Opinion Denying TRO — Children's Health Defense v. Rutgers

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No. 3:21-cv-15333-ZNQ-TJB · Doc. 27 · 2021-09-27 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
CHILDREN’S HEALTH DEFENSE, INC., et 
al., 
 
Civil Action No. 21-15333 (ZNQ) (TJB)  
 
OPINION 
 
 
Plaintiffs,
 
v.  
RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW JERSEY, et al.,
 
Defendants. 
 
QURAISHI, District Judge 
THIS MATTER comes before the Court upon a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 
filed by Plaintiffs Children’s Health Defense, Inc. (“CHD”) and Adriana Pinto (collectively, 
“Plaintiffs”).  (the “Motion”, ECF No. 10.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a Memorandum of Law in 
support of the Motion and on behalf Adriana Pinto.  (“Plaintiffs’ Memorandum”, ECF No. 10-1.)  
Defendants Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey (“Rutgers”), Board of Governors, Rutgers 
School of Biomedical and Health Sciences, Chancellor Brian L. Strom, and President Jonathan 
Holloway (collectively, “Defendants”) opposed the Motion,  (Opposition Brief, ECF No. 20), to 
which Plaintiffs replied, (Reply, ECF No. 24).1  The Court has carefully considered the parties’ 
submissions and decides the Motion without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1.  For the reasons stated herein, the Motion will be denied. 
 
1 By letter dated September 22, 2021, Defendants sought leave to file a sur-reply in further opposition to the Motion.  
(ECF No. 35.)  The same day, the Court denied leave and instructed the parties to file no further briefing.  (ECF No. 
36.) 
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I. 
BACKGROUND  
On August 16, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the portion of 
Rutgers’ COVID-19 policy requiring students to be vaccinated prior to returning to campus (the 
“Policy”) is unlawful.  (Complaint ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.)  The Complaint spans seven counts and alleges 
the Policy is “both illegal and unconstitutional” and coerces students to accept “an experimental 
COVID-19 vaccine” as a precondition for their return to campus.  (Id. ¶¶ 1,3.).  The seven counts 
in the Complaint alleges the following: (1) Preemption by Federal Law and Ultra Vires under State 
Law (First Cause of Action) (Id. ¶¶ 224-251); (2) Violation of the Right to Informed Consent and 
the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 1 
of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey (Second Cause of Action) (Id. ¶¶ 252-287); (3) 
Violation of Equal Protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I of the 
Constitution of the State of New Jersey (Third Cause of Action) (Id. ¶¶ 288-296); (4) Violation of 
Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Fourth Cause of Action) (Id. ¶¶ 297-300); (5) Violation of 
the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (Fifth Cause of Action) (Id. ¶¶ 301-303); (6) Estoppel or 
Detrimental Reliance (Sixth Cause of Action) (Id. ¶¶ 304-310) and; (7) Breach of Contract 
(Seventh Cause of Action) (Id. ¶¶ 311-315.)  The Summons was issued that same day. 
On August 25, 2021, the Court entered a letter order scheduling a conference call between 
the parties for August 31, 2021.  (ECF No. 9.)  On August 30, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the Motion.  
(ECF No. 10.)  On August 31, 2021, during a conference call between the Court and the parties, 
Plaintiffs alerted the Court that they would be filing a motion seeking the Judge’s recusal.  (ECF 
No. 14.)  During that same call, the Court discussed the Motion with the Plaintiffs.  (Id.)  On 
September 1, 2021, following the conference call, the Court entered a text order setting a briefing 
schedule for the present motion and the motion for recusal.  On September 14, 2021, the Court 
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denied Plaintiffs’ motion for recusal.  (ECF No. 21.)  Plaintiffs’ counsel requested an extension, 
until September 20, 2021, to file its reply to the Motion.  (ECF No. 22.)  The Court granted 
Plaintiffs’ extension  and on September 20, 2021, Plaintiffs filed its reply.  (ECF No. 24.)  The 
Court now considers the Motion.  
II. 
PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS 
A. Plaintiffs’ Moving Brief 
Plaintiffs begin by asserting that they are likely to succeed on the merits. (Plaintiffs’ 
Memorandum at 6.)  They argue that under the 14th Amendment, “Ms. Pinto has a constitutionally 
guaranteed right to informed consent and to refuse unwanted medical treatment.”  (Id.)  Plaintiffs 
contend that Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) requires a mandatory vaccination to 
be reasonable, necessary for public health, and proportional to the need.  (Id. (citing Jacobson, 197 
U.S. at 27–33).)  According to Plaintiffs, the Policy is inconsistent with Jacobson, and therefore 
is unconstitutional, because it mandates vaccination for “students who will never set foot on 
campus,” which has no relationship to Rutgers’ claimed interest in safeguarding the health of its 
community.  (Id. at 8.)  Plaintiffs also argue that Rutgers acted arbitrarily and capriciously with 
respect to Ms. Pinto by first instituting the Policy, which includes language exempting students 
from the vaccination requirement if they are taking “fully remote classes,” only to later block Ms. 
Pinto’s online account because she was not vaccinated.   
With respect to irreparable harm to Ms. Pinto, Plaintiffs argue that two violations of her 
constitutional rights are irreparable per se.  (Id. at 9.)  First, Rutgers is “coercing her to reverse the 
decision she made in the exercise of her right to informed consent and to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment.”  (Id.)  Second, Rutgers is “blocking her from her account and from taking her class 
solely because she exercised these rights and chose not to vaccinate for COVID-19.”  (Id. at 9-10.)   
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With respect to harms to Defendants, Plaintiffs assert that Rutgers will not be injured by 
an injunctive order requiring it to follow its own Policy to exempt from its vaccination requirement 
those students who are fully remote.  (Id. at 10.)  These students will not impact Rutgers’ purported 
health and safety concerns because they do not need to physically come to campus for coursework. 
(Id.)   
As to public interest, Plaintiffs cite the public’s general interests in safeguarding 
constitutional rights and in requiring public institutions to adhere to their own stated policies.  More 
narrowly, Plaintiffs contend that there is a strong public interest in ensuring that mandates 
concerning COVID-19 are appropriately related to the purported health and safety interests that 
motivate them.  (Id. at 10–11.)  Narrower still, Plaintiffs argue that the public has a vested interest 
in protecting students who decide to be “fully remote,” from Rutgers’ arbitrary and irrational 
attempts to force them to take the vaccine.  (Id. at 11–12.) 
B. Defendants’ Opposition 
Unsurprisingly, Defendants say that Ms. Pinto cannot demonstrate her claims are likely to 
succeed on the merits.  First, they argue her facial challenge to the Policy is precluded by Jacobson, 
whose central principle of deference to vaccine mandates has remained undisturbed by the 
Supreme Court despite being referenced on multiple occasions since the inception of the COVID-
19 pandemic.  (Opposition Brief at 12–14.)  Defendants point out that similar suits challenging 
vaccine mandates have failed in various district courts around the country.  (Id. at 15.)  Moreover, 
the Policy in this case is more likely to survive a constitutional challenge because it provides for 
religious and medical exemptions.  (Id. at 13 (citing Klaasen v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., 7 F.4th 592 
(7th Cir. 2021)).  And Rutgers has the added benefit of “express statutory authority to add COVID-
19 vaccines to its required immunization list.”  (Id.)  Defendants fault Plaintiffs for failing to 
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appreciate that the right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute and must yield to the public 
interest in protecting the public from a deadly virus through vaccination.  (Id. at 19.)  The cases 
that Plaintiffs rely on involve other types of medical treatment rather than vaccines.  Still, the 
courts in those cases recognized, either implicitly or explicitly, that there is no absolute 
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment.  (Id. at 19–21.)   
Second, Defendants contend that any challenge to the constitutionality of the Policy as 
applied to Ms. Pinto should also fail.  (Id. at 22.)  Ms. Pinto claims to have “struggled with her 
health” but has not elaborated and she admits that she has not applied for a medical exemption.  
(Id.)  Defendants likewise reject her claims that she may be naturally immune to COVID-19 
because there is currently no recognized mechanism for verifying a natural immunity.  (Id. at 22-
23.)  Ms. Pinto’s election of a class that is meeting remotely and her attestation that she will not 
physically come to campus do not qualify her an exception as a remote student.  (Id. at 23.)  That 
exemption is for students enrolled in a fully online degree program.  (Id.)  Those students are not 
issued student identifications, are not expected to appear on campus, and could not access 
restricted areas of the campus even if they wished to appear.  (Id.)   
From Defendants’ perspective, Plaintiffs are demanding that Rutgers create, oversee, and 
manage a new category of students: ones who are fully matriculated, have all the privileges of in-
person students, but who have promised not to visit campus and have registered for classes that 
happen to be meeting remotely at the time.  (Id. at 24.)  Rutgers says it has no means to police such 
a group of students.  (Id.)  Even if it did, it has no way to guarantee that the remote classes would 
remain remote because that decision is vested with the individual professors teaching such classes 
rather than the administration.  (Id.)  The professors may return to in-person classes or require 
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students to do work that can only be done on campus or require students to work on group projects.  
(Id.) 
Defendants argue that Ms. Pinto cannot establish that she will suffer irreparable harm 
because she delayed before seeking relief.  (Id. at 25.)  Ms. Pinto knew for five months that she 
could not take Fall 2021 classes without complying with the vaccination requirements yet did not 
seek an injunction until two days before classes began on August 30, 2021.  (Id.)  Defendants also 
says Ms. Pinto’s claim to being ready to graduate if she completes one class this Fall semester is 
untrue.  In addition to the class this semester, her degree requires a three-credit 400 level course 
that she has not completed.  Thus, Ms. Pinto is still required to “return to Rutgers” to complete 
some remaining credits before she can be conferred her degree in psychology.  (Id. at 26-27.)   
With respect to balance of the harms and the public interest, Defendants rely upon the 
public interest in leaving policymaking to the states and their institutions.  (Id. at 27.) Further, they 
contend that the “public interest here favors protecting as many people as possible from contracting 
a serious case of a potentially deadly illness.”  (Id. at 28.)  Defendants conclude here that Plaintiffs’ 
refusal to be vaccinated not only harms themselves but possibly harms other students, faculty, and 
staff.  (Id. at 29.)   
C. Plaintiffs’ Reply 
Plaintiffs begin their reply by reiterating that Ms. Pinto faces irreparable harm because her 
right to informed consent and to refuse unwanted medical treatment under the Due Process Clause 
was chilled by the Policy.  (Reply at 5.)  They also deny that there was delay on their part.  (Id.)  
They claim Rutgers was to blame by allowing Ms. Pinto to register for her class without uploading 
vaccination documentation and waiting until August 26 to block her account, long after the final 
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August 18 deadline for her to submit proof of vaccination.  (Id.)  By failing to act, Plaintiffs say 
Rutgers confirmed her belief that she could register for an online class.  (Id.)   
Next, Plaintiffs maintain they are likely to succeed on the merits.  (Id.)  They contend that 
Defendants misinterpret Jacobson.  (Id. at 6.)  Jacobson requires that the statute regulation be 
reasonable and necessary, and Defendants fail to offer any “explanation why its mandate upon a 
fully remote student – as opposed to all other students – is reasonable or necessary.”  (Id. at 5-6.)  
Here, Plaintiffs insist the Policy is neither reasonable or necessary because Ms. Pinto is not on 
campus and cannot transmit the virus, nor proportional because unvaccinated professors and 
students are permitted to teach and attend classes indoors.  (Id. at 6.)  
Plaintiffs assert that the cases Defendants cite are all distinguishable because none of the 
injunctions sought in those cases concern a mandate on a remote student.  (Id. at 6–7.)  Plaintiffs 
contend that under Jacobson, the Policy here does not have a real and substantial relation to 
Rutgers’ purported goals because they argue Ms. Pinto is “a person sitting at home on a computer, 
miles away from campus” and “is not a threat to other students.”  (Id. at 8.)  Therefore, “it is 
extreme to keep Ms. Pinto from completing her course work at Rutgers based upon the implausible 
threat of infecting other students.”  (Id.)  Plaintiffs further argue that the Policy is discriminatory 
because it treats Ms. Pinto differently from unvaccinated professors, staff, students, and members 
of the public they claim are routinely allowed on campus.  (Id.)  Plaintiffs also argue at length that 
the Defendants lack the authority to mandate the Policy.2  (Id. at 8–13.)   
 
2 Plaintiffs raise on Reply for the first time that Rutgers lacks the statutory and legal authority to mandate a COVID-
19 vaccine.  This is improper and the Court will ignore these arguments.  See, e.g., Judge v. United States, 119 
F.Supp.3d 270, 284 (D.N.J. 2015) (a moving party may not raise new issues in reply brief that it should have raised 
in its initial brief).  Incredibly, Plaintiffs’ omission was not an oversight, it was calculated.  They say they did not 
address the provisions earlier because they disagree that the statutes and regulations cited by Rutgers convey the 
authority it claims and “this Court should not be persuaded by a cryptic 30+ year old regulation” to the contrary.  
(Reply at 9–10.)  
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III. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Rule 65 governs temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
65; Vuitton v. White, 945 F.2d 569, 573 (3d Cir. 1991).  A restraining order loses its temporary 
status and becomes a preliminary injunction if it continues beyond a ten-day limit.  Id.  (citing Sims 
v. Greene, 160 F.2d 512, 517 (3d Cir. 1947)).  Courts “will look beyond terminology to the actual 
content, purport, and effect of that which may otherwise described as a temporary restraining order 
or as a preliminary injunction.”  In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litig., 689 F.2d 1150, 1155 n.7 
(3d Cir. 1982).   
“Preliminary injunctive relief is an ‘extraordinary remedy, which should be granted only 
in limited circumstances.’”  Ferring Pharms., Inc. v. Watson Pharms, Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (quoting Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merk Consumer 
Pharms. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002).  As the Court emphasizes, “there is no power the 
exercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation, and sound 
discretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuing [of] an injunction.”  FM 103.1, 
Inc. v. Universal Broad., 929 F. Supp. 187, 193 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing E.B. v. Poritz, 914 F. Supp. 
85, 90 (D.N.J. 1996)).  A Court should only issue an injunction “if the plaintiff produces evidence 
sufficient to convince the district court that all four factors favor preliminary relief.”  AT&T v. 
Winback & Conserve Program, 42 F.3d 1421, 1427 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).  Further, it 
is within “the sound discretion of the district judge” to balance all of these factors “in making a 
decision.”  Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). 
A party seeking a preliminary injunction must satisfy the traditional four-factor test: (1) a 
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is 
denied; (3) granting relief will not result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) the 
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public interest favors such relief.  Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. 
Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 2004).  Of the four requirements, this Circuit has placed 
significant weight “on the probability of irreparable harm and the likelihood of success on the 
merits” factors.  FM 103.1, Inc., 929 F. Supp. at 193.  “A likelihood of success on the merits 
requires ‘a showing significantly better than negligible but not necessarily more likely than not.’” 
Durel B. v. Decker, 455 F. Supp. 3d 99, 106 (D.N.J. 2020).  The strength of a claim “depends on 
the balance of the harms: the more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker the plaintiff's 
claim on the merits can be while still supporting some preliminary relief.’”  Id.  (quoting Hoosier 
Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009)).  
IV. 
DISCUSSION 
After a careful review of the parties’ submissions and relevant case law, this Court 
concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their burden to warrant the imposition of an injunction.3  
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
Given the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson, and persuasive authorities 
from other circuits on this issue, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their burden that 
they are likely to succeed on the merits.  In Jacobson v. Massachusetts, a state statute was 
challenged that required all Massachusetts residents to be vaccinated or face a fine or 
imprisonment.  197 U.S. 11, 26.  The defendant, an unvaccinated resident criminally charged with 
violating the statute, argued that the law was “unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive” and 
therefore violated his constitutionally protected liberty interest.  Id.  The Court reasoned that the 
 
3  The Court notes that Plaintiffs’ original motion sought an emergent temporary restraining order.  Time has passed 
since the initial filing because Plaintiffs elected to set aside this motion in favor of pursuing a motion to recuse the 
undersigned.  More importantly, Plaintiffs have also expanded the relief they seek.  They now request that the Court 
order Rutgers to permit Ms. Pinto to register for classes for the Spring 2022 semester.  (Reply at 15.)  Accordingly, 
the Court views the Motion as one seeking a preliminary injunction rather than a temporary restraining order.  The 
analysis does not differ.  
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Constitution does not convey an absolute right in every person to be “wholly freed from restraint.”  
Id.  It was not for the courts to decide what was “likely to be effective for the protection of the 
public against disease.”  Id. at 30.  That was for the legislature to determine, given all the 
information “it had or could obtain.”  Id.  The Court applied a deferential standard and asserted 
that it would only find a statute unconstitutional if it purported to protect public health, safety, and 
morals but did not, or if it did not have any “real or substantial relation” to protecting public health.  
Id. at 31.  The Court then concluded that the Massachusetts statute was not unconstitutional 
because it did have a real and substantial relation to protecting public health and safety, given the 
spread of smallpox in many states.  Id. at 31–32.   
Here, although Plaintiffs have rights to informed consent and to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment, as Jacobson explained, these rights are not absolute.   Jacobson 197 U.S. at 26.  Second, 
like Jacobson, it is for the legislature not the Courts to determine what modes of protection would 
likely be effective against the vaccine.  Third, given the severity and number of cases and deaths 
during the COVID-19 pandemic so far, there is a real and substantial relation between the Policy 
and the need to protect public health.  Last, as the Jacobson Court noted then, other states and 
countries in Europe have likewise enacted similar vaccine policies giving more legitimacy to the 
Policy at issue. Therefore, based on Jacobson, Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on the merits.   
This Court also finds Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Jacobson unpersuasive.  The statute 
in Jacobson was even more stringent than Rutgers’ Policy, providing easier grounds for this Court 
to deny injunctive relief.  First, unlike the statute in Jacobson, there is no penalty for failure to 
comply with the Policy.  In fact, Plaintiffs concede this very point in their Motion stating, 
“[a]dditionally, there is no penalty or sanction provision expressed in the Policy for a student’s 
failure to submit evidence of COVID-19 immunization.”  (Plaintiffs’ Memorandum at 3.)  Second, 
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the Policy provides exemptions unlike the one in Jacobson; another point Plaintiffs concede in 
their Motion. (See Couns. Decl. Ex. A., ECF No. 10-3) (appending the Rutgers’ policy discussing 
exceptions and exemptions from the vaccine requirements.).  Finally, like Jacobson, there is a 
public health rationale via the ongoing COVID-19 disease that provides grounds for the Policy.   
As Defendants point out, other courts have addressed vaccine mandates or policies and 
have ruled similar challenges also fail.   In Klaassen v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., the Seventh 
Circuit rejected a similar challenge to Indiana University’s vaccination policy brought by some of 
its students.  7 F.4th 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2021).  In that case, eight students from Indiana University 
challenged the university’s policy requiring that “all students  . . .  must be vaccinated against 
COVID-19 unless they [were] exempt for religious or medical reasons.”  Id. at 592.  The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge to the law, holding that “this case is easier than Jacobson for the 
University.”  Id. at 593.  The court explained that unlike in Jacobson, the university’s policy had 
both religious and medical exceptions.  Id.  Further, the court explained that “Indiana does not 
require every adult member of the public to be vaccinated, as Massachusetts did in Jacobson.”  Id.  
The Court also added that those who do not wish to be vaccinated “may go elsewhere” and seek 
other educational opportunities.  Id.  The Court concluded that “[i]f conditions of higher education 
may include surrendering property and following instructions about what to read and write, it is 
hard to see a greater problem with medical conditions that help all students remain safe when 
learning.”   Id. at 594.   
Harris v. Univ. of Massachusetts, Lowell is another example where a court denied 
Plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief which sought to prevent University of Massachusetts from 
enforcing vaccine requirements prior to the Fall semester.  Civ. No. 21-11244, 2021 WL 3848012, 
at *8 (D. Mass. Aug. 27, 2021).  In that case, UMass imposed vaccine requirements for students 
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seeking to be on campus during the fall semester.  Id. at *2.  Two students, one who sought 
exemptions and the other who did not, brought the suit alleging that by failing to be vaccinated 
they faced expulsion.  Id.  The court disagreed and held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed 
on the merits because it rejected their claim that the university vaccine policy left them without an 
option.  Id. at *5. The UMass policy only “prohibited [students] from in-person classes, 
dormitories and other activities” and still allowed them to be “enrolled and  . . . still take classes.”  
Id.  The Court further added that the policy was “generally applicable to all students and formulated 
prospectively toward the fall semester.”  Id.   The Court found that rational basis review applied 
because protecting the public health and safety vis-à-vis curbing the spread of COVID-19 was a 
rational government interest.  Id. at *6.  The Policy was rationally related because UMass “based 
the decision upon both medical and scientific evidence and research.”  Id.  See also Norris v. 
Stanley, Civ. No. 21-756, 2021 WL 3891615 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 31, 2021) (denying an employees’ 
petition for injunctive relief against Michigan State University’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate 
given the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jacobson and other persuasive authorities, 
Plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate that she has a constitutionally protected property interest in her 
employment, and Plaintiff’s inability to show the vaccine policy was not rationally related to a 
legitimate government interest.). 
Plaintiffs are understandably eager to distinguish Ms. Pinto’s particular case by self-
applying the label of “fully remote student” and contending that her decision not to be vaccinated 
therefore cannot pose a risk to students on campus. But Rutgers defines what constitutes a fully 
remote student, not Ms. Pinto, and she does not meet Rutgers’ definition.  She is not a fully remote 
student within the context of the Rutgers system.  The class she registered for is not an officially 
remote one and therefore Plaintiffs cannot show a distinction.  Plaintiffs appear to believe that Ms. 
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Pinto’s self-proclaimed “remote” status entitles her to not comply with the Policy.  However, her 
words alone—that she will not physically be on campus—do not persuade the Court that she will 
be fully remote, nor do they prevent Ms. Pinto from coming on campus.  Here, Ms. Pinto’s promise 
is insufficient and leaves Defendants with no mechanism for enforcement if she decides to appear 
on campus.   
B. Irreparable Harm to the Moving Party 
Further, this Court is not persuaded Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm or injury if a 
preliminary injunction is not granted.  Here, though Plaintiffs contend they will suffer irreparable 
harm if injunctive relief is not granted, any purported harm Plaintiffs may face is of their delay. 
On March 25, 2021, the Policy was announced requiring all students to comply with Rutgers’ 
vaccination requirements.  On April 13, 2021, the Policy was adopted. On July 23, 2021, Plaintiffs’ 
lawyer submitted a letter with the Court arguing that the mandate had no exceptions.  On August 
30, 2021, two days before classes began, Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief.  The Court lists these 
dates to highlight that Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to seek injunctive relief, given their 
advance notice of the Policy.  Plaintiffs could have sought a preliminary injunction several months 
and weeks before the semester began rather than days before.  However, Plaintiffs failed to do so. 
Courts have expressed “a Plaintiffs delay in seeking preliminary injunctive relief” shows 
“evidence that speedy relief is not needed.”  EMSL Analytical, Inc. v. Testamerica Analytical 
Testing Corp., No. 05-5259, 2006 WL 892718, at *12 (D.N.J. Apr. 4, 2006);  Lanin v. Borough of 
Tenafly, No. 12-3399, 2013 WL 936363, at *3 (3d Cir. Mar. 12, 2013) (“Preliminary injunctions 
are generally granted under the theory that there is an urgent need for speedy action to protect the 
plaintiffs’ rights . . . [and] [d]elay[s] in seeking enforcement of those rights . . . tends to indicate at 
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least a reduced need for such drastic, speedy action.”) (quoting Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 
F.2d 273, 275 (2d Cir.1985)) (internal citations omitted). 
Here, Plaintiffs waited five months after Rutgers announced the Policy to seek relief for 
injunctive relief.  The Court finds that this delay created a self-inflicted harm that Plaintiffs suffer 
and therefore it cannot grant injunctive relief. Further, even if this Court were to grant injunctive 
relief, such a remedy is moot given Ms. Pinto’s initial and mistaken belief that she only required 
the one class at issue to graduate. Upon Defendants’ assertion, Ms. Pinto now concedes that she 
would be required to return to Rutgers in the Spring or another semester in order to complete her 
degree.  Ms. Pinto will not suffer irreparable harm when such a harm is self-inflicted by her delay 
in seeking relief and that even if she were allowed to attend the class at issue, she would not have 
accrued enough credits to graduate.   
C. Harm to the Non-moving Party 
Plaintiffs asserted that Defendants will not be injured by an injunctive order requiring it to 
follow its own Policy to exempt from its vaccination requirement those students who are fully 
remote.  They contended that these students’ decisions will not impact Defendants’ purported 
health and safety concerns because they do not need to physically come to campus for coursework. 
However, the Court finds it is reasonable that Defendants may suffer administrative harm if an 
injunctive relief were granted.  Defendants would be required to develop and adopt policies and 
make new procedures to accommodate Plaintiffs’ whenever they were on campus. These policies 
may require the following: (1) prior notice anytime any of the Plaintiffs appear on campus, (2) 
physical safety accommodations for others in the Rutgers’ community while also accommodating 
the unvaccinated students, and (3) maintenance and safety measures in every room and building 
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the unvaccinated students appeared.  The Court certainly finds these measures may be harmful to 
Defendants in time, costs, and efforts.   
D. Public Interest 
The Court concludes that Plaintiffs also cannot show the public interest is served if it were 
to grant injunctive relief.  In fact, the public may likely be harmed if the Court were to do so.  
Specifically, it would place the health and safety of others inside and out of Rutgers’ community 
at risk.  The public interest of preventing COVID-19, a virus that has taken the lives of many New 
Jersey residents will not be served if this Court were to bar Rutgers from enforcing the Policy.   As 
the Court in Klassen noted,  “[e]nabling . . . this state university to work through these problems 
reasonably fosters public health and safety in areas of scientific uncertainty.”  See Klaassen, 2021 
WL 3073926, at *43 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)); Harris, 2021 WL 
3848012, at *8 (noting there was a “strong public interest” in “preventing further spread of 
COVID-19 on campus, a virus which has infected and take the lives of thousands of Massachusetts 
residents.”)  Further, given that many students around campuses are returning to in-person classes 
this semester and the considerable size of Rutgers’ student population, were this Court to grant 
injunctive relief, thousands of students may possibly be at risk.  Therefore, this Court finds that 
there is a strong public interest against granting injunctive relief.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not shown that a 
preliminary injunction is warranted in this case.  Plaintiffs’ motion will therefore be denied.  An 
appropriate order will follow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       s/ Zahid N Quraishi                   . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ZAHID N. QURAISHI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  
Case 3:21-cv-15333-ZNQ-TJB   Document 27   Filed 09/27/21   Page 15 of 15 PageID: 389

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