Memorandum in Support of Motion to Compel Doe Disclosure — Children's Health Defense v. Rutgers (D.N.J.)

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No. 3:21-cv-15333-ZNQ-TJB · Doc. 30-1 · 2021-10-08 · Docket on CourtListener

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FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP 
Jeffrey S. Jacobson  
Andrew B. Joseph 
Kristen N. Roshto  
600 Campus Drive 
Florham Park, New Jersey 07932 
(973) 549-7000 
(973) 360-9831 (fax) 
Jeffrey.Jacobson@faegredrinker.com 
Andrew.Joseph@faegredrinker.com 
Kristen.Roshto@faegredrinker.com 
Attorneys for Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, et al. 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
 
CHILDREN’S HEALTH DEFENSE, 
INC., PETER CORDI, RAELYNNE 
MILLER, KAYLA MATEO, ADRIANA 
PINTO, JAKE BOTHE, AND DOES 1-
13,  
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
 
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY 
OF NEW JERSEY, BOARD OF 
GOVERNORS, RUTGERS SCHOOL OF 
BIOMEDICAL AND HEALTH 
SCIENCES, CHANCELLOR BRIAN L. 
STROM, PRESIDENT JONATHAN 
HOLLOWAY, in their official capacities, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
Civil Action No. 3:21-cv-15333-ZNQ-TJB 
 
Civil Action 
 
(Document Filed Electronically) 
 
Return Date: November 1, 2021 
 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DEFENDANTS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO COMPEL 
PLAINTIFFS TO COMPLY WITH FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 10(a) 
 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................... 2 
ARGUMENT......................................................................................................... 3 
I. 
This Case Does Not Present the Unique, Exceptional 
Circumstances Required for Anonymous Litigation. .......................... 3 
II. 
The Megless Factors Weigh in Favor of Disclosure of 
Plaintiffs’ Identity. ............................................................................. 6 
A. 
The Doe Plaintiffs Have Not Taken Steps to Remain 
Anonymous and Cannot Demonstrate a Unique or 
Particularized Harm That Prevents Them From 
Revealing Their Identity. ......................................................... 6 
B. 
There is No Significant Public Interest in Maintaining the 
Doe Plaintiffs’ Anonymity. ...................................................... 8 
C. 
There is a Strong Public Interest in Knowing the Identity 
of the Litigants In This Case. ................................................. 11 
III. 
Allowing Doe Plaintiffs to Proceed Anonymously Would Be 
Fundamentally Unfair to Rutgers. .................................................... 12 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................... 13 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
Cases 
In re Allergan BIOCELL Prods. Liab. Litig., 
No. 19-MD-2921 (BRM) (JAD), 2020 WL 4745558 (D.N.J. Aug. 
17, 2020) ............................................................................................................ 8 
Craig v. Harney, 
331 U.S. 367 (1947) ........................................................................................... 3 
Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 
897 F.3d 518 (3d Cir. 2018) ............................................................................... 8 
Doe v. College of New Jersey (“TCNJ”), 
No. 19-20674(FLW), 2020 WL 3604094 (D.N.J. July 2, 2020), 
aff’d, 997 F.3d 489 (3d Cir. 2021).............................................................. 3, 7, 8 
Doe v. Felician Coll., 
No. 2:18-CV-13539, 2019 WL 2135959 (D.N.J. May 15, 2019) ........................ 6 
Doe v. Frank, 
951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992) ............................................................................ 4 
Doe v. Genesis HealthCare, 
__ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 1599697 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2021) ........................ 8 
Doe v. Law Offices of Robert A. Schuerger Co., 
No. 17-13105 (BRM) (DEA), 2018 WL 4258155 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 
2018) ................................................................................................................. 7 
Doe v. Megless, 
654 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2011) ...................................................................... passim 
Doe v. Middlesex County, 
No. 20-8625 (MAS) (ZNQ), 2021 WL 130480 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 
2021) ................................................................................................................. 9 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
Page 
 
 
-iii- 
 
 
Doe v. N.C. Cent. Univ., 
No. 1:98CV01095, 1999 WL 19398248 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1999) ................. 12 
Doe v. Porter, 
370 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2004) .............................................................................. 4 
Doe v. Princeton Univ., 
No. 19-7853 (BRM) (TJB), 2019 WL 5587327 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 
2019) ................................................................................................................. 6 
Doe v. Regional Sch. Unit No. 21, 
No. 2:19-341-NT, 2020 WL 2833248 (D. Me. May 29, 2020) ......................... 11 
Doe v. Rider Univ., 
No. 16-4882 (BRM), 2018 WL 3756950 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018) ........................ 7 
Doe v. Rutgers, 
No. 2:18-cv-12952-KM-CLW, 2019 WL 1967021 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 
2019) ................................................................................................................. 8 
Doe v. Sessions, 
No. 18-4 (RC), 2018 WL 4637014 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018)............................. 11 
Doe v. Stegall, 
653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981) .............................................................................. 4 
Doe v. TCNJ, 
997 F.3d at 496 ................................................................................................ 10 
Doe v. Temple Univ., 
No. 14-04729, 2014 WL 4375613 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2014) ........................ 10, 11 
Does 1-6 v. Mills, 
No. 1:21-cv-242-JDL, 2021 WL 4005985 (D. Me. Sept. 2, 2021) .............. 10, 12 
Does I Thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 
214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000) ............................................................................ 4 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
Page 
 
 
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Harsman v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 
No. 1:21-cv-597, 2021 WL 4504245 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2021) ....................... 9 
Hencey v. United Airlines, Inc., 
NO. 21-601702-CIV-GAYLES/STRAUSS, 2021 WL 3634630 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2021) ................................................................................... 9 
James v. Jacobson, 
6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993) .................................................................................. 4 
K.W. v. Holtzapple, 
299 F.R.D. 438 (M.D. Pa. 2014) ........................................................................ 7 
Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 
__ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 3073926 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021) ....................... 9 
M.M. v. Zavaras, 
139 F.3d 798 (10th Cir. 1998) ............................................................................ 4 
Malibu Media, LLC v. Does, 
No. 12-3896-MAS, 2012 WL 6203697 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012) ......................... 7 
Maniscalgo v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 
No. 21-cv-5055 (BMC), 2021 WL 4344267 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 
2021) ................................................................................................................. 9 
Norris v. Stanley, 
__ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 3891615 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2021) .................. 9 
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 U.S. 555 (1980) ........................................................................................... 3 
Rose v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 
240 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Tex. 2007) ..................................................................... 12 
Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 
537 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2008) ............................................................................... 4 
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
(continued) 
Page 
 
 
-v- 
 
 
Valdez v. Grisham, 
__ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 4145746 (D.N.M. Sept. 13, 2021) ......................... 9 
Other Authorities 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a) ........................................................................................... 1, 3 
 
 
 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs in this case are five people who sued using their real names and 
“Does 1-13,” who did not.  These “Doe Plaintiffs,” if they wished to remain 
anonymous, had to file a motion seeking the Court’s leave to do so.  They did not.  
Had they filed a motion, the Court would have been compelled to deny it.  The Third 
Circuit allows plaintiffs to sue using pseudonyms only in very narrow categories of 
cases, and this is not such a case.  The Court therefore should require the Doe 
Plaintiffs to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a), as their co-Plaintiffs did.1  See Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 10(a) (“The title of the complaint must name all the parties . . . .”).     
Suing anonymously requires exceptional circumstances.  To mask their real 
names, the Doe Plaintiffs must show “both (1) a fear of severe harm, and (2) that the 
fear of severe harm is reasonable.”  Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 
2011).  In Plaintiffs’ Complaint, however, the Doe Plaintiffs did no more than 
speculate about retaliation or potential social stigmatization.  See Compl. ¶ 12, ECF 
No. 1.  These purported consequences are neither severe nor reasonable, as 
evidenced by the five named Plaintiffs who do not allege consequences from suing 
in their real names.  The Court should not permit pseudonymity here.       
                                                             
1 Plaintiffs have advised Rutgers of their intention to file an Amended Complaint 
within the next several weeks and that the Amended Complaint will continue to 
include some number of Doe Plaintiffs.  This motion, therefore, should be unaffected 
by Plaintiffs’ upcoming amendment.   
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
Plaintiffs Children’s Health Defense, Inc. (“CHD”), Peter Cordi, Raelynne 
Miller, Kayla Mateo, Adriana Pinto, Jake Bothe, and “Does 1-13” filed their 
Complaint on August 16, 2021.  All Plaintiffs other than CHD allege that they are 
Rutgers students.  See id. ¶ 12.  They assert that Rutgers’ requirement for all students 
either to receive a COVID-19 vaccination or to obtain a lawful exemption from that 
mandate violates the Constitution and state and federal laws.  See Compl. ¶ 1.     
Each Plaintiff, named and pseudonymized, pleads a unique set of factual 
circumstances.  The Doe Plaintiffs’ claims, Compl. ¶¶ 18-30, involve multiple 
requests for medical or religious exemptions, some of which the Complaint states 
already have been granted.  See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 22, 25, 28, 29.  Some Doe 
Plaintiffs assert claims arising from Rutgers’ decision to exclude them from 
university housing.  See id. ¶¶ 18, 19, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29.  Others allege that they 
requested exemptions but Rutgers had not yet responded to their request or asked 
them to submit additional information.  See id. ¶¶ 20, 21, 23, 24, 27, 30.  Rutgers 
has not been able to verify the Doe Plaintiffs’ allegations because, with one 
exception, the Doe Plaintiffs have not identified themselves even to Rutgers.   
 
Our judicial system assumes open and public judicial proceedings.  It is 
Plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate an entitlement to withhold their names.  The Doe 
Plaintiffs, however, did not file a motion seeking leave to proceed pseudonymously.  
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They alleged in the Complaint that they withheld their real names from the 
Complaint because they “fear ostracism and retaliation by Rutgers, the faculty, the 
student body, the media, and the public for exercising their rights.”  Compl. ¶ 12.    
ARGUMENT 
I. 
This Case Does Not Present the Unique, Exceptional Circumstances 
Required for Anonymous Litigation. 
 
“A trial is a public event.”  Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947).  
“[T]here is no special prerequisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished 
from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events 
which transpire in proceedings before it.”  Id.; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980) (“[H]istorically both civil and criminal 
trials have been presumptively open.”).  According to the Third Circuit in Megless, 
654 F.3d at 408, “[i]dentifying the parties to the proceeding is an important 
dimension of publicness” because “[t]he people have a right to know who is using 
their courts” and “defendants have a right to confront their accusers.”  As stated 
recently by Chief Judge Wolfson in Doe v. College of New Jersey (“TCNJ”), No. 
19-20674(FLW), 2020 WL 3604094, at *2 (D.N.J. July 2, 2020), aff’d, 997 F.3d 489 
(3d Cir. 2021), “[t]he public’s right of knowledge of judicial proceedings, codified 
in Rule 10(a), is, similar to the public’s right of access to judicial proceedings, deeply 
rooted in common law and predates even the Constitution.” 
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Because of this presumption that judicial proceedings will be open, courts 
carefully limit the use of pseudonymity to “exceptional cases.”  Megless, 654 F.3d 
at 408.  “That a plaintiff may suffer embarrassment or economic harm is not 
enough.”  Id.  Rather, in Megless, the Third Circuit endorsed a multi-factor analysis 
to determine whether “a litigant’s reasonable fear of severe harm outweighs the 
public’s interest in open judicial proceedings” such that anonymity is appropriate.  
Id. at 409.2  Those factors include: 
(1) 
the extent to which the identity of litigant has been kept confidential; 
(2) 
the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and 
the substantiality of these bases; 
(3) 
the magnitude of public interest in maintaining confidentiality of the 
litigant’s identity; 
(4) 
whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or 
otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the 
litigant’s identity; 
                                                             
2 Multiple Courts of Appeals have adopted balancing tests similar to the Megless 
test.  See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189-90 (2d Cir. 
2008); Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004); Does I Thru XXIII v. 
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000); M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 
F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 1993); 
Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 
(5th Cir. 1981).   
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(5) 
the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party 
and attributable to the litigant’s refusal to pursue the case at the price 
of being publicly identified; 
(6) 
whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate 
ulterior motives; 
(7) 
the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of 
litigants; 
(8) 
whether, because of the subject matter of the litigation, the status of the 
litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong 
interest in knowing the litigant’s identity; and 
(9) 
whether opposition to pseudonymity by counsel, the public, or the press 
is illegitimately motivated.  [See id.3] 
 
Balancing these factors, and “acknowledg[ing] the thumb on the scale that is 
the universal interest in favor of open judicial proceedings,” the Third Circuit 
affirmed that the plaintiff in Megless—who sought to remain anonymous because he 
alleged he was being falsely accused of pedophilia—could not proceed 
anonymously.  Id. at 411.  Rutgers submits that if the plaintiff in Megless could not 
remain anonymous on those facts, the Doe Plaintiffs here cannot do so, either.  If the 
                                                             
3 Rutgers does not contend that the Doe Plaintiffs have illegitimate motives in 
seeking to sue pseudonymously.  It is unlikely, but unknown, whether the Doe 
Plaintiffs are public figures. 
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Doe Plaintiffs wish to challenge a vaccine mandate or related restrictions as 
unconstitutional, they must do so in their real names. 
II. 
The Megless Factors Weigh in Favor of Disclosure of Plaintiffs’ Identity. 
A. 
The Doe Plaintiffs Have Not Taken Steps to Remain Anonymous and 
Cannot Demonstrate a Unique or Particularized Harm That Prevents 
Them From Revealing Their Identity. 
The Doe Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that they have taken steps to keep 
their identity confidential, other than by suing anonymously, which does not suffice.  
See Doe v. Felician Coll., No. 2:18-CV-13539, 2019 WL 2135959, at *3 (D.N.J. 
May 15, 2019) (“Ms. Doe does not allude to any efforts she has made to maintain 
her confidentiality, other than filing her complaint under ‘Jane Doe.’”).  Most of the 
Doe Plaintiffs have openly requested medical or religious objections from Rutgers’ 
mandate, see Compl. ¶¶ 18, 19, 22, 25, 28, 29, but now refuse to tell Rutgers that 
they have taken the additional step of suing.     
These Doe Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a “severe harm” that would outweigh 
the public’s strong interest in disclosure of their identities.  Their contention that the 
fear of “ostracism and retaliation by Rutgers, the faculty, the student body, the 
media, and the public for exercising their rights” is unreasonable and lacks any 
factual support in the record or otherwise.  See Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 19-7853 
(BRM) (TJB), 2019 WL 5587327, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2019) (“[F]ear of social 
stigma fails to outweigh the general interest in favor of open judicial proceedings.”). 
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Further, Plaintiffs will be unable to cite case law supporting pseudonymity based 
solely on a fear of “ostracism.”  The potential for professional or social 
embarrassment never justifies pseudonymity.  See Megless, 654 F.3d at 408; Doe v. 
Law Offices of Robert A. Schuerger Co., No. 17-13105 (BRM) (DEA), 2018 WL 
4258155, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2018) (requiring the plaintiff in a Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act claim to disclose his real name despite his fear that his 
professional reputation would be tarnished if he were believed to have defaulted on 
financial obligations); Doe v. Rider Univ., No. 16-4882 (BRM), 2018 WL 3756950, 
at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018) (fear of social stigmatization as alleged perpetrator of 
sexual assault did not warrant anonymity); Malibu Media, LLC v. Does, No. 12-
3896-MAS, 2012 WL 6203697, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 12, 2012) (denying request to 
proceed anonymously where plaintiffs argued they would be “subject to humiliation 
and ridicule if their names appear next to the allegations in the Complaint”); accord 
K.W. v. Holtzapple, 299 F.R.D. 438, 442 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (students’ embarrassment 
and possibility of denial of future employment benefits based on disclosure of drug 
policy violations insufficient for anonymity).  
In Doe v. TCNJ, for example, Chief Judge Wolfson determined that then-
Magistrate Judge Quraishi did not abuse his discretion in denying the plaintiff’s 
motion to proceed under a pseudonym in an employment discrimination suit.  TCNJ, 
2020 WL 3604094, at *4.  In denying the motion, the court noted that all “[p]laintiff 
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ha[d] pointed to is her fear that her professional reputation would potentially be 
impaired by bringing th[e] suit.”  Id.4  Here, too, the Doe Plaintiffs have raised 
nothing more than speculative and non-specific fears of ostracism and retaliation.  
That does not suffice.  See, e.g., In re Allergan BIOCELL Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 
19-MD-2921 (BRM) (JAD), 2020 WL 4745558, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 17, 2020) 
(plaintiffs failed to articulate a “fear of severe harm” because they “made their 
argument through generalizations and hypothetical situations, rather than focusing 
on any particular [p]laintiff’s actual circumstances”). 
B. 
There is No Significant Public Interest in Maintaining the Doe 
Plaintiffs’ Anonymity.  
 
This case also does not involve matters that trigger a heightened public interest 
in maintaining the Doe Plaintiffs’ anonymity.  See, e.g., Doe v. Rutgers, No. 2:18-
cv-12952-KM-CLW, 2019 WL 1967021 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2019) (allowing a victim 
of alleged sexual assault to proceed anonymously); Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. 
Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 2018) (minor transgender students prohibited from 
using school facilities which align with their gender identities rather than birth-
assigned sex); Doe v. Genesis HealthCare, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 1599697, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2021) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit have allowed anonymity due 
                                                             
4 This Court’s decision in TCNJ, which Chief Judge Wolfson affirmed, was reported 
at 2020 WL 360719 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2020).  As this Court wrote in TCNJ, plaintiffs 
must carry a heavy burden to overcome “our legal norms [and] contravention of the 
public’s right to open judicial proceedings.”  Id. at *4.  
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to the private and intimate nature of being transgender as well as the widespread 
discrimination, harassment, and violence faced by these individuals.”).  This case 
does not involve disclosure of sex-based victimization or revelation of a transgender 
person’s status.  In Doe v. Middlesex County, No. 20-8625 (MAS) (ZNQ), 2021 WL 
130480 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2021), this Court permitted anonymity in a case brought by 
a detainee alleging mistreatment by corrections officers during her pregnancy and 
birthing experience where the plaintiff “show[ed] that her fear of severe harm by 
being retraumatized is reasonable.”  Id. at *4.  The facts of this case are not similar 
to those in Middlesex County, either.    
 
By contrast, there have been multiple challenges around the country to 
university and employer vaccine mandates pursued by plaintiffs suing in their real 
names.  See e.g., Harsman v. Cincinnati Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., No. 1:21-cv-
597, 2021 WL 4504245 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2021);  Maniscalgo v. N.Y. City Dep’t 
of Educ., No. 21-cv-5055 (BMC), 2021 WL 4344267 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2021); 
Valdez v. Grisham, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 4145746 (D.N.M. Sept. 13, 2021); 
Norris v. Stanley, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2021 WL 3891615 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2021); 
Hencey v. United Airlines, Inc., NO. 21-601702-CIV-GAYLES/STRAUSS, 2021 
WL 3634630 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2021); Klaassen v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., __ F. Supp. 
3d __, 2021 WL 3073926 (N.D. Ind. July 18, 2021).  That these plaintiffs did not 
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even attempt to sue under pseudonyms further demonstrates the lack of need for 
pseudonymity in this case.5     
 
Moreover, to the extent Doe Plaintiffs argue that disclosing their names would 
deter them from pursuing their case in court (the fifth factor), “no matter how 
sincere, a plaintiff’s ‘refusal to litigate openly by itself cannot outweigh the public’s 
interest in open trials.’”  Doe v. Temple Univ., No. 14-04729, 2014 WL 4375613, at 
*2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2014), quoting Megless, 654 F.3d at 410-11.  The Doe Plaintiffs 
also cannot contend that requiring them to disclose their names would dissuade 
others from bringing similar lawsuits because five of their fellow Plaintiffs already 
have disclosed their names publicly in this case.  See Doe v. TCNJ, 997 F.3d at 496 
(“But, as we explained in Megless, that factor requires a showing that, if anonymity 
is denied, others similarly situated will be deterred from litigating claims the public 
would like to have litigated.” (internal quotation and brackets omitted)).  
                                                             
5 A small number of plaintiffs in vaccine mandate cases have sued pseudonymously.  
See, e.g., Does 1-6 v. Mills, No. 1:21-cv-242-JDL, 2021 WL 4005985 (D. Me. Sept. 
2, 2021).  In Mills, the plaintiffs filed a motion seeking leave to remain anonymous, 
and the court granted them anonymity, only through the preliminary injunction 
phase, because of the “substantial public controversy currently surrounding public 
and private mandates requiring individuals to be vaccinated for the COVID-19 
coronavirus or to provide proof of vaccination status.”  Id. at *2.  The First Circuit, 
unlike the Third Circuit, has not adopted a balancing test for pseudonymity.  See id.  
Rutgers respectfully submits that the court in Mills decided the pseudonymity issue 
contrary to what Megless requires.  Further, the instant case already has moved 
beyond the phase of preliminary injunctive relief. 
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C. 
There is a Strong Public Interest in Knowing the Identity of the 
Litigants In This Case. 
The public has a “strong interest in an open litigation process” such that “[a] 
plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym ‘runs afoul of the public’s common law right of access 
to judicial proceedings.’”  Megless, 654 F.3d at 408, quoting Does I Thru XXIII v. 
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2000).  Plaintiffs’ case raises 
issues that are part of an ongoing national discussion regarding vaccine efficacy and 
safety.  Because these issues are the subject of public and media attention, there is a 
greater than usual public interest in knowing the identities of the litigants.  As the 
court recognized in Doe v. Temple: 
[John Doe] filed suit in federal court to seek his 
exoneration. Because “one of the essential qualities of a 
Court of Justice [is] that its proceedings should be public,” 
Doe’s choice comes with a consequence. The dispute, and 
Doe’s name, will contribute to the current debate about 
sexual assault on college campuses.  
2014 WL 4375613, at *2 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).  
To be sure, courts have held that plaintiffs may sue pseudonymously where 
confidential and sensitive medical diagnoses are involved.  See, e.g., Doe v. Sessions, 
No. 18-4 (RC), 2018 WL 4637014, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2018) (plaintiff feared 
public disclosure of his diagnosis of Asperger’s Syndrome); Doe v. Regional Sch. 
Unit No. 21, No. 2:19-341-NT, 2020 WL 2833248 (D. Me. May 29, 2020) (plaintiff 
sought to keep confidential a history of sexual abuse and the mental health treatment 
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sought as a result).  These are tamong the cases cited by the plaintiffs in Mills in 
support of their request for pseudonymity, but they are readily distinguishable.  Here, 
Plaintiffs are disputing the safety and efficacy of vaccines that already have been 
taken by hundreds of millions of their fellow citizens and nearly all of their fellow 
Rutgers students.  The Court should not permit them to assert these claims behind 
an unnecessary and unjustified cloak of anonymity.     
III. 
Allowing 
Doe 
Plaintiffs 
to 
Proceed 
Anonymously Would 
Be 
 
Fundamentally Unfair to Rutgers. 
 
Plaintiffs do not meet the legal standard for anonymity under Megless and, 
just as fundamentally, “defendants have a right to confront their accusers.”  Megless, 
654 F.3d at 408.  The Doe Plaintiffs chose to bring this lawsuit in a public forum 
and to accuse Rutgers and its officials publicly of violating their rights and 
discriminating against them.  Part of the “publicness” of judicial proceedings 
requires litigants to stand behind their allegations.  See, e.g., Rose v. Beaumont 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.R.D. 264, 267-68 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (“fundamental fairness” 
required that student who alleged she was sexually assaulted and accused educators 
of contributing to the assaults “not be allowed to cast aspersions against the public 
school system and its educators while hiding behind a pseudonym”); Doe v. N.C. 
Cent. Univ., No. 1:98CV01095, 1999 WL 19398248, at *5 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 
1999) (denying motion to proceed under pseudonym where “it would be unfair to 
Case 3:21-cv-15333-ZNQ-TJB   Document 30-1   Filed 10/08/21   Page 18 of 19 PageID: 412

 
13 
Defendant to allow Plaintiff to make these charges publicly, through the media, 
while she hides ‘behind a cloak of anonymity’”).  The same is true here. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Rutgers respectfully requests that the Court 
prohibit Doe Plaintiffs from proceeding anonymously in this matter, and compel 
them to reveal their identities. 
 
Dated: October 8, 2021  
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 /s/ Jeffrey S. Jacobson  
Jeffrey S. Jacobson 
Andrew B. Joseph 
Kristen N. Roshto 
FAEGRE DRINKER BIDDLE & REATH, LLP 
600 Campus Drive 
Florham Park, New Jersey 07932 
(973) 549-7000 
(973) 360-9831 (fax) 
Jeffrey.Jacobson@faegredrinker.com 
Andrew.Joseph@faegredrinker.com 
 
 
 
 
 
Kristen.Roshto@faegredrinker.com 
Case 3:21-cv-15333-ZNQ-TJB   Document 30-1   Filed 10/08/21   Page 19 of 19 PageID: 413

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