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USA Response to [134] MTD re Brady violation

Date
2024-08-21

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 23-60173-CR-KMW(s) (GRAHAM)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

vs.

CAROLYN DENISE WADE and
TRACY D. WADE,

       Defendants.
                                    /

UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT CAROLYN DENISE WADE’S MOTION
TO DISMISS THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT [DE 134]

Introduction

The United States of America, by and through its undersigned counsel, hereby responds in
opposition to the “Motion to Dismiss Superseding Indictment Due to Brady Violation Prior to the
Trial on the Original Indictment and Request for Evidentiary Hearing,” which Defendant Carolyn
Denise Wade (“Defendant”) filed on August 21, 2024, at docket entry (“DE”) 134 (the “Motion”
or “Mot.”).1  In sum, the Motion seeks dismissal of the Superseding Indictment (DE 88), as to
Carolyn Wade only, based upon Defendant’s assertion that the government failed “to disclose
evidence favorable to Ms. Wade prior to the trial on the original indictment.” (Mot. at 1).  The
claimed “evidence favorable to Ms. Wade” are records of 20 Paycheck Protection Program (PPP)
loan applications of other individuals (the “Third-Party PPP Applications”).  Yet, as Defendant
rightly concedes, the Third-Party PPP Applications “had nothing to do with Carolyn Wade.” (Mot.

1 Counsel for Defendant did not confer with the government prior to filing the Motion, as required by Local
Rule 88.9.  On August 21, 2024, the Court entered a Paperless Order Referring Motions (DE 136), pursuant
to which the Court referred this Motion (DE 134) to U.S. Magistrate Judge Patrick M. Hunt for a report and
recommendation.
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at 4).  Furthermore, the government produced the Third-Party PPP Applications to Defendant on
May 1, 2024, approximately two weeks before the commencement of the first trial, under an
unopposed Protective Order entered by the Court on May 1, 2024 (DE 49).
As explained herein, the Motion wholly fails for two primary reasons.  First, the Third-
Party PPP Applications do not fall within the ambit of Brady and its progeny because, among other
things, these records are neither favorable to Defendant nor material.  Second, despite having no
disclosure obligation under Brady, the government nevertheless produced the Third-Party PPP
Applications as a courtesy to Defendant on May 1, 2024 (approximately two weeks before trial on
the original indictment).  Additionally, Defendant has not established any prejudice.
Accordingly, the United States respectfully asks the Court to deny the Motion (DE 134) in
its entirety.  The United States further submits that Defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary
hearing.
Procedural and Factual Background
1.
Original Indictment
On September 14, 2023, a grand jury sitting in the Fort Lauderdale Division of this Court
(the “Grand Jury”) returned an indictment (DE 3) (the “Indictment”) charging Defendant with one
count of wire fraud, in violation of Tile 18, United States Code, Section 1343.  The Indictment
alleged that, from May 2021 through August 2021, Carolyn Wade, then employed by the Broward
County Sheriff’s Office (BSO) as a Deputy Sherriff in the Detention Department, participated in
a scheme to defraud in which she obtained a loan through the Small Business Administration
(SBA)’s Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) based upon materially false information.  Such
materially false information allegedly included, among other things, that a sole proprietorship
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having the business legal name “Carolyn Wade” earned “$113,560” of gross income in 2019.
2.
Government’s First Response to the Standing Discovery Order
On October 19, 2023, Defendant was arraigned on the Indictment and the Court entered
the Standing Discovery Order (“SDO”) (DE 11).  The government filed its response to the SDO
and produced discovery to Defendant on November 3, 2023 (DE 13).  On November 29, 2023,
the Court granted an unopposed motion to continue the trial until March 25, 2024.  Thereafter,
government counsel engaged in plea discussions with Defendant’s prior counsel.  On or about
February 14, 2024, the government was advised that Ms. Wade had retained new counsel (Mr.
McCray) and would proceed to trial.
3.
Government’s Receipt of the Third-Party PPP Applications from Womply
In early March 2024, as it was preparing for Defendant’s trial, the government learned for
the first time that Defendant applied for her PPP loan online through a service provider named
Womply.2  On March 7, the government served on Womply a subpoena to testify at Defendant’s
criminal trial (then set for April 8, 2024), and to bring documents or electronically stored
information requested on an attachment thereto.  The attachment requested all records related to
Carolyn Wade’s PPP loan (number 6697269001).3
On Saturday, March 16, Womply produced to the government records responsive to the
subpoena via the government’s file sharing platform, USAFx.  In its production, Womply

2 Before this, the government had only been aware of the lender for Defendant’s PPP loan.  As it turned
out, many lenders participating in the PPP, including the lender of Defendant’s PPP loan, outsourced the
application processes (including application intake) to third party service providers, such as Womply.

3 Specifically, the subpoena requested “the entire content of any electronic or physical file related to
[Carolyn Wade’s PPP loan number],” which included, among other records, “other applications with the
same IP addresses as [Carolyn Wade’s PPP loan number].”
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segregated the PPP application records into 21 folders identified by the full name of the individual
applicant.  The production contained only one folder named “Carolyn Wade.”  The remaining 20
folders contained the Third-Party PPP Applications that are the subject of this Motion.
On the next business day, Monday, March 18, the government produced to Defendant all
records in the Womply folder named “Carolyn Wade.”  At the time of that production, the
government had not reviewed the content of the other 20 folders (i.e., the Third-Party PPP
Applications), and did not then produce those records, since it was clear from the face of the folders
that they contained PPP applications of third persons that had nothing to do with Carolyn Wade (a
fact Defendant concedes in the Motion).4  Although the government assumed that Womply
produced the additional 20 Third-Party PPP Applications in response to the subpoena because of
a common IP address appearing in the records, at that time, the government did not have
confirmation of that fact, nor had the government identified any common IP address.5  Moreover,
in the government’s view, the supposed commonality of an unidentified IP address did not provide
a basis to produce 20 PPP loan applications for individuals that were not charged, not under
investigation, and had no connection to Defendant and the allegations in the Indictment.

4 One of the folders was named “Tracy Wade,” Defendant’s husband.  However, as of March 18, 2024,
Tracy Wade had not been charged in this case and was not then under investigation.

5 Indeed, the purpose of including in its subpoena to Womply a request for “other applications with same
IP addresses as PPP loan number 6697269001” (Defendant’s PPP loan) was to determine whether
Defendant had applied through Womply for any other PPP loan that the government was not aware of.  On
its face, Womply’s production confirmed that Defendant had not.
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4.
Government’s Production of the Third-Party PPP Applications
On April 29, 2024, the government received a phone call from a legal assistant to
Defendant’s counsel of record, Mr. McCray.  The legal assistant advised that the purpose of the
call was to obtain the government’s position on a proposed motion the defense wanted to file for
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum upon two non-party entities, one of which was the Small
Business Administration (SBA).6  The government responded that it did not expect to object to
such motion, but asked to review the proposed motion and subpoena before providing its position.
The legal assistant thereafter provided a copy of the proposed motion and subpoena.
Upon review of Defendant’s proposed motion and subpoena later that day (April 29), the
government noted that Defendant was seeking from the SBA records of PPP loan applications for
Haydee Rivero, f/k/a Haydee Granados (“Granados”), Eduardo Rivero (“Rivero”), who was
Granados’ husband, and certain businesses associated with the Rivero family.  Although the
government did not have such records from the SBA, one of the 20 Third-Party PPP Applications
folders from Womply was named “Haydee Granados.”  Government counsel had not reviewed
that folder, or any of the other Third-Party PPP Applications folder, but nevertheless immediately
contacted defense counsel.  During a phone call that afternoon (April 29), government counsel
advised defense counsel of the following: 1) the government had, in response to a trial subpoena,
received from Womply PPP applications of certain third parties (i.e., the Third-Party PPP
Applications), and one folder in that production was named “Haydee Granados”; 2) the
government counsel had not reviewed the “Haydee Granados” folder, or any of the Third-Party

6 The legal assistant further advised that the defense had served such a subpoena on the SBA, and that the
SBA was requiring a separate court order before producing the records due to privacy concerns (because
the individuals whose records were requested were not a party to this case).
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PPP Applications, and could not speak to their content; however, given the general nature of
Womply’s records as a PPP service provider, the “Haydee Granados” folder may contain records
that Defendant was seeking from the SBA; 3) the government believed it had no obligation to
disclose the Third-Party PPP Applications to Defendant; and 4) notwithstanding the above, based
on Defendant’s subpoena to the SBA, the government was willing as a courtesy to Defendant to
provide the Third-Party Applications subject to the entry of a Protective Order.
The next day, April 30, the parties appeared telephonically for a scheduled calendar call
and briefed the Court on the anticipated motion for a protective order needed to produce any Third-
Party PPP Applications to Defendant (DE 46).  Immediately after calendar call, government
counsel emailed defense counsel a list of the folder names of the 20 Third-Party PPP Applications
and asked the defense to advise which folders it wanted to receive.  The government also sent
defense counsel the proposed motion for a protective order and protective order.  That evening,
defense counsel responded that it had no objection to the protective order and requested all 20 of
the Third-Party PPP Applications folders.  This correspondence is filed herewith as Exhibit 1.7
The next day, May 1, the government filed the unopposed motion for the protective order
(DE 48), the Court granted the motion and entered the protective order (DE 49), and the
government produced to Defendant, via USAFx, the 20 Third-Party PPP Applications exactly in
the form in which Womply had provided the records to the government.8  In its cover letter, a

7 The names of the 20 Third-Party PPP Applications folders are redacted for their privacy, with the
exception of Haydee Granados and Tracy Wade (who have since been charged),.

8 For sake of completeness, the government included in this production all communications and other
records related to the Third-Party PPP Applications that the government received from Womply.  At
defense counsel’s request, the government also sent, via FedEx on May 2, 2024, a CD containing only the
20 Third-Party PPP Applications.
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copy of which is filed herewith as Exhibit 2, the government expressly stated that it was producing
the 20 Third-Party PPP Applications (defined therein as the “Confidential Records”) to Defendant
voluntarily and as a courtesy based on its understanding that the records may fall within the scope
of a subpoena that Defendant had served on an entity (i.e., the SBA) seeking similar records.
Before filing the instant Motion, Defendant never complained, nor sought any relief from the
Court, based upon the manner or the timing of its receipt of the 20 Third-Party PPP Applications.
5.
First Trial
Trial commenced on May 13, 2024, in the Miami Division before Senior United States
District Judge Donald L. Graham.  In its case in chief, the government called 10 witnesses and
introduced 90 exhibits into evidence.  Government Exhibit 002 was a written stipulation, pursuant
to which the parties stipulated and agreed that the IP address “76.110.183.125” was an IP address
with usage attributable to Granados (GX 002).  The government never listed Granados as a
government witness, did not subpoena Granados to testify, did not call Granados as a witness, and
had no contact with Granados until June 2024 (weeks after the mistrial).
The defense called one witness (Defendant’s husband, Tracy Wade) and introduced a
handful of exhibits.  The defense did not offer at trial any evidence from the 20 Third-Party PPP
Applications produced by the government on May 1, 2024.  Although the defense subpoenaed
Granados and Rivero, and had previously met with them, they both invoked their Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.9  In closing arguments, both sides argued that Granados was

9 During trial, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the Indictment, accusing the government of improperly
interfering with the defense’s right to call these witnesses.  Following an evidentiary hearing on the matter,
the Court immediately denied the motion and noted the following:

Footnote continued...
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responsible for uploading a fraudulent IRS Form Schedule C tax document to Defendant’s PPP
application, and that Granados had used the .125 IP address to do so.  The case was submitted to
the jury on May 20, 2024.  After two days of deliberations, the Court declared a mistrial based
upon the jury’s failure to reach a unanimous verdict (DE 72).
6.
Superseding Indictment
On June 27, 2024, the Grand Jury returned the Superseding Indictment (DE 188), which
charged Defendants Carolyn Wade and Tracy Wade with one or more of the following offenses:
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of Tile 18, United States Code, Section 1349 (Count
1); wire fraud, in violation of Tile 18, United States Code, Section 1343 (Counts 2-3); conspiracy
to make false statements to the SBA, in violation of Tile 18, United States Code, Section 371
(Count 4); and false statements to the SBA, in violation of Title 15, Untied States Code, Section
645(a) (Counts 5-10).
With respect to the conspiracy to commit wire fraud (Count 1), the Superseding Indictment
alleged that, from May 2021 through August 2021, Defendants agreed with each other, with
Granados, and with others, to obtain PPP loans based upon materially false and fraudulent
information, including fictitious tax documents.10  The substantive wire fraud counts alleged that,

Based on the evidence, I don’t see any improper governmental inference.  Frankly, based
on what I have heard in this case, if the witnesses had taken the stand and questions had
begun, I likely would have stopped the proceeding and advised them exactly as their
counsel did, that you understand that you potentially have some liability and are you taking
advantage of your Fifth Amendment privilege.  And based upon what I have heard, there
was certainly cause for those individuals [Granados and Rivero] to be concerned.

Ex. 3 hereto, 5/17/24 Tr. at 22.

10 Granados was charged by way of information filed on July 1, 2024, in case number 24-60124-CR-Smith.
The information charges Granados with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud and make false
statements to the SBA, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.

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from May 2021 through August 2021, Defendants participated in a scheme to defraud in which
they obtained PPP loans based upon materially false and fraudulent information, including
fictitious tax documents.  Count 2 charged Tracy Wade with causing the execution of a wire
communication in interstate commerce related a fraudulent PPP loan in his name, and Count 3
charged both Defendants with causing the execution of a wire communication in interstate
commerce related to a fraudulent PPP loan in Carolyn Wade’s name.11
The conspiracy to make false statements to the SBA (Count 4) alleged that, from May 2021
through August 2021, Defendants agreed with each other, with Granados, and with others, to make
false statements to the SBA in PPP loan applications (using SBA Form 2483-C) and SBA PPP
loan forgiveness applications (using SBA Form 3508S).  Additionally, Carolyn Wade and Tracy
Wade were each charged individually with three counts of making false statements to the SBA in
their respective PPP loan applications and forgiveness applications (Counts 5, 8, and 9 as to
Carolyn Wade and Counts 6, 7, and 10 as to Tracy Wade).
On July 15, 2024, Defendants Carolyn Wade and Tracy Wade were arraigned on the
Superseding Indictment and the Court entered the standing discovery order.  On July 24, the
government filed its response to the SDO, which included reproducing to Defendants all prior
discovery in this case, including the Third-Party PPP Applications previously produced to Carolyn
Wade on May 1, 2024.

11 The execution of the wire alleged in Count 3 was the same unit of prosecution for the sole count of wire
fraud alleged in the original indictment.
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Discussion of Applicable Law
1.
Standard for a Brady Claim
As established in Brady v. Maryland, the prosecution must disclose “evidence which is
advantageous to the defendant, and which, if suppressed, would deprive him or her of a fair trial.”
United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1426 (11th Cir. 1991).  This does not mean all evidence,
or even all favorable evidence.  Accordingly, under Brady, the government need only disclose
during pretrial discovery (or later, at the trial) evidence which, in the eyes of a neutral and objective
observer, could alter the outcome of the proceedings.  United States v. Jordan, 316 F.3d 1215,
1251-52 (11th Cir. 2003).  The government does not, however, have an obligation to seek
evidence of which it has no knowledge or which is not in its possession.  United States v. Luis-
Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1548 (11th Cir. 1983).
To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that: 1) the cumulative effect of
evidence was favorable because it was exculpatory or impeaching; 2) the evidence was willfully
or inadvertently suppressed by the prosecution; 3) the evidence was material; and 4) that the failure
to disclose the evidence was prejudicial.  Bradley v. Nagle, 212 F.3d 559, 566 (11th Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted).  The prosecution need not provide its entire file to the defense, but must
disclose “material” evidence.  Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)).  Evidence is material “only if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.
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Finally, there is no suppression by the government of exculpatory evidence, and thus no
Brady violation, if either the defendant or the defense attorney knows before trial of the allegedly
exculpatory information.  Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907 (11th Cir. 1995), modified, 62 F.3d 342
(11th Cir. 1995); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 1999); Maharaj v. Secretary for the
Dep’t of Corrs., 432 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2006).
2.
Standard for Dismissal or Sanctions
Actual prejudice to the defendant is a necessary element when a defendant seeks to dismiss
an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct.  United States v. Accetturo, 858 F.2d 679, 681 (11th
Cir. 1988) (“[D]ismissal of an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct is an extreme sanction
which should be infrequently utilized”) (citations omitted).  The Supreme Court has made clear
that dismissing an indictment for misconduct that did not prejudice the defendant is inappropriate.
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255 (1988) (“a district court exceeds its powers
in dismissing an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct not prejudicial to the defendant”).  Even
when misconduct and prejudice can be shown, courts first determine whether a less severe remedy
could address the constitutional violation.  United States v O’Keefe, 825 F.2d 314, 318 (11th Cir.
1987) (“dismissal of an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct is an extreme sanction which
should be infrequently utilized.”)
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Argument

As addressed in turn below, the Motion fails to establish a Brady violation in all respects.
First, the evidence Defendant alleges as the basis for the Brady violation (the Third-Party PPP
Applications and Granados’ involvement therewith) is not favorable to Defendant and not material.
Second, the government voluntarily produced the Third-Party PPP Applications to Defendant
almost two weeks before trial started.  Furthermore, Defendant has failed to show that the
government willfully or inadvertently suppressed any evidence, or that Defendant was prejudiced.
1.
The Third-Party PPP Applications are neither favorable to Defendant nor
material.

Defendant “contends,” without offering any evidence, that “the government knew that the
20 [Third-Party PPP Applications] contained false or fraudulent information, and the government
failed to disclose this information to the defense” (Mot. at 4).  Defendant further contends that, if
this was disclosed, “there was a reasonable possibility that Mrs. Wade would have been acquitted”
(Mot. at 5).  Defendant’s unsupported assertions concerning the government’s knowledge and
disclosure, and the favorability and materiality of the evidence, are mistaken in all respects.
First, as an initial matter (before addressing the issues of favorability, materiality, and
disclosure), Defendant has not demonstrated that, at any point before or during Defendant’s trial,
the government knew that the Third-Party PPP Applications contained false and fraudulent
information.  Indeed, Granados was not under investigation by the government before
Defendant’s trial.  The government did not interview Granados and did not otherwise make any
contact with her before or during trial.  Furthermore, before Defendant’s trial, the government did
not investigate or contact any of the 20 individual applicants for the Third-Party PPP Applications,
much less develop any evidence that those records contained false or fraudulent information.  The
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government would only have known whether the Third-Party Applications contained false or
fraudulent information if the government had independently investigated the 20 applicants, and
the government had no obligation to do that.  Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d at 1548.  Only after the
mistrial did the government open an investigation of Granados and begin to develop evidence of
fraudulent misrepresentations in the Third-Party PPP Loan Applications.12
Second, any evidence that Granados was involved with other PPP loan applications that
contained false statements is certainly not favorable to Defendant or material to her defense.  To
the contrary, it is incriminating evidence of Defendant’s guilt.  At trial, the government introduced
evidence in its case in chief, and argued in summation, the Defendant intentionally paid Granados
the sum of $5,000 (in the form of a $1,000 Zelle transfer and a $4,000 check) for uploading a
fraudulent Schedule C (for the tax year 2019) with Defendant’s PPP application.  Indeed, the
government’s evidence showed that Defendant had filed a Schedule C with the IRS for the year
2019, but did not use that one (and never sent it to Granados).  The government expressly argued
that paying Granados thousands of dollars to create and upload a fake Schedule C (when Defendant
had a real one) was evidence of Defendant acting knowingly and with intent to defraud.  Any
evidence that Granados was doing this for other individuals only bolsters the government’s theory
that Defendant paid Granados to create a fake document (because Granados was doing the same
for others).  In no way could such evidence, in the eyes of a neutral and objective observer, alter
the outcome of the proceedings in Defendant’s favor.  Jordan, 316 F.3d at 1251-52.  The fact
that Defendant had the Third-Party PPP Applications before trial, and did not offer even one page

12 The government interviewed Granados for the first time on June 14, 2024.  In response to the SDO
entered for the superseding indictment, the government produced to Defendants on July 25, 2024, the FBI-
302 of that interview (Bates number 23-60173-CR-009053-61).

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of those records into evidence, further belies the notion that this evidence was material.
Third, the Third-Party PPP Applications were not discoverable as impeachment evidence
because Granados was not a government witness.  Granados was never listed on a government
witness list (DE 33, 52, 61), and the government expressly told Defendant it had never contacted
Granados and she would not be a government witness.  As such, even if the Third-Party PPP
Applications could be used as impeachment of Granados if she testified for the government, the
government had no disclosure obligation in this regard because she was not named as a government
witness (and never testified).  If Defendant wanted to do her own investigation of Granados, to
develop “404(b) evidence” or otherwise, she was free to do that.  In fact, Defendant apparently
did try to do just that with her subpoena to the SBA.  However, Defendant cannot force the
government to investigate a person Defendant intends to call as a witness to develop evidence of
“other bad acts” against that witness for Defendant’s benefit.
2.
The government produced the Third-Party PPP Applications 12 days before
trial commenced.

In the penultimate paragraph of the Motion, Defendant finally concedes that the
government produced the Third-Party PPP Applications before trial (Mot. at 9).  Although
Defendant characterizes this production as occurring at the “eleventh hour,” it is undisputable that
the government made this production on May 1, 2024—12 days before trial commenced.
Defendant never objected to the timeliness of this production, nor sought additional time to prepare
for trial.  Indeed, courts have held that disclosures even closer to the start of trial (or during trial)
did not violate Brady.  See e.g., United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1358 (11th Cir. 2004)
(affirming no violation where Brady information was disclosed on the day of trial); United States
v. Bueno-Sierra, 99 F.3d 375, 379-80 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming that defendants were not
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prejudiced by mid-trial Brady disclosure where recess allowed defense time to consider new
material); United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d 1247, 1258 (11th Cir. 2017) (affirming conviction
notwithstanding district court’s denial of continuance after late disclosure); United States v.
McGhee, 553 F. App’x 895, 900 (11th Cir. 2014) (affirming conviction despite government’s mid-
trial disclosure where court took remedial measures).
3.
The government did not willfully or inadvertently suppress the Third-Party
PPP Applications.

The government at no point willfully or inadvertently suppressed the Third-Party PPP
Applications.  Rather, the government did not initially produce the records upon receipt from
Womply because, as Defendant concedes in the Motion, the Third-Party PPP Applications “had
nothing to do with Carolyn Wade” (Mot. at 4), and the unconfirmed commonality of an
unidentified IP address did not provide a basis to produce 20 PPP loan applications for individuals
that were not charged and not under investigation.  Nevertheless, when the government learned
through Defendant’s proposed subpoena that Defendant was seeking similar records from the
SBA, the government immediately went above and beyond its discovery obligations and offered
the Third-Party PPP Applications to Defendant as a courtesy.  Furthermore, the government acted
expeditiously, producing the records to Defendant within 48 hours of learning Defendant was
seeking similar documents from the SBA, and immediately upon entry of the necessary Protective
Order (which the government had applied for within 48 hours).  No Brady violation exists when
evidence is not actually suppressed.  See, e.g., Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir.
1995) (“[w]e have held numerous times that there is no suppression, and thus no Brady violation,
if either the defendant or his attorney knows before trial of the allegedly exculpatory information.”)
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4.
Defendant has not established actual prejudice.

Finally, “the law of this circuit establishes that prejudice to the defendant is required when
dismissal of an indictment is sought based on violations of the constitution.”  O’Keefe, 825 F.2d
at 318.  There was no Brady violation here for the reasons addressed above, and it is also
unequivocally clear from the record that Defendant suffered no actual prejudice.
At trial, the government and Defendant agreed that Granados had uploaded a fraudulent
IRS Form Schedule to Defendant’s online PPP application.  A Womply spreadsheet the
government produced to Defendant on March 19, 2024 (received in evidence without objection as
Government Exhibits 102e), and additional Womply spreadsheets produced by the government
before trial (received in evidence without objection as Government Exhibits 102.1e and 102.2e)
all showed that the IP address ending in .125 was used to upload the fraudulent Schedule C in
Defendant’s application.  Moreover, the government and Defendant stipulated during trial that
the IP address ending in .125 “was an IP address with usage attributable Haydee Granados”
(stipulation received as Government Exhibit 002).  Indeed, this was a fact that both sides argued
in summation.  Because Defendant had all 20 records of the Third-Party PPP Applications two
weeks before trial, Defendant had the opportunity to review for herself which of these applications,
if any, also had online activity associated with the .125 IP address.  The government had no
obligation to do that for her, and by no means caused her any prejudice.
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Conclusion

In sum, the Motion wholly fails to establish a Brady violation because: 1) the evidence at
issue (the Third-Party PPP Applications and Granados’ involvement therewith) is not favorable to
Defendant and is not material; 2) the government voluntarily produced the Third-Party PPP
Applications to Defendant almost two weeks before trial started; 3) Defendant has failed to show
that government willfully or inadvertently suppressed any evidence; and 4) Defendant has not
established actual prejudice required for the extreme sanction of dismissal of the Superseding
Indictment.  Accordingly, the United States respectfully asks the Court to enter an Order denying
the Motion (DE 134) in its entirety without the need for an evidentiary hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

MARKENZY LAPOINTE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

By: /s/ David A. Snider

David A. Snider
Assistant United States Attorney
Court ID No. A5502260
500 E. Broward Blvd
Fort Lauderdale, FL  33394
Tel: (954) 660-5696
Fax: (954) 356-7336
Email: david.snider@usdoj.gov
Case 0:23-cr-60173-KMW   Document 146   Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2024   Page 17 of 17

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