Information — United States v. Carolyn Denise Wade (Dkt. 213, S.D. Fla. No. 0:23-cr-60173)

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U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 0:23-cr-60173-KMW · Doc. 213 · 2025-01-10 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STA TES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 23-60173-CR-WILLIAMS/GRAHAM 
UNITED ST A TES OF AMERICA 
vs. 
CAROLYN DENISE WADE and 
TRACY D. WADE 
Defendants. 
I 
ORDER 
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants Carolyn Denise Wade and Tracy D. 
Wade's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal After Jury Verdict. (ECF No. 204). The Court also 
considers the Government's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Post-Trial Motion for Judgment 
of Acquittal. (ECF No. 207). 
THE COURT has reviewed the pleadings and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. Based 
thereon, for the reasons explained below, the Defendants' motion is denied. 
I. 
BACKGROUND 
On June 27, 2024, the Grand Jury returned the Superseding Indictment (ECF No. 188), which 
charged Defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of Tile 18, United States 
Code, Section 1349; wire fraud, in violation of Tile 18, United States Code, Section 1343; 
conspiracy to make false statements to the SBA, in violation of Tile 18, United States Code, Section 
371; and false statements to the SBA, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 645(a). 
With respect to conspiracy to commit wire fraud (Count 1), the Superseding Indictment 
alleged that, from May 2021 through August 2021 , Defendants agreed with each other, with Haydee 
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Rivero, f/k/a Haydee Granados ("Rivero"), and with others, to obtain loans through the Paycheck 
Protection Program ("PPP") based upon materially false and fraudulent information, including 
fictitious tax documents. The substantive wire fraud counts alleged that, from May 2021 through 
August 2021 , Defendants participated in a scheme to defraud in which they obtained PPP loans 
based upon materially false and fraudulent information, including fictitious tax documents. Count 2 
charged Tracy Wade with causing the execution of a wire communication in interstate commerce 
that disbursed the proceeds of a fraudulently obtained PPP loan for the purported business "Tracy 
Wade," and Count 3 charged both Defendants with causing the execution of a wire communication 
in interstate commerce that disbursed the proceeds of a fraudulently obtained PPP loan for the 
purported business "Carolyn Wade." 
As to conspiracy to make false statements to the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
(Count 4), the Superseding Indictment alleged that, from May 2021 through August 2021 , 
Defendants agreed with each other, with Rivero, and with others, to make false statements to the 
SBA in PPP loan applications (using SBA Form 2483-C) and SBA PPP loan forgiveness 
applications (using SBA Form 3508S). Additionally, Carolyn Wade and Tracy Wade were each 
charged individually with three counts of making false statements to the SBA in their respective PPP 
loan applications and forgiveness applications (Counts 5, 8, and 9 as to Carolyn Wade and Counts 6, 
7, and 10 as to Tracy Wade). 
On October 23, 2024, after a jury trial, Defendants were found guilty on all counts with 
which they were charged, respectively. (ECF Nos. 183 and 184). 
Now, Defendants move, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P 29(c)(l), for a judgment of acquittal 
after jury verdict asserting that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to persuade any 
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rational factfinder of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (ECF No. 204). Specifically, Defendants 
contend that with respect to the conspiracy counts, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the 
Defendants willfully joined in either conspiracy. As to the wire fraud counts, the Defendants contend 
that the evidence was insufficient to prove that they knowing devised and participated in a scheme 
to defraud or acted with intent to defraud. As to the false statements to the SBA, the Defendants 
assert that the evidence was insufficient to prove that they knowingly made any false statement. Id. 
The Government filed its response in opposition to Defendants' motion. (ECF No. 207). 
Defendants filed no reply to the government's response. This matter being ripe, the Court addresses 
the arguments raised in Defendants' motion below. 
II. 
LEGAL ST AND ARD 
A. 
Rule 29 Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
Rule 29 provides the Court with authority, where appropriate, to enter a judgment ofacquittal 
following a guilty verdict. See Rule 29( c )(2). A motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 "is a 
direct challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presented against the defendant." United States v. 
Aibejeris, 28 F.3d 97, 98 (11th Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Ward, 197 F.3d 1076, 1079 
(11th Cir. 1999) ("In considering a motion for the entry of judgment of acquittal under [Rule 29( c )], 
a district court should apply the same standard used in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain a conviction."). In ruling on such a motion, "a district court must 'determine whether, 
viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a reasonable trier of fact 
could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "' United States v. Grigsby, 
111 F.3d 806, 833 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. O'Keefe, 825 F.2d 314, 319 (11th Cir. 
1987)). Applying this test, "[a]ll credibility choices must be made in support of the jury's verdict." 
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Williams, 611 F.2d at 1323 ( citing United States v. Gianni, 678 F.2d 956, 958-59 (11th Cir. 1982) 
and United States v. Burns, 597 F.2d 939, 941 (5th Cir. 1979)). Because a jury may choose among 
reasonable constructions of the evidence, "[i]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of 
guilt, provided a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. at 1324 (quoting United States v. Young, 906 F.2d 615, 618 (11th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Vera, 701 F.2d 1349, 1357 (11th Cir. 1983)). "A conviction must be affirmed unless 
there is no reasonable construction of the evidence from which the jury could have found the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Ignasiak, 667 F.3d 1217, 1227 (11th 
Cir. 2012) ( citation omitted). 
III. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendants renew their Motion for Judgement of acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure asserting that the evidence was insufficient for a conviction. Accordant 
with the Court's prior rulings on Defendants' ore tenus Rule 29 motions made during trial, the 
record evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government with all reasonable 
inferences and credibility choices made in its favor, was sufficient to permit a rational jury to find 
Defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to each count. 
In its case in chief, the Government presented testimony of witnesses affiliated with the SBA 
(Althea Harris), Womply (Amandeep Thakral), Persona (Lindsey Bergh), Verizon (Dion Morrow), 
AT&T (Philip Fanara), IRS (Renee McClain), and the Broward Sheriff's Office (Alexander 
Rodriguez). The government also presented testimony of Rivero, who testified pursuant to a plea 
agreement. Lastly, the government presented testimony of FBI Special Agent Kelly DiPietrantonio, 
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who testified as a summary witness. 
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there is sufficient evidence to 
allow a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendants participated in the 
conspiracy that resulted in Defendants obtaining, and receiving forgiveness of, PPP loans based upon 
materially false information. Specifically, the evidence showed that, on multiple occasions 
throughout the period of the conspiracy, Defendants logged into their PPP applications on the 
Womply website using cell phone models that Defendants had and actively used, and/or using an IP 
address then accessible to Defendants, made changes; uploaded bank documents and linked bank 
accounts; verified their identity; and viewed, initialed, and signed the critical documents via 
DocuSign, including multiple SBA application forms in which they certified that false information 
was true. Thereafter, Defendants received the proceeds of their fraudulent PPP loans in their 
personal bank accounts, immediately paid Rivero $2,000 in total for her preparation of the fraudulent 
Schedule C submitted with each PPP application. Defendants thereafter wrote checks to themselves 
with memo lines that suggested that they spent the PPP loan proceeds on payroll when they had not. 
Defendants subsequently applied to the SBA to have their fraudulently obtained PPP loans forgiven, 
which required them to again sign and initial SBA forms that contained materially false information. 
At the start of her testimony, Rivero acknowledged that she had pleaded guilty to conspiracy 
to commit wire fraud and make false statements to the SBA, and that she was testifying for the 
government pursuant to a plea agreement. She then testified about her role in the PPP applications 
for the Defendants, and other individuals with whom she was involved in the PPP application 
process. She also testified about her own receipt of fraudulent PPP loans and her knowledge that her 
PPP loan applications contained false income information. 
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Regarding the PPP applications for Defendants, Rivero testified that the scope of her 
involvement included: ( a) creating a fictitious Schedule C form for the Defendants; (b) uploading the 
fictitious Schedule C forms she created for Defendants to the respective PPP applications on 
Womply's website; and (c) inputting the false income information from the fictitious Schedule C 
forms into each Defendant's application on Womply's website. The scope of Rivera's activity for 
Defendants was consistent with the undisputed Womply data in evidence. Rivero also testified about 
the understanding she had with Defendants regarding her creation of fictitious Schedule C forms for 
their PPP loan applications. Specifically, Rivero testified that, during a phone call with Defendant 
Tracy Wade, she told him that to receive a PPP loan of $20,000, she would need to create a Schedule 
C that reflected $100,000 in gross income for a business in Defendant Tracy Wade's own name, and 
not for his business, Wade Funeral Home. Rivero testified she told Defendant Tracy Wade that the 
process would be same for Defendant Carolyn Wade. Rivera's testimony about her phone calls with 
Defendant Tracy Wade was corroborated by records showing 28 phone calls between them during 
the conspiracy, and no calls between them either before or after the period of the conspiracy (i.e., 
before May 2021 or after August 2021). Rivero testified that she received a $1 ,000 payment from 
Tracy Wade and a $1 ,000 payment from Carolyn Wade for the false Schedule C she created that 
allowed them to obtain the PPP loans. 
Rivero further testified that she did not know how to assist with any PPP loan application 
other than one for a sole proprietorship (i.e., she did not know how to apply for a PPP loan for a 
corporation or limited liability company). When asked during cross examination about images of 
blank checks for businesses "Wade Funeral Home" and " 1 Step A-Head," which were emailed to her 
in or around March 2021 , Rivero testified that those were not related to the sole proprietorship PPP 
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loans she was involved with for the Defendants and other individuals. 
Rivero testified that she completed or attempted to complete PPP loan applications for other 
individuals. Rivero also testified to obtaining loans for several of her friends and relatives. Rivero 
claimed that everyone for whom she applied for a loan knew that she was preparing a fictitious 
Schedule C form. The gross income listed on the fictitious schedule C was used in the PPP loan 
applications she prepared for other individuals. When asked by the government and defense, Rivero 
did not remember every person whom she assisted with a PPP loan application. Rivero recalled that 
some individuals did not receive PPP loans because they could not successfully verify their identity. 
For those individuals who could not verify their identity, Rivero testified that she did not create a 
Schedule C for their PPP loan application. 
The defense called three witnesses to attempt to rebut Rivero's testimony concerning the 
creation of fictitious Schedule C forms. Two of the witnesses testified that they had no knowledge 
that Rivero had included a fictitious Schedule C form in their PPP applications. Additionally, 
Defendant Tracy Wade testified that he and Carolyn Wade had no knowledge of any of the false 
information contained in their PPP loan applications and PPP forgiveness applications, including the 
fictitious schedule C, and that he did not see the application when prompted to electronically sign his 
PPP loan application. 
Two witnesses, Clemente Perez and Edison Rogers, testified on direct examination that they 
did not receive a PPP loan. With respect to Mr. Perez, he admitted during cross examination that he 
had difficulty verifying his identity despite several attempts, and that his PPP application ultimately 
failed. Mr. Perez's testimony was consistent with Rivero's testimony that Mr. Perez did not receive a 
loan because his identify verification failed. With respect to Edison Rogers, he testified that he was 
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not familiar with Rivero and did not recall Rivero assisting him with a PPP loan application. Mr. 
Rogers' testimony was consistent with Rivero's testimony that she did not recall a person named 
Edison Rogers or helping that person with a PPP loan application. The third defense witness, Walter 
Wright, testified that he received a PPP loan with Rivero's assistance. However, on cross 
examination, Mr. Wright admitted that it took several attempts for him to verify his identity before 
his application was accepted. That testimony was consistent with Rivero's testimony that Mr. Wright 
had trouble verifying his identity. Furthermore, the fact that Mr. Wright's identify verification failed 
several times is consistent with Rivero not remembering that Wright had received a PPP loan or that 
she had created a false Schedule C for him. 
The three defense witnesses did not rebut any of the Womply data, that established activity 
by Defendants in their PPP loan applications. To the contrary, when the government asked the 
defense witnesses if they had done any of the type of activity that Defendants had done (e.g., 
received one-time codes, logged into their accounts, made modifications to their PPP loan 
applications, or uploaded bank statements), all the defense witnesses testified that they had not. 
When Defendant Tracy Wade testified on cross examination, he accepted the data as true, 
thereby admitting to his and Carolyn Wade's activity established by the data. Defendant Tracy 
Wade also admitted to paying Rivero. 
Guilty knowledge can rarely be established directly, and therefore a Jury may infer 
knowledge and criminal intent from circumstantial evidence alone. United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 
1259, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, the government can establish knowledge "through proof of 
surrounding circumstances such as acts committed by the defendant which furthered the purpose of 
the conspiracy." United States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206, 1215 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation 
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omitted). A conviction may be supported by reasonable inferences, not by mere speculation. United 
Statesv. Knowles,66F.3d 1146, llSS(llthCir.1995). 
The record evidence, including the testimony, in this case was sufficient for a jury to find the 
elements of each conspiracy (Counts 1 and 4) proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that is, Defendants 
agreed with each other, and with Rivero, to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan to 
commit wire fraud (Count 1) and make false statements to the SBA (Count 4), and Defendants knew 
the unlawful purpose of each plan and willfully joined in it. Defendants' conduct, as demonstrated 
through the undisputed Womply and DocuSign records, Rivera's testimony, and other admitted 
evidence, was also sufficient for a jury to find the elements of wire fraud (Count 2 as to Tracy Wade 
and Count 3 as to both Defendants) proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Finally, the evidence was sufficient to find Defendants guilty of the substantive counts of 
making false statements to the SBA. Among other things, the evidence established that Defendants 
viewed, modified, and signed their own PPP loan applications and forgiveness multiple times. 
Therefore, a rational jury could conclude that Defendants knowingly submitted false information to 
the SBA in connection with their PPP loans and loan forgiveness. 
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government and the jury's verdict, the evidence 
sufficiently established that Defendants knowingly participated in a scheme to fraudulently obtain 
PPP loans and acted with intent to defraud. Based, thereon, Defendant's motion is denied. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendants' Motion for Judgment of Acquittal After 
Jury Verdict. (ECF No. 204) is DENIED. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this /0 t~ay of January 2025. 
DO ALD L. GRAHAM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
cc: 
All Counsel of Record 
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