers harm as a result of not having possession of

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documents that it considers to be loan files, monetary damages are an adequate remedy. Indeed,
that is why Fountainhead is seeking monetary damages from Womply in the Arbitration.

For these reasons and the reasons set forth below, Womply respectfully requests that this
Court: (i) compel Fountainhead to arbitrate the loan file dispute in the pending Arbitration;
(11) either dismiss the Complaint or stay the action pending resolution of the Arbitration; and/or
(111) deny the Petition.

BACKGROUND

1. On or about March 23, 2021, Fountainhead and Womply entered into a PPP Loan
Referral Agreement (the “Agreement”), a copy of which is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Complaint.

2. Section 12 of the Agreement includes an arbitration provision. (Compl. Ex. 1 § 12.)

3. Womply terminated the Agreement, as it is expressly permitted to do, because
Fountainhead failed to pay Womply over $90 million in fees due under the Agreements. (Cheney
Aff. 4 6.)!

4. On June 15, 2021, Womply commenced arbitration against Fountainhead captioned
Oto Analytics, Inc. d/b/a Womply v. Fountainhead SBF LLC, No. 1100-111-808, by filing with
JAMS an arbitration demand and statement of claim (the “Arbitration Demand”). (/d. § 7.)

5. In its Arbitration Demand, Womply asserted claims for, among other things, breach
of contract and declaratory judgment based on Fountainhead’s failure to pay Womply more than

$90 million in fees due under the Agreement. (/d. { 8.)

1 References to “Cheney Aff.” or “Cheney Affidavit” are to the Affidavit of Alexander L. Cheney, submitted
contemporaneously with and in support of this Motion and Opposition. References to “Exhibit” are to the Exhibits
attached to the Cheney Affidavit.

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6. On July 23, 2021, Fountainhead submitted an answer to Womply’s Arbitration
Demand and asserted counterclaims against Womply in the Arbitration (the “Arbitration
Counterclaims”). Ud. 9 9; Exhibit A.)

7. On August 5, 2021, JAMS appointed as arbitrator in the Arbitration the Honorable
Elaine Rushing (Ret.) (the “Arbitrator”), a former California state court judge. (/d. | 11.)

8. Count I of Fountainhead’s Arbitration Counterclaims is for breach of contract for
allegedly “fail[ing] and refus[ing] to provide Fountainhead with copies of the Loan Files.”
(Exhibit A ¥ 13.)

9. Count III of Fountainhead’s Arbitration Counterclaims is for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing based, in part, on the allegation that Womply is “refusing to provide
Fountainhead with its Loan Files.” (/d. J 24.)

10. | Count IV of Fountainhead’s Arbitration Counterclaims is for tortious interference
based on the allegation that Fountainhead’s relationships with borrowers and prospective
borrowers have been disrupted because “Fountainhead is unable to access Loan Files.” (/d. 4 28-
29)

11. Count V of Fountainhead’s Arbitration Counterclaims is for declaratory relief and
seeks a declaratory judgment that “Womply is obligated under the Operative Agreement to return
to Fountainhead its Loan Files.” (/d. ¥ 33.)

12. ‘In addition to seeking equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment,
Fountainhead seeks monetary damages in the Arbitration for alleged harm caused by Womply’s

alleged failure to produce loan files. (U/d. at Section VI.)

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13. Fountainhead concedes in the Arbitration that “JAMS has jurisdiction over
[Fountainhead’s] Counterclaims pursuant to Section 12” of the parties’ Agreement, which contains
the arbitration provision. (/d. ¥ 2.)

14. On July 27, 2021, Womply and Fountainhead submitted their respective “strike
lists” to JAMS ranking the possible arbitrators provided by JAMS. (Cheney Aff. ¥ 12.)

15. On August 20, 2021, Womply answered Fountainhead’s counterclaims, disputing
that it breached its obligations under the Agreement. (/d. ¥ 13.)

16. The Arbitrator has scheduled a conference with the parties for September 17, 2021.
(Id. § 14.)

17. Despite all of this, Fountainhead commenced this action making the same
allegations and seeking the same relief as in the Arbitration. Under the Federal Arbitration Act
(the “FAA”), which governs this dispute involving interstate commerce, the Court must send the
parties to arbitration because there is no dispute that an arbitration agreement exists and that the
loan file dispute fits within its scope. The Court should not accept Fountainhead’s invitation to
interfere with the jurisdiction of JAMS, usurp the Arbitrator’s authority, and resolve the parties’
loan file dispute in contravention of the FAA and the Florida Arbitration Act.

ARGUMENT

I. THIS COURT SHOULD COMPEL FOUNTAINHEAD TO ARBITRATE THE
LOAN FILE DISPUTE AND DISMISS OR STAY THIS CASE.

A. The Arbitrator Already Has Jurisdiction Over This Matter.

Given that the Arbitrator already has jurisdiction over the relief that Fountainhead seeks,

Fountainhead’s dilatory request for emergency relief is entirely inappropriate.

4840-7221-8874.1

Fountainhead ignores the Florida Arbitration Act,” which dictates that the Arbitrator, not
the Court, should decide whether Fountainhead is entitled to the requested relief. Section
682.031(2)(b), Florida Statutes, provides: “[a]fter an arbitrator is appointed and is authorized and
able to act [... ] [a] party to an arbitration proceeding may move the court for a provisional remedy
only if the matter is urgent and the arbitrator is not able to act timely or the arbitrator cannot
provide an adequate remedy.” (emphasis added). Further, under JAMS Comprehensive
Arbitration Rules & Procedures, Rule 2(c), Fountainhead could have sought the appointment of an

29 <¢

Emergency Arbitrator pursuant to “Emergency Relief Procedures” “prior to the appointment of an
Arbitrator.” Rule 2(c)(i). Now that an arbitrator has been appointed, however, any emergency
relief must be heard by the Arbitrator. See JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rule 2(c)(v).
Fountainhead has not sought emergency relief in the Arbitration. (Cheney Aff. § 15). Nor
has Fountainhead even attempted to explain in its Amended Petition why it cannot seek the relief
it requests here from the Arbitrator (it can). Accordingly, Fountainhead has not met its burden in
establishing the predicate necessary for seeking a provisional remedy from this Court despite the
pending Arbitration, and the Complaint can be dismissed on this basis alone. See K/2 Fla. LLC
v. 8. Fla. Virtual Charter Sch. Bd., Inc., 2019 WL 568878, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2019), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. K12 Fla. LLC v. 8. Fla. Virtual Sch. Charter Sch. Bd.,
Inc., 2019 WL 1115877 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2019) (recommending dismissal in light of pending
arbitration where “but for the actions of K12 in moving to suspend the arbitration pending

resolution of the Petition, the appointment of the arbitrator could have been accomplished and the

same petition could have been presented to the arbitrator”).

? Although this dispute is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, the Florida Arbitration Act governs where not
expressly preempted by conflict or inconsistency. See Sachse Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Affirmed Drywall, Corp., 251
So. 3d 1005, 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (“Enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
the FAA preempts conflicting or inconsistent state law.’’).

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B. The Elements Of The Florida Arbitration Act And Federal Arbitration Act
Are Satisfied.

To the extent any dispute remains as to whether this claim is arbitrable, all three factors
mandating arbitration are met. The FAA applies to arbitrations, like the Arbitration between
Womply and Fountainhead, involving interstate commerce. Grant v. Rotolante, 147 So. 3d 128,
131 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (“The FAA applies to any contract ‘affecting’ interstate commerce.”).
Here, Fountainhead is a lender in Florida and Womply is a Delaware technology Company, and
the Agreement at issue concerns services related to the referral and management of hundreds of
thousands of loans under the federal Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) to borrowers across
the United States. In any event, on a motion to compel arbitration under either the FAA or
Florida’s Arbitration Act, Florida courts consider the same three factors: “(1) whether a valid
written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the
right to arbitration was waived.” Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Saldukas, 896 So. 2d 707,
711 (Fla. 2005); Terminix Int’l Co., v. Ponzio, 693 So. 2d 104, 106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997).

There is no dispute that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and that the loan file dispute
raised in the Complaint and Amended Petition is an arbitrable issue within the scope of the
arbitration provision in Section 12 of the Agreement. As discussed above, Fountainhead is
pursuing Arbitration Counterclaims against Womply seeking monetary damages and equitable
relief in the form of a declaratory judgment based on Womply’s alleged failure to provide loan
files to Fountainhead under the parties’ Agreement. Fountainhead further concedes in the
Arbitration that “JAMS has jurisdiction over [Fountainhead’s] Counterclaims pursuant to Section
12” of the parties’ Agreement.” (Exhibit A § 2.)

Further, any purported carve-out in the Agreement does not preclude compelling

arbitration. In its Complaint, Fountainhead claims that the Agreement provides Fountainhead with

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“the right to seek equitable relief from Womply in court, as it is doing in this action.” (Compl.
4] 28). This assertion misconstrues the limited scope of the exception that allows for limited court
intervention to preserve the status quo in an emergency. While the arbitration provision in the
Agreement does not “limit[] a party’s right to seek injunctive or other equitable relief in court,”
that provision contemplates an emergency to preserve the status quo where it will take time to
form a panel or appoint an arbitrator; it does not permit Fountainhead to seek the same equitable
relief in this Court that it is already pursuing in the Arbitration after the appointment of the
Arbitrator.

To the contrary, under Florida law, Fountainhead is estopped from pursuing the Complaint
and Amended Petition because they are based on the same facts and seek the same relief as
Fountainhead’s Arbitration Counterclaims. See Heller v. Blue Aerospace, LLC, 112 So. 3d 635
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (holding that a party was “equitably estopped by its own conduct” from
pursuing a complaint in court based on “essentially the same allegation and operative facts” as in
the party’s counterclaims in arbitration). And Fountainhead does not, because it cannot, claim that
the Arbitrator cannot grant Fountainhead the same relief it seeks from this Court. The Court should
therefore compel Fountainhead to arbitrate the loan file dispute in the pending Arbitration and
dismiss this case. See Perera v. H&R Block Eastern Enters., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1289-90
(S.D. Fla. 2012) (dismissing case under the FAA where all claims are subject to arbitration).

In the alternative, the Court should stay the case pending resolution of the first-filed
Arbitration under the principle of priority. See Siegel v. Siegel, 575 So. 2d 1267, 1272 (Fla. 1991)
(“[W]here courts within one sovereignty have concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first
exercises its jurisdiction acquires exclusive jurisdiction to proceed with that case”); Hirsh v.

DiGaetano, 732 So. 2d 1177, 1177-78 (Fla. Sth DCA 1999) (“It is well-established law of Florida

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that where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction of a cause of action, the first court to exercise
jurisdiction has the exclusive right to hear all issues or arising in the case”); Polaris Pub. Income
Funds v. Einhorn, 625 So.2d 128, 129-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (ordering stay of the later filed
Florida lawsuit because it “is so similar in parties and issues as to be unnecessarily duplicative of
the prior-filed New York state proceedings”); Pilevsky v. Morgans Hotel Grp. Mgmt, LLC, 961
So. 2d 1032, 1035 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (“It is sufficient that the two actions involve a single set of
facts and that resolution of the one case will resolve many of the issues involved in the
subsequently filed case.”) (citation and quotation omitted).

II. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION FOR MANDATORY
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.

If the Court does consider the merits of Fountainhead’s claims (it should not), the Court
should deny the Petition. Under Florida law, “a temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy
that can only be granted if the movant establishes (1) a likelihood of irreparable harm,
(2) unavailability of an adequate legal remedy, (3) substantial likelihood of succeeding on the
merits, and (4) support for the injunction within considerations of public interest.” Phantom of
Clearwater, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 894 So.2d 1011, 1014 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); see also Playpen
South, Inc. v. City of Oakland Park, 396 So.2d 830, 830-31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (“It is incumbent
upon the plaintiff’ who seeks the relief to prove the four elements of a temporary injunction.); Fla.
R. Civ. P. 1.610(a). The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo. See
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d 918, 924 (Fla. 2017)
(“[T]he purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo while final injunctive relief
is sought.”); Grant v. Robert Half Intern., Inc., 597 So. 2d 801, 801-02 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (“The
purpose of a temporary injunction is not to resolve a dispute on the merits, but rather to preserve

the status quo until the final hearing when full relief may be granted.”).

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Fountainhead’s Amended Petition misleadingly asks for “temporary injunctive relief” but
it actually seeks the ultimate relief sought in Fountainhead’s Complaint: a mandatory injunction
ordering Womply to produce “loan files” to Fountainhead. In Florida, a mandatory injunction
“will not be granted until after a final hearing on the merits as its effect before that time has been

>”?

compared to awarding execution before trial and judgment.” Montgomery Pipe & Tube Co. of
Fla., 205 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); see also Zetrouer v. Zetrouer, 89 Fla. 253, 103 So.
625 (1925) (“It is well settled that mandatory injunctions are rarely granted before final hearing,
or before the parties have full opportunity to present all the facts in such manner as will enable the
court to see and judge what the truth may be.”). The only instance where a mandatory injunction
might issue prior to a final hearing is in the “rare case[] where the right is clear and free from
reasonable doubt.” Jd. “Mandatory injunctions are looked upon with disfavor, and the courts
seem even more reluctant to issue them than prohibitory ones. One court has announced that relief
of this kind for the most obvious reasons should be granted only in situations which so clearly call
for it as to make its refusal work real and serious hardship and injustice.” Johnson v. Killian, 27
So. 2d 345, 346 (Fla. 1946) (quotations and citations omitted).

Fountainhead cannot meet the standards for a temporary injunction, let alone a mandatory
injunction at the outset of this case without discovery on an order to show cause.

First, Fountainhead fails to articulate any irreparable harm it will suffer absent a mandatory
injunction. In its Amended Petition, Fountainhead claims that (1) it will be unable to fund 77 loans
with a total loan principal of $1,060,499 (Amended Petition at 8), (11) government agencies and
law enforcement officials have served subpoenas on Fountainhead seeking documents that are in
Womply’s possession (id. at 8-9), and (111) Fountainhead is required by regulation to maintain “all

applications for financing, financing instruments, and ‘all other documents and supporting material

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299

relating to such loans, including correspondence’” (id. at 9). None of this constitutes irreparable
harm.

Fountainhead does not explain how it could still fund PPP loans when the SBA stopped
approving PPP loans on June 30, 2021. (See https:/;www.womply.com/blog/ppp-deadline-
extended-ppp-extension-act-of-2021-urgent-update/.) In any event, Fountainhead does not
identify what harm it would suffer from failing to fund 77 loans. Rather, the predominant harm it
complains of is to unidentified potential borrowers, not to Fountainhead. And while Fountainhead
may not receive fees from the SBA or interest on those potential loans, the amounts of such fees
and interest would be nominal, and monetary loss this does not constitute “irreparable harm.” State
of Fla., Dept. of Health y. Bayfront HMA Med. Center, 236 So. 3d 466, 475 (Fla 1st DCA 2018)
(“[E]conomic harm does not constitute irreparable injury.”).

Nor can Fountainhead show irreparable harm by not possessing documents sought by
subpoenas. To the extent Fountainhead has received subpoenas, it is only obligated to produce
documents in its possession. Indeed, Fountainhead does not even allege that any government
agency or law enforcement official has threatened Fountainhead with any penalty for not
producing documents that are not in Fountainhead’s possession.

Fountainhead’s purported concerns about its regulatory obligations are similarly
insufficient to show irreparable harm. For one thing, it is not clear from the face of the Amended
Petition that Fountainhead would be in violation of any regulation absent the injunctive relief it
seeks here. To the contrary, Fountainhead’s CEO concedes that Fountainhead has access to at
least some of the documents it contends are loan files—that is, the borrower applications and

promissory notes. (Hurn Aff. § 7.)> For another, Fountainhead does not claim that it is under

3 References to “Hurn Aff.” are to the Affidavit of Christopher G. Hurn, dated September 8, 2021, submitted in support
of Fountainhead’s Verified Petition for Order to Show Cause for Expedited Temporary Injunctive Relief.

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imminent threat of any sanction, or even what a potential sanction might be. Any potential harm
to Fountainhead from a regulatory perspective is speculative, at best, and therefore not irreparable.
See State of Fla., Dept. of Health v. Bayfront HMA Med. Center, 236 So. 3d 466 (Fla Ist DCA
2018) (“Irreparable injury will never be found where the injury complained of is doubtful,
eventual, or contingent.”) (quotations and citations omitted.); Yachting Promotions, Inc., 792 So.
2d at 663 (same).4

Second, and in any event, even if Fountainhead suffered some harm as a result of any of
the foregoing allegations, monetary damages would be an adequate remedy. The best evidence of
this is that Fountainhead is already seeking monetary damages for the foregoing alleged harm in
the Arbitration. In Count I of its Arbitration Counterclaims for breach of contract, Fountainhead
seeks monetary damages for the “economic and reputational damage to Fountainhead” for
Womply’s alleged failure to provide loan files, which allegedly “has prevented Fountainhead from
funding loan applications, servicing existing borrowers, complying with law enforcement requests,
and adhering to SBA regulations.” (Exhibit A § 14.) These are the same purported harms that
Fountainhead complains of here. Mandatory injunctive relief is inappropriate under these
circumstances. See Esposito v. Horning, 416 So. 2d 896, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982) (reversing trial
court’s grant of preliminary injunction because the plaintiff has “an adequate remedy at law” where
she “has claimed damages in a number of counts and, if the complaint is proven, she could recover

for her damages”).

‘4 Fountainhead’s Order to Show Cause for Expedited Temporary Injunctive Relief, submitted with its Amended
Petition, asks the Court to order that, pending a hearing on the Amended Petition, “Womply is temporarily restrained,
together with its agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, from altering or destroying any of the Loan Files.”
However, Fountainhead fails to allege any facts even suggesting that there is a risk Womply will alter or destroy loan
files. Even if there was a risk (there is not), Fountainhead could seek that same relief from the appointed Arbitrator.
It has not.

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Third, Fountainhead cannot establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits,
which requires a prima facie clear legal right to the relief requested. Naegele Outdoor Advertising
Co., Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 659 So. 2d 1046, 1047-48 (Fla. 1995). Fountainhead claims that
“the ultimate issue before the Court — whether Womply is obligated to provide the Loan Files to
Fountainhead — is straightforward,” but the term “loan files” in the Agreement is not defined. And
the definition that Fountainhead’s CEO attempts to provide in his affidavit is vague. It includes,
among other unspecific and overbroad categories of documents, “bank information,” “all other
data utilized to determine applicable eligibility,” and “any and all communications with borrowers
or potential borrowers.” (Hurn Aff. § 7.) Moreover, the meaning of the word “loan files,” and
therefore whether and to what extent Womply must produce any documents to Fountainhead, is in
dispute and the subject of Fountainhead’s Arbitration Counterclaims presently before the
Arbitrator.

Fourth, Fountainhead cannot establish that an injunction supports the public interest.
Fountainhead claims that with its “loan files,” it will be able to respond to subpoenas to aid
government agencies and law enforcement officials, fund 77 PPP loans, and comply with
regulatory requirements. (Amended Petition at 11-12.) However, if government agencies or law
enforcement officials require documents in Womply’s possession, they can serve a subpoena on
Womply. And the public’s interest in having just 77 PPP loans funded, or having Fountainhead
satisfy its regulatory obligations, is not sufficient enough to compel Womply to produce loan files
or provide access to a technology platform that Womply was expressly permitted to terminate
under the Agreement due to Fountainhead’s failure to pay $90 million in fees to Womply.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Womply respectfully requests that the Court:

(1) compel Fountainhead to arbitrate the loan file dispute in the pending Arbitration; (11) either
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dismiss the Complaint or stay the action pending resolution of the Arbitration; and/or (111) deny

the Petition.

Dated this 13th day of September, 2021.

/s/ Emily J. Lang

Kevin D. Fowler

Florida Bar No. 091110

Primary email: kfowler@foley.com
Secondary email: bshelley@foley.com
Emily J. Lang

Florida Bar No. 1011367

Primary: elang@foley.com
Secondary: dburgos@foley.com
FOLEY & LARDNER LLP

301 East Pine Street, Suite 1200
Orlando, FL 32801

Tel. 407.244.3235

Fax 407.648.1743

Attorneys for Defendant OTO Analytics d/b/a
Womply

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13" day of September, 2021, a true copy of the foregoing

was filed with the Clerk of Court via the Florida Court E-filing Portal which was directed to

electronically furnish a copy of the forgoing to all counsel/parties of record.

4840-7221-8874.1

/s/ Emily J. Lang
Emily J. Lang
Florida Bar No.: 1011367

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