Pandemic Darlings The pandemic economy, in original documents
Home Source documents Opinion — Blueacorn PPP, LLC v. Pay Nerd LLC (Del. Ch.)

Opinion — Blueacorn PPP, LLC v. Pay Nerd LLC (Del. Ch.)

Archived source: Download Aspx 328f2cf11cf636f0. Captured from courts.delaware.gov.

Cited in: Blueacorn · Matthew "Matt" Mandell · Taylor Hendricksen

Full text

    IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

BLUEACORN PPP, LLC,                   )
                                      )
      Plaintiff,                      )
                                      )
      v.                              )       C.A. No. 2023-0414-MMJ
                                      )
PAY NERD LLC, PAYNERDIER              )
LLC, MATTHEW MANDELL and              )
TAYLOR HENDRICKSEN,                   )
                                      )
      Defendants.                     )

                          Submitted: November 6, 2023
                           Decided: January 29, 2024
                           Unsealed: February 8, 2024

                  On Defendant Paynerd LLC, Paynerdier LLC,
                   Matthew Mandell, and Taylor Hendricksen’s
           Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Blueacorn PPP, LLC’s Complaint
                                    DENIED
                                    OPINION

A. Thompson Bayliss, Esq., Michael A. Barlow, Esq., Adam K. Shulman, Esq.,
Joseph A. Sparco, Esq., Abrams & Bayliss LLP, Wilmington, DE, Michael A. Levy,
Esq. (pro hac vice) (Argued), Charlotte K. Newell, Esq., Katelin Everson, Esq. (pro
hac vice), Sidley Austin LLP, New York, NY, Christopher M. Egleson, Esq. (pro hac
vice), Sidley Austin, Los Angeles, CA, Attorneys for Plaintiff Blueacorn PPP, LLC.

Francis DiGiovanni, Esq., Todd C. Schiltz, Esq., Renée M. Dudek, Esq., Faegre
Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Wilmington, DE, Breton Bocchieri, Esq. (pro hac vice)
(Argued), Michael B. Lachuk, Bocchieri & Lachuk, Los Angeles, CA, Attorneys for
Defendants PayNerd LLC, PayNerdier LLC, Matthew Mandell, and Taylor
Hendricksen

JOHNSTON, J.
                                          1
                      PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL CONTEXT

          The original complaint in this contract dispute was filed on December 23,

2021. Defendants filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs amended their

complaint. The Court heard argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts II,

III, V-VII, and X of the Amended Complaint.

          By Opinion dated November 3, 2022, the Court ruled that Counts I, II, IV, IX

and X remained. Counts V-VIII were dismissed without prejudice. Count III -

negligent misrepresentation - was dismissed because the Court of Chancery has

exclusive jurisdiction over equitable claims. Plaintiffs were granted leave to file an

election to transfer Count III to the Court of Chancery pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 1902.1

This Judge has been cross-designated as Vice Chancellor for the purpose of

addressing Count III (negligent misrepresentation) and all equitable defenses.

          On December 21, 2022, Defendants filed an Answer and Third-Party

Complaint, asserting various counterclaims. Plaintiffs filed motions to dismiss the

counterclaims and third-party claims. By Opinion dated August 16, 2023, the Court

ruled:

                The Court finds that PayNerd sufficiently pled its fraudulent
          inducement counterclaims by alleging that Blueacorn made
          misrepresentations of then-existing operational capacities that were

1
    See Fin Cap Inc. v. PayNerd LLC, 2023 WL 5543736, at *2 (Del. Super.).

                                                2
based on facts known to the speakers at the time the misrepresentations
were made. Under these case-specific factual allegations, whether or
not fraudulent inducement ultimately is determined to be beyond mere
puffery or fraud in hindsight will be determined in the context of
evidence, including facts relating to credibility and context.

       The Court finds PayNerd has alleged that Reis himself made
misrepresentations. The Court finds that the allegations are sufficiently
particularized to put Reis on notice. PayNerd may develop the factual
record through discovery to make the appropriate distinctions between
allegations attributable to closely related parties: Reis, Spirakus, and
Fin Cap.

     Therefore, the Court hereby DENIES Blueacorn’s and Reis’
Motions to Dismiss with respect to Counterclaim V. The Court hereby
DENIES Blueacorn’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Counterclaim
VI.

       The Court finds that PayNerd’s breach of contract claims go
beyond the alleged failure to process every single PPP loan application.
The breach of contract claims include other alleged breaches. The
Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist that prevent
dismissal of Counterclaims I and II. Therefore, the Court hereby
DENIES Blueacorn’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Counterclaims
I and II.

       The Court finds that Blueacorn had an implied duty to maintain
accurate Salesforce records. With respect to Blueacorn’s alleged duties
to provide application processing, to process all applications from
PayNerd, and not to mismanage internal operations, the Court finds the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing does not apply. Therefore,
Blueacorn’s Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART with respect to Counterclaims III and IV.
Counterclaims III and IV only may continue as to the alleged Salesforce
data integrity.

     The Court finds that PayNerd’s Counterclaims VII–XII are
unnecessarily duplicative of its contractual claims. Therefore,
PayNerd’s Counterclaims VII–XII are hereby DISMISSED.
                                   3
                 Plaintiffs’ and Third-Party Defendants Noah Spirakus’ and Barry
           Calhoun’s Motion to Dismiss PayNerd’s Counterclaims and Third-
           Party Claims is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN
           PART. Third-Party Defendant Nathan Reis’ Motion to Dismiss and
           Joinder is hereby DENIED.2

           Defendants have moved to dismiss the negligent misrepresentation claim.

                           MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

           When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court views the complaint in

the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accepts the well-pled allegations,

and draws reasonable inferences from those allegations.3

                                           ANALYSIS

           It is undisputed that Plaintiffs are not seeking an equitable remedy. Therefore,

the issue raised in this motion is whether Plaintiffs have alleged a relationship

sufficient to obtain jurisdiction in the Court of Chancery.

                        Negligent Misrepresentation - Required Duty

           Defendants argue that there is no equity jurisdiction.               Negligent

misrepresentation requires either a fiduciary or other special relationship.

Defendants assert Plaintiffs have failed to plead any relevant relationship. The

parties are sophisticated business entities and independent contractors whose


2
    Id. at *9-10.
3
    Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 703-04 (Del. 2009).

                                                  4
repleationships are governed by, and limited to, written commercial contracts that

were negotiated and performed at arms’ length.

          Plaintiffs counter that Pay Nerd had a pecuniary duty to provide accurate

information. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached that duty by supplying false

information, failing to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating

information, and that Plaintiffs suffered a pecuniary loss caused by justifiable

reliance upon the false information.

          Negligent misrepresentation is “essentially a species of fraud with a lesser

state of mind requirement.” However, there is an added element of pecuniary duty.4

          To assert a claim for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must plead four

elements: “(1) the defendant had a pecuniary duty to provide accurate information,

(2) the defendant supplied false information, (3) the defendant failed to exercise

reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the information, and (4) the plaintiff

suffered a pecuniary loss caused by justifiable reliance upon the false information.”5

          The Court of Chancery has clarified the requirements for equity jurisdiction,

based on negligent misrepresentation, in more recent case law. For example, in Addy




4
    Vichi v. Koninklijke Philips Elecs., N.V., 85 A.3d 725, 822 (Del. Ch. 2014).
5
    Steinman v. Levine, 2002 WL 31761252, at *15 (Del. Ch.).

                                                    5
v. Piedmonte,6 the plaintiff failed to allege the existence of a fiduciary relationship

regarding the transactions at issue. The Court concluded that the only reasonable

inference was that there was no special trust imposed or any special duty to protect

the plaintiff’s interests.

          “The Court of Chancery generally does not apply fiduciary duty doctrine to

ordinary commercial transactions... ‘[I]t is vitally important that the exacting

standards of fiduciary duties not be extended to quotidian commercial relationships.

This is true both to protect participants in such normal market activities from

unexpected sources of liability against which they were unable to protect themselves

and, perhaps more important, to prevent an erosion of the exacting standards applied

by courts of equity to persons found to stand in a fiduciary relationship to others.’

Bargained-for commercial relationships between sophisticated parties do not give

rise to fiduciary duties. In addition, [the Court of Chancery] is chary of expanding

the scope of fiduciary duty to a broad set of commercial relationships which

traditionally has been regulated by normal market conditions, rather than the




6
    2009 WL 707641 (Del. Ch.).

                                           6
scrupulous concerns of equity for persons in special relationships of trust and

confidence.”7

          A negligent misrepresentation claim must allege either: “(i) a special

relationship between the parties over which equity takes jurisdiction (like a fiduciary

relationship) or (ii) justification for a remedy that only equity can afford.”8 A generic

pecuniary interest is not sufficient. There must be a fiduciary relationship beyond a

normal arm’s-length business relationship.             The plaintiff must demonstrate its

dependence on the defendant - to provide information - “to such an extent as to

invoke the power of equity to regulate fiduciary relationships....”9

          The Court notes that rarely, if ever, does each party involved in a business

contract dispute not have a pecuniary interest in the transaction. If the Court were

to interpret “pecuniary duty” as broadly as asserted by Plaintiffs, virtually every

fraud-in-the-inducement or breach of warranty claim would be heard in the Court of

Chancery.



7
 Id. at *17 (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 872 A.2d 627-28 (Del. Ch. 2005),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 901 A.2d 106 (Del. 2006) and citing Prestancia Mgmt. Group,
Inc. v. Va. Heritage Found., II LLC, 2005 WL 1364616, at *6 (Del. Ch.)).
8
 Lyons Ins. Agency Inc. v. Wilson, 2018 WL 481641, at *4 (Del. Ch.) (quoting Envo, Inc. v.
Waters, 2009 WL 5173807, at *6 (Del. Ch.)); Fortis Advisors LLC v. Dialog Semiconductor
PLC, 2015 WL 401371, at *9 (Del. Ch.).
9
    Biegler v. Underwriting Service Mgmt. Co., LLC, 2022 WL 17820533, at *4 (Del. Ch.).

                                                7
                            Pleading with Particularity

      Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ negligent misrepresentation claims also fails

to satisfy the Court of Chancery Rule 9(b) requirement of pleading with particularity.

Specifically, Defendants assert that Plaintiffs have not articulated why statements by

some Defendants are attributable to all Defendants. Additionally, there are no

alleged misrepresentations purportedly made by any Defendant to the “actual

plaintiff” in this action - Blueacorn PPP, LLC.

      Plaintiffs’ contend that Defendants already have argued that Blueacorn could

not claim any reliance because Blueacorn had not yet been formed when Defendants

initially made their alleged misrepresentations. Defendants argue that negligent

misrepresentation cannot apply because Defendants’ alleged false statements were

directed to Fin Cap, not Blueacorn. Plaintiffs assert that this argument fails.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ misrepresentations continued to persist during the

period of time after Blueacorn was formed through the time the contract was

executed. The Defendant seller allegedly made false statements to a buyer, for the

purpose of inducing the Plaintiff buyer to form a new company in order to engage

in business with the seller. Under these circumstances, a claim against Defendants

can be stated, even though alleged misrepresentations were not made directly from

one named party to another.

      In the Opinion dated August 16, 2023, this Court found:
                                          8
             The Court finds that PayNerd sufficiently pled the elements of
      its    fraudulent    inducement      counterclaims—misrepresentation,
      knowledge of the falsity, intent, reliance, and damages. PayNerd
      sufficiently alleged that Blueacorn made misrepresentations of then-
      existing operational capacities that were based on facts known to the
      speakers at the time the misrepresentations were made. Under these
      case-specific factual allegations, whether or not fraudulent inducement
      ultimately is determined to be beyond mere puffery or fraud in
      hindsight will be determined in the context of evidence produced in
      discovery.       This is especially true because the alleged
      misrepresentations are oral, making credibility and context of greater
      importance.

      After considering the parties arguments on the issue of group pleading, the

Court found:

             The Court finds that imputation is not required in this case
      because the counterclaim does not allege that another’s statements
      should be imputed to Reis. Rather, PayNerd alleges that Reis himself
      made misrepresentations. Therefore, the instant case is more akin to
      River Valley and WeWork. The Court finds that the allegations are
      sufficiently particularized to put Reis on notice. It is reasonably
      conceivable that Reis is liable for the alleged misrepresentations.
      PayNerd should have the opportunity to develop the factual record
      through discovery to make the appropriate distinctions between
      allegations attributable to closely related parties: Reis, Spirakus, and
      Fin Cap.


      The reasoning applied denying dismissal of the counterclaims also applies to

Plaintiffs’ affirmative claims. Fin Cap Inc. and Blueacorn PPP, LLC are closely-

related.   Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged misrepresentation by claiming that




                                         9
Defendants’ purportedly false statements were made for the purpose of inducing a

buyer to form a new company to engage in business with the seller.10



                               Practical Considerations

       In response to questioning during oral argument, counsel for Pay Nerd

stated that dismissal of the negligent misrepresentation claim would streamline the

case at this stage in the litigation. Counsel asserted that, for example, fewer

witnesses would be necessary at trial and certain factual and legal issues would not

need to be addressed. Blueacorn’s counsel disagreed, stating that trial would involve

the same witnesses and evidence.

       When a judicial officer is cross-appointed to sit in both law and equity, the

jury is presented with special interrogatories to determine the issues of fact upon

which the legal claims depend. The Judge or Chancellor separately determines

whether the facts support liability for the claims sounding in equity.

       In this case, the Court is not persuaded that judicial economy will be served

by dismissing the negligent misrepresentation claim at this time. Counsel did not

provide any specifics about what witnesses or discovery would become superfluous.

Although Pay Nerd argued that there would be additional factual issues regarding

10
 See Trascent Mgmt. Consulting, LLC v. Bouri, 2018 WL 4293359, at *12 (Del. Ch.); Nye
Odorless Incinerator Corp. v. Felton, 162 A. 504, 508-509 (Del. Super. 1931).

                                            10
the relationship between the parties, it appears that the parties’ course of conduct

will have to be presented to the finders of fact regardless of the nature of the cause

of action.

      All parties agree that negligent misrepresentation in this case is essentially a

“lesser included offense” of the legal claim based on intentional or reckless fraud in

the inducement. Should the jury find that Defendants are liable for fraud, the

negligent misrepresentation claim will become moot. If the jury finds otherwise, the

Court can address the negligent misrepresentation claim at that time.

                                   CONCLUSION

      Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged misrepresentation by claiming that

Defendants’ purportedly false statements were made for the purpose of inducing a

buyer to form a new company to engage in business with the seller.

      The Court finds that the negligent misrepresentation claims has been pled with

sufficient particularity as required by Rule 9(b). While the complaint was amended

without leave of the Court, that procedural impropriety does not warrant dismissal

under the present circumstances.

      However, the Court is not convinced that Plaintiffs have pled a pecuniary

interest to invoke equity jurisdiction, based upon negligent misrepresentation. The

Court notes that rarely, if ever, does each party involved in a business contract

dispute not have a pecuniary interest in the transaction. If the Court were to interpret
                                          11
“pecuniary duty” as broadly as asserted by Plaintiffs, virtually every fraud-in-the-

inducement or breach of warranty claim would be heard in the Court of Chancery.

         Nevertheless, in the interest of judicial economy, having assessed all practical

considerations, the Court declines to dismiss the negligent misrepresentation claim

at this time. If appropriate, the Court will revisit the motion at the conclusion of the

trial.

         THEREFORE, Defendant Paynerd LLC, Paynerdier LLC, Matthew

Mandell, and Taylor Hendricksen’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Blueacorn PPP,

LLC’s Complaint is hereby DENIED AT THIS TIME.



         IT IS SO ORDERED.



                                               Mary M. Johnston
                                          The Honorable Mary M. Johnston




                                            12


File and source

File
download-aspx_328f2cf11cf636f0.pdf
Size
247,842 bytes
SHA-256
bc1905c57f82f6b1978e6d7f152dd1436a3193243eb6ff22ab812f0fae4ef350
Our copy
download-aspx_328f2cf11cf636f0.pdf
Original
courts.delaware.gov
Back to top