How Much Did Blueacorn Make From Pandemic Relief?

I. Blueacorn's own number, and four others

The $1.08 billion comes from a document the public has not seen. Blueacorn gave the House Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis a "Simplified Cash Flow Statement" covering January 1, 2021 to February 28, 2022 (Bates BA-SSCC-0000121-22). The Subcommittee's December 2022 staff report, "We Are Not the Fraud Police," summarized it: "Blueacorn received over $1.08 billion from its lending partners as fees for its PPP services in 2021. According to internal financial information obtained by the Select Subcommittee, Prestamos paid Blueacorn $700 million and Capital Plus paid Blueacorn $386 million in PPP processing fees" (House report, p. 23 and nn. 152–153). The two payments sum to $1.086 billion.

Four other figures circulate, and they answer different questions:

Question	Figure	Source	Kind
What did the two lenders pay Blueacorn, Jan. 2021 to Feb. 2022?	$1.08 billion to $1.086 billion ($700M from Prestamos, $386M from Capital Plus)	Blueacorn's cash-flow statement, as the House report describes it	reported ($700M and $386M)
What did Blueacorn tell Congress it had received?	about $1.03 billion, out of about $1.84 billion in lender fees	Blueacorn's letter to the Subcommittee, Feb. 4, 2022	company statement
What do the contract rates imply?	$1.17 billion to $1.23 billion	the lenders' modeled SBA fees times the contract splits (section IV)	modeled
What did Blueacorn's co-founder say it had made?	"nearly $1.5 billion dollars in less than half a year"	Nathan Reis's text messages, as the House report paraphrases them (p. 23)	claim
What went to the owners?	$258 million	the cash-flow statement, as the House report describes it (p. 26)	reported

The $1.03 billion and the $1.08 billion are consistent: the letter is dated three weeks before the cash-flow statement ends. Both are cash received, and both contracts deferred part of Blueacorn's share until borrowers applied for forgiveness, so cash lags the contract formulas. Reis's $1.5 billion is higher than every other figure in the table, including the contract formulas.

II. Who paid Blueacorn, and under which rule

The money started at the SBA. Under the CARES Act, the SBA paid lenders a processing fee on every PPP loan they made. For loans made on or after December 27, 2020, the fee on a loan of $50,000 or less was "the lesser of fifty (50) percent or $2,500"; loans from $50,000 to $350,000 paid 5 percent, and larger ones 3 percent or 1 percent (86 FR 3692; 86 FR 3712). In 2020 the small-loan fee had been 5 percent (85 FR 20811).

Say a sole proprietor borrowed $15,000 in 2021. Under the 2020 schedule her lender would have earned $750. Under the 2021 schedule it earned $2,500, a sixth of the loan. The average loan on the two Blueacorn lenders' books was $15,549 (SBA loan-level data, summed on the Blueacorn network page).

The same rule told SBA to pay the fee "not later than 5 days after the reported disbursement of the PPP loan" and barred it from requiring repayment "unless the lender is found guilty of an act of fraud in connection with the PPP loan" (86 FR 3692).

The SBA paid lenders only. Anyone else had to be paid by a lender. An agent who helped a borrower prepare an application could collect no more than 1 percent on a loan up to $350,000, out of the lender's fee, and could not charge the borrower at all (85 FR 20811). Agents who sued to be paid even that much lost.

Blueacorn signed as something else: a lender service provider, doing the lender's own work under contract. Its subsidiary Fin Cap, Inc. signed the agreement with Capital Plus Financial, LLC in January 2021, effective October 23, 2020. The House report quotes it as having Blueacorn provide "staff services" to Capital Plus "to carry out certain functions related to the PPP Loan Portfolio rather than hiring employees directly for those same staff functions." According to the House report, Prestamos signed on April 14, 2021, with another subsidiary, BA PPP Fin, LLC, for Blueacorn to engage "in the origination, marketing, underwriting, and funding of loans" (House report, p. 22). Blueacorn's lawyers described the pay in a letter of January 12, 2022 (Subcommittee's Blueacorn documents):

• Capital Plus: "an initial 20% share of SBA fees received by Capital Plus for each loan (with 50% of this amount held back until the borrower applied for SBA forgiveness for the underlying loan), which compensated Blueacorn for the amount that Blueacorn paid marketers to advertise on the internet; and (ii) 41% of the remaining SBA fees (and 8% for two of Blueacorn's initial founders, who had since exited)."
• Prestamos: "Blueacorn earned 70% of the SBA fees received by Prestamos for each loan, with 10% of Blueacorn's share held back until the borrower either completed a forgiveness application or the loan matured."

On a $2,500 fee, Capital Plus owed Blueacorn $500 up front, half of it deferred, plus 41 percent of the remaining $2,000, or $820: $1,320 in all, 52.8 percent of the fee. The two departed founders' 8 percent was not Blueacorn's. Under a settlement of April 12, 2021, the founders' companies allege, Capital Plus paid it to YXS Investments, Inc., and at YXS's request the money went to companies of Michael Cota and James Flores (YXS Investments, Inc. v. Capital Plus Financial, LLC, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cv-00664-P, complaint, paras. 20–24). It came to $160 or $200 on a $2,500 fee, depending on its base. Prestamos owed $1,750, of which $175 waited for the forgiveness application.

Blueacorn's launch homepage, in May 2020, explained the arrangement to borrowers: "Our service is 100% FREE because The CARES Act mandates banks pay us a fee, if they approve your loan. That means, we don't get paid, if you don't get funded" (homepage, May 6, 2020). The CARES Act mandated a fee from the SBA to the lender; the lender's payment to Blueacorn was a private contract. The second sentence was accurate.

Its FAQ of March 2021 asked, "Why don't I see other similar services available?" and answered, "Because it's not as profitable to help smaller businesses" (FAQ, March 19, 2021). Under the 2021 schedule the smallest loans paid the highest fee per dollar lent. The largest loans still paid the most per loan: a $1.9 million loan paid its lender 3 percent, $57,000, and at Prestamos's split Blueacorn's share of that would have been $39,900, as much as 23 small loans. In messages the Subcommittee obtained, Stephanie Hockridge, a co-founder, complained of "a $1.9M deal that's been sitting in UW [underwriting] Ready for 5 DAYS!!!" and reminded the contractor who supervised reviewers that "closing these monster loans will get everyone paid" (House report, p. 34).

III. How many loans: 739,282, by Blueacorn's count

Blueacorn told the Subcommittee that more than 1.7 million applicants completed its initial screening in 2021 and that it approved 739,282 applications and sent them to its lenders for funding. It also said it had supported "808,000 small business owners / sole proprietors via disbursement of $12.5 billion in SBA PPP funds" (House report, pp. 21–22). It said over 4.1 million people started an application (p. 22).

The SBA's loan-level file puts 444,780 PPP loans ($6.85 billion) at Prestamos and 395,359 ($6.21 billion) at Capital Plus: 840,139 loans and $13.06 billion (Blueacorn network page; Prestamos; Capital Plus). That is an upper bound on Blueacorn's volume, because it includes Prestamos's 925 loans of 2020 and the 2021 loans either lender made outside Blueacorn. Prestamos told the Subcommittee that about 439,622 of its Round 3 loans were "processed and funded through the Blueacorn Platform," out of about 551,153 applications submitted to SBA (letter of Aug. 18, 2022, Subcommittee's Blueacorn documents). Capital Plus's parent described one lender service provider agreement and, apart from it, about 500 loans referred by partner banks and processed on a third-party platform (Crossroads FY2021 annual disclosure, note 6).

Reading SBA's May 2021 report, the House report counted Capital Plus and Prestamos as the two largest PPP lenders of 2021 by number of loans, and said that they "together facilitated almost three times as many PPP loans in 2021 than JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America combined" (p. 20). The 840,139 loans are 63.8 percent of the 1,316,501 PPP loans made by community development lenders (The CDFI channel was a fintech channel).

Per application Blueacorn approved and forwarded, the $1.08 billion comes to about $1,460. Spread across both lenders' whole books, it is about $1,290 a loan.

IV. The model: $1.17 billion to $1.23 billion at contract rates

Priced loan by loan under the published schedules, Prestamos earned about $1,053.8 million in SBA fees on its 2021 loans and Capital Plus $937.3 million (PPP lenders by estimated fees). By that model they were the first- and third-largest fee earners of 2021, with Harvest Small Business Finance between them. Together that is $1.99 billion, about one dollar in ten of the $20.07 billion the model gives all lenders for 2021.

Blueacorn's $1.086 billion, the cash paid by February 2022, is 54.5 percent of that pool: 66 percent of Prestamos's fees and 41 percent of Capital Plus's. What each lender was left with is a separate figure. Capital Plus's comes from the audited group accounts of its parent, Crossroads, whose consolidating schedules (unaudited for fiscal 2021) put every PPP fee line in Capital Plus's column: $929.2 million of PPP fees over the fiscal years 2021 to 2023, less $623.5 million expensed as fees to Capital Plus's lending service partners, leaves $305.7 million before interest, salaries and taxes (FY2021 annual disclosure; FY2023 audited financials, note 19). Prestamos's figure is modeled: its fees less the $700 million leave at most $355 million, before the holdbacks still due to Blueacorn.

Applying the contract rates to the modeled fees gives a range for what Blueacorn had earned once every holdback was released:

Lender	Modeled SBA fees on Blueacorn loans	Contract rate	Implied ($M)	Paid by Feb. 2022 ($M)
Prestamos	≈$1,043M (439,622 loans at the book's $2,372 average) to $1,054M (whole 2021 book)	70%	730–738	700
Capital Plus	$937.3M	52.8% (Blueacorn's letter) or 47% (Schedule A, as the YXS complaint quotes it); the departed founders' 8% went to YXS	441–495	386
Total			1,171–1,233	1,086

Prestamos's figure fits its contract. Ninety percent of $730 million, the share paid before forgiveness, is $657 million, and Prestamos had paid $700 million, somewhere between the upfront amount and the full amount.

Capital Plus's fits one of its two rates. Besides the $386 million, the Crossroads group had accrued another $80 million as due to Blueacorn under Capital Plus's contract by October 31, 2023, while disputing that it was owed (FY2023 audited financials, note 19): $466 million in all. Set beside that, the 52.8 percent rate leaves about $25 million to $29 million unaccounted for, and the 47 percent rate leaves nothing. That difference is a reconciliation item, not a finding of underpayment. The range allows for the roughly 500 bank-referred loans, which the SBA file does not identify; their fees came to at most $6.5 million. No document we have gives the amount of any payment after February 2022. Fin Cap's application to confirm the arbitration award says that "a portion of funds has been paid and resolved" between Capital Plus and Blueacorn, without saying how much (application, para. 10). On July 31, 2024, the accrued liabilities in Capital Plus's column of the group's consolidating balance sheet were $69,978,515, less than the $80 million accrual alone (financial statements for the quarter to July 31, 2024).

Capital Plus's parent, Crossroads Systems, booked $868.4 million of "PPP administrative fees" for the fiscal year ended October 31, 2021 and $628.1 million of "PPP processing fees" as an expense, both entirely in Capital Plus's column of its consolidating schedule; Crossroads said the fees "were paid to the Company's lending service partners." That is 72 percent of Capital Plus's fee income. At year-end, $256.2 million of "Lender Service Provider Fees" was still carried as an accrued liability (Crossroads FY2021 annual disclosure, notes 6 and 8). Blueacorn's statement shows $386 million received from Capital Plus by February 2022. The disclosure does not split the $628.1 million by payee, so it does not show whether any of it reached Womply, which said it "referred 86,521 PPP loans to Capital Plus through Blueacorn" and sued for $76,714,482.67 in fees (First Amended Complaint, N.D. Tex. 3:21-cv-02636). The documents that would settle it are the Capital Plus agreement (BA-SSCC-0000026-40) and the cash-flow statement itself; neither is in the Blueacorn documents the Subcommittee released.

Under the 2020 schedule, 5 percent of every dollar the two lenders lent comes to at most $653 million, for both lenders' entire books. That is less than Blueacorn alone received. At the same contract rates, Blueacorn's share of the 2020-schedule fees would have been about $386 million to $404 million. Program-wide, the 2021 schedule added $8.74 billion to lenders' fees for that year (The 2021 fee schedule).

V. Where the $1.08 billion went

The House report described the cash-flow statement line by line (pp. 26–27):

Use	Amount	Share of income
Paynerd (marketing and lead generation)	$666 million	over 60%
Owners' profits	$258 million	about 24%
Technology	$51,597,240	4.75%
Eligibility verification	$13,713,563	1.26%
Fraud prevention	$8,682,207	0.79%
Customer service and support	not given in dollars	0.75%

Paynerd, also called Paynerdier, was "a marketing company founded and operated by Blueacorn Strategic Advisor Matt Mandell and Blueacorn Chief Marketing Officer Taylor Hendricksen" (p. 26). Its $666 million was "almost 50 times" what Blueacorn spent on eligibility verification (p. 2). Divided by the 739,282 applications Blueacorn forwarded, it is about $901 each.

Paynerd was paid the way Blueacorn was paid. Blueacorn's marketing partners "shared a percentage of Blueacorn's revenue on funded loans" (Blueacorn letter, Mar. 25, 2022), and Blueacorn told the Subcommittee that Paynerd "was compensated only for marketing leads that ripened into completed loans." The report added that Blueacorn's "own revenue and the compensation of many of its executives was also tied to the number of applications that ripened into completed loans" (p. 31).

Blueacorn's own lawsuit against Paynerd, filed in Delaware Superior Court on December 23, 2021, gives Blueacorn's account of how that worked in practice. Starting in early April 2021, it alleges, as the first lender received its lending fees from the SBA it "would promptly wire a fixed percentage of those fees—well over half of Blueacorn's share—directly to PayNerd," as an advance to be reconciled later. The referral contracts priced each loan by where the applicant came from: "PayNerd Generated," "Company Generated," or "Blueacorn Generated." Blueacorn alleges that Paynerd controlled the coding that decided which, and billed nearly 86,000 organic loans at the "more generous" Paynerd rate. The dollar figures in the public version of the complaint are redacted (complaint, in the Subcommittee's Blueacorn documents). Blueacorn's lawyers told the Subcommittee the suit sought "to recover at least $175 million" (letter of Feb. 4, 2022).

Paynerd's counterclaims allege the reverse: that Blueacorn, Reis, co-founder Noah Spirakus and chief executive Barry Calhoun misrepresented Blueacorn's capacity, including a claimed ability to process "over 10,000 PPP loan applications per day." In August 2023 the court let Paynerd's breach-of-contract and fraudulent-inducement counterclaims proceed (Fin Cap Inc. v. PayNerd LLC, Del. Super. C.A. No. N21C-12-118 MMJ CCLD, opinion of Aug. 16, 2023). In January 2024 the Court of Chancery declined to dismiss Blueacorn's negligent-misrepresentation claim (Blueacorn PPP, LLC v. Pay Nerd LLC, Del. Ch. C.A. No. 2023-0414-MMJ, opinion of Jan. 29, 2024). Both rulings decide only whether the claims were pleaded well enough; neither decides who owes whom.

The $258 million in owners' profits was divided by an operating agreement the Subcommittee obtained: Spirakus held 50 percent, and Reis and Hockridge, who are married, jointly held the other 50. "This ownership stake could have entitled Mr. Spirakus to $129 million, while Mr. Reis and Ms. Hockridge would have shared the other half" (p. 27). Blueacorn declined to give the Subcommittee profits by owner. The report's citation for the operating agreement reads "(online at XXX)" (p. 97, n. 199). Its summary rounds the owners' $258 million to "nearly $300 million" (p. 2).

VI. What the fee bought

By the report's account, the fee bought little screening. Both lenders "largely delegated their fraud prevention and eligibility verification functions to Blueacorn" (p. 20). Blueacorn said it had "one direct employee who assisted with processing PPP loan applications" and "almost exclusively relied on third-party companies and contractors" (p. 24). Its "PPP Processing Script," the reviewers' main guide, told them: "if you are doubtful of a document authenticity but are not certain, the rule of thumb is to accept it" (p. 30). A former reviewer's complaint to SBA's Inspector General quoted Blueacorn management: "We want you to submit. The more you submit, the more we get paid" (p. 28). Blueacorn's compliance consultants told the Subcommittee that Reis and Hockridge had tried to charge some applicants up to 10 percent of the loan, which SBA rules prohibit (p. 36).

Under SBA rules, as the report quotes them, the loans stayed the lenders' responsibility: Capital Plus was required to "exercise[] day-to-day responsibility for evaluating, processing, closing, disbursing, servicing, liquidating, and litigating its SBA portfolio" (p. 43). It told the Subcommittee it "does not maintain statistics regarding the number of PPP loan applications that were manually reviewed by Capital Plus personnel" (p. 43). Prestamos said it "spot-check[ed] certain loans" and that the checks were "not formally logged or documented" (p. 44).

The Subcommittee's findings carry no penalty. Seven days after the report, on December 8, 2022, the SBA said it had "immediately suspended non-lenders Blueacorn and Womply ... from working with the SBA in any capacity" and opened investigations of eight lenders, Capital Plus and Prestamos among them (SBA statement).

VII. Restitution orders ran from $64 million to $66 million

The criminal cases concern fraudulent loans. In United States v. Reis & Hockridge, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00287-O (case filings), the indictment of November 14, 2024 named the two co-founders (indictment). Reis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud in August 2025. His factual resume stipulates that "through Blueacorn, Reis and his coconspirators submitted and caused to be submitted PPP loan applications that they knew contained materially false information in order to make more money," causing a lender "based in Bedford, Texas," Capital Plus's home, to fund them, and that they "charged borrowers fees based on a percentage of the loan amounts that were funded" (factual resume, Doc. 272). The resume does not name the lender.

A jury convicted Hockridge of conspiracy on June 20, 2025. The Justice Department's account of the trial evidence names the fee as a motive: "To get more kickbacks from borrowers and a higher percentage of lender fees from the SBA, Hockridge and her co-conspirators submitted PPP loan applications that they knew contained materially false information" (DOJ, Nov. 21, 2025). Each was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Hockridge was ordered to pay over $63 million in restitution and Reis over $66 million; DOJ said Reis and his co-conspirators "processed over 530 fraudulent loans causing over $65 million in losses" (DOJ, Dec. 18, 2025). Hockridge has appealed her conviction (ABC15). A third co-founder, James Flores, pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 41 months, with $64,391,256.84 in restitution joint and several with Reis and Hockridge (amended judgment, United States v. Flores, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00306-Y, Doc. 84).

The losses in those cases, about $65 million, equal 6 percent of the fees Blueacorn collected. The defendants were individuals; Blueacorn and its lenders were not charged in those cases, and neither Paynerd nor Spirakus was a defendant.

Womply's suit over its Capital Plus fees named BA Fin Orion, LLC d/b/a Blueacorn and Calhoun, alongside Capital Plus, its parent Crossroads and Donnelly; the court dismissed the claims against BA Fin Orion and Calhoun without prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction on April 11, 2022 (order, N.D. Tex. 3:21-cv-02636-B, Doc. 68). In Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, E.D. Pa. No. 5:21-cv-04337, borrowers alleged that Prestamos reported their loans as funded, collected the fees, and never sent them the money. The court summarized Prestamos's answer: it had Blueacorn review loans that borrowers' banks returned with fraud codes, and "kept the loan processing fees because the government said that it could" (memorandum opinion, Apr. 29, 2025). Class certification was denied, and the case was dismissed in September 2025 after the parties reported a settlement (order); a settlement is not an admission by either side.

VIII. "Best-in-class fraud detection" and other claims

In a press release on its website, Blueacorn said that it and its partners had helped more than 860,000 small businesses, processing about $14 billion in loans, "leveraging proprietary technologies and best-in-class fraud detection software to ensure PPP funds reached those who need them most" (Blueacorn press release). The Subcommittee's report said Blueacorn "relied on off-the-shelf fraud screening software" (p. 2), and its fraud-prevention line was $8.7 million, 0.79 percent of income. Blueacorn's own count to Congress was 808,000 borrowers and $12.5 billion.

In its February 2022 letter, Blueacorn told the Subcommittee that of about $1.03 billion received it had "itself spent in excess of $700 million dollars on the operational expenses associated with the services it provided to the lenders, including payment for marketing and referral services, eligibility verification services, customer service support, fraud prevention, and technology development and infrastructure costs." That is accurate as far as it goes. The cash-flow statement shows that $666 million of it was the first item on the list, paid to one firm, Paynerd.

Prestamos, a subsidiary of the nonprofit Chicanos Por La Causa, took on a volume its president later said it was "not prepared for" and explained why: "Who else is going to serve the rest of the country? Nobody else was doing it the way we were" (pp. 44–45). Crossroads' chief executive said in the second quarter of 2021 that "our success in the [PPP] has put us into the best position we have ever been in" (p. 44). For its 2021 fiscal year Crossroads reported $256.9 million of "Net Income from PPP" and consolidated net income for the group of $195.4 million; Capital Plus's own column of the unaudited consolidating schedule showed $265.0 million, before the group's income tax, which is booked in Crossroads' column (Crossroads FY2021 annual disclosure).

IX. Fourth, behind Womply and the two largest banks

Collector	How it was paid	Program receipts ($M)	Basis
Womply	technology and referral fees from seven lenders, 2021	1,847–2,641 billed	court records and modeled lender fees
JPMorgan Chase	SBA lender fees, 438,565 loans	1,700.2	modeled
Bank of America	SBA lender fees, 491,034 loans	1,491.1	modeled
Blueacorn	share of two lenders' fees; no loans of its own	1,080–1,086	reported
Cross River	SBA lender fees, 478,866 loans	1,034.6	modeled
RER Solutions (EIDL)	SBA processing contract	at least 357.3	SBA Inspector General audit and House invoices, to February 2021
Prestamos	SBA lender fees, less Blueacorn's share	up to 355.1	modeled less reported
Capital Plus	SBA lender fees, less fees booked to its service partners	305.7	audited group accounts; column per consolidating schedules

The lender figures other than Capital Plus's are modeled from the fee ranking and count both years of the program. They are accruals: the model assumes SBA paid a fee on every loan in the file. Capital Plus's is from its parent's audited group accounts for fiscal 2021 to 2023; the consolidating schedules place those lines in Capital Plus's column, and the fiscal 2021 schedule is unaudited. Womply's is what it billed; its collections were lower. Blueacorn's figure is cash received from January 2021 to February 2022. In the series ranking of fee collectors, on fees after payments to agents and with Womply ranked on its billings, Blueacorn is fourth. Capital Plus, ranked on its own column of its parent's books, is 23rd.

JPMorgan Chase was owed a modeled $1.70 billion over two years on $41.6 billion of loans it made: about $3,880 a loan. Blueacorn earned about $1,290 to $1,460 a loan without lending anything. Its $1.08 billion, received over fourteen months, is more than the model gives any single lender for 2021, including Prestamos at $1,053.8 million, and about 5.4 percent of all lender fees that year.

Womply billed 61 to 87 percent of the fees its lenders collected on its loans. Blueacorn's contracts gave it 47 to 52.8 percent at Capital Plus (the departed founders' 8 percent went to YXS, outside Blueacorn's share) and 70 percent at Prestamos; the cash it had received by February 2022 came to 41 percent and 66 percent. The Subcommittee put Womply's 2021 net income at over $1.3 billion (p. 57); Blueacorn passed $666 million to Paynerd and $258 million to its owners.

The fee rule let SBA take a lender's fee back only if the lender was "found guilty of an act of fraud in connection with the PPP loan." The people convicted in the Blueacorn cases were its founders. In April 2026 a federal judge ruled that the government could garnish the family trusts to which Reis and Hockridge had moved money from their brokerage accounts. The Justice Department said it expects to recover nearly $30 million (DOJ, May 19, 2026). The final order of garnishment is stayed while the garnishment appeals run, except as a stipulated order of June 8, 2026 provides (United States v. Reis, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00287-O, Docs. 456, 462 and 472), and no document we have shows any money recovered.

Method, and what would change the numbers

Blueacorn's cash-flow statement. Blueacorn's $1.08 billion, the $700 million from Prestamos, the $666 million to Paynerd, the $258 million in owners' profits and the spending lines are Blueacorn's cash-flow statement (Jan. 1, 2021 to Feb. 28, 2022; BA-SSCC-0000121-22) as the House report describes it; the statement itself is not public, and its figures are unaudited. The report's percentages imply a denominator of about $1.086 billion.

Reported. The $386 million from Capital Plus is Blueacorn's own statement, as the House report quotes it. Capital Plus's accounts do not name the payees of its $623.5 million in fees to service partners. The contract terms are Blueacorn's own description, in its letter of January 12, 2022; the 47 percent is Capital Plus's Schedule A as the YXS complaint quotes it (para. 19). Crossroads' figures are from its FY2021 annual disclosure and its audited financial statements for fiscal 2023, which carry the fiscal 2022 figures beside them; the consolidating schedules in both place the PPP fee lines in Capital Plus's column, and the group's income tax and management bonus in Crossroads'.

Modeled figures. Each lender's SBA fees are the loan-level file priced loan by loan under 85 FR 20811, 86 FR 3692 and 86 FR 3712. Prestamos's fees on Blueacorn loans take its 439,622-loan count at the average fee of its whole book. Capital Plus's implied share treats the 395,359 loans it originated as Blueacorn's; that base already leaves out the 1,402 loans it bought from Hanmi Bank. Its parent's disclosure names one lender service provider agreement and about 500 bank-referred loans, which the SBA file does not identify; even if they were the 500 largest loans in the book, their fees would total at most $6.5 million, or $3.4 million at 52.8 percent.

Claims. Reis's "nearly $1.5 billion" and "$750 million in cash" (House report, p. 23), the $129 million the report says Spirakus "could have" been entitled to, Blueacorn's $175 million claim against Paynerd and Paynerd's counterclaims are allegations or estimates, not findings.

Documents that would close the gaps. The cash-flow statement; the Capital Plus and Prestamos agreements (BA-SSCC-0000001-15 and BA-SSCC-0000026-40); the Paynerd referral agreements' Schedule A rates; the payee split of Capital Plus's $623.5 million; and any judgment in the Delaware cases.

Sources: Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Crisis, "We Are Not the Fraud Police" (Dec. 1, 2022); Select Subcommittee, Blueacorn documents (Sidley Austin letters of Jan. 12, Feb. 4 and Mar. 25, 2022; Prestamos letter of Aug. 18, 2022; Fin Cap and Blueacorn complaint against PayNerd); YXS Investments, Inc. v. Capital Plus Financial, LLC, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cv-00664-P (complaint, Doc. 1, July 17, 2024); Crossroads Systems FY2021 annual disclosure; Crossroads Impact Corp FY2023 audited financials; SBA PPP loan-level FOIA data (2024-09-30 release), priced under 85 FR 20811, 86 FR 3692 and 86 FR 3712; Blueacorn homepage, May 6, 2020; Blueacorn FAQ, Mar. 19, 2021; Blueacorn press release; SBA statement, Dec. 8, 2022; United States v. Reis & Hockridge, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00287-O (indictment, factual resume); United States v. Flores, N.D. Tex. No. 4:24-cr-00306-Y (amended judgment); DOJ releases of Nov. 21, 2025, Dec. 18, 2025 and May 19, 2026; Oto Analytics v. Capital Plus Financial, N.D. Tex. No. 3:21-cv-02636 (First Amended Complaint, order of Apr. 11, 2022); Fin Cap Inc. v. PayNerd LLC, Del. Super. (Aug. 16, 2023); Blueacorn PPP, LLC v. Pay Nerd LLC, Del. Ch. (Jan. 29, 2024); Marshall v. Prestamos CDFI, E.D. Pa. No. 5:21-cv-04337 (memorandum opinion, dismissal order); ABC15 on Hockridge's appeal. The House report is a partisan staff document released by the Democratic majority's staff in the final weeks of the 117th Congress, with no public hearing and no sworn testimony; an arbitrator refused it as "rank hearsay" that relied on companies then in arbitration with Womply, and a federal judge declined to take judicial notice of its findings (about the report).