produced in this case, which have been cited in support of Plaintiffs’ concurrently filed motion

Date: 2023-05-03

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Joseph R. Biden, President of the United States, et
al.,

Defendants.

Case No.: 18-cv-06810-JST

PLAINTIFFS’ APPENDIX
The following documents are excerpts of the administrative records Defendants
produced in this case, which have been cited in support of Plaintiffs’ concurrently filed motion
for summary judgment.
INDEX OF “CLP_AR” DOCUMENTS

Title
Page Number
1. Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address
the Causes of Migration, To Manage Migration Throughout
North and Central America, and To Provide Safe and Orderly
Processing of Asylum Seekers at United States Border, Exec.
Order 14,010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267 (Feb. 5, 2021)
CLP_AR_000553-57
2. Implementation of a Parole Process for Nicaraguans, 88 Fed.
Reg. 1,255 (Jan. 9, 2023)
CLP_AR_000995-1006
3. Letter from Brenda Abdelall, Assistant Sec’y, Off. of
Partnership & Engagement, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., response
to Rafael Malpica Padilla, Exec. Dir. Of Serv. & Justice,
Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am., (Mar. 23, 2023)
CLP_AR_001252-54
4. Letter from Cory Booker, Member of Cong., inquiry to
Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y to U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_AR_001258-60
5. Letter from Edward Markey, Member of Cong., inquiry to
Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y to U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(Feb. 21, 2023)
CLP_AR_001261-64
6. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet, U.S. Government
Announces Sweeping New Actions to Manage Regional
Migration (Apr. 27, 2023)
CLP_AR_002187-89
7. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Off. of Immigration Statistics,
Data for May 2023 Final Rule
CLP_AR_002374-2484
8. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Off. of Immigration Statistics,
Encounter Projections (May 3, 2023)
CLP_AR_002485-95
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 1 of 1047

9. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Press Release, CBP Makes
Changes to CBP One App (May 5, 2023)
CLP_AR_002575-79
10. White House, Press Release, Mexico and United States
Strengthen Joint Humanitarian Plan on Migration (May 2,
2023)
CLP_AR_004631-32
11. Biden’s Asylum Ban Will Continue to Place Survivors in
Harm’s Way, TAHIRIH (Feb. 21, 2023)
CLP_AR_004847-51
12. Brewer, Stephanie et al, Struggling to Survive: the Situation of
Asylum Seekers in Tapachula, Mexico, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN
AM. (June 2022)
CLP_AR_004858-96
13. Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions Framework,
MIRPS 2022 - Annual Report of the Regional Comprehensive
Framework for Protection and Solutions (Dec. 8, 2022)
CLP_AR_004948-98
14. Gov’t of Mex., La COMAR en Números (Dec. 2022)
CLP_AR_005707
15. Gov’t of Mex., Mexican Refugee Assistance Commission, La
COMAR en números: Octobre 2022 (Nov. 7, 2022)
CLP_AR_005752
16. Letter from Advocates for Human Rights et al., inquiry to
Alejandro Mayorkas et al., Sec’y to U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec. (Mar. 1, 2023)
CLP_AR_006669-76
17. Letter from Michael Kippins, Laws. for Civ. Rts., inquiry to
Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y to U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
(Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_AR_006715-17

INDEX OF “CLP_PC” DOCUMENTS

Title
Page Number
1. Human Rights First, Human Rights Stain, Public Health Farce
(Dec. 2022)
CLP_PC_000081-101
2. National Immigration Project (NIPNLG) Public Comment
(Mar. 23, 2023)
CLP_PC_020225-40
3. Kino Border Initiative Public Comment (Mar. 24, 2023)
CLP_PC_020355-64
4. Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota Public Comment (Mar.
24, 2023)
CLP_PC_020616-27
5. Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. Public Comment
(Mar. 24, 2023)
CLP_PC_020658-73
6. Asylum Access, Mexican Asylum System for U.S. Immigration
Lawyers FAQ (Nov. 2019)
CLP_PC_020773-82
7. George Washington University Law School Public Comment
(Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_021091-98
8. Yale Law School Immigrant Justice Project Public Comment
(Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_021162-81
9. Round Table of Former Immigration Judges Public Comment
(Mar. 27, 2023).
CLP_PC_021345-56
10. Nebraska Appleseed Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_021444-49
11. Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración (IMUMI) & the
Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC), Stuck in Uncertainty
and Exposed to Violence: The Impact of US and Mexican
Migration Polices on Women Seeking Protection in 2021 (Feb.
2022)
CLP_PC_021586-94
12. Women’s Refugee Commission et al., The consequences of US
and Mexican immigration policies on the protection of
Venezuelan women and LGBTIQ+ individuals in Southwest
Mexico (Dec. 2022)
CLP_PC_021595-615
13. Tahirih Justice Center & Oxfam, Surviving Deterrence (2022)
CLP_PC_021741-72
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 2 of 1047

14. Helen Kerwin, The Mexican Asylum System in Regional
Context, 33 MD. J. INT’L L. 290 (2018)
CLP_PC_021944-67
15. Eduardo Torre Cantalapiedra et al., The Mexican Asylum
System: Between Protecting and Control, Frontera Norte (Apr.
2021)
CLP_PC_021968-91
16. Amnesty International Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_022038-44
17. Amnesty International, Overlooked, Under-Protected:
Mexico’s Deadly Refoulment of Central Americans Seeking
Asylum (2018)
CLP_PC_022500-23
18. Amnesty International, Unprotected in Ecuador: Venezuelan
Refugee Women Survivors of Gender-Based Violence (2022)
CLP_PC_022583-623
19. Black Alliance for Just Immigration, “There is a Target on
Us” – The Impact of Anti-Black Racism on African Migrants
at Mexico’s Southern Border (2021)
CLP_PC_022632-736
20. Daina Beth Solomon & Lizbeth Diaz, Mexico Seeks to Curb
“Abuse” of Asylum System by
Migrants Who Do Not Plan to Stay, Reuters (Feb. 13, 2023)
CLP_PC_022810-12
21. Fragomen, Del Rey, Bernsen & Loewy LLP, Costa Rica:
Special Permit for Cuban,
Nicaraguan & Venezuelan Refugees Will Reopen (Dec. 19,
2022)
CLP_PC_022823-24
22. Government of Belize, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign
Trade & Immigration, Amnesty
2022: Who Qualify? (2023) (accessed Mar. 16, 2023)
CLP_PC_022825-26
23. Human Rights First, Is Mexico Safe for Refugees and Asylum
Seekers? (Nov. 2018)
CLP_PC_022851-52
24. Humans Rights Watch, Mexico: Asylum Seekers Face Abuses
at Southern Border (June 6, 2022)
CLP_PC_022853-68
25. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2023: Events of 2022
(2023)
CLP_PC_022869-3231
26. International Crisis Group, Ecuador’s High Tide of Drug
Violence (Nov. 4, 2022)
CLP_PC_023232-41
27. Andrew Selee et al., Laying the Foundation for Regional
Cooperation, MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE (Apr. 2021)
CLP_PC_023302-66
28. Arturo Castellanos-Canales, Mexico’s Asylum System: Good in
Theory, Insufficient in Practice, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION
FORUM (Mar. 15, 2023)
CLP_PC_023385-94
29. Nate Edwards, Colombia’s Support for Venezuelan Migrants
and Refugees: President Petro reaffirms commitment to
integration, but continued progress requires more
international support, NYU CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION & PATHFINDERS FOR PEACEFUL, JUST AND
INCLUSIVE SOCIETIES (Sept. 2022)
CLP_PC_023395-404
30. Rachel Schmidtke, A New Way Forward:
Strengthening the Protection Landscape in Mexico, Refugees
International (Nov. 12, 2020)
CLP_PC_023428-41
31. Rosa Flores, Mexico rethinks asylum initiative after
controversial US announcement, CNN (Feb. 24, 2023)
CLP_PC_023442-45
32. UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, Ecuador Monthly Update
(Nov. 2022)
CLP_PC_023463-69
33. UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, Number of displaced
Nicaraguans in Costa Rica doubles in less than a year (Mar.
25, 2022)
CLP_PC_023473-77

Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 3 of 1047

34. UNHCR The UN Refugee Agency, Datasets of Asylum
Decisions in Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and
Honduras (2022)
CLP_PC_023478-86
35. Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec’y of
Homeland Sec., Termination of the Migrant Protection
Protocols (Oct. 29, 2021)
CLP_PC_023691-94
36. U.S. Dep’t of State, Belize International Travel Information
(last visited Mar. 16, 2023)
CLP_PC_023726-30
37. U.S. Dep’t of State, Colombia Travel Advisory (last visited
Mar. 16, 2023)
CLP_PC_023780-82
38. U.S. Dep’t of State, Ecuador Travel Advisory (last visited
Mar. 17, 2023)
CLP_PC_023828-31
39. U.S. Dep’t of State, El Salvador International Travel
Information (last visited Mar. 16, 2023)
CLP_PC_023874-79
40. Overseas Security Advisory Council, Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, U.S. Dep’t of State, Guatemala Country Security
Report (Aug. 15, 2022)
CLP_PC_024105-12
41. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Releases January
2023 Monthly
Operational Update (Feb. 10, 2023)
CLP_PC_024814-23
42. Stephanie Leutert & Caitlyn Yates, Asylum Processing at the
U.S.-Mexico Border: February 2023, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS
AT AUSTIN STRAUSS CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AND LAW (Feb. 2023)
CLP_PC_024899-910
43. Tahirih Justice Center & Oxfam, Surviving Deterrence (2022)
CLP_PC_024919-50
44. Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Asylum
Access, & the Institute for Women in Migration (IMUMI),
Key Issues on Access to Asylum in Mexico, Protections for
Migrant Children, and U.S. Cooperation (Mar. 23, 2021)
CLP_PC_025089-91
45. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, Guatemala 2022 Human Rights Report (2022)
CLP_PC_025128-70
46. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and
Labor, Honduras 2022 Human Rights Report (2022)
CLP_PC_025171-96
47. Letter from 172 national, state, and local organizations,
inquiry to Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., et.
al. (Mar. 1, 2023)
CLP_PC_025280-87
48. Kate Morrissey, Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling
through mobile app error messages for few appointments into
the U.S., SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Jan. 22, 2023)
CLP_PC_025454-65
49. Letter from Jesús G. “Chuy” García et al., Members of Cong.,
inquiry to Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. (Mar.
13, 2023)
CLP_PC_025477-82
50. Letter from Edward J. Markey,
United States Senator, inquiry to Alejandro Mayorkas, Sec’y
of Homeland Sec. (Feb. 21, 2023)
CLP_PC_025485-88
51. John Washington, Glitchy CBP One app turning volunteers
into Geek Squad support
for asylum-seekers in Nogales, ARIZONA LUMINARIA (Mar. 20,
2023)
CLP_PC_025499-500
52. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) Encounters Nationwide, Southwest
Land Border and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal
Year (FY) (Mar. 3, 2023)
CLP_PC_025573-90

Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 4 of 1047

53. Dr. Eric Hershberg, Director of the Center for Latin American
& Latino Studies (CLALS), Expert Declaration of Dr. Eric
Hershberg (Feb. 28, 2020)
CLP_PC_026149-203
54. Expert Declaration of Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey, Director of
the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies (CLALS),
American University (Feb. 28, 2020)
CLP_PC_026234-49
55. Human Rights Watch, Deportation with a Layover: Failure of
Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative
Agreement (May 19, 2020)
CLP_PC_026308-33
56. Yael Schacher & Rachel Schmidtke, Harmful Returns: The
Compounded Vulnerabilities of Returned Guatemalans in the
Time of COVID-19, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL (June 2020)
CLP_PC_026341-72
57. Karen Musalo, Biden’s Embrace of Trump’s Transit Ban
Violates US Legal and Moral Refugee Obligations,
JUST SECURITY (Feb. 8, 2023)
CLP_PC_029159-63
58. USCIS Refugee, Asylum and Int’l Operations Research Unit,
Guatemala: Treatment of Non-Guatemalan Migrants (Nov.
15, 2019)
CLP_PC_029447-56
59. Email from Giovanni Bassu to Glenn Coine et al. (Oct. 4,
2019)
CLP_PC_029465-66
60. Amnesty International, Unprotected: Gender-Based Violence
Against Venezuelan Refugee Women in Colombia and Peru
(July 2022)
CLP_PC_029634-61
61. Ari Sawyer, US: LGBT Asylum Seekers in Danger at the
Border (May 31, 2022)
CLP_PC_029700-08
62. Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración (IMUMI) & the
Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC), Stuck in Uncertainty
and Exposed to Violence:
The Impact of US and Mexican Migration Policies on Women
Seeking Protection in 2021 (Dec. 2021)
CLP_PC_029738-46
63. Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración (IMUMI) et al.,
Memo: Impacts of U.S. and Mexican migration enforcement
on migrant and refugee rights in Mexico (Sept. 2021)
CLP_PC_029747-55
64. Moises Castillo & Christopher Sherman, Fleeing Nicaraguans
strain Costa Rica's asylum system, AP News (Sept. 2, 2022)
CLP_CP_030101-12
65. Refugees International Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_030637-43
66. FWD.us Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_030665-83
67. Human Rights First, Human Rights Stain, Public Health
Farce (Dec. 2022)
CLP_PC_030900-20
68. American Gateways Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_031496-518
69. Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project Public
Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_031519-45
70. Taylor Levy Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_031894-907
71. Black Immigrant Bail Fund, Cameroon Advocacy Network,
Haitian Bridge Alliance, and Robert F. Kennedy Human
Rights Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_032290-359
72. Immigrant Defenders Law Center Public Comment (Mar. 27,
2023)
CLP_PC_032360-76
73. U.S. Dep’t of State, Mexico 2022 Human Rights Report
(2022)
CLP_PC_032428-73
74. Tahirih Justice Center Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_032709-44
75. Youth Center for Immigrant Children’s Rights Public
Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_032745-71
76. Texas Civil Rights Project Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_032967-83
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 5 of 1047

77. Frente Accion Latinx de Minnesota Public Comment (Mar.
27, 2023)
CLP_PC_032995-3012
78. Lads Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center Public Comment
(Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_033167-87
79. Al Otro Lado Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_033339-59
80. Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) &
International huma Rights Clinic (IHRLC), Asylum in
Mesoamerica: Accessing International Protection in Mexico
and Guatemala, AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON
COLLEGE OF LAW
CLP_PC_033392-457
81. U.S. Dep’t of State, El Salvador 2022 Human Rights Report
CLP_PC_034188-223
82. U.S. Dep’t of State, Colombia 2022 Human Rights Report
CLP_PC_034224-66
83. U.S. Dep’t of State, Ecuador 2022 Human Rights Report
CLP_PC_034267-304
84. Elliot Spagat, Online System to Seek Asylum in US is Quickly
Overwhelmed, AP (Jan. 28, 2023)
CLP_PC_034909-912
85. Ryan Baugh, Homeland Security: Fiscal Year 2020 Refugees
and Asylees Annual Flow Report (Mar. 8, 2022)
CLP_PC_039827-50
86. Black Immigrant Bail Fund, Cameroon Advocacy Network,
Haitian Bridge Alliance, and Robert F. Kennedy Human
Rights Public Comment (Mar. 27, 2023)
CLP_PC_069077-145
87. Human Rights First, Two Years of Suffering: Biden
Administration Continues Use of Discredited Title 42 Order
to Flout Refugee Law (Mar. 2022)
CLP_PC_075945-50
88. Human Rights First, Tracker of Reported Attacks Against
Asylum Seekers and Migrants Who Are Stranded in and/or
Expelled to Mexico Due to Title 42 Since January 2021
(2022)
CLP_PC_076248-87

Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 6 of 1047

Presidential Documents
8267
Federal Register
Vol. 86, No. 23
Friday, February 5, 2021
Title 3—
The President
Executive Order 14010 of February 2, 2021
Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework To Address
the Causes of Migration, To Manage Migration Throughout
North and Central America, and To Provide Safe and Or-
derly Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United States Bor-
der
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the
laws of the United States of America, including the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1. Policy. For generations, immigrants have come to the United
States with little more than the clothes on their backs, hope in their hearts,
and a desire to claim their own piece of the American Dream. These mothers,
fathers, sons, and daughters have made our Nation better and stronger.
The United States is also a country with borders and with laws that must
be enforced. Securing our borders does not require us to ignore the humanity
of those who seek to cross them. The opposite is true. We cannot solve
the humanitarian crisis at our border without addressing the violence, insta-
bility, and lack of opportunity that compel so many people to flee their
homes. Nor is the United States safer when resources that should be invested
in policies targeting actual threats, such as drug cartels and human traffickers,
are squandered on efforts to stymie legitimate asylum seekers.
Consistent with these principles, my Administration will implement a multi-
pronged approach toward managing migration throughout North and Central
America that reflects the Nation’s highest values. We will work closely
with civil society, international organizations, and the governments in the
region to: establish a comprehensive strategy for addressing the causes of
migration in the region; build, strengthen, and expand Central and North
American countries’ asylum systems and resettlement capacity; and increase
opportunities for vulnerable populations to apply for protection closer to
home. At the same time, the United States will enhance lawful pathways
for migration to this country and will restore and strengthen our own asylum
system, which has been badly damaged by policies enacted over the last
4 years that contravened our values and caused needless human suffering.
Sec. 2. United States Strategies for Addressing the Root Causes of Irregular
Migration and for Collaboratively Managing Migration in the Region. (a)
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA), in
coordination with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary
of Homeland Security, and the heads of any other relevant executive depart-
ments and agencies, shall as soon as possible prepare:
(i) the United States Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes of Migration
(the ‘‘Root Causes Strategy’’); and
(ii) the United States Strategy for Collaboratively Managing Migration in
the Region (the ‘‘Collaborative Management Strategy’’).
(b) The Root Causes Strategy shall identify and prioritize actions to address
the underlying factors leading to migration in the region and ensure coher-
ence of United States Government positions. The Root Causes Strategy shall
take into account, as appropriate, the views of bilateral, multilateral, and
private sector partners, as well as civil society, and it shall include proposals
to:
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(i) coordinate place-based efforts in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
(the ‘‘Northern Triangle’’) to address the root causes of migration, including
by:
(A) combating corruption, strengthening democratic governance, and ad-
vancing the rule of law;
(B) promoting respect for human rights, labor rights, and a free press;
(C) countering and preventing violence, extortion, and other crimes per-
petrated by criminal gangs, trafficking networks, and other organized crimi-
nal organizations;
(D) combating sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence; and
(E) addressing economic insecurity and inequality;
(ii) consult and collaborate with the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor
to evaluate compliance with the Dominican Republic-Central America Free
Trade Agreement to ensure that unfair labor practices do not disadvantage
competition; and
(iii) encourage the deployment of Northern Triangle domestic resources
and the development of Northern Triangle domestic capacity to replicate
and scale efforts to foster sustainable societies across the region.
(c) The Collaborative Management Strategy shall identify and prioritize
actions to strengthen cooperative efforts to address migration flows, including
by expanding and improving upon previous efforts to resettle throughout
the region those migrants who qualify for humanitarian protection. The
Collaborative Management Strategy should focus on programs and infrastruc-
ture that facilitate access to protection and other lawful immigration avenues,
in both the United States and partner countries, as close to migrants’ homes
as possible. Priorities should include support for expanding pathways
through which individuals facing difficult or dangerous conditions in their
home countries can find stability and safety in receiving countries throughout
the region, not only through asylum and refugee resettlement, but also
through labor and other non-protection-related programs. To support the
development of the Collaborative Management Strategy, the United States
Government shall promptly begin consultations with civil society, the private
sector, international organizations, and governments in the region, including
the Government of Mexico. These consultations should address:
(i) the continued development of asylum systems and resettlement capac-
ities of receiving countries in the region, including through the provision
of funding, training, and other support;
(ii) the development of internal relocation and integration programs for
internally displaced persons, as well as return and reintegration programs
for returnees in relevant countries of the region; and
(iii) humanitarian assistance, including through expansion of shelter net-
works, to address the immediate needs of individuals who have fled
their homes to seek protection elsewhere in the region.
Sec. 3. Expansion of Lawful Pathways for Protection and Opportunity in
the United States. (a) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall promptly review mechanisms for better identifying and proc-
essing individuals from the Northern Triangle who are eligible for refugee
resettlement to the United States. Consideration shall be given to increasing
access and processing efficiency. As part of this review, the Secretary of
State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall also identify and imple-
ment all legally available and appropriate forms of relief to complement
the protection afforded through the United States Refugee Admissions Pro-
gram. The Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security shall
submit a report to the President with the results of the review.
(b) As part of the review conducted pursuant to section 3(a) of this
order, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall:
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(i) consider taking all appropriate actions to reverse the 2017 decision
rescinding the Central American Minors (CAM) parole policy and termi-
nating the CAM Parole Program, see ‘‘Termination of the Central American
Minors Parole Program,’’ 82 FR 38,926 (August 16, 2017), and consider
initiating appropriate actions to reinstitute and improve upon the CAM
Parole Program; and
(ii) consider promoting family unity by exercising the Secretary’s discre-
tionary parole authority to permit certain nationals of the Northern Triangle
who are the beneficiaries of approved family-sponsored immigrant visa
petitions to join their family members in the United States, on a case-
by-case basis.
(c) The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
promptly evaluate and implement measures to enhance access for individuals
from the Northern Triangle to visa programs, as appropriate and consistent
with applicable law.
Sec. 4. Restoring and Enhancing Asylum Processing at the Border. (a) Resum-
ing the Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Claims at United States
Land Borders.
(i) The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director of the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), in coordination with the Sec-
retary of State, shall promptly begin consultation and planning with inter-
national and non-governmental organizations to develop policies and pro-
cedures for the safe and orderly processing of asylum claims at United
States land borders, consistent with public health and safety and capacity
constraints.
(ii) The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), and the
Director of CDC, shall promptly begin taking steps to reinstate the safe
and orderly reception and processing of arriving asylum seekers, consistent
with public health and safety and capacity constraints. Additionally, in
furtherance of this goal, as appropriate and consistent with applicable
law:
(A) The Secretary of HHS and the Director of CDC, in consultation
with the Secretary of Homeland Security, shall promptly review and deter-
mine whether termination, rescission, or modification of the following
actions is necessary and appropriate: ‘‘Order Suspending the Right To
Introduce Certain Persons From Countries Where a Quarantinable Commu-
nicable Disease Exists,’’ 85 FR 65,806 (October 13, 2020); and ‘‘Control
of Communicable Diseases; Foreign Quarantine: Suspension of the Right
to Introduce and Prohibition of Introduction of Persons into United States
from Designated Foreign Countries or Places for Public Health Purposes,’’
85 FR 56,424 (September 11, 2020) (codified at 42 CFR 71.40).
(B) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall promptly review and
determine whether to terminate or modify the program known as the
Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP), including by considering whether
to rescind the Memorandum of the Secretary of Homeland Security titled
‘‘Policy Guidance for Implementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols’’
(January 25, 2019), and any implementing guidance. In coordination with
the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of CDC,
the Secretary of Homeland Security shall promptly consider a phased
strategy for the safe and orderly entry into the United States, consistent
with public health and safety and capacity constraints, of those individuals
who have been subjected to MPP for further processing of their asylum
claims.
(C) The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
promptly review and determine whether to rescind the interim final rule
titled ‘‘Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Procla-
mations; Procedures for Protection Claims,’’ 83 FR 55,934 (November 9,
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2018), and the final rule titled ‘‘Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modi-
fications,’’ 85 FR 82,260 (December 17, 2020), as well as any agency
memoranda or guidance that were issued in reliance on those rules.
(D) The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall
promptly review and determine whether to rescind the interim final rule
titled ‘‘Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative Agree-
ments Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,’’ 84 FR 63,994 (Novem-
ber 19, 2019), as well as any agency memoranda or guidance issued
in reliance on that rule. In the interim, the Secretary of State shall promptly
consider whether to notify the governments of the Northern Triangle that,
as efforts to establish a cooperative, mutually respectful approach to man-
aging migration across the region begin, the United States intends to
suspend and terminate the following agreements:
(1) ‘‘Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Guatemala on Co-
operation Regarding the Examination of Protection Claims,’’ 84 FR
64,095 (July 26, 2019).
(2) ‘‘Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of El Salvador for Co-
operation in the Examination of Protection Claims,’’ 85 FR 83,597
(September 20, 2019).
(3) ‘‘Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Republic of Honduras for Co-
operation in the Examination of Protection Claims,’’ 85 FR 25,462
(September 25, 2019).
(E) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall promptly cease imple-
menting the ‘‘Prompt Asylum Case Review’’ program and the ‘‘Humani-
tarian Asylum Review Program’’ and consider rescinding any orders, rules,
regulations, guidelines or policies implementing those programs.
(F) The following Presidential documents are revoked:
(1) Executive Order 13767 of January 25, 2017 (Border Security and
Immigration Enforcement Improvements).
(2) Proclamation 9880 of May 8, 2019 (Addressing Mass Migration
Through the Southern Border of the United States).
(3) Presidential Memorandum of April 29, 2019 (Additional Measures
to Enhance Border Security and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration
System).
(4) Presidential Memorandum of April 6, 2018 (Ending ‘‘Catch and
Release’’ at the Border of the United States and Directing Other En-
hancements to Immigration Enforcement).
(5) Presidential Memorandum of April 4, 2018 (Securing the Southern
Border of the United States).
(G) The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary
of Homeland Security shall promptly take steps to rescind any agency
memoranda or guidance issued in reliance on or in furtherance of any
directive revoked by section 4(a)(ii)(F) of this order.
(b) Ensuring a Timely and Fair Expedited Removal Process.
(i) The Secretary of Homeland Security, with support from the United
States Digital Service within the Office of Management and Budget, shall
promptly begin a review of procedures for individuals placed in expedited
removal proceedings at the United States border. Within 120 days of
the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit
a report to the President with the results of this review and recommenda-
tions for creating a more efficient and orderly process that facilitates
timely adjudications and adherence to standards of fairness and due proc-
ess.
(ii) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall promptly review and consider
whether to modify, revoke, or rescind the designation titled ‘‘Designating
Aliens for Expedited Removal,’’ 84 FR 35,409 (July 23, 2019), regarding
the geographic scope of expedited removal pursuant to INA section
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235(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), consistent with applicable law. The review
shall consider our legal and humanitarian obligations, constitutional prin-
ciples of due process and other applicable law, enforcement resources,
the public interest, and any other factors consistent with this order that
the Secretary deems appropriate. If the Secretary determines that modi-
fying, revoking, or rescinding the designation is appropriate, the Secretary
shall do so through publication in the Federal Register.
(c) Asylum Eligibility. The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security shall:
(i) within 180 days of the date of this order, conduct a comprehensive
examination of current rules, regulations, precedential decisions, and inter-
nal guidelines governing the adjudication of asylum claims and determina-
tions of refugee status to evaluate whether the United States provides
protection for those fleeing domestic or gang violence in a manner con-
sistent with international standards; and
(ii) within 270 days of the date of this order, promulgate joint regulations,
consistent with applicable law, addressing the circumstances in which
a person should be considered a member of a ‘‘particular social group,’’
as that term is used in 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A), as derived from the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
Sec. 5. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed
to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency,
or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and
subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party
against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers,
employees, or agents, or any other person.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 2, 2021.
[FR Doc. 2021–02561
Filed 2–4–21; 8:45 am]
Billing code 3295–F1–P
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1 See Memorandum for the Secretary from the
Under Secretary for Strategy, Policy, and Plans,
Acting Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, and Director of U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, Parole Process for Certain
Nicaraguan Nationals (Dec. 22, 2022).
2 In this notice, irregular migration refers to the
movement of people into another country without
authorization.
B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA), 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, all
Departments are required to submit to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), for review and approval, any
new reporting requirements they
impose. The process announced by this
notice requires changes to two
collections of information, as follows.
OMB has recently approved a new
collection, Form I–134A, Online
Request to be a Supporter and
Declaration of Financial Support (OMB
control number 1615–NEW). This new
collection will be used for the Haiti
parole process, and is being revised in
connection with this notice, including
by increasing the burden estimate. To
support the efforts described above,
DHS has created a new information
collection that will be the first step in
these parole processes and will not use
the paper USCIS Form I–134 for this
purpose. U.S.-based supporters will
submit USCIS Form I–134A online on
behalf of a beneficiary to demonstrate
that they can support the beneficiary for
the duration of their temporary stay in
the United States. USCIS has submitted
and OMB has approved a request for
emergency authorization of the required
changes (under 5 CFR 1320.13) for a
period of 6 months. Within the next 90
days, USCIS will immediately begin
normal clearance procedures under the
PRA.
OMB has previously approved an
emergency request under 5 CFR 1320.13
for a revision to an information
collection from CBP entitled Advance
Travel Authorization (OMB control
number 1651–0143). In connection with
the implementation of the process
described above, CBP is making
multiple changes under the PRA’s
emergency processing procedures at 5
CFR 1320.13, including increasing the
burden estimate and adding Haitian
nationals as eligible for a DHS
established process that necessitates
collection of a facial photograph in CBP
OneTM. OMB has approved the
emergency request for a period of 6
months. Within the next 90 days, CBP
will immediately begin normal
clearance procedures under the PRA.
More information about both
collections can be viewed at
www.reginfo.gov.
Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2023–00255 Filed 1–5–23; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 9110–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Implementation of a Parole Process for
Nicaraguans
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: This notice describes a new
effort designed to enhance the security
of our Southwest Border (SWB) by
reducing the number of encounters of
Nicaraguan nationals crossing the
border without authorization, as the
U.S. Government continues to
implement its broader, multi-pronged
and regional strategy to address the
challenges posed by a surge in
migration. Nicaraguans who do not avail
themselves of this new process, and
instead enter the United States without
authorization between ports of entry
(POEs), generally are subject to
removal—including to third countries,
such as Mexico. As part of this effort,
the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is implementing a
process—modeled on the successful
Uniting for Ukraine (U4U) and Process
for Venezuelans—for certain Nicaraguan
nationals to lawfully enter the United
States in a safe and orderly manner and
be considered for a case-by-case
determination of parole. To be eligible,
individuals must have a supporter in
the United States who agrees to provide
financial support for the duration of the
beneficiary’s parole period, pass
national security and public safety
vetting, and fly at their own expense to
an interior POE, rather than entering at
a land POE. Individuals are ineligible
for this process if they have been
ordered removed from the United States
within the prior five years; have entered
unauthorized into the United States
between POEs, Mexico, or Panama after
the date of this notice’s publication,
with an exception for individuals
permitted a single instance of voluntary
departure or withdrawal of their
application for admission to still
maintain their eligibility for this
process; or are otherwise deemed not to
merit a favorable exercise of discretion.
DATES: DHS will begin using the Form
I–134A, Online Request to be a
Supporter and Declaration of Financial
Support, for this process on January 6,
2023.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Daniel Delgado, Acting Director, Border
and Immigration Policy, Office of
Strategy, Policy, and Plans, Department
of Homeland Security, 2707 Martin
Luther King Jr. Ave. SE, Washington, DC
20528–0445; telephone (202) 447–3459
(not a toll-free number).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background—Nicaraguan Parole
Process
This notice describes the
implementation of a new parole process
for certain Nicaraguan nationals,
including the eligibility criteria and
filing process. The parole process is
intended to enhance border security by
reducing the record levels of Nicaraguan
nationals entering the United States
between POEs, while also providing a
process for certain such nationals to
lawfully enter the United States in a safe
and orderly manner.
The announcement of this new
process followed detailed consideration
of a wide range of relevant facts and
alternatives, as reflected in the
Secretary’s decision memorandum
dated December 22, 2022.1 The
complete reasons for the Secretary’s
decision are included in that
memorandum. This Federal Register
notice is intended to provide
appropriate context and guidance for
the public regarding the policy and
relevant procedures associated with this
policy.
A. Overview
The U.S. Government is engaged in a
multi-pronged, regional strategy to
address the challenges posed by
irregular migration.2 This long-term
strategy—a shared endeavor with
partner nations—focuses on addressing
the root causes of migration, which are
currently fueling unprecedented levels
of irregular migration, and creating safe,
orderly, and humane processes for
migrants seeking protection throughout
the region. This includes domestic
efforts to expand immigration
processing capacity and multinational
collaboration to prosecute migrant-
smuggling and human-trafficking
criminal organizations, as well as their
facilitators, and money-laundering
networks. While this strategy shows
great promise, it will take time to fully
implement. In the interim, the U.S.
government needs to take immediate
steps to provide safe, orderly, humane
pathways for the large numbers of
individuals seeking to enter the United
States and to discourage such
individuals from taking the dangerous
journey to, and arriving without
authorization at, the SWB.
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3 Implementation of a Parole Process for
Venezuelans, 87 FR 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022).
4 DHS Office of Immigration Statistics (OIS)
analysis of data pulled from CBP Unified
Immigration Portal (UIP) December 5, 2022. Data
are limited to USBP encounters to exclude those
being paroled in through ports of entry.
5 Servicio Nacional de Migracio´n de Panama´,
Irregulares en Tra´nsito Frontera Panama´-Colombia
2022, https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/
img2022/PDF/IRREGULARES_%20POR_
%20DARI%C3%89N_NOVIEMBRE_2022.pdf (last
viewed Dec. 11, 2022).
6 OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data
through October 31, 2022.
Building on the success of the
successful Uniting for Ukraine (U4U)
process and the Process for
Venezuelans, DHS is implementing a
similar process to address the increasing
number of encounters of Nicaraguan
nationals at the SWB, which have
reached record levels over the past six
months. Similar to Venezuela,
Nicaragua has restricted DHS’s ability to
remove individuals to Nicaragua, which
has constrained DHS’s ability to
respond to this surge.
In October 2022, DHS undertook a
new effort to address the high number
of Venezuelans encountered at the
SWB.3 Specifically, DHS provided a
new parole process for Venezuelans
who are backed by supporters in the
United States to come to the United
States by flying to interior ports of
entry—thus obviating the need for them
to make the dangerous journey to the
SWB. Meanwhile, the Government of
Mexico (GOM) for the first time made an
independent decision to accept the
returns of Venezuelans who crossed the
SWB without authorization pursuant to
the Title 42 public health Order, thus
imposing a consequence on
Venezuelans who sought to come to the
SWB rather than avail themselves of the
newly announced Parole Process.
Within a week of the October 12, 2022
announcement of that process, the
number of Venezuelans encountered at
the SWB fell from over 1,100 per day to
under 200 per day, and, as of the week
ending December 4, to an average of 86
per day.4 The new process and
accompanying consequence for
unauthorized entry also led to a
precipitous decline in irregular
migration of Venezuelans throughout
the Western Hemisphere. The number of
Venezuelans attempting to enter
Panama through the Darie´n Gap—an
inhospitable jungle that spans between
Panama and Colombia—was down from
40,593 in October 2022 to just 668 in
November.5
DHS anticipates that implementing a
similar process for Nicaraguans will
reduce the number of Nicaraguans
seeking to irregularly enter the United
States between POEs along the SWB by
coupling a meaningful incentive to seek
a safe, orderly means of traveling to the
United States with the imposition of
consequences for those who seek to
enter without authorization pursuant to
this process. Only those who meet
specified criteria and pass national
security and public safety vetting will
be eligible for consideration for parole
under this process. Implementation of
the new parole process for Nicaraguans
is contingent on the GOM accepting the
return, departure, or removal to Mexico
of Nicaraguan nationals seeking to enter
the United States without authorization
between POEs on the SWB.
As in the process for Venezuelans, a
supporter in the United States must
initiate the process on behalf of a
Nicaraguan national (and certain non-
Nicaraguan nationals who are an
immediate family member of a primary
beneficiary), and commit to providing
the beneficiary financial support, as
needed.
In addition to the supporter
requirement, Nicaraguan nationals and
their immediate family members must
meet several eligibility criteria in order
to be considered, on a case-by-case
basis, for advance travel authorization
and parole. Only those who meet all
specified criteria are eligible to receive
advance authorization to travel to the
United States and be considered for a
discretionary grant of parole, on a case-
by-case basis, under this process.
Beneficiaries must pass national
security, public safety, and public
health vetting prior to receiving a travel
authorization, and those who are
approved must arrange air travel at their
own expense to seek entry at an interior
POE.
A grant of parole under this process
is for a temporary period of up to two
years. During this two-year period, the
United States will continue to build on
the multi-pronged, long-term strategy
with our foreign partners throughout the
region to support conditions that would
decrease irregular migration, work to
improve refugee processing and other
immigration pathways in the region,
and allow for increased removals of
Nicaraguans from both the United States
and partner nations who continue to
migrate irregularly but who lack a valid
claim of asylum or other forms of
protection. The two-year period will
also enable individuals to seek
humanitarian relief or other
immigration benefits for which they
may be eligible, and to work and
contribute to the United States. Those
who are not granted asylum or any other
immigration benefit during this two-
year parole period generally will need to
depart the United States prior to the
expiration of their authorized parole
period or will be placed in removal
proceedings after the period of parole
expires.
The temporary, case-by-case parole of
qualifying Nicaraguan nationals
pursuant to this process will provide a
significant public benefit for the United
States by reducing unauthorized entries
along our SWB while also addressing
the urgent humanitarian reasons that are
driving hundreds of thousands of
Nicaraguans to flee their home country,
to include widespread and violent
repression and human rights violations
and abuses by the Ortega regime. Most
significantly, DHS anticipates this
process will: (i) enhance the security of
the U.S. SWB by reducing irregular
migration of Nicaraguan nationals,
including by imposing additional
consequences on those who seek to
enter between POEs; (ii) enhance border
security and national security by vetting
individuals prior to their arrival at a
U.S. POE; (iii) reduce the strain on DHS
personnel and resources; (iv) minimize
the domestic impact of irregular
migration from Nicaragua; (v)
disincentivize a dangerous irregular
journey that puts migrant lives and
safety at risk and enriches smuggling
networks; and (vi) fulfill important
foreign policy goals to manage migration
collaboratively in the hemisphere.
The Secretary retains the sole
discretion to terminate the Nicaragua
process at any point.
B. Conditions at the Border
1. Impact of Venezuela Process
This process is modeled on the
Venezuela process—as informed by the
way that similar incentive and
disincentive structures successfully
decreased the number of Venezuelan
nationals making the dangerous journey
to and being encountered along the
SWB. The Venezuela process
demonstrates that combining a clear and
meaningful consequence for irregular
entry along the SWB with a significant
incentive for migrants to wait where
they are and use a safe, orderly process
to come to the United States can change
migratory flows. Prior to the October 12,
2022 announcement of the Venezuela
process, DHS encountered
approximately 1,100 Venezuelan
nationals per day between POEs—with
peak days exceeding 1,500.6 Within a
week of the announcement, the number
of Venezuelans encountered at the SWB
fell from over 1,100 per day to under
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7 OIS analysis of data pulled from CBP UIP
December 5, 2022. Data are limited to USBP
encounters to exclude those being paroled in
through ports of entry.
8 Servicio Nacional de Migracio´n de Panama´,
Irregulares en Tra´nsito Frontera Panama´-Colombia
2022, https://www.migracion.gob.pa/images/
img2022/PDF/IRREGULARES_%20POR_
%20DARI%C3%89N_NOVIEMBRE_2022.pdf, (last
viewed Dec. 11, 2022).
9 La Prensa Latina Media, More than 4,000
migrants voluntarily returned to Venezuela from
Panama, https://www.laprensalatina.com/more-
than-4000-migrants-voluntarily-returned-to-
venezuela-from-panama/, Nov. 9 2022 (last viewed
Dec. 8, 2022).
10 Voice of America, U.S. Policy Prompts Some
Venezuelan Migrants to Change Route, https://
www.voanews.com/a/us-policy-prompts-some-
venezuelan-migrants-to-change-route/
6790996.html, Oct. 14, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 8,
2022).
11 Axios, Biden’s new border policy throws
Venezuelan migrants into limbo, https://
www.axios.com/2022/11/07/biden-venezuela-
border-policy-darien-gap, Nov. 7, 2022 (last viewed
Dec. 8, 2022).
12 OIS analysis of historic CBP data.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 According to historic OIS Yearbooks of
Immigration Statistics, Mexican nationals
accounted for 96 to over 99 percent of
apprehensions of persons entering without
inspection between 1980 and 2000. On Mexican
migrants from this era’s demographics and
economic motivations see Jorge Durand, Douglas S.
Massey, and Emilio A. Parrado, ‘‘The New Era of
Mexican Migration to the United States,’’ The
Journal of American History Vol. 86, No. 2 (Sept.
1999): 518–536.
16 Northern Central America refers to El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras.
17 According to OIS analysis of CBP data,
Mexican nationals continued to account for 89
percent of total SWB encounters in FY 2010, with
Northern Central Americans accounting for 8
percent and all other nationalities for 3 percent.
Northern Central Americans’ share of total
encounters increased to 21 percent by FY 2012 and
averaged 46 percent in FY 2014–FY 2019, the last
full year before the start of the COVID–19
pandemic. All other countries accounted for an
average of 5 percent of total SWB encounters in FY
2010–FY 2013, and for 10 percent of total
encounters in FY 2014–FY 2019.
18 Prior to 2013, the overall share of encounters
who were processed for expedited removal and
claimed fear averaged less than 2 percent annually.
Between 2013 and 2018, the share rose from 8 to
20 percent, before dropping with the surge of family
unit encounters in 2019 (most of whom were not
placed in expedited removal) and the onset of T42
expulsions in 2020. At the same time, between 2013
and 2021, among those placed in expedited
removal, the share making fear claims increased
from 16 to 82 percent. OIS analysis of historic CBP
and USCIS data and OIS Enforcement Lifecycle
through June 30, 2022.
19 AP News, Fleeing Nicaraguans Strain Costa
Rica’s Asylum System (Sept. 2, 2022), https://
apnews.com/article/covid-health-elections-
presidential-caribbean-52044748d15dbbb6
ca706c66cc7459a5.
20 UNHCR, ‘Sharp rise’ in Nicaraguans fleeing to
Costa Rica, strains asylum system, https://
news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114792, Mar. 25,
2022 (last viewed Dec. 9, 2022).
21 Reuters, Costa Rica prepares plan to regularize
status of 200,000 mostly Nicaraguan migrants,
https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/costa-
rica-prepares-plan-regularize-status-200000-mostly-
nicaraguan-migrants-2022-08-10/, Aug. 10, 2022
(last viewed Dec. 4, 2022).
22 Boris Cheshirkov, Number of displaced
Nicaraguans in Costa Rica doubles in less than a
year, https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2022/3/
623d894c4/number-displaced-nicaraguans-costa-
rica-doubles-year.html, Mar. 25, 2022 (last viewed
Dec. 7, 2022).
23 OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on
data through October 31, 2022. Unique encounters
include encounters of persons at the Southwest
Border who were not previously encountered in the
prior 12 months. Throughout this memo unique
encounter data are defined to also include OFO
parolees and other OFO administrative encounters.
200 per day, and as of the week ending
December 4, an average of 86 per day.7
Panama’s daily encounters of
Venezuelans also declined significantly
over the same time period, falling some
88 percent, from 4,399 on October 16 to
532 by the end of the month—a decline
driven entirely by Venezuelan migrants’
choosing not to make the dangerous
journey through the Darie´n Gap. The
number of Venezuelans attempting to
enter Panama through the Darie´n Gap
continued to decline precipitously in
November—from 40,593 encounters in
October, a daily average of 1,309, to just
668 in November, a daily average of just
22.8
The Venezuela process fundamentally
changed the calculus for Venezuelan
migrants. Venezuelan migrants who had
already crossed the Darie´n Gap returned
to Venezuela by the thousands on
voluntary flights organized by the
governments of Mexico, Guatemala, and
Panama, as well as civil society.9 Other
migrants who were about to enter the
Darie´n Gap turned around and headed
back south.10 Still others who were
intending to migrate north are staying
where they are to apply for this parole
process.11 Put simply, the Venezuela
process demonstrates that combining a
clear and meaningful consequence for
irregular entry along the SWB with a
significant incentive for migrants to wait
where they are and use this parole
process to come to the United States can
yield a meaningful change in migratory
flows.
2. Trends and Flows: Increase of
Nicaraguan Nationals Arriving at the
Southwest Border
The last decades have yielded a
dramatic increase in encounters at the
SWB and a dramatic shift in the
demographics of those encountered.
Throughout the 1980s and into the first
decade of the 2000s, encounters along
the SWB routinely numbered in the
millions per year.12 By the early 2010s,
three decades of investments in border
security and strategy contributed to
reduced border flows, with border
encounters averaging fewer than
400,000 per year from 2011–2017.13
However, these gains were subsequently
reversed as border encounters more than
doubled between 2017 and 2019, and—
following a steep drop in the first
months of the COVID–19 pandemic—
continued to increase at a similar pace
in 2021 and 2022.14
Shifts in demographics have also had
a significant effect on migration flows.
Border encounters in the 1980s and
1990s consisted overwhelmingly of
single adults from Mexico, most of
whom were migrating for economic
reasons.15 Beginning in the 2010s, a
growing share of migrants have come
from Northern Central America 16 (NCA)
and, since the late 2010s, from countries
throughout the Americas.17 Migrant
populations from these newer source
countries have included large numbers
of families and children, many of whom
are traveling to escape violence,
political oppression, and for other non-
economic reasons.18
Historically, Nicaraguans migrated
south to Costa Rica, resulting in
relatively few Nicaraguan encounters at
the SWB. Consistent with this trend, the
number of Nicaraguans seeking asylum
in Costa Rica has grown rapidly in
recent years, putting immense pressure
on the country’s asylum system, and
causing many asylum seekers to wait
years for an initial interview.19
According to United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as
of February 2022, ‘‘more Nicaraguans
are currently seeking protection in Costa
Rica than all the refugees and asylum
seekers combined, during Central
America’s civil wars in the 1980s, when
Costa Rica was a sanctuary for those
fleeing violence.’’ 20 The Government of
Costa Rica recently announced its
intention to regularize the status of more
than 200,000 Nicaraguan migrants and
asylum seekers providing them with
access to jobs and healthcare as part of
the process.21
Despite Costa Rica’s efforts, increasing
numbers of Nicaraguans are traveling
north to the SWB due to renewed unrest
in Nicaragua and the strained asylum
system in Costa Rica. As a result, the
United States and Mexico saw surges in
migration from Nicaragua, with
Nicaraguans claiming asylum in Mexico
at three times the rate through October
31 of this year than the previous year
and with a surge in migration having
significantly contributed to the rising
number of encounters at the SWB.22
Unique encounters of Nicaraguan
nationals increased throughout fiscal
year (FY) 2021, totaling 47,300,23 and
increased further—and sharply—in FY
2022. DHS encountered an estimated
157,400 unique Nicaraguan nationals in
FY 2022, which composed nine percent
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24 OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on
data through October 31, 2022.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.; OIS analysis of UIP CBP data pulled on
November 28, 2022.
28 Voice of America, With Turmoil at Home, More
Nicaraguans Flee to the U.S. (July 29, 2021), https://
www.voanews.com/a/americas_turmoil-home-
more-nicaraguans-flee-us/6208907.html.
29 Los Angeles Times, Sandinistas Complete
Their Political Domination of Nicaragua Following
Local Elections (Nov. 8, 2022), https://
www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-11-08/
sandinistas-complete-political-domination-
nicaragua-local-elections.
30 Reuters, Ortega’s Path to Run for Fourth
Straight Re-election as Nicaraguan President (Nov.
3, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/
ortegas-path-run-fourth-straight-re-election-
nicaraguan-president-2021-11-03/.
31 Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Human
Rights Situation in Nicaragua 2 (Sept. 2, 2022),
https://reliefweb.int/report/nicaragua/human-
rights-situation-nicaragua-report-united-nations-
high-commissioner-human-rights-ahrc5142-
unofficial-english-translation.
32 Inter-American Commission On Human Rights,
Nicaragua: Concentration of Power and the
Undermining of the Rule of Law, OEA/Ser.L/V/II,
Doc. 288, 65 (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/reports/pdfs/2021_nicaragua-en.pdf.
33 Inter-American Commission On Human Rights,
Annual Report 2021, Chapter IV.B—Nicaragua, 775,
(June 2, 2022), https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/
reports/ia.asp?Year=2021.
34 In light of serious allegations regarding the
closure of civic spaces in Nicaragua, UN and IACHR
Special Rapporteurs urge authorities to comply
with their international obligations to respect and
guarantee fundamental freedoms, IACHR, Sept. 28,
2022, https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/
showarticle.asp?lID=1&artID=1257.
35 Nicaragua: Government Dismantles Civil
Society, Human Rights Watch, July 19, 2022,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/19/nicaragua-
government-dismantles-civil-society.
36 IACHR, Annual Report 2021, Chapter IV.B—
Nicaragua, 775 (June 2, 2022), https://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/reports/ia.asp?Year=2021.
37 Inter-American Commission On Human Rights,
IACHR Calls for International Solidarity, Urges
States to Protect the People Who Have Been Forced
to Flee from Nicaragua (Dec. 20, 2021), http://
www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/
media_center/PReleases/2021/346.asp.
38 The Washington Post, Nicaragua Detains
Catholic Bishop in Escalating Crackdown on
Dissent (Aug. 19, 2022), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/08/19/
nicaragua-bishop-rolando-alvarez-arrest-ortega/.
39 Politico, Sandinistas Complete Their Political
Domination of Nicaragua (Nov. 8, 2022), https://
www.politico.com/news/2022/11/08/nicaragua-
sandinistas-ortega-repression-00065603.
40 The World Bank, GDP per Capita (Current U.S.
$)—Latin America & Caribbean, Nicaragua, https://
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?
locations=ZJ-NI&most_recent_value_desc=false
(last visited Dec. 6, 2022).
41 World Food Programme, Nicaragua, https://
www.wfp.org/countries/nicaragua (last visited:
Sept. 26, 2022).
of all unique encounters and was the
fourth largest origin group.24 Between
FY 2021 and FY 2022, unique
encounters of Nicaraguan nationals rose
232 percent while unique encounters of
all other nationalities combined
increased just 47 percent.25 FY 2022
average unique monthly encounters of
Nicaraguan nationals at the land border
totaled 13,113 as opposed to an average
monthly rate of 316 encounters in FYs
2014–2019, a 41-fold increase.26
These trends thus far are only
accelerating in FY 2023. In October and
November of 2022, DHS encountered
51,000 Nicaraguan nationals at the
border—nearly one third of the record
total of Nicaraguan encounters in FY
2022.27
3. Push and Pull Factors
DHS assesses that the high—and
rising—number of Nicaraguan nationals
encountered at the SWB is driven by
two key factors: First, a confluence of
political, economic, and humanitarian
crises in Nicaragua—exacerbated by the
widespread and violent crackdown on
democratic freedoms by the Ortega
regime and the government’s numerous
human rights violations against its own
population—are causing thousands to
leave the country. This situation is
compounded by the fact that
increasingly sophisticated human
smugglers often target migrants in such
circumstances to offer them a facilitated
opportunity to travel to the United
States—at a cost. Second, the United
States faces significant limits on the
ability to remove Nicaraguan nationals
who do not establish a legal basis to
remain in the United States to Nicaragua
or elsewhere; absent such an ability,
more individuals are willing to take a
chance that they can come—and stay.
i. Factors Pushing Migration From
Nicaragua
Current political, economic, and
humanitarian crises in Nicaragua are
driving migration of Nicaraguans
throughout the hemisphere as well as to
our border.28 As conditions have
deteriorated in Nicaragua due to this
confluence of factors, the Government of
Nicaragua has shown little tolerance for
those who openly criticize their regime
and moves swiftly to brazenly silence
dissent.29
Since 2007, Daniel Ortega and his
party, the Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN), have gradually
consolidated control over the country’s
institutions and society, including by
eliminating presidential term limits.30
Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in
July 2022 that ‘‘[s]ince taking office in
2007, the Ortega administration has
dismantled all institutional checks on
presidential power, including the
judiciary.’’ 31 According to the Inter-
American Commission on Human
Rights (IACHR), this consolidation of
power in the executive ‘‘has facilitated
Nicaragua’s transformation into a police
state in which the executive branch has
instituted a regime of terror and of
suppression of all freedoms. . .
supported by the other branches of
government.’’ 32 The IACHR reported in
June 2022 that ‘‘the state’s violent
response to the social protests that
started on April 18, 2018, triggered a
serious political, social, and human
rights crisis in Nicaragua,’’ 33 and that as
of late September, ‘‘more than 2,000
organizations of civil society—linked to
political parties, academic, and religious
spaces—have been cancelled’’ since
April 2018.34 Further, HRW reported
that the shutting down of non-
governmental organizations in
Nicaragua ‘‘is part of a much broader
effort to silence civil society groups and
independent media through a
combination of repressive tactics that
include abusive legislation,
intimidation, harassment, arbitrary
detention, and prosecution of human
rights defenders and journalists.’’ 35
Since early 2021, the IACHR has
observed the escalation of repression by
the Nicaraguan government,
characterized by a series of state actions
leading to the elimination of the
opposition’s participation in the
elections even before they were held.36
In December 2021, the IACHR expressed
its concern ‘‘about the increasing
number of people who have been forced
to flee Nicaragua and to request
international protection in the context
of the ongoing serious human rights
crisis in the country.’’ 37 In August 2022,
Ortega had a bishop, five priests, and
two seminarians arrested, claiming that
the bishop ‘‘persisted in destabilizing
and provocative activities.’’ 38 Prior to
the November 2022 municipalities
election, the government closed 200
nongovernmental groups and over 50
media outlets.39
Exacerbated by political repression,
Nicaragua is one of the poorest
countries in Latin America. According
to the World Bank, Nicaragua’s gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita in
2021 was only $2,090.80, the second
lowest in the region, above Haiti.40
According to the World Food Program,
almost 30 percent of Nicaraguan
families live in poverty in the country,
‘‘over 8 percent struggle in extreme
poverty, surviving on less than $1.25
daily,’’ and ‘‘17 percent of children aged
under five suffer from chronic
malnutrition.’’ 41 Migrants often seek
economic opportunities to be able to
support their families that remain in
Nicaragua. Remittances from the United
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42 Banco Central De Nicaragua, Remesas Por Paı´s
de Origen, https://www.bcn.gob.ni/sites/default/
files/estadisticas/siec/datos/remesas_origen.htm
(last visited Dec. 6, 2022).
43 UNHCR USA, Displacement in Central
America, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/
displacement-in-central-america.html.
44 UNHCR, 2021 Global Trends Report, June 16,
2022, https://www.unhcr.org/62a9d1494/global-
trends-report-2021.
45 OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on
data through October 31, 2022.
46 There are some limited exceptions to this
prohibition, including Nicaraguan nationals that
have Mexican family members.
47 DHS Memorandum from Alejandro N.
Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, to
Interested Parties, DHS Plan for Southwest Border
Security and Preparedness (Apr. 26, 2022), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/22_0426_
dhs-plan-southwest-border-security-
preparedness.pdf.
48 OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on
data through October 31, 2022.
49 Id., and CBP UIP data for November 1–27
pulled on November 28, 2022.
50 OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on
data through October 31, 2022.
51 Data from SBCC, as of December 11, 2022.
States to Nicaragua from January–
September 2022 have surpassed the
total remittances sent in all of 2021.42
According to the UNHCR,
approximately 200,000 Nicaraguans
have sought international protection
worldwide.43 More than 100,000 filed
asylum applications in 2021; this is a
five-fold increase from 2020.44 Daniel
Ortega’s repressive policies, coupled
with widespread poverty, have pushed
thousands of Nicaraguans to seek
humanitarian relief in the Western
Hemisphere, including increasingly in
the United States.45
ii. Return Limitations
The Government of Nicaragua is not
accepting returns or removals of their
nationals at a volume that allows the
United States to effectively manage the
number of encounters of Nicaraguans by
the United States. Additionally, the
GOM has generally not allowed returns
of Nicaraguan nationals pursuant to
Title 42 authorities, or their removal
from the United States pursuant to Title
8 authorities.46 Other countries have
similarly refused to accept Title 8
removals of Nicaraguan nationals. As a
result, DHS was only able to repatriate
a small number of Nicaraguan nationals
to Nicaragua in FY 2022.
Moreover, returns alone are not
sufficient to reduce and divert irregular
flows of Nicaraguans. The United States
will combine a consequence for
Nicaraguan nationals who seek to enter
the United States without authorization
at the land border with an incentive to
use the safe, orderly process to request
authorization to travel by air to, and
seek parole to enter, the United States,
without making the dangerous journey
to the border.
4. Impact on DHS Resources and
Operations
To respond to the increase in
encounters along the SWB since FY
2021—an increase that has accelerated
in FY 2022, driven in part by the
number of Nicaraguan nationals
encountered—DHS has taken a series of
extraordinary steps. Since FY 2021,
DHS has built and now operates 10 soft-
sided processing facilities at a cost of
$688 million. U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detailed
a combined 3,770 officers and agents to
the SWB to effectively manage this
processing surge. In FY 2022, DHS had
to utilize its above threshold
reprogramming authority to identify
approximately $281 million from other
divisions in the Department to address
SWB needs, to include facilities,
transportation, medical care, and
personnel costs.
The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) has spent $260 million
in FYs 2021 and 2022 combined on
grants to non-governmental
organizations (NGO) and state and local
entities through the Emergency Food
and Shelter Program—Humanitarian
(EFSP–H) to assist with the reception
and onward travel of irregular migrants
arriving at the SWB. This spending is in
addition to $1.4 billion in additional FY
2022 appropriations that were
designated for SWB enforcement and
processing capacities.47
The impact has been particularly
acute in certain border sectors. The
increased flows of Nicaraguan nationals
are disproportionately occurring within
the remote Del Rio and Rio Grande
Valley sectors, all of which are at risk
of operating, or are currently operating,
over capacity. In FY 2022, 80 percent of
unique encounters of Nicaraguan
nationals occurred in these two
sectors.48 There have also been a
growing number of encounters in El
Paso sector since September 2022. In FY
2023, Del Rio, El Paso, and Rio Grande
Valley sectors have accounted for 88
percent of encounters of Nicaraguan
nationals.49 In FY 2022, Del Rio sector
encountered almost double (85 percent
increase) the number of migrants as
compared to FY 2021. Driven in part by
the sharp increase in Nicaraguan
nationals being encountered in this
sector, this was an eighteen-fold
increase over the average for FY 2014–
FY 2019.50
The focused increase in encounters
within those three sectors is particularly
challenging. Del Rio sector is
geographically remote, and because—up
until the past two years—it has not been
a focal point for large numbers of
individuals entering without
authorization, has limited infrastructure
and personnel in place to safely process
the elevated encounters that CBP is now
seeing there. The Yuma Sector is along
the Colorado River corridor, which
presents additional challenges to
migrants, such as armed robbery, assault
by bandits, and drowning, as well as to
the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents
encountering them. El Paso sector has
relatively modern infrastructure for
processing noncitizens encountered at
the border but is far away from other
CBP sectors, which makes it challenging
to move individuals for processing
elsewhere during surges.
In an effort to decompress sectors that
are experiencing surges, DHS deploys
lateral transportation, using buses and
flights to move noncitizens to other
sectors that have additional capacity to
process. In November 2022, U.S. Border
Patrol (USBP) sectors along the SWB
operated a combined 602
decompression bus routes to
neighboring sectors and operated 124
lateral decompression flights,
redistributing noncitizens to other
sectors with additional capacity.51
Because DHS assets are finite, using
air resources to operate lateral flights
reduces DHS’s ability to operate
international repatriation flights to
receiving countries, leaving noncitizens
in custody for longer and further taxing
DHS resources. Fewer international
repatriation flights in turn exacerbates
DHS’s inability to return or remove
Nicaraguans and other noncitizens in its
custody by sending the message that
there is no consequence for illegal entry.
DHS assesses that a reduction in the
flow of Nicaraguan nationals arriving at
the SWB would reduce pressure on
overstretched resources and enable the
Department to more quickly process
and, as appropriate, return or remove
those who do not have a lawful basis to
stay.
II. DHS Parole Authority
The Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA or Act) provides the Secretary of
Homeland Security with the
discretionary authority to parole
noncitizens ‘‘into the United States
temporarily under such reasonable
conditions as [the Secretary] may
prescribe only on a case-by-case basis
for urgent humanitarian reasons or
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52 INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A);
see also 6 U.S.C. 202(4) (charging the Secretary with
the responsibility for ‘‘[e]stablishing and
administering rules . . . governing . . . parole’’).
Nicaraguans paroled into the United States through
this process are not being paroled as refugees, and
instead will be considered for parole on a case-by-
case basis for a significant public benefit or urgent
humanitarian reasons. This parole process does not,
and is not intended to, replace refugee processing.
53 INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
54 Id.
55 See 8 CFR 212.5(f).
56 See 8 CFR 212.5(e).
57 See 8 CFR 274a.12(c)(11).
58 INA sec. 212(d)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5)(A).
significant public benefit.’’ 52 Parole is
not an admission of the individual to
the United States, and a parolee remains
an ‘‘applicant for admission’’ during the
period of parole in the United States.53
DHS may set the duration of the parole
based on the purpose for granting the
parole request and may impose
reasonable conditions on parole.54
Individuals may be granted advance
authorization to travel to the United
States to seek parole.55 DHS may
terminate parole in its discretion at any
time.56 Individuals who are paroled into
the United States generally may apply
for and be granted employment
authorization.57
This process will combine a
consequence for those who seek to enter
the United States irregularly between
POEs with a significant incentive for
Nicaraguan nationals to remain where
they are and use a lawful process to
request authorization to travel by air to,
and ultimately apply for a discretionary
grant of parole into, the United States
for a period of up to two years.
III. Justification for the Process
As noted above, section 212(d)(5)(A)
of the INA confers upon the Secretary of
Homeland Security the discretionary
authority to parole noncitizens ‘‘into the
United States temporarily under such
reasonable conditions as [the Secretary]
may prescribe only on a case-by-case
basis for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit.’’ 58
A. Significant Public Benefit
The parole of Nicaraguan nationals
and their immediate family members
under this process—which imposes new
consequences for Nicaraguans who seek
to enter the United States without
authorization between POEs, while
providing an alternative opportunity for
eligible Nicaraguan nationals and their
immediate family members to seek
advance authorization to travel to the
United States to seek discretionary
parole, on a case-by-case basis, in the
United States—serves a significant
public benefit for several, interrelated
reasons. Specifically, we anticipate that
the parole of eligible individuals
pursuant to this process will: (i)
enhance border security through a
reduction in irregular migration of
Nicaraguan nationals, including by
imposing additional consequences on
those who seek to enter between POEs;
(ii) improve vetting for national security
and public safety; (iii) reduce strain on
DHS personnel and resources; (iv)
minimize the domestic impact of
irregular migration from Nicaragua; (v)
provide a disincentive to undergo the
dangerous journey that puts migrant
lives and safety at risk and enriches
smuggling networks; and (vi) fulfill
important foreign policy goals to
manage migration collaboratively in the
hemisphere and, as part of those efforts,
to establish additional processing
pathways from within the region to
discourage irregular migration.
1. Enhanced Border Security by
Reducing Irregular Migration of
Nicaraguan Nationals
As described above, Nicaraguan
nationals make up a significant and
growing number of those encountered
seeking to cross between POEs without
authorization. Without additional and
more immediate consequences imposed
on those who seek to do so, together
with a safe and orderly process for
Nicaraguans to enter the United States,
without making the journey to the SWB,
the numbers will continue to grow.
By incentivizing individuals to seek a
safe, orderly means of traveling to the
United States through the creation of an
alternative pathway to the United
States, while imposing additional
consequences to irregular migration,
DHS assesses this process could lead to
a meaningful drop in encounters of
Nicaraguan individuals along the SWB.
This expectation is informed by the
recently implemented process for
Venezuelans and the significant shifts in
migratory patterns that took place once
the process was initiated. The success to
date of the Venezuela process provides
compelling evidence that coupling
effective disincentives for irregular
entry with incentives for a safe, orderly
parole process can meaningfully shift
migration patterns in the region and to
the SWB.
Implementation of this parole process
is contingent on the GOM’s acceptance
of Nicaraguan nationals who voluntarily
depart the United States, those who
voluntarily withdraw their application
for admission, and those subject to
expedited removal who cannot be
removed to Nicaragua or another
designated country. The ability to
effectuate voluntary departures,
withdrawals, and removals of
Nicaraguan nationals to Mexico will
impose a consequence on irregular entry
that currently does not exist.
2. Improve Vetting for National Security
and Public Safety
All noncitizens whom DHS
encounters at the border undergo
thorough vetting against national
security and public safety databases
during their processing. Individuals
who are determined to pose a national
security or public safety threat are
detained pending removal. That said,
there are distinct advantages to being
able to vet more individuals before they
arrive at the border so that we can stop
individuals who could pose threats to
national security or public safety even
earlier in the process. The Nicaraguan
parole process will allow DHS to vet
potential beneficiaries for national
security and public safety purposes
before they travel to the United States.
As described below, the vetting will
require prospective beneficiaries to
upload a live photograph via an app.
This will enhance the scope of the pre-
travel vetting—thereby enabling DHS to
better identify those with criminal
records or other disqualifying
information of concern and deny
authorization to travel under this
process before they arrive at our border,
representing an improvement over the
status quo.
3. Reduce the Burden on DHS Personnel
and Resources
By reducing encounters of Nicaraguan
nationals at the SWB, and channeling
decreased flows of Nicaraguan nationals
to interior POEs, we anticipate that the
process will relieve some of the impact
increased migratory flows have had on
the DHS workforce along the SWB. This
process is expected to free up resources,
including those focused on
decompression of border sectors, which
in turn may enable an increase in
removal flights—allowing for the
removal of more noncitizens with final
orders of removal faster and reducing
the number of days migrants are in DHS
custody. While the process will also
draw on DHS resources within U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS) and CBP to process requests for
discretionary parole on a case-by-case
basis and conduct vetting, these
requirements involve different parts of
DHS and require fewer resources as
compared to the status quo.
In addition, permitting Nicaraguans to
voluntarily depart or withdraw their
application for admission one time and
still be considered for parole through
the process also will reduce the burden
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59 OIS analysis of and CBP subject-level data and
OIS Persist Dataset based on data through October
31, 2022.
60 CNN, Washington, DC, Approves Creation of
New Agency to Provide Services for Migrants
Arriving From Other States (Sept. 21, 2022), https://
www.cnn.com/2022/09/21/us/washington-dc-
migrant-services-office.
61 San Antonio Report, Migrant aid groups
stretched thin as city officials seek federal help for
expected wave (Apr. 27, 2022), https://
sanantonioreport.org/migrant-aid-groups-stretched-
thin-city-officials-seek-federal-help/.
62 KGUN9 Tucson, Local Migrant Shelter
Reaching Max Capacity as it Receives Hundreds per
Day (Sept. 23, 2022), https://www.kgun9.com/news/
local-news/local-migrant-shelter-reaching-max-
capacity-as-it-receives-hundreds-per-day.
63 CBP, Fact Sheet: Counter Human Smuggler
Campaign Updated (Oct. 6, 2022), https://
www.dhs.gov/news/2022/10/06/fact-sheet-counter-
human-smuggler-campaign-update-dhs-led-effort-
makes-5000th.
64 CNN, First on CNN: A Record Number of
Migrants Have Died Crossing the U.S.-Mexico
Border (Sept. 7, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/
09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/
index.html.
65 Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Rescue Beacons
and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 2022 Report
to Congress.
66 CNN, First on CNN: A Record Number of
Migrants Have Died Crossing the U.S.-Mexico
Border (Sept. 7, 2022), https://www.cnn.com/2022/
09/07/politics/us-mexico-border-crossing-deaths/
index.html.
67 Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Rescue Beacons
and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 2022 Report
to Congress.
68 The Guardian, Migrants Risk Death Crossing
Treacherous Rio Grande River for ‘American
Dream’ (Sept. 5, 2022), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/sep/05/
migrants-risk-death-crossing-treacherous-rio-
grande-river-for-american-dream.
69 Department of Homeland Security, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, Rescue Beacons
and Unidentified Remains: Fiscal Year 2022 Report
to Congress.
70 DHS Memorandum from Alejandro N.
Mayorkas, Secretary of Homeland Security, to
Interested Parties, DHS Plan for Southwest Border
Security and Preparedness (Apr. 26, 2022), https://
www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/22_0426_
dhs-plan-southwest-border-security-
preparedness.pdf.
71 New York Times, Smuggling Migrants at the
Border Now a Billion-Dollar Business, (July 25,
2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/25/us/
migrant-smuggling-evolution.html.
on DHS personnel and resources that
would otherwise be required to obtain
and execute a final order of removal.
This includes reducing strain on
detention and removal flight capacity,
officer resources, and reducing costs
associated with detention and
monitoring.
4. Minimize the Domestic Impact
Though the Venezuelan process has
significantly reduced the encounters of
Venezuelan nationals, other migratory
flows continue to strain domestic
resources, which is felt most acutely by
border communities. Given the inability
to remove, return, or repatriate
Nicaraguan nationals in substantial
numbers, DHS is currently conditionally
releasing 96 percent of the Nicaraguan
nationals it encounters at the border,
pending their removal proceedings or
the initiation of such proceedings, and
Nicaraguan nationals accounted for 18
percent of all encounters released at the
border in October 2022.59 The increased
volume of provisional releases of
Nicaraguan nationals puts strains on
U.S. border communities.
Generally, since FY 2019, DHS has
worked with Congress to make
approximately $290 million available
through FEMA’s EFSP to support NGOs
and local governments that provide
initial reception for migrants entering
through the SWB. These entities have
engaged to provide services and
assistance to Nicaraguan nationals and
other noncitizens who have arrived at
our border, including by building new
administrative structures, finding
additional housing facilities, and
constructing tent shelters to address the
increased need.60 FEMA funding has
supported building significant NGO
capacity along the SWB, including a
substantial increase in available shelter
beds in key locations.
Nevertheless, local communities have
reported strain on their ability to
provide needed social services. Local
officials and NGOs report that the
temporary shelters that house migrants
are quickly reaching capacity due to the
high number of arrivals,61 and
stakeholders in the border region have
expressed concern that shelters will
eventually reach full bed space capacity
and not be able to host any new
arrivals.62 Since Nicaraguan nationals
account for a significant percentage of
the individuals being conditionally
released into communities after being
processed along the SWB, this parole
process will address these concerns by
diverting flows of Nicaraguan nationals
into a safe and orderly process in ways
that DHS anticipates will yield a
decrease in the numbers arriving at the
SWB.
DHS anticipates that this process will
help minimize the burden on
communities, state and local
governments, and NGOs who support
the reception and onward travel of
arriving migrants at the SWB.
Beneficiaries are required to fly at their
own expense to an interior POE, rather
than arriving at the SWB. They also are
only authorized to come to the United
States if they have a supporter who has
agreed to receive them and provide
basic needs, including housing support.
Beneficiaries also are eligible to apply
for work authorization, thus enabling
them to support themselves.
5. Disincentivize a Dangerous Journey
That Puts Migrant Lives and Safety at
Risk and Enriches Smuggling Networks
The process, which will incentivize
intending migrants to use a safe,
orderly, and lawful means to access the
United States via commercial air flights,
cuts out the smuggling networks. This is
critical, because transnational criminal
organizations—including the Mexican
drug cartels—are increasingly playing a
key role in human smuggling, reaping
billions of dollars in profit and callously
endangering migrants’ lives along the
way.63
In FY 2022, more than 750 migrants
died attempting to enter the United
States across the SWB,64 an estimated
32 percent increase from FY 2021 (568
deaths) and a 195 percent increase from
FY 2020 (254 deaths).65 The
approximate number of migrants
rescued by CBP in FY 2022 (almost
19,000 rescues) 66 increased 48 percent
from FY 2021 (12,857 rescues), and 256
percent from FY 2020 (5,336 rescues).67
Although exact figures are unknown,
experts estimate that about 30 bodies
have been taken out of the Rio Grande
River each month since March 2022.68
CBP attributes these rising trends to
increasing numbers of migrants, as
evidenced by increases in overall U.S.
Border Patrol encounters.69 The
increased rates of both migrant deaths
and those needing rescue at the SWB
demonstrate the perils in the migrant
journey.
Meanwhile, these numbers do not
account for the countless incidents of
death, illness, and exploitation migrants
experience during the perilous journey
north. These migratory movements are
in many cases facilitated by numerous
human smuggling organizations, for
which the migrants are pawns; 70 the
organizations exploit migrants for profit,
often bringing them across inhospitable
deserts, rugged mountains, and raging
rivers, often with small children in tow.
Upon reaching the border area,
noncitizens seeking to cross into the
United States generally pay
transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) to coordinate and guide them
along the final miles of their journey.71
Tragically, a significant number of
individuals perish along the way. The
trailer truck accident that killed 55
migrants in Chiapas, Mexico, in
December 2021 and the tragic incident
in San Antonio, Texas, on June 27,
2022, in which 53 migrants died of the
heat in appalling conditions, are just
two examples of many in which TCOs
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72 Reuters, Migrant Truck Crashes in Mexico
Killing 54 (Dec. 9, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/
article/uk-usa-immigration-mexico-accident-
idUKKBN2IP01R; Reuters, The Border’s Toll:
Migrants Increasingly Die Crossing into U.S. from
Mexico (July 25, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/
article/usa-immigration-border-deaths/the-borders-
toll-migrants-increasingly-die-crossing-into-u-s-
from-mexico-idUSL4N2Z247X.
73 See DHS Update on Southwest Border Security
and Preparedness Ahead of Court-Ordered Lifting of
Title 42 (Dec. 13, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/
publication/update-southwest-border-security-and-
preparedness-ahead-court-ordered-lifting-title-42.
74 National Security Council, Root Causes of
Migration in Central America (July 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/
Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
75 National Security Council, Collaborative
Migration Management Strategy (July 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/
Collaborative-Migration-Management-
Strategy.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_
source=govdelivery.
76 Id.; The White House, Los Angeles Declaration
on Migration and Protection (LA Declaration) (June
10, 2022) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2022/06/10/los-angeles-
declaration-on-migration-and-protection/.
77 Id.
78 Id.
engaged in human smuggling prioritize
profit over safety.72
DHS anticipates this process will save
lives and undermine the profits and
operations of the dangerous TCOs that
put migrants’ lives at risk for profit
because it incentivizes intending
migrants to use a safe and orderly means
to access the United States via
commercial air flights, thus ultimately
reducing the demand for smuggling
networks to facilitate the dangerous
journey to the SWB. By reducing the
demand for these services, DHS is
effectively targeting the resources of
TCOs and human smuggling networks
that so often facilitate these
unprecedented movements with utter
disregard for the health and safety of
migrants. DHS and federal partners have
taken extraordinary measures—
including the largest-ever surge of
resources against human smuggling
networks—to combat and disrupt the
TCOs and smugglers and will continue
to do so.73
6. Fulfill Important Foreign Policy Goals
To Manage Migration Collaboratively in
the Hemisphere
Promoting a safe, orderly, legal, and
humane migration strategy throughout
the Western Hemisphere has been a top
foreign policy priority for the
Administration. This is reflected in
three policy-setting documents: the U.S.
Strategy for Addressing the Root Causes
of Migration in Central America (Root
Causes Strategy); 74 the Collaborative
Migration Management Strategy
(CMMS); 75 and the Los Angeles
Declaration on Migration and Protection
(L.A. Declaration), which was endorsed
in June 2022 by 21 countries.76 The
CMMS and the L.A. Declaration call for
a collaborative and regional approach to
migration, wherein countries in the
hemisphere commit to implementing
programs and processes to stabilize
communities hosting migrants or those
of high outward-migration; humanely
enforce existing laws regarding
movements across international
boundaries, especially when minors are
involved; take actions to stop migrant
smuggling by targeting the criminals
involved in these activities; and provide
increased regular pathways and
protections for migrants residing in or
transiting through the 21 countries.77
The L.A. Declaration specifically lays
out the goal of collectively ‘‘expand[ing]
access to regular pathways for migrants
and refugees.’’ 78
This new process helps achieve these
goals by providing an immediate and
temporary orderly process for
Nicaraguan nationals to lawfully enter
the United States while we work to
improve conditions in sending countries
and expand more permanent lawful
immigration pathways in the region,
including refugee processing and other
lawful pathways into the United States
and other Western Hemisphere
countries. It thus provides the United
States another avenue to lead by
example.
The process also responds to an acute
foreign policy need. Key allies in the
region—including specifically the
Governments of Mexico and Costa
Rica—are affected by the increased
movement of Nicaraguan nationals and
have been seeking greater U.S. action to
address these challenging flows for
some time. These Nicaraguan flows
contribute to strain on governmental
and civil society resources in Mexican
border communities in both the south
and the north—something that key
foreign government partners have been
urging the United States to address.
Along with the Venezuelan process,
this new process adds to these efforts
and enables the United States to lead by
example. Such processes are a key
mechanism to advance the larger
domestic and foreign policy goals of the
U.S. Government to promote a safe,
orderly, legal, and humane migration
strategy throughout our hemisphere.
The new process also strengthens the
foundation for the United States to press
regional partners—many of which are
already taking important steps—to
undertake additional actions with
regard to this population, as part of a
regional response. Any effort to
meaningfully address the crisis in
Nicaragua will require continued efforts
by these and other regional partners.
Importantly, the United States will
only implement the new parole process
while able to remove or return to
Mexico Nicaraguan nationals who enter
the United States without authorization
across the SWB. The United States’
ability to execute this process thus is
contingent on the GOM making an
independent decision to accept the
return or removal of Nicaraguan
nationals who bypass this new process
and enter the United States without
authorization.
For its part, the GOM has made clear
its position that, in order to effectively
manage the migratory flows that are
impacting both countries, the United
States needs to provide additional safe,
orderly, and lawful processes for
migrants who seek to enter the United
States. The GOM, as it makes its
independent decisions as to its ability to
accept returns of third country nationals
at the border and its efforts to manage
migration within Mexico, is thus closely
watching the United States’ approach to
migration management and whether it is
delivering on its plans in this space.
Initiating and managing this process—
which is dependent on GOM’s actions—
will require careful, deliberate, and
regular assessment of GOM’s responses
to independent U.S. actions and
ongoing, sensitive diplomatic
engagements.
As noted above, this process is
responsive to the GOM’s request that the
United States increase lawful pathways
for migrants and is also aligned with
broader Administration domestic and
foreign policy priorities in the region.
The process couples a meaningful
incentive to seek a lawful, orderly
means of traveling to the United States
with the imposition of consequences for
those who seek to enter without
authorization along the SWB. The goal
of this process is to reduce the irregular
migration of Nicaraguan nationals while
the United States, together with partners
in the region, works to improve
conditions in sending countries and
create more lawful immigration and
refugee pathways in the region,
including to the United States.
B. Urgent Humanitarian Reasons
The case-by-case temporary parole of
individuals pursuant to this process will
address the urgent humanitarian needs
of Nicaraguan nationals who have fled
the Ortega regime and Nicaragua. The
Government of Nicaragua continues to
repress and punish all forms of dissent
and public criticism of the regime and
has continued to take actions against
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79 OHCHR, Presentation of Report on the Human
Rights Situation in Nicaragua, Human Rights
Council Resolution 49/3 (Sept. 13, 2022), https://
www.ohchr.org/en/speeches/2022/09/presentation-
report-human-rights-situation-nicaragua.
80 Certain non-Nicaraguans may use this process
if they are an immediate family member of a
Nicaraguan beneficiary and traveling with that
Nicaraguan beneficiary. For purposes of this
process, immediate family members are limited to
a spouse, common-law partner, and/or unmarried
child(ren) under the age of 21.
81 See preceding footnote.
82 This limitation does not apply to immediate
family members traveling with a Nicaraguan
national.
83 See, e.g., INA sec. 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C.
1182(a)(9)(A).
84 As defined in 6 U.S.C. 279(g)(2). Children
under the age of 18 must be traveling to the United
States in the care and custody of their parent or
legal guardian to be considered for parole at the
POE under the process.
those who oppose its positions.79 This
process provides a safe mechanism for
Nicaraguan nationals who seek to leave
their home country to enter the United
States without having to make the
dangerous journey to the United States.
IV. Eligibility To Participate in the
Process and Processing Steps
A. Supporters
U.S.-based supporters must initiate
the process by filing Form I–134A on
behalf of a Nicaraguan national and, if
applicable, the national’s immediate
family members.80 Supporters may be
individuals filing on their own, with
other individuals, or on behalf of non-
governmental entities or community-
based organizations. Supporters are
required to provide evidence of income
and assets and declare their willingness
to provide financial support to the
named beneficiary for the length of
parole. Supporters are required to
undergo vetting to identify potential
human trafficking or other concerns. To
serve as a supporter under the process,
an individual must:
• be a U.S. citizen, national, or lawful
permanent resident; hold a lawful status
in the United States; or be a parolee or
recipient of deferred action or Deferred
Enforced Departure;
• pass security and background
vetting, including for public safety,
national security, human trafficking,
and exploitation concerns; and
• demonstrate sufficient financial
resources to receive, maintain, and
support the intended beneficiary whom
they commit to support for the duration
of their parole period.
B. Beneficiaries
In order to be eligible to request and
ultimately be considered for a
discretionary issuance of advance
authorization to travel to the United
States to seek a discretionary grant of
parole at the POE, such individuals
must:
• be outside the United States;
• be a national of Nicaragua or be a
non-Nicaraguan immediate family
member 81 and traveling with a
Nicaraguan principal beneficiary;
• have a U.S.-based supporter who
filed a Form I–134A on their behalf that
USCIS has vetted and confirmed;
• possess an unexpired passport valid
for international travel;
• provide for their own commercial
travel to an air U.S. POE and final U.S.
destination;
• undergo and pass required national
security and public safety vetting;
• comply with all additional
requirements, including vaccination
requirements and other public health
guidelines; and
• demonstrate that a grant of parole is
warranted based on significant public
benefit or urgent humanitarian reasons,
as described above, and that a favorable
exercise of discretion is otherwise
merited.
A Nicaraguan national is ineligible to
be considered for advance authorization
to travel to the United States as well as
parole under this process if that person
is a permanent resident or dual national
of any country other than Nicaragua, or
currently holds refugee status in any
country, unless DHS operates a similar
parole process for the country’s
nationals.82
In addition, a potential beneficiary is
ineligible for advance authorization to
travel to the United States as well as
parole under this process if that person:
• fails to pass national security and
public safety vetting or is otherwise
deemed not to merit a favorable exercise
of discretion;
• has been ordered removed from the
United States within the prior five years
or is subject to a bar to admissibility
based on a prior removal order; 83
• has crossed irregularly into the
United States, between the POEs, after
January 9, 2023 except individuals
permitted a single instance of voluntary
departure pursuant to INA section 240B,
8 U.S.C. 1229c or withdrawal of their
application for admission pursuant to
INA section 235(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
1225(a)(4) will remain eligible;
• has irregularly crossed the Mexican
or Panamanian border after January 9,
2023; or
• is under 18 and not traveling
through this process accompanied by a
parent or legal guardian, and as such is
a child whom the inspecting officer
would determine to be an
unaccompanied child.84
Travel Requirements: Beneficiaries
who receive advance authorization to
travel to the United States to seek parole
into the United States will be
responsible for arranging and funding
their own commercial air travel to an
interior POE of the United States.
Health Requirements: Beneficiaries
must follow all applicable requirements,
as determined by DHS’s Chief Medical
Officer, in consultation with the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, with
respect to health and travel, including
vaccination and/or testing requirements
for diseases including COVID–19, polio,
and measles. The most up-to-date public
health requirements applicable to this
process will be available at
www.uscis.gov/CHNV.
C. Processing Steps
Step 1: Declaration of Financial Support
A U.S.-based supporter will submit a
Form I–134A, Online Request to be a
Supporter and Declaration of Financial
Support, with USCIS through the online
myUSCIS web portal to initiate the
process. The Form I–134A identifies
and collects information on both the
supporter and the beneficiary. The
supporter must submit a separate Form
I–134A for each beneficiary they are
seeking to support, including
Nicaraguans’ immediate family
members and minor children. The
supporter will then be vetted by USCIS
to protect against exploitation and
abuse, and to ensure that the supporter
is able to financially support the
beneficiary whom they agree to support.
Supporters must be vetted and
confirmed by USCIS, at USCIS’
discretion, before moving forward in the
process.
Step 2: Submit Biographic Information
If a supporter is confirmed by USCIS,
the listed beneficiary will receive an
email from USCIS with instructions to
create an online account with myUSCIS
and next steps for completing the
application. The beneficiary will be
required to confirm their biographic
information in their online account and
attest to meeting the eligibility
requirements.
As part of confirming eligibility in
their myUSCIS account, individuals
who seek authorization to travel to the
United States will need to confirm that
they meet public health requirements,
including certain vaccination
requirements.
Step 3: Submit Request in CBP One
Mobile Application
After confirming biographic
information in myUSCIS and
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85 Air carriers can validate an approved and valid
travel authorization submission using the same
mechanisms that are currently in place to validate
that a traveler has a valid visa or other
documentation to facilitate issuance of a boarding
pass for air travel.
86 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A); id. 553(d)(2).
87 See Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 197 (1993)
(quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302
n.31 (1979)).
88 5 U.S.C. 553(a)(1).
89 Mast Indus. v. Regan, 596 F. Supp. 1567, 1582
(C.I.T. 1984) (cleaned up).
90 See, e.g., Rajah v. Mukasey, 544 F.3d 427, 437
(2d Cir. 2008).
completing required eligibility
attestations, the beneficiary will receive
instructions through myUSCIS for
accessing the CBP One mobile
application. The beneficiary must then
enter limited biographic information
into CBP One and submit a live photo.
Step 4: Approval to Travel to the United
States
After completing Step 3, the
beneficiary will receive a notice in their
myUSCIS account confirming whether
CBP has, in CBP’s discretion, provided
the beneficiary with advance
authorization to travel to the United
States to seek a discretionary grant of
parole on a case-by-case basis. If
approved, this authorization is generally
valid for 90 days, and beneficiaries are
responsible for securing their own travel
via commercial air to the United
States.85 Approval of advance
authorization to travel does not
guarantee parole into the United States.
Whether to parole the individual is a
discretionary determination made by
CBP at the POE at the time the
individual arrives at the interior POE.
All of the steps in this process,
including the decision to grant or deny
advance travel authorization and the
parole decision at the interior POE, are
entirely discretionary and not subject to
appeal on any grounds.
Step 5: Seeking Parole at the POE
Each individual arriving at a POE
under this process will be inspected by
CBP and considered for a grant of
discretionary parole for a period of up
to two years on a case-by-case basis.
As part of the inspection,
beneficiaries will undergo additional
screening and vetting, to include
additional fingerprint biometric vetting
consistent with CBP inspection
processes. Individuals who are
determined to pose a national security
or public safety threat or otherwise do
not warrant parole pursuant to section
212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A), and as a matter of
discretion upon inspection, will be
processed under an appropriate
processing pathway and may be referred
to ICE for detention.
Step 6: Parole
If granted parole pursuant to this
process, each individual generally will
be paroled into the United States for a
period of up to two years, subject to
applicable health and vetting
requirements, and will be eligible to
apply for employment authorization
from USCIS under existing regulations.
USCIS is leveraging technological and
process efficiencies to minimize
processing times for requests for
employment authorization. All
individuals two years of age or older
will be required to complete a medical
screening for tuberculosis, including an
IGRA test, within 90 days of arrival to
the United States.
D. Scope, Termination, and No Private
Rights
The Secretary retains the sole
discretion to terminate the process at
any point.The number of travel
authorizations granted under the Parole
Process for Nicaraguans shall be spread
across this process and the separate and
independent Parole Process for Cubans,
the Parole Process for Haitians, and
Parole Process for Venezuelans (as
described in separate notices published
concurrently in today’s edition of the
Federal Register) and shall not exceed
30,000 each month in the aggregate.
Each of these processes operates
independently, and any action to
terminate or modify any of the other
processes will have no bearing on the
criteria for or independent decisions
with respect to this process.
This process is being implemented as
a matter of the Secretary’s discretion. It
is not intended to and does not create
any rights, substantive or procedural,
enforceable by any party in any matter,
civil or criminal.
V. Regulatory Requirements
A. Administrative Procedure Act
This process is exempt from notice-
and-comment rulemaking and delayed
effective date requirements on multiple
grounds, and is therefore amenable to
immediate issuance and
implementation.
First, the Department is merely
adopting a general statement of policy,86
i.e., a ‘‘statement[ ] issued by an agency
to advise the public prospectively of the
manner in which the agency proposes to
exercise a discretionary power.’’ 87 As
section 212(d)(5)(A) of the INA, 8 U.S.C.
1182(d)(5)(A), provides, parole
decisions are made by the Secretary of
Homeland Security ‘‘in his discretion.’’
Second, even if this process were
considered to be a legislative rule that
would normally be subject to
requirements for notice-and-comment
rulemaking and a delayed effective date,
the process would be exempt from such
requirements because it involves a
foreign affairs function of the United
States.88 Courts have held that this
exemption applies when the rule in
question ‘‘is clearly and directly
involved in a foreign affairs
function.’’ 89 In addition, although the
text of the Administrative Procedure Act
does not expressly require an agency
invoking this exemption to show that
such procedures may result in
‘‘definitely undesirable international
consequences,’’ some courts have
required such a showing.90 This process
satisfies both standards.
As described above, this process is
directly responsive to requests from key
foreign partners—including the GOM—
to provide a lawful process for
Nicaraguan nationals to enter the United
States. The United States will only
implement the new parole process
while able to return or remove to
Mexico Nicaraguan nationals who enter
without authorization across the SWB.
The United States’ ability to execute this
process is contingent on the GOM
making an independent decision to
accept the return or removal of
Nicaraguan nationals who bypass this
new process and enter the United States
without authorization. Thus, initiating
and managing this process will require
careful, deliberate, and regular
assessment of the GOM’s responses to
U.S. action in this regard, and ongoing,
sensitive diplomatic engagements.
Delaying issuance and
implementation of this process to
undertake rulemaking would undermine
the foreign policy imperative to act now.
It also would complicate broader
discussions and negotiations about
migration management. For now, the
GOM has indicated it is prepared to
make an independent decision to accept
the return or removal of Nicaraguan
nationals. The GOM’s willingness to
accept the returns or removals could be
impacted by the delay associated with a
public rulemaking process involving
advance notice and comment and a
delayed effective date. Additionally,
making it publicly known that we plan
to return or remove nationals of
Nicaragua to Mexico at a future date
would likely result in an even greater
surge in migration, as migrants rush to
the border to enter before the process
begins—which would adversely impact
each country’s border security and
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91 See 82 FR 4902 (Jan. 17, 2017).
92 See 87 FR 63507 (Oct. 19, 2022).
93 See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B); id. 553(d)(3).
94 See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC, 443
F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (‘‘The [‘‘good cause’’]
exception excuses notice and comment in
emergency situations, where delay could result in
serious harm, or when the very announcement of
a proposed rule itself could be expected to
precipitate activity by affected parties that would
harm the public welfare.’’ (citations omitted)).
95 See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).
96 See, e.g., Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d
87, 94–95 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (noting that the ‘‘good
cause’’ exception ‘‘is appropriately invoked when
the timing and disclosure requirements of the usual
procedures would defeat the purpose of the
proposal—if, for example, announcement of a
proposed rule would enable the sort of financial
manipulation the rule sought to prevent [or] in
order to prevent the amended rule from being
evaded’’ (cleaned up)); DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc.,
499 F.2d 1321, 1332 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975)
(‘‘[W]e are satisfied that there was in fact ‘good
cause’ to find that advance notice of the freeze was
‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest’ within the meaning of section
553(b)(B). . . . Had advance notice issued, it is
apparent that there would have ensued a massive
rush to raise prices and conduct ‘actual
transactions’—or avoid them—before the freeze
deadline.’’ (cleaned up)).
97 See, e.g., Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064, 1068
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975) (‘‘[W]e think good
cause was present in this case based upon [the
agency’s] concern that the announcement of a price
increase at a future date could have resulted in
producers withholding crude oil from the market
until such time as they could take advantage of the
price increase.’’).
98 See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. SEC.,
443 F.3d 890, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (‘‘The [‘‘good
cause’’] exception excuses notice and comment in
emergency situations, where delay could result in
serious harm, or when the very announcement of
a proposed rule itself could be expected to
precipitate activity by affected parties that would
harm the public welfare.’’ (citations omitted));
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 728 F.2d 1477,
1492 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1983) (‘‘On a number
of occasions . . . this court has held that, in special
circumstances, good cause can exist when the very
announcement of a proposed rule itself can be
expected to precipitate activity by affected parties
that would harm the public welfare.’’).
99 See, e.g., Tech Transparency Project, Inside the
World of Misinformation Targeting Migrants on
Social Media, https://
www.techtransparencyproject.org/articles/inside-
world-misinformation-targeting-migrants-social-
media, July 26, 2022 (last viewed Dec. 6, 2022).
100 Eliminating Exception to Expedited Removal
Authority for Cuban Nationals Arriving by Air, 82
FR 4769, 4770 (Jan. 17, 2017).
further strain their personnel and
resources deployed to the border.
Moreover, this process is not only
responsive to the interests of key foreign
partners—and necessary for addressing
migration issues requiring coordination
between two or more governments—it is
also fully aligned with larger and
important foreign policy objectives of
this Administration and fits within a
web of carefully negotiated actions by
multiple governments (for instance in
the L.A. Declaration). It is the view of
the United States that the
implementation of this process will
advance the Administration’s foreign
policy goals by demonstrating U.S.
partnership and U.S. commitment to the
shared goals of addressing migration
through the hemisphere, both of which
are essential to maintaining strong
bilateral relationships.
The invocation of the foreign affairs
exemption here is also consistent with
Department precedent. For example,
DHS published a notice eliminating an
exception to expedited removal for
certain Cuban nationals, which
explained that the change in policy was
consistent with the foreign affairs
exemption because the change was
central to ongoing negotiations between
the two countries.91 DHS similarly
invoked the foreign affairs exemption
more recently, in connection with the
Venezuela parole process.92
Third, DHS assesses that there is good
cause to find that the delay associated
with implementing this process through
notice-and-comment rulemaking and
with a delayed effective date would be
contrary to the public interest and
impracticable.93 The numbers of
Nicaraguans encountered at the SWB
are already high, and a delay would
greatly exacerbate an urgent border and
national security challenge and would
miss a critical opportunity to reduce
and divert the flow of irregular
migration.94
Undertaking notice-and-comment rule
making procedures would be contrary to
the public interest because an advance
announcement of the process would
seriously undermine a key goal of the
policy: it would incentivize even more
irregular migration of Nicaraguan
nationals seeking to enter the United
States before the process would take
effect. There are urgent border and
national security and humanitarian
interests in reducing and diverting the
flow of irregular migration.95 It has long
been recognized that agencies may use
the good cause exception, and need not
take public comment in advance, where
significant public harm would result
from the notice-and-comment process.96
If, for example, advance notice of a
coming price increase would
immediately produce market
dislocations and lead to serious
shortages, advance notice need not be
given.97 A number of cases follow this
logic in the context of economic
regulation.98
The same logic applies here, where
the Department is responding to
exceedingly serious challenges at the
border, and advance announcement of
that response would significantly
increase the incentive, on the part of
migrants and others (such as smugglers),
to engage in actions that would
compound those very challenges. It is
well established that migrants may
change their behavior in response to
perceived imminent changes in U.S.
immigration policy.99 For example, as
detailed above, implementation of the
parole process for Venezuelans was
associated with a drastic reduction in
irregular migration by Venezuelans. Had
the parole process been announced
prior to a notice-and-comment period, it
likely would have had the opposite
effect, resulting in many hundreds of
thousands of Venezuelan nationals
attempting to cross the border before the
program went into effect. Overall, the
Department’s experience has been that
in some circumstances when public
announcements have been made
regarding changes in our immigration
laws and procedures that would restrict
access to immigration benefits to those
attempting to enter the United States
along the U.S.-Mexico land border, there
have been dramatic increases in the
numbers of noncitizens who enter or
attempt to enter the United States.
Smugglers routinely prey on migrants in
response to changes in domestic
immigration law.
In addition, it would be impracticable
to delay issuance of this process in
order to undertake such procedures
because—as noted above—maintaining
the status quo, which involves record
numbers of Nicaraguan nationals
currently being encountered attempting
to enter without authorization at the
SWB, coupled with DHS’s extremely
limited options for processing,
detaining, or quickly removing such
migrants, would unduly impede DHS’s
ability to fulfill its critical and varied
missions. At current rates, a delay of
just a few months to conduct notice-
and-comment rulemaking would
effectively forfeit an opportunity to
reduce and divert migrant flows in the
near term, harm border security, and
potentially result in scores of additional
migrant deaths.
The Department’s determination here
is consistent with past practice in this
area. For example, in addition to the
Venezuelan process described above,
DHS concluded in January 2017 that it
was imperative to give immediate effect
to a rule designating Cuban nationals
arriving by air as eligible for expedited
removal because ‘‘pre-promulgation
notice and comment would . . .
endanger[ ] human life and hav[e] a
potential destabilizing effect in the
region.’’ 100 DHS cited the prospect that
‘‘publication of the rule as a proposed
rule, which would signal a significant
change in policy while permitting
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101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.; accord, e.g., Visas: Documentation of
Nonimmigrants Under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as Amended, 81 FR 5906, 5907
(Feb. 4, 2016) (finding the good cause exception
applicable because of similar short-run incentive
concerns).
continuation of the exception for Cuban
nationals, could lead to a surge in
migration of Cuban nationals seeking to
travel to and enter the United States
during the period between the
publication of a proposed and a final
rule.’’ 101 DHS found that ‘‘[s]uch a
surge would threaten national security
and public safety by diverting valuable
Government resources from
counterterrorism and homeland security
responsibilities. A surge could also have
a destabilizing effect on the region, thus
weakening the security of the United
States and threatening its international
relations.’’ 102 DHS concluded that ‘‘a
surge could result in significant loss of
human life.’’ 103
B. Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
Under the Paperwork Reduction Act
(PRA), 44 U.S.C. chapter 35, all
Departments are required to submit to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), for review and approval, any
new reporting requirements they
impose. The process announced by this
notice requires changes to two
collections of information, as follows.
OMB has recently approved a new
collection, Form I–134A, Online
Request to be a Supporter and
Declaration of Financial Support (OMB
control number 1615–NEW). This new
collection will be used for the Nicaragua
parole process, and is being revised in
connection with this notice, including
by increasing the burden estimate. To
support the efforts described above,
DHS has created a new information
collection that will be the first step in
these parole processes and will not use
the paper USCIS Form I–134 for this
purpose. U.S.-based supporters will
submit USCIS Form I–134A online on
behalf of a beneficiary to demonstrate
that they can support the beneficiary for
the duration of their temporary stay in
the United States. USCIS has submitted
and OMB has approved a request for
emergency authorization of the required
changes (under 5 CFR 1320.13) for a
period of 6 months. Within the next 90
days, USCIS will immediately begin
normal clearance procedures under the
PRA.
OMB has previously approved an
emergency request under 5 CFR 1320.13
for a revision to an information
collection from CBP entitled Advance
Travel Authorization (OMB control
number 1651–0143). In connection with
the implementation of the process
described above, CBP is making
multiple changes under the PRA’s
emergency processing procedures at 5
CFR 1320.13, including increasing the
burden estimate and adding Nicaraguan
nationals as eligible for a DHS
established process that necessitates
collection of a facial photograph in CBP
OneTM. OMB has approved the
emergency request for a period of 6
months. Within the next 90 days, CBP
will immediately begin normal
clearance procedures under the PRA.
More information about both
collections can be viewed at
www.reginfo.gov.
Alejandro N. Mayorkas,
Secretary of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. 2023–00254 Filed 1–5–23; 4:15 pm]
BILLING CODE 9110–9M–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Federal Emergency Management
Agency
[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA–4679–
DR; Docket ID FEMA–2022–0001]
West Virginia; Major Disaster and
Related Determinations
AGENCY: Federal Emergency
Management Agency, DHS.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: This is a notice of the
Presidential declaration of a major
disaster for the State of West Virginia
(FEMA–4679–DR), dated November 28,
2022, and related determinations.
DATES: The declaration was issued
November 28, 2022.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Dean Webster, Office of Response and
Recovery, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, 500 C Street SW,
Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646–2833.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is
hereby given that, in a letter dated
November 28, 2022, the President
issued a major disaster declaration
under the authority of the Robert T.
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.
(the ‘‘Stafford Act’’), as follows:
I have determined that the damage in
certain areas of the State of West Virginia
resulting from severe storms, flooding,
landslides, and mudslides during the period
of August 14 to August 15, 2022, is of
sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant
a major disaster declaration under the Robert
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq. (the
‘‘Stafford Act’’). Therefore, I declare that such
a major disaster exists in the State of West
Virginia.
In order to provide Federal assistance, you
are hereby authorized to allocate from funds
available for these purposes such amounts as
you find necessary for Federal disaster
assistance and administrative expenses.
You are authorized to provide Public
Assistance in the designated areas and
Hazard Mitigation throughout the State.
Consistent with the requirement that Federal
assistance be supplemental, any Federal
funds provided under the Stafford Act for
Public Assistance and Hazard Mitigation will
be limited to 75 percent of the total eligible
costs.
Further, you are authorized to make
changes to this declaration for the approved
assistance to the extent allowable under the
Stafford Act.
The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) hereby gives notice that
pursuant to the authority vested in the
Administrator, under Executive Order
12148, as amended, Jeffrey L. Jones, of
FEMA is appointed to act as the Federal
Coordinating Officer for this major
disaster.
The following areas of the State of
West Virginia have been designated as
adversely affected by this major disaster:
Fayette County for Public Assistance.
All areas within the State of West Virginia
are eligible for assistance under the Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program.
The following Catalog of Federal Domestic
Assistance Numbers (CFDA) are to be used
for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030,
Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora
Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis Counseling;
97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034,
Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA);
97.046, Fire Management Assistance Grant;
97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to
Individuals and Households In Presidentially
Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049,
Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance—
Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals
and Households; 97.050, Presidentially
Declared Disaster Assistance to Individuals
and Households—Other Needs; 97.036,
Disaster Grants—Public Assistance
(Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039,
Hazard Mitigation Grant.
Deanne Criswell,
Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2023–00178 Filed 1–6–23; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111–23–P
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Implementation of a Parole Process for
Cubans
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: This notice describes a new
effort designed to enhance the security
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Office of Partnership and Engagement
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528

March 23, 2023

Reverend Dr. Rafael Malpica Padilla
Executive Director, Service and Justice
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
8765 W Higgins Road
Chicago, IL 60631

Dear Reverend Dr. Malpica Padilla:

Thank you for your January 23, 2023, letter to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) related to your concerns with DHS and Department of Justice’s (DOJ) intent to issue a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would place certain conditions on individuals who
circumvent available, established pathways to lawful migration, and fail to seek protection in a
country through which they traveled on their way to the United States. Secretary Mayorkas
asked that I respond on his behalf.

I appreciate the concerns you have raised about the proposed rule. When the proposed
rule was published in the Federal Register on February 23, DHS and DOJ invited public comment
and the comment period closes on March 27, 2023. We are interested in your input and
encourage you to submit written comments to the docket for careful, on-the-record consideration
of your views. You can view the rule and submit comments at:
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/02/23/2023-03718/circumvention-of-lawful-
pathways.

DHS is also pursuing phased implementation of the Procedures for Credible Fear
Screening and Consideration of Asylum, Withholding of Removal, and Convention Against
Torture (CAT)Protection Claims by Asylum Officers interim final rule (IFR)1, which took effect
May 31, 2022. The IFR allows U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to adjudicate, in the
first instance, the asylum claims of individuals who receive a positive credible fear determination
after being placed into expedited removal. That rule is a key step toward implementing the
Administration’s Blueprint for a Fair, Orderly, and Humane Immigration System by building a
more functional and sensible asylum system to increase the efficiency and fairness of the process
by which noncitizens who are placed into expedited removal proceedings are either removed or, if

1 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/29/2022-06148/procedures-for-credible-fear-screening-and-
consideration-of-asylum-withholding-of-removal-and-cat
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Rev. Dr. Rafael Malpica Padilla
Page 2

eligible, granted protection. It also aims to reduce the growing backlog of asylum applications in
immigration courts.

In addition, DHS published a temporary final rule2 in recognition of delays in the timely
processing of Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization. The rule, effective on
May 4, 2022, increased the automatic extension period of employment authorization documents
(EAD) for certain EAD renewal applicants, including asylees, individuals with pending asylum
applications, individuals who have been granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS), and certain
TPS applicants.

DHS has also continued, in consultation with the Department of State, to monitor and
evaluate conditions in countries around the globe for consideration of newly designating or
extending designations of specific countries for TPS. TPS provides much-needed humanitarian
relief to nationals of the designated country already present in the United States as of a date
specified in the TPS designation. DHS has prioritized administering TPS in an equitable manner,
regularly monitoring country conditions across the globe. There are 16 countries whose nationals
currently receive TPS benefits, including 12 countries which have been newly designated or
redesignated since January 2021.

Finally, Uniting for Ukraine and the parole process for Venezuelans provides certain
eligible nationals and family members an opportunity to seek authorization to travel to the United
States to be considered, on a case-by-case basis, for a temporary period of parole for up to two
years and employment authorization. Building upon the success of Uniting for Ukraine, DHS
announced similar processes on January 5, 2023 for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua and
their family members who face unique challenges in their home countries. The processes for
these applicants have been effective; individuals are successfully using this lawful pathway and
encounters of Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan nationals attempting to cross the
Southwest Border unlawfully have decreased dramatically since President Biden announced these
processes. Information about these parole processes is accessible and available in English,
Spanish, and Haitian Creole.

In addition to these new lawful pathways, the U.S. Government (USG) provides durable
solutions for humanitarian protection through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program for
applicants who qualify. The USG intends to welcome at least 20,000 refugees from Latin
America and the Caribbean in Fiscal Years 2023 and 2024, which would put the United States on
pace to more than triple refugee admissions from the Western Hemisphere this fiscal year alone.
The USG also continues to work with our partners to expand access to refugee resettlement more
broadly throughout the Western Hemisphere.

DHS is committed to strengthening the availability of legal, orderly pathways to the
United States while providing consequences to those who fail to use those pathways. We are
operating within a fundamentally broken immigration system. The steps we are taking reflect the
constraints of our outdated laws, which have not been updated in decades and were designed to

2 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/05/04/2022-09539/temporary-increase-of-the-automatic-
extension-period-of-employment-authorization-and-documentation
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Rev. Dr. Rafael Malpica Padilla
Page 3
address a fundamentally different migratory reality than that which exists today along the
Southwest Border and around the world.
Thank you again for your letter and interest in these important issues. Please share this
response with your members and congregations. Should you have any questions, please contact
the DHS Office of Partnership and Engagement.
Sincerely,
Brenda F. Abdelall
Assistant Secretary for Partnership and Engagement
Office of Partnership and Engagement
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March 27, 2023

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2801 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20528

The Honorable Troy A. Miller
Acting Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20229

Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Acting Commissioner Miller,

I write to express my grave concerns about the implementation of the CBP One mobile
application as the sole method for migrants to seek asylum at the border and for Haitians,
Nicaraguans, Cubans, and Venezuelans to seek humanitarian parole. Public reporting has showed
that users continue to experience a multitude of technical problems, which could ultimately lead
to more migrants turning to potentially fatal, unregulated border crossings.1

Since the app became the primary method for seeking asylum and humanitarian parole in
January 2023, it has been plagued by inconsistencies that have created an inequitable process.
U.S Customs and Border Protection (CBP) releases a limited number of appointments each day.
Successfully receiving an appointment is akin to winning the lottery for the thousands of
migrants living in camps waiting to secure an interview slot. Beyond the odds of getting an
appointment, technical issues make it virtually impossible for many migrants to access the app –
antiquated devices, poor cell phone service, or language access have all become barriers.

When CBP established the app as the sole method for Haitians, Nicaraguans, Cubans, and
Venezuelans to seek humanitarian parole, the app was only available in English and Spanish.
This overlooked the fact that the majority of Haitian nationals speak only Haitian Creole.2 I
applaud CBP for quickly addressing the problem and offering a Haitian Creole translation in
February 2023. However, error messages still only appear in English, leaving non-English
speakers without direction when they encounter an issue.3

1 Bernard Debusmann Jr., At U.S. Border, Tech Issues Plague New Migrant Applications, BBC NEWS (March 8,
2023) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64814095.
2 Dara Lind, How To Seek Asylum (Under Biden’s Proposed Asylum Transit Ban), In 12 Not-At-All-Easy Steps,
IMMIGRATION IMPACT (Feb. 22, 2023) https://immigrationimpact.com/2023/02/22/steps-to-seek-asylum-biden-
transit-ban/.
3 Id.
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2
News reports in early February indicated that Black migrants attempting to use CBP One faced
additional challenges because the app is failing to register the photo of their faces.4 Despite staff-
level assurances that this issue was due to user error and not a problem with the app itself, these
reports have continued.5 I remain deeply concerned that the technology used to capture faces
with darker complexions has not been adequately tested and structurally disadvantages Black
asylum seekers and urge the agency to address the issue.

During a recent visit to Matamoros, Mexico, I had the opportunity to speak with migrant mothers
who shared their experience attempting to sign up for appointments through the app. CBP and
State Department officials also acknowledged problems, confirming recent reports of families
with children who cannot secure appointments for their entire family. For example, by the time a
family with two parents and two children has completed the application for an appointment, all
of the appointments made available that day are usually filled. This results in family members
who have appointment times presenting themselves and abandoning their children or other
member of their family that did not successfully obtain an appointment.6 I am glad that CBP
recently addressed this issue to make it easier for family units to secure appointments by
releasing appointments in larger batches at fewer intervals of time. Even with this improvement,
I urge CBP to review and assess its implementation and efficiency to ensure families are not
faced with the difficult decision of separating at the border in order to seek asylum.

The process for registering for appointments is also in need of improvement. Many migrants
have antiquated mobile devices that are slow to connect to the internet. Some migrants do not
have phones at all, while others cannot use CBP One because they do not read or write. These
difficulties result in a select group of asylum seekers securing appointments. Additional
impediments include the requirement that asylum seekers be in Mexico in order to register for an
appointment, leading them to wait, sometimes for months at a time, in migrant camps at the
border in deplorable conditions. Occasionally, the app wrongly identifies migrants who are in
Mexico as already inside the U.S. and blocks them from registering for appointments.

Pregnant or nursing mothers are also particularly harmed by the current CBP One process
because they do not qualify for a life-threatening injury or medical emergency exemption to Title
42. Service providers in the area have communicated to my staff that this interpretation has
forced some pregnant women to cross outside ports of entry and present themselves to CBP
agents in the United States, where they can receive adequate and safe medical care.

I welcome the changes CBP made to the app to respond to these glaring problems, but several
issues remain that must be addressed. First, the process does not consider the how long it has
been since a person registered on the app when that person then tries to secure an appointment.
Since appointments open every day and fill within minutes of opening, CBP One has created a

4 Arelis Hernández, Desperate Migrants Seeking Asylum Face a New Hurdle: Technology, WASHINGTON POST
(Mar. 11, 2023) https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2023/03/11/asylum-seekers-mexico-border-app/.
5 Melissa Del Bosque, Facial Recognition Bias Frustrates Black Asylum Applicants to US, Advocates say, THE
GUARDIAN (Feb. 8, 2023) https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/feb/08/us-immigration-cbp-one-app-facial-
recognition-bias.
6 Andrea Castillo, Asylum Seekers Face Decision to Split up Families or Wait Indefinitely Under New Border
Policy, LA TIMES (Feb. 24, 2023) https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2023-02-24/asylum-seeking-families-
consider-separation-shortage-mobile-app-appointments.
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3
luck-based lottery system to gain an appointment. Some migrants could obtain an appointment
the same day they register, others could be forced to wait for months. Reports have indicated that
some asylum seekers have turned to use automation apps that employ “inhumanly fast reflexes”
previously employed by ticket scalpers to gain access to one of the limited daily appointments.7
CBP must implement a more orderly process does not reward people seeking to game the
system.

Even if the CBP One app was as efficient, user friendly, fair, and inclusive as possible – which I
hope one day it will be – it would still be inherently discriminatory. To use the app, a person
must have a working cell phone, a reliable internet connection, and must have adequate resources
and be in good enough health to safely stay in a single location either near the southern border or
in their country of origin. This situation is not the reality for asylum seekers whose lives are
threatened in their home country or in northern Mexico. It is not a reality for pregnant women,
who do not qualify for a humanitarian exception to the CBP One appointment process. And it is
not a reality for asylum seekers who travel to our border or stay in their country of origin but do
not have phone or internet access, or are unable to use a cell phone.

These shortcomings are the logical result of a rushed and inadequate development and testing
process. Documents detailing the development of the CBP One app acquired by the American
Immigration Council indicate that the rapid implementation of the app has confused CBP
officials, and that there has been little consideration of the app’s flaws or transparency
surrounding the app’s functions.8 While the expansion of opportunities for asylum seekers to
have their claims heard is vital, I am disappointed that precautions were not taken before our
government made the CBP One app the sole avenue to schedule appointments.

As your agency prepares for the long-overdue end of Title 42 expulsions in May 2023, I strongly
support increasing the number of appointments available on CBP One to accommodate as many
legitimate asylum claims of migrants who cannot return to their homes. I also encourage you
explore additional pathways that would allow people without the resources necessary to secure
CBP One appointments to safely claim asylum at ports of entry.

Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

Sincerely,

Cory A. Booker

United States Senator

7 Stephania Corpi Arnaud, Once a Ticket Scalpers’ Tool, Auto Clickers Now Help Migrants Enter the U.S., REST OF
THE WORLD (Feb. 22, 2023) https://restofworld.org/2023/auto-clicker-migrants-us-mexico/.
8 Government Documents Reveal Information about the Development of the CBP One App, AMERICAN
IMMIGRATION COUNCIL (Feb. 28, 2023) https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/FOIA/government-
documents-reveal-information-about-development-cbp-one-app.
CLP_AR_001260
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 29 of 1047

February 21, 2023

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016

Dear Secretary Mayorkas,

I write to urge the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to cease using the CBP One mobile
application, which DHS recently made a requirement for migrants seeking asylum in the United
States at the southern border. Under the new DHS policy, those asylum seekers must now use the
CBP One app to submit biometric information and schedule appointments to present themselves
at certain points of entry (POEs).1 This expanded use of the CBP One app raises troubling issues
of inequitable access to — and impermissible limits on — asylum, and has been plagued by
significant technical problems and privacy concerns. DHS should shelve the CBP One app
immediately.

I appreciate that, through the expanded use of the CBP One app — initially launched in October
2020 with limited functionality—the Biden administration intended to ensure the safe and
orderly processing of noncitizens at POEs. But requiring asylum seekers to use a virtual platform
accessible only with a smartphone effectively denies to indigent migrants their legally protected
right to seek asylum.2 Those fleeing dangerous conditions often lack access to technology,
including smartphones and the internet access required to download and use the CBP One app.3

Furthermore, even migrants with the resources and know-how to obtain and use this technology
must schedule an appointment at, and travel to, one of only eight POEs participating in the CBP
One app’s expanded rollout—out of 328 POEs nationwide.4 Advocates report that migrants in

1 DHS Continues to Prepare for End of Title 42: Announces New Border Enforcement Measures and Additional Safe
and Orderly Processes, Dep’t of Homeland Security (Jan. 5, 2023), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/01/05/dhs-
continues-prepare-end-title-42-announces-new-border-enforcement-measures-and.
2 CBP One Mobile Application, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, NEW: Submit Advance Information and
Schedule an Appointment Capability for Non-Citizens without Appropriate Travel Documents,
https://www.cbp.gov/about/mobile-apps-directory/cbpone.
3 Id.
4 DHS Continues to Prepare for End of Title 42: Announces New Border Enforcement Measures and Additional Safe
and Orderly Processes, Dep’t of Homeland Security (Jan. 5, 2023), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/01/05/dhs-
CLP_AR_001261
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 30 of 1047
By ESEC at 10:41 am, Feb 22, 2023

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Page 2 of 4

Reynoso and Matamoros, Mexico were given appointments for asylum in Tijuana, some 1,500
miles away.5 Technology can facilitate asylum processing, but we cannot allow it to create a
tiered system that treats asylum seekers differently based on their economic status — including
the ability to pay for travel — language, nationality, or race.

According to reports, the app also was not ready for its expanded use, could not handle the
volume of applicants, and frequently did not work.6 One user described how she “would create
an account, go through several more steps and the app would then restart to step one, a
seemingly endless cycle.”7

Additionally, the use of the CBP One app to collect biometric information raises privacy
concerns and poses unique threats to immigrant communities. According to DHS, the CBP One
app uses facial comparison and cloud technology to collect, store, and process data — including
biometric and geolocation information — on asylum seekers before they enter the United States.8
But this technology is fraught with serious problems. An analysis of face recognition software
tools conducted by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) found that “one-
to-one matching . . . saw higher rates of false positives for Asian and African American faces
relative to images of Caucasians,” up to a factor of 100 times.9 It therefore comes as no surprise
that CBP One has reportedly rejected photos from some migrants — particularly those with dark
complexions — delaying or rejecting their applications and requiring them to start the arduous
process all over again.10 Accuracy issues aside, government collection of biometric data is
extremely problematic because it is highly invasive and invites serious privacy violations.

The use of geolocation tracking and cloud storage also raises surveillance concerns. These
features allow the government to identify and track migrants’ movements without their
knowledge or consent. Communities of color are systematically subjected to over-policing. The
proliferation of biometric surveillance tools is therefore likely to disproportionately infringe on
the privacy of individuals in Black, Brown, and immigrant communities.

Last, but certainly not least, the CBP One app promotes the false notion that, in order to seek
asylum in the United States, an appointment is required. It is not, under either U.S. or
international law. Indeed, according to DHS guidance from November 2021, “asylum seekers or

continues-prepare-end-title-42-announces-new-border-enforcement-measures-and; At Ports of Entry, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry.
5 Sandra Sanchez, CBP One app gives cash-strapped asylum-seekers interviews hundreds of miles away (Jan. 18,
2023), https://www.borderreport.com/immigration/cbp-one-app-gives-cash-strapped-asylum-seekers-interviews-
hundreds-of-miles-away/.
6 Regina Yurrita, Asylum seekers met with issues from new CBP One app, CBS8 (Feb. 1, 2023),
https://www.cbs8.com/article/news/local/asylum-seekers-met-with-issues-from-cbp-one-app/509-5f69579c-05e1-
4999-a7a9-720eab0cc680.
7 Id.
8 Privacy Impact Assessment for CBP One, Dep’t of Homeland Security (Feb. 19, 2021),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/privacy-pia-cbp068-cbpmobileapplication-jan2023.pdf.
9 National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST Study Evaluates Effects of Race, Age, Sex on Face
Recognition Software (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nist.gov/news-events/news/2019/12/nist-study-evaluates-effects-
race-age-sex-face-recognition-software.
10 Suzanne Monyak, Migrants grapple with government app to make asylum appointments, Roll Call (Jan. 31,
2023), https://rollcall.com/2023/01/31/migrants-grapple-with-government-app-to-make-asylum-appointments/.
CLP_AR_001262
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 31 of 1047

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Page 3 of 4

others seeking humanitarian protection cannot be required to submit advance information in
order to be processed at a Southwest Border land POE.”11 Disturbingly, requiring asylum seekers
to remain in Mexico and await their appointments mirrors “metering” efforts under the Trump
administration.12 And those awaiting their appointments can face dangerous conditions, In
January, a 17-year old Cuban boy awaiting his scheduled CBP One appointment in Monterrey,
Mexico was fatally shot, underscoring the dangers facing asylum seekers.13

Currently, the CBP One app is required for asylum seekers requesting an exception from Title
42; after Title 42 restrictions are lifted, its use will be greatly expanded.14 This carries profound
long-term implications for the U.S. immigration system. In order to help us better understand
current and future issues surrounding the CBP One app, please provide written answers to the
following questions by March 10, 2023:

1. Will DHS commit to permanently cease using the CBP One application to screen asylum
applicants? If not, why not, and will DHS at least temporarily stop using it until DHS can
remove any biometric technology and geolocation functionality and fix the app’s
technical issues?
2. Will DHS ensure that there is an alternative means for migrants to seek asylum at the
southern border, one that does not require an app or internet access? Currently, are
asylum seekers who lack a smartphone or internet access — and therefore cannot
schedule an appointment through CBP One — turned back when they present themselves
at a POE?
3. How is DHS preventing the CBP One app from discriminating against applicants of
color, including the app’s rejecting photos of applicants with darker complexions?
4. What assistance, if any, is DHS providing to asylum seekers whose photos are rejected,
or who receive error messages or experience other technical problems with CBP One?
Can migrants seeking asylum at the southern border still exercise that right without using
the CBP One app?
5. Before CBP One’s expanded rollout, was the application tested to screen for technology
glitches or failures? If not, why not?
6. Before CBP One’s expanded rollout, were civil society or nongovernmental
organizations consulted? If not, why not?
7. Why are only eight POEs participating in CBP One? How and why did DHS decide on
this number and the specific locations?
8. How many appointments does DHS make available each day through the CBP One app?

11 Guidance for Management and Processing of Undocumented Noncitizens at Southwest Border Land Ports of
Entry, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (Nov. 1,2021),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2021-Nov/CBP-mgmt-processing-non-citizens-swb-lpoes-
signed-Memo-11.1.2021-508.pdf
12 Metering and Asylum Turnbacks, American Immigration Council (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/metering-and-asylum-turnbacks.
13 Press Release, Teenager Killed While Waiting in Mexico to Seek Asylum in the United States, Young Center for
Immigrant Children’s Rights (Jan. 26, 2023), https://www.theyoungcenter.org/media-press-
releases/2023/1/26/teenager-killed-while-waiting-in-mexico-to-seek-asylum-in-the-united-states.
14 DHS Continues to Prepare for End of Title 42: Announces New Border Enforcement Measures and Additional
Safe and Orderly Processes, Dep’t of Homeland Security (Jan. 5, 2023), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/01/05/dhs-
continues-prepare-end-title-42-announces-new-border-enforcement-measures-and.
CLP_AR_001263
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 32 of 1047

The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Page 4 of 4

9. In what geographic areas does the CBP One application work and how was this decided?
10. How is DHS working with Mexico to ensure the safety of individuals who must travel in
order to present themselves at one of the eight participating POEs?
11. The CBP One app is available only in English, Spanish, and Haitian Creole languages.
This makes the app inaccessible to asylum seekers who speak a different language. How
did DHS decide on these three languages? What options are available for asylum seekers
using the CBP One app who don’t speak those three languages?
12. What steps is DHS taking to prevent exploitation of asylum seekers through clone apps or
scam attempts? How is DHS defending against misinformation around the CBP One app?
13. How is DHS safeguarding biometric and geolocation information obtained through use of
the CBP One App? How is DHS ensuring that this information cannot be misused? Has
CBP shared any personal information collected by the CBP One App with any other
government agencies or law enforcement entities? If so please describe that sharing in
detail.

Rather than mandating use of an app that is inaccessible to many migrants, and violates both
their privacy and international law, DHS should instead implement a compassionate, lawful, and
human-rights centered approach for those seeking asylum in the United States.

Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter, and I look forward to your response.

Sincerely,

___________________________
Edward J. Markey
United States Senator

CLP_AR_001264
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 33 of 1047

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CLP_AR_002187
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 34 of 1047

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CLP_AR_002188
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 35 of 1047

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CLP_AR_002189
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 36 of 1047

Quote: Analysis by the DHS Office of Immigration Statistics ("OIS") found that even while CDC’s Title 42 public health Order has been in place, encounters at our SWB —referring to the number of times U.S. officials encounter noncitizens attempting to c
Source: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023; OIS Analysis of historic U.S. Border Patrol data.
Filters: SWB (ALWAYS Southwest Land Border); excludes CBPOne
Monthly encounters are highlighted red if larger than 14‐19 average
14‐19 yearly totals, and 14‐19 average. If higher than this average, unprecedented
Brazil
Colombia Cuba
Ecuador
El SalvadorHaiti
Nicaragua Peru
Venezuela Grand Total
Row Label Brazil
Colombia Cuba
Ecuador
El Salvado Haiti
Nicaragua Peru
Venezuela
Oct‐19
1,504
41
1,843
1,343
2,582
230
348
72
728
45,139
Nov‐19
1,698
67
1,182
1,181
2,175
459
313
63
588
42,642
2014
583

330

17,564

4,858

68,385

493

1,874

974

Dec‐19
1,331
58
949
1,638
1,939
657
304
72
693
40,563
2015
1,410

413

31,065

2,659

45,110

343

1,069

541

163

Jan‐20
1,141
60
655
1,565
1,330
490
218
72
243
36,583
2016
4,648

490

41,617

2,980

80,566

6,427

1,377

687

326

Feb‐20
726
61
596
1,437
1,488
839
209
58
206
36,686
2017
4,703

293

15,557

1,586

57,188

9,263

1,150

567

395

Mar‐20
327
40
432
1,381
1,441
586
215
77
166
34,457
2018
5,917

320

7,124

1,554

36,999

308

3,553

682

686

Apr‐20
81
4
164
682
553
20
89
18
9
17,106
2019
19,513

631

33,014

13,374

92,345

3,067

14,380

934

7,677

May‐20
39
17
535
368
471
8
70
4
10
23,237
Jun‐20
61
12
947
146
542
151
97
16
13
33,029
14‐19
6,129

413

24,324

4,502

63,432

3,317

3,901

731

1,554

Jul‐20
50
18
1,567
151
947
158
110
13
36
40,949
Aug‐20
34
16
2,181
685
1,478
55
126
5
49
50,007
Sep‐20
169
10
2,359
1,518
2,219
882
192
14
46
57,668
Oct‐20
163
26
1,679
2,220
3,014
593
256
12
143
71,927
Nov‐20
229
69
1,590
2,765
3,650
97
387
22
184
72,113
Dec‐20
291
73
2,067
3,676
3,921
237
640
63
206
73,994
Jan‐21
308
69
1,899
3,598
3,580
1,718
534
52
295
78,414
Feb‐21
991
76
3,848
3,440
5,599
827
706
81
913
101,098
Mar‐21
3,995
179
5,700
5,579
9,475
3,084
1,930
126
2,566
173,277
Apr‐21
8,750
260
3,288
8,079
11,043
1,250
3,074
250
6,048
178,795
May‐21
7,374
408
2,664
11,691
10,462
2,817
4,414
296
7,499
180,597
Jun‐21
6,566
481
3,072
12,803
11,582
5,904
7,435
450
7,583
189,034
Jul‐21
8,643
751
3,559
17,335
12,719
5,521
13,456
438
6,126
213,593
Aug‐21
9,100
1,562
4,496
17,611
12,692
7,569
9,979
511
6,301
209,840
Sep‐21
10,471
2,248
4,812
7,353
10,953
17,638
7,298
896
10,814
192,001
Oct‐21
7,904
3,015
5,896
748
9,801
908
9,255
1,024
13,416
164,837
Nov‐21
6,955
3,368
6,605
556
9,664
1,022
13,627
1,193
20,388
174,845
Dec‐21
7,926
4,094
7,986
673
8,874
7,144
15,297
1,268
24,801
179,253
Jan‐22
2,766
3,911
9,721
602
5,810
3,372
11,564
860
22,779
154,874
Feb‐22
1,402
9,608
16,557
683
7,146
1,877
13,296
1,458
3,073
166,010
Mar‐22
1,346
15,373
32,153
877
8,403
2,171
16,017
2,460
4,053
222,574
Apr‐22
3,024
13,128
34,839
1,636
8,355
5,739
12,565
3,573
4,107
235,785
May‐22
5,125
19,320
25,643
3,046
8,980
10,514
19,034
9,744
5,088
241,137
Jun‐22
4,026
12,597
16,172
3,231
9,123
4,069
11,200
5,853
13,199
207,834
Jul‐22
5,504
13,454
20,098
2,948
7,952
5,380
12,073
7,216
17,647
200,162
Aug‐22
5,747
13,497
19,060
3,681
6,675
6,551
11,749
7,782
25,361
204,087
Sep‐22
1,732
13,807
26,178
5,379
6,247
5,163
18,199
8,231
33,804
227,547
Oct‐22
747
17,191
28,841
7,030
5,995
6,577
20,919
9,079
22,039
228,603
Nov‐22
709
15,609
34,709
11,995
5,457
5,385
34,236
8,529
7,963
231,021
Dec‐22
1,215
17,428
42,653
16,203
4,804
5,073
35,387
11,357
8,131
248,604
Jan‐23
1,084
9,215
6,229
9,013
3,680
2,640
3,352
3,890
3,740
146,485
Feb‐23
1,286
12,576
189
7,003
4,515
185
412
5,029
1,614
135,691
CLP_AR_002374
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 37 of 1047

Mar‐23
2,247
16,596
193
6,729
5,427
328
232
8,248
3,860
169,035
CLP_AR_002375
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 38 of 1047

cross the SWB of the United States without authorization to do so— reached an all‐time high in 2022, driven in large part by an unprecedented exodus of migrants at different times from countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, N
USBP SWB Encounters (Yearbook)
1960
21,022

1961
21,745

average FY1983‐2006
1,190,461

1962
21,103

average FY2011‐2018
377,364

1963
29,644

Factor increase from 2017‐2019
2.80
1964
32,519

Factor increase from 2019‐2021
1.95
1965
40,020

Factor increase from 2021‐22
1.33
1966
62,640

2022 all time high
2,206,437

1967
73,973

1968
96,641

1969
137,968

1970
201,780

1971
263,991

1972
321,326

1973
441,066

1974
571,606

1975
512,264

1976
607,499

1977
733,193

1978
789,441

1979
795,798

1980
690,554

1981
749,808

1982
745,820

1983
1,033,974

1984
1,058,276

1985
1,183,351

1986
1,615,844

1987
1,122,067

1988
942,561

1989
852,506

1990
1,049,321

1991
1,077,876

1992
1,145,574

1993
1,212,886

1994
979,101

1995
1,271,390

1996
1,507,020

1997
1,368,707

1998
1,516,680

1999
1,537,000

2000
1,643,679

CLP_AR_002376
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 39 of 1047

2001
1,235,718

2002
929,809

2003
905,065

2004
1,139,282

2005
1,171,396

2006
1,071,972

2007
858,638

2008
705,005

2009
540,865

2010
447,731

2011
327,577

2012
356,873

2013
414,397

2014
479,370

2015
331,333

2016
408,870

2017
303,916

2018
396,579

2019
851,508

2020
400,635

2021
1,659,206

2022
2,206,437

CLP_AR_002377
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 40 of 1047

Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela.
CLP_AR_002378
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 41 of 1047

Quote: The U.S. Border Patrol ("USBP") completed 221,710 encounters between ports of entry in December 2022, second only to May 2022 (224,371 encounters) for the most monthly encounters since at least Fiscal Year ("FY") 2000 (the period f
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Production data based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filters: SWB; USBP
Average daily encounters 2000‐2019:
1,977

Average daily encounters 2014‐2019:
1,265

USBP Encounters
USBP Encounters
USBP SW Land Border Apprehensions: FY2000‐FY2023YTD (March)
Oct‐21
159,113
12/01/202
7532
FY
CY
Month
Mon‐FY
Mon‐CYm of count Daily Avg
FY Totals Days/year
Nov‐21
167,015
12/02/202
8736
Low
3,532
2000
1999
Oct
Oct‐00
Oct‐99
87,819

2,833

1,566,421

366
1,977

Oct
Dec‐21
170,602
12/03/202
7119
High
8,736
2000
1999
Nov
Nov‐00
Nov‐99
74,362

2,479

Nov
Jan‐22
147,877
12/04/202
7100
Average
7,152
2000
1999
Dec
Dec‐00
Dec‐99
66,256

2,137

Dec
Feb‐22
159,170
12/05/202
7369
Over 8000
11
2000
2000
Jan
Jan‐00
Jan‐00
175,383

5,658

Jan
Mar‐22
211,181
12/06/202
7415
2000
2000
Feb
Feb‐00
Feb‐00
200,619

7,165

Feb
Apr‐22
203,504
12/07/202
8390
2000
2000
Mar
Mar‐00
Mar‐00
209,311

6,752

Mar
May‐22
224,371
12/08/202
8371
2000
2000
Apr
Apr‐00
Apr‐00
170,621

5,687

Apr
Jun‐22
192,399
12/09/202
8497
2000
2000
May
May‐00
May‐00
155,961

5,031

May
Jul‐22
181,834
12/10/202
8181
2000
2000
Jun
Jun‐00
Jun‐00
103,856

3,462

Jun
Aug‐22
181,774
12/11/202
7902
2000
2000
Jul
Jul‐00
Jul‐00
111,963

3,612

Jul
Sep‐22
207,597
12/12/202
7811
2000
2000
Aug
Aug‐00
Aug‐00
113,448

3,660

Aug
Oct‐22
204,885
12/13/202
8073
2000
2000
Sep
Sep‐00
Sep‐00
96,822

3,227

Sep
Nov‐22
207,448
12/14/202
8281
2001
2000
Oct
Oct‐01
Oct‐00
81,995

2,645

1,231,412

365

Dec‐22
221,710
12/15/202
8132
2001
2000
Nov
Nov‐01
Nov‐00
67,217

2,241

Jan‐23
128,936
12/16/202
6849
2001
2000
Dec
Dec‐01
Dec‐00
54,828

1,769

Feb‐23
130,024
12/17/202
6940
2001
2001
Jan
Jan‐01
Jan‐01
124,586

4,019

Mar‐23
162,317
12/18/202
6904
2001
2001
Feb
Feb‐01
Feb‐01
150,616

5,379

12/19/202
7309
2001
2001
Mar
Mar‐01
Mar‐01
169,904

5,481

12/20/202
8568
2001
2001
Apr
Apr‐01
Apr‐01
142,040

4,735

12/21/202
8431
2001
2001
May
May‐01
May‐01
123,054

3,969

12/22/202
8086
2001
2001
Jun
Jun‐01
Jun‐01
89,034

2,968

12/23/202
7301
2001
2001
Jul
Jul‐01
Jul‐01
83,853

2,705

12/24/202
6247
2001
2001
Aug
Aug‐01
Aug‐01
84,837

2,737

12/25/202
3532
2001
2001
Sep
Sep‐01
Sep‐01
59,448

1,982

12/26/202
5013
2002
2001
Oct
Oct‐02
Oct‐01
37,746

1,218

930,341

365

12/27/202
6084
2002
2001
Nov
Nov‐02
Nov‐01
32,694

1,090

12/28/202
5914
2002
2001
Dec
Dec‐02
Dec‐01
31,531

1,017

12/29/202
5512
2002
2002
Jan
Jan‐02
Jan‐02
79,647

2,569

12/30/202
4736
2002
2002
Feb
Feb‐02
Feb‐02
95,645

3,416

12/31/202
5375
2002
2002
Mar
Mar‐02
Mar‐02
126,906

4,094

2002
2002
Apr
Apr‐02
Apr‐02
121,908

4,064

2002
2002
May
May‐02
May‐02
97,571

3,147

2002
2002
Jun
Jun‐02
Jun‐02
78,730

2,624

2002
2002
Jul
Jul‐02
Jul‐02
76,719

2,475

2002
2002
Aug
Aug‐02
Aug‐02
82,860

2,673

2002
2002
Sep
Sep‐02
Sep‐02
68,384

2,279

2003
2002
Oct
Oct‐03
Oct‐02
61,913

1,997

906,734

365

2003
2002
Nov
Nov‐03
Nov‐02
47,919

1,597

2003
2002
Dec
Dec‐03
Dec‐02
37,930

1,224

2003
2003
Jan
Jan‐03
Jan‐03
87,002

2,807

2003
2003
Feb
Feb‐03
Feb‐03
97,016

3,465

CLP_AR_002379
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 42 of 1047

2003
2003
Mar
Mar‐03
Mar‐03
98,625

3,181

2003
2003
Apr
Apr‐03
Apr‐03
75,564

2,519

2003
2003
May
May‐03
May‐03
88,845

2,866

2003
2003
Jun
Jun‐03
Jun‐03
75,634

2,521

2003
2003
Jul
Jul‐03
Jul‐03
79,396

2,561

2003
2003
Aug
Aug‐03
Aug‐03
84,651

2,731

2003
2003
Sep
Sep‐03
Sep‐03
72,239

2,408

2004
2003
Oct
Oct‐04
Oct‐03
65,388

2,109

1,140,247

366
2004
2003
Nov
Nov‐04
Nov‐03
57,942

1,931

2004
2003
Dec
Dec‐04
Dec‐03
43,663

1,408

2004
2004
Jan
Jan‐04
Jan‐04
92,751

2,992

2004
2004
Feb
Feb‐04
Feb‐04
110,824

3,958

2004
2004
Mar
Mar‐04
Mar‐04
155,089

5,003

2004
2004
Apr
Apr‐04
Apr‐04
135,632

4,521

2004
2004
May
May‐04
May‐04
118,811

3,833

2004
2004
Jun
Jun‐04
Jun‐04
94,607

3,154

2004
2004
Jul
Jul‐04
Jul‐04
92,152

2,973

2004
2004
Aug
Aug‐04
Aug‐04
93,299

3,010

2004
2004
Sep
Sep‐04
Sep‐04
80,089

2,670

2005
2004
Oct
Oct‐05
Oct‐04
75,908

2,449

1,171,391

365

2005
2004
Nov
Nov‐05
Nov‐04
65,110

2,170

2005
2004
Dec
Dec‐05
Dec‐04
48,410

1,562

2005
2005
Jan
Jan‐05
Jan‐05
93,029

3,001

2005
2005
Feb
Feb‐05
Feb‐05
113,776

4,063

2005
2005
Mar
Mar‐05
Mar‐05
143,044

4,614

2005
2005
Apr
Apr‐05
Apr‐05
140,074

4,669

2005
2005
May
May‐05
May‐05
115,817

3,736

2005
2005
Jun
Jun‐05
Jun‐05
90,796

3,027

2005
2005
Jul
Jul‐05
Jul‐05
94,964

3,063

2005
2005
Aug
Aug‐05
Aug‐05
96,745

3,121

2005
2005
Sep
Sep‐05
Sep‐05
93,718

3,124

2006
2005
Oct
Oct‐06
Oct‐05
83,561

2,696

1,071,976

365

2006
2005
Nov
Nov‐06
Nov‐05
70,954

2,365

2006
2005
Dec
Dec‐06
Dec‐05
52,663

1,699

2006
2006
Jan
Jan‐06
Jan‐06
101,262

3,267

2006
2006
Feb
Feb‐06
Feb‐06
125,030

4,465

2006
2006
Mar
Mar‐06
Mar‐06
160,696

5,184

2006
2006
Apr
Apr‐06
Apr‐06
126,554

4,218

2006
2006
May
May‐06
May‐06
105,443

3,401

2006
2006
Jun
Jun‐06
Jun‐06
68,365

2,279

2006
2006
Jul
Jul‐06
Jul‐06
59,633

1,924

2006
2006
Aug
Aug‐06
Aug‐06
59,733

1,927

2006
2006
Sep
Sep‐06
Sep‐06
58,082

1,936

2007
2006
Oct
Oct‐07
Oct‐06
60,726

1,959

858,736

365

2007
2006
Nov
Nov‐07
Nov‐06
51,592

1,720

2007
2006
Dec
Dec‐07
Dec‐06
40,527

1,307

2007
2007
Jan
Jan‐07
Jan‐07
72,000

2,323

CLP_AR_002380
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 43 of 1047

2007
2007
Feb
Feb‐07
Feb‐07
79,273

2,831

2007
2007
Mar
Mar‐07
Mar‐07
114,136

3,682

2007
2007
Apr
Apr‐07
Apr‐07
104,465

3,482

2007
2007
May
May‐07
May‐07
88,510

2,855

2007
2007
Jun
Jun‐07
Jun‐07
71,336

2,378

2007
2007
Jul
Jul‐07
Jul‐07
66,793

2,155

2007
2007
Aug
Aug‐07
Aug‐07
59,801

1,929

2007
2007
Sep
Sep‐07
Sep‐07
49,577

1,653

2008
2007
Oct
Oct‐08
Oct‐07
51,355

1,657

705,049

366
2008
2007
Nov
Nov‐08
Nov‐07
42,208

1,407

2008
2007
Dec
Dec‐08
Dec‐07
31,824

1,027

2008
2008
Jan
Jan‐08
Jan‐08
59,034

1,904

2008
2008
Feb
Feb‐08
Feb‐08
73,483

2,624

2008
2008
Mar
Mar‐08
Mar‐08
89,769

2,896

2008
2008
Apr
Apr‐08
Apr‐08
91,552

3,052

2008
2008
May
May‐08
May‐08
69,240

2,234

2008
2008
Jun
Jun‐08
Jun‐08
53,850

1,795

2008
2008
Jul
Jul‐08
Jul‐08
49,468

1,596

2008
2008
Aug
Aug‐08
Aug‐08
48,544

1,566

2008
2008
Sep
Sep‐08
Sep‐08
44,722

1,491

2009
2008
Oct
Oct‐09
Oct‐08
42,937

1,385

540,851

365

2009
2008
Nov
Nov‐09
Nov‐08
32,782

1,093

2009
2008
Dec
Dec‐09
Dec‐08
25,946

837

2009
2009
Jan
Jan‐09
Jan‐09
44,503

1,436

2009
2009
Feb
Feb‐09
Feb‐09
49,211

1,758

2009
2009
Mar
Mar‐09
Mar‐09
67,342

2,172

2009
2009
Apr
Apr‐09
Apr‐09
58,493

1,950

2009
2009
May
May‐09
May‐09
50,883

1,641

2009
2009
Jun
Jun‐09
Jun‐09
46,044

1,535

2009
2009
Jul
Jul‐09
Jul‐09
43,841

1,414

2009
2009
Aug
Aug‐09
Aug‐09
43,519

1,404

2009
2009
Sep
Sep‐09
Sep‐09
35,350

1,178

2010
2009
Oct
Oct‐10
Oct‐09
40,890

1,319

447,731

365

2010
2009
Nov
Nov‐10
Nov‐09
32,815

1,094

2010
2009
Dec
Dec‐10
Dec‐09
25,034

808

2010
2010
Jan
Jan‐10
Jan‐10
34,784

1,122

2010
2010
Feb
Feb‐10
Feb‐10
42,790

1,528

2010
2010
Mar
Mar‐10
Mar‐10
61,361

1,979

2010
2010
Apr
Apr‐10
Apr‐10
55,237

1,841

2010
2010
May
May‐10
May‐10
47,045

1,518

2010
2010
Jun
Jun‐10
Jun‐10
32,955

1,099

2010
2010
Jul
Jul‐10
Jul‐10
25,609

826

2010
2010
Aug
Aug‐10
Aug‐10
26,415

852

2010
2010
Sep
Sep‐10
Sep‐10
22,796

760

2011
2010
Oct
Oct‐11
Oct‐10
26,165

844

327,577

365

2011
2010
Nov
Nov‐11
Nov‐10
22,405

747

2011
2010
Dec
Dec‐11
Dec‐10
19,429

627

CLP_AR_002381
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 44 of 1047

2011
2011
Jan
Jan‐11
Jan‐11
23,926

772

2011
2011
Feb
Feb‐11
Feb‐11
28,786

1,028

2011
2011
Mar
Mar‐11
Mar‐11
42,014

1,355

2011
2011
Apr
Apr‐11
Apr‐11
36,251

1,208

2011
2011
May
May‐11
May‐11
31,236

1,008

2011
2011
Jun
Jun‐11
Jun‐11
27,166

906

2011
2011
Jul
Jul‐11
Jul‐11
23,170

747

2011
2011
Aug
Aug‐11
Aug‐11
24,166

780

2011
2011
Sep
Sep‐11
Sep‐11
22,863

762

2012
2011
Oct
Oct‐12
Oct‐11
25,612

826

356,873

366
2012
2011
Nov
Nov‐12
Nov‐11
23,368

779

2012
2011
Dec
Dec‐12
Dec‐11
18,983

612

2012
2012
Jan
Jan‐12
Jan‐12
25,714

829

2012
2012
Feb
Feb‐12
Feb‐12
31,579

1,128

2012
2012
Mar
Mar‐12
Mar‐12
42,218

1,362

2012
2012
Apr
Apr‐12
Apr‐12
40,628

1,354

2012
2012
May
May‐12
May‐12
36,966

1,192

2012
2012
Jun
Jun‐12
Jun‐12
30,669

1,022

2012
2012
Jul
Jul‐12
Jul‐12
26,978

870

2012
2012
Aug
Aug‐12
Aug‐12
27,567

889

2012
2012
Sep
Sep‐12
Sep‐12
26,591

886

2013
2012
Oct
Oct‐13
Oct‐12
28,929

933

414,397

365

2013
2012
Nov
Nov‐13
Nov‐12
27,636

921

2013
2012
Dec
Dec‐13
Dec‐12
23,243

750

2013
2013
Jan
Jan‐13
Jan‐13
26,921

868

2013
2013
Feb
Feb‐13
Feb‐13
35,042

1,252

2013
2013
Mar
Mar‐13
Mar‐13
47,293

1,526

2013
2013
Apr
Apr‐13
Apr‐13
48,212

1,607

2013
2013
May
May‐13
May‐13
43,856

1,415

2013
2013
Jun
Jun‐13
Jun‐13
34,436

1,148

2013
2013
Jul
Jul‐13
Jul‐13
33,230

1,072

2013
2013
Aug
Aug‐13
Aug‐13
33,797

1,090

2013
2013
Sep
Sep‐13
Sep‐13
31,802

1,060

2014
2013
Oct
Oct‐14
Oct‐13
35,312

1,139

479,370

365

1264.982
2014
2013
Nov
Nov‐14
Nov‐13
31,896

1,063

2014
2013
Dec
Dec‐14
Dec‐13
29,528

953

2014
2014
Jan
Jan‐14
Jan‐14
28,668

925

2014
2014
Feb
Feb‐14
Feb‐14
36,403

1,300

2014
2014
Mar
Mar‐14
Mar‐14
49,596

1,600

2014
2014
Apr
Apr‐14
Apr‐14
51,502

1,717

2014
2014
May
May‐14
May‐14
60,683

1,958

2014
2014
Jun
Jun‐14
Jun‐14
57,861

1,929

2014
2014
Jul
Jul‐14
Jul‐14
40,708

1,313

2014
2014
Aug
Aug‐14
Aug‐14
31,388

1,013

2014
2014
Sep
Sep‐14
Sep‐14
25,825

861

2015
2014
Oct
Oct‐15
Oct‐14
26,450

853

331,333

365

2015
2014
Nov
Nov‐15
Nov‐14
24,641

821

CLP_AR_002382
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 45 of 1047

2015
2014
Dec
Dec‐15
Dec‐14
25,019

807

2015
2015
Jan
Jan‐15
Jan‐15
21,514

694

2015
2015
Feb
Feb‐15
Feb‐15
24,376

871

2015
2015
Mar
Mar‐15
Mar‐15
29,791

961

2015
2015
Apr
Apr‐15
Apr‐15
29,750

992

2015
2015
May
May‐15
May‐15
31,576

1,019

2015
2015
Jun
Jun‐15
Jun‐15
29,303

977

2015
2015
Jul
Jul‐15
Jul‐15
28,388

916

2015
2015
Aug
Aug‐15
Aug‐15
30,239

975

2015
2015
Sep
Sep‐15
Sep‐15
30,286

1,010

2016
2015
Oct
Oct‐16
Oct‐15
32,724

1,056

408,870

366
2016
2015
Nov
Nov‐16
Nov‐15
32,838

1,095

2016
2015
Dec
Dec‐16
Dec‐15
37,014

1,194

2016
2016
Jan
Jan‐16
Jan‐16
23,758

766

2016
2016
Feb
Feb‐16
Feb‐16
26,072

931

2016
2016
Mar
Mar‐16
Mar‐16
33,316

1,075

2016
2016
Apr
Apr‐16
Apr‐16
38,089

1,270

2016
2016
May
May‐16
May‐16
40,337

1,301

2016
2016
Jun
Jun‐16
Jun‐16
34,450

1,148

2016
2016
Jul
Jul‐16
Jul‐16
33,723

1,088

2016
2016
Aug
Aug‐16
Aug‐16
37,048

1,195

2016
2016
Sep
Sep‐16
Sep‐16
39,501

1,317

2017
2016
Oct
Oct‐17
Oct‐16
46,184

1,490

303,916

365

2017
2016
Nov
Nov‐17
Nov‐16
47,211

1,574

2017
2016
Dec
Dec‐17
Dec‐16
43,251

1,395

2017
2017
Jan
Jan‐17
Jan‐17
31,576

1,019

2017
2017
Feb
Feb‐17
Feb‐17
18,754

670

2017
2017
Mar
Mar‐17
Mar‐17
12,195

393

2017
2017
Apr
Apr‐17
Apr‐17
11,127

371

2017
2017
May
May‐17
May‐17
14,519

468

2017
2017
Jun
Jun‐17
Jun‐17
16,087

536

2017
2017
Jul
Jul‐17
Jul‐17
18,187

587

2017
2017
Aug
Aug‐17
Aug‐17
22,288

719

2017
2017
Sep
Sep‐17
Sep‐17
22,537

751

2018
2017
Oct
Oct‐18
Oct‐17
25,488

822

396,579

365

2018
2017
Nov
Nov‐18
Nov‐17
29,085

970

2018
2017
Dec
Dec‐18
Dec‐17
28,995

935

2018
2018
Jan
Jan‐18
Jan‐18
25,975

838

2018
2018
Feb
Feb‐18
Feb‐18
26,666

952

2018
2018
Mar
Mar‐18
Mar‐18
37,390

1,206

2018
2018
Apr
Apr‐18
Apr‐18
38,243

1,275

2018
2018
May
May‐18
May‐18
40,339

1,301

2018
2018
Jun
Jun‐18
Jun‐18
34,089

1,136

2018
2018
Jul
Jul‐18
Jul‐18
31,299

1,010

2018
2018
Aug
Aug‐18
Aug‐18
37,524

1,210

2018
2018
Sep
Sep‐18
Sep‐18
41,486

1,383

2019
2018
Oct
Oct‐19
Oct‐18
51,005

1,645

851,508

365

CLP_AR_002383
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 46 of 1047

2019
2018
Nov
Nov‐19
Nov‐18
51,857

1,729

2019
2018
Dec
Dec‐19
Dec‐18
50,751

1,637

2019
2019
Jan
Jan‐19
Jan‐19
47,979

1,548

2019
2019
Feb
Feb‐19
Feb‐19
66,883

2,389

2019
2019
Mar
Mar‐19
Mar‐19
92,833

2,995

2019
2019
Apr
Apr‐19
Apr‐19
99,273

3,309

2019
2019
May
May‐19
May‐19
132,856

4,286

2019
2019
Jun
Jun‐19
Jun‐19
94,902

3,163

2019
2019
Jul
Jul‐19
Jul‐19
71,978

2,322

2019
2019
Aug
Aug‐19
Aug‐19
50,684

1,635

2019
2019
Sep
Sep‐19
Sep‐19
40,507

1,350

2020
2019
Oct
Oct‐20
Oct‐19
35,402

1,142

400,635

366
2020
2019
Nov
Nov‐20
Nov‐19
33,524

1,117

2020
2019
Dec
Dec‐20
Dec‐19
32,853

1,060

2020
2020
Jan
Jan‐20
Jan‐20
29,205

942

2020
2020
Feb
Feb‐20
Feb‐20
30,077

1,074

2020
2020
Mar
Mar‐20
Mar‐20
30,389

980

2020
2020
Apr
Apr‐20
Apr‐20
16,182

539

2020
2020
May
May‐20
May‐20
21,593

697

2020
2020
Jun
Jun‐20
Jun‐20
30,816

1,027

2020
2020
Jul
Jul‐20
Jul‐20
38,556

1,244

2020
2020
Aug
Aug‐20
Aug‐20
47,276

1,525

2020
2020
Sep
Sep‐20
Sep‐20
54,762

1,825

2021
2020
Oct
Oct‐21
Oct‐20
69,032

2,227

1,659,206

365

2021
2020
Nov
Nov‐21
Nov‐20
69,169

2,306

2021
2020
Dec
Dec‐21
Dec‐20
71,141

2,295

2021
2021
Jan
Jan‐21
Jan‐21
75,316

2,430

2021
2021
Feb
Feb‐21
Feb‐21
97,643

3,487

2021
2021
Mar
Mar‐21
Mar‐21
169,216

5,459

2021
2021
Apr
Apr‐21
Apr‐21
173,699

5,790

2021
2021
May
May‐21
May‐21
172,654

5,569

2021
2021
Jun
Jun‐21
Jun‐21
178,649

5,955

2021
2021
Jul
Jul‐21
Jul‐21
200,658

6,473

2021
2021
Aug
Aug‐21
Aug‐21
196,514

6,339

2021
2021
Sep
Sep‐21
Sep‐21
185,515

6,184

2022
2021
Oct
Oct‐22
Oct‐21
159,113

5,133

2,206,437

365

2022
2021
Nov
Nov‐22
Nov‐21
167,015

5,567

2022
2021
Dec
Dec‐22
Dec‐21
170,602

5,503

2022
2022
Jan
Jan‐22
Jan‐22
147,877

4,770

2022
2022
Feb
Feb‐22
Feb‐22
159,170

5,685

2022
2022
Mar
Mar‐22
Mar‐22
211,181

6,812

2022
2022
Apr
Apr‐22
Apr‐22
203,504

6,783

2022
2022
May
May‐22
May‐22
224,371

7,238

2022
2022
Jun
Jun‐22
Jun‐22
192,399

6,413

2022
2022
Jul
Jul‐22
Jul‐22
181,834

5,866

2022
2022
Aug
Aug‐22
Aug‐22
181,774

5,864

2022
2022
Sep
Sep‐22
Sep‐22
207,597

6,920

CLP_AR_002384
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 47 of 1047

2023
2022
Oct
Oct‐23
Oct‐22
204,885

6,609

1,055,320

365

2023
2022
Nov
Nov‐23
Nov‐22
207,448

6,915

2023
2022
Dec
Dec‐23
Dec‐22
221,710

7,152

2023
2023
Jan
Jan‐23
Jan‐23
128,936

4,159

2023
2023
Feb
Feb‐23
Feb‐23
130,024

4,644

2023
2023
Mar
Mar‐23
Mar‐23
162,317

5,236

CLP_AR_002385
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 48 of 1047

for which detailed records are available), and very likely the most ever.
SWB Encounters, March 12 ‐ April 10, 2023 from UIP
31
Low
3,630

30
12‐Mar
4,756
High
6,370

31
13‐Mar
4,875
Average
5,255

31
14‐Mar
5,678
Over 5200
17
28
15‐Mar
5,381
31
16‐Mar
5,662
30
17‐Mar
4,980
31
18‐Mar
5,118
30
19‐Mar
4,366
31
20‐Mar
5,355
31
21‐Mar
5,677
30
22‐Mar
5,195
23‐Mar
5,597
24‐Mar
5,348
25‐Mar
5,470
26‐Mar
5,384
27‐Mar
5,569
28‐Mar
6,087
29‐Mar
6,327
30‐Mar
6,370
31‐Mar
5,152
1‐Apr
4,906
2‐Apr
4,629
3‐Apr
5,343
4‐Apr
5,470
5‐Apr
5,470
6‐Apr
5,705
7‐Apr
4,790
8‐Apr
4,758
9‐Apr
3,630
10‐Apr
4,596
Source: Data pulled from UIP on 4/13/2023.
CLP_AR_002386
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 49 of 1047

Quote: Daily encounters between POEs averaged 7,152 for December 2022 and exceeded 8,000 per day 11 times during the month, as compared to average daily encounters of 1,977 for all of 2000‐2019 and average daily encounters of 1,265 i
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Production data for FY 2000 – March 2023 and OIS Yearbook data for FY 1925 – FY 1999. As discussed further below, encounters between ports of entry fell sharply in January 2023 following the launch of the Cuba,
Filters: SWB; USBP
Average daily encounters 2000‐2019:
1,977

Average daily encounters 2014‐2019:
1,265

USBP SW Land Border Apprehensions: FY2000‐FY2023YTD (March)
SWB Encounters, March 12 ‐ April 10, 2023 from UIP
FY
CY
Month
Mon‐FY
Mon‐CYm of count Daily Avg
FY Totals Days/year
12‐Mar
4,756
Low
3,630

2000
1999
Oct
Oct‐00
Oct‐99
87,819

2,833

1,566,421

366
1,977

Oct
31
13‐Mar
4,875
High
6,370

2000
1999
Nov
Nov‐00
Nov‐99
74,362

2,479

Nov
30
14‐Mar
5,678
Average
5,255

2000
1999
Dec
Dec‐00
Dec‐99
66,256

2,137

Dec
31
15‐Mar
5,381
Over 5200
17
2000
2000
Jan
Jan‐00
Jan‐00
175,383

5,658

Jan
31
16‐Mar
5,662
2000
2000
Feb
Feb‐00
Feb‐00
200,619

7,165

Feb
28
17‐Mar
4,980
2000
2000
Mar
Mar‐00
Mar‐00
209,311

6,752

Mar
31
18‐Mar
5,118
2000
2000
Apr
Apr‐00
Apr‐00
170,621

5,687

Apr
30
19‐Mar
4,366
2000
2000
May
May‐00
May‐00
155,961

5,031

May
31
20‐Mar
5,355
2000
2000
Jun
Jun‐00
Jun‐00
103,856

3,462

Jun
30
21‐Mar
5,677
2000
2000
Jul
Jul‐00
Jul‐00
111,963

3,612

Jul
31
22‐Mar
5,195
2000
2000
Aug
Aug‐00
Aug‐00
113,448

3,660

Aug
31
23‐Mar
5,597
2000
2000
Sep
Sep‐00
Sep‐00
96,822

3,227

Sep
30
24‐Mar
5,348
2001
2000
Oct
Oct‐01
Oct‐00
81,995

2,645

1,231,412

365

25‐Mar
5,470
2001
2000
Nov
Nov‐01
Nov‐00
67,217

2,241

26‐Mar
5,384
2001
2000
Dec
Dec‐01
Dec‐00
54,828

1,769

27‐Mar
5,569
2001
2001
Jan
Jan‐01
Jan‐01
124,586

4,019

28‐Mar
6,087
2001
2001
Feb
Feb‐01
Feb‐01
150,616

5,379

29‐Mar
6,327
2001
2001
Mar
Mar‐01
Mar‐01
169,904

5,481

30‐Mar
6,370
2001
2001
Apr
Apr‐01
Apr‐01
142,040

4,735

31‐Mar
5,152
2001
2001
May
May‐01
May‐01
123,054

3,969

1‐Apr
4,906
2001
2001
Jun
Jun‐01
Jun‐01
89,034

2,968

2‐Apr
4,629
2001
2001
Jul
Jul‐01
Jul‐01
83,853

2,705

3‐Apr
5,343
2001
2001
Aug
Aug‐01
Aug‐01
84,837

2,737

4‐Apr
5,470
2001
2001
Sep
Sep‐01
Sep‐01
59,448

1,982

5‐Apr
5,470
2002
2001
Oct
Oct‐02
Oct‐01
37,746

1,218

930,341

365

6‐Apr
5,705
2002
2001
Nov
Nov‐02
Nov‐01
32,694

1,090

7‐Apr
4,790
2002
2001
Dec
Dec‐02
Dec‐01
31,531

1,017

8‐Apr
4,758
2002
2002
Jan
Jan‐02
Jan‐02
79,647

2,569

9‐Apr
3,630
2002
2002
Feb
Feb‐02
Feb‐02
95,645

3,416

10‐Apr
4,596
2002
2002
Mar
Mar‐02
Mar‐02
126,906

4,094

Source: Data pulled from UIP on 4/13/2023.
2002
2002
Apr
Apr‐02
Apr‐02
121,908

4,064

2002
2002
May
May‐02
May‐02
97,571

3,147

2002
2002
Jun
Jun‐02
Jun‐02
78,730

2,624

2002
2002
Jul
Jul‐02
Jul‐02
76,719

2,475

2002
2002
Aug
Aug‐02
Aug‐02
82,860

2,673

2002
2002
Sep
Sep‐02
Sep‐02
68,384

2,279

2003
2002
Oct
Oct‐03
Oct‐02
61,913

1,997

906,734

365

2003
2002
Nov
Nov‐03
Nov‐02
47,919

1,597

2003
2002
Dec
Dec‐03
Dec‐02
37,930

1,224

6,000
7,000
Chart Title
CLP_AR_002387
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 50 of 1047

2003
2003
Jan
Jan‐03
Jan‐03
87,002

2,807

2003
2003
Feb
Feb‐03
Feb‐03
97,016

3,465

2003
2003
Mar
Mar‐03
Mar‐03
98,625

3,181

2003
2003
Apr
Apr‐03
Apr‐03
75,564

2,519

2003
2003
May
May‐03
May‐03
88,845

2,866

2003
2003
Jun
Jun‐03
Jun‐03
75,634

2,521

2003
2003
Jul
Jul‐03
Jul‐03
79,396

2,561

2003
2003
Aug
Aug‐03
Aug‐03
84,651

2,731

2003
2003
Sep
Sep‐03
Sep‐03
72,239

2,408

2004
2003
Oct
Oct‐04
Oct‐03
65,388

2,109

1,140,247

366
2004
2003
Nov
Nov‐04
Nov‐03
57,942

1,931

2004
2003
Dec
Dec‐04
Dec‐03
43,663

1,408

2004
2004
Jan
Jan‐04
Jan‐04
92,751

2,992

2004
2004
Feb
Feb‐04
Feb‐04
110,824

3,958

2004
2004
Mar
Mar‐04
Mar‐04
155,089

5,003

2004
2004
Apr
Apr‐04
Apr‐04
135,632

4,521

2004
2004
May
May‐04
May‐04
118,811

3,833

2004
2004
Jun
Jun‐04
Jun‐04
94,607

3,154

2004
2004
Jul
Jul‐04
Jul‐04
92,152

2,973

2004
2004
Aug
Aug‐04
Aug‐04
93,299

3,010

2004
2004
Sep
Sep‐04
Sep‐04
80,089

2,670

2005
2004
Oct
Oct‐05
Oct‐04
75,908

2,449

1,171,391

365

2005
2004
Nov
Nov‐05
Nov‐04
65,110

2,170

2005
2004
Dec
Dec‐05
Dec‐04
48,410

1,562

2005
2005
Jan
Jan‐05
Jan‐05
93,029

3,001

2005
2005
Feb
Feb‐05
Feb‐05
113,776

4,063

2005
2005
Mar
Mar‐05
Mar‐05
143,044

4,614

2005
2005
Apr
Apr‐05
Apr‐05
140,074

4,669

2005
2005
May
May‐05
May‐05
115,817

3,736

2005
2005
Jun
Jun‐05
Jun‐05
90,796

3,027

2005
2005
Jul
Jul‐05
Jul‐05
94,964

3,063

2005
2005
Aug
Aug‐05
Aug‐05
96,745

3,121

2005
2005
Sep
Sep‐05
Sep‐05
93,718

3,124

2006
2005
Oct
Oct‐06
Oct‐05
83,561

2,696

1,071,976

365

2006
2005
Nov
Nov‐06
Nov‐05
70,954

2,365

2006
2005
Dec
Dec‐06
Dec‐05
52,663

1,699

2006
2006
Jan
Jan‐06
Jan‐06
101,262

3,267

2006
2006
Feb
Feb‐06
Feb‐06
125,030

4,465

2006
2006
Mar
Mar‐06
Mar‐06
160,696

5,184

2006
2006
Apr
Apr‐06
Apr‐06
126,554

4,218

2006
2006
May
May‐06
May‐06
105,443

3,401

2006
2006
Jun
Jun‐06
Jun‐06
68,365

2,279

2006
2006
Jul
Jul‐06
Jul‐06
59,633

1,924

2006
2006
Aug
Aug‐06
Aug‐06
59,733

1,927

2006
2006
Sep
Sep‐06
Sep‐06
58,082

1,936

2007
2006
Oct
Oct‐07
Oct‐06
60,726

1,959

858,736

365

2007
2006
Nov
Nov‐07
Nov‐06
51,592

1,720

0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
CLP_AR_002388
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 51 of 1047

2007
2006
Dec
Dec‐07
Dec‐06
40,527

1,307

2007
2007
Jan
Jan‐07
Jan‐07
72,000

2,323

2007
2007
Feb
Feb‐07
Feb‐07
79,273

2,831

2007
2007
Mar
Mar‐07
Mar‐07
114,136

3,682

2007
2007
Apr
Apr‐07
Apr‐07
104,465

3,482

2007
2007
May
May‐07
May‐07
88,510

2,855

2007
2007
Jun
Jun‐07
Jun‐07
71,336

2,378

2007
2007
Jul
Jul‐07
Jul‐07
66,793

2,155

2007
2007
Aug
Aug‐07
Aug‐07
59,801

1,929

2007
2007
Sep
Sep‐07
Sep‐07
49,577

1,653

2008
2007
Oct
Oct‐08
Oct‐07
51,355

1,657

705,049

366
2008
2007
Nov
Nov‐08
Nov‐07
42,208

1,407

2008
2007
Dec
Dec‐08
Dec‐07
31,824

1,027

2008
2008
Jan
Jan‐08
Jan‐08
59,034

1,904

2008
2008
Feb
Feb‐08
Feb‐08
73,483

2,624

2008
2008
Mar
Mar‐08
Mar‐08
89,769

2,896

2008
2008
Apr
Apr‐08
Apr‐08
91,552

3,052

2008
2008
May
May‐08
May‐08
69,240

2,234

2008
2008
Jun
Jun‐08
Jun‐08
53,850

1,795

2008
2008
Jul
Jul‐08
Jul‐08
49,468

1,596

2008
2008
Aug
Aug‐08
Aug‐08
48,544

1,566

2008
2008
Sep
Sep‐08
Sep‐08
44,722

1,491

2009
2008
Oct
Oct‐09
Oct‐08
42,937

1,385

540,851

365

2009
2008
Nov
Nov‐09
Nov‐08
32,782

1,093

2009
2008
Dec
Dec‐09
Dec‐08
25,946

837

2009
2009
Jan
Jan‐09
Jan‐09
44,503

1,436

2009
2009
Feb
Feb‐09
Feb‐09
49,211

1,758

2009
2009
Mar
Mar‐09
Mar‐09
67,342

2,172

2009
2009
Apr
Apr‐09
Apr‐09
58,493

1,950

2009
2009
May
May‐09
May‐09
50,883

1,641

2009
2009
Jun
Jun‐09
Jun‐09
46,044

1,535

2009
2009
Jul
Jul‐09
Jul‐09
43,841

1,414

2009
2009
Aug
Aug‐09
Aug‐09
43,519

1,404

2009
2009
Sep
Sep‐09
Sep‐09
35,350

1,178

2010
2009
Oct
Oct‐10
Oct‐09
40,890

1,319

447,731

365

2010
2009
Nov
Nov‐10
Nov‐09
32,815

1,094

2010
2009
Dec
Dec‐10
Dec‐09
25,034

808

2010
2010
Jan
Jan‐10
Jan‐10
34,784

1,122

2010
2010
Feb
Feb‐10
Feb‐10
42,790

1,528

2010
2010
Mar
Mar‐10
Mar‐10
61,361

1,979

2010
2010
Apr
Apr‐10
Apr‐10
55,237

1,841

2010
2010
May
May‐10
May‐10
47,045

1,518

2010
2010
Jun
Jun‐10
Jun‐10
32,955

1,099

2010
2010
Jul
Jul‐10
Jul‐10
25,609

826

2010
2010
Aug
Aug‐10
Aug‐10
26,415

852

2010
2010
Sep
Sep‐10
Sep‐10
22,796

760

2011
2010
Oct
Oct‐11
Oct‐10
26,165

844

327,577

365

CLP_AR_002389
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 52 of 1047

2011
2010
Nov
Nov‐11
Nov‐10
22,405

747

2011
2010
Dec
Dec‐11
Dec‐10
19,429

627

2011
2011
Jan
Jan‐11
Jan‐11
23,926

772

2011
2011
Feb
Feb‐11
Feb‐11
28,786

1,028

2011
2011
Mar
Mar‐11
Mar‐11
42,014

1,355

2011
2011
Apr
Apr‐11
Apr‐11
36,251

1,208

2011
2011
May
May‐11
May‐11
31,236

1,008

2011
2011
Jun
Jun‐11
Jun‐11
27,166

906

2011
2011
Jul
Jul‐11
Jul‐11
23,170

747

2011
2011
Aug
Aug‐11
Aug‐11
24,166

780

2011
2011
Sep
Sep‐11
Sep‐11
22,863

762

2012
2011
Oct
Oct‐12
Oct‐11
25,612

826

356,873

366
2012
2011
Nov
Nov‐12
Nov‐11
23,368

779

2012
2011
Dec
Dec‐12
Dec‐11
18,983

612

2012
2012
Jan
Jan‐12
Jan‐12
25,714

829

2012
2012
Feb
Feb‐12
Feb‐12
31,579

1,128

2012
2012
Mar
Mar‐12
Mar‐12
42,218

1,362

2012
2012
Apr
Apr‐12
Apr‐12
40,628

1,354

2012
2012
May
May‐12
May‐12
36,966

1,192

2012
2012
Jun
Jun‐12
Jun‐12
30,669

1,022

2012
2012
Jul
Jul‐12
Jul‐12
26,978

870

2012
2012
Aug
Aug‐12
Aug‐12
27,567

889

2012
2012
Sep
Sep‐12
Sep‐12
26,591

886

2013
2012
Oct
Oct‐13
Oct‐12
28,929

933

414,397

365

2013
2012
Nov
Nov‐13
Nov‐12
27,636

921

2013
2012
Dec
Dec‐13
Dec‐12
23,243

750

2013
2013
Jan
Jan‐13
Jan‐13
26,921

868

2013
2013
Feb
Feb‐13
Feb‐13
35,042

1,252

2013
2013
Mar
Mar‐13
Mar‐13
47,293

1,526

2013
2013
Apr
Apr‐13
Apr‐13
48,212

1,607

2013
2013
May
May‐13
May‐13
43,856

1,415

2013
2013
Jun
Jun‐13
Jun‐13
34,436

1,148

2013
2013
Jul
Jul‐13
Jul‐13
33,230

1,072

2013
2013
Aug
Aug‐13
Aug‐13
33,797

1,090

2013
2013
Sep
Sep‐13
Sep‐13
31,802

1,060

2014
2013
Oct
Oct‐14
Oct‐13
35,312

1,139

479,370

365

1264.982
2014
2013
Nov
Nov‐14
Nov‐13
31,896

1,063

2014
2013
Dec
Dec‐14
Dec‐13
29,528

953

2014
2014
Jan
Jan‐14
Jan‐14
28,668

925

2014
2014
Feb
Feb‐14
Feb‐14
36,403

1,300

2014
2014
Mar
Mar‐14
Mar‐14
49,596

1,600

2014
2014
Apr
Apr‐14
Apr‐14
51,502

1,717

2014
2014
May
May‐14
May‐14
60,683

1,958

2014
2014
Jun
Jun‐14
Jun‐14
57,861

1,929

2014
2014
Jul
Jul‐14
Jul‐14
40,708

1,313

2014
2014
Aug
Aug‐14
Aug‐14
31,388

1,013

2014
2014
Sep
Sep‐14
Sep‐14
25,825

861

CLP_AR_002390
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 53 of 1047

2015
2014
Oct
Oct‐15
Oct‐14
26,450

853

331,333

365

2015
2014
Nov
Nov‐15
Nov‐14
24,641

821

2015
2014
Dec
Dec‐15
Dec‐14
25,019

807

2015
2015
Jan
Jan‐15
Jan‐15
21,514

694

2015
2015
Feb
Feb‐15
Feb‐15
24,376

871

2015
2015
Mar
Mar‐15
Mar‐15
29,791

961

2015
2015
Apr
Apr‐15
Apr‐15
29,750

992

2015
2015
May
May‐15
May‐15
31,576

1,019

2015
2015
Jun
Jun‐15
Jun‐15
29,303

977

2015
2015
Jul
Jul‐15
Jul‐15
28,388

916

2015
2015
Aug
Aug‐15
Aug‐15
30,239

975

2015
2015
Sep
Sep‐15
Sep‐15
30,286

1,010

2016
2015
Oct
Oct‐16
Oct‐15
32,724

1,056

408,870

366
2016
2015
Nov
Nov‐16
Nov‐15
32,838

1,095

2016
2015
Dec
Dec‐16
Dec‐15
37,014

1,194

2016
2016
Jan
Jan‐16
Jan‐16
23,758

766

2016
2016
Feb
Feb‐16
Feb‐16
26,072

931

2016
2016
Mar
Mar‐16
Mar‐16
33,316

1,075

2016
2016
Apr
Apr‐16
Apr‐16
38,089

1,270

2016
2016
May
May‐16
May‐16
40,337

1,301

2016
2016
Jun
Jun‐16
Jun‐16
34,450

1,148

2016
2016
Jul
Jul‐16
Jul‐16
33,723

1,088

2016
2016
Aug
Aug‐16
Aug‐16
37,048

1,195

2016
2016
Sep
Sep‐16
Sep‐16
39,501

1,317

2017
2016
Oct
Oct‐17
Oct‐16
46,184

1,490

303,916

365

2017
2016
Nov
Nov‐17
Nov‐16
47,211

1,574

2017
2016
Dec
Dec‐17
Dec‐16
43,251

1,395

2017
2017
Jan
Jan‐17
Jan‐17
31,576

1,019

2017
2017
Feb
Feb‐17
Feb‐17
18,754

670

2017
2017
Mar
Mar‐17
Mar‐17
12,195

393

2017
2017
Apr
Apr‐17
Apr‐17
11,127

371

2017
2017
May
May‐17
May‐17
14,519

468

2017
2017
Jun
Jun‐17
Jun‐17
16,087

536

2017
2017
Jul
Jul‐17
Jul‐17
18,187

587

2017
2017
Aug
Aug‐17
Aug‐17
22,288

719

2017
2017
Sep
Sep‐17
Sep‐17
22,537

751

2018
2017
Oct
Oct‐18
Oct‐17
25,488

822

396,579

365

2018
2017
Nov
Nov‐18
Nov‐17
29,085

970

2018
2017
Dec
Dec‐18
Dec‐17
28,995

935

2018
2018
Jan
Jan‐18
Jan‐18
25,975

838

2018
2018
Feb
Feb‐18
Feb‐18
26,666

952

2018
2018
Mar
Mar‐18
Mar‐18
37,390

1,206

2018
2018
Apr
Apr‐18
Apr‐18
38,243

1,275

2018
2018
May
May‐18
May‐18
40,339

1,301

2018
2018
Jun
Jun‐18
Jun‐18
34,089

1,136

2018
2018
Jul
Jul‐18
Jul‐18
31,299

1,010

2018
2018
Aug
Aug‐18
Aug‐18
37,524

1,210

CLP_AR_002391
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 54 of 1047

2018
2018
Sep
Sep‐18
Sep‐18
41,486

1,383

2019
2018
Oct
Oct‐19
Oct‐18
51,005

1,645

851,508

365

2019
2018
Nov
Nov‐19
Nov‐18
51,857

1,729

2019
2018
Dec
Dec‐19
Dec‐18
50,751

1,637

2019
2019
Jan
Jan‐19
Jan‐19
47,979

1,548

2019
2019
Feb
Feb‐19
Feb‐19
66,883

2,389

2019
2019
Mar
Mar‐19
Mar‐19
92,833

2,995

2019
2019
Apr
Apr‐19
Apr‐19
99,273

3,309

2019
2019
May
May‐19
May‐19
132,856

4,286

2019
2019
Jun
Jun‐19
Jun‐19
94,902

3,163

2019
2019
Jul
Jul‐19
Jul‐19
71,978

2,322

2019
2019
Aug
Aug‐19
Aug‐19
50,684

1,635

2019
2019
Sep
Sep‐19
Sep‐19
40,507

1,350

2020
2019
Oct
Oct‐20
Oct‐19
35,402

1,142

400,635

366
2020
2019
Nov
Nov‐20
Nov‐19
33,524

1,117

2020
2019
Dec
Dec‐20
Dec‐19
32,853

1,060

2020
2020
Jan
Jan‐20
Jan‐20
29,205

942

2020
2020
Feb
Feb‐20
Feb‐20
30,077

1,074

2020
2020
Mar
Mar‐20
Mar‐20
30,389

980

2020
2020
Apr
Apr‐20
Apr‐20
16,182

539

2020
2020
May
May‐20
May‐20
21,593

697

2020
2020
Jun
Jun‐20
Jun‐20
30,816

1,027

2020
2020
Jul
Jul‐20
Jul‐20
38,556

1,244

2020
2020
Aug
Aug‐20
Aug‐20
47,276

1,525

2020
2020
Sep
Sep‐20
Sep‐20
54,762

1,825

2021
2020
Oct
Oct‐21
Oct‐20
69,032

2,227

1,659,206

365

2021
2020
Nov
Nov‐21
Nov‐20
69,169

2,306

2021
2020
Dec
Dec‐21
Dec‐20
71,141

2,295

2021
2021
Jan
Jan‐21
Jan‐21
75,316

2,430

2021
2021
Feb
Feb‐21
Feb‐21
97,643

3,487

2021
2021
Mar
Mar‐21
Mar‐21
169,216

5,459

2021
2021
Apr
Apr‐21
Apr‐21
173,699

5,790

2021
2021
May
May‐21
May‐21
172,654

5,569

2021
2021
Jun
Jun‐21
Jun‐21
178,649

5,955

2021
2021
Jul
Jul‐21
Jul‐21
200,658

6,473

2021
2021
Aug
Aug‐21
Aug‐21
196,514

6,339

2021
2021
Sep
Sep‐21
Sep‐21
185,515

6,184

2022
2021
Oct
Oct‐22
Oct‐21
159,113

5,133

2,206,437

365

2022
2021
Nov
Nov‐22
Nov‐21
167,015

5,567

2022
2021
Dec
Dec‐22
Dec‐21
170,602

5,503

2022
2022
Jan
Jan‐22
Jan‐22
147,877

4,770

2022
2022
Feb
Feb‐22
Feb‐22
159,170

5,685

2022
2022
Mar
Mar‐22
Mar‐22
211,181

6,812

2022
2022
Apr
Apr‐22
Apr‐22
203,504

6,783

2022
2022
May
May‐22
May‐22
224,371

7,238

2022
2022
Jun
Jun‐22
Jun‐22
192,399

6,413

2022
2022
Jul
Jul‐22
Jul‐22
181,834

5,866

CLP_AR_002392
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 55 of 1047

2022
2022
Aug
Aug‐22
Aug‐22
181,774

5,864

2022
2022
Sep
Sep‐22
Sep‐22
207,597

6,920

2023
2022
Oct
Oct‐23
Oct‐22
204,885

6,609

1,055,320

365

2023
2022
Nov
Nov‐23
Nov‐22
207,448

6,915

2023
2022
Dec
Dec‐23
Dec‐22
221,710

7,152

2023
2023
Jan
Jan‐23
Jan‐23
128,936

4,159

2023
2023
Feb
Feb‐23
Feb‐23
130,024

4,644

2023
2023
Mar
Mar‐23
Mar‐23
162,317

5,236

CLP_AR_002393
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 56 of 1047

n the immediate pre‐pandemic period, 2014‐2019.
, Haiti, and Nicaragua parole processes, and daily encounters at the SWB averaged just over 5,200 a day 17 the 30 days ending April 10, 2023. OIS analysis of Unified Immigration Portal (UIP) data pulled on April 13, 2023.
USBP Encounters
12/01/202
7532
12/02/202
8736
Low
3,532
12/03/202
7119
High
8,736
12/04/202
7100
Average
7,152
12/05/202
7369
Over 8000
11
12/06/202
7415
12/07/202
8390
12/08/202
8371
12/09/202
8497
12/10/202
8181
12/11/202
7902
12/12/202
7811
12/13/202
8073
12/14/202
8281
12/15/202
8132
12/16/202
6849
12/17/202
6940
12/18/202
6904
12/19/202
7309
12/20/202
8568
12/21/202
8431
12/22/202
8086
12/23/202
7301
12/24/202
6247
12/25/202
3532
12/26/202
5013
12/27/202
6084
12/28/202
5914
12/29/202
5512
12/30/202
4736
12/31/202
5375
CLP_AR_002394
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 57 of 1047

Quote: The practical result of this growing backlog is that those with meritorious claims may have to wait years for their claims to be granted, while individuals who are ultimately denied protection may spend years in the United States before being issu
Footnote: OIS analysis of EOIR data as of March 31, 2023
Filters: Limited to 862 cases; medians days calculated from NTA (the date EOIR receives and lodge the case) to the completion date
comp_FY EOIR_DECIN Obs
Mean
Median
Meidan Years
2000
366
comp_FY
N Obs
Mean
Median
Median
Years
N Obs
Mean
Median
Median
Years
2000
FO/VD
58121
32.79237 11
0.030055
2001
365
2000 66,939
42
13 0.04 17,055
105
87 0.24
2000
Relief
3389
146.5841 132
0.360656
2002
365
2001 97,395
109
28 0.08 28,132
177
145 0.40
2000
Terminate 4871
72.13373 49
0.13388
2003
365
2002 115,984
172
46 0.13 30,214
209
163 0.45
2001
FO/VD
76374
75.74231 16
0.043836
2004
365
2003 140,238
211
50 0.14 29,843
195
120 0.33
2001
Relief
11006
282.5668 273
0.747945
2005
365
2004 142,799
252
52 0.14 40,400
157
92 0.25
2001
Terminate 9203
175.3252 142
0.389041
2006
365
2005 149,545
283
43 0.12 92,538
114
67 0.18
2002
FO/VD
89235
121.0808 21
0.057534
2007
365
2006 160,378
308
50 0.14 93,956
134
79 0.22
2002
Relief
15657
407.784
390
1.068493
2008
366
2007 179,931
283
36 0.10 28,938
268
171 0.47
2002
Terminate 10175
258.2852 194
0.531507
2009
365
2008 190,483
264
22 0.06 23,527
324
172 0.47
2003
FO/VD
107450
150.8352 19
0.052055
2010
365
2009 197,954
267
26 0.07 19,480
319
143 0.39
2003
Relief
21113
490.8419 434
1.189041
2011
365
2010 189,025
351
48 0.13 20,882
320
174 0.48
2003
Terminate 10624
259.2037 139
0.380822
2012
365
2011 187,304
389
61 0.17 18,549
377
249 0.68
2004
FO/VD
106317
173.8404 16
0.043836
2013
365
2012 166,071
504
145 0.40 16,389
443
301 0.82
2004
Relief
24020
582.1776 492
1.347945
2014
365
2013 142,194
671
392 1.07 17,975
464
323 0.88
2004
Terminate 11207
288.0162 134
0.367123
2015
365
2014 125,665
710
423 1.16 22,033
390
258 0.71
2005
FO/VD
112704
189.4396 15
0.041096
2016
366
2015 122,721
791
518 1.42 32,614
347
210 0.58
2005
Relief
24921
676.4903 561
1.536986
2017
365
2016 133,188
868
594 1.63 29,992
494
332 0.91
2005
Terminate 10795
353.3629 167
0.457534
2018
365
2017 129,902
795
426 1.17 37,232
535
299 0.82
2006
FO/VD
111228
171.3595 13
0.035616
2019
365
2018 143,266
837
466 1.28 41,844
650
410 1.12
2006
Relief
29851
725.0457 568
1.556164
2020
365
2019 172,989
835
392 1.07 82,754
459
231 0.63
2006
Terminate 17212
468.9618 289
0.791781
2021
365
2020 136,958
834
358 0.98 82,043
306
157 0.43
2007
FO/VD
127581
149.3074 14
0.038356
2022
365
2021 110,598 1,463 1,244 3.41 7,602
930
720 1.97
2007
Relief
26431
773.654
599
1.641096
2023
365
2022 284,075 1,608 1,351 3.70 58,928
749
559 1.53
2007
Terminate 21998
463.2345 287
0.786301
2023 178,733 1,369 1,245 3.41 71,639
789
494 1.35
2008
FO/VD
145197
137.2008 11
0.030055
2008
Relief
24994
814.8601 592
1.617486
2008
Terminate 18682
497.0126 273
0.745902
2009
FO/VD
152535
130.3314 13
0.035616
2009
Relief
25515
867.1162 617
1.690411
2009
Terminate 17859
560.4533 322
0.882192
2010
FO/VD
132342
154.1929 18
0.049315
2010
Relief
28493
932.4361 690
1.890411
2010
Terminate 26406
700.7074 433
1.186301
2011
FO/VD
129823
181.9396 21
0.057534
2011
Relief
29768
944.6407 711
1.947945
2011
Terminate 25986
779.1678 511
1.4
2012
FO/VD
103356
219.7137 25
0.068493
2012
Relief
34967
1016.39
808
2.213699
2012
Terminate 27079
932.6871 665
1.821918
2013
FO/VD
73752
305.7366 47
0.128767
2013
Relief
37835
1090.18
871.5
2.387671
ABSENTIA=No
ABSENTIA=Yes
CLP_AR_002395
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 58 of 1047

2013
Terminate 30808
1046.19
771
2.112329
2014
FO/VD
62378
308.7534 49
0.134247
2014
Relief
31785
1110.57
947
2.594521
2014
Terminate 32109
1113.63
852
2.334247
2015
FO/VD
49854
315.9406 61
0.167123
2015
Relief
33038
1160.63
1016
2.783562
2015
Terminate 41221
1082.71
777
2.128767
2016
FO/VD
51161
339.6952 80
0.218579
2016
Relief
39250
1234.61
1091
2.980874
2016
Terminate 45174
1154.2
803
2.193989
2017
FO/VD
69981
402.7517 87
0.238356
2017
Relief
27755
1255.1
1100
3.013699
2017
Terminate 32596
1234.38
883
2.419178
2018
FO/VD
92652
574.5763 132
0.361644
2018
Relief
24833
1375.87
1202
3.293151
2018
Terminate 23832
1331.23
909.5
2.491781
2019
FO/VD
118056
666.518
224
0.613699
2019
Relief
32612
1377.52
1127
3.087671
2019
Terminate 25152
900.9169 432
1.183562
2020
FO/VD
90218
624.9785 269
0.736986
2020
Relief
25139
1300.86
990
2.712329
2020
Terminate 21867
1051.26
594
1.627397
2021
FO/VD
33493
1012.14
704
1.928767
2021
Relief
20490
1766.82
1483
4.063014
2021
Terminate 54144
1639.04
1455
3.986301
2022
FO/VD
54180
1037.34
739
2.024658
2022
Relief
43247
1757.71
1500
4.109589
2022
Terminate 180861
1748.85
1458
3.994521
2023
FO/VD
41241
963.6735 489
1.339726
2023
Relief
26632
1571.82
1500
4.109589
2023
Terminate 104665
1489.53
1317
3.608219
CLP_AR_002396
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 59 of 1047

ued a final order of removal.
CLP_AR_002397
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 60 of 1047

Quote: As the demographics of border encounters have shifted in recent years to include larger numbers of non‐Mexicans—who are far more likely to assert asylum claims—and as the time required to process and remove noncitizens ineligible for pro
Footnote: For noncitizens encountered at the SWB in FY 2014–FY 2019 who were placed in expedited removal, 6 percent of Mexican nationals made fear claims that were referred to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) for adjudication
Filter: Exclude AM, OFO admin cases (crewmembers, parolees, withdrawals). Total exclusions made up 2.9 percent of total encounters between FY2013 and FY2023 Q1.
Correlation coefficient between mean days and OTM % Apprehensions:
0.909028939
Fiscal Year
Mean days for
EOIR completion
OTM % of
Apprehensions
OTM
encounters
2000
42
2%
25,738

2001
109
2%
29,902

2002
172
3%
28,299

2003
211
4%
39,478

2004
252
6%
65,917

2005
283
13%
166,071

2006
308
9%
110,287

2007
283
8%
72,206

2008
264
8%
64,940

2009
267
9%
53,870

2010
351
11%
59,953

2011
389
14%
57,049

2012
504
26%
109,218

2013
671
35%
172,050

2014
710
50%
284,546

2015
791
43%
191,196

2016
868
54%
302,908

2017
795
56%
233,680

2018
837
57%
298,233

2019
835
76%
740,162

2020
834
35%
160,374

2021
1,463
62%
1,079,092

2022
1,608
66%
1,570,605

2023
1,369
73%
340,038

Note: OIS calculated mean days from EOIR case received
date to EOIR case completion date by pulling all EOIR case
completions from OIS production data, and linking each
completion to its case receipt date. In absentia removal
orders and case completions that did not result in decisions,
terminations, or closures were excluded from the analysis.
OIS calculated OTMs as a % of encounters by dividing total
non‐Mexican SWB encounters by total SWB encounters,
pulling from OIS production data.
CLP_AR_002398
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 61 of 1047

otection has grown (during which individuals may become eligible to apply for employment authorization), the deterrent effect of apprehending noncitizens at the SWB has become more limited.
, compared to 57 percent of people from Northern Central America, and 90 percent of all other nationalities. OIS analysis of Enforcement Lifecycle data as of December 31, 2022. Of note, according to OIS analysis of historic EOIR and CBP data, there is
CLP_AR_002399
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 62 of 1047

a clear correlation since FY 2000 between the increasing time it takes to complete immigration proceedings and the lower share of noncitizens being removed, and the growth in non‐Mexican encounters at the SWB. Both trends accelerated in the 2010
CLP_AR_002400
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 63 of 1047

0s, as non‐Mexicans became the majority of border encounters, and they have accelerated further since FY 2021, as people from countries other than Mexico and Northern Central America now account for the largest numbers of border encounters
CLP_AR_002401
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 64 of 1047

Quote: In the weeks between the November announcement that the Title 42 public health Order would be lifted and the December 19 stay order that kept the Title 42 public health Order in place, encounter rates jumped from an average of just under
Footnote: Month over month change from November to December for all of FY 2013 – FY2022 averaged negative 2 percent. OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filters: SWB; CBPOne excluded
CBP daily
Rolling 7‐day avg
USBP 7‐day Rolling Avg
Date
SWB Encounters
Date
SWB Encounters
26‐Oct
7,617
27‐Oct
7,916
28‐Oct
7,732
29‐Oct
7,984
30‐Oct
6,490
31‐Oct
6,881
1‐Nov
7,811
7,490
Average encounters two weeks ending 11/15/22
7,658

1‐Nov
6,605
Average encounters two weeks ending 11/15/22
6,687

2‐Nov
8,239
7,579
Average encounters two weeks ending 12/24/22
8,794

2‐Nov
6,549
Average encounters two weeks ending 12/24/22
7,823

3‐Nov
7,027
7,452
Number of days 11/15 ‐ 12/24 > 9K encounters
5
3‐Nov
6,636
Number of days 11/15 ‐ 12/24 > 9K encounters
0
4‐Nov
7,790
7,460
4‐Nov
6,505
5‐Nov
6,983
7,317
5‐Nov
6,522
6‐Nov
7,866
7,514
6‐Nov
6,378
7‐Nov
7,405
7,589
7‐Nov
6,566
8‐Nov
8,457
7,681
8‐Nov
6,635
9‐Nov
7,586
7,588
9‐Nov
6,727
10‐Nov
8,118
7,744
10‐Nov
6,627
11‐Nov
8,469
7,841
11‐Nov
6,793
12‐Nov
7,523
7,918
12‐Nov
6,898
13‐Nov
7,116
7,811
13‐Nov
6,970
14‐Nov
7,899
7,881
14‐Nov
6,867
15‐Nov
8,147 Announcem
7,837 Announcement date
15‐Nov
6,944 Announcement date
16‐Nov
8,205
7,925
16‐Nov
6,904
17‐Nov
9,583
8,135
17‐Nov
6,999
18‐Nov
7,940
8,059
18‐Nov
7,206
19‐Nov
7,920
8,116
19‐Nov
7,121
20‐Nov
6,956
8,093
20‐Nov
7,184
21‐Nov
7,989
8,106
21‐Nov
7,207
22‐Nov
7,971
8,081
22‐Nov
7,226
23‐Nov
7,529
7,984
23‐Nov
7,209
24‐Nov
7,372
7,668
24‐Nov
7,122
25‐Nov
7,162
7,557
25‐Nov
6,816
26‐Nov
8,049
7,575
26‐Nov
6,705
27‐Nov
7,166
7,605
27‐Nov
6,725
28‐Nov
7,748
7,571
28‐Nov
6,718
29‐Nov
7,677
7,529
29‐Nov
6,677
30‐Nov
9,244
7,774
30‐Nov
6,629
1‐Dec
8,541
7,941
1‐Dec
6,870
2‐Dec
9,671
8,299
2‐Dec
7,014
3‐Dec
7,962
8,287
3‐Dec
7,372
4‐Dec
7,977
8,403
4‐Dec
7,367
5‐Dec
8,367
8,491
5‐Dec
7,481
CLP_AR_002402
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 65 of 1047

6‐Dec
8,422
8,598
6‐Dec
7,562
7‐Dec
9,352
8,613
7‐Dec
7,657
8‐Dec
9,419
8,739
8‐Dec
7,666
9‐Dec
9,520
8,717
9‐Dec
7,786
10‐Dec
9,156
8,888
10‐Dec
7,752
11‐Dec
8,874
9,016
11‐Dec
7,903
12‐Dec
8,810
9,079
12‐Dec
8,018
13‐Dec
9,093
9,175
13‐Dec
8,081
14‐Dec
9,319
9,170
14‐Dec
8,175
15‐Dec
9,137
9,130
15‐Dec
8,159
16‐Dec
7,861
8,893
16‐Dec
8,125
17‐Dec
7,895
8,713
17‐Dec
7,890
18‐Dec
7,788
8,558
18‐Dec
7,713
19‐Dec
8,352
8,492
19‐Dec
7,570
20‐Dec
9,564
8,559
20‐Dec
7,498
21‐Dec
9,469
8,581
21‐Dec
7,569
22‐Dec
9,102
8,576
22‐Dec
7,590
23‐Dec
8,330
8,643
23‐Dec
7,584
24‐Dec
7,130
8,534
24‐Dec
7,648
25‐Dec
4,381
8,047
25‐Dec
7,549
26‐Dec
5,911
7,698
26‐Dec
7,068
27‐Dec
7,137
7,351
27‐Dec
6,740
28‐Dec
6,955
6,992
28‐Dec
6,385
29‐Dec
6,497
6,620
29‐Dec
6,025
30‐Dec
5,745
6,251
30‐Dec
5,658
31‐Dec
6,275
6,129
31‐Dec
5,291
CLP_AR_002403
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 66 of 1047

7,700 per week (early November) to nearly 8,800 per week (mid‐December), a change not predicted by normal seasonal effects.
seasonal pattern
Month over month change from November to December for all of FY 2013 – FY2022 averaged negative 2 percent. OIS
Average month over month change 2013 ‐ 2
‐2%
Fiscal Year
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2013
28929
27636
23243
26921
35042
47293
48212
43856
34436
33230
33797
31802
2014
35312
31896
29528
28668
36403
49596
51502
60683
57861
40708
31388
25825
2015
26450
24641
25019
21514
24376
29791
29750
31576
29303
28388
30239
30286
2016
32724
32838
37014
23758
26072
33316
38089
40337
34450
33723
37048
39501
2017
46184
47211
43251
31576
18754
12195
11127
14519
16087
18187
22288
22537
2018
25488
29085
28995
25975
26666
37390
38243
40339
34089
31299
37524
41486
2019
51005
51857
50751
47979
66883
92833
99273
132856
94902
71978
50684
40507
2020
35402
33524
32853
29205
30077
30389
16182
21593
30816
38556
47276
54762
2021
69032
69169
71141
75316
97643
169216
173699
172654
178649
200658
196514
185515
2022
159113
167015
170602
147877
159170
211181
203504
224371
192399
181834
181774
207597
2023
204885
207448
221710
128936
130024
162317
Grand Tota
714524
722320
734107
587725
651110
875517
709581
782784
702992
678561
668532
679818
Month‐over month change: November ‐ December
2013
‐0.15896
2014
‐0.07424
2015
0.01534
2016
0.12717
2017
‐0.08388
2018
‐0.00309
2019
‐0.02133
2020
‐0.02002
2021
0.02851
2022
0.021477
2023
0.06875
CLP_AR_002404
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 67 of 1047

While a number of factors make it particularly difficult to precisely project the numbers of migrants who would seek to cross the SWB without authorization or present at a U.S. port of entry (“POE”) without documents sufficient for admission afte
DHS SWB Encounter Planning Model generated April 18, 2023. The complexity of international migration limits the Department’s ability to precisely project border encounters under the best of circumstances. The current period is characterized b
V1
FOUO
Blended Projections, Totals
Assumptions:
Title 42, CHNV returns to Mexico, and CHNV paroles end May 11. NPRM not implemented.
Projection Type:
23‐Apr
23‐May
23‐Jun
23‐Jul
23‐Aug
23‐Sep Total
Total
Projection
5,392
6,768
7,527
6,878
7,119
7,712
6,900
Moderately High
6,817
8,147
8,953
8,257
8,499
9,137
8,301
Moderately Low
4,098
5,407
6,130
5,511
5,750
6,423
5,553
High
8,186
9,471
10,321
9,581
9,823
10,505
9,647
Low
3,208
4,174
4,824
4,252
4,494
5,203
4,358
FM
Projection
1,145
2,089
2,787
2,244
2,326
2,466
2,177
Moderately High
1,826
2,748
3,468
2,903
2,985
3,147
2,847
Moderately Low
584
1,449
2,127
1,598
1,670
1,921
1,558
High
2,480
3,381
4,122
3,536
3,618
3,801
3,490
Low
266
893
1,522
1,019
1,099
1,408
1,034
SA
Projection
3,814
4,243
4,233
4,182
4,335
4,769
4,263
Moderately High
4,521
4,927
4,940
4,866
5,020
5,476
4,958
Moderately Low
3,118
3,559
3,532
3,498
3,658
4,062
3,571
High
5,200
5,584
5,619
5,523
5,677
6,155
5,626
Low
2,578
2,916
2,867
2,852
3,007
3,391
2,935
UC
Projection
433
436
507
452
458
476
460
Moderately High
470
472
545
488
493
513
497
Moderately Low
397
400
470
416
422
439
424
High
506
506
580
522
528
549
532
Low
363
366
435
382
387
404
389
HHS Referrals
Projection
326
338
397
352
347
356
353
Moderately High
356
367
427
381
376
387
382
Moderately Low
297
309
367
323
318
327
324
High
459
435
488
424
444
450
450
Low
270
282
339
295
291
299
296
Planning. All projections are for planning purposes, showing what OIS estimates may happen under these assumptions. Effects of these policy assumptions are also based on best available infor
Operational confidence intervals (not assuming growing uncertainty over time) are used to quantify model uncertainty.
Users should not treat these results as a precise statement of what will happen.
CLP_AR_002405
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 68 of 1047

CLP_AR_002406
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 69 of 1047

r the lifting of the Title 42 public health Order, DHS encounter projections and planning models from early April suggest that encounters could rise to 11,000 encounters per day, absent policy changes and absent a viable mechanism for removing Cuban
by greater than usual uncertainty due to ongoing changes in the major migration source countries (i.e., the shift from Mexico and Northern Central America to new countries of origin, discussed further below), the growing impact of climate change on m
rmation.
CLP_AR_002407
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 70 of 1047

n, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan (“CHNV”) nationals who do not have a valid protection claim
migration, political instability in several source countries, the evolving recovery from the COVID pandemic, and uncertainty generated by border‐related litigation, among other factors.OIS leads an interagency SWB Encounter Projections Working Group t
CLP_AR_002408
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 71 of 1047

that generates encounter projections every 2‐4 weeks, with ongoing refinements to the model based on feedback from the working group and model diagnostics. The enterprise encounter projection utilizes a mixed method blended model that combin
CLP_AR_002409
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 72 of 1047

nes a Bayesian structural time series sta
CLP_AR_002410
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 73 of 1047

Quote: As discussed in greater detail below, data indicate that recently announced enforcement processes, as applied to CHNV nationals, which couple new parole processes with prompt returns of those who attempt to cross the SWB witho
Footnote: In the week prior to the announcement of the parole processes (ending October 12, 2022 for Venezuela and January 6, 2023 for Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua), the daily average of CHNV encounters was nearly 2,000 between POEs. A
Filter: SWB; beginning Jan 11, 23 ‐ remove CBPOne Appointments
Daily average week prior to announcement
Cuba
Haiti
Nicaragua Venezuela
CHNV
666
2
241
1088
1996
1 month later
10
1
17
261
288
Last 7 days ending April 10
6
5
6
179
195

USBP
CHN
non-CHNV
Vennon-CHNV
UIP data pulled 4/13/

1/1/2023
467

1,980

10/1/2022
1,240

4,048

CUBA
HAITI

Venezuela Cuba
Haiti
Nicaragua CHN Sum Non-CHNV
1/2/2023
691

2,106

10/2/2022
1,512

3,958

4‐Apr
3
4
Date

1/3/2023
1,046

2,606

10/3/2022
1,366

3,987

5‐Apr
6
1
10/1/2022
1,240
766
7
606
1,379
4,048
6,667
1/4/2023
766

2,297

10/4/2022
1,260

4,945

6‐Apr
12
3
10/2/2022
1,512
984
5
553
1,542
3,958
7,012
1/5/2023
928

2,577

10/5/2022
1,139

5,240

7‐Apr
6
2
10/3/2022
1,366
965
10
421
1,396
3,987
6,749
1/6/2023
800

2,725

10/6/2022
1,174

4,711

8‐Apr
2
7
10/4/2022
1,260
716
5
833
1,554
4,945
7,759
1/7/2023
853

2,813

10/7/2022
1,083

4,568

9‐Apr
7
5
10/5/2022
1,139
1,039
5
700
1,744
5,240
8,123
1/8/2023
691

2,667

10/8/2022
1,006

4,244

10‐Apr
3
11
10/6/2022
1,174
822
7
913
1,742
4,711
7,627
1/9/2023
575

2,946

10/9/2022
1,202

3,875

10/7/2022
1,083
829
2
671
1,502
4,568
7,153
1/10/2023
264

3,757

10/10/2022
1,224

3,824

daily avera
6
5
10/8/2022
1,006
1,115
7
800
1,922
4,244
7,172
1/11/2023
354

3,930

10/11/2022
1,128

4,354

10/9/2022
1,202
937
0
770
1,707
3,875
6,784
1/12/2023
285

3,981

10/12/2022
796

4,056

10/10/2022
1,224
905
8
590
1,503
3,824
6,551
1/13/2023
235

4,007

10/13/2022
1,256

4,360

10/11/2022
1,128
925
9
578
1,512
4,354
6,994
1/14/2023
213

4,244

10/14/2022
1,053

4,017

10/12/2022
796
1,074
1
544
1,619
4,056
6,471
1/15/2023
188

3,612

10/15/2022
834

3,640

10/13/2022
1,256
1,006
2
642
1,650
4,360
7,266
1/16/2023
114

3,747

10/16/2022
484

3,530

10/14/2022
1,053
936
3
697
1,636
4,017
6,706
1/17/2023
164

4,240

10/17/2022
298

4,039

10/15/2022
834
692
4
694
1,390
3,640
5,864
1/18/2023
110

4,542

10/18/2022
185

4,636

10/16/2022
484
640
1
633
1,274
3,530
5,288
1/19/2023
158

4,201

10/19/2022
156

4,417

10/17/2022
298
746
7
514
1,267
4,039
5,604
1/20/2023
111

4,495

10/20/2022
159

4,797

10/18/2022
185
613
1
487
1,101
4,636
5,922
1/21/2023
73

4,362

10/21/2022
132

4,583

10/19/2022
156
897
4
659
1,560
4,417
6,133
1/22/2023
91

4,042

10/22/2022
145

4,264

10/20/2022
159
911
4
564
1,479
4,797
6,435
1/23/2023
49

4,443

10/23/2022
160

4,207

10/21/2022
132
1,027
1
795
1,823
4,583
6,538
1/24/2023
49

4,240

10/24/2022
247

4,261

10/22/2022
145
966
2
656
1,624
4,264
6,033
1/25/2023
46

4,745

10/25/2022
296

5,094

10/23/2022
160
1,054
4
554
1,612
4,207
5,979
1/26/2023
62

4,709

10/26/2022
415

4,740

10/24/2022
247
830
3
480
1,313
4,261
5,821
1/27/2023
43

4,952

10/27/2022
301

4,897

10/25/2022
296
1,089
3
758
1,850
5,094
7,240
1/28/2023
39

4,756

10/28/2022
408

4,406

10/26/2022
415
798
1
710
1,509
4,740
6,664
1/29/2023
37

4,087

10/29/2022
405

4,430

10/27/2022
301
1,107
3
661
1,771
4,897
6,969
1/30/2023
43

4,418

10/30/2022
331

3,332

10/28/2022
408
1,078
1
855
1,934
4,406
6,748
10/31/2022
430

3,769

10/29/2022
405
1,267
1
978
2,246
4,430
7,081
Nov-2022
6,753

131,790

10/30/2022
331
1,066
10
859
1,935
3,332
5,598
Dec-2022
6,183

137,518

Country of Citizenship
CHN
CLP_AR_002411
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 74 of 1047

10/31/2022
430
1,011
3
721
1,735
3,769
5,934
Jan-2023
2,344

117,027

11/1/2022
412
1,106
5
1,131
2,242
4,194
6,848
Feb-2023
1,455

127,972

11/2/2022
331
1,166
3
1,210
2,379
4,561
7,271
Mar-2023
3,301

158,506

11/3/2022
305
898
2
686
1,586
4,166
6,057
Apr 1-15, 2023
11/4/2022
348
1,154
0
983
2,137
4,380
6,865
11/5/2022
250
1,066
0
681
1,747
4,074
6,071
11/6/2022
239
1,133
3
1,506
2,642
4,032
6,913
11/7/2022
265
869
0
994
1,863
4,293
6,421
11/8/2022
263
1,068
6
1,167
2,241
4,984
7,488
11/9/2022
262
935
1
902
1,838
4,477
6,577
11/10/2022
262
1,055
0
1,167
2,222
4,735
7,219
11/11/2022
341
1,425
4
956
2,385
4,871
7,597
11/12/2022
192
1,142
0
846
1,988
4,398
6,578
11/13/2022
197
1,113
3
915
2,031
3,964
6,192
11/14/2022
158
1,543
0
972
2,515
4,287
6,960
11/15/2022
168
1,200
1
1,091
2,292
4,744
7,204
11/16/2022
498
850
1
1,219
2,070
4,674
7,242
11/17/2022
1,074
1,492
1
1,096
2,589
5,004
8,667
11/18/2022
212
985
1
955
1,941
4,850
7,003
11/19/2022
91
1,555
0
1,206
2,761
4,171
7,023
11/20/2022
118
1,210
0
1,218
2,428
3,801
6,347
11/21/2022
84
1,443
1
1,424
2,868
4,141
7,093
11/22/2022
126
1,048
2
1,280
2,330
4,629
7,085
11/23/2022
81
1,273
0
1,012
2,285
4,270
6,636
11/24/2022
60
1,094
0
1,223
2,317
4,150
6,527
11/25/2022
51
987
1
1,299
2,287
3,889
6,227
11/26/2022
55
1,387
0
1,274
2,661
4,442
7,158
11/27/2022
75
827
1
1,686
2,514
3,713
6,302
11/28/2022
65
1,006
0
1,334
2,340
4,397
6,802
11/29/2022
83
1,046
0
1,064
2,110
4,557
6,750
11/30/2022
87
1,598
0
1,698
3,296
4,942
8,325
12/1/2022
102
1,275
2
1,336
2,613
4,817
7,532
12/2/2022
95
1,614
1
1,720
3,335
5,306
8,736
12/3/2022
79
1,464
0
1,426
2,890
4,150
7,119
12/4/2022
126
1,712
1
1,298
3,011
3,963
7,100
12/5/2022
120
1,320
2
1,594
2,916
4,333
7,369
12/6/2022
84
1,151
0
1,572
2,723
4,608
7,415
12/7/2022
144
1,698
1
1,809
3,508
4,738
8,390
12/8/2022
49
1,690
0
1,813
3,503
4,819
8,371
12/9/2022
88
1,944
0
1,592
3,536
4,873
8,497
12/10/2022
101
1,786
1
1,758
3,545
4,535
8,181
12/11/2022
161
1,487
1
1,606
3,094
4,647
7,902
12/12/2022
114
1,463
2
1,699
3,164
4,533
7,811
12/13/2022
157
1,459
2
1,548
3,009
4,907
8,073
12/14/2022
116
1,601
0
1,555
3,156
5,009
8,281
12/15/2022
145
1,547
2
1,447
2,996
4,991
8,132
12/16/2022
91
1,178
0
699
1,877
4,881
6,849
CLP_AR_002412
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 75 of 1047

12/17/2022
146
1,444
0
996
2,440
4,354
6,940
12/18/2022
187
1,398
2
909
2,309
4,408
6,904
12/19/2022
231
1,538
1
867
2,406
4,672
7,309
12/20/2022
254
1,336
1
1,201
2,538
5,776
8,568
12/21/2022
362
1,341
0
1,122
2,463
5,606
8,431
12/22/2022
723
1,131
1
933
2,065
5,298
8,086
12/23/2022
267
1,729
0
817
2,546
4,488
7,301
12/24/2022
306
1,181
0
1,004
2,185
3,756
6,247
12/25/2022
254
586
5
290
881
2,397
3,532
12/26/2022
234
944
3
501
1,448
3,331
5,013
12/27/2022
353
1,382
1
493
1,876
3,855
6,084
12/28/2022
247
1,056
1
590
1,647
4,020
5,914
12/29/2022
257
1,176
0
390
1,566
3,689
5,512
12/30/2022
263
705
0
397
1,102
3,371
4,736
12/31/2022
327
1,280
1
380
1,661
3,387
5,375
1/1/2023
309
289
3
175
467
1,980
2,756
1/2/2023
280
487
1
203
691
2,106
3,077
1/3/2023
270
795
1
250
1,046
2,606
3,922
1/4/2023
366
592
3
171
766
2,297
3,429
1/5/2023
142
591
3
334
928
2,577
3,647
1/6/2023
98
625
0
175
800
2,725
3,623
1/7/2023
77
679
2
172
853
2,813
3,743
1/8/2023
61
574
0
117
691
2,667
3,419
1/9/2023
70
450
1
124
575
2,946
3,591
1/10/2023
73
161
1
102
264
3,757
4,094
1/11/2023
56
189
5
160
354
3,930
4,340 CBP One Removed
1/12/2023
57
114
0
171
285
3,981
4,323
1/13/2023
35
80
0
155
235
4,007
4,277
1/14/2023
50
112
6
95
213
4,244
4,507
1/15/2023
41
66
0
122
188
3,612
3,841
1/16/2023
43
19
4
91
114
3,747
3,904
1/17/2023
21
42
0
122
164
4,240
4,425
1/18/2023
28
26
2
82
110
4,542
4,680
1/19/2023
22
56
0
102
158
4,201
4,381
1/20/2023
32
23
1
87
111
4,495
4,638
1/21/2023
24
29
3
41
73
4,362
4,459
1/22/2023
24
33
4
54
91
4,042
4,157
1/23/2023
20
10
2
37
49
4,443
4,512
1/24/2023
8
27
2
20
49
4,240
4,297
1/25/2023
35
17
0
29
46
4,745
4,826
1/26/2023
17
23
0
39
62
4,709
4,788
1/27/2023
11
24
0
19
43
4,952
5,006
1/28/2023
18
19
1
19
39
4,756
4,813
1/29/2023
30
15
0
22
37
4,087
4,154
1/30/2023
10
13
1
29
43
4,418
4,471
1/31/2023
16
8
1
11
20
4,800
4,836
2/1/2023
11
10
1
20
31
4,642
4,684
CLP_AR_002413
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 76 of 1047

2/2/2023
17
4
0
20
24
4,637
4,678
2/3/2023
8
12
0
24
36
4,667
4,711
2/4/2023
46
6
3
8
17
4,178
4,241
2/5/2023
32
10
1
16
27
4,009
4,068
2/6/2023
77
17
0
23
40
4,414
4,531
2/7/2023
20
4
1
18
23
5,054
5,097
2/8/2023
254
4
0
27
31
4,770
5,055
2/9/2023
327
7
0
13
20
4,821
5,168
2/10/2023
144
7
0
7
14
4,461
4,619
2/11/2023
40
4
2
5
11
4,231
4,282
2/12/2023
42
10
0
17
27
3,969
4,038
2/13/2023
24
14
0
20
34
4,630
4,688
2/14/2023
22
8
0
29
37
4,674
4,733
2/15/2023
22
4
1
8
13
4,608
4,643
2/16/2023
26
6
1
19
26
4,663
4,715
2/17/2023
21
8
1
11
20
4,708
4,749
2/18/2023
20
3
1
9
13
4,482
4,515
2/19/2023
11
1
0
17
18
4,325
4,354
2/20/2023
43
8
0
6
14
4,388
4,445
2/21/2023
30
2
5
13
20
4,633
4,683
2/22/2023
8
2
0
9
11
4,456
4,475
2/23/2023
32
1
0
17
18
4,931
4,981
2/24/2023
37
3
0
6
9
4,971
5,017
2/25/2023
21
8
0
8
16
4,760
4,797
2/26/2023
59
3
0
8
11
4,121
4,191
2/27/2023
21
3
3
13
19
4,311
4,351
2/28/2023
40
7
1
9
17
5,458
5,515
3/1/2023
17
6
0
7
13
5,429
5,459
3/2/2023
21
2
1
10
13
5,099
5,133
3/3/2023
43
4
2
10
16
5,359
5,418
3/4/2023
15
10
7
10
27
5,226
5,268
3/5/2023
42
3
5
5
13
4,925
4,980
3/6/2023
72
4
1
4
9
4,828
4,909
3/7/2023
31
8
4
6
18
6,064
6,113
3/8/2023
48
4
7
11
22
5,280
5,350
3/9/2023
40
4
5
3
12
5,310
5,362
3/10/2023
15
2
12
2
16
5,350
5,381
3/11/2023
31
0
12
1
13
5,022
5,066
3/12/2023
78
2
9
5
16
4,467
4,561
3/13/2023
66
3
3
9
15
4,594
4,675
3/14/2023
66
2
17
10
29
5,368
5,463
3/15/2023
30
3
13
3
19
5,156
5,205
3/16/2023
41
0
18
9
27
5,450
5,518
3/17/2023
21
2
8
4
14
4,772
4,807
3/18/2023
37
1
7
7
15
4,874
4,926
3/19/2023
61
5
4
2
11
4,095
4,167
3/20/2023
91
0
3
15
18
5,032
5,141
CLP_AR_002414
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 77 of 1047

3/21/2023
68
3
1
4
8
5,433
5,509
3/22/2023
53
3
4
2
9
4,910
4,972
3/23/2023
38
1
5
12
18
5,376
5,432
3/24/2023
28
5
1
8
14
5,091
5,133
3/25/2023
58
4
4
10
18
5,194
5,270
3/26/2023
108
2
1
5
8
5,013
5,129
3/27/2023
162
4
4
4
12
5,200
5,374
3/28/2023
125
1
2
5
8
5,732
5,865
3/29/2023
560
7
5
17
29
5,419
6,008
3/30/2023
1,006
14
3
13
30
4,888
5,924
3/31/2023
229
8
1
11
20
4,550
4,799
CLP_AR_002415
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 78 of 1047

ut utilizing these processes, are effectively deterring irregular migration from those countries to the United States, thus yielding a substantial decrease in encounter numbers for nationals of CHNV countries
month after the parole announcements, daily encounters of CHNV nationals averaged just under 300 encounters. In the most recent seven days ending April 10, 2023, CHNV daily encounters averaged 195. OIS analysis of OIS Persist dataset based on da
23
NICAR
VENEZ
CHNV
3
48
58
2
69
78
8
95
118
7
45
60
Daily average week prior to announcement
2
83
94
Cuba
Haiti
Nicaragua Venezuela CHNV
11
103
126
665.5714 1.714286 241.1429 1087.571
1996
8
812
834
1 month later
6
179
195
9.571429 0.857143 17.42857 260.5714 288.4286
Last 7 days ending April 10
5.571429 4.714286 5.857143 179.2857 195.4286
CLP_AR_002416
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 79 of 1047

ata through March 31, 2023, and OIS analysis of CBP UIP data downloaded April 13, 2023.
CLP_AR_002417
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 80 of 1047

Quote: In the absence of the policy changes included in the rule, most non‐Mexicans processed for expedited removal under Title 8 would likely establish credible fear and remain in the United States for the foreseeable future despite the fact t
Footnote: Overall, 63 percent of non‐Mexicans placed in expedited removal from 2014‐2019 made fear claims, and 85 percent of those claiming fear (54 percent of all those placed in ER) established fear or were otherwise placed in section §240
Final or Most Current Outcomes, Total SW Border Encounters by Fear Claims and Fiscal Year or Month: Fiscal Years 2013 - 2023 YTD (February 2023)
Sum FY 2014 - 2019 non-Mexican encounters
Total Encounters1
1,650,462

T8 Encounters
1,650,462

T42 Encounters
0

Placed in ER (CBP ER Dispositions)
651,806

APSO fear claims2
413,219

63%
Referred to EOIR3
350,000

85%
54%
Still in proceedings4
125,644

EOIR case completion5
210,623

Relief6
35,266

Relief on merits7
33,967

Other relief8
1,299

Removal Order + VD9
126,823

Absentia
48,892

Confirmed departure
4,135

No confirmed departure
44,757

Not absentia
77,931

Confirmed departure
34,994

No confirmed departure
42,937

Terminate/Dismiss/closure/other10
48,534

1 Excludes accompanied minors, unaccompanied children, and OFO administrative cases including, crewmembers, parolees, and withdrawals.
2 Includes individuals placed in ER and found to have a credible fear case in USCIS APSO system.
3 Includes USCIS positive fear determinations, negative fear determinations vacated by EOIR, and case closures referred to EOIR.
4 Includes cases with no EOIR completion code or completion codes indicating change of venue, transfer, fear vacated, zero bond, BIA appeal, or decision rescinded.
5 Includes cases with the EOIR completion codes indicating an IJ decision or other completion codes indicating termination, dismissal, administrative closure, failure to prosecute, and other administrative completions.
6 Includes cases with completion codes for relief on merits and other types of relief.
7 Includes completion codes for conditional grants of asylum, grants of asylum, and adjustment of status under various statutory provisions.
8 Includes completion codes for asylum withholding, statutory withholding of removal, deferral of removal under CAT, withholding of removal under CAT, findings of non-removability, cancellation of removal.
9 Includes completion codes for removal order, voluntary departure, withdrawal, abandonment, denial, and DHS negative fear decision affirmed.
10 Includes completion codes for termination, dismissal, administrative closure, failure to prosecute, and other administrative completions.
Notes: Results based on OIS Enforcement Lifecycle methodology as of December 7, 2022. Encounters include USBP apprehensions and OFO inadmissibility determinations on the Southwest Border by year of encounter.
Source: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics Enforcement Lifecycle data as of February 28, 2023.
MOST CURRENT OUTCOMES
CLP_AR_002418
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 81 of 1047

hat many of them will not ultimately be granted asylum, a scenario that would likely incentivize an increasing number of migrants to the United States and further increase the likelihood of sustained, high encounter rates.
0 removal proceedings as a result of their fear claim. These rates are likely to be higher after May 11, 2023 because of the growing prevalence of extra‐regional nationals, who are more likely than Northern Central Americans to make fear claims and to e
CLP_AR_002419
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 82 of 1047

establish fear. OIS analysis of OIS Enforcement Lifecycle data based on data through February 28, 2023.
CLP_AR_002420
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 83 of 1047

Quote: A week before the announcement of the Venezuela parole process on October 12, 2022, Venezuelan encounters between POEs at the SWB averaged over 1,100 a day from October 5–11. About two weeks after the announcement, Ve
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Quote: U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") encountered an average of 106 Venezuelans between POEs per day in March 2023, about one‐tenth the number of encounters prior to the announcement of the parole process.
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: SWB, USBP

USBP
Daily Average 10/5‐10/11
1,137

CHN

Daily Average 10/18‐10/24
169

Venezuela Cuba
Haiti
Nicaragua CHN Sum Non-CHNV
Daily Average 11/23‐11/29
67
Date

Daily Average 1/16‐1/22
28
10/1/2022
1,240
766
7
606
1,379
4,048
6,667
Daily Average March 2023
106
10/2/2022
1,512
984
5
553
1,542
3,958
7,012
10/3/2022
1,366
965
10
421
1,396
3,987
6,749
10/4/2022
1,260
716
5
833
1,554
4,945
7,759
Daily Average 10/6‐10/12
1,088
10/5/2022
1,139
1,039
5
700
1,744
5,240
8,123
10/6/2022
1,174
822
7
913
1,742
4,711
7,627
Daily Average Oct
704.0
10/7/2022
1,083
829
2
671
1,502
4,568
7,153
Daily Average Nov
225.1
10/8/2022
1,006
1,115
7
800
1,922
4,244
7,172
Daily Average Jan
75.6
10/9/2022
1,202
937
0
770
1,707
3,875
6,784
Daily Average Mar
106.5
10/10/2022
1,224
905
8
590
1,503
3,824
6,551
10/11/2022
1,128
925
9
578
1,512
4,354
6,994
10/12/2022
796
1,074
1
544
1,619
4,056
6,471
10/13/2022
1,256
1,006
2
642
1,650
4,360
7,266
10/14/2022
1,053
936
3
697
1,636
4,017
6,706
10/15/2022
834
692
4
694
1,390
3,640
5,864
10/16/2022
484
640
1
633
1,274
3,530
5,288
10/17/2022
298
746
7
514
1,267
4,039
5,604
10/18/2022
185
613
1
487
1,101
4,636
5,922
10/19/2022
156
897
4
659
1,560
4,417
6,133
10/20/2022
159
911
4
564
1,479
4,797
6,435
10/21/2022
132
1,027
1
795
1,823
4,583
6,538
10/22/2022
145
966
2
656
1,624
4,264
6,033
10/23/2022
160
1,054
4
554
1,612
4,207
5,979
10/24/2022
247
830
3
480
1,313
4,261
5,821
10/25/2022
296
1,089
3
758
1,850
5,094
7,240
10/26/2022
415
798
1
710
1,509
4,740
6,664
10/27/2022
301
1,107
3
661
1,771
4,897
6,969
10/28/2022
408
1,078
1
855
1,934
4,406
6,748
10/29/2022
405
1,267
1
978
2,246
4,430
7,081
10/30/2022
331
1,066
10
859
1,935
3,332
5,598
10/31/2022
430
1,011
3
721
1,735
3,769
5,934
11/1/2022
412
1,106
5
1,131
2,242
4,194
6,848
11/2/2022
331
1,166
3
1,210
2,379
4,561
7,271
11/3/2022
305
898
2
686
1,586
4,166
6,057
11/4/2022
348
1,154
0
983
2,137
4,380
6,865
11/5/2022
250
1,066
0
681
1,747
4,074
6,071
11/6/2022
239
1,133
3
1,506
2,642
4,032
6,913
Country of Citizenship
CLP_AR_002421
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 84 of 1047

11/7/2022
265
869
0
994
1,863
4,293
6,421
11/8/2022
263
1,068
6
1,167
2,241
4,984
7,488
11/9/2022
262
935
1
902
1,838
4,477
6,577
11/10/2022
262
1,055
0
1,167
2,222
4,735
7,219
11/11/2022
341
1,425
4
956
2,385
4,871
7,597
11/12/2022
192
1,142
0
846
1,988
4,398
6,578
11/13/2022
197
1,113
3
915
2,031
3,964
6,192
11/14/2022
158
1,543
0
972
2,515
4,287
6,960
11/15/2022
168
1,200
1
1,091
2,292
4,744
7,204
11/16/2022
498
850
1
1,219
2,070
4,674
7,242
11/17/2022
1,074
1,492
1
1,096
2,589
5,004
8,667
11/18/2022
212
985
1
955
1,941
4,850
7,003
11/19/2022
91
1,555
0
1,206
2,761
4,171
7,023
11/20/2022
118
1,210
0
1,218
2,428
3,801
6,347
11/21/2022
84
1,443
1
1,424
2,868
4,141
7,093
11/22/2022
126
1,048
2
1,280
2,330
4,629
7,085
11/23/2022
81
1,273
0
1,012
2,285
4,270
6,636
11/24/2022
60
1,094
0
1,223
2,317
4,150
6,527
11/25/2022
51
987
1
1,299
2,287
3,889
6,227
11/26/2022
55
1,387
0
1,274
2,661
4,442
7,158
11/27/2022
75
827
1
1,686
2,514
3,713
6,302
11/28/2022
65
1,006
0
1,334
2,340
4,397
6,802
11/29/2022
83
1,046
0
1,064
2,110
4,557
6,750
11/30/2022
87
1,598
0
1,698
3,296
4,942
8,325
12/1/2022
102
1,275
2
1,336
2,613
4,817
7,532
12/2/2022
95
1,614
1
1,720
3,335
5,306
8,736
12/3/2022
79
1,464
0
1,426
2,890
4,150
7,119
12/4/2022
126
1,712
1
1,298
3,011
3,963
7,100
12/5/2022
120
1,320
2
1,594
2,916
4,333
7,369
12/6/2022
84
1,151
0
1,572
2,723
4,608
7,415
12/7/2022
144
1,698
1
1,809
3,508
4,738
8,390
12/8/2022
49
1,690
0
1,813
3,503
4,819
8,371
12/9/2022
88
1,944
0
1,592
3,536
4,873
8,497
12/10/2022
101
1,786
1
1,758
3,545
4,535
8,181
12/11/2022
161
1,487
1
1,606
3,094
4,647
7,902
12/12/2022
114
1,463
2
1,699
3,164
4,533
7,811
12/13/2022
157
1,459
2
1,548
3,009
4,907
8,073
12/14/2022
116
1,601
0
1,555
3,156
5,009
8,281
12/15/2022
145
1,547
2
1,447
2,996
4,991
8,132
12/16/2022
91
1,178
0
699
1,877
4,881
6,849
12/17/2022
146
1,444
0
996
2,440
4,354
6,940
12/18/2022
187
1,398
2
909
2,309
4,408
6,904
12/19/2022
231
1,538
1
867
2,406
4,672
7,309
12/20/2022
254
1,336
1
1,201
2,538
5,776
8,568
12/21/2022
362
1,341
0
1,122
2,463
5,606
8,431
12/22/2022
723
1,131
1
933
2,065
5,298
8,086
12/23/2022
267
1,729
0
817
2,546
4,488
7,301
CLP_AR_002422
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 85 of 1047

12/24/2022
306
1,181
0
1,004
2,185
3,756
6,247
12/25/2022
254
586
5
290
881
2,397
3,532
12/26/2022
234
944
3
501
1,448
3,331
5,013
12/27/2022
353
1,382
1
493
1,876
3,855
6,084
12/28/2022
247
1,056
1
590
1,647
4,020
5,914
12/29/2022
257
1,176
0
390
1,566
3,689
5,512
12/30/2022
263
705
0
397
1,102
3,371
4,736
12/31/2022
327
1,280
1
380
1,661
3,387
5,375
1/1/2023
309
289
3
175
467
1,980
2,756
1/2/2023
280
487
1
203
691
2,106
3,077
1/3/2023
270
795
1
250
1,046
2,606
3,922
1/4/2023
366
592
3
171
766
2,297
3,429
1/5/2023
142
591
3
334
928
2,577
3,647
1/6/2023
98
625
0
175
800
2,725
3,623
1/7/2023
77
679
2
172
853
2,813
3,743
1/8/2023
61
574
0
117
691
2,667
3,419
1/9/2023
70
450
1
124
575
2,946
3,591
1/10/2023
73
161
1
102
264
3,757
4,094
1/11/2023
56
189
5
160
354
3,930
4,340
1/12/2023
57
114
0
171
285
3,981
4,323
1/13/2023
35
80
0
155
235
4,007
4,277
1/14/2023
50
112
6
95
213
4,244
4,507
1/15/2023
41
66
0
122
188
3,612
3,841
1/16/2023
43
19
4
91
114
3,747
3,904
1/17/2023
21
42
0
122
164
4,240
4,425
1/18/2023
28
26
2
82
110
4,542
4,680
1/19/2023
22
56
0
102
158
4,201
4,381
1/20/2023
32
23
1
87
111
4,495
4,638
1/21/2023
24
29
3
41
73
4,362
4,459
1/22/2023
24
33
4
54
91
4,042
4,157
1/23/2023
20
10
2
37
49
4,443
4,512
1/24/2023
8
27
2
20
49
4,240
4,297
1/25/2023
35
17
0
29
46
4,745
4,826
1/26/2023
17
23
0
39
62
4,709
4,788
1/27/2023
11
24
0
19
43
4,952
5,006
1/28/2023
18
19
1
19
39
4,756
4,813
1/29/2023
30
15
0
22
37
4,087
4,154
1/30/2023
10
13
1
29
43
4,418
4,471
1/31/2023
16
8
1
11
20
4,800
4,836
2/1/2023
11
10
1
20
31
4,642
4,684
2/2/2023
17
4
0
20
24
4,637
4,678
2/3/2023
8
12
0
24
36
4,667
4,711
2/4/2023
46
6
3
8
17
4,178
4,241
2/5/2023
32
10
1
16
27
4,009
4,068
2/6/2023
77
17
0
23
40
4,414
4,531
2/7/2023
20
4
1
18
23
5,054
5,097
2/8/2023
254
4
0
27
31
4,770
5,055
CLP_AR_002423
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 86 of 1047

2/9/2023
327
7
0
13
20
4,821
5,168
2/10/2023
144
7
0
7
14
4,461
4,619
2/11/2023
40
4
2
5
11
4,231
4,282
2/12/2023
42
10
0
17
27
3,969
4,038
2/13/2023
24
14
0
20
34
4,630
4,688
2/14/2023
22
8
0
29
37
4,674
4,733
2/15/2023
22
4
1
8
13
4,608
4,643
2/16/2023
26
6
1
19
26
4,663
4,715
2/17/2023
21
8
1
11
20
4,708
4,749
2/18/2023
20
3
1
9
13
4,482
4,515
2/19/2023
11
1
0
17
18
4,325
4,354
2/20/2023
43
8
0
6
14
4,388
4,445
2/21/2023
30
2
5
13
20
4,633
4,683
2/22/2023
8
2
0
9
11
4,456
4,475
2/23/2023
32
1
0
17
18
4,931
4,981
2/24/2023
37
3
0
6
9
4,971
5,017
2/25/2023
21
8
0
8
16
4,760
4,797
2/26/2023
59
3
0
8
11
4,121
4,191
2/27/2023
21
3
3
13
19
4,311
4,351
2/28/2023
40
7
1
9
17
5,458
5,515
3/1/2023
17
6
0
7
13
5,429
5,459
3/2/2023
21
2
1
10
13
5,099
5,133
3/3/2023
43
4
2
10
16
5,359
5,418
3/4/2023
15
10
7
10
27
5,226
5,268
3/5/2023
42
3
5
5
13
4,925
4,980
3/6/2023
72
4
1
4
9
4,828
4,909
3/7/2023
31
8
4
6
18
6,064
6,113
3/8/2023
48
4
7
11
22
5,280
5,350
3/9/2023
40
4
5
3
12
5,310
5,362
3/10/2023
15
2
12
2
16
5,350
5,381
3/11/2023
31
0
12
1
13
5,022
5,066
3/12/2023
78
2
9
5
16
4,467
4,561
3/13/2023
66
3
3
9
15
4,594
4,675
3/14/2023
66
2
17
10
29
5,368
5,463
3/15/2023
30
3
13
3
19
5,156
5,205
3/16/2023
41
0
18
9
27
5,450
5,518
3/17/2023
21
2
8
4
14
4,772
4,807
3/18/2023
37
1
7
7
15
4,874
4,926
3/19/2023
61
5
4
2
11
4,095
4,167
3/20/2023
91
0
3
15
18
5,032
5,141
3/21/2023
68
3
1
4
8
5,433
5,509
3/22/2023
53
3
4
2
9
4,910
4,972
3/23/2023
38
1
5
12
18
5,376
5,432
3/24/2023
28
5
1
8
14
5,091
5,133
3/25/2023
58
4
4
10
18
5,194
5,270
3/26/2023
108
2
1
5
8
5,013
5,129
3/27/2023
162
4
4
4
12
5,200
5,374
CLP_AR_002424
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 87 of 1047

3/28/2023
125
1
2
5
8
5,732
5,865
3/29/2023
560
7
5
17
29
5,419
6,008
3/30/2023
1,006
14
3
13
30
4,888
5,924
3/31/2023
229
8
1
11
20
4,550
4,799
CLP_AR_002425
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 88 of 1047

enezuelan encounters averaged under 200 per day between October 18 and 24.
CLP_AR_002426
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 89 of 1047

Quote: Between the announcement of these processes on January 5, 2023, and January 21, the number of daily encounters between POEs of CHN nationals dropped from 928 to 73, a 92 percent decline.
Footnote: OIS Persist based on data through March 31, 2023.
CHN encounters between POEs continued to decline to an average of fewer than 17 per day in March 2023.
OIS Persist based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: SWB, USBP
USBP
CHNnon-CHNV
% change 5 Jan to 21 Jan, 2023:
‐92%
12/27/2022
1,876

3,855

Average in March 2023:
16.5
12/28/2022
1,647

4,020

12/29/2022
1,566

3,689

12/30/2022
1,102

3,371

12/31/2022
1,661

3,387

1/1/2023
467

1,980

1/2/2023
691

2,106

1/3/2023
1,046

2,606

1/4/2023
766

2,297

1/5/2023
928

2,577

1/6/2023
800

2,725

1/7/2023
853

2,813

1/8/2023
691

2,667

1/9/2023
575

2,946

1/10/2023
264

3,757

1/11/2023
354

3,930

1/12/2023
285

3,981

1/13/2023
235

4,007

1/14/2023
213

4,244

1/15/2023
188

3,612

1/16/2023
114

3,747

1/17/2023
164

4,240

1/18/2023
110

4,542

1/19/2023
158

4,201

1/20/2023
111

4,495

1/21/2023
73

4,362

1/22/2023
91

4,042

1/23/2023
49

4,443

1/24/2023
49

4,240

1/25/2023
46

4,745

1/26/2023
62

4,709

1/27/2023
43

4,952

1/28/2023
39

4,756

1/29/2023
37

4,087

1/30/2023
43

4,418

1/31/2023
20
4800
2/1/2023
31
4642
2/2/2023
24
4637
2/3/2023
36
4667
CLP_AR_002427
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 90 of 1047

2/4/2023
17
4178
2/5/2023
27
4009
2/6/2023
40
4414
2/7/2023
23
5054
2/8/2023
31
4770
2/9/2023
20
4821
2/10/2023
14
4461
2/11/2023
11
4231
2/12/2023
27
3969
2/13/2023
34
4630
2/14/2023
37
4674
2/15/2023
13
4608
2/16/2023
26
4663
2/17/2023
20
4708
2/18/2023
13
4482
2/19/2023
18
4325
2/20/2023
14
4388
2/21/2023
20
4633
2/22/2023
11
4456
2/23/2023
18
4931
2/24/2023
9
4971
2/25/2023
16
4760
2/26/2023
11
4121
2/27/2023
19
4311
2/28/2023
17
5458
3/1/2023
13
5429
3/2/2023
13
5099
3/3/2023
16
5359
3/4/2023
27
5226
3/5/2023
13
4925
3/6/2023
9
4828
3/7/2023
18
6064
3/8/2023
22
5280
3/9/2023
12
5310
3/10/2023
16
5350
3/11/2023
13
5022
3/12/2023
16
4467
3/13/2023
15
4594
3/14/2023
29
5368
3/15/2023
19
5156
3/16/2023
27
5450
3/17/2023
14
4772
3/18/2023
15
4874
3/19/2023
11
4095
3/20/2023
18
5032
3/21/2023
8
5433
3/22/2023
9
4910
CLP_AR_002428
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 91 of 1047

3/23/2023
18
5376
3/24/2023
14
5091
3/25/2023
18
5194
3/26/2023
8
5013
3/27/2023
12
5200
3/28/2023
8
5732
3/29/2023
29
5419
3/30/2023
30
4888
3/31/2023
20
4550
CLP_AR_002429
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 92 of 1047

Quote: DHS estimates that the drop in CHNV encounters in January through March was almost four times as large as the number of people permitted entry under the parole processes
Footnote: In December 2022, prior to the announcement of the CHN parole processes, the OIS Enterprise Encounter Projection predicted 273,000 total encounters of CHNV nationals in January through March 2023, a projection equivalent to 26
December 8, 2022 Encounter Projection
jan‐mar total
Jan‐23
Feb‐23
Mar‐23
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Aug‐23
Sep‐23
Cuba
36,367
36,995
38,820
38,018
38,258
37,442
37,059
37,788
38,523
112,182
Haiti
5,895
5,727
5,962
5,964
6,877
6,315
6,347
6,806
7,840
17,584
Nicaragua
35,523
36,781
37,808
36,190
38,601
37,029
37,337
37,323
38,048
110,112
Venezuela
11,583
9,921
11,378
11,637
12,677
13,639
13,433
14,578
16,044
32,882
Jan‐Mar total=
272,760
Ratio of drop in encounters to CHNV process paroles
3.953328
Projected
Encounters
Unique Encounter
Rate (FY 2022)
Projected
Unique
Encounters1
Actual
Unique
Encounte
rs2
Pojected
minus
Actual
CHNV
Parolees
Cuba
112,200 0.97 109,370 6,407 102,963 14,814
Haiti
17,600 0.94 16,458 2,810 13,648 18,439
Nicaragua 110,100 0.97 106,583 3,726 102,857 7,512
Venezuel
a
32,900 1.00 32,768 7,261 25,507 21,202
CHNV
Total
272,800
265,180 20,204 244,976 61,967
Notes: Data are for Jan ‐ March 2023.
1 Projected Unique Encounters calculated by applying unique encounter rate for FY 2022 to projected Jan ‐ March encounters
2 Excludes CBP One encounters
Source: Projected encounters from December 8, 2022 Enterprise Encounter Projection; Encounters, unique encounter rates, and CBP One encounters from OIS Persist; CHNV parolees from OFO Advanced Travel Authorization Report.
CLP_AR_002430
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 93 of 1047

65,000 unique encounters given CHNV repeat encounter rates. During that same period, following the enactment of the CHN parole processes, unique SWB encounters (excluding scheduled arrivals via the CBP One app) of CHNV nationals was 20,204—
CLP_AR_002431
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 94 of 1047

—245,000 fewer unique encounters than had been predicted. By comparison, a total of 61,967 CHNV nationals entered the United States pursuant to the CHNV parole processes during the same period. OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset is based on data
CLP_AR_002432
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 95 of 1047

a through March 31, 2023, and of CBP OFO CHNV Advance Travel Authorization reports.
CLP_AR_002433
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 96 of 1047

Quote: Thirty‐eight percent of all noncitizens who entered along the SWB, received a positive credible fear determination, and were placed into proceedings before EOIR between FY 2014 and FY 2019 remained in EOIR proceedings as of December 31, 2022.
Footnote: See OIS Enforcement Lifecycle data through December 31, 2022.
Quote: Further, almost half (47 percent) of EOIR cases who received positive credible fear determinations resulting from FY 2019 encounters (referrals to EOIR) remained in proceedings as of December 31, 2022.
Footnote: Id.
Filters:
% still in EOIR out of Comprehensive Positive Fear (TOTAL):
38.12%
% still in EOIR out of Comprehensive Positive Fear (2019):
47.07%
Most Recent Outcome
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019 Total
Total Encounters
471,989
359,453
438,908
336,791
439,776
878,156 2,925,073
T8 Encounters
471,989
359,453
438,908
336,791
439,776
878,156 2,925,073
Processed for Expedited Removal
229,165
180,592
227,911
160,305
214,667
223,200 1,235,840
No fear claim
175,510
130,839
130,728
89,438
115,118
121,748
763,381
No Fear Claim - confirmed removal
or return
167,324
129,954
127,975
86,711
110,035
118,662
740,661
Fear Claims Withdrawn (Based on
APSO receipts)
5,025
3,447
4,623
2,288
4,013
3,365
22,761
Credible Fear Claims (APSO cases Only)
48,630
46,306
92,560
68,579
95,536
98,087
449,698
Positive fear determinations
34,966
33,835
73,487
53,442
74,460
70,869
341,059
Negative fear determinations
9,088
7,502
9,360
7,275
9,107
17,645
59,977
Negative fear determinations
appealed to EOIR
7,242
6,226
7,572
5,842
6,730
14,253
47,865
Negative fear determinations
vacated by EOIR
1,265
1,221
1,983
1,425
1,270
3,837
11,001
Negative fear determinations
upheld by EOIR
5,977
5,005
5,589
4,417
5,460
10,416
36,864
Case closures
4,576
4,969
9,713
7,862
11,969
9,573
48,662
Case closures referred to EOIR
1,531
1,815
4,606
3,814
6,550
3,305
21,621
Case closures not referred to
EOIR
3,045
3,154
5,107
4,048
5,419
6,268
27,041
Non-Referrals to EOIR
15,893
12,882
17,107
12,186
17,269
23,441
98,778
Executed Removal Orders
10,578
9,216
11,910
9,630
12,139
18,908
72,381
EOIR cases started
37,193
36,422
78,225
56,693
77,084
71,392
357,009
Still in EOIR Proceedings
9,002
9,895
24,180
21,982
33,995
35,164
134,218
EOIR Cases completed
28,191
26,527
54,045
34,711
43,089
36,228
222,791
Terminations / Dismissals
4,996
4,422
9,705
7,543
10,530
11,287
48,483
CLP_AR_002434
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 97 of 1047

Quote: Excluding in absentia orders, the mean completion time for EOIR cases in FY 2022 was 3.7 years.
Footnote: OIS analysis of EOIR data as of March 31, 2023
Filters: Limited to 862 cases; medians days calculated from NTA (the date EOIR receives and lodge the case) to the completion date
Median years 2022:
3.7
comp_FY
N Obs
Mean
Median
Median
Years
N Obs
Mean
Median
Median
Years
2000 66,939
42
13 0.04 17,055
105
87 0.24
2001 97,395
109
28 0.08 28,132
177
145 0.40
2002 115,984
172
46 0.13 30,214
209
163 0.45
2003 140,238
211
50 0.14 29,843
195
120 0.33
2004 142,799
252
52 0.14 40,400
157
92 0.25
2005 149,545
283
43 0.12 92,538
114
67 0.18
2006 160,378
308
50 0.14 93,956
134
79 0.22
2007 179,931
283
36 0.10 28,938
268
171 0.47
2008 190,483
264
22 0.06 23,527
324
172 0.47
2009 197,954
267
26 0.07 19,480
319
143 0.39
2010 189,025
351
48 0.13 20,882
320
174 0.48
2011 187,304
389
61 0.17 18,549
377
249 0.68
2012 166,071
504
145 0.40 16,389
443
301 0.82
2013 142,194
671
392 1.07 17,975
464
323 0.88
2014 125,665
710
423 1.16 22,033
390
258 0.71
2015 122,721
791
518 1.42 32,614
347
210 0.58
2016 133,188
868
594 1.63 29,992
494
332 0.91
2017 129,902
795
426 1.17 37,232
535
299 0.82
2018 143,266
837
466 1.28 41,844
650
410 1.12
2019 172,989
835
392 1.07 82,754
459
231 0.63
2020 136,958
834
358 0.98 82,043
306
157 0.43
2021 110,598 1,463 1,244 3.41 7,602
930
720 1.97
2022 284,075 1,608 1,351 3.70 58,928
749
559 1.53
2023 178,733 1,369 1,245 3.41 71,639
789
494 1.35
ABSENTIA=No
ABSENTIA=Yes
CLP_AR_002435
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 98 of 1047

Quote: As noted in the NPRM, for the 30 days ending December 24, 2022, total daily encounters along the SWB consistently fluctuated between approximately 7,100 and 9,700 per day, averaging approximately 8,500 per day, with encounters exceeding 9,000 per day on 12 different occasions during this 30‐day stretch.
Footnote: OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: SW Land Border
SWB Encounters, November 25 ‐ December 24, 2022
SWB Encounters, March 12 ‐ April 10, 2023 from UIP
Low
7130
USBP
Low
3630
USBP
25‐Nov
7162
High
9671
6227
44997
4756
High
6370
4535
26‐Nov
8049
Average
8538.567
7158
44998
4875
Average
5254.8
4648
27‐Nov
7166
Over 9000
12
6302
44999
5678
Over 9000
0
5445
28‐Nov
7748
6802
45000
5381
5169
29‐Nov
7677
6750
45001
5662
5469
30‐Nov
9244
8325
45002
4980
4770
1‐Dec
8541
7532
45003
5118
4900
2‐Dec
9671
8736
45004
4366
4146
3‐Dec
7962
7119
45005
5355
5121
4‐Dec
7977
7100
45006
5677
5494
5‐Dec
8367
7369
45007
5195
4955
6‐Dec
8422
7415
45008
5597
5379
7‐Dec
9352
8390
45009
5348
5122
8‐Dec
9419
8371
45010
5470
5255
9‐Dec
9520
8497
45011
5384
5171
10‐Dec
9156
8181
45012
5569
5367
11‐Dec
8874
7902
45013
6087
5900
12‐Dec
8810
7811
45014
6327
6167
13‐Dec
9093
8073
45015
6370
6202
14‐Dec
9319
8281
45016
5152
4980
15‐Dec
9137
8132
45017
4906
4736
16‐Dec
7861
6849
45018
4629
4425
17‐Dec
7895
6940
45019
5343
5159
18‐Dec
7788
6904
45020
5470
5249
19‐Dec
8352
7309
45021
5470
5263
20‐Dec
9564
8568
45022
5705
5525
21‐Dec
9469
8431
45023
4790
4586
22‐Dec
9102
8086
45024
4758
4610
23‐Dec
8330
7301
45025
3630
3448
24‐Dec
7130
6247
45026
4596
4372
Source: Data pulled from Persist as of 3/31/2023.
Source: Data pulled from UIP on 4/13/2023.
CLP_AR_002436
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 99 of 1047

Quote: While commenters are correct that the Title 42 public health Order has increased the percentage of repeat crossing attempts relative to the 2010s, since 2022 over 97 percent of extra‐regional migrants – the people representing the greatest pro
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: FY 2023 includes data through March 31. Table exc ludes administartive encounters by OFO (most OFO parolees and persons permitted to withdraw applications for admission without prejudice, a total of 2.7 percent of SWB encounters during th
Row LabelsRepeat
Unique
Total
% Unique Repeat
Unique
Total
% Unique Repeat
Unique
Total
% Unique
2013
91987
217314
309301
70%
16158
124171
140329
88%
562
27267
27829
98%
2014
81834
196233
278067
71%
22736
225208
247944
91%
405
18251
18656
98%
2015
62247
181532
243779
74%
13199
129016
142215
91%
342
17137
17479
98%
2016
61832
182814
244646
75%
12316
214985
227301
95%
390
32749
33139
99%
2017
41611
124011
165622
75%
9912
177510
187422
95%
346
31802
32148
99%
2018
46863
153925
200788
77%
11708
246433
258141
95%
382
39073
39455
99%
2019
50962
166971
217933
77%
21863
601421
623284
96%
2158
114034
116192
98%
2020
106620
182517
289137
63%
24654
82013
106667
77%
12092
41321
53413
77%
2021
325417
323123
648540
50%
191004
509796
700800
73%
51131
326476
377607
86%
2022
388234
406491
794725
51%
152576
388772
541348
72%
20903
984523
1005426
98%
2023
156594
208305
364899
57%
46873
139867
186740
75%
16381
584144
600525
97%
Mexico
N. Central America
Extra‐Regional
CLP_AR_002437
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 100 of 1047

ocessing challenge – are unique encounters.
his period.
CLP_AR_002438
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 101 of 1047

Quote: Today’s encounter totals are, in fact, the highest ever observed, both absolutely and when measured as unique crossers.
Footnote: Concrete data on unique versus repeat encounters are only available since 2010. During that period, for the years prior to the implementation of Title 42 expulsions, the percentage of encounters that were unique increased each ye
Filters: (???)
Year
Unique Encounters Repeat Encounters Total Encounters Unique percent
2000
1,566,000

NA
1,566,000

NA
2001
1,231,000

NA
1,231,000

NA
2002
930,000

NA
930,000

NA
2003
907,000

NA
907,000

NA
2004
1,140,000

NA
1,140,000

NA
2005
1,171,000

NA
1,171,000

NA
2006
1,072,000

NA
1,072,000

NA
2007
859,000

NA
859,000

NA
2008
705,000

NA
705,000

NA
2009
541,000

NA
541,000

NA
2010
283,000

165,000

448,000

63%
2011
223,000

105,000

328,000

68%
2012
264,000

93,000

357,000

74%
2013
311,000

104,000

415,000

75%
2014
378,000

101,000

479,000

79%
2015
259,000

73,000

332,000

78%
2016
336,000

73,000

409,000

82%
2017
254,000

50,000

304,000

84%
2018
337,000

59,000

396,000

85%
2019
774,000

78,000

852,000

91%
2020
257,000

143,000

400,000

64%
2021
1,079,000

581,000

1,660,000

65%
2022
1,630,000

577,000

2,207,000

74%
CLP_AR_002439
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 102 of 1047

ear from 2010 – 2019. OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023. While specific data on numbers of unique encounters are not available prior to 2010, it is widely accepted that in the years before the 2010, and particularl
CLP_AR_002440
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 103 of 1047

ly in the years before 2000, were characterized by much larger numbers of repeat encounters, as most encounters were of Mexican nationals who were permitted to return to Mexico without being subject to formal removal proceedings or other enforc
CLP_AR_002441
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 104 of 1047

cement consequences. Also see FY 2021 Border Security Metrics Report, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration‐statistics/border‐security/border‐security‐metrics‐report. Also see DHS, FY 2021 Border Security Metrics Report (Apr. 27, 2022), available at htt
CLP_AR_002442
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 105 of 1047

tps://www.dhs.gov/immigration‐statistics/bor
CLP_AR_002443
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 106 of 1047

Quote: As recently as the 2000s, unauthorized migration to the SWB consisted almost entirely of single adults from Mexico.
Footnote: According to historic OIS Yearbooks of Immigration Statistics, Mexican nationals accounted for 97 percent of all administrative arrests by the legacy Immigration and Nationality Service from 1981‐1999. According to OIS Production data
Quote: Families and UCs accounted for increasing shares of unauthorized migrants in the 2010s, as did migrants from Nothern Central America; and “extra‐regional” migrants have driven increased flows in the 2020s, accounting for an absolute m
Footnote: Families and unaccompanied children accounted for an estimated 11 percent of SWB encounters in 2013, rising to 62 percent in 2019, and have averaged 30 percent in 2020 – March 2023. Data on unaccompanied children were first co
Filter: Apprehensions data for 1981 ‐ 1999 include nationwide adminstrative immigration arrests of persons present in the United States without no record of a lawful entry, the large majority of which occured at the southwest border.
Apprehensi
ons of EWIs:
Mexican
nationals
Apprehensi
ons of EWIs:
total
Mx% total
FY
Mexico
Grand TotaMx% total
FY
Mexico
N. Central
America
Extra‐
Regional
Total
Mx % of
Total
Extra‐
regional
% of total
FY
AM
FM
1981
894,771

898,550

100%
2000
1540683
1566421
98%
2013
317562
140442
31608
489612
65%
6%
2013
12934
1982
870,806

902,463

96%
2001
1201510
1231412
98%
2014
285502
248063
36483
570048
50%
6%
2014
67040
1983
1,157,948

1,190,198

97%
2002
902042
930341
97%
2015
253660
142341
48855
444856
57%
11%
2015
39834
1984
1,159,101

1,196,353

97%
2003
867256
906734
96%
2016
256083
227458
75450
558991
46%
13%
2016
103053
1985
1,291,734

1,300,691

99%
2004
1074330
1140247
94%
2017
181519
187539
46141
415199
44%
11%
2017
104987
1986
1,661,997

1,720,321

97%
2005
1103162
1269230
87%
2018
221711
258413
39820
519944
43%
8%
2018
1320
160827
1987
1,133,092

1,166,983

97%
2006
1058026
1168309
91%
2019
237067
623569
116593
977229
24%
12%
2019
948
526975
1988
943,147

985,479

96%
2007
882216
954396
92%
2020
297692
106760
53614
458066
65%
12%
2020
688
70990
1989
914,516

922,443

99%
2008
727494
792409
92%
2021
655591
701049
378043
1734683
38%
22%
2021
2108
479716
1990
1,080,699

1,131,454

96%
2009
565248
619113
91%
2022
808340
541618
1028987
2378945
34%
43%
2022
2963
560630
1991
1,120,099

1,161,495

96%
2010
467461
527413
89%
2023
371742
186824
600873
1159439
32%
52%
1992
1,193,455

1,225,993

97%
2011
344013
401058
86%
Note: Data on accompanied mino
1993
1,258,009

1,294,256

97%
2012
316890
426105
74%
Source: OIS Persist
1994
1,029,039

1,064,068

97%
1995
1,330,017

1,365,171

97%
1996
1,586,492

1,620,033

98%
1997
1,463,573

1,499,267

98%
1998
1,598,903

1,627,748

98%
1999
1,614,492

1,654,011

98%
Source: OIS Yearbook of Immigration Statistics,
Source: OIS Production Data
Source: OIS Persist
CLP_AR_002444
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 107 of 1047

a, Mexican nationals, also accounted for 97 percent of SWB encounters from 2000‐2003. Mexico’s share of SWB border encounters fell to 94 percent in 2004, an all‐time low, then averaged 91 percent for the remainder of the 2000s. OIS analysis of OIS Y
majority of encounters in FY 2023 YTD
ollected in 2008 and data on other family statuses were first collected in 2013, but not universally collected until 2016. Mexican nationals accounted for an average of 57 percent of SWB encounters from 2013‐2015, fell to an all‐time low of 24 percent in
SA
UC
UNK
Grand TotaSA% of tot SA+ UNK %FM+UC% of Total
359643
41177
75858
489612
73%
89%
11%
341482
72755
88771
570048
60%
75%
25%
251505
44123
109394
444856
57%
81%
19%
327864
66362
61712
558991
59%
70%
30%
257901
48618
3693
415199
62%
63%
37%
299157
58234
406
519944
58%
58%
42%
368306
80634
366
977229
38%
38%
62%
353003
33233
152
458066
77%
77%
23%
1105683
146925
251
1734683
64%
64%
36%
1662477
152057
818
2378945
70%
70%
30%
ors are unavailable prior to 2018; data on family unit individuals are unavailable prior to 2013. CBP assumes all unknown family statuses are single adults.
CLP_AR_002445
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 108 of 1047

Yearbook on Immigration Statistics, 1981‐1999; OIS Production Data, 2000‐2009.
n 2019 (when Northern Central Americans accounted for 64 percent of the total), and have averaged 35 percent of encounters from 2021 through March 2023. Extra regional nationals accounted for an average of 9 percent of SWB encounters from 2013
CLP_AR_002446
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 109 of 1047

3‐2018, 12 percent from 2019‐2020, and account for 52 percent in the first six months of FY 2023. OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
CLP_AR_002447
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 110 of 1047

Quote: However, the U.S. immigration system has experienced extreme strain with a dramatic increase of noncitizens attempting to cross the SWB in between POEs without authorization, reaching an all‐time high of 2.2 million encounters in Fisc
Footnote: OIS Analysis of historic USBP data.
Filter: SWB, USBP
USBP SWB Encounters (Yearbook)
1960
21,022

1961
21,745

average FY1983‐2006
1,190,461

1962
21,103

average FY2011‐2018
377,364

1963
29,644

Factor increase from 2017‐2019
2.80
1964
32,519

Factor increase from 2019‐2021
1.95
1965
40,020

Factor increase from 2021‐22
1.33
1966
62,640

2022 all time high
2,206,437

1967
73,973

1968
96,641

1969
137,968

1970
201,780

1971
263,991

1972
321,326

1973
441,066

1974
571,606

1975
512,264

1976
607,499

1977
733,193

1978
789,441

1979
795,798

1980
690,554

1981
749,808

1982
745,820

1983
1,033,974

1984
1,058,276

1985
1,183,351

1986
1,615,844

1987
1,122,067

1988
942,561

1989
852,506

1990
1,049,321

1991
1,077,876

1992
1,145,574

1993
1,212,886

1994
979,101

1995
1,271,390

1996
1,507,020

1997
1,368,707

1998
1,516,680

1999
1,537,000

2000
1,643,679

2001
1,235,718

CLP_AR_002448
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 111 of 1047

2002
929,809

2003
905,065

2004
1,139,282

2005
1,171,396

2006
1,071,972

2007
858,638

2008
705,005

2009
540,865

2010
447,731

2011
327,577

2012
356,873

2013
414,397

2014
479,370

2015
331,333

2016
408,870

2017
303,916

2018
396,579

2019
851,508

2020
400,635

2021
1,659,206

2022
2,206,437

CLP_AR_002449
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 112 of 1047

cal Year (“FY”) 2022
CLP_AR_002450
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 113 of 1047

The Departments believe that without a meaningful policy change, border encounters could dramatically rise to as high as 11,000 a day after the Title 42 public health Order is lifted
DHS SWB Encounter Planning Model generated April 184, 2023. DHS SWB Encounter Planning Model generated January 6, 2023.
FOUO
Blended Projections, Totals
Assumptions:
Title 42, CHNV returns to Mexico, and CHNV paroles end May 11. NPRM not implemented.
Projection Type:
23‐Apr
23‐May
23‐Jun
23‐Jul
23‐Aug
23‐Sep Total
Total
Projection
5,392
6,768
7,527
6,878
7,119
7,712
6,900
Moderately High
6,817
8,147
8,953
8,257
8,499
9,137
8,301
Moderately Low
4,098
5,407
6,130
5,511
5,750
6,423
5,553
High
8,186
9,471
10,321
9,581
9,823
10,505
9,647
Low
3,208
4,174
4,824
4,252
4,494
5,203
4,358
FM
Projection
1,145
2,089
2,787
2,244
2,326
2,466
2,177
Moderately High
1,826
2,748
3,468
2,903
2,985
3,147
2,847
Moderately Low
584
1,449
2,127
1,598
1,670
1,921
1,558
High
2,480
3,381
4,122
3,536
3,618
3,801
3,490
Low
266
893
1,522
1,019
1,099
1,408
1,034
SA
Projection
3,814
4,243
4,233
4,182
4,335
4,769
4,263
Moderately High
4,521
4,927
4,940
4,866
5,020
5,476
4,958
Moderately Low
3,118
3,559
3,532
3,498
3,658
4,062
3,571
High
5,200
5,584
5,619
5,523
5,677
6,155
5,626
Low
2,578
2,916
2,867
2,852
3,007
3,391
2,935
UC
Projection
433
436
507
452
458
476
460
Moderately High
470
472
545
488
493
513
497
Moderately Low
397
400
470
416
422
439
424
High
506
506
580
522
528
549
532
Low
363
366
435
382
387
404
389
HHS Referrals
Projection
326
338
397
352
347
356
353
Moderately High
356
367
427
381
376
387
382
Moderately Low
297
309
367
323
318
327
324
High
459
435
488
424
444
450
450
Low
270
282
339
295
291
299
296
Planning. All projections are for planning purposes, showing what OIS estimates may happen under these assumptions. Effects of these policy assumptions are also based on best available information.
Operational confidence intervals (not assuming growing uncertainty over time) are used to quantify model uncertainty.
Users should not treat these results as a precise statement of what will happen.
CLP_AR_002451
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 114 of 1047

Quote: In March 2023, for example, 26 percent of encounters at the SWB involved individuals who had at least one prior encounter during the previous 12 months, compared to an average 1‐year re‐encounter rate of 14 percent for FYs 2014–201
Footnote: Including CBP enforcement encounters at or between ports of entry. OIS Persist based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: SWB; Enforcment Encoutners
CBP
Date
T42 Repea T42 Uniqu T42 Total T8 Repeat T8 Unique T8 Total
Total RepeTotal
T42 RecidivT8 RecidiviTotal RecidAverage revidivism pre‐T42
10%
10%
12%
Oct‐17
4365
28635
33000
4365
33000
13%
13% Average recidivism post‐T42
27%
31%
Nov‐17
4302
32914
37216
4302
37216
12%
12% Average recidivism T42
46%
46%
Dec‐17
4131
34572
38703
4131
38703
11%
11% Average recidvidism T8
12%
12%
Jan‐18
4373
29462
33835
4373
33835
13%
13%
pre‐T42
12%
12%
Feb‐18
4718
30270
34988
4718
34988
13%
13%
post‐42
12%
11%
Mar‐18
6238
42265
48503
6238
48503
13%
13%
Apr‐18
6524
42860
49384
6524
49384
13%
13%
T42 Repeat T42 Unique T42 Total
May‐18
5642
44580
50222
5642
50222
11%
11% TOTAL
1,284,837

1,493,708

2,778,545

% Repeat o
Jun‐18
4480
37125
41605
4480
41605
11%
11% TOTAL 2022
497,151

582,356

1,079,507

46%
Jul‐18
4239
33678
37917
4239
37917
11%
11%
Aug‐18
4965
39587
44552
4965
44552
11%
11% T8 2022
64,562

1,197,430

1,261,992

5%
Sep‐18
4976
43483
48459
4976
48459
10%
10%
Oct‐18
5590
53333
58923
5590
58923
9%
9%
Nov‐18
4835
55782
60617
4835
60617
8%
8%
Dec‐18
3894
55182
59076
3894
59076
7%
7%
Recid rate 2014‐19
14%
Jan‐19
4360
52144
56504
4360
56504
8%
8%
Feb‐19
5455
69455
74910
5455
74910
7%
7%
Repeat
Unique
Total
Recid Rate
Mar‐19
6766
95221
101987
6766
101987
7%
7%
2013
108707
368752
477459 0.227678
Apr‐19
7141
100546
107687
7141
107687
7%
7%
2014
104975
439692
544667 0.192732
May‐19
8490
133956
142446
8490
142446
6%
6%
2015
75788
327685
403473 0.187839
Jun‐19
7444
95548
102992
7444
102992
7%
7%
2016
74538
430548
505086 0.147575
Jul‐19
6280
74101
80381
6280
80381
8%
8%
2017
51869
333323
385192 0.134658
Aug‐19
7057
54011
61068
7057
61068
12%
12%
2018
58953
439431
498384 0.118288
Sep‐19
7671
43147
50818
7671
50818
15%
15%
2019
74983
882426
957409 0.078319
Oct‐19
8242
35373
43615
8242
43615
19%
19%
2020
143366
305851
449217 0.319146
Nov‐19
7799
33410
41209
7799
41209
19%
19%
2021
567552
1159395
1726947 0.328645
Dec‐19
7480
31812
39292
7480
39292
19%
19%
2022
561713
1779786
2341499 0.239895
Jan‐20
7643
27885
35528
7643
35528
22%
22%
2023
219848
932316
1152164 0.190813
Feb‐20
7571
28007
35578
7571
35578
21%
21%
Mar‐20
2287
4863
7150
5701
20867
26568
7988
33718
32%
21%
24%
Apr‐20
7188
8334
15522
271
1201
1472
7459
16994
46%
18%
44%
May‐20
9971
10924
20895
418
1685
2103
10389
22998
48%
20%
45%
Jun‐20
13280
16529
29809
736
2176
2912
14016
32721
45%
25%
43%
Jul‐20
16837
20054
36891
1008
2746
3754
17845
40645
46%
27%
44%
Aug‐20
20705
23741
44446
1565
3626
5191
22270
49637
47%
30%
45%
Sep‐20
22680
27381
50061
1984
5237
7221
24664
57282
45%
27%
43%
Oct‐20
29813
35079
64892
1837
4804
6641
31650
71533
46%
28%
44%
Nov‐20
31315
31915
63230
2005
6499
8504
33320
71734
50%
24%
46%
Dec‐20
33240
29102
62342
2895
8365
11260
36135
73602
53%
26%
49%
Jan‐21
32775
31529
64304
2623
10918
13541
35398
77845
51%
19%
45%
Feb‐21
35851
38414
74265
3494
22648
26142
39345
100407
48%
13%
39%
CLP_AR_002452
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 115 of 1047

Mar‐21
47923
61326
109249
5126
58263
63389
53049
172638
44%
8%
31%
Apr‐21
52053
60537
112590
5090
60431
65521
57143
178111
46%
8%
32%
May‐21
59210
54182
113392
5941
60571
66512
65151
179904
52%
9%
36%
Jun‐21
55828
49100
104928
6209
77149
83358
62037
188286
53%
7%
33%
Jul‐21
49869
46383
96252
6223
110248
116471
56092
212723
52%
5%
26%
Aug‐21
43967
51440
95407
6213
107363
113576
50180
208983
46%
5%
24%
Sep‐21
44518
58155
102673
3534
84974
88508
48052
191181
43%
4%
25%
Oct‐21
42831
51692
94523
3298
66138
69436
46129
163959
45%
5%
28%
Nov‐21
40510
49677
90187
3028
80420
83448
43538
173635
45%
4%
25%
Dec‐21
37681
44472
82153
3428
92450
95878
41109
178031
46%
4%
23%
Jan‐22
37629
42086
79715
2735
71214
73949
40364
153664
47%
4%
26%
Feb‐22
45103
48050
93153
3363
68331
71694
48466
164847
48%
5%
29%
Mar‐22
54073
58008
112081
5178
101330
106508
59251
218589
48%
5%
27%
Apr‐22
48621
51953
100574
7939
106016
113955
56560
214529
48%
7%
26%
May‐22
46699
59075
105774
9814
124183
133997
56513
239771
44%
7%
24%
Jun‐22
42133
52547
94680
6590
105354
111944
48723
206624
45%
6%
24%
Jul‐22
34028
43678
77706
6283
114916
121199
40311
198905
44%
5%
20%
Aug‐22
34137
40572
74709
6729
121389
128118
40866
202827
46%
5%
20%
Sep‐22
33706
40546
74252
6177
145689
151866
39883
226118
45%
4%
18%
Oct‐22
33194
46871
80065
6866
140530
147396
40060
227461
41%
5%
18%
Nov‐22
27667
41380
69047
6732
154066
160798
34399
229845
40%
4%
15%
Dec‐22
20127
31744
51871
9625
185888
195513
29752
247384
39%
5%
12%
Jan‐23
26827
39312
66139
7438
71558
78996
34265
145135
41%
9%
24%
Feb‐23
32697
43259
75956
4717
53810
58527
37414
134483
43%
8%
28%
Mar‐23
37864
49798
87662
6094
74100
80194
43958
167856
43%
8%
26%
Note: Exludes administrative encounters. SWB only.
Source: OIS Persist march 2023
CLP_AR_002453
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 116 of 1047

19.
of total 42 in FY22
e
CLP_AR_002454
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 117 of 1047

Quote: Overall, since the start of the pandemic and the initiation of Title 42 expulsions, 39 percent of all Title 42 expulsions have been followed by a re‐encounter of the same individual within 30 days versus a 9 percent 30‐day re‐encounter rate f
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Enforcement Lifecycle based on data through December 31, 2022.
Quote: While a portion of the overall gap between Title 42 and Title 8 re‐encounter rates is likely explained by the fact that many Title 42 expulsions are to Mexico and almost all Title 8 repatriations are to individuals’ countries of citizenship, it is n
Footnote: For Mexican nationals, since the start of the pandemic, the 30‐day re‐encounter rates are 44 percent for Title 42 expulsions versus 15 percent for Title 8 repatriations, and the 12‐month re‐encounter rates are 55 percent for Title 42 exp
Filter: FY 2023 includes data through March 31. Table exc ludes administartive encounters by OFO (most OFO parolees and persons permitted to withdraw applications for admission without prejudice, a total of 2.7 percent of SWB encounters dur
One‐Year Re‐Encounter Rates by Title Authority of Initial Repatriation
One‐Year Re‐Encount
Repatriation Month Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
Repatriation Month
Mar‐20
3,957

3,213

7,170

45%
24,641

7,189

31,830

23%
Mar‐20
Apr‐20
7,529

8,015

15,544

52%
8,780

1,872

10,652

18%
Apr‐20
May‐20
9,494

11,465

20,959

55%
7,599

1,420

9,019

16%
May‐20
Jun‐20
14,192

15,745

29,937

53%
7,581

1,361

8,942

15%
Jun‐20
Jul‐20
17,261

19,897

37,158

54%
8,188

1,589

9,777

16%
Jul‐20
Aug‐20
20,520

24,553

45,073

54%
8,836

1,758

10,594

17%
Aug‐20
Sep‐20
24,030

26,899

50,929

53%
9,323

1,758

11,081

16%
Sep‐20
Oct‐20
30,705

35,091

65,796

53%
12,387

2,631

15,018

18%
Oct‐20
Nov‐20
28,880

34,927

63,807

55%
8,855

2,306

11,161

21%
Nov‐20
Dec‐20
27,453

35,665

63,118

57%
8,865

2,867

11,732

24%
Dec‐20
Jan‐21
28,962

35,819

64,781

55%
9,137

2,875

12,012

24%
Jan‐21
Feb‐21
35,164

39,400

74,564

53%
6,898

2,093

8,991

23%
Feb‐21
Mar‐21
54,254

55,367

109,621

51%
8,461

2,355

10,816

22%
Mar‐21
Apr‐21
54,737

58,161

112,898

52%
8,069

2,343

10,412

23%
Apr‐21
May‐21
51,641

62,144

113,785

55%
8,423

2,469

10,892

23%
May‐21
Jun‐21
48,594

56,860

105,454

54%
8,654

2,251

10,905

21%
Jun‐21
Jul‐21
47,775

49,246

97,021

51%
9,133

2,151

11,284

19%
Jul‐21
Aug‐21
50,063

46,499

96,562

48%
8,981

2,162

11,143

19%
Aug‐21
Sep‐21
57,931

45,736

103,667

44%
8,282

2,063

10,345

20%
Sep‐21
Oct‐21
50,484

44,967

95,451

47%
10,392

2,472

12,864

19%
Oct‐21
Nov‐21
48,886

42,100

90,986

46%
10,591

2,330

12,921

18%
Nov‐21
Dec‐21
44,139

39,225

83,364

47%
9,922

2,198

12,120

18%
Dec‐21
Jan‐22
39,682

41,196

80,878

51%
9,631

2,347

11,978

20%
Jan‐22
Total
796,333

832,190

1,628,523

51%
221,629

54,860

276,489

20%
Total
T42
T8
CLP_AR_002455
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 118 of 1047

for Title 8 repatriations. Similarly, the 12‐month re‐encounter rates are 51 percent for Title 42 expulsions versus 20 percent for Title 8 repatriations
notable that a large gap between Title 42 and Title 8 re‐encounter rates is also observed in the case of Mexican naionals, all of whom are repatriated to Mexico
ulsions versus 26 percent for Title 8 repatriations. OIS analysis of OIS Enforcement Lifecycle based on data through December 31, 2022.
ring this period.
ter Rates by Title Authority of Initial Repatriation, Mexican Nationals
30‐Day Re‐Encounter Rates by Title Authority of Initial Repatr
Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
Repatriation Month Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered
2277
2401
4,678

51%
15442
6027
21,469

28%
Mar‐20
5,107

2,063

5000
6183
11,183

55%
5702
1373
7,075

19%
Apr‐20
9,865

5,679

7641
9815
17,456

56%
4778
1067
5,845

18%
May‐20
12,285

8,674

11804
13549
25,353

53%
4697
1031
5,728

18%
Jun‐20
18,159

11,778

13339
16376
29,715

55%
4852
1135
5,987

19%
Jul‐20
22,136

15,022

14728
19177
33,905

57%
5273
1223
6,496

19%
Aug‐20
26,294

18,779

16067
19584
35,651

55%
5117
1222
6,339

19%
Sep‐20
30,631

20,298

19330
24294
43,624

56%
6146
1652
7,798

21%
Oct‐20
38,839

26,957

17805
22413
40,218

56%
5204
1867
7,071

26%
Nov‐20
36,628

27,179

14989
19656
34,645

57%
5417
2451
7,868

31%
Dec‐20
35,553

27,565

15396
20464
35,860

57%
5157
2276
7,433

31%
Jan‐21
35,977

28,804

17279
22388
39,667

56%
3963
1774
5,737

31%
Feb‐21
42,885

31,679

24558
32099
56,657

57%
4751
1943
6,694

29%
Mar‐21
65,041

44,580

25797
33416
59,213

56%
4664
1970
6,634

30%
Apr‐21
65,149

47,749

27213
35918
63,131

57%
4773
2050
6,823

30%
May‐21
62,305

51,480

24527
32178
56,705

57%
4665
1891
6,556

29%
Jun‐21
58,183

47,271

22548
28465
51,013

56%
4546
1681
6,227

27%
Jul‐21
56,108

40,913

21307
26623
47,930

56%
4500
1714
6,214

28%
Aug‐21
58,341

38,221

24723
29425
54,148

54%
4308
1658
5,966

28%
Sep‐21
66,314

37,353

28114
32131
60,245

53%
5123
1927
7,050

27%
Oct‐21
59,655

35,796

27325
29879
57,204

52%
4909
1758
6,667

26%
Nov‐21
57,375

33,611

20758
24612
45,370

54%
4487
1640
6,127

27%
Dec‐21
52,352

31,012

23531
30176
53,707

56%
4845
1882
6,727

28%
Jan‐22
47,118

33,760

426,056

531,222

957,278

55%
123,319

43,212

166,531

26%
Feb‐22
54,532

39,936

T42
T8
T4
CLP_AR_002456
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 119 of 1047

riation
30‐Day Re‐Encounter Rates by Title Authority of Initial Repatriation, Mexican Nationals
Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
Repatriation Month Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
7,170

29%
29,142

2,688

31,830

8%
Mar‐20
2,992

1,686

4,678

36%
15,544

37%
10,295

357

10,652

3%
Apr‐20
6,639

4,544

11,183

41%
20,959

41%
8,697

322

9,019

4%
May‐20
9,894

7,562

17,456

43%
29,937

39%
8,599

343

8,942

4%
Jun‐20
15,091

10,262

25,353

40%
37,158

40%
9,367

410

9,777

4%
Jul‐20
17,043

12,672

29,715

43%
45,073

42%
10,142

452

10,594

4%
Aug‐20
18,875

15,030

33,905

44%
50,929

40%
10,588

493

11,081

4%
Sep‐20
20,474

15,177

35,651

43%
65,796

41%
14,353

665

15,018

4%
Oct‐20
24,538

19,086

43,624

44%
63,807

43%
10,287

874

11,161

8%
Nov‐20
22,851

17,367

40,218

43%
63,118

44%
10,560

1,172

11,732

10%
Dec‐20
19,951

14,694

34,645

42%
64,781

44%
10,830

1,182

12,012

10%
Jan‐21
19,886

15,974

35,860

45%
74,564

42%
7,970

1,021

8,991

11%
Feb‐21
21,730

17,937

39,667

45%
109,621

41%
9,683

1,133

10,816

10%
Mar‐21
30,582

26,075

56,657

46%
112,898

42%
9,225

1,187

10,412

11%
Apr‐21
31,926

27,287

59,213

46%
113,785

45%
9,681

1,211

10,892

11%
May‐21
34,212

28,919

63,131

46%
105,454

45%
9,829

1,076

10,905

10%
Jun‐21
30,712

25,993

56,705

46%
97,021

42%
10,307

977

11,284

9%
Jul‐21
27,865

23,148

51,013

45%
96,562

40%
10,100

1,043

11,143

9%
Aug‐21
26,122

21,808

47,930

45%
103,667

36%
9,395

950

10,345

9%
Sep‐21
29,802

24,346

54,148

45%
95,451

38%
11,756

1,108

12,864

9%
Oct‐21
33,953

26,292

60,245

44%
90,986

37%
11,929

992

12,921

8%
Nov‐21
32,619

24,585

57,204

43%
83,364

37%
11,230

890

12,120

7%
Dec‐21
25,822

19,548

45,370

43%
80,878

42%
10,782

1,196

11,978

10%
Jan‐22
28,357

25,350

53,707

47%
94,468

42%
12,259

1,391

13,650

10%
Feb‐22
33,878

30,350

64,228

47%
T42
42
T8
CLP_AR_002457
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 120 of 1047

Not Re‐encountered Re‐encountered Total Repatriations
% of Repatriations
Re‐encountered
18,846

2,623

21,469

12%
6,734

341

7,075

5%
5,549

296

5,845

5%
5,405

323

5,728

6%
5,622

365

5,987

6%
6,080

416

6,496

6%
5,901

438

6,339

7%
7,218

580

7,798

7%
6,252

819

7,071

12%
6,742

1,126

7,868

14%
6,316

1,117

7,433

15%
4,759

978

5,737

17%
5,646

1,048

6,694

16%
5,532

1,102

6,634

17%
5,706

1,117

6,823

16%
5,547

1,009

6,556

15%
5,344

883

6,227

14%
5,269

945

6,214

15%
5,078

888

5,966

15%
6,018

1,032

7,050

15%
5,766

901

6,667

14%
5,336

791

6,127

13%
5,653

1,074

6,727

16%
6,304

1,283

7,587

17%
T8
CLP_AR_002458
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 121 of 1047

Quote: However, as noted in the NPRM, encounters of non‐Mexican nationals at the SWB in between POEs have reached a 10‐year high of 1.5 million in FY 2022, driven by smuggling networks that enable and exploit this unprecedented moveme
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: SWB; USBP
USBP SWB Encounters (persist)
Mexico
NTriangle Other
Non‐Mex
Grand Total
2013
265,409

137,548

11,440

148,988

414,397

2014
226,770

237,860

14,740

252,600

479,370

2015
186,017

133,528

11,788

145,316

331,333

2016
190,760

199,401

18,709

218,110

408,870

2017
127,938

162,891

13,087

175,978

303,916

2018
152,257

223,604

20,718

244,322

396,579

2019
166,458

607,774

77,276

685,050

851,508

2020
253,104

103,816

43,715

147,531

400,635

2021
608,037

683,894

367,275

1,051,169

1,659,206

2022
738,781

520,602

947,054

1,467,656

2,206,437

CLP_AR_002459
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 122 of 1047

ent of people.
CLP_AR_002460
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 123 of 1047

Quote: Indeed, most noncitizens who receive a positive credible fear determination will be able to live and work in the United States for the duration of their removal proceedings—which, on average, take almost 4 years.
Footnote: OIS analysis of DOJ EOIR data based on data through March 31, 2023.
Median years (2022):
3.70
comp_FY
N Obs
Mean
Median
Median
Years
N Obs
Mean
Median
Median
Years
2000 66,939
42
13 0.04 17,055
105
87 0.24
2001 97,395
109
28 0.08 28,132
177
145 0.40
2002 115,984
172
46 0.13 30,214
209
163 0.45
2003 140,238
211
50 0.14 29,843
195
120 0.33
2004 142,799
252
52 0.14 40,400
157
92 0.25
2005 149,545
283
43 0.12 92,538
114
67 0.18
2006 160,378
308
50 0.14 93,956
134
79 0.22
2007 179,931
283
36 0.10 28,938
268
171 0.47
2008 190,483
264
22 0.06 23,527
324
172 0.47
2009 197,954
267
26 0.07 19,480
319
143 0.39
2010 189,025
351
48 0.13 20,882
320
174 0.48
2011 187,304
389
61 0.17 18,549
377
249 0.68
2012 166,071
504
145 0.40 16,389
443
301 0.82
2013 142,194
671
392 1.07 17,975
464
323 0.88
2014 125,665
710
423 1.16 22,033
390
258 0.71
2015 122,721
791
518 1.42 32,614
347
210 0.58
2016 133,188
868
594 1.63 29,992
494
332 0.91
2017 129,902
795
426 1.17 37,232
535
299 0.82
2018 143,266
837
466 1.28 41,844
650
410 1.12
2019 172,989
835
392 1.07 82,754
459
231 0.63
2020 136,958
834
358 0.98 82,043
306
157 0.43
2021 110,598 1,463 1,244 3.41 7,602
930
720 1.97
2022 284,075 1,608 1,351 3.70 58,928
749
559 1.53
2023 178,733 1,369 1,245 3.41 71,639
789
494 1.35
ABSENTIA=No
ABSENTIA=Yes
CLP_AR_002461
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 124 of 1047

Quote: Finally, the unprecedented migratory flow of non‐Mexican migrants, who are far more likely to apply for protection, has contributed to a growing backlog of cases awaiting review by AOs and IJs
Footnote: For noncitizens encountered at the SWB in FYs 2014‐FY 2019 who were placed in expedited removal, 6 percent of Mexican nationals made fear claims that were referred to USCIS for adjudication compared to 57 percent of people from North
Filter:
CLP_AR_002462
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 125 of 1047

hern Central America and 90 percent of all other nationalities. OIS analysis of Enforcement Lifecycle data as of December 31, 2022.
CLP_AR_002463
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 126 of 1047

Quote: DHS was encountering an average of approximately 8,800 noncitizens per day during the first ten days of December 2022—a new record—and expects that encounter numbers could increase to 11,000 per day following the termination
Footnote: See DHS Post‐Title 42 Planning Model generated April 18, 2023; see also OIS analysis of CBP UIP data downloaded January 13, 2023.
Filter: SWB; all CBP
CBP Enc
daily average first 10 weeks:
8,839

12/1/2022
8,541

FOUO
12/2/2022
9,671

Blended Projections, Totals
12/3/2022
7,962

AssumptioTitle 42, CHNV returns to Mexico, and CHNV paroles end May 11. NPRM not implemented.
12/4/2022
7,977

12/5/2022
8,367

Projection
12/6/2022
8,422

12/7/2022
9,352

12/8/2022
9,419

12/9/2022
9,520

12/10/2022
9,156

23‐Apr
23‐May
23‐Jun
23‐Jul
23‐Aug
23‐Sep Total
12/11/2022
8,874

Total
12/12/2022
8,810

Projection
5,392
6,768
7,527
6,878
7,119
7,712
6,900
12/13/2022
9,093

Moderatel
6,817
8,147
8,953
8,257
8,499
9,137
8,301
12/14/2022
9,319

Moderatel
4,098
5,407
6,130
5,511
5,750
6,423
5,553
12/15/2022
9,137

High
8,186
9,471
10,321
9,581
9,823
10,505
9,647
12/16/2022
7,861

Low
3,208
4,174
4,824
4,252
4,494
5,203
4,358
12/17/2022
7,895

FM
12/18/2022
7,788

Projection
1,145
2,089
2,787
2,244
2,326
2,466
2,177
12/19/2022
8,352

Moderatel
1,826
2,748
3,468
2,903
2,985
3,147
2,847
12/20/2022
9,564

Moderatel
584
1,449
2,127
1,598
1,670
1,921
1,558
12/21/2022
9,469

High
2,480
3,381
4,122
3,536
3,618
3,801
3,490
12/22/2022
9,102

Low
266
893
1,522
1,019
1,099
1,408
1,034
12/23/2022
8,330

SA
12/24/2022
7,130

Projection
3,814
4,243
4,233
4,182
4,335
4,769
4,263
12/25/2022
4,381

Moderatel
4,521
4,927
4,940
4,866
5,020
5,476
4,958
12/26/2022
5,911

Moderatel
3,118
3,559
3,532
3,498
3,658
4,062
3,571
12/27/2022
7,137

High
5,200
5,584
5,619
5,523
5,677
6,155
5,626
12/28/2022
6,955

Low
2,578
2,916
2,867
2,852
3,007
3,391
2,935
12/29/2022
6,497

UC
12/30/2022
5,745

Projection
433
436
507
452
458
476
460
12/31/2022
6,275

Moderatel
470
472
545
488
493
513
497
Moderatel
397
400
470
416
422
439
424
High
506
506
580
522
528
549
532
Low
363
366
435
382
387
404
389
HHS Referrals
Projection
326
338
397
352
347
356
353
Moderatel
356
367
427
381
376
387
382
Moderatel
297
309
367
323
318
327
324
High
459
435
488
424
444
450
450
Low
270
282
339
295
291
299
296
Planning. All projections are for planning purposes, showing what OIS estimates may happen under these assumptions. Effects o
Operational confidence intervals (not assuming growing uncertainty over time) are used to quantify model uncertainty.
Users should not treat these results as a precise statement of what will happen.
CLP_AR_002464
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 127 of 1047

of the Title 42 public health Order.
of these policy assumptions are also based on best available information.
CLP_AR_002465
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 128 of 1047

Quote: Total migrants interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) increased by 502 percent between FY 2020 (2,079) and FY 2022 (12,521)
Footnote: OIS analysis of USCG data through March 31, 2023.
Quote: Interdictions continued to rise in FY 2023 with 8,822 migrants interdicted at sea through March, almost 70 percent of the total in FY 2022 within six months.
Footnote: Id.
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022 2023YTD
Cuba
2,090
2,736
5,221
1,465
259
381
43
827
5,740
5,427
Haiti
968
561
380
419
609
824
398
1,205
4,025
2,565
Dominica
269
257
570
519
492
920
1,201
744
1,804
560
Mexico
33
11
3
50
123
160
343
612
676
208
Venezuela
0
0
1
1
1
0
10
0
63
2
Honduras
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
32
0
Jamaica
12
13
15
16
8
25
3
16
29
5
Ecuador
0
3
23
3
57
7
2
9
18
3
Uzbekistan
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
Colombia
0
0
0
2
7
7
1
11
15
1
Other
19
32
121
37
106
104
77
82
103
51
% change 22 to 20
502%
Total
3,391
3,614
6,334
2,512
1,662
2,429
2,079
3,508
12,521
8,822
% of total, 23YTD/22
70%
CLP_AR_002466
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 129 of 1047

Quote: For instance, between the announcement of the CHN processes on January 5, 2023, and January 21, 2023, the number of daily encounters between POEs of CHN nationals dropped from 928 to 73, a 92 percent decline
Source: OIS Persist based on data through March 31, 2023.
Quote: CHN encounters between POEs continued to decline to an average of fewer than 17 per day in March 2023
Source: Id.
Jan 5 CHN
928
Jan 21 CHN
73
% change
‐92%
Daily Average CHN March 2023
16.45

USBP

Venezuela Cuba
Haiti
Nicaragua CHN Sum Non-CHNVN
Date

10/1/2022
1,240
766
7
606
1,379
4,048
6,667
10/2/2022
1,512
984
5
553
1,542
3,958
7,012
10/3/2022
1,366
965
10
421
1,396
3,987
6,749
10/4/2022
1,260
716
5
833
1,554
4,945
7,759
10/5/2022
1,139
1,039
5
700
1,744
5,240
8,123
10/6/2022
1,174
822
7
913
1,742
4,711
7,627
10/7/2022
1,083
829
2
671
1,502
4,568
7,153
10/8/2022
1,006
1,115
7
800
1,922
4,244
7,172
10/9/2022
1,202
937
0
770
1,707
3,875
6,784
########
1,224
905
8
590
1,503
3,824
6,551
########
1,128
925
9
578
1,512
4,354
6,994
########
796
1,074
1
544
1,619
4,056
6,471
########
1,256
1,006
2
642
1,650
4,360
7,266
########
1,053
936
3
697
1,636
4,017
6,706
########
834
692
4
694
1,390
3,640
5,864
########
484
640
1
633
1,274
3,530
5,288
########
298
746
7
514
1,267
4,039
5,604
########
185
613
1
487
1,101
4,636
5,922
########
156
897
4
659
1,560
4,417
6,133
########
159
911
4
564
1,479
4,797
6,435
########
132
1,027
1
795
1,823
4,583
6,538
########
145
966
2
656
1,624
4,264
6,033
########
160
1,054
4
554
1,612
4,207
5,979
########
247
830
3
480
1,313
4,261
5,821
########
296
1,089
3
758
1,850
5,094
7,240
########
415
798
1
710
1,509
4,740
6,664
########
301
1,107
3
661
1,771
4,897
6,969
########
408
1,078
1
855
1,934
4,406
6,748
########
405
1,267
1
978
2,246
4,430
7,081
########
331
1,066
10
859
1,935
3,332
5,598
########
430
1,011
3
721
1,735
3,769
5,934
11/1/2022
412
1,106
5
1,131
2,242
4,194
6,848
Country of Citizenship
CHN
CLP_AR_002467
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 130 of 1047

11/2/2022
331
1,166
3
1,210
2,379
4,561
7,271
11/3/2022
305
898
2
686
1,586
4,166
6,057
11/4/2022
348
1,154
0
983
2,137
4,380
6,865
11/5/2022
250
1,066
0
681
1,747
4,074
6,071
11/6/2022
239
1,133
3
1,506
2,642
4,032
6,913
11/7/2022
265
869
0
994
1,863
4,293
6,421
11/8/2022
263
1,068
6
1,167
2,241
4,984
7,488
11/9/2022
262
935
1
902
1,838
4,477
6,577
########
262
1,055
0
1,167
2,222
4,735
7,219
########
341
1,425
4
956
2,385
4,871
7,597
########
192
1,142
0
846
1,988
4,398
6,578
########
197
1,113
3
915
2,031
3,964
6,192
########
158
1,543
0
972
2,515
4,287
6,960
########
168
1,200
1
1,091
2,292
4,744
7,204
########
498
850
1
1,219
2,070
4,674
7,242
########
1,074
1,492
1
1,096
2,589
5,004
8,667
########
212
985
1
955
1,941
4,850
7,003
########
91
1,555
0
1,206
2,761
4,171
7,023
########
118
1,210
0
1,218
2,428
3,801
6,347
########
84
1,443
1
1,424
2,868
4,141
7,093
########
126
1,048
2
1,280
2,330
4,629
7,085
########
81
1,273
0
1,012
2,285
4,270
6,636
########
60
1,094
0
1,223
2,317
4,150
6,527
########
51
987
1
1,299
2,287
3,889
6,227
########
55
1,387
0
1,274
2,661
4,442
7,158
########
75
827
1
1,686
2,514
3,713
6,302
########
65
1,006
0
1,334
2,340
4,397
6,802
########
83
1,046
0
1,064
2,110
4,557
6,750
########
87
1,598
0
1,698
3,296
4,942
8,325
12/1/2022
102
1,275
2
1,336
2,613
4,817
7,532
12/2/2022
95
1,614
1
1,720
3,335
5,306
8,736
12/3/2022
79
1,464
0
1,426
2,890
4,150
7,119
12/4/2022
126
1,712
1
1,298
3,011
3,963
7,100
12/5/2022
120
1,320
2
1,594
2,916
4,333
7,369
12/6/2022
84
1,151
0
1,572
2,723
4,608
7,415
12/7/2022
144
1,698
1
1,809
3,508
4,738
8,390
12/8/2022
49
1,690
0
1,813
3,503
4,819
8,371
12/9/2022
88
1,944
0
1,592
3,536
4,873
8,497
########
101
1,786
1
1,758
3,545
4,535
8,181
########
161
1,487
1
1,606
3,094
4,647
7,902
########
114
1,463
2
1,699
3,164
4,533
7,811
########
157
1,459
2
1,548
3,009
4,907
8,073
########
116
1,601
0
1,555
3,156
5,009
8,281
########
145
1,547
2
1,447
2,996
4,991
8,132
########
91
1,178
0
699
1,877
4,881
6,849
########
146
1,444
0
996
2,440
4,354
6,940
########
187
1,398
2
909
2,309
4,408
6,904
CLP_AR_002468
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 131 of 1047

########
231
1,538
1
867
2,406
4,672
7,309
########
254
1,336
1
1,201
2,538
5,776
8,568
########
362
1,341
0
1,122
2,463
5,606
8,431
########
723
1,131
1
933
2,065
5,298
8,086
########
267
1,729
0
817
2,546
4,488
7,301
########
306
1,181
0
1,004
2,185
3,756
6,247
########
254
586
5
290
881
2,397
3,532
########
234
944
3
501
1,448
3,331
5,013
########
353
1,382
1
493
1,876
3,855
6,084
########
247
1,056
1
590
1,647
4,020
5,914
########
257
1,176
0
390
1,566
3,689
5,512
########
263
705
0
397
1,102
3,371
4,736
########
327
1,280
1
380
1,661
3,387
5,375
1/1/2023
309
289
3
175
467
1,980
2,756
1/2/2023
280
487
1
203
691
2,106
3,077
1/3/2023
270
795
1
250
1,046
2,606
3,922
1/4/2023
366
592
3
171
766
2,297
3,429
1/5/2023
142
591
3
334
928
2,577
3,647
1/6/2023
98
625
0
175
800
2,725
3,623
1/7/2023
77
679
2
172
853
2,813
3,743
1/8/2023
61
574
0
117
691
2,667
3,419
1/9/2023
70
450
1
124
575
2,946
3,591
1/10/2023
73
161
1
102
264
3,757
4,094
1/11/2023
56
189
5
160
354
3,930
4,340 CBP One Removed
1/12/2023
57
114
0
171
285
3,981
4,323
1/13/2023
35
80
0
155
235
4,007
4,277
1/14/2023
50
112
6
95
213
4,244
4,507
1/15/2023
41
66
0
122
188
3,612
3,841
1/16/2023
43
19
4
91
114
3,747
3,904
1/17/2023
21
42
0
122
164
4,240
4,425
1/18/2023
28
26
2
82
110
4,542
4,680
1/19/2023
22
56
0
102
158
4,201
4,381
1/20/2023
32
23
1
87
111
4,495
4,638
1/21/2023
24
29
3
41
73
4,362
4,459
1/22/2023
24
33
4
54
91
4,042
4,157
1/23/2023
20
10
2
37
49
4,443
4,512
1/24/2023
8
27
2
20
49
4,240
4,297
1/25/2023
35
17
0
29
46
4,745
4,826
1/26/2023
17
23
0
39
62
4,709
4,788
1/27/2023
11
24
0
19
43
4,952
5,006
1/28/2023
18
19
1
19
39
4,756
4,813
1/29/2023
30
15
0
22
37
4,087
4,154
1/30/2023
10
13
1
29
43
4,418
4,471
1/31/2023
16
8
1
11
20
4,800
4,836
2/1/2023
11
10
1
20
31
4,642
4,684
2/2/2023
17
4
0
20
24
4,637
4,678
2/3/2023
8
12
0
24
36
4,667
4,711
CLP_AR_002469
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 132 of 1047

2/4/2023
46
6
3
8
17
4,178
4,241
2/5/2023
32
10
1
16
27
4,009
4,068
2/6/2023
77
17
0
23
40
4,414
4,531
2/7/2023
20
4
1
18
23
5,054
5,097
2/8/2023
254
4
0
27
31
4,770
5,055
2/9/2023
327
7
0
13
20
4,821
5,168
2/10/2023
144
7
0
7
14
4,461
4,619
2/11/2023
40
4
2
5
11
4,231
4,282
2/12/2023
42
10
0
17
27
3,969
4,038
2/13/2023
24
14
0
20
34
4,630
4,688
2/14/2023
22
8
0
29
37
4,674
4,733
2/15/2023
22
4
1
8
13
4,608
4,643
2/16/2023
26
6
1
19
26
4,663
4,715
2/17/2023
21
8
1
11
20
4,708
4,749
2/18/2023
20
3
1
9
13
4,482
4,515
2/19/2023
11
1
0
17
18
4,325
4,354
2/20/2023
43
8
0
6
14
4,388
4,445
2/21/2023
30
2
5
13
20
4,633
4,683
2/22/2023
8
2
0
9
11
4,456
4,475
2/23/2023
32
1
0
17
18
4,931
4,981
2/24/2023
37
3
0
6
9
4,971
5,017
2/25/2023
21
8
0
8
16
4,760
4,797
2/26/2023
59
3
0
8
11
4,121
4,191
2/27/2023
21
3
3
13
19
4,311
4,351
2/28/2023
40
7
1
9
17
5,458
5,515
3/1/2023
17
6
0
7
13
5,429
5,459
3/2/2023
21
2
1
10
13
5,099
5,133
3/3/2023
43
4
2
10
16
5,359
5,418
3/4/2023
15
10
7
10
27
5,226
5,268
3/5/2023
42
3
5
5
13
4,925
4,980
3/6/2023
72
4
1
4
9
4,828
4,909
3/7/2023
31
8
4
6
18
6,064
6,113
3/8/2023
48
4
7
11
22
5,280
5,350
3/9/2023
40
4
5
3
12
5,310
5,362
3/10/2023
15
2
12
2
16
5,350
5,381
3/11/2023
31
0
12
1
13
5,022
5,066
3/12/2023
78
2
9
5
16
4,467
4,561
3/13/2023
66
3
3
9
15
4,594
4,675
3/14/2023
66
2
17
10
29
5,368
5,463
3/15/2023
30
3
13
3
19
5,156
5,205
3/16/2023
41
0
18
9
27
5,450
5,518
3/17/2023
21
2
8
4
14
4,772
4,807
3/18/2023
37
1
7
7
15
4,874
4,926
3/19/2023
61
5
4
2
11
4,095
4,167
3/20/2023
91
0
3
15
18
5,032
5,141
3/21/2023
68
3
1
4
8
5,433
5,509
3/22/2023
53
3
4
2
9
4,910
4,972
CLP_AR_002470
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 133 of 1047

3/23/2023
38
1
5
12
18
5,376
5,432
3/24/2023
28
5
1
8
14
5,091
5,133
3/25/2023
58
4
4
10
18
5,194
5,270
3/26/2023
108
2
1
5
8
5,013
5,129
3/27/2023
162
4
4
4
12
5,200
5,374
3/28/2023
125
1
2
5
8
5,732
5,865
3/29/2023
560
7
5
17
29
5,419
6,008
3/30/2023
1,006
14
3
13
30
4,888
5,924
3/31/2023
229
8
1
11
20
4,550
4,799
CLP_AR_002471
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 134 of 1047

Quote: For instance, as noted in the proposed rule, in the week prior to the announcement of the Venezuela parole process on October 12, 2022, encounters of Venezuelan nationals between POEs at the SWB averaged over 1,100 a day from October 5
Footnote: USBP encountered an average of 225 Venezuelans per day in November 2022 and 199 per day in December 2022. OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023. Data are limited to USBP encounters to exclude thos
Quote: The low trend continued with a daily average of 106 in March 2023.
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Quote: Between the announcement of the new processes on January 5, 2023, and January 21, the number of daily encounters between POEs of CHN nationals dropped from 928 to 73, a 92 percent decline.
Footnote: Id.
Quote: Encounters between POEs of CHN nationals continued to decline to a daily average of fewer than 17 per day in March 2023.
Footnote: Id.
Filter: SWB; beginning Jan 11, 2023 ‐ remove CBP One Appointments, USBP only
Jan 5 CHN
928
Daily Average 10/5‐10/11
1,137
Jan 21 CHN
73
Daily Average 10/18‐10/24
169
% change
‐92%
Daily Average 11/23‐11/29
67
Daily Average 1/16‐1/22
28

USBP
CHNnon-CHNV
Daily Average March 2023
106

1/1/2023
467

1,980

Venezuela Cuba
Haiti
Nicaragua CHN Sum Non-CHNVN
1/2/2023
691

2,106

Daily Average CHN March 2023
16
Date

1/3/2023
1,046

2,606

Daily Average V November 2022
225
10/1/2022
1,240
766
7
606
1,379
4,048
6,667
1/4/2023
766

2,297

Daily Average V December 2022
199
10/2/2022
1,512
984
5
553
1,542
3,958
7,012
1/5/2023
928

2,577

Daily Average V March 2023
106
10/3/2022
1,366
965
10
421
1,396
3,987
6,749
1/6/2023
800

2,725

10/4/2022
1,260
716
5
833
1,554
4,945
7,759
1/7/2023
853

2,813

10/5/2022
1,139
1,039
5
700
1,744
5,240
8,123
1/8/2023
691

2,667

10/6/2022
1,174
822
7
913
1,742
4,711
7,627
1/9/2023
575

2,946

10/7/2022
1,083
829
2
671
1,502
4,568
7,153
1/10/2023
264

3,757

10/8/2022
1,006
1,115
7
800
1,922
4,244
7,172
1/11/2023
354

3,930

10/9/2022
1,202
937
0
770
1,707
3,875
6,784
1/12/2023
285

3,981

########
1,224
905
8
590
1,503
3,824
6,551
1/13/2023
235

4,007

########
1,128
925
9
578
1,512
4,354
6,994
1/14/2023
213

4,244

########
796
1,074
1
544
1,619
4,056
6,471
1/15/2023
188

3,612

########
1,256
1,006
2
642
1,650
4,360
7,266
1/16/2023
114

3,747

########
1,053
936
3
697
1,636
4,017
6,706
1/17/2023
164

4,240

########
834
692
4
694
1,390
3,640
5,864
1/18/2023
110

4,542

########
484
640
1
633
1,274
3,530
5,288
1/19/2023
158

4,201

########
298
746
7
514
1,267
4,039
5,604
1/20/2023
111

4,495

########
185
613
1
487
1,101
4,636
5,922
1/21/2023
73

4,362

########
156
897
4
659
1,560
4,417
6,133
1/22/2023
91

4,042

########
159
911
4
564
1,479
4,797
6,435
1/23/2023
49

4,443

########
132
1,027
1
795
1,823
4,583
6,538
1/24/2023
49

4,240

########
145
966
2
656
1,624
4,264
6,033
1/25/2023
46

4,745

########
160
1,054
4
554
1,612
4,207
5,979
1/26/2023
62

4,709

########
247
830
3
480
1,313
4,261
5,821
1/27/2023
43

4,952

########
296
1,089
3
758
1,850
5,094
7,240
1/28/2023
39

4,756

########
415
798
1
710
1,509
4,740
6,664
1/29/2023
37

4,087

########
301
1,107
3
661
1,771
4,897
6,969
1/30/2023
43

4,418

########
408
1,078
1
855
1,934
4,406
6,748
########
405
1,267
1
978
2,246
4,430
7,081
Country of Citizenship
CHN
CLP_AR_002472
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 135 of 1047

########
331
1,066
10
859
1,935
3,332
5,598
########
430
1,011
3
721
1,735
3,769
5,934
11/1/2022
412
1,106
5
1,131
2,242
4,194
6,848
11/2/2022
331
1,166
3
1,210
2,379
4,561
7,271
11/3/2022
305
898
2
686
1,586
4,166
6,057
11/4/2022
348
1,154
0
983
2,137
4,380
6,865
11/5/2022
250
1,066
0
681
1,747
4,074
6,071
11/6/2022
239
1,133
3
1,506
2,642
4,032
6,913
11/7/2022
265
869
0
994
1,863
4,293
6,421
11/8/2022
263
1,068
6
1,167
2,241
4,984
7,488
11/9/2022
262
935
1
902
1,838
4,477
6,577
########
262
1,055
0
1,167
2,222
4,735
7,219
########
341
1,425
4
956
2,385
4,871
7,597
########
192
1,142
0
846
1,988
4,398
6,578
########
197
1,113
3
915
2,031
3,964
6,192
########
158
1,543
0
972
2,515
4,287
6,960
########
168
1,200
1
1,091
2,292
4,744
7,204
########
498
850
1
1,219
2,070
4,674
7,242
########
1,074
1,492
1
1,096
2,589
5,004
8,667
########
212
985
1
955
1,941
4,850
7,003
########
91
1,555
0
1,206
2,761
4,171
7,023
########
118
1,210
0
1,218
2,428
3,801
6,347
########
84
1,443
1
1,424
2,868
4,141
7,093
########
126
1,048
2
1,280
2,330
4,629
7,085
########
81
1,273
0
1,012
2,285
4,270
6,636
########
60
1,094
0
1,223
2,317
4,150
6,527
########
51
987
1
1,299
2,287
3,889
6,227
########
55
1,387
0
1,274
2,661
4,442
7,158
########
75
827
1
1,686
2,514
3,713
6,302
########
65
1,006
0
1,334
2,340
4,397
6,802
########
83
1,046
0
1,064
2,110
4,557
6,750
########
87
1,598
0
1,698
3,296
4,942
8,325
12/1/2022
102
1,275
2
1,336
2,613
4,817
7,532
12/2/2022
95
1,614
1
1,720
3,335
5,306
8,736
12/3/2022
79
1,464
0
1,426
2,890
4,150
7,119
12/4/2022
126
1,712
1
1,298
3,011
3,963
7,100
12/5/2022
120
1,320
2
1,594
2,916
4,333
7,369
12/6/2022
84
1,151
0
1,572
2,723
4,608
7,415
12/7/2022
144
1,698
1
1,809
3,508
4,738
8,390
12/8/2022
49
1,690
0
1,813
3,503
4,819
8,371
12/9/2022
88
1,944
0
1,592
3,536
4,873
8,497
########
101
1,786
1
1,758
3,545
4,535
8,181
########
161
1,487
1
1,606
3,094
4,647
7,902
########
114
1,463
2
1,699
3,164
4,533
7,811
########
157
1,459
2
1,548
3,009
4,907
8,073
########
116
1,601
0
1,555
3,156
5,009
8,281
########
145
1,547
2
1,447
2,996
4,991
8,132
CLP_AR_002473
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 136 of 1047

########
91
1,178
0
699
1,877
4,881
6,849
########
146
1,444
0
996
2,440
4,354
6,940
########
187
1,398
2
909
2,309
4,408
6,904
########
231
1,538
1
867
2,406
4,672
7,309
########
254
1,336
1
1,201
2,538
5,776
8,568
########
362
1,341
0
1,122
2,463
5,606
8,431
########
723
1,131
1
933
2,065
5,298
8,086
########
267
1,729
0
817
2,546
4,488
7,301
########
306
1,181
0
1,004
2,185
3,756
6,247
########
254
586
5
290
881
2,397
3,532
########
234
944
3
501
1,448
3,331
5,013
########
353
1,382
1
493
1,876
3,855
6,084
########
247
1,056
1
590
1,647
4,020
5,914
########
257
1,176
0
390
1,566
3,689
5,512
########
263
705
0
397
1,102
3,371
4,736
########
327
1,280
1
380
1,661
3,387
5,375
1/1/2023
309
289
3
175
467
1,980
2,756
1/2/2023
280
487
1
203
691
2,106
3,077
1/3/2023
270
795
1
250
1,046
2,606
3,922
1/4/2023
366
592
3
171
766
2,297
3,429
1/5/2023
142
591
3
334
928
2,577
3,647
1/6/2023
98
625
0
175
800
2,725
3,623
1/7/2023
77
679
2
172
853
2,813
3,743
1/8/2023
61
574
0
117
691
2,667
3,419
1/9/2023
70
450
1
124
575
2,946
3,591
1/10/2023
73
161
1
102
264
3,757
4,094
1/11/2023
56
189
5
160
354
3,930
4,340 CBP One Removed
1/12/2023
57
114
0
171
285
3,981
4,323
1/13/2023
35
80
0
155
235
4,007
4,277
1/14/2023
50
112
6
95
213
4,244
4,507
1/15/2023
41
66
0
122
188
3,612
3,841
1/16/2023
43
19
4
91
114
3,747
3,904
1/17/2023
21
42
0
122
164
4,240
4,425
1/18/2023
28
26
2
82
110
4,542
4,680
1/19/2023
22
56
0
102
158
4,201
4,381
1/20/2023
32
23
1
87
111
4,495
4,638
1/21/2023
24
29
3
41
73
4,362
4,459
1/22/2023
24
33
4
54
91
4,042
4,157
1/23/2023
20
10
2
37
49
4,443
4,512
1/24/2023
8
27
2
20
49
4,240
4,297
1/25/2023
35
17
0
29
46
4,745
4,826
1/26/2023
17
23
0
39
62
4,709
4,788
1/27/2023
11
24
0
19
43
4,952
5,006
1/28/2023
18
19
1
19
39
4,756
4,813
1/29/2023
30
15
0
22
37
4,087
4,154
1/30/2023
10
13
1
29
43
4,418
4,471
1/31/2023
16
8
1
11
20
4,800
4,836
CLP_AR_002474
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 137 of 1047

2/1/2023
11
10
1
20
31
4,642
4,684
2/2/2023
17
4
0
20
24
4,637
4,678
2/3/2023
8
12
0
24
36
4,667
4,711
2/4/2023
46
6
3
8
17
4,178
4,241
2/5/2023
32
10
1
16
27
4,009
4,068
2/6/2023
77
17
0
23
40
4,414
4,531
2/7/2023
20
4
1
18
23
5,054
5,097
2/8/2023
254
4
0
27
31
4,770
5,055
2/9/2023
327
7
0
13
20
4,821
5,168
2/10/2023
144
7
0
7
14
4,461
4,619
2/11/2023
40
4
2
5
11
4,231
4,282
2/12/2023
42
10
0
17
27
3,969
4,038
2/13/2023
24
14
0
20
34
4,630
4,688
2/14/2023
22
8
0
29
37
4,674
4,733
2/15/2023
22
4
1
8
13
4,608
4,643
2/16/2023
26
6
1
19
26
4,663
4,715
2/17/2023
21
8
1
11
20
4,708
4,749
2/18/2023
20
3
1
9
13
4,482
4,515
2/19/2023
11
1
0
17
18
4,325
4,354
2/20/2023
43
8
0
6
14
4,388
4,445
2/21/2023
30
2
5
13
20
4,633
4,683
2/22/2023
8
2
0
9
11
4,456
4,475
2/23/2023
32
1
0
17
18
4,931
4,981
2/24/2023
37
3
0
6
9
4,971
5,017
2/25/2023
21
8
0
8
16
4,760
4,797
2/26/2023
59
3
0
8
11
4,121
4,191
2/27/2023
21
3
3
13
19
4,311
4,351
2/28/2023
40
7
1
9
17
5,458
5,515
3/1/2023
17
6
0
7
13
5,429
5,459
3/2/2023
21
2
1
10
13
5,099
5,133
3/3/2023
43
4
2
10
16
5,359
5,418
3/4/2023
15
10
7
10
27
5,226
5,268
3/5/2023
42
3
5
5
13
4,925
4,980
3/6/2023
72
4
1
4
9
4,828
4,909
3/7/2023
31
8
4
6
18
6,064
6,113
3/8/2023
48
4
7
11
22
5,280
5,350
3/9/2023
40
4
5
3
12
5,310
5,362
3/10/2023
15
2
12
2
16
5,350
5,381
3/11/2023
31
0
12
1
13
5,022
5,066
3/12/2023
78
2
9
5
16
4,467
4,561
3/13/2023
66
3
3
9
15
4,594
4,675
3/14/2023
66
2
17
10
29
5,368
5,463
3/15/2023
30
3
13
3
19
5,156
5,205
3/16/2023
41
0
18
9
27
5,450
5,518
3/17/2023
21
2
8
4
14
4,772
4,807
3/18/2023
37
1
7
7
15
4,874
4,926
3/19/2023
61
5
4
2
11
4,095
4,167
CLP_AR_002475
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 138 of 1047

3/20/2023
91
0
3
15
18
5,032
5,141
3/21/2023
68
3
1
4
8
5,433
5,509
3/22/2023
53
3
4
2
9
4,910
4,972
3/23/2023
38
1
5
12
18
5,376
5,432
3/24/2023
28
5
1
8
14
5,091
5,133
3/25/2023
58
4
4
10
18
5,194
5,270
3/26/2023
108
2
1
5
8
5,013
5,129
3/27/2023
162
4
4
4
12
5,200
5,374
3/28/2023
125
1
2
5
8
5,732
5,865
3/29/2023
560
7
5
17
29
5,419
6,008
3/30/2023
1,006
14
3
13
30
4,888
5,924
3/31/2023
229
8
1
11
20
4,550
4,799
CLP_AR_002476
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 139 of 1047

5–11. About two weeks after the announcement, encounters of Venezuelan nationals averaged under 200 per day between October 18 and 24.
se being paroled in through ports of entry.
CLP_AR_002477
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 140 of 1047

Quote: Total migrants interdicted at sea by the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) increased by 502 percent between FY 2020 (2,079) and FY 2022 (12,521)
Footnote: OIS analysis of USCG data through March 31, 2023.
Quote: Interdictions continued to rise in FY 2023 with 8,822 migrants interdicted at sea through March, almost 70 percent of the total in FY 2022 within six months
Footnote: Id.
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023YTD
% increase FY2020 to 2022:
502%
Cuba
2,090
2,736
5,221
1,465
259
381
43
827
5,740
5,427
2023 YTD % of 2022:
70%
Haiti
968
561
380
419
609
824
398
1,205
4,025
2,565
Dominica
269
257
570
519
492
920
1,201
744
1,804
560
Mexico
33
11
3
50
123
160
343
612
676
208
Venezuela
0
0
1
1
1
0
10
0
63
2
Honduras
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
32
0
Jamaica
12
13
15
16
8
25
3
16
29
5
Ecuador
0
3
23
3
57
7
2
9
18
3
Uzbekistan
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
Colombia
0
0
0
2
7
7
1
11
15
1
Other
19
32
121
37
106
104
77
82
103
51
Total
3,391
3,614
6,334
2,512
1,662
2,429
2,079
3,508
12,521
8,822
CLP_AR_002478
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 141 of 1047

Quote: Individuals departing from Cuban and Haitian nationals in the Caribbean make up the vast majority of maritime interdictions. Maritime migration from Cuba increased by nearly 600 percent in FY 2022, with 5,740 Cuban nationals interd
Footnote: OIS analysis of USCG data through March 31, 2023.
Quote: Similarly, maritime migration from Haiti more than tripled in FY 2022, with 4,025 Haitian nationals interdicted at sea, compared to 1,205 in FY 2021 and 398 in FY 2020.
Footnote: OIS analysis of USCG data through March 31, 2023.
Quote: In the first six months of FY 2023, Cuban interdictions were nearly equal to the Cuban FY 2022 total, comprising 62 percent of all FY 2023 interdictions at sea; Haitian interdictions were almost 50 percent of the Haitian FY 2022 total, com
Footnote: OIS analysis of USCG data through March 31, 2023.
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023YTD
Cuba
2,090
2,736
5,221
1,465
259
381
43
827
5,740
5,427
Cuba
% change 21‐22
594%
Haiti
968
561
380
419
609
824
398
1,205
4,025
2,565
% of whole 21
24%
Dominica
269
257
570
519
492
920
1,201
744
1,804
560
% of whole 22
46%
Mexico
33
11
3
50
123
160
343
612
676
208
% of whole 23YTD
62%
Venezuela
0
0
1
1
1
0
10
0
63
2
% of last year's total
95%
Honduras
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
2
32
0
Haiti
% change 21‐22
234%
Jamaica
12
13
15
16
8
25
3
16
29
5
% of whole 21
34%
Ecuador
0
3
23
3
57
7
2
9
18
3
% of whole 22
32%
Uzbekistan
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
16
0
% of whole 23YTD
29%
Colombia
0
0
0
2
7
7
1
11
15
1
% of last year's total
64%
Other
19
32
121
37
106
104
77
82
103
51
Total
3,391
3,614
6,334
2,512
1,662
2,429
2,079
3,508
12,521
8,822
CLP_AR_002479
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 142 of 1047

dicted at sea, compared to 827 in FY 2021.
mprising 30 percent of all FY 2023 interdictions at sea
CLP_AR_002480
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 143 of 1047

Quote: There were 5,978 such apprehensions in FY 2022, nearly triple the number of apprehensions in FY 2021 (2,045). And in FY 2023 to date, there have already been 6,364 USBP apprehensions of noncitizens who made landfall in southeast
Footnote: OIS analysis of OIS Persist Dataset based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: Maritime Border, USBP
Coastal USBP
Cuba
Haiti
Other
Total
% Cuba
% Cuba+Haiti
2013
539
708
1,915
3,162
17%
39%
2014
956
1,014
1,972
3,942
24%
50%
2015
1,040
370
1,748
3,158
33%
45%
2016
1,845
160
2,658
4,663
40%
43%
2017
547
77
2,964
3,588
15%
17%
2018
107
75
3,065
3,247
3%
6%
2019
144
64
3,377
3,585
4%
6%
2020
83
116
2,031
2,230
4%
9%
2021
239
601
1,205
2,045
12%
41%
2022
2,675
1,840
1,463
5,978
192%
45%
76%
2023
4,522
809
1,033
6,364
6%
71%
84%
Persist
CLP_AR_002481
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 144 of 1047

t coastal sectors, more than the total for all of FY 2022. Cuban and Haitian nationals made up 76 percent of these apprehensions in FY 2022 and 84 percent of apprehensions so far in FY 2023.
CLP_AR_002482
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 145 of 1047

Quote: Within two days of the court’s decision, total encounters at the SWB reached 9,583 in a single day on November 17, 2022, a 17 percent increase from the day before
Footnote: OIS Persist based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: SWB; excludes CBPOne appointments; CBP (USBP+OFO)
Total CBP Encounters
Nov 17 SWB
9,583
N
% increase from yesterday
17%
Date
11/4/2022
7,790
11/5/2022
6,983
11/6/2022
7,866
11/7/2022
7,405
11/8/2022
8,457
11/9/2022
7,586
11/10/2022
8,118
11/11/2022
8,469
11/12/2022
7,523
11/13/2022
7,116
11/14/2022
7,899
11/15/2022
8,147
11/16/2022
8,205
11/17/2022
9,583
11/18/2022
7,940
11/19/2022
7,920
11/20/2022
6,956
11/21/2022
7,989
11/22/2022
7,971
11/23/2022
7,529
11/24/2022
7,372
11/25/2022
7,162
11/26/2022
8,049
11/27/2022
7,166
11/28/2022
7,748
11/29/2022
7,677
11/30/2022
9,244
CLP_AR_002483
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 146 of 1047

Quote: The baseline number of encounters decreased in March 2023 from April 2022 and also consisted of a much lower share of nationals from countries that have stopped or limited returns of their own nationals
Footnote: OIS Persist based on data through March 31, 2023.
Filter: SWB; excludes CBPOne Appointments; CBP (USBP+OFO)
Cuba
El Salvado GuatemalaHaiti
Honduras Mexico
Nicaragua VenezuelaTotal
MEX+NCA NCA
CHNV
MEX
Other
Total
Select CouCHNV/Total
Oct‐21
5,896

9,801

19,374

908

21,861

66,049

9,255

13,416

164,837

Oct‐21
154,907

38,430

50,428

66,049

9,930

164,837

94%
31%
Nov‐21
6,605

9,664

20,469

1,022

20,105

63,846

13,627

20,388

174,845

Nov‐21
168,331

43,760

60,725

63,846

6,514

174,845

96%
35%
Dec‐21
7,986

8,874

21,009

7,144

18,141

51,475

15,297

24,801

179,253

Dec‐21
162,880

45,180

66,225

51,475

16,373

179,253

91%
37%
Jan‐22
9,721

5,810

13,856

3,372

12,011

60,341

11,564

22,779

154,874

Jan‐22
147,646

31,230

56,075

60,341

7,228

154,874

95%
36%
Feb‐22
16,557

7,146

18,215

1,877

14,075

71,850

13,296

3,073

166,010

Feb‐22
157,508

38,657

47,001

71,850

8,502

166,010

95%
28%
Mar‐22
32,153

8,403

21,392

2,171

16,213

88,132

16,017

4,053

222,574

Mar‐22
202,380

45,812

68,436

88,132

20,194

222,574

91%
31%
Apr‐22
34,839

8,355

19,910

5,739

15,734

82,568

12,565

4,107

235,785

Apr‐22
190,643

40,830

67,245

82,568

45,142

235,785

81%
29%
May‐22
25,643

8,980

21,468

10,514

19,730

77,454

19,034

5,088

241,137

May‐22
196,431

49,482

69,495

77,454

44,706

241,137

81%
29%
Jun‐22
16,172

9,123

24,648

4,069

24,177

66,730

11,200

13,199

207,834

Jun‐22
176,449

44,971

64,748

66,730

31,385

207,834

85%
31%
Jul‐22
20,098

7,952

20,212

5,380

20,340

55,692

12,073

17,647

200,162

Jul‐22
166,087

40,237

70,158

55,692

34,075

200,162

83%
35%
Aug‐22
19,060

6,675

15,681

6,551

16,219

60,772

11,749

25,361

204,087

Aug‐22
167,266

34,105

72,389

60,772

36,821

204,087

82%
35%
Sep‐22
26,178

6,247

15,331

5,163

14,417

63,431

18,199

33,804

227,547

Sep‐22
195,806

39,777

92,598

63,431

31,741

227,547

86%
41%
Oct‐22
28,841

5,995

14,727

6,577

13,793

65,377

20,919

22,039

228,603

Oct‐22
192,610

41,641

85,592

65,377

35,993

228,603

84%
37%
Nov‐22
34,709

5,457

14,432

5,385

12,881

58,160

34,236

7,963

231,021

Nov‐22
202,074

54,125

89,789

58,160

28,947

231,021

87%
39%
Dec‐22
42,653

4,804

14,814

5,073

13,050

47,038

35,387

8,131

248,604

Dec‐22
201,264

55,005

99,221

47,038

47,340

248,604

81%
40%
Jan‐23
6,229

3,680

11,860

2,640

10,641

60,761

3,352

3,740

146,485

Jan‐23
103,615

18,892

23,962

60,761

42,870

146,485

71%
16%
Feb‐23
189

4,515

14,093

185

10,150

64,016

412

1,614

135,691

Feb‐23
95,401

19,020

12,365

64,016

40,290

135,691

70%
9%
Mar‐23
193

5,427

14,911

328

11,594

76,390

232

3,860

169,035

Mar‐23
112,839

20,570

15,879

76,390

56,196

169,035

67%
9%
CLP_AR_002484
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 147 of 1047

FOUO
Encounter Projections: Blended
Release Date: 2023‐05‐03
Key updates from previous version: Machine learning (LightGBM) is used to model FM and UC
encounters. BSTS continues to be used for SA encounters. May and June SME survey results are used
for Model 1. Model 2 is assumed to have the same uncertainty as Model 1, so the width of Model 2's
confidence intervals are set equal to that of Model 1.
Policy Assumptions:
‐ Title 42 public health Order ends on May 11, 2023 (all models)
Model 1:
‐ CHNV returns to Mexico end June 30, 2023.
‐ NPRM not in effect.
Model 2:
‐ CHNV returns to Mexico continue.
‐ Presumed implementation of NPRM after the lifting of the Title 42 public health Order.
Enforcement measures and lawful pathways (e.g.‐ expanded CBP One, CHNV parole processes, in‐
country refugee processing) are also implemented.
Workbook Details: This workbook presents the most recent Blended Encounter Projections. The
workbook contains the following worksheets:

Overview: Current worksheet, providing details about the workbook and the projections.

Model 1: Daily average of the encounter projections by Total, Family Type, and HHS Referrals.
o
Note: HHS Referrals are estimated by summing all non‐Mexican UC encounter
projections. This estimate is likely to be a slight underestimate because there are
usually a small number of Mexican UCs who do get referred to HHS.

Model 2: Daily average of the encounter projections by Total, Family Type, and HHS Referrals.
o
Note: HHS Referrals are estimated by summing all non‐Mexican UC encounter
projections. This estimate is likely to be a slight underestimate because there are
usually a small number of Mexican UCs who do get referred to HHS.

Graphs‐High: Graphs of the High lines from each scenario for total and by family type, as well
as actuals for the prior 13 months.

Graphs‐Moderately High: Graphs of the Moderately High lines from each scenario for total
and by family type, as well as actuals for the prior 13 months.
CLP_AR_002485
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 148 of 1047

The Blended Encounter Projections: A mixed‐methods approach that combines the knowledge and
intel of subject matter expertise with mathematical, regression‐based predictive models. More
specifically, the current Blended Projections average, or ‘blend’, the:

Hybrid Model.

Bayesian Structural Time Series (BSTS) Model projections.

LightGBM Model projections.
Model Specifications and Notes:

Uses actuals of encounters through:
o
Hybrid Model: NA.
o
BSTS Model: 2023‐03‐31.
o
LightGBM Model: 2023‐03‐31.

Model Descriptions:
o
The Hybrid Model combines field level intelligence, SME analysis of relevant policies and
factors, historic monthly change, and current and past trends. It also has a specific focus
on accounting for expectations of the consequences of ending the Title 42 public health
Order.

Broken down into results by country with country‐family type proportions based
on encounter actuals for last 3 months.
o
The BSTS Model was built using a machine learning approach and includes: a 12‐
seasonal component, a semi‐local linear trend (except for CHNV), an autoregressive
component (AR(1)), and a regression component.

The BSTS regression component includes the following predictors: Mexico
Apprehensions (through Jan 2023), USA Unemployment (through Jan 2023), and
ratio of Removals by T8 Encounters (through Jan 2023).
o
The LightGBM Model was built using a machine learning approach and includes
predictors from the BSTS.
CLP_AR_002486
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 149 of 1047

CLP_AR_002487
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 150 of 1047

FOUO
Blended Projections, Totals
Assumptions:
Title 42 ends May 11. CHNV returns to Mexico and CHNV paroles end June 30. NPRM not implemented.
Projection Type:
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Aug‐23
Sep‐23
Total
Total
Projection
5,392
6,768
7,527
6,878
7,119
7,712
6,900
Moderately High
6,817
8,147
8,953
8,257
8,499
9,137
8,301
Moderately Low
4,098
5,407
6,130
5,511
5,750
6,423
5,553
High
8,186
9,471
10,321
9,581
9,823
10,505
9,647
Low
3,208
4,174
4,824
4,252
4,494
5,203
4,358
FM
Projection
1,145
2,089
2,787
2,244
2,326
2,466
2,177
Moderately High
1,826
2,748
3,468
2,903
2,985
3,147
2,847
Moderately Low
584
1,449
2,127
1,598
1,670
1,921
1,558
High
2,480
3,381
4,122
3,536
3,618
3,801
3,490
Low
266
893
1,522
1,019
1,099
1,408
1,034
SA
Projection
3,814
4,243
4,233
4,182
4,335
4,769
4,263
Moderately High
4,521
4,927
4,940
4,866
5,020
5,476
4,958
Moderately Low
3,118
3,559
3,532
3,498
3,658
4,062
3,571
High
5,200
5,584
5,619
5,523
5,677
6,155
5,626
Low
2,578
2,916
2,867
2,852
3,007
3,391
2,935
UC
Projection
433
436
507
452
458
476
460
Moderately High
470
472
545
488
493
513
497
Moderately Low
397
400
470
416
422
439
424
High
506
506
580
522
528
549
532
Low
363
366
435
382
387
404
389
HHS Referrals
Projection
326
338
397
352
347
356
353
Moderately High
356
367
427
381
376
387
382
Moderately Low
297
309
367
323
318
327
324
High
459
435
488
424
444
450
450
Low
270
282
339
295
291
299
296
Planning. All projections are for planning purposes, showing what OIS estimates may happen under these assumptions. Effects of these policy assumptions are also based on best available information.
Operational confidence intervals (not assuming growing uncertainty over time) are used to quantify model uncertainty.
Users should not treat these results as a precise statement of what will happen.
CLP_AR_002488
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 151 of 1047

FOUO
Blended Projections, Totals
Assumptions:
Projection Type:
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Aug‐23
Sep‐23
Total
Total
Projection
5,392
5,480
5,580
5,079
5,258
5,730
5,420
Moderately High
6,807
6,860
7,005
6,458
6,638
7,156
6,820
Moderately Low
4,108
4,119
4,182
3,713
3,889
4,441
4,075
High
8,165
8,184
8,373
7,782
7,962
8,524
8,165
Low
3,227
2,887
2,877
2,453
2,633
3,221
2,883
FM
Projection
1,145
1,239
1,499
1,233
1,337
1,511
1,326
Moderately High
1,826
1,898
2,180
1,892
1,996
2,192
1,998
Moderately Low
584
598
839
587
681
966
709
High
2,480
2,531
2,834
2,525
2,629
2,846
2,641
Low
266
43
234
8
110
453
186
SA
Projection
3,814
3,805
3,610
3,426
3,496
3,776
3,655
Moderately High
4,521
4,489
4,317
4,110
4,180
4,483
4,350
Moderately Low
3,118
3,121
2,910
2,741
2,818
3,069
2,963
High
5,200
5,146
4,996
4,767
4,837
5,162
5,018
Low
2,578
2,478
2,245
2,095
2,168
2,398
2,327
UC
Projection
433
436
470
420
425
443
438
Moderately High
470
472
507
456
461
480
474
Moderately Low
397
400
433
384
390
406
402
High
506
507
543
490
496
515
509
Low
363
366
398
350
355
370
367
HHS Referrals
Projection
326
339
368
327
323
332
336
Moderately High
356
367
398
356
352
362
365
Moderately Low
297
310
338
299
294
302
307
High
459
436
459
400
420
425
433
Low
270
282
310
271
267
274
279
Planning. All projections are for planning purposes, showing what OIS estimates may happen under these assumptions. Effects of these policy assumptions are also based on best available information. Model 2 is
assumed to have equal uncertainty as the operational confidence interval (not assuming growing uncertainty over time) from Model 1.
Users should not treat these results as a precise statement of what will happen.
CHNV Returns to Mexico continue. CHNV parole (30,000 monthly) continues. NPRM begins May 12. Title 42 ends May 11. CBP One increases from 740 per day to 1,000 per day on May 12, then to 1,250 per day on
June 1. In‐country refugee processing in Latin America expands.
CLP_AR_002489
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 152 of 1047

FOUO
Feb‐22
Mar‐22
Apr‐22
May‐22
Jun‐22
Jul‐22
Aug‐22
Sep‐22
Oct‐22
Nov‐22
Dec‐22
Jan‐23
Feb‐23
Mar‐23
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Aug‐23
Total
Actual
5,885
7,048
7,146
7,733
6,885
6,414
6,540
7,535
7,334
7,657
7,975
4,679
4,759
5,393
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
5,393
8,165
9,452
10,264
9,530
9,771
Policy Bundle Model 2
5,393
8,165
8,184
8,373
7,782
7,962
FM
Actual
955
1,172
1,418
1,920
1,725
1,681
1,672
1,798
1,875
2,031
2,420
1,080
933
1,090
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
1,090
2,480
3,381
4,122
3,536
3,618
Policy Bundle Model 2
1,090
2,480
2,531
2,834
2,525
2,629
SA
Actual
4,503
5,420
5,326
5,340
4,653
4,306
4,503
5,340
5,072
5,189
5,160
3,298
3,443
3,910
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
3,910
5,200
5,584
5,619
5,523
5,677
Policy Bundle Model 2
3,910
5,200
5,146
4,996
4,767
4,837
UC
Actual
427
455
402
473
508
427
365
396
387
436
395
301
384
394
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
394
506
506
580
522
528
Policy Bundle Model 2
394
507
507
543
490
496
HHS Referrals
Actual
334
358
314
394
437
367
295
320
309
367
335
224
292
297
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
297
459
435
488
424
444
Policy Bundle Model 2
297
460
435
459
400
421
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
Blended Projections, Total Encounters
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
Feb‐22
Mar‐22
Apr‐22
May‐22
Jun‐22
Jul‐22
Aug‐22
Sep‐22
Oct‐22
Nov‐22
Dec‐22
Jan‐23
Feb‐23
Mar‐23
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Aug‐23
Sep‐23
Blended Projections, FM Encounters
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
5,000
6,000
7,000
Blended Projections, SA Encounters
500
600
700
Blended Projections, UC Encounters
CLP_AR_002490
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 153 of 1047

28
31
30
31
30
31
31
30
31
30
31
31
28
31
164778
218492
214367
239710
206559
198834
202746
226042
227351
229709
247240
145047
133265
167188
26744
36347
42551
59512
51744
52098
51823
53943
58132
60938
75015
33476
26114
33776
126081
168027
159767
165536
139581
133485
139597
160211
157224
155684
159966
102238
96394
121213
11953
14118
12049
14662
15234
13251
11326
11888
11995
13087
12259
9333
10757
12199
9346
11109
9431
12213
13098
11374
9147
9592
9579
11010
10395
6937
8166
9204
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
0
100
200
300
400
Feb‐22
Mar‐22
Apr‐22
May‐22
Jun‐22
Jul‐22
Aug‐22
Sep‐22
Oct‐22
Nov‐22
Dec‐22
Jan‐23
Feb‐23
Mar‐23
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Aug‐23
Sep‐23
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Blended Projections, HHS Referrals
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
CLP_AR_002491
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 154 of 1047

Sep‐23
10,451
8,524
3,801
2,846
6,155
5,162
549
516
450
426
CLP_AR_002492
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 155 of 1047

FOUO
Feb‐22
Mar‐22
Apr‐22
May‐22
Jun‐22
Jul‐22
Aug‐22
Sep‐22
Oct‐22
Nov‐22
Dec‐22
Jan‐23
Feb‐23
Mar‐23
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Total
Actual
5,885
7,048
7,146
7,733
6,885
6,414
6,540
7,535
7,334
7,657
7,975
4,679
4,759
5,393
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
5,393
6,807
8,138
8,905
8,215
Policy Bundle Model 2
5,393
6,807
6,860
7,005
6,458
FM
Actual
955
1,172
1,418
1,920
1,725
1,681
1,672
1,798
1,875
2,031
2,420
1,080
933
1,090
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
1,090
1,826
2,748
3,468
2,903
Policy Bundle Model 2
1,090
1,826
1,898
2,180
1,892
SA
Actual
4,503
5,420
5,326
5,340
4,653
4,306
4,503
5,340
5,072
5,189
5,160
3,298
3,443
3,910
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
3,910
4,521
4,927
4,940
4,866
Policy Bundle Model 2
3,910
4,521
4,489
4,317
4,110
UC
Actual
427
455
402
473
508
427
365
396
387
436
395
301
384
394
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
394
470
472
545
488
Policy Bundle Model 2
394
470
472
507
456
HHS Referrals
Actual
334
358
314
394
437
367
295
320
309
367
335
224
292
297
Title 42 & CHNV end Model 1
297
356
367
427
381
Policy Bundle Model 2
297
356
367
398
356
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
Blended Projections, Total Encounters
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
Feb‐22
Mar‐22
Apr‐22
May‐22
Jun‐22
Jul‐22
Aug‐22
Sep‐22
Oct‐22
Nov‐22
Dec‐22
Jan‐23
Feb‐23
Mar‐23
Apr‐23
May‐23
Jun‐23
Jul‐23
Aug‐23
Sep‐23
Blended Projections, FM Encounters
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
4,000
5,000
6,000
Blended Projections, SA Encounters
400
500
600
Blended Projections, UC Encounters
CLP_AR_002493
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 156 of 1047

28
31
30
31
30
31
31
30
31
30
31
31
28
31
164778
218492
214367
239710
206559
198834
202746
226042
227351
229709
247240
145047
133265
167188
26744
36347
42551
59512
51744
52098
51823
53943
58132
60938
75015
33476
26114
33776
126081
168027
159767
165536
139581
133485
139597
160211
157224
155684
159966
102238
96394
121213
11953
14118
12049
14662
15234
13251
11326
11888
11995
13087
12259
9333
10757
12199
9346
11109
9431
12213
13098
11374
9147
9592
9579
11010
10395
6937
8166
9204
0
1,000
2,000
3,000
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
0
100
200
300
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Blended Projections, HHS Referrals
Actual
Model 1
Model 2
CLP_AR_002494
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 157 of 1047

Aug‐23
Sep‐23
8,456
9,093
6,638
7,156
2,985
3,147
1,996
2,192
5,020
5,476
4,180
4,483
493
513
461
480
376
387
352
362
CLP_AR_002495
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 158 of 1047

5/8/23, 9:29 AM
CBP Makes Changes to CBP One App | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-makes-changes-cbp-one-app?s=03
1/5
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CBP Makes Changes to CBP One App
CLP_AR_002575
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 159 of 1047

5/8/23, 9:29 AM
CBP Makes Changes to CBP One App | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-makes-changes-cbp-one-app?s=03
2/5
Release Date: Fri, 05/05/2023 - 12:00
App will expand number of appointments, allow for additional time, prioritize those
first registered
WASHINGTON — U.S. Customs and Border Protection today announced changes
to the CBP One app to expand the number of appointments available, allow for
additional time to complete requests, and prioritize those who have been waiting
the longest. Scheduling an appointment in CBP One provides a safe, orderly, and
humane process for noncitizens to access ports of entry rather than attempting to
enter the United States irregularly.
CBP One will transition to a new appointment scheduling system on May 10 that
will address previous volume issues around specific times in the day by making
appointments available for 23 hours each day instead of at a designated time,
allowing for more flexibility and access to the scheduling system. Noncitizens will
receive notification to confirm their appointments after submitting their request.
CBP will also increase the number of appointments available to approximately
1,000 each day, and will prioritize noncitizens who have waited the longest.
Specifically, CBP One App will now:
Allow for additional time to complete the appointment request. Currently,
all CBP One appointments become available at the same time each day. With
these changes, noncitizens will no longer be required to access CBP One
during that one short period of time to schedule an appointment. Instead, the
appointment request process will have two steps, so requestors have ample
time to make requests and confirm appointments at their convenience over
the course of a day.
Noncitizens will be allowed to request appointments at any point during a
full 23-hour period each day and, if allocated an appointment, will have
another 23-hour period to confirm that appointment.
Allowing noncitizens a longer window of time to ask for and to confirm
their appointment will reduce time pressure and dependency on internet
speed and connectivity.
Expand the number of daily appointment allotments. CBP will add
additional appointments each day, totaling up to approximately 1,000 each
day starting May 12, and continually evaluate expanding the number of
available appointments as operations and efficiencies allow.
Cut out smugglers who are preying on noncitizens by prioritizing
appointments for those who have been waiting the longest. A percentage
of daily available appointments will be allocated to the earliest registered CBP
One profiles, so noncitizens who have been trying to obtain appointments for
the longest time will be prioritized.
CLP_AR_002576
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 160 of 1047

5/8/23, 9:29 AM
CBP Makes Changes to CBP One App | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-makes-changes-cbp-one-app?s=03
3/5
Importantly, these new changes will not change the way noncitizens initially
register themselves, their families, or others via the CBP One app, nor does it
change the requirements for individuals to confirm their appointments. The
enhanced process will give noncitizens more time to navigate the appointment
scheduling app, along with prioritizing noncitizens who have been waiting the
longest for an appointment.
These changes will provide noncitizens with limited connectivity the same
opportunity to schedule appointments to present themselves for inspection at
Southwest Border ports of entry as those with better internet connections. CBP
continues to advance innovative technologies and improve the delivery of its
critical homeland security mission, including to streamline safe and efficient
processes at ports of entry. CBP One remains a key part of the Department of
Homeland Security’s multi-pronged strategy to address migrant flows at the
southwest border. By using CBP One for these appointments, we have increased
our capacity to process noncitizens at ports of entry, a critical part of our
commitment to safe, orderly, and humane migration processes.
Noncitizens must still be physically located within central or northern Mexico to
both request and schedule an appointment via CBP One. Appointments are being
offered at eight ports of entry: Brownsville, Paso Del Norte in El Paso, Eagle Pass,
Hidalgo, and Laredo in Texas; Calexico and San Ysidro in California; and Nogales in
Arizona.
More information on the CBP One mobile application, available in English,
Spanish, Haitian Creole, Portuguese, and Russian, can be found
at https://www.cbp.gov/about/mobile-apps-directory/cbpone. The CBP One
application can be downloaded for free from the Apple and Google Application
Stores as well from the CBP website.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is the unified border agency within the
Department of Homeland Security charged with the comprehensive management,
control, and protection of our nation’s borders, combining customs, immigration,
border security, and agricultural protection at and between official ports of entry.
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CLP_AR_002577
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 161 of 1047

5/8/23, 9:29 AM
CBP Makes Changes to CBP One App | U.S. Customs and Border Protection
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-makes-changes-cbp-one-app?s=03
4/5
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CLP_AR_002578
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 162 of 1047

5/8/23, 9:29 AM
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CLP_AR_002579
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 163 of 1047

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CLP_AR_004631
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 164 of 1047

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CLP_AR_004632
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 165 of 1047

CLP_AR_004847
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CLP_AR_004848
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CLP_AR_004849
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 168 of 1047

CLP_AR_004850
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 169 of 1047

CLP_AR_004851
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 170 of 1047

Struggling to Survive: the
Situation of Asylum Seekers
in Tapachula, Mexico
By: Stephanie Brewer, Lesly Tejada, and Maureen Meyer
JUNE 2022
RESEARCH
REPORT
CLP_AR_004858
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 171 of 1047

Key Findings
Introduction and Acknowledgements
Background on Mexico’s Asylum System
Legal and institutional framework
Trends in asylum claims and approvals
Migration enforcement role of the armed forces, including the National
Guard
The role of Tapachula in the asylum process
Findings from WOLA’s 2022 Visit to Tapachula
Lack of immediate access to asylum at Mexico’s southern border puts
families and individuals at risk

Diverse factors have caused drastic increases in asylum claims,
overwhelming COMAR
Asylum seekers’ and institutions’ responses, 2021-2022
The importance of resettlement and integration support to stabilize
forced migration
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
3
5
5
6
8
10
10
12
18
8
15
CLP_AR_004859
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 172 of 1047

Asylum intake patterns in 2022
The “prison city”: migrants and asylum seekers caught between a rock
and a hard place
U.S. government engagement with Mexico on access
to protection for refugees
U.S. government support to Mexico’s asylum system and efforts to
address root causes
U.S. migration policies and Mexico: a failed attempt to deter largely
forced migration
Conclusions
Recommendations
Endnotes
18
20
27
27
29
31
32
35
CLP_AR_004860
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 173 of 1047

1 Struggling to Survive June 2022
• Migrants and asylum seekers arriving in Tapachula—the city in southern
Mexico where the vast majority of asylum claims are made—face what
service providers repeatedly described to us as a “system to wear people
down” (política de desgaste). This refers not to a written policy, but rather
to the combined effects of a series of government actions and omissions
that leave people struggling to survive and vulnerable to abuse and arbitrary
treatment as they navigate multiple backlogged legal processes. These
conditions do not contribute to addressing forced migration to or through
Mexico; rather, they increase the suffering and risks faced by people on the
move.
• Skyrocketing asylum claims in Mexico reflect growing forced displacement
and protection needs in the region and worldwide. They also reflect a failure
to respond adequately to the different needs of the migrant population,
including people who migrate in search of economic opportunities or
for other reasons that fall outside the recognized grounds for seeking
asylum. Asylum claims in Mexico have grown a hundredfold since 2013 to
reach over 130,000 in 2021. Mexico’s asylum system is overwhelmed and
under-resourced, with prolonged delays in case processing times. In addition
to large numbers of people in need of international protection, Mexican
migration authorities’ reticence to facilitate access to other legal pathways
has the effect of channeling people into Mexico’s asylum system as though
it were the only option to seek a documented status in the country, creating
an even more acute situation.
• Those needing protection are almost never able to request it at ports of
entry. This puts people at further risk and constitutes an undue barrier to
seeking asylum. People displaced from their homes by violence, repression,
or other threats to their survival arrive at Mexico’s border with protection
needs, generally after additional violence and trauma on the journey north.
Yet even if they are prepared to claim asylum, protection-seeking families
and individuals have found themselves blocked from doing so at ports of
entry, where agents of the National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional
de Migración, INM) may instead tell them that this is not the right place
to seek asylum or instruct them to cross between ports of entry without
documentation. Migrants who are able to request asylum at ports of entry
will generally be detained by the INM and held for at least a few days for
processing. As a result, asylum seekers are often forced to cross between
ports and try to reach the offices of Mexico’s refugee agency (Comisión
Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR) to claim asylum without being
KEY FINDINGS
CLP_AR_004861
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 174 of 1047

2 Struggling to Survive June 2022
detained by enforcement authorities or victimized by criminals.
• While trapped in Tapachula, asylum seekers struggle to survive.
Mexican authorities’ efforts to contain them there are both arbitrary
and untenable. Mexican asylum law requires asylum seekers to wait out
their cases in the state where they made their claim. In reality, security
forces generally block them from leaving Tapachula itself. Asylum seekers in
Tapachula face scarce employment opportunities, obstacles to healthcare,
and a dearth of affordable housing, with government, United Nations, and
civil society support programs insufficient to meet overwhelming levels of
demand. Tapachula’s close proximity to Central America puts some people at
risk of encounters with their persecutors. Asylum seekers also face abuses
by authorities ranging from arbitrary detention to extortion to other forms
of violence. Women and Afro-descendant migrants face particular situations
of risk and discrimination. All of these factors point to the need to end
Mexico’s containment policy for asylum seekers.
• Deterrence-based tactics that only serve to put more suffering and
danger in migrants’ paths will not decrease forced migration to and
through Mexico. Closing off legal paths to migration forces the displaced
population into hiding along dangerous migratory routes, while the growing
list of visa restrictions for South American countries that prevent people
from flying into Mexico force more people to cross north by land. These
inescapable realities highlight the need to prioritize access to protection in
regional migration management, alleviating the human suffering in places like
Tapachula, and developing sustainable solutions for the migrant population.
• Initiatives to support migrants’ and asylum seekers’ integration into
other parts of Mexico, such as those currently led by the UN Refugee
Agency (UNHCR), are crucial to preventing humanitarian crises in
Tapachula and providing solutions and stability to the migrant population.
As desperation, overcrowding, and marches by migrants increased over
2021, the INM sporadically transported migrants and asylum seekers to
other states, but it did so without clear criteria or coordination with other
institutions. A regularized relocation system, more resources for Mexico’s
refugee agency, and additional efforts to provide legal status to migrants
seeking better opportunities would be important measures to address the
growing number of migrants arriving at Mexico’s southern border.
CLP_AR_004862
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 175 of 1047

3 Struggling to Survive June 2022
Introduction and acknowledgements
WOLA staff and partners at the Mexico-Guatemala border in Cuidad Hidalgo, a crossing point
for many asylum seekers bound for Tapachula
This report is based on a visit by WOLA staff to Mexico City and Tapachula, Chiapas state, in
late February and early March 2022.
As part of WOLA’s work on regional migration patterns, access to asylum, and the impact of
border enforcement measures, in recent years we have closely monitored and visited the city
of Tapachula on Mexico’s southern border, a crucial crossing point where the vast majority of
Mexico’s asylum requests are filed. Tapachula provides both a relevant snapshot of northward
migration trends and a paradigmatic example of the consequences of containment policies
on asylum seekers. The present report fits within our reporting from the Mexico-Guatemala
border over the past decade and our overall analysis of the impacts of U.S. and regional
migration policies on the movement and rights of migrants throughout the hemisphere.
On this occasion, the WOLA delegation met with asylum seekers, government officials, UN
agencies, and civil society partners providing services to people on the move in southern
Mexico. We particularly acknowledge the support of the Fray Matías de Córdova Human Rights
Center, a 2020 WOLA Human Rights Award recipient organization, whose staff generously
helped us to convene meetings with civil society organizations and asylum seekers, as well as
providing information on the trends and practices they are documenting in their day-to-day
work with the asylum-seeking population. We are also especially grateful to the three asylum
seekers who agreed to be interviewed on video by the WOLA team so that their stories could
be quoted in this report and shown in the videos that accompany it.
During our visit, we also met with officials of the Tapachula and national offices of Mexico’s
refugee agency, the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (Comisión Mexicana de
Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR); the Tapachula and national offices of the UN Refugee Agency
CLP_AR_004863
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 176 of 1047

4 Struggling to Survive June 2022
(UNHCR); the Tapachula office of Mexico’s Welfare Ministry (Secretaría de Bienestar); and the
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. We spoke with representatives of legal service providers and civil
society organizations including Formación y Capacitación (FOCA), American Friends Service
Committee (AFSC), the Migration Program (Programa de Asuntos Migratorios, Prami) of the
Universidad Iberoamericana Mexico City, Una Mano Amiga en la Lucha contra el SIDA, Iniciativas
para el Desarrollo Humano, Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA), Jesuit Refugee
Service, and the Institute for Women in Migration (Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración,
IMUMI). Most of these organizations form part of the Southeast Mexico Human Rights
Observation and Monitoring Collective (Colectivo de Observación y Monitoreo de Derechos
Humanos en el Sureste Mexicano), which documents human rights abuses against migrants
and asylum seekers. Despite our attempts to obtain a meeting with the National Migration
Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM), we were unable to meet with representatives of
this agency.
The information provided in these meetings, our observations in different parts of Tapachula
and at the Mexico-Guatemala border, as well as our ongoing written research and monitoring
have led to the present report, which aims to present an updated window into the situation of
asylum seekers arriving and seeking protection in Tapachula. Our analysis leads us to set out
recommendations for the Mexican and U.S. governments, focusing both on domestic policies
and regional collaboration to respond to forced migration.
CLP_AR_004864
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 177 of 1047

5 Struggling to Survive June 2022
BACKGROUND ON MEXICO’S ASYLUM
SYSTEM
Legal and institutional framework
In 2000, Mexico became a party to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to
the Status of Refugees, the cornerstone United Nations (UN) agreements that provide for the
right to seek asylum from persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion. Mexico’s Law on Refugees, Complementary
Protection and Political Asylum (Ley Sobre Refugiados, Protección Complementaria y Asilo
Político, “Law on Refugees”) incorporates this protection framework as well as gender-
based persecution. It further incorporates additional grounds for protection outlined in the
Cartagena Declaration.1 Thus, Mexican law recognizes refugee status for people who have
fled their country of origin “because their lives, security, or freedom have been threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive human rights violations, or
other circumstances that have seriously disturbed public order[.]”2
Mural near the Mexico-Guatemala border
Mexico’s refugee law also provides for “complementary protection” to people who are not
recognized as refugees but whose life would be in danger or who would be at risk of torture
or ill treatment if returned to another country.3 Complementary protection applies to the
person who requested protection, but it is not extended to their family members. These
different forms of protection do not cover all people forcibly displaced from their countries of
origin: in particular, disasters provoked by climate change and other environmental factors are
increasingly relevant drivers of forced migration, but families and individuals displaced by climate
disasters were not understood to be refugees at the time the aforementioned international
and national legal instruments were drafted. However, Mexico’s legal framework protects a
decidedly broader class of refugees than U.S. law does.
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The Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR), housed within the Ministry of the
Interior (Secretaría de Gobernación, SEGOB) is the government agency charged with processing
asylum claims. COMAR has central offices in Mexico City, as well as offices in the south and
north of the country (two in Chiapas and one each in the states of Tabasco, Veracruz, Coahuila,
Nuevo León, Baja California, and the central state of Jalisco).
The National Migration Institute (INM), also within SEGOB, is in charge of overseeing migrant
arrivals at ports of entry, granting visas and legal residency, and migration enforcement. One
of the INM’s functions as outlined by the Law on Refugees’ implementing regulations is to
detect individuals in need of international protection and assist and coordinate with COMAR
in facilitating their access to the asylum system.4
Families and individuals seeking asylum must submit their application no later than 30 business
days after entering the country.5 After the application has been received, COMAR issues
a document (constancia) that serves as proof of an open asylum case. Once someone has
requested refugee protection, legally they cannot be returned back to their country of origin
during the processing of their case.6
With their constancia from COMAR, asylum seekers can apply with the INM to receive a
humanitarian visa, known as a Visitor Card for Humanitarian Reasons (Tarjeta de Visitante por
Razones Humanitarias, TVRH), which confers legal permission for people to live and work in
Mexico for a year.
To determine refugee status, COMAR will interview applicants about the reason for leaving
their country (with the participation of interpreters when an asylum seeker does not speak
Spanish).7 By law, COMAR has 45 business days to process applications, which may be extended
up to 90 days.8 These limits are not currently observed, as will be discussed below. Crucially,
while a claim is being processed, asylum seekers are required by the Law on Refugees’ current
regulations to remain in the state where they filed their asylum request,9 unless they receive
special permission to relocate and continue their case from a different state.10
Trends in asylum claims and approvals
In 2021 Mexico received a record-breaking 130,627 asylum requests, more than 100 times
the number received just eight years ago in 2013.11 The top three nationalities that applied
for asylum in Mexico in 2021 were Haitians, Hondurans, and Cubans. The number of Haitian
asylum seekers saw the most dramatic increase from 2020 to 2021, from 5,917 to 51,337.
Children born to Haitian parents also accounted for a large percentage of 2021 asylum seekers
from Chile and Brazil, who increased from a combined total of 1,170 in 2020 to 10,749 in
2021.
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In 2021, COMAR resolved 38,054 asylum cases, with an overall asylum grant rate of 72 percent
(74 percent counting complementary protection), considerably higher than the average U.S.
asylum approval rate of roughly 37 percent in FY2021. There were significant disparities in
approval rates for applicants of different nationalities. The major nationalities that saw the
highest percentage of approval rates last year were Venezuelans (97 percent), Hondurans (85
percent), and Salvadorans (85 percent). COMAR regularly evaluates applications from nationals
of these countries under the broader criteria of the Cartagena Declaration. Of the top asylum-
seeking nationalities, Haitians had the lowest approval rate at 23 percent.
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Asylum claims in Mexico continue to rise and may be on track to break new records, with
40,026 requests filed in the first four months of 2022—the highest number in the January-
April period in the past three years.
Migration enforcement role of the armed forces, including the National Guard
While not officially responsible for the asylum process, Mexico’s armed forces currently play a
leading role in migration enforcement, bringing them into direct contact with arriving families
and individuals, with consequences that can impact people’s access to asylum. As of late April
2022, 28,542 military troops were deployed in a migration enforcement role at Mexico’s
borders. Available data suggest that military forces, in particular the army and the National
Guard,12 carry out or collaborate in the majority of migratory detentions in Mexico, depriving
hundreds of thousands of migrants of their liberty in recent years.
Military troops are primarily trained to combat enemy forces, a background that raises obvious
concerns when assigning troops to be potential first contact points for migrant and asylum-
seeking families, children, and adults. The deployment of the armed forces to intercept
migrants is a clear example of an official response that treats migration—including forced
migration and those seeking protection—as though it were a national security threat rather
than a movement of people who have disproportionately high levels of vulnerability, trauma,
and humanitarian needs. Concerns regarding militarization of border and migration tasks in
Mexico are not just theoretical: in 2021, army and National Guard troops shot and killed
two migrants in separate incidents in Chiapas, while the National Human Rights Commission
(Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH) has issued recommendations finding
National Guard troops responsible for other violations against migrants at Mexico’s southern
border. In 2021, the CNDH received complaints against the National Guard in Chiapas for
cruel and inhumane treatment, arbitrary detention, and torture.
While a detailed analysis of border militarization is beyond the scope of this report, this remains
one of the most concerning aspects of the armed forces’ multiplying roles in Mexico. It is also
an area in which the U.S. government has negatively influenced migrant rights and access
to protection in Mexico in recent years by pressuring Mexican authorities to crack down on
northward migration, including through the threat of tariffs on Mexican exports during the
Trump administration and by praising Mexico’s efforts to stop migrant caravans, which translates
into the deployment of military troops.
The role of Tapachula in the asylum process
Due to its location just inland of the Mexico-Guatemala border, size, and connectivity to
main highways from Central America, Tapachula is the main point of arrival for a significant
portion of migrants and asylum seekers coming by land to Mexico. A large majority of asylum
claims—89,613 in 2021—were filed in COMAR’s Tapachula office, creating an enormous
strain on this office and prolonged delays in case processing, stretching into wait times of many
months for asylum applicants.
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Map showing Tapachula/southern border
Since asylum seekers are generally required to wait out their cases in the state where they file
their claims, tens of thousands of asylum seekers are currently expected to live in Chiapas, the
southern border state where Tapachula is located (and Mexico’s poorest state, with a poverty
rate of 75.5 percent in 2020). In practice, Mexican authorities seek to confine these families
and individuals not just to Chiapas state, but to the city of Tapachula itself. For this reason,
Tapachula is known as the “prison city” (ciudad cárcel) for asylum seekers. As we will discuss
below, this containment policy has led to a series of negative consequences including lack of
access to basic services and the means to survive, pushing asylum seekers to try to find ways
to leave the city.
Bicentennial Park in Tapachula, where migrants and asylum seekers without a place to stay often
spend the night
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Lack of immediate access to asylum at Mexico’s southern border puts families and individuals
at risk
While Mexico continues to experience mixed migration flows, a large number of people arriving
in Tapachula have international protection needs after fleeing life-threatening circumstances
in their home countries.
Migrants and asylum seekers generally arrive in Mexico after living through different forms
of violence, trauma, and exploitation during their journey north. As numerous people told
us, every step along the migratory route to Mexico costs money, whether due to criminal
extortion, bribes demanded by authorities, fees to secure guides, or other payments necessary
to move from one place to another with as little violence as possible. Even those able to muster
resources through their family and social networks are still vulnerable to violence and repeated
criminal attacks, including kidnapping and rape, while people forced to flee their homes with
little prior notice are likely to travel with even fewer resources and thus have even less of
an opportunity to fend off detention and violent attacks. Regardless of their circumstances,
arriving migrants and asylum seekers in Tapachula, especially those in a heightened situation
of vulnerability such as children, are likely to arrive in need of physical, psychological, and other
humanitarian attention after their journey, as well as with the right to request international
protection or to pursue other pathways for temporary or permanent legal status.
Families and individuals face severe obstacles in requesting asylum when they arrive at Mexico’s
border because COMAR does not have a regular presence at ports of entry, which are instead
manned by INM agents. Despite the INM’s legal mandate to assist and collaborate with COMAR,
according to multiple service providers in Tapachula, INM agents at ports of entry are known
to tell asylum seekers that they cannot seek asylum at the border and cannot enter Mexico
without documents.
Paradoxically, rather than seeking truly to block the path of asylum seekers into Mexico, the
“It’s impossible to live in Honduras. It’s so dangerous now. The gangs see 12-year-
olds, 13-year-olds, and they already want to recruit them… I have a 10-year-old
daughter and a 14-year-old daughter, that’s why I had to leave my country, leave my
family and everything behind, because the gangs came… they said they were going to
recruit my daughters… and that if I didn’t let them, they were going to kill us all, my
children and me…”

-“Maria,” Honduran asylum seeker
FINDINGS FROM WOLA’S 2022 VISIT
TO TAPACHULA
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11 Struggling to Survive June 2022
INM agents themselves may also instruct people to cross between ports of entry in order
to make their way to COMAR’s Tapachula office to claim asylum. Only in certain cases, such
as when a service-providing organization has contacted authorities to request entry for an
asylum-seeking person or group, are there greater guarantees of asylum seekers’ being able
to cross at a port of entry and to avoid detention in the INM’s migration stations (detention
centers) while their paperwork is being processed.
The Suchiate River, which divides Tecún Umán, Guatemala from Ciudad Hidalgo, Mexico
The result of this approach by the INM is that many asylum-seeking families and individuals
must cross Mexico’s border in hiding and try to make it from the border to the COMAR office
or an NGO or other service provider without documentation that authorizes their presence in
Mexico. These journeys put asylum seekers at risk of attacks and extortion by criminal groups
who prey on migrants and of detention or extortion by INM agents, state and local police, and
military forces.
WOLA staff heard accounts of detentions and abuses by the INM, police agents, and the
military even against migrants with official permission to be in Mexican territory; for arriving
asylum seekers with no documentation who are forced to cross irregularly into the country,
“When you’re an immigrant and you’re on the move… the authorities, instead of
helping you because they’re authorities, no, what they do is take what little you
have… even if you have children, they don’t care, they take their papers, and it’s, ‘ei-
ther give me what you have or I’ll send you back or I’ll imprison you…’ As a migrant,
you’re afraid, so you agree to whatever they ask of you… you just say, ‘yes.’”
-“Maria,” Honduran asylum seeker
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12 Struggling to Survive June 2022
the risks are even higher. According to data collected from 2,742 asylum seekers in Tapachula
between October 2020 and October 2021 by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and the
Jesuit Refugee Service Mexico (JRS), 98.3 percent of respondents affirmed having entered
Mexico irregularly, and 34.3 percent of these respondents “describe incidents of extortion,
violence, threats, and other abuses, compared with only 9.1% of respondents who indicate
having entered the country regularly.”
Detention by authorities may lead to extortion and/or temporary imprisonment in the INM’s
detention centers. According to international standards and guidelines, detention of asylum
seekers should be exceptional and based on an evaluation of the specific need for detention
in each case. In Mexico, such detention tends to respond to few criteria other than migratory
status and may be prolonged for months. While an alternatives-to-detention program exists
in Mexico, which releases asylum seekers from detention and refers them to shelters in
coordination with COMAR and support from the UN Refugee Agency, the INM has curtailed
its use in recent years. Interviews conducted during our visit and reporting from organizations
working with asylum seekers suggest that the INM has become less responsive to requests for
migrants to be released from detention.
Once detained, many asylum seekers are told that if they make a protection claim, they will
remain locked up while their case moves forward. This factor alone makes it much more difficult
for people to prepare their asylum case, as they face obstacles such as inadequate access to
information, legal assistance, and healthcare, overcrowding, or safety issues. This leads some
people with protection needs to desist from their claims in order to be released from detention.
A 2020 reform to Mexico’s migration and refugee framework established that children
(unaccompanied and those with their families) should not be held in detention by the INM.13
Children and their families should instead be referred to the National System for Integral
Family Development (Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia, DIF). However,
service providers told WOLA that this sometimes amounts to little more than a change of
detention setting for individuals and families sent to DIF shelters. Civil society counterparts
also told WOLA of the INM’s practice of separating families, for instance by detaining a father
in a migration station and sending a mother and children to a DIF facility.
Diverse factors have caused drastic increases in asylum claims, overwhelming COMAR
Mirroring global trends, there has been a dramatic increase in people displaced from their
homes throughout the Western Hemisphere. Mexico, which in 2021 became the third country
“At the first checkpoint… [the authorities] took me; they brought me to the Siglo XXI
migrant detention center… I was scared when I got there, I’ve never been detained…
after three and a half months, I couldn’t stand it there anymore… I decided not to
continue [with that asylum request], because I wasn’t sleeping, I wasn’t eating well by
then… it got to the point where I would talk to myself…”
-Nelson, Nicaraguan asylum seeker
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worldwide in the number of asylum requests received, has become a significant destination
country for a growing number of people.
Latin America has witnessed an increase in human mobility in recent years as both long-
standing and emerging causes of displacement force more people to flee their homes. Latin
American and Caribbean countries consistently lead the world in homicide rates, with gang
violence in Central America and organized crime in Mexico continuing to be significant causes
of displacement. Repression and political and humanitarian crises, exemplified in different
forms in countries such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, add to forced displacement.
The devastation caused by Hurricanes Eta and Iota in Central America in 2020 highlighted
the increasing percentage of people on the move who can be considered climate refugees.
Violence, poverty, and other already life-threatening crises have now been aggravated by the
Covid-19 pandemic.
In addition to people fleeing directly from their countries of origin, a large percentage of 2021
asylum requests in Mexico came from people of Haitian origin who had previously fled Haiti
following its devastating 2010 earthquake, resettled for a time in South American countries
(notably Brazil and Chile), but once again found themselves on the move due to shrinking visa
availability, scant labor opportunities, and racism and discrimination in South America, with
fewer possibilities than ever of returning to Haiti as gang violence, political crises, and natural
disasters engulfed the country in 2021.
In this context, the modern face of northward migration through Latin America includes a
significant percentage of women and children, with many families migrating and seeking asylum
together.
In addition to these trends, both authorities and civil society counterparts agree that people on
the move are currently funneled into Mexico’s asylum system even though Mexican law has
some other paths available to those seeking a legalized status in the country. In particular, while
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Mexican law makes TVRH humanitarian visas available to migrants who have been victims of
or witnessed a crime in Mexico, children, or for other humanitarian purposes or public interest
reasons,14 in practice these visas have not been made widely available to migrants. Even asylum
seekers face steep obstacles in obtaining a TVRH. In 2021, the INM issued 87,174 TVRHs.
However, only 35,397 were provided to asylum seekers, contributing to the obstacles WOLA
staff witnessed in Tapachula with asylum seekers unable to access employment because they
lacked this visa. At the same time, the fact that more than half (48,611) of these visas were
issued for humanitarian reasons, including 30,057 to Haitians (and another 6,547 to Brazilians
and Chileans, many of whom are likely children of Haitians born in these countries), illustrates
that in the context of high levels of forced migration and significant pressure as a result of the
tens of thousands of migrants and asylum seekers trapped in Tapachula in the fall of 2021,
the Mexican government more broadly used TVRHs as a tool to provide temporary status in
Mexico. In contrast, the INM issued only 25,414 TVRHs in 2020, with less than a thousand,
862, provided for humanitarian reasons.
Given the INM’s reticence to offer alternatives to migrants arriving at Mexico’s southern border,
seeking asylum is seen as the necessary route to obtain a TVRH for most arriving migrants,
contributing to COMAR’s increased caseload. This also means that an unknown number of
people who intend to reach the United States to reunite with family or for other reasons find
themselves channeled into applying for asylum in Mexico to regularize their presence in the
country, even though Mexico is not their final destination.
Finally, with the U.S. border closed to many arriving asylum seekers under Title 42 since March
2020, some asylum seekers may have requested protection from COMAR even if they do
not feel safe in Mexico, following expulsion or being blocked at U.S. ports of entry. If the Title
42 policy is lifted, part of this population will likely move to the U.S. border in the hope of
being able to request asylum in the United States. These asylum seekers would join a growing
number of other foreign nationals who have been bottled up along the U.S.-Mexico border
awaiting their chance to approach a port of entry and request asylum in the United States,
with U.S. authorities estimating this number could be around 25,000.
The record-breaking rise in asylum requests in Mexico has meant that those arriving find
themselves navigating an asylum system that is overwhelmed, under-resourced, and severely
backlogged. Nowhere is this reality more evident than in Tapachula.
“I came here, not because I had some American dream, but because I was fleeing so
that [the authorities] wouldn’t hurt my family, first of all, and secondly to protect my
own life…
[This has been] an emotional and economic change that hit me hard, believe me… I
don’t wish this on anyone. That’s what I can tell you: I don’t wish this on anyone.”
-Nelson, Nicaraguan asylum seeker
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As has been evident in the images of hundreds of asylum seekers waiting outside of COMAR’s
offices in Tapachula, the agency has yet to secure enough resources to process current
caseloads. In response to rising numbers of claims, COMAR has expanded in recent years
with support from the UN Refugee Agency; today, COMAR has nine offices throughout the
country and plans to open more, including a coordinating office in Chiapas state to oversee
the work of the multiple Chiapas COMAR offices. With UNHCR support, COMAR increased
its processing capacity by 116 percent between 2020 and 2021, and has gone from 20,466
case determinations in 2019 to 38,054 in 2021. In December 2021, COMAR signed a new
agreement with UNHCR that will allow COMAR to directly hire 230 staff members (under
Mexican law, government officers must be the ones to make asylum determinations; that is,
staff directly paid by UNHCR cannot substitute COMAR in this role).
However, even with this additional support, the resources afforded to COMAR are still far from
sufficient to enable prompt processing of incoming asylum requests, with the agency’s overall
domestic budget remaining essentially stable from 2021 to 2022 despite skyrocketing levels
of asylum claims.15
Asylum seekers’ and institutions’ responses, 2021-2022
As mentioned, delays of many months in refugee determinations, coupled with Mexico’s
containment policy, have effectively trapped tens of thousands of foreign nationals in
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untenable conditions in Tapachula. As this situation reached crisis levels in 2021, lack of access
to job opportunities, housing, healthcare, and other necessities in Tapachula; safety concerns;
discrimination; and desperation at seemingly never-ending legal processes led large groups of
asylum seekers to try to leave the city.
In perhaps the best-known example, hundreds of foreign nationals sought to leave Tapachula
by marching north together in “caravans” in the second half of 2021, particularly beginning
at the end of August. However, the caravans met with blockades, detention, and sometimes
violent repression from INM agents and the National Guard. Since then, multiple caravans
have left Tapachula, with some reaching other states, though none remaining intact beyond
the center of the country.
Mexican immigration agents detain a Haitian migrant in Escuintla, Chiapas state, Mexico in
September 2021 (AP Photo/Marco Ugarte)
For its part, COMAR’s Tapachula office tried several strategies throughout 2021 to increase
its capacity to process asylum claims. At the beginning of the year, unable to keep up with case
intake, the office began issuing appointment notices (citatorios), which stipulate a later date for
the formalization of a family’s or individual’s asylum application. In mid-2021, COMAR set up
an online platform for use in Tapachula to request asylum appointments. However, WOLA
staff was told, the system received tens of thousands of online requests in a single week,
grew to include people who had not yet arrived in Mexico, and led to large numbers of case
inquiries. Service providers pointed out that the online system also created challenges for
asylum seekers unfamiliar with navigating the internet or unable to access the online platform.
Changing tactics, from late September to late November COMAR convened asylum seekers
to come in person to Tapachula’s stadium to confirm their appointment requests, in an
unprecedented strategy in which UN agencies and other Mexican institutions collaborated.
Approximately 55,000 asylum seekers participated, allowing COMAR to reorganize and open
up appointment times.
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These efforts were disrupted, however, by the INM’s own parallel response strategies. As
growing numbers of desperate asylum seekers sought to leave Tapachula on foot, producing
high-level news coverage including images of caravans and repression, the INM began offering
caravan participants or would-be participants humanitarian visas and relocation by bus to a
series of other Mexican states. In this context, the INM announced that it too would use
Tapachula’s stadium at the end of November 2021 to program transportation to other states.
INM’s announcement prompted families and individuals to abandon jobs, housing, and other
activities in Tapachula to camp out around the stadium, awaiting what they believed would be
their turn to leave. Given Tapachula’s extremely hot conditions, the situation for families and
children in particular was often unbearable according to service providers who sought to assist
asylum seekers at the time.
Not everyone waiting at the stadium received transportation, however. In December, the INM
began issuing QR codes to migrants and asylum seekers, instructing them to pay their own way
to one of a list of different states (determined in each case by the QR code) and then report to
an INM office within 30 days to regularize their status. It is estimated that some 35,000 people
were relocated to 17 central and northern Mexican cities through the INM programs. The
long list of states in which the INM issued over 1,000 humanitarian visas in December 2021
(44,425 TVRHs in total) is one indicator of the application of this program.
While the initiative to move people out of Tapachula points to recognition of the failure of the
containment policy, the INM has implemented this plan in a piecemeal and reactive manner,
and it is not permanently or universally available. The main criterion for busing seems to be
a desire to break up caravans, deactivate protests, and diminish the crisis of overcrowding in
Tapachula.
The INM also failed to adequately coordinate its busing project with COMAR, and asylum
seekers were sometimes unwittingly considered to have abandoned their claims by virtue
of no longer being able to show up at Tapachula’s COMAR office. Some, having struggled to
leave Tapachula, even found themselves returning there once they realized they could not
follow up on their cases from other states. WOLA was told that the INM eventually began
providing more complete data to COMAR on which asylum seekers were transported to what
destinations, which would allow COMAR to re-open their cases. However, it is unclear what
will happen to many of the transported migrants who wish to pursue their asylum claims.
“Abuses by authorities, corruption, and impunity are very severe problems… and
they’re aggravated when the victim is a person who isn’t perceived as a person…
they’re perceived as the other.”
-Brenda Ochoa, Director of the Fray Matías de Córdova Human Rights Center
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The importance of resettlement and integration support to stabilize forced migration
Stakeholders interviewed by WOLA emphasized that the extent to which resettlement
and integration is available and supported in Mexico, giving refugees access to services and
the ability to live and work throughout the country, influences the number of people who
will opt to resettle in Mexico and the stability of that resettlement. In this vein, while many
counterparts spoke of the need to facilitate immediate humanitarian visas to asylum seekers
and other migrants who qualify for them, several also signaled the need to think beyond
short-term solutions and to recognize that without permanent resident status, people on
the move will live in a more vulnerable situation in which they must constantly renew their
documentation.
Positive examples of integration support exist and can provide guidance for expanding such
efforts. In particular, UNHCR has led an integration program (Local Integration Program,
Programa de Integración Local, PIL) that has helped more than 10,000 refugees relocate
within Mexico and start their lives in their new communities since 2016. The program has
helped move refugees from the southern part of the country to eight cities in the center and
north of Mexico. A UN study demonstrates the success of the program: while in southern
Mexico, only 10 percent of refugees were employed and 17 percent had sporadic informal
jobs, but after their relocation, 92 percent were in formal employment with earnings that
were on average 60 percent higher than in the south.
In December 2021, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNHCR presented
a pilot project that aims to support the stabilization and integration of Haitians in Mexico. The
program will allow Haitian families who have not applied for asylum to participate in the PIL
program. It will be important to monitor the success of this new initiative, including the extent
to which it is able to facilitate access to work for women as well as men.
Initiatives such as this one fit within the overall, recognized need for countries to expand legal
pathways to resettlement for people who need to leave their homes. For example, UNHCR
has emphasized the importance of complementary pathways, or safe and regulated avenues
that complement refugee resettlement, which offer alternatives to resorting to irregular and
dangerous movement and facilitate the acquisition of a sustainable and durable migration
status. Complementary pathways for admission are diverse and can include humanitarian
visas, family reunification, and education and labor opportunities, among others.
Asylum intake patterns in 2022
During our visit, COMAR’s Tapachula offices were intaking some 250 asylum seekers per day,
although that number is sometimes several times higher on Mondays. Stakeholders were
unanimous in telling us of an increase in the number of Venezuelans, Cubans, and Nicaraguans
arriving by land this year. They also noted an increase in extra-continental migrants and asylum
seekers, largely from African countries.
In part, these movements reflect trends apparent in 2021, which saw significant increases in the
number of Venezuelans, Cubans, and Nicaraguans requesting asylum in Mexico and detained
in Mexico (a total of 26,705 people of these nationalities were apprehended by Mexican
authorities in 2021, a more than tenfold increase from the 2,204 Venezuelans, Cubans,
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19 Struggling to Survive June 2022
and Nicaraguans detained in 2020). However, more recent reported upticks in the number
of Venezuelans arriving in Tapachula in particular would seem also to be a consequence of
Mexico’s new visa requirements for Venezuelans, imposed in January 2022 following reported
requests from the United States, which block air travel to many Venezuelan migrants and
hence drive more Venezuelans to migrate north by land through Central America and Mexico.
Mexico similarly imposed visa requirements on nationals of Brazil and Ecuador in 2021 in
response to increasing arrivals from those countries at the U.S. southern border.
More Cubans are also arriving in Mexico, in part due to Nicaragua’s lifting of visa requirements
for Cubans in November 2021, enabling them to fly to Nicaragua to continue their journey
north. COMAR’s asylum applications reflect these shifts in nationalities, with more Cubans
requesting asylum in Mexico in the first four months of 2022 (8,445) than in all of 2021
(8,298), while 4,270 Venezuelans requested protection in this same period, as compared to
6,192 in all of 2021. In the first four months of 2022, 841 people from Senegal also requested
protection in Mexico.
The land route from South America to Mexico passes through the notorious Darién Gap that
connects Colombia to Panama, a migratory corridor known for extreme levels of lawlessness
and violence (including rape), robbery and extorsion, deaths from exposure to extreme
conditions, and other life-threatening and trauma-inducing conditions. In November 2021,
Doctors without Borders reported that since April of that year they had attended 288 victims
of sexual violence in the Darién Gap in their reception centers and with the Panamanian
Ministry of Health, estimating that this represented only a quarter of the actual cases. U.S.,
Mexican, or other regional migration policies that channel larger numbers of people through
this route thus will necessarily have extremely severe negative effects on the lives of migrants
and asylum seekers.
CLP_AR_004879
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20 Struggling to Survive June 2022
Finally, we note that COMAR may acquire a large new portfolio of work stemming from a
proposed General Law on Forced Displacement that has passed in Mexico’s House of
Representatives and is now under consideration in the Senate. This law would recognize
and create a system for attending to Mexico’s own large population of internally displaced
people (IDPs), with tens of thousands of people displaced in large-scale movements in 2021
alone and potentially hundreds of thousands displaced in total in recent years. Under the
proposed legislation, COMAR will become the institution in charge of implementing the law
and supporting the IDP population. However, WOLA was told that the agency’s plan is to
keep its refugee and IDP functions as separate as possible, ensuring separate structures and
budgets to cover both. It remains to be seen if the law passes in its current form and how
implementation and funding of the law will play out in practice. The Mexican Senate ended its
normal legislative session in late April 2022 without moving forward with the legislation.
The “prison city”: migrants and asylum seekers caught between a rock and a hard place
Recalling that Chiapas is Mexico’s poorest state and Tapachula is a city of some 350,000
residents, it is unsurprising that foreign nationals’ need for jobs surpass Tapachula’s labor
market. As was described to us repeatedly during our visit, migrants and asylum seekers in
Tapachula also tend to face obstacles to accessing healthcare, education, and housing, as well
as experiencing racial discrimination and abuses by authorities, including arbitrary detention.
Language barriers and racism faced by Haitian and other Afro-descendant and indigenous
migrants have further impeded their access to public services. WOLA staff conversations
with a Spanish-speaking Haitian asylum seeker also made clear that language barriers impact
Haitians’ ability to access and understand Mexico’s asylum system, as has been documented
by several civil society organizations. These circumstances make clear that, as thousands of
people continue to arrive and ask for protection, authorities must remove existing obstacles
to dignified living conditions in the city, improve access to services for non-Spanish-speaking
“In our group [of migrants crossing the Darién Gap], one man fell… I don’t know how
he managed to grab onto something, because if he had fallen to the bottom there,
he would have died. […] [On the path] you see things, you see dead bodies, you see
everything people have left behind, because you get to a point where even your own
clothes weigh you down from the sweat. […] At a certain point, I couldn’t breathe…
I said, ‘go on ahead, I’m going to stay here a while…’ […] And when I woke up, there
were only two people there… they said they hadn’t left because they saw that I was
still breathing. Because I had lost consciousness completely. […] We walked and
walked and walked and walked and walked and walked…”
-Frantz, Haitian asylum seeker
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21 Struggling to Survive June 2022
migrants, address institutional racism, and reform the containment policy so that Tapachula is
no longer a prison city for people on the move.
A migrant or asylum seeker’s stay in Tapachula is marked by arbitrary rules and long wait times
that leave them in a constant state of uncertainty. INM agents and the National Guard operate
fixed and moving checkpoints in and around the city, as well as conducting raids, particularly at
night, in which they detain migrants for alleged failure to demonstrate their permission to be
in Mexico. In reality, detentions have swept up people with legal permission to be in Mexico,
including asylum seekers. Service providers told us that security forces will target a certain park
or hotel to raid, and sometimes ask to see even bystanders’ identifications; we heard accounts
of such authorities destroying asylum seekers’ documents that proved that they were lawfully
present or had ongoing cases.
Those detained may be imprisoned for weeks or more in INM detention centers, where,
according to civil society investigations, INM agents regularly pressure asylum seekers to
abandon their cases—and some, desperate to be released from detention, opt to do so. As
mentioned, an alternatives-to-detention program, albeit an imperfect one, has existed since
2016, but the INM has greatly curtailed access to the program since 2020. Detention of asylum
seekers deprives them of a wide variety of rights, separates families, exacerbates trauma, and
makes it much more difficult for them to continue their asylum cases with due process.
Even the many asylum seekers who are able to avoid detention and live in Tapachula face safety
risks that include extortion by authorities and attacks by criminals. Tapachula’s close proximity
to Guatemala means that gang members can easily show up there, and service providers told
us of cases in which asylum seekers had been found by members of the Central American
gangs from which they had fled in the first place. Although a request can be made for COMAR
to transfer cases to a COMAR office in another state for security reasons, it is a cumbersome
process requiring the asylum seeker to present detailed documentation of the risk.
Beyond safety concerns, day to day living conditions are often untenable, aggravated by the
bureaucracy of the processes required to regularize one’s migratory status. Desperation was
palpable the day that members of WOLA and the Fray Matías Center visited the overflowing
line of migrants waiting all day in direct sunlight and sweltering heat outside an INM office for
a chance at an appointment, a pattern often repeated day after day.
“In the raids [to detain migrants], authorities commit serious abuses, there is a lot of
violence even against women, girls, boys, adolescents…”
-Brenda Ochoa, Director of the Fray Matías de Córdova Human Rights Center
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22 Struggling to Survive June 2022
Migrants and asylum seekers waiting for appointments outside the National Migration Institute
Most asylum seekers need income to survive. However, existing employment opportunities
in the formal sector are insufficient and require that people have documentation showing
their permission to work in Mexico—though employers may balk at hiring migrants even
when presented with humanitarian visas. Some asylum seekers set up stands or other informal
businesses to provide goods and services to the population, but municipal authorities sometimes
clear them out of certain parks or areas, making it harder for them to earn income.
Sign that prohibits migrants from selling their wares in a plaza in Tapachula
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23 Struggling to Survive June 2022
Mexico’s Welfare Ministry (Secretaría de Bienestar) runs a program for asylum seekers and other
migrants seeking regularization in which it provides them with cash support in exchange for
several hours of volunteer work through its Social Emergency Program (Programa de Emergencia
Social). Participating migrants take part in construction, planting, cleaning, translating, and other
jobs. Officials in charge of the program in Tapachula told WOLA that enrolled migrants generally
remain in Tapachula throughout the duration of their regularization processes. However, the
program does not have the capacity to include all the asylum seekers and migrants who seek
to participate: we were told in March 2022 that it covered approximately 1,400 people in
Tapachula. The day of our visit, a crowd of people was lined up at the door of the program’s
headquarters, seeking to enroll.
Asylum seekers face steep obstacles in access to housing. Shelters in Tapachula lack the
capacity to house the arriving population, and local landlords have taken advantage of increased
migration levels to charge usurious rates to rent apartments or rooms, including charging per
person for renting shared rooms between groups of people.
Healthcare is another right that many migrants and asylum seekers are prevented from
accessing. Service providers and asylum seekers told WOLA that hospitals and other healthcare
providers require identification and ask for documentation that asylum seekers may not have,
especially if they have arrived recently. Service providers expressed particular concern for
the situation of women, including pregnant women and non-Spanish speakers. Those who
require care unavailable in Tapachula face difficulties in accessing it; partners told us that it is
complicated to obtain permission to bring a migrant even as far as the capital city of Chiapas
state. In addition to physical ailments or injuries, migrants and asylum seekers frequently need
psychological healthcare after surviving trauma along the migratory route.
To help address asylum seekers’ need for services in Tapachula, UNHCR provides direct assistance
to them after an initial interview to identify their needs, a process facilitated by the opening in
March 2021 of the Center to Support Refugees (Centro de Atención a Refugiados, CAR), which
operates next to COMAR’s registration center. However, the scope of this program depends
on the availability of resources, which are currently insufficient. UNHCR seeks to support
asylum seekers with school inscription, protection against threats to their safety, psychosocial
attention, access to healthcare and medicines, and orientation about available migrant shelters
and other support mechanisms.
Certain migrant and asylum-seeking groups face particularly acute situations, especially as
migrants have become more visible and vulnerable to local xenophobia. It is not uncommon
for longstanding Tapachula residents to reject the presence of migrants in the city because of
the perception that they are taking jobs from the local people.
“My 6-year-old daughter had an accident… Here at the hospital, they didn’t want to
perform surgery on her; they said that they couldn’t send her to a different hospital
because I was an immigrant…”
-“Maria,” Honduran asylum seeker
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24 Struggling to Survive June 2022
There is an insufficient offer of adapted public services for migrants who do not speak Spanish.
In the case of families from countries where Spanish is not a common language, women are
especially likely to face language barriers that further reduce their access to services. This leads
to patterns in which women’s access to services is dependent on male relatives’ liaising with
authorities.
As mentioned, Haitian migrants and asylum seekers face anti-Black discrimination as well as
frequent language barriers. An investigation by the Center for Gender and Refugee Studies,
IMUMI, and Haitian Bridge Alliance found that “[f]ew to none of the immigration officials or
non-governmental service providers in Tapachula speak Kreyol, and as a result, Haitian migrants
have difficulty understanding the immigration system and how to access the networks of legal
and humanitarian services available to them.” By December 2021, COMAR’s Tapachula office
had increased its number of Haitian Creole interpreters from two to eight, but concerns persist
about how Haitian cases are processed. Legal service providers signal that the notably low
rates of asylum grants for Haitians bely insufficient analysis of their cases, especially given the
high rates of approvals for other nationalities whose countries of origin suffer from generalized
violence or crises. Beyond the asylum process itself, Haitian migrants report experiencing
racism from both authorities and the local population.
During WOLA’s visit, we were struck by the fact that multiple institutional actors expressed
that asylum seekers of Haitian nationality or descent were unlikely to qualify for asylum. While
we understand that they were referencing a pattern of secondary movements by Haitians who
had previously migrated to South American countries (which differs from a ‘typical’ asylum case
in which a person flees directly from their country of persecution), we recall that domestic
and international asylum law require an individualized evaluation of each person’s case. We
also note that growing numbers of Haitians are now arriving directly from Haiti following
that country’s 2021 security, political, and natural crises. Furthermore, unlike asylum claims
from Honduras, Venezuela, and El Salvador, which are generally processed using the standards
outlined in the Cartagena Declaration, COMAR has not designated Haiti as a country whose
nationals have access to this differentiated asylum procedure.
Given all of the conditions described above, migrants and asylum seekers in Tapachula
increasingly protest in a variety of ways to call for permission to leave Tapachula and regularize
their migratory status; the caravans attempting to leave the city are one clear expression of
this. In order to bring attention to the desperate situation they are facing, migrants have sewn
their lips together, gone on hunger strikes, chained themselves, and marched with crosses.
On March 11, 2022, during president Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s visit to Tapachula,
migrants protested outside a military base where the president held his daily news conference.
Those 150 migrants were told they would receive humanitarian visas by the end of the day,
in addition to approximately 800 migrants who were given documents in the days leading up
to the president’s visit, according to immigration authorities. These numbers are just a small
fraction of the tens of thousands of foreign nationals waiting in Tapachula.
“The paperwork… they keep you going round in circles to see if you get tired.”
-Frantz, Haitian asylum seeker
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25 Struggling to Survive June 2022
Asylum seekers and migrants defend their rights not just by protesting, but also by providing direct
assistance to other asylum seekers and migrants and by advocating with relevant authorities.
As always, non-governmental organizations and migrant shelters also continue to be on the
front lines of providing migrants with legal representation and humanitarian assistance, as well
as documenting abuses against them. Throughout 2020 and 2021, the organizations that
form part of the Southeast Mexico Human Rights Observation and Monitoring Collective
have been documenting abuses against migrants and asylum seekers throughout the region
and monitoring INM and National Guard actions during caravans and other moments of mass
movements of migrants.
The inspiring work done by partners on the ground in Tapachula and elsewhere in Chiapas,
and the tireless struggle of migrants and asylum seekers themselves, have led to growing
recognition of the crisis caused by Mexico’s attempts to contain tens of thousands of vulnerable
people at its southern border. Until reforms are made, however, asylum seekers in Tapachula
will continue to face what multiple interviewees described to us as a “system to wear people
down” (política de desgaste)—a combination of norms, arbitrary actions, inefficiencies, and lack
of capacity that traps people in a prolonged limbo of uncertainty, risk, and precarious conditions.
This situation represents the worst of all worlds: it increases the suffering and vulnerability of
asylum seekers while doing nothing to sustainably or constructively manage migratory flows
or advance a regionally shared plan to provide protection to those who need it.
Patio of the Fray Matías de Córdova Human Rights Center
“[The police] arrived, they broke open the door, and they said, ‘down,’ pointing at us
with guns, anti-gang police they’re called here… They took us to an empty lot and
they started beating us… and asking us what gang we belonged to, what cartel, what
organization…”
-Nelson, Nicaraguan asylum seeker
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26 Struggling to Survive June 2022
“I went to the park and I could identify the people who didn’t speak Spanish. And I said
to them, ‘what do you need?’ Like one patient asking another patient, ‘what do you
need?’ And one says, ‘I don’t understand the paperwork,’ because sometimes [the au-
thorities] give you a document and you have to read it and you don’t understand. ‘Oh,
no? I’ll translate for you.’ Pretty soon, I had 20, 30 people waiting for me to translate
for them… So, I started helping people… […] And soon, every day I would get up…
and go to the park… to Fray Matías [Human Rights Center]… to COMAR… Sometimes
I would lose my voice by the time I got home. Because I was so hoarse from the work
that we had done.”
-Frantz, Haitian asylum seeker
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27 Struggling to Survive June 2022
U.S. influence on people’s access to protection in Mexico stems from both U.S. support for
Mexico’s asylum system and overall U.S. migration policy—two frameworks that do not
necessarily align with one another.
U.S. government support to Mexico’s asylum system and efforts to address root causes
The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) manages
U.S. support for access to asylum in Mexico and Central America, focusing on humanitarian
assistance, capacity-building, and diplomatic engagement.16 The U.S. government is the largest
financial supporter of UNHCR activities in Mexico: in 2021, UNHCR Mexico reported a U.S.
contribution of $38,715,766, which constituted 77 percent of total UNHCR contributions
earmarked for Mexico in 2021. In turn, UNHCR funds a large share of COMAR’s work, enabling
it to operate with significantly more staff than it could with its domestic budget.
While such U.S. support has been ongoing over a number of years, the U.S. Congress has
recently reinforced the need to invest in Mexico’s asylum processing capacity in the face of
its overwhelming caseload, including language linked to U.S. foreign assistance specifying the
need to support COMAR and INM “to improve intake facilities and asylum case management
and processing.”17
In a letter sent to Secretary of State Antony Blinken in March 2021, 19 members of Congress
stated that Mexico’s asylum system “merits priority attention”:
While Mexico’s refugee agency, Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados
(COMAR), has improved its processing capacity, asylum seekers continue to
face inadequate screening for protection concerns by migration enforcement
officials, poor conditions in detention centers, and long processing times. […]
U.S.-Mexico cooperation should seek to improve access to protection in
Mexico, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and civil society organizations, by increasing COMAR’s
presence throughout the country, supporting alternatives to detention for
asylum seekers, and further improving COMAR’s capacity.
In July 2021, the White House published its Collaborative Migration Management Strategy
(CMMS), which lays out eight lines of action through which the U.S. government seeks a
comprehensive regional approach to migration. One of these is “Expand Access to International
Protection,” an area in which the Biden administration specifically cites cooperation with
Mexico, stating:
The United States will support regional government efforts to strengthen
and expand their asylum systems to provide vulnerable individuals with
U.S. GOVERNMENT ENGAGEMENT
WITH MEXICO ON ACCESS TO
PROTECTION FOR REFUGEES
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28 Struggling to Survive June 2022
protection… […] For example, since 2016, the Mexican Commission for
Refugee Assistance has expanded dramatically with U.S. support, opening
new field offices and tripling its annual case processing capacity. The United
States will continue to work with Mexico to build on this success and with
other regional governments to help expand their asylum systems.
The CMMS also points to Mexico as an example of the need for strong internal relocation and
resettlement programs:
The United States will support inclusion and integration programs that
ensure individuals can access livelihood opportunities, services, healthcare,
and education, and can develop roots in their new communities. The United
States will look to expand successful ongoing integration efforts, such as
a program that relocates protection recipients from southern Mexico to
industrial belt municipalities in Mexico with labor needs.
In line with the CMMS, U.S. embassy officials in Mexico City told WOLA that the embassy, led by
U.S. Ambassador Ken Salazar, advocates with Mexican authorities for migration management
that includes, among other components, addressing the root causes of migration, attending to
the displaced population, effective asylum processing, and modernized border infrastructure.
The Biden administration has made especially clear that it seeks to address the root causes
of forced migration, particularly from Central America. The White House published its
multifaceted Root Causes Strategy along with the CMMS in July 2021. For its part, Mexico’s
federal government is implementing social programs in northern Central America through its
international development agency, AMEXCID (Agencia Mexicana de Cooperación Internacional
para el Desarrollo). These programs largely replicate the Mexican government’s signature
domestic social programs “Sowing Life” (Sembrando Vida, a program that pays participants to
plant trees) and Youth Constructing the Future (Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro, a paid internship
program for young people). AMEXCID reports that its programs dramatically decrease Central
American participants’ plans to emigrate, although investigations have denounced irregularities
in the implementation of these programs in Mexico. USAID and AMEXCID are coordinating
certain assistance in Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador within a framework known as
“Sowing Opportunities” (Sembrando Oportunidades).
Beyond the actions described above, there is a need to improve U.S.-Mexico collaboration to
protect specific groups of people who arrive in Mexico with protection needs but whose safe
and sustainable resettlement warrants relocation to the United States. This is the case, for
example, of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children trying to reunite with U.S.-based family
members. Such children should not be forced either to seek asylum in Mexico or to migrate
north in hiding when it is clearly in their best interest to join their relatives in the United States.
In other cases, families or individuals may have compelling safety reasons to seek protection
in the United States rather than in Mexico. Identifying such cases and facilitating a pathway
to request protection in the United States would avoid the need for these groups to be
processed by Mexico’s asylum system when ultimately Mexico will not be a viable destination
for them.
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29 Struggling to Survive June 2022
U.S. migration policies and Mexico: a failed attempt to deter largely forced migration
Despite its financial support for Mexico’s asylum system, overall U.S. migration policy under the
Biden administration has followed that of previous administrations and prioritized reducing the
number of migrants and asylum seekers crossing the Mexico-U.S. border. U.S. actions have
included prolonging Title 42, the Trump-era anti-asylum policy that blocks or expels asylum
seekers back into Mexico without a chance to request protection; asking Mexican authorities
to crack down on northward-bound migration through Mexico; and requesting Mexico to
implement increased visa requirements for other nationalities. This overall context helps to
explain Mexico’s harsh and arbitrary enforcement of its asylum seeker containment policy
in Tapachula, failure to facilitate a greater number of humanitarian visas to migrants, large
numbers of migrant detentions (with a record 307,679 in 2021), and continued militarization
of migration enforcement along its borders.
Such U.S. strategies are not new. As WOLA has reported previously, in response to the surge of
unaccompanied minors from Central America in 2014 (during the administration of president
Barack Obama), the U.S. government backed Mexico’s Southern Border Program, which
increased apprehensions and deportations of migrants traveling through Mexico’s southern
border region. In 2019, when migrant arrivals increased at the U.S. border once more, then-
president Trump threatened to impose tariffs on Mexican goods if Mexican authorities did
not tighten migration enforcement, which resulted in the Mexican government’s agreement
to deploy the National Guard at its borders to crack down on migration (a policy in place
in Mexico today). In addition to this containment role centered on blocking migrants’ paths
through Mexico, Mexico’s federal government under López Obrador has accepted unlawful
and counterproductive U.S. anti-asylum programs in its territory, including Title 42 expulsions
and the Remain in Mexico program, which forces select U.S.-bound asylum seekers to wait in
Mexico for their immigration hearings. The Biden administration even flew Central American
nationals on expulsion flights to Tapachula and Villahermosa, Tabasco state during several
months in 2021, where Mexican immigration agents and National Guard troops forced
them to cross into Guatemala without the opportunity to request asylum in Mexico, violating
international law and placing people in danger of what the UN has termed “chain refoulement.”
These sorts of policies increase risks to asylum seekers and create obstacles and delays in
their access to protection in either Mexico or the United States. What they do not do is
end forced migration. As shown by WOLA’s analysis of trends in U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) southwest border encounters over the past decade, crackdowns do not lead
to sustainable reductions in migration. As pointed out by the American Immigration Council,
U.S. government strategies centered on deterrence, blocking, family separation, and detention
of migrants and asylum seekers follow a cyclical pattern in which they have “temporarily
suppressed arrivals, but the push factors in home countries and drivers of migration have
remained. Within a few years of each punitive policy’s implementation, there was another
increase in people coming to the border.”
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*Note that FY2020 and FY2021 data, in particular, overestimate total migrants encountered. This occurs due to increased
repeat crossings prompted by Title 42 border expulsions. For instance, the total number of individuals encountered in FY2021 is
likely just over one million. Source of FY2021 data: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters.
Source of FY2006-FY2020 data: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/media-resources/stats.
During our visit to Tapachula, numerous counterparts stated that Mexican authorities’
reluctance to expand access to legal migration pathways outside the asylum system, such as
visas for humanitarian or public interest reasons, has stemmed in part from opposition by the
U.S. government, as temporary legal status for migrants in Mexico has been viewed as a factor
that would increase arrivals at the U.S. border. Ironically, however, to the extent that current
practices make it difficult to obtain legal status in Mexico (and hence to resettle in Mexico
with access to work, school, and other services), migrants who otherwise would seek to make
their lives in Mexico may instead be pushed to continue north to the United States. At the
same time, migrants and asylum seekers determined to set out for the United States due to
family connections or other needs will continue to do so both on their own and through the
networks of smugglers who fill this demand.
Against this backdrop, it is urgent for the U.S. and Mexican governments, as well as other
governments of the region, to recognize the counterproductive nature of deterrence and
containment policies as responses to forced migration—and especially as responses to families
and individuals fleeing life-threatening conditions in their home countries.
A concrete opportunity to do so will occur shortly after the publication of this report at the
Ninth Summit of the Americas, hosted by the U.S. government in June 2022 in Los Angeles.
While not one of the Summit’s official themes, regional cooperation on migration will be one of
the focus issues of the Summit, which comes after Biden administration officials’ participation
in ministerial meetings on regional migration management in Colombia in October 2021 and
Panama in April 2022, as well as numerous bilateral meetings with Mexican and other officials,
including the signing of bilateral arrangements on migration and protection with Panama and
Costa Rica. Ahead of the Summit, a coalition of civil society organizations, including WOLA,
have laid out a set of guiding principles for regional migration cooperation, centering human
rights, access to protection, and sustainable solutions to forced displacement.
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31 Struggling to Survive June 2022
Like regional forced migration in general, migration to and through Tapachula will not diminish
anytime soon, and certainly will not decrease through deterrence-based tactics that only
serve to put more suffering and danger in migrants’ and asylum seekers’ paths. On the
contrary, policies designed to block migration through Mexico, such as the growing list of visa
restrictions for South American countries that prevent people from flying into Mexico, force
more people from these countries to cross north by land through treacherous routes. This
inescapable reality highlights the need to make good on government pledges to prioritize
access to protection in regional migration management, alleviating the human suffering in
places like Tapachula and developing sustainable solutions for the migrant population.
In the case of Tapachula, guaranteeing access to asylum requires ensuring that arriving families
and individuals can safely and immediately file their asylum claims and that authorities in charge
of border crossing points, intake, and processing are from appropriate agencies and attend
to the needs of this population as required by Mexican and international law. It also requires
diversifying responses to the migrant population, recognizing that arriving people have different
needs and that Mexican law provides for regularization for a number of reasons—not just due
to filing an asylum claim.
Mexican authorities must take decisive steps to end abuses and discrimination by authorities
against the asylum-seeking and migrant population. This includes curbing arbitrary detentions
by the INM and the military, investigating allegations of abuse against migrants and asylum
seekers and sanctioning those agents found responsible, and ensuring access to basic services.
Finally, in addition to taking needed steps to promptly resolve asylum claims, the Mexican
government should cease holding asylum seekers in Tapachula and reform its state-based
containment policy to allow asylum seekers to access work and dignified living conditions in
other parts of Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS
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32 Struggling to Survive June 2022
To the Mexican government:
• Guarantee that asylum-seeking families, children, and adults arriving at Mexico’s
southern border can request protection at official ports of entry. This could be done by
stationing COMAR personnel at ports of entry to register asylum claims. To the extent that
ports of entry continue to be manned by INM agents, these agents should be instructed to
admit asylum seekers and facilitate their access to COMAR without automatic detention,
and mechanisms should be established to monitor and guarantee compliance with these
obligations. Arriving asylum seekers should immediately receive documents indicating that
they have permission to be in Mexico, avoiding scenarios in which people are forced to
cross irregularly and make their way to COMAR.
• End the practice of containing asylum seekers in Tapachula. It is illegal and untenable
to forcibly contain tens of thousands of asylum seekers in a single city for months or
years, much less one that is ill-equipped to provide them with adequate public services and
employment opportunities. The federal government should reform the official state-based
containment policy currently established in administrative regulations, promptly allowing
asylum seekers to move to different states in order to find work, reunite with family, and
otherwise begin integration processes. COMAR should strengthen its ability to transfer
asylum cases between its offices.
• End detention of asylum seekers except where compelling reasons exist for such a
measure, as foreseen in international law. Detention should be exceptional and based
only on an analysis of the need for such a measure in the individual case. Unnecessary
detention dissuades asylum claims, causes people to desist from existing requests, makes
it more difficult to pursue ongoing cases, and causes needless suffering, economic impacts,
and health consequences for the detained people and their family members. (We define
“detention” as housing people inside government or other facilities from which they are
not free to leave, regardless of the institution in charge of such facilities or the terms used
under Mexican law to describe such deprivation of liberty.)
• Provide humanitarian and other visas as foreseen in Mexican law. The National
Migration Institute should make available humanitarian and other visas to those who qualify
for them based on any of the grounds set out in domestic law. Asylum seekers who have
submitted their claim before COMAR should be promptly provided with a humanitarian
visa (TVRH).
• Develop a coordinated system amongst Mexican agencies for the asylum process.
Instead of pursuing legal processes before COMAR and the INM, asylum seekers should only
have to provide their information once. Since applying for asylum entitles the applicant to a
TVRH, this should automatically be processed and issued based on the asylum application
filed with COMAR.
• Ensure access to healthcare, schools, and other basic services. Authorities in these
sectors should receive all necessary guidelines on guaranteeing registration and access of
migrant children, families, and adults to vital services, and officials should promptly investigate
reports of exclusion from such services and implement corrective measures. In particular,
RECOMMENDATIONS
CLP_AR_004892
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33 Struggling to Survive June 2022
accusations of discrimination by Mexican officials against women, Afro-descendant,
indigenous, or other migrants should be investigated and adequately addressed.
• Maximize integration and resettlement programs. This crucial component of the
migration and refugee process is the subject of ongoing and pilot programs coordinated
by UNHCR. Mexican authorities should continue to collaborate with these efforts as well
as strengthening their domestic inter-agency coordination and programming to ensure
that growing numbers of asylum seekers, refugees, and other migrants are able not only
to relocate, but also to integrate into a range of Mexican cities and states, providing a
sustainable response to forced migration.
• Increase government funding and support for COMAR. Mexico received the third highest
number of asylum requests worldwide for 2021. In spite of this, COMAR’s 2022 budget
remains essentially unchanged. While UNHCR provides crucial support and resources for
COMAR, the Mexican government must also do its part. Insufficient resources contribute
to long processing times, overworked staff, a lack of interpreters to support asylum seekers
who speak indigenous languages and Haitian Creole, and limits on COMAR’s presence
along Mexico’s southern border.
• Hold Mexican migration agents and security forces accountable for abuses against
migrants and asylum seekers. Mexican and international civil society organizations have
documented widespread abuses against migrants and asylum seekers in southern Mexico
by INM agents, members of the military and National Guard, and police forces, as has
the CNDH in a growing number of cases. Afro-descendant migrants, particularly Haitian
migrants, have also faced racism and discrimination by Mexican authorities. The failure to
hold agents accountable for their actions facilitates the perpetration of further abuses.
To the U.S. government:
• Ensure that migration cooperation with Mexico and other countries prioritizes
access to protection and solutions for the forcibly displaced population, rather than
a counterproductive focus on blocking the paths of migrants and asylum seekers.
Measures such as border militarization, increases in detentions, and visa requirements
produce changes in migration patterns, but a sustainable reduction in forced migration
is not one of these changes. Approaches centered on deterrence and detention push
migrants and asylum seekers to dangerous and hidden routes, increase demand and profits
for human smugglers, and increase suffering and loss of life among people on the move.
Families, children, and adults will continue to be displaced and to migrate as long as violence,
extreme poverty, climate disasters, and other factors leave them no realistic path to safety
and survival at home. Only by offering options for short- and long-term resettlement can
the governments of the region stabilize the crisis of forced displacement, bring migrants
and asylum seekers out of hiding, cut profits to organized criminal groups, and ensure
protection for vulnerable families and individuals.
• Work with Mexican authorities to identify and facilitate access to the United States
for unaccompanied children seeking to reunite with U.S.-based family members and
for people who cannot resettle in Mexico due to risks deriving from their concrete
situation. Even with improvements to its asylum system, Mexico is not a logical destination
for all individuals. People arriving in Mexico who identify the United States as their destination
CLP_AR_004893
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34 Struggling to Survive June 2022
and who have compelling reasons to seek protection there, such as reunification with adult
family members, should be supported in doing so.
• Continue to provide robust funding to support access to protection in Mexico, while
upholding national and international law on the ability to access asylum in the United
States. The United States continues to be the largest donor for UNHCR in Mexico, providing
almost $39 million in assistance in 2021. Additional support to COMAR and international
organizations operating in Mexico has been provided through the State Department’s
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.
CLP_AR_004894
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35 Struggling to Survive June 2022
1
The Cartagena Declaration is a regional agreement on refugees specific to Latin America. It delin-
eates broader grounds for refugee status that include threats of generalized violence and disturbance of
public order.
2
Law on Refugees, art. 13.II.
3
Law on Refugees, art. 28.
4
Regulations of the Law on Refugees, art. 16.
5
Law on Refugees, art. 18.
6
Law on Refugees, art. 7; Regulations of the Law on Refugees, art. 22.
7
Law on Refugees, art. 23.
8
Law on Refugees, art. 24.
9
Regulations of the Law on Refugees, art. 38.
10
Regulations of the Law on Refugees, art. 23.
11
These and all asylum statistics quoted subsequently come from COMAR’s monthly information
bulletin, as updated through May 1, 2022, at: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/722490/
Cierre_Abril-2022__1-Mayo_.pdf, except for data on women and children, which are updated as of Febru-
ary 2022 and are available here: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/707121/02_MUJERES_
NNA_Febrero-2022.pdf and here: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/706715/Cierre_Febre-
ro-2022__1-Marzo_.pdf.
12
The National Guard is a militarized security force proposed by Mexican president Andrés Manu-
el López Obrador and created by law in 2019. It replaced the Federal Police and was announced as a new
force to prevent crime and maintain public security, formally housed within the Ministry of Security and
Citizen Protection (Secretaría de Seguridad y Protección Ciudadana, SSPC). Despite formally belonging to a
civilian ministry, the National Guard is under the operational control of the Ministry of Defense (Secretaría de
la Defensa Nacional, SEDENA) and is composed primarily of members of the armed forces. President López
Obrador has announced that he will propose the formal incorporation of the National Guard into SEDENA,
which would constitute the final step in the militarization of federal policing tasks in Mexico. The deployment
of the National Guard to Mexico’s border with Guatemala began in 2019, as part of the Mexican govern-
ment’s June 2019 agreement with the Trump administration to increase immigration enforcement.
13
See, for example, Law on Refugees, art. 20.
14
Migration Law (Ley de Migración), art. 52.V.
15
COMAR’s annual budget can be viewed at line N00 of the Ministry of the Interior’s annual budget,
available at: https://www.pef.hacienda.gob.mx/work/models/aVbnZty0/PEF2022/kgp8l9cM/docs/04/r04_aae.
pdf (2022) and https://www.pef.hacienda.gob.mx/work/models/PEF2021/docs/04/r04_aae.pdf (2021).
16
According to the PRM website: “PRM support in the region aims to address the humanitarian needs
of vulnerable migrants, internally displaced persons, asylum seekers, and refugees, in support of national
government responses. PRM funding supports programming in the following sectors: protection (including
child protection and GBV prevention and response); emergency and cash based initiatives; shelter; water,
health, and sanitation; and livelihood programming. The Bureau funds its traditional partners, including the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and NGOs (in limited locations).”
17
The joint explanatory statement accompanying the FY2022 omnibus appropriations legislation
incorporates these instructions set out on page 119 of House Report 117-84. The same document notes
troubling reports “that agents in Mexico’s National Migration Agency have committed human rights viola-
tions and have not been held accountable.” Ibid.
ENDNOTES
CLP_AR_004895
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 208 of 1047

ABOUT WOLA
WOLA is a leading research and advocacy organization advancing human rights in the Americas.
We envision a future where public policies in the Americas protect human rights, recognize
human dignity, and where justice overcomes violence.
WOLA.ORG | 1666 CONNECTICUT AVE NW, SUITE 400, WASHINGTON DC 20009|
202-797-2171
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Stephanie Brewer is the Director for Mexico and Migrant Rights at WOLA. Lesly
Tejada is the Program Assistant for the Mexico and Migration & Border Security
programs at WOLA. Maureen Meyer serves as WOLA’s Vice President for
Programs.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report would not have been possible without the generous support of the
Open Society Foundations.
CLP_AR_004896
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Informe anual del Marco Integral
Regional para la Protección y Soluciones
MIRPS 2022
CLP_AR_004948
9-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 210 of 1047

Informe anual del Marco Integral
Regional para la Protección y Soluciones
MIRPS 2022
CLP_AR_004949
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CRÉDITOS
Se reconocen las contribuciones de la Presidencia Pro-tempore
Honduras 2022, los equipos técnicos nacionales de los países
MIRPS y sus socios en la elaboración de este informe.
PRODUCCIÓN
Presidencia Pro-tempore Honduras 2022, Equipos técnicos
nacionales del MIRPS, Secretaría Técnica ACNUR-OEA (Oficina
Regional del ACNUR para las Américas y Departamento de Inclusión
Social, Secretaría de Acceso a Derechos y Equidad de la OEA).
Los gráficos en esta publicación no implican la expresión de
ninguna opinión por parte de los gobiernos de países MIRPS ni sus
socios, con respecto al estatus legal de ningún país o territorio, o la
delimitación de fronteras.
Portada: © UNHCR/Diana Diaz

Con el apoyo de la Secretaría Técnica
ÍNDICE
PRESENTACIÓN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CONTEXTO REGIONAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
TRABAJO REGIONAL MIRPS
PLAN REGIONAL 2022. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
01. Actualización de los planes de acción nacional y grupos

de coordinación nacional. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
02. Diálogo acerca de las causas subyacentes

del desplazamiento. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
03. Grupos de trabajo y espacios políticos OEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
04. Alianzas con socios estratégicos. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
MIRPS EN ACCIÓN
AVANCES NACIONALES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Belice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Costa Rica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
El Salvador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Guatemala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Honduras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
México . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Panamá . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
PLATAFORMA DE APOYO AL MIRPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
CLP_AR_004950
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INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
MIRPS 2022
4
5
ACRÓNIMOS
GENERALES
ACNUR: Alto Comisionado de Naciones
Unidas para los Refugiados
BCIE: Banco Centroamericano de Integración
Económica
BID: Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
CAJP: Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y
Políticos de la OEA
CAM: Comisión de Asuntos Migratorios de la OEA
CENTROESTAD: Comisión Centroamericana
de Estadística del SICA
CEPAL: Comisión Económica para América
Latina y el Caribe
CGLU: Ciudades y Gobiernos Locales Unidos
CICR: Comité internacional de la Cruz Roja
CIDI: Consejo Interamericano para el
Desarrollo Integral
COI: Información de país de origen
CONARE: Comisión Nacional para Refugiados
COVID-19: Virus SARS-CoV-2
CRM: Conferencia Regional sobre Migración
(GRF por sus siglas en inglés)
CSAN: Comité de Selección de Alto Nivel del
Fondo MIRPS
DIS: Departamento de Inclusión Social de la OEA
ETN: Equipo técnico nacional del MIRPS
FMR: Foro Mundial sobre los Refugiados
GI-TOC: Iniciativa Global contra el Crimen
Organizado Transnacional
LGBTIQ+: Lesbianas, Gays, Bisexuales, Trans,
Intersexo y Queer
MIRPS: Marco Integral Regional para la
Protección y Soluciones
MMC: Consejo de Alcaldes por la Migración
(Mayors Migration Council)
NNA: Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes
OEA: Organización de los Estados Americanos
OIM: Organización Internacional para las
Migraciones
OIT: Organización Internacional del Trabajo
ONU: Organización de las Naciones Unidas
PDD: Plataforma sobre Desplazamiento por
Desastres PPT: Presidencia Pro-tempore
PNUD: Programa de las Naciones Unidas para
el Desarrollo
SART: Sistemas de Alerta y Respuesta Temprana
SICA: Sistema de la Integración
Centroamericana
UE: Unión Europea
UNICEF: Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para
la Infancia
VBG: Violencia basada en género
BELICE
MSMEs: Micro, pequeñas y medianas
empresas
COSTA RICA
CCSS: Caja Costarricense del Seguro Social
IMAS: Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social
EL SALVADOR
DAV: Dirección de Atención a Víctimas
DGME: Dirección General de Migración y
Extranjería
MTPS: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social
GUATEMALA
CAI: Centro de Atención Infantil
DPI-E: Documento Personal de Identificación
Especial
DRER: Departamento de Reconocimiento de
Estatus de Refugiado
EOUM: Escuela Oficial Urbana Mixta
IGM: Instituto Guatemalteco de Migración
INEB: Instituto Nacional de Educación Básica
INTECAP: Instituto Técnico de Capacitación y
Productividad
MINEDUC: Ministerio de Educación
MINTRAB: Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión
Social
MSPAS: Ministerio de Salud Pública y
Asistencia Social
PDH: Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos
PEX: Plataforma Electrónica de Permisos de
Trabajo para Extranjeros
PGN: Procuraduría General de la Nación
SBS: Secretaría de Bienestar Social de la
Presidencia de la República
SVET: Secretaría contra la Violencia Sexual,
Explotación y Trata de Personas
HONDURAS
AMHON: Asociación de Municipios de Honduras
CIPPDV: Comisión Interinstitucional para la
Protección de Personas Desplazadas por la
Violencia
DIPPDV: Dirección General de Atención
y Protección a las Personas Desplazadas
Internamente
INM: Instituto Nacional de Migración
IP: Instituto de la Propiedad
MAHE: Mecanismo de Asistencia Humanitaria
de Emergencia
MMAHE: Mecanismo Municipal de Asistencia
Humanitaria de Emergencia
SEDH: Secretaría de Derechos Humanos
VTP: Vivienda, tierra y propiedad
MÉXICO
CAIMFS: Coordinación para la Atención
Integral de la Migración en la Frontera Sur
COMAR: Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a
Refugiados
CURP: Clave Única de Registro de Población
IMER: Instituto Mexicano de la Radio
INEA: Instituto Nacional para la Educación de
los Adultos
INM: Instituto Nacional de Migración
PNDH: Programa Nacional de Derechos
Humanos
PRONAPINNA: Programa Nacional de
Protección de Niñas, Niños y Adolescentes
RENAPO: Registro Nacional de Población
SCJN: Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación
SEGOB: Secretaría de Gobernación
SEP: Secretaría de Educación Pública
SIRE: Sistema de Información sobre Refugiados
UPMRIP: Unidad de Política Migratoria,
Registro e Identidad
PANAMÁ
CONARE: Comisión Nacional para los Refugiados
HIAS:
INADEH: Instituto Nacional de Formación
Profesional y Capacitación para el Desarrollo
Humano
ONPAR: Oficina Nacional para la Atención a
Refugiados
CLP_AR_004951
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MIRPS 2022
7
En 2022, a cinco años de la adopción de la De-
claración de San Pedro Sula, el Gobierno de
Honduras asumió la Presidencia Pro-Tempore
(PPT) del Marco Integral Regional para la Pro-
tección y Soluciones (MIRPS) con la convicción
de promover y fortalecer la coordinación y res-
puestas regionales y nacionales en materia de
prevención, protección y soluciones duraderas
para las personas refugiadas, solicitantes de la
condición de refugiado, desplazadas internas y
personas retornadas con necesidades de pro-
tección en Centroamérica y México.
Dando seguimiento a las iniciativas propicia-
das por las anteriores Presidencias, Honduras
ha promovido el diálogo político y el intercam-
bio acordado en las Declaraciones previamen-
te adoptadas, buscando fortalecer al MIRPS
como un mecanismo orientado a la acción y a
resultados de alto impacto, que se traducen en
respuestas de protección y soluciones para la
población desplazada y/o en riesgo de despla-
zamiento y las comunidades que los acogen.
El V Informe Anual presenta la visión estratégica
regional del MIRPS a partir de la actualización
de los Planes de Acción Nacional de los países
que lo conformamos: Belice, Costa Rica, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, México y Panamá,
reforzando la visibilidad y el diálogo regional
acerca de las causas subyacentes del despla-
zamiento a partir del intercambio regional en
el marco de los Grupos de Trabajo del MIRPS
y espacios políticos de la OEA, y fortaleciendo
las alianzas con socios estratégicos, incluyen-
do miembros a los de la Plataforma de Apoyo,
el Sistema de las Naciones Unidas, actores de
desarrollo, el sector privado y la sociedad civil.
El trabajo coordinado con la Plataforma de Apo-
yo ha permitido dar mayor visibilidad sobre la
situación y retos de la región en foros interna-
cionales, propiciando la generación de alianzas
con la cooperación, actores de desarrollo y
otros socios estratégicos a nivel regional.
PRESENTACIÓN
_
© UNHCR/Santiago Escobar-Jaramillo
CLP_AR_004952
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INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
MIRPS 2022
8
9
A través de los cuatro pilares del MIRPS -i) re-
cepción y admisión; ii) necesidades inmediatas;
iii) países y comunidades de acogida; y iv) solu-
ciones duraderas-, el presente informe es una
confirmación de que los países que integra-
mos el MIRPS seguiremos revisando los avan-
ces y desafíos a nivel local, nacional y regional.
Este informe también da muestra de los esfuer-
zos que se continúan propiciando a nivel de la
región para la articulación de respuestas inte-
grales en base al principio de responsabilidad
compartida en materia de prevención, protec-
ción y soluciones duraderas para las personas
refugiadas, solicitantes de la condición de re-
fugiado, desplazadas internas y personas re-
tornadas con necesidades de protección en
Centroamérica y México.
Como Presidencia Pro-Témpore saliente, Hon-
duras expresa su agradecimiento a los Estados
MIRPS, Estados y organizaciones miembros de
la Plataforma de Apoyo y Organismos Inter-
nacionales amigos, agradeciendo su apoyo y
compromiso a lo largo de este año. A la vez
damos la más cordial bienvenida, a la nueva
Presidencia Pro-Témpore de Panamá 2023, a
quien le manifestamos nuestro apoyo para res-
paldar los esfuerzos planificados, con el objeto
de seguir avanzando en conjunto.
Presidencia Pro-Témpore del MIRPS 2022
CONTEXTO
REGIONAL
_
Nuevas aplicaciones de asilo en los países del MIRPS en 2022
Fuente: ACNUR, corte a junio 2022
Mexico
58622
Costa Rica 69280
Guatemala 501
Panama
378
El Salvador 48
Belice
106
Honduras
86
CLP_AR_004953
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10
11
INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
MIRPS 2022
COSTA RICA
MÉXICO
PANAMÁ
84594
180264
0
83130
2568
11253
0
142031
11187
204730
0
20293
Solicitantes de asilo
Personas desplazadas internas
Otras personas que necesitan
protección internacional
Personas refugiadas
EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA
HONDURAS
BELICE
611
1472
0
0
84
54
71500
0
89
2071
0
0
164
111
24709
0
Personas desplazadas por la fuerza en los países del MIRPS
Fuente: ACNUR, corte a junio 2022
CLP_AR_004954
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INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
MIRPS 2022
12
13
Al cierre del año 2022, más de un millón de per-
sonas se encontraban desplazadas por la fuerza
desde y hacia países de Centroamérica y Mé-
xico. La inseguridad, violencia, pobreza y des-
igualdad, agravadas por el impacto económico
y social de la pandemia y la inflación global, así
como los efectos adversos del cambio climático
y los desastres continuaban afectando despro-
porcionadamente a las personas que viven en
entornos inseguros y de mayor vulnerabilidad,
actuando como factores aceleradores de la mo-
vilidad humana en la región. Los desafíos de la
movilidad se han visto asimismo profundizados
a partir de un marcado aumento en el número
de personas que se desplazan a través de la re-
gión involucradas en movimientos mixtos, acre-
centando la presión sobre los mecanismos de
recepción y atención en los países de tránsito y
destino de dichos movimientos.
El número de personas refugiadas y solicitantes
de asilo en países de Centroamérica y México
ha aumentado año tras año desde la firma de
la Declaración de San Pedro Sula, pasando de
44,554 en 2017 a 499,252 en 2022. Un total de
128,278 nuevas solicitudes de la condición de
refugiado se reportaban en la subregión este
año. Si bien México se ha mantenido como un
país de tránsito para personas involucradas en
movimientos mixtos hacia el norte, el país se ha
consolidado como un destino para personas
necesitadas de protección, albergando a fines
de 2022 a 264,858 refugiados y solicitantes de
asilo, un aumento del 14% en comparación con
el año anterior. El fortalecimiento de los meca-
nismos de registro, documentación y manejo
de casos ha contribuido de modo significativo a
mitigar los riesgos de protección y explotación,
y ha favorecido el acceso a los servicios bási-
cos y al mercado laboral.
Entre las personas que se desplazan desde
países del norte de Centroamérica a México,
una gran proporción manifestó que abando-
naron sus hogares después de sufrir violencia
y persecución. Las causas del desplazamien-
to incluyen situaciones de extorsión, despojo
de tierras y viviendas, reclutamiento forzado,
violencia sexual y de género contra mujeres
y niñas, casos de abuso doméstico y violencia
contra personas LGBTIQ+. Si bien han continua-
do los movimientos en grupos grandes y poco
organizados, la mayoría de las personas que se
desplazan lo hacen individualmente, en peque-
ños grupos y unidades familiares. Los efectos
adversos de los desastres, exacerbados por el
impacto del cambio climático y la degradación
ambiental, representan un catalizador adicional
del desplazamiento en la región.
Costa Rica alberga a 216,145 personas con ne-
cesidad de protección internacional, de las
cuales 11,187 han sido reconocidas como refu-
giadas y 204,730 son solicitantes de asilo (in-
cluyendo personas con cita pendiente para
formalizar su solicitud de asilo). Costa Rica se
ubica entre los cuatro principales países de re-
gistro individual de nuevos solicitantes de asi-
lo a nivel mundial en 2021 y 2022 con 68,537
nuevas solicitudes de asilo presentadas este
año. Este elevado número de personas que
buscan protección internacional en Costa Rica
ha ejercido una presión adicional sobre las ca-
pacidades del sistema nacional de asilo y los
servicios esenciales, incluida la educación y la
atención médica, particularmente en la región
fronteriza norte, donde el 90% de los solicitan-
tes de asilo provienen de Nicaragua.
Además de un número creciente de personas
que se desplazan a través de fronteras interna-
cionales en busca de protección, la escala del
desplazamiento interno forzado en la subre-
gión continúa planteando serios desafíos. La
situación de desplazamiento interno incluye
a 318,590 desplazados internos en El Salva-
dor y Honduras. La respuesta a este fenómeno
ha visto fortalecido un enfoque en la estabili-
zación de las comunidades desplazadas y en
riesgo a través de la protección basada en la
comunidad. Esto ha implicado ampliar la pre-
sencia del estado y la colaboración con la so-
ciedad civil y las organizaciones de base para
fortalecer las respuestas de prevención y pro-
tección junto a las comunidades. Se han rea-
lizado inversiones en instituciones nacionales
de derechos humanos, educación, prevención
y respuesta a la violencia de género, progra-
mas de protección infantil, provisión de alterna-
tivas de protección temporal y, en la medida de
lo posible, soluciones a través de la integración
local sostenible.
La región ha sido testigo de movimientos mix-
tos y sucesivos de personas cada vez más
complejos. Se trata de personas que viajan
juntas, generalmente de forma irregular, utili-
zando las mismas rutas y medios de transpor-
te, pero por diferentes motivos. El perfil de las
personas involucradas en dichos movimientos
mixtos puede incluir a personas solicitantes de
la condición refugiado, refugiadas, apátridas,
víctimas de trata, menores no acompañados o
separados y migrantes. El número de perso-
nas que entre los meses de enero y septiem-
bre atravesaron de forma irregular el Tapón de
Darién, en la frontera entre Colombia y Pana-
má, alcanzó la cifra de 151,582, registrándose
un récord mensual en septiembre con 48,204
llegadas. Esto representa un aumento del 58%,
en comparación con el mismo período del año
2021. La principal nacionalidad de personas in-
volucradas en movimientos mixtos a través de
Darién corresponde a personas provenientes
de Venezuela, seguidos por personas prove-
nientes de Ecuador, Colombia, Cuba y Haití,
así como personas prevenientes de países de
Asia y África.
En un contexto de movilidad y desplazamien-
to forzado cambiante en la subregión, los Esta-
dos MIRPS actualizaron sus Planes de Acción
Nacionales a mediados de año, los cuales re-
flejan en la actualidad 180 compromisos polí-
ticos para continuar ampliando el acceso a la
protección internacional en los países de aco-
gida y en los países de origen, la protección
para grupos en riesgo, la intensificación de so-
luciones duraderas y mayores esfuerzos para
integrar y estabilizar a las poblaciones despla-
zadas y las comunidades de acogida. La cola-
boración regional entre los Estados en 2022 se
ha concentrado en avanzar la respuesta colec-
tiva para la recepción y admisión de personas
con necesidades de protección internacional,
el desplazamiento interno, la colaboración con
las autoridades locales y la certificación de ha-
bilidades y competencias para facilitar la inclu-
sión laboral.
Un enfoque renovado del diálogo regional so-
bre las causas subyacentes del desplazamien-
to significó un avance importante este año,
informando futuras inversiones de desarrollo
en seguridad y estabilidad en la subregión. Esta
iniciativa ha incluido el intercambio y la identi-
ficación de intervenciones comunitarias con-
tra la extorsión por parte de las Secretarías de
Seguridad Pública de los Estados MIRPS, junto
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con una primera consulta MIRPS sobre despla-
zamiento en el contexto de desastres y cambio
climático, donde las Secretarías de Medio Am-
biente e instituciones nacionales de protección
civil, gestión de riesgos y atención de emer-
gencia debatieron acerca de la protección de
las personas desplazadas a través de fronteras
por desastres, y la gestión de los riesgos de
desplazamiento por desastres en las comuni-
dades en riesgo.
Al momento en que Belice, Costa Rica, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, México y Panamá
concluyen el quinto año del MIRPS, la estabili-
zación y las soluciones para garantizar que las
personas obligadas a huir tengan la oportuni-
dad de integrarse en sus comunidades, acceso
a atención médica, educación y asegurar em-
pleos significativos y oportunidades para el es-
píritu empresarial se ven consolidadas como
prioridades compartidas de este proceso. Los
compromisos e iniciativas acordados en el con-
texto de la Declaración de Los Ángeles sobre
Migración y Protección representan un desa-
rrollo positivo, mientras que la complementarie-
dad y la alineación con la Conferencia Regional
sobre Migración (CRM) y el Sistema de la Inte-
gración Centroamericana (SICA) se plantean
como un objetivo común. Al final del año, los
Estados MIRPS renovaron su compromiso con-
junto con la protección y las soluciones, y die-
ron la bienvenida a una mayor colaboración
internacional con la Plataforma de Apoyo al
MIRPS, en la previa de del Foro Mundial sobre
Refugiados (GRF por sus siglas en inglés) a de-
sarrollarse el próximo año.
La región ha sido testigo de movimientos
mixtos y sucesivos de personas cada vez más
complejos. Se trata de personas que viajan
juntas, generalmente de forma irregular,
utilizando las mismas rutas y medios de
transporte, pero por diferentes motivos.
© UNHCR/Nicolo Filippo Rosso
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© UNHCR/Diana Diaz
17
TRABAJO
REGIONAL
MIRPS
_
Plan regional 2022
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En 2022, el MIRPS cumplía el quinto año de
implementación de los Planes de Acción Na-
cional que los estados miembros adoptaron al
momento de integrarse a dicho proceso. Con-
siderando que durante los últimos años la re-
gión ha experimentado un aumento en los
desafíos que enfrenta, incluyendo la pande-
mia, los desastres, las diferentes manifestacio-
nes de violencia, las crecientes necesidades
humanitarias, el primer objetivo de la Presiden-
cia Pro-tempore 2022 fue hacer un llamado a
los países MIRPS a revisar y actualizar sus Pla-
nes de Acción Nacional, de modo que reflejen
los contextos actuales de los países de origen,
tránsito y destino de la región.
Los siete países llevaron a cabo procesos de
recopilación de los compromisos alcanzados,
adaptación de los compromisos pendientes a
los desafíos actuales, y análisis de la necesidad
de involucrar a nuevos actores en la implemen-
tación de los mismos y la consecuente amplia-
ción de sus equipos técnicos nacionales. Los
Planes de Acción Nacional actualizados pue-
den encontrarse aquí.
Asimismo, se han establecido los Grupos de
Coordinación Nacional, como espacios de diá-
logo y trabajo conjunto entre los Equipos Técni-
cos Nacionales y otros actores relevantes para
la implementación de los Planes de Acción Na-
cional en los países MIRPS: representaciones
diplomáticas de los miembros de la Plataforma
de Apoyo a nivel nacional, agencias de coope-
ración para el desarrollo, agencias de la ONU,
sociedad civil y otras partes interesadas. En
los capítulos país de este reporte se incluirán
los avances y logros de cada Grupo nacional,
que seguirán siendo promovidos como un foro
común para la evaluación de necesidades de
protección, brechas operativas y prioridades
de respuesta en el contexto de la movilidad hu-
mana, y para discutir políticas y explorar opor-
tunidades y prioridades operativas del MIRPS,
basadas en intereses compartidos y en un en-
foque coordinado.
01.
02.
Actualización de
los planes de acción
nacional y grupos de
coordinación nacional
_
Diálogo acerca de las
causas subyacentes
del desplazamiento
_
En línea con el objetivo estratégico del Plan de
Trabajo Regional de la Presidencia Pro-Tempo-
re del MIRPS 2022 dirigido a fortalecer el diálo-
go regional y aumentar la visibilidad sobre las
causas subyacentes del desplazamiento forza-
do, se realizaron dos sesiones de consulta y
diálogo en línea entre los siete Estados MIRPS
en materia de desplazamiento en el contexto
de extorsión, y el impacto de los desastres y
el cambio climático. Las sesiones fueron orga-
nizadas en colaboración con la Iniciativa Glo-
bal contra el Crimen Organizado Transnacional
(GI-TOC), y la Plataforma sobre Desplazamiento
por Desastres (PDD).
EXTORSIÓN
Se realizó una reunión virtual sobre extorsión,
que convocó a la representación de cinco Equi-
pos Técnicos Nacionales del MIRPS, y a puntos
focales de las policías nacionales, ministerios
públicos, tribunales y miembros de la sociedad
civil. El encuentro brindó una oportunidad para
que los participantes revisaran las tendencias
sobre este fenómeno, que constituye uno de
los principales impulsores del desplazamiento
forzado en los países del norte de Centroamé-
rica. Asimismo, los participantes compartieron
algunas de las respuestas institucionales na-
cionales al fenómeno delictivo, buenas prácti-
cas de la región y herramientas para generar
respuestas desde las propias comunidades.
Entre las principales conclusiones, se destacó
que el sector privado, uno de los principales
generadores de empleo, se ha visto particular-
mente afectado por la extorsión, afectando a
propietarios de pequeñas y grandes empresas,
comerciantes, trabajadores agrícolas, además
de docentes y directores de instituciones edu-
cativas, médicos, trabajadoras sexuales, niños,
niñas, adolescentes y habitantes de comunida-
des donde maras y pandillas ejercen un gra-
do considerable de control. Se destacó que en
estos contextos, algunos elementos que facili-
tan la implementación de respuestas incluyen
el fortalecimiento de la comprensión específica
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del contexto en el que tiene lugar la extorsión,
el fortalecimiento de las capacidades institu-
cionales y comunitarias; el empoderamiento
de las respuestas locales basadas en el cono-
cimiento y las capacidades existentes; y la ge-
neración de confianza entre las autoridades y
la ciudadanía.
La consulta también brindó la oportunidad de
destacar el “Manual de Acción para la Resilien-
cia Comunitaria en Centroamérica”, desarrollado
por GI-TOC a partir de un proceso de consul-
tas regionales con múltiples partes interesadas
en Guatemala. El Manual de Acción incluye mó-
dulos enfocados en conceptos, definiciones e
información sobre tipos y modalidades de extor-
sión, ideas sobre iniciativas frente al fenómeno
delictivo, recomendaciones sobre cómo actuar
ante un caso de extorsión de acuerdo con los
lineamientos de la autoridad, e ideas y herra-
mientas para el diagnóstico, planificación y se-
guimiento que los diversos actores comunitarios
pueden utilizar para el registro, denuncia y se-
guimiento de los casos de extorsión.
Conozca más información sobre la reunión aquí
DESASTRES Y CAMBIO
CLIMÁTICO
En la sesión sobre Desastres y Cambio Climá-
tico participaron representantes de todos los
Equipos Técnicos Nacionales del MIRPS, junto
con representantes de los Ministerios de Me-
dio Ambiente, instituciones y servicios de pro-
tección civil, gestión de riesgos y atención de
emergencias y la academia. Durante la sesión,
los Estados intercambiaron sus perspectivas
sobre este tema que ha cobrado particular re-
levancia en los últimos años, y a su vez, dis-
cutieron los avances en la implementación de
la Agenda para la protección de las personas
desplazadas a través de fronteras en el con-
texto de desastres y cambio climático de la Ini-
ciativa Nansen.
La Agenda de Protección fue aprobada en una
consulta intergubernamental global en 2015 y
consolidó los resultados de una serie de con-
sultas regionales convocadas por la Iniciati-
va Nansen. La Agenda de Protección integra
medidas para gestionar los riesgos de despla-
zamiento por desastres en el país de origen,
incluye prácticas efectivas para reducir vulne-
rabilidades y fortalecer la resiliencia ante el
riesgo de desplazamiento en el contexto de
desastres. Para informar la consulta, los parti-
cipantes fueron invitados a sumarse a consul-
tas grupales paralelas. Un grupo, presidido por
México, abordó “La protección de las perso-
nas desplazadas a través de las fronteras por
desastres”, mientras que el grupo que fue pre-
sidido por Honduras, discutió la “Gestión de
riesgos de desplazamiento por desastres en
comunidades en riesgo”.
Como resultado de la consulta, los Estados par-
ticipantes recomendaron aprovechar el MIRPS
como un foro de coordinación regional entre
Estados para promover el intercambio de infor-
mación y de buenas prácticas para garantizar
respuestas comunes al desplazamiento en el
contexto del cambio climático y los desastres;
asimismo, adoptar un enfoque transversal al
desplazamiento en el contexto del cambio cli-
mático y los desastres, con el objetivo de infor-
mar la planificación armonizada en cada país.
El documento completo de recomendaciones
se puede encontrar aquí.
GRUPO DE TRABAJO SOBRE RECEPCIÓN, ADMISIÓN
Y PROCESAMIENTO DE PERSONAS CON NECESIDAD
DE PROTECCIÓN INTERNACIONAL
03.
Grupos de trabajo
y espacios políticos
OEA
_
El Grupo de Trabajo sobre Recepción y Admi-
sión y Procesamiento de personas con nece-
sidad de protección internacional se enfoca
en el fortalecimiento de los sistemas de asilo/
protección de refugiados, para mejorar la aten-
ción y acogida de personas refugiadas, en si-
tuaciones de movimientos mixtos incluyendo la
identificación de necesidades de protección in-
ternacional, gestión de casos y registro biomé-
trico y el uso de modalidades diferenciadas de
determinación de la condición de refugiado.
Durante el 2022, el Grupo llevó a cabo una re-
unión regional de hermanamiento, que reunió
a las autoridades de asilo de los países MIRPS
con representantes de Brasil, Canadá y Esta-
dos Unidos, como miembros de la Plataforma
de Apoyo MIRPS que expresaron interés en es-
tablecer acuerdos de hermanamiento para for-
talecer los sistemas de asilo en Centroamérica
y México. La reunión dio como resultado la pre-
sentación de proyectos y/o acuerdos de her-
manamiento concretos que buscan responder
a las necesidades inmediatas y a largo plazo
de los países sobre el tema de fortalecimien-
to de sistemas de asilo. A partir de la misma, se
han logrado los siguientes avances:
PAÍSES INTEGRANTES: Todos los países MIRPS
PAÍS LÍDER: México
CON EL APOYO TÉCNICO Y FINANCIERO DE: Brasil, Canadá, Estados Unidos, ACNUR
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• Apoyo al fortalecimiento de capacidades
entre pares por medio de intercambios de
experiencias bilaterales México-Brasil y Gua-
temala-México, centrados en la mejora de
las modalidades diferenciadas para el pro-
cesamiento de solicitudes de asilo/refugio.
• Reunión Regional de Información de País
de Origen (COI), en la que participaron los
siete países del MIRPS, acompañados de
Brasil, Canadá, Estados Unidos, Uruguay
y la Unión Europea como Miembros de la
Plataforma de Apoyo. Los participantes co-
nocieron las diferentes metodologías de in-
vestigación, buenas prácticas, productos y
estructuras organizativas de las unidades
de COI participantes. Asimismo, se some-
tió a la consideración de los participantes el
establecimiento de una red regional de COI
que sirva de apoyo adicional a los CONA-
RE de la región en la recopilación y difusión
de COI, y la promoción de buenas prácticas
metodológicas para actividades conjuntas
como la producción de informes de COI y
la realización de misiones de investigación
de COI en el terreno. A la vez, se promovió
el uso y la relevancia de la COI en el marco
de los procedimientos de reconocimiento
prima facie de la condición de refugiado en
la región, y se compartió información sobre
país de origen relativa a Haití y Venezuela
de parte de expertos invitados.
• Capacitación sobre la determinación de la
condición de la persona refugiada en ma-
teria de género, con el apoyo de Canadá
como Miembro de la Plataforma de Apoyo.
Esta capacitación se realizó en el margen
de los 16 Días de Activismo contra la Violen-
cia de Género, fortaleciendo las capacida-
des técnicas de 90 oficiales de elegibilidad,
agentes fronterizos y oficiales de los gobier-
nos de Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, México y Panamá, en relación al
análisis y resolución de casos fundados en
situaciones de violencia basada en género
y sobre los procedimientos para el manejo
de casos de VBG basados en las guías ac-
tualizadas de la Comisión de Inmigración y
Refugiados de Canadá y las guías de orien-
tación del ACNUR.
Visitar aquí el sitio web del Grupo de Trabajo.
GRUPO DE TRABAJO SOBRE DESPLAZAMIENTO INTERNO
PAÍSES INTEGRANTES: El Salvador, Honduras, México
PAÍS LÍDER: El Salvador
CON EL APOYO TÉCNICO DE: Colombia, UNICEF, ACNUR, OEA.
El Grupo de Trabajo MIRPS sobre Desplaza-
miento Interno que se encuentra en su tercer
año de funcionamiento, se consolida como un
espacio dirigido al fortalecimiento de las capa-
cidades y el desarrollo de marcos legales e ins-
titucionales que contribuyen a la respuesta al
desplazamiento interno en El Salvador, Hon-
duras y México. Durante el 2022 y de cara al
2023, el Grupo de Trabajo avanza en:
• Articulación con las Oficinas Nacionales de
Estadísticas y con el Grupo Técnico de Mi-
gración y Desplazamiento de la Comisión
Centroamericana de Estadística del SICA
(CENTROESTAD) para la mejora de los me-
canismos de recolección, gestión, uso,
análisis y divulgación de datos sobre des-
plazamiento interno. El uso de información
sobre el desplazamiento forzado permite
la identificación de escenarios y perfiles de
riesgo, así como a partir de los contextos la
caracterización de la vulnerabilidad que se
deriva del desplazamiento forzado. Lo ante-
rior, de conformidad con las Recomendacio-
nes Internacionales para la Generación de
Estadísticas sobre Personas Desplazadas
Internas otras normas internacionales perti-
nentes, así como las recomendaciones que
puedan aportarse desde las experiencias
de otros países en la materia.
• Intercambio de experiencias sobre identifi-
cación de alternativas de prevención de los
factores que conducen al desplazamien-
to. Con el acompañamiento de la OEA, el
Grupo aprendió experiencias aplicadas en
la región como los Sistemas de Alerta y Res-
puesta Temprana (SART). Estos mecanis-
mos de prevención y atención de conflictos
que se enfocan en la recolección sistemáti-
ca (cuantitativa o cualitativa), procesamiento
y análisis de información de situaciones de
violencia, cuyo propósito es alertar a los de-
cisores políticos para tomar medidas o ac-
ciones que eviten el surgimiento o escalada
de un conflicto.
Asimismo, se ha organizado un plan de traba-
jo continuo hasta el 2023 con el acompaña-
miento de Colombia y UNICEF, para fortalecer
la coordinación y la calidad de las respuestas
de protección y asistencia a personas en situa-
ciones de desplazamiento interno, asegurando
su acceso a los servicios públicos, focalizado
en documentación, educación, medios de vida,
tierras y asistencia humanitaria.
Visitar aquí el sitio web del Grupo de Trabajo.
© UNHCR/Ruben Salgado
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GRUPO DE TRABAJO SOBRE GOBERNABILIDAD LOCAL
GRUPO DE TRABAJO SOBRE EMPLEO Y MEDIOS DE VIDA
PAÍSES INTEGRANTES: Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Panamá, y El Salvador
como observador
PAÍS LÍDER: Guatemala
CON EL APOYO TÉCNICO DE: CGLU, BID, Municipalidad de Medellín, MMC, OEA,
PNUD y ACNUR
El Grupo de Trabajo convocó tres sesiones
centradas en: Iniciativas y Marcos Globales so-
bre Gobernabilidad Local, Ciudades Solida-
rias, y las funciones y responsabilidades de
las organizaciones regionales e internaciona-
les. Las consultas proporcionaron una platafor-
ma para que los participantes compartan sus
experiencias, buenas prácticas y conocimien-
tos en protección e inclusión. Los participantes
también aprovecharon la experiencia técnica
de otros países e instituciones que han desa-
rrollado experiencias relevantes parala gober-
nabilidad local. Como uno de los resultados de
las consultas, los doce municipios participan-
tes acordaron considerar un ‘Compromiso co-
lectivo bajo el Llamado a la Acción Local para
Migrantes y Refugiados’, con el fin de alinear
esfuerzos comunes para implementar Ciuda-
des Solidarias en Centroamérica.
Visitar aquí el sitio web del Grupo de Trabajo.
PAÍSES INTEGRANTES: Todos los países MIRPS
PAÍS LÍDER: Costa Rica
CON EL APOYO TÉCNICO DE: OIT, PNUD, ACNUR, BID, OEA.
CON EL APOYO FINANCIERO DE: España, Unión Europea, OEA.

Considerando los desafíos que tiene la región
en materia de integración laboral de las perso-
nas en situación de desplazamiento, dentro de
la estructura del MIRPS se continuó el aborda-
je regional desde el Grupo de Trabajo sobre
Empleo y Medios de Vida. Bajo el liderazgo de
Costa Rica, la prioridad durante el 2022 fue el
avance en la creación de una ruta que permi-
ta a las personas trabajadoras en situación de
desplazamiento y movilidad el reconocimiento
de las competencias adquiridas previamente y
obtener información para su inserción laboral,
facilitando su integración social y económica.
Durante el 2022, el Grupo ha logrado los si-
guientes avances:
• Identificación y sistematización de los meca-
nismos de los países miembros del MIRPS
para el reconocimiento de competencias
laborales que les permiten a las personas
trabajadoras migrantes, refugiadas y solici-
tantes de asilo acceder a oportunidades en
el mercado laboral del país de acogida.
• Mapeo de oportunidades de articulación en
la metodología que tienen los países miem-
bros del MIRPS para el reconocimiento de
competencias laborales.
• Elaboración de una ruta conjunta entre los
países miembros del MIRPS, para lograr que
las personas trabajadoras migrantes, refu-
giadas y solicitantes de asilo, tengan acce-
so a servicios para el reconocimiento de sus
competencias laborales, que favorezcan su
ingreso y movilidad al mercado laboral del
país de acogida.
Se ha conformado una red regional de especia-
listas gubernamentales de los siete países del
MIRPS, representados por funcionarios de los
Departamentos de Migración, las Direcciones
de Empleo de los Ministerios de Trabajo y de
los Institutos de Formación Profesional encar-
gados de la certificación de competencias en
el país. Esta red se encargará de la implemen-
tación de la hoja de ruta para la construcción
de la Estrategia Regional para el reconocimien-
to de competencias de personas trabajadoras
en situación de desplazamiento y movilidad.
Visitar aquí el sitio web del Grupo de Trabajo
© UNHCR/Victor Sánchez Mejía
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POSICIONAMIENTO
ESTRATÉGICO DEL MIRPS
DESDE LA OEA
Las prioridades del MIRPS se siguen posicio-
nando y en espacios estratégicos dentro de
la agenda hemisférica promovida dentro de la
OEA. En 2022, se han procurado oportunida-
des para divulgar y compartir el trabajo y los
avances del MIRPS de manera más amplia en
foros de relevancia hemisférica.
En el ámbito de la protección de los derechos
humanos, la Comisión de Asuntos Jurídicos y
Políticos (CAJP) de la OEA en la órbita del Con-
sejo Permanente de la Organización, el órgano
político de más rango después de la Asam-
blea General, se ha dado seguimiento a los
avances del MIRPS desde su establecimiento.
En 2022, en la CAJP se presentó un balance
de los progresos alcanzados por los Estados
MIRPS, dando visibilidad a la magnitud de la cri-
sis de desplazamiento en la región, mostrando
las repercusiones y los efectos prolongados de
la pandemia del COVID-19 en las poblaciones
desplazadas por la fuerza, y revisando las ten-
dencias actuales de los movimientos mixtos de
personas en estos países.
A su vez, en la esfera de desarrollo integral,
dentro de la Comisión de Asuntos Migratorios
(CAM) de la OEA, se analizaron los retos, las
buenas prácticas y las oportunidades para el
desarrollo de un abordaje integral y hemisfé-
rico para responder a la migración y el des-
plazamiento forzado en la región. Esta fue una
ocasión para destacar al MIRPS como uno de
los mecanismos regionales de respuestas in-
tegrales que en corto tiempo ha logrado re-
sultados tangibles y efectivos en beneficio de
las personas solicitantes de asilo, refugiadas,
desplazadas internas, y retornadas con nece-
sidades de protección internacional conectan-
do con actores de desarrollo. Asimismo, ante
el Consejo Interamericano para el Desarrollo
Integral (CIDI), la Presidencia Pro-Tempore del
MIRPS compartió las buenas prácticas que se
realizan en materia de gobernanza del despla-
zamiento forzado que puedan servir de ejem-
plo a otros Estados. En estas discusiones se
generaron espacios de coordinación con otros
mecanismos subregionales sobre el tema bus-
cando promover sinergias y la articulación de
acciones conjuntas.
En el marco de la Novena Cumbre de las Amé-
ricas, que reunió a los Presidentes y mandata-
rios de las Américas en Los Ángeles, California,
el MIRPS fue resaltado en un evento parale-
lo de alto nivel sobre Gobernanza regional en
materia migratoria y de protección internacio-
nal. Este evento tuvo como objetivo abordar
la importancia del fortalecimiento de la gober-
nanza regional en materia migratoria y de pro-
tección internacional, así como revisar diversos
roles para coordinar esfuerzos entre los diver-
sos mecanismos regionales de respuesta. Tam-
bién en el marco de esta cumbre, todos los
Estados del MIRPS suscribieron la Declaración
de Los Ángeles sobre Migración y Protección,
en la cual los Estados suscriptores reiteraron
su voluntad de fortalecer los esfuerzos regio-
nales y hemisféricos a fin de crear las condi-
ciones para una migración segura, ordenada,
humana y regular, y de fortalecer los marcos
necesarios para la protección y cooperación
internacional. En esta declaración, el MIRPS es
uno de los mecanismos regionales de respues-
ta que se distinguen como efectivos para apor-
tar de manera concreta a lograr los objetivos
de este documento.
Finalmente, en el marco de la Asamblea Gene-
ral de la OEA celebrada en el mes de octubre,
los Cancilleres de las Américas reconocieron al
MIRPS por quinto año consecutivo en la reso-
lución referida a la protección de las personas
refugiadas en las Américas. En este documen-
to se resalta cómo desde el MIRPS se impulsan
acciones conjuntas para mitigar las causas es-
tructurales del desplazamiento en la región al
igual que las medidas para responder a las ne-
cesidades humanitarias y de protección de las
personas desplazadas.
La Secretaría General de la OEA seguirá acom-
pañando a los Estados participantes del MIRPS
poniendo a disposición los espacios de diálo-
go, articulación e intercambio a nivel hemisfé-
rico disponibles para resaltar las virtudes de
este mecanismo que pone en el centro de su
respuesta a más de un millón de personas des-
plazadas en y desde Centroamérica y México.
FONDO MIRPS EN ACCIÓN
El Fondo MIRPS es uno de los mecanismos cla-
ve para la consecución de recursos y la coor-
dinación de los apoyos requeridos por los
Estados del MIRPS en complemento a los me-
canismos existentes para atender la crisis de
desplazamiento en la región. El Fondo MIRPS,
establecido por el Consejo Permanente de la
OEA, se puso a disposición por primera vez en
el Primer Evento de Solidaridad que tuvo lu-
gar en 2021. A finales de ese año, el Gobier-
no de España anunció una aportación pionera
al Fondo MIRPS siendo un hito a nivel regional
en términos de solidaridad y responsabilidad
compartida para apoyar las respuestas de los
países del MIRPS en brindar protección y solu-
ciones a la situación de las personas desplaza-
das y de las comunidades de acogida.
A partir de esta primera contribución, en 2022,
se puso en marcha todo el marco de operación
del Fondo con participación de los propios Esta-
dos MIRPS, y se abrió la convocatoria al primer
llamado a propuestas del Fondo MIRPS, para
que cada país MIRPS presentara sus propuestas
de proyectos en consonancia con los Planes de
Acción Nacional de los países del MIRPS.
Para la revisión y análisis de las propuestas,
se ha constituido un Comité de Selección de
Alto Nivel (CSAN) del Fondo MIRPS, conforma-
do por dos expertos independientes seleccio-
nados por los países MIRPS, un representante
de la Plataforma de Apoyo al MIRPS, y un re-
presentante de cada una de las instituciones
que conforman la Secretaría Técnica conjunta
del MIRPS, el ACNUR y el Departamento de In-
clusión Social de la OEA.
Las propuestas recibidas y evaluadas por el
CSAN abordan diversas temáticas que buscan
alcanzar los objetivos planteados en el marco
del MIRPS: el fortalecimiento de las capacidades
institucionales para una mejor atención y protec-
ción de personas solicitantes de la condición de
refugiado, refugiadas, desplazadas internas y
retornadas con necesidades de protección; am-
pliar el acceso a la asistencia humanitaria y brin-
dar medios de vida y autosuficiencia para estas
poblaciones, fortalecer mecanismos para la in-
tegración socioeconómica de las poblaciones
desplazadas y fortalecer los procesos de reco-
nocimiento del derecho a la identidad y docu-
mentación de las poblaciones desplazadas en
sus comunidades de acogida; entre otras. Los
proyectos presentados por los Estados MIRPS
están alineados a los pilares del MIRPS y a los
compromisos actualizados en el 2022, lo que
permitirá a los Estados beneficiarios avanzar la
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implementación de acciones definidas en sus
Planes nacionales. Asimismo, los proyectos in-
cluyen de manera transversal una perspectiva
de derechos e inclusión, así como un enfoque
de género, edad y atención a las necesidades
diferenciadas de algunas poblaciones en espe-
cial situación de vulnerabilidad, por ejemplo, la
protección de niñas, niños y adolescentes retor-
nados con necesidades de protección, garanti-
zando que al menos la mitad de las beneficiarias
directas sean mujeres desplazadas.
Según mandato del Consejo Permanente (CP/
RES. 1154 (2286/20), refrendado a nivel de la
Asamblea General de la OEA 2020, el Departa-
mento de Inclusión Social (DIS) de la OEA, tiene
a su cargo la administración, gestión financiera
y rendición de cuentas del FONDO MIRPS. En
esa calidad y en la etapa de ejecución de los
proyectos específicos por los Estados MIRPS,
el DIS les estará brindando acompañamiento
y asistencia para asegurar la consecución de
los resultados esperados. El Fondo MIRPS se
encuentra abierto a recibir nuevas contribucio-
nes, y continuar implementando iniciativas y
proyectos en terreno en los Estados MIRPS.
ALIANZAS CON EL SECTOR
PRIVADO
La comunidad empresarial en los países MIRPS
representa un actor clave para la implementa-
ción de acciones que prioricen la inversión di-
rigida a la inclusión laboral e integración de las
personas desplazadas. En 2022, la Secretaría
Técnica del MIRPS ha continuado los esfuerzos
para fortalecer el dialogo, la sensibilización y
el acercamiento con el sector empresarial pro-
moviendo buenas prácticas por la inclusión de
personas en situación de desplazamiento.
Parte de estos esfuerzos incluyeron un mayor
acercamiento con representantes de empre-
sas del sector privado canadiense con presen-
cia en Centroamérica, a iniciativa de Canadá
como Presidencia de la Plataforma de apoyo
con el fin de explorar posibilidades de partici-
pación y apoyo a las poblaciones en situación
de desplazamiento en la región.
Como resultado, se amplió la gama de actores,
alcanzando 40 organizaciones empresariales
en tres niveles: A Nivel Regional, con asociacio-
nes empresariales, asociaciones de cámaras
de comercio y organizaciones de Responsa-
bilidad Social Empresarial; a nivel gremial, con
las agrupaciones gremiales regionales, Cáma-
ras de comercio nacionales, organizaciones de
sectores productivos; y a nivel Empresarial, con
organizaciones empresariales, multinacionales
y empresarios particulares con presencia im-
portante en la región.
La Secretaría Técnica del MIRPS ha planteado
también un esquema de participación del sec-
tor privado en múltiples ámbitos de las activida-
des del MIRPS. Entre ellos:
• Espacios de diálogo y cooperación regio-
nales del MIRPS tal como en la reunión
anual del MIRPS y el evento anual de So-
lidaridad. Durante el evento de solidaridad
internacional del 2022, se presentó la “Ex-
presión Conjunta de Solidaridad del Sec-
tor Privado para fortalecer la protección
y promover soluciones para las personas
04.
Alianzas con
socios estratégicos
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desplazadas y sus comunidades de aco-
gida en Centroamérica y México”. La ex-
presión de solidaridad fue suscrita por doce
organizaciones empresariales de la región.
• Eventos de sensibilización e intercambio
entre gobiernos y sector privado de la re-
gión. En 2022, la Secretaría técnica del
MIRPS organizó cinco eventos con la par-
ticipación del sector privado sobre la si-
tuación de desplazamiento forzado en la
región. Estos eventos se dieron en el marco
de sesiones del MIRPS, la Cumbre de las
Américas, la Convención Anual de Rotary In-
ternational, diálogo directo con los gobier-
nos de la región, entre otros.
• Buenas prácticas e iniciativas empresariales
en materia de inclusión de población des-
plazada. La Secretaría Técnica del MIRPS
avanzó en el desarrollo de una “Caja de He-
rramientas MIRPS: Aportes de la comunidad
empresarial a la situación de desplazamien-
to forzado en Centroamérica y México”. Este
documento recoge alrededor de 30 inicia-
tivas y buenas prácticas que actualmente
están adelantando las organizaciones del
sector empresarial en la región.
De cara al 2023, la estrategia regional con el
sector empresarial se enfocará en seguir for-
taleciendo las vías de cooperación desde el
cual el sector empresarial puede contribuir a
las respuestas de los Estados de acuerdo a
las líneas de acción:
• Acción 1: Mejorar el conocimiento de los
empresarios sobre el marco normativo de
los derechos laborales de las personas re-
fugiadas, retornadas y desplazadas.
• Acción 2: Promover el diálogo y la interlo-
cución público-privada para el desarrollo de
acciones conjuntas para abordar las causas
subyacentes del desplazamiento forzado.
• Acción 3: Desarrollar una cultura de hospi-
talidad, integración y respeto hacia las po-
blaciones desplazadas, buscando cambiar
narrativas para erradicar prácticas discrimi-
natorias y xenófobas dentro de los entornos
empresariales.
Guiados por el trabajo técnico de los Grupos de
Trabajo del MIRPS se buscará estrechar la inter-
locución de estos socios en espacios estratégi-
cos, la articulación con la Plataforma de apoyo
del MIRPS liderada por Estados Unidos, y la
movilización del sector privado en eventos de
solidaridad del MIRPS con acuerdos de coope-
ración y compromisos específicos. Todo ello di-
rigido a la conformación progresiva de una red
activa y dinámica de actores del sector privado
que contribuyan con programas concretos para
mejorar las oportunidades económicas, los me-
dios de vida y la autosuficiencia de las personas
desplazadas en Centroamérica y México.
SOCIEDAD CIVIL
El trabajo de sociedad civil en acompañamien-
to a los objetivos del MIRPS se ha fortalecido,
por medio de la promoción de derechos, difu-
sión de información y trabajo conjunto, enten-
diendo los retos nacionales y locales de las
organizaciones que forman parte del Mecanis-
mo de Diálogo de la Sociedad Civil del MIRPS.
En el 2022, se ha avanzado en la consolidación
del Mecanismo de organizaciones de socie-
dad civil del MIRPS. La organización mexicana
“Programa Casa Refugiado” fungió como pre-
sidencia rotativa y se mantuvo la participación
continua de 40 organizaciones a nivel nacional.
De esta manera, se sostuvieron reuniones de
coordinación con la Presidencia Pro-tempore
del MIRPS, con gobiernos de países MIRPS, AC-
NUR, OEA y la Plataforma de Apoyo al MIRPS.
El Mecanismo ha trabajado de manera regio-
nal y nacional, desarrollando espacios de diá-
logo con gobiernos, organismos y empresas.
Asimismo, se compartieron posicionamientos
públicos en diferentes eventos, tales como el
Evento de Solidaridad Internacional del MIRPS,
y en distintos foros donde se impulsó la colabo-
ración, el trabajo en redes y el fortalecimiento
de los espacios de coordinación con participa-
ción múltiple.
El Mecanismo también hizo la presentación del
Informe resultado de una serie de diagnósticos
realizados en los siete países MIRPS (2021). Se
presentaron las buenas prácticas, retos y avan-
ces de la región en relación al abordaje del
desplazamiento forzado, desde la perspecti-
va de las organizaciones de sociedad civil que
contribuyen a los planes de acción nacional del
MIRPS.
Finalmente, es importante reconocer que el
año reportado ha permitido reinterpretar las
dinámicas de colaboración desde el MIRPS,
como espacio de encuentro para la construc-
ción de acuerdos y sinergias, para mejorar el
acompañamiento y el fortalecimiento de la co-
laboración en las realidades nacionales.
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MIRPS
EN ACCIÓN
_
Avances nacionales
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35
BELICE _
FOMENTANDO LAS OPORTUNIDADES DE EDUCACIÓN
PARA SOLICITANTES DE ASILO EN EL SUR DE BELICE
En Belice, 10 jóvenes solicitantes de asilo tuvieron la oportunidad de
ampliar sus estudios en una institución técnico-profesional.
El sonido de la alarma despierta a Joe de un salto. Son las 4:00 de la ma-
ñana y el solicitante de asilo de 20 años se levanta para prepararse para la
escuela. Camina durante veinte minutos por un tranquilo camino de tierra,
agradecido por la oportunidad de experimentar la paz en su nueva comu-
nidad. Cuando llega a la parada del autobús, sus compañeros están es-
perando el autobus que los llevarán al Instituto de Educación y Formación
Técnica y Profesional (ITVET) de Stann Creek. Es un viaje de dos horas y
media cada día, pero es un sacrificio que hacen con gusto.
Joe es uno de los 10 jóvenes solicitantes de asilo que han tenido la oportuni-
dad de volver a estudiar luego de que vieran interrumpidos sus estudios cuan-
do se vieron repentinamente obligados a huir de sus hogares por la violencia.
“No podíamos quedarnos allí porque era totalmente inseguro”, recuerda
Joe. “Cuando llega una amenaza así, lo único que sigue es la muerte. Es
algo grave. No es fácil. Estaba en mi último año de instituto y no pude ter-
minar porque simplemente no podíamos sobrevivir más en ese lugar.”
Selena*, una solicitante de asilo de 17 años procedente de Honduras, no
pudo terminar el el colegio tras sobrevivir a un violento asalto a su casa por
parte de miembros de una banda, que se resultó en el asesinato de su her-
mano. Tras este hecho, tanto ella como los demás miembros de su familia
recibieron numerosas amenazas de muerte y huyeron a Belice en busca
de seguridad.
“Me siento muy feliz de haber podido volver a la escuela”, dice Selena.
“No pensé que podría seguir estudiando hasta que recibí esta oportuni-
dad, y estoy muy agradecida por ello”.
Después de un año de superar los retos del aprendizaje en un nuevo sis-
tema escolar y en un idioma desconocido, los estudiantes se gradúan con
un diploma técnico que equivale a un título de secundaria.
“Para mí, esta debería ser una oportunidad que todos los solicitantes de
asilo puedan recibir para tener un futuro mejor y poder encontrar un buen
trabajo”, dice Selena.
Cerca de la mitad de los niños refugiados del mundo -el 48%- no están
escolarizados. El ACNUR en Belice, junto con el Gobierno y los socios loca-
les, trabaja para garantizar que la educación sea accesible para todos los
niños, niñas y jóvenes, incluidos los solicitantes de asilo.
© ACNUR/Aida Escobar
“No pensé que podría
seguir estudiando
hasta que recibí esta
oportunidad, y estoy
muy agradecida
por ello”
*Nombre cambiado
por motivos de
protección
CONOCE MÁS
SOBRE ESTA HISTORIA
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CONTEXTO NACIONAL
En 2022, Belice continuó construyendo sobre
los cimientos establecidos en 2021 en lo que
concerniente al refuerzo de la protección y la
aplicación de soluciones duraderas para las
personas desplazadas por la fuerza a esca-
la regional y mundial. Belice continúa creando
alianzas con actores relevantes y fomentando
iniciativas destacadas de los sectores humani-
tarios y de desarrollo, público y privado. Con
la ayuda de aliados estratégicos, Belice ha ido
mejorando el mecanismo de recepción y ad-
misión, respondiendo a las necesidades hu-
manitarias y de protección e implementando
soluciones duraderas para los desplazados
forzosos. A través de diversas iniciativas, Beli-
ce sigue trabajando en el marco del MIRPS en
una respuesta regional coordinada al despla-
zamiento forzoso. El Departamento de Refu-
giados emitió aproximadamente 211 cartas de
remisión, que representaban a unas 408 per-
sonas recomendadas pero no confirmadas
como solicitantes de asilo, para su presenta-
ción ante el Departamento de Gestión de Fron-
teras y Servicios de Inmigración para la emisión
de Permisos Especiales de trabajo en agroin-
dustrias. Este servicio se dio sin coste alguno
para estos solicitantes y sus dependientes. Los
permisos especiales les permitían seguir re-
sidiendo en Belice y trabajar en las industrias
de cítricos, plátanos o caña de azúcar. Esta ca-
tegoría especial se concedió únicamente a
las personas que habían sido recomendadas
previamente por el Comité de Elegibilidad de
Refugiados, pero que no habían sido confirma-
das hasta finales de 2020. Además, el ACNUR
aprobó una propuesta de proyecto para la am-
pliación y mejora del Departamento de Refu-
giados. Asimismo, se concedió una amnistía a
unos 298 migrantes irregulares cuyas prórro-
gas de visado caducaron durante el cierre de
fronteras del periodo COVID 19, y el año 2021
concluyó con el anuncio de la tercera amnistía
de inmigración de Belice, que se centra en la
gestión de la migración para la seguridad na-
cional y el desarrollo socioeconómico de Beli-
ce, proporcionando la residencia permanente
con una vía hacia la ciudadanía a los migrantes
aprobados.
El Gobierno ha dado un primer paso para
introducir cambios en la política actual de las
autoridades de inmigración en relación al acceso
de los solicitantes de asilo a los mercados
laborales nacionales.
36
37
INDICADORES
4.175
3.000
refugiados y solicitantes de asilo
(Gob. de Belice, octubre de 2022)
otras personas de interés
(ACNUR, septiembre de 2022)
Fuente: Evaluación de perfiles en Belice, ACNUR, Julio de 2002
• El 85% de los hogares evaluados
declararon tener relaciones
positivas con su comunidad de
acogida
• Alrededor del 7% de los
niños de entre 7 y 12 años no
están escolarizados. De los
matriculados, el 72% lo están en
los niveles 1 a 4.
• Principales razones para no
acogerse a la amnistía: No
tenía información previa sobre
la amnistía (45%), no estoy
interesado (18%), no cumplo los
requisitos de elegibilidad (12%)
y temo ser identificado por las
autoridades (9%).
• Principales razones para no
solicitar asilo (entre quienes
no lo solicitaron): No tenía
información sobre cómo o
dónde hacerlo (34%), No sé lo
que es (20%), Lo intenté pero no
me lo permitieron por falta de
documentos (9%) y Otros (14%).
• Principales motivos de entrada
irregular en el país: Falta de
documentos para los adultos
(13%), Miedo a la deportación (4%)
y Falta de documentos para los
niños (3%).
• Las principales dificultades
para encontrar un lugar donde
alojarse fueron la falta de recursos
económicos (71%), la falta de
documentos (25%) y el rechazo
por motivos de nacionalidad (15%).
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• Un 70% de los solicitantes
informan de que tienen
conocimientos de comunicación
en inglés
• La mayoría de los solicitantes
vinieron a Belice por reunificación
familiar (25%), empleo (25%),
acompañaban a un padre o tutor
(20%), o como resultado de un
desplazamiento forzoso debido a la
tasa de criminalidad en su país (15%)
• Hay solicitantes de treinta y dos
(32) países de todo el mundo.
• Estos Treinta y Dos (32) países
están dispersos globalmente en
Siete (7) regiones, a saber, Europa
(8), América del Sur (5), Islas
del Caribe (5), Asia (5), América
Central (4), América del Norte (3) y
África (2).
• Amnistía de 1984: se
registraron 8.680 inmigrantes
irregulares.
• Amnistía de 1999: 11.168
migrantes irregulares obtuvieron
la residencia permanente.
• En diciembre de 2021, se
anunció un programa de
amnistía para regularizar a los
migrantes irregulares en Belice.
En virtud de la amnistía de 2022,
los migrantes irregulares que
cumplan alguno de los ocho (8)
criterios de cualificación pueden
solicitar la residencia permanente
para regularizar su presencia en
Belice.
personas y dependientes habían
aplicado al 30 de septiembre de
2022 (2 meses después de que
finalizara el periodo de registro
de 4 meses).
5.097
4.500
solicitantes de asilo cumplen los
requisitos para solicitar la amnistía
solicitantes de asilo han solicitado
y recibido la carta de referencia
de amnistía del Departamento de
Refugiados a 30 de septiembre
de 2022 (2 meses del Periodo de
Registro de 4 meses).
• La mayoría de las solicitudes se
recibieron en las oficinas urbanas
de Amnistía 2022.
• La mayoría de los participantes
son mujeres (54%).
• La mayoría de los solicitantes
(70%) no tienen personas a su
cargo. La segunda categoría más
numerosa son los solicitantes con
sólo 1 persona a cargo (20%) .
749
90%
18-24
19%
25-34
33%
35-44
24%
45-54
14%
• La encuesta de citas en línea
informa de que la mayoría (90%)
de los solicitantes se encuentran
dentro de los años productivos.
• En cuanto al número real de
solicitantes por región, hay que
señalar que Centroamérica es la
que cuenta con el mayor número
de solicitantes (97%), seguida de
Norteamérica (2%). Las solicitudes
de nacionales de las otras cinco
(5) regiones suman un 1%.
• Información adicional
informa que alrededor del
55% de las solicitudes son
de guatemaltecos, 23% de
salvadoreños, 18% de hondureños,
1% de nicaragüenses, y todas las
solicitudes de otros nacionales se
incluyen en el 3% restante.
Fuente: Reporte sobre la Amnistía del Gobierno de Belice,
Septiembre 2002
CLP_AR_004968
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 230 of 1047

AVANCES
40
41
PROTECCIÓN
El 2022 inició el proyecto de dos años aprobado por el ACNUR titulado “For-
talecimiento de la capacidad institucional del Departamento de Refugiados/
Ministerio de Inmigración”. Este proyecto ha sido esencial para la contrata-
ción de tres nuevos funcionarios de admisibilidad, el desarrollo de la ca-
pacidad técnica de todos los empleados, el suministro de tecnología de la
información, espacio de oficinas, equipos de oficina y el desarrollo de bases
de datos. Esta asociación ha ampliado la capacidad de tramitación del asilo
en relación con la reducción de la acumulación de solicitudes y la mejora de
las modalidades de gestión de los nuevos casos de asilo. Al mismo tiempo,
los procesos de registro, almacenamiento y análisis de datos de los departa-
mentos se están modernizando con nuevos equipos y programas informáti-
cos. El Comité de Admisibilidad de Refugiados ha recibido formación técnica
en profundidad para la resolución de las solicitudes de asilo.
La revisión de la legislación nacional relativa a los refugiados ha comen-
zado bajo los auspicios del proyecto del ACNUR y las perspectivas para
2023 incluyen la conclusión de este proceso con una ley de refugiados
moderna, racionalizada y actualizada, revisada y apoyada por el Ejecuti-
vo y aprobada por el Legislativo. Los diversos puntos focales de los pro-
yectos forman sinergias en términos de tener un sistema de asilo robusto,
gestionado por empleados formados internacionalmente, utilizando un
sistema tecnológico digitalizado y moderno para proporcionar protección
y asistencia a los apátridas, solicitantes de asilo y refugiados en Belice.
Hacia finales de 2021, el Gobierno anunció un programa de amnistía
para determinadas personas indocumentadas que permanecen en Beli-
ce. En una primera fase, se decidió incluir a las personas con necesida-
des de protección internacional y a los solicitantes de asilo registrados,
para quienes la amnistía ofrece una vía alternativa para regularizar su si-
tuación migratoria en Belice. Hasta el 30 de septiembre de 2022, dos
meses después de un periodo de registro de cuatro meses, unos 749
solicitantes de asilo registrados habían solicitado la carta de referencia
de la amnistía. La Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM)
y el ACNUR han desempeñado un papel decisivo a la hora de orientar y
ayudar a las personas afectadas en el proceso de solicitud.
EDUCACIÓN
Belice sigue centrado desde principios de 2020 en ampliar los servicios
de formación profesional técnica a los jóvenes refugiados y solicitantes
de asilo, junto con los jóvenes de las comunidades de acogida. En 2022
se continuó la movilización de recursos para centrarse a nivel nacional
en el crecimiento de las micro, pequeñas y medianas empresas-MSMEs,
con el fin de proporcionar nuevas vías para que los solicitantes de asi-
lo y los refugiados se inscriban en iniciativas formales de desarrollo em-
presarial gestionadas por el Servicio de Desarrollo del Comercio y la
Inversión, el Centro de Desarrollo de Pequeñas Empresas y el Centro de
Formación y Empleo de Belice.
©UNHCR/Diana Diaz
CLP_AR_004969
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 231 of 1047

MIRPS 2022
43
42
COSTA RICA _
REFUGIADO NICARAGÜENSE LIDERA ALBERGUE
QUE UN DÍA LE ACOGIÓ
Tras graduarse de la carrera de derecho, Ernesto planeaba ejercer su pro-
fesión y crear su propia firma legal. Sin embargo, tuvo que salir de Nicara-
gua y empezar una nueva vida en medio de la crisis sociopolítica que inició
en abril del 2018. Recién graduado, puso sus sueños en una maleta y bus-
có refugio en Costa Rica.
A su llegada a Costa Rica, fue atendido en un albergue en San José, la
capital, donde no solo encontró personas solidarias que le atendieron,
sino que ese mismo lugar se convirtió en el lugar de trabajo que hoy lide-
ra con pasión.
La integración de Ernesto no hubiera sido posible sin el acceso a los do-
cumentos de identidad que le otorgó el Estado costarricense. Como so-
licitante de refugio, Ernesto logró establecerse como líder del albergue y
por su formación como abogado, no solo ha dado asistencia humanitaria,
también ha logrado que otras personas accedan a esta documentación y
a otros derechos que otorga el país a personas solicitantes de refugio y
refugiadas en Costa Rica.
Su trabajo se ha extendido durante casi cuatro años, brindando atención
a personas solicitantes de refugio de la región. “Nos ha tocado atender a
personas de Nicaragua, Haití y más recientemente Venezuela”, asegura
satisfecho y orgulloso de la ayuda que ha brindado.
Ahora Ernesto, reconocido como una persona refugiada, sueña con conver-
tirse en psicólogo, carrera que inició en Costa Rica. “Siempre quise ser abo-
gado o psicólogo. Me decanté por derecho sin saber que algún día terminaría
dando ayuda psicosocial a personas que, como yo, tuvieron que huir de su
país”, dice Ernesto.
Sin su documentación, Ernesto no imagina como hubiese sido el tiempo
que ha transcurrido en el país. Primero como solicitante de refugio y ahora
como refugiado, Ernesto ahora mira al futuro con la esperanza de seguir brin-
dando ayuda a quienes, como él, un día requirieron de una mano solidaria en
el país que les acogió.
©ACNUR/Austin Ramírez Reyes
“Nos ha tocado atender a
personas de Nicaragua, Haití y
más recientemente Venezuela”
CLP_AR_004970
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44
45
CONTEXTO NACIONAL
INDICADORES
Costa Rica ha sido tradicionalmente un país de
acogida para personas que han sido despla-
zadas forzosamente de sus países de origen.
Gracias a su estabilidad democrática, institucio-
nes robustas y su tradición de respeto a los de-
rechos humanos, el país ofrece las condiciones
para que estas personas encuentren la seguri-
dad y las posibilidades necesarias para reha-
cer sus vidas.
En los últimos años, Costa Rica ha ampliado
su rol como país de destino debido a las si-
tuaciones de persecución y violencia en la re-
gión, particularmente en Nicaragua, Venezuela,
Cuba y el Norte de Centroamérica. Desde el
2018 y hasta el 30 de setiembre del 2022, el
país contabilizó 218,788 personas con necesi-
dad de protección internacional, de las cuales
12,077 corresponden a personas refugiadas,
206,711 solicitantes de refugio. Adicionalmente,
hay 67 personas reconocidas como apátridas y
125 en proceso de determinación de esa con-
dición (al 30 de setiembre 2022).
El aumento sostenido del número de personas
que buscan protección internacional en el país
ha incrementado la presión sobre la instituciona-
lidad costarricense y su capacidad de respues-
ta. La pandemia por Covid-19 y su impacto en
la situación económica, profundizaron los retos
del país para atender de forma oportuna a esta
población. En el primer semestre del 2022,
50,224 personas formalizaron su solicitud de
reconocimiento de la condición de persona re-
fugiada.
A pesar de que el país cuenta con un siste-
ma de asilo robusto, el contexto de desplaza-
miento actual plantea nuevos desafíos para la
respuesta a esta población, en un escenario
donde la demanda de servicios y atención no
avanza al mismo ritmo que la oferta. Cuando
las personas ingresan al territorio costarricense
en búsqueda de protección internacional, son
las comunidades fronterizas quienes brindan
la primera respuesta a las necesidades de las
personas desplazadas forzosamente. Las co-
munidades de la zona norte del país, segunda
región con menor desarrollo humano del país,
brindan a estas personas servicios básicos de
atención en salud, educación y ayuda humani-
taria. Por ello, es que el Gobierno de la Repú-
blica y el Sistema de Naciones Unidas en Costa
Rica promueven una intervención territorial en
la que participen actores de desarrollo como
los Organismos Financieros Internacionales y
agencias humanitarias para fortalecer las co-
munidades de acogida y asegurar el acceso
a derechos y servicios de todos los habitan-
tes del territorio. Costa Rica apela a la comuni-
dad internacional para apoyar los esfuerzos del
país para su atención y respuesta.
4 AÑOS
Tiempo promedio de
procesamiento desde la
formalización de la solicitud de
refugio hasta la adopción de una
decisión sobre la solicitud de
refugio en primera instancia.
Número de personas solicitantes
de refugio o refugiadas en
situación de pobreza y pobreza
extrema.
Número de personas solicitantes de refugio con documentos
de identidad o credenciales legalmente reconocidas.
Número de personas solicitantes
de refugio o refugiadas menores
de edad en situación de pobreza
y pobreza extrema beneficiarias
de un subsidio de estudio.
Número de personas solicitantes de refugio que poseen
un permiso de trabajo.
Proporción de personas
solicitantes de refugio con
respecto a la población nacional.
3225*
POBREZA EXTREMA: 2703
POBREZA: 1050
67.175
684
57.732
(EL 100% DE
LAS PERSONAS
MAYORES DE EDAD)
POBLACIÓN TOTAL:
5.213.506 *
NÚMERO ESTIMADO DE
SOLICITANTES DE REFUGIO:
167.330 **
3,2%
CLP_AR_004971
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46
47
AVANCES
EMPLEO Y MEDIOS DE VIDA
Acceso a la documentación que permite a las personas solicitantes de
refugio incorporarse al mercado laboral. El Gobierno de la República
otorga a las personas refugiadas y solicitantes de esa condición un per-
miso laboral para poder integrarse al mercado laboral y apoya esa inte-
gración a través del sistema nacional de empleo, plataforma que articula
programas de capacitación que ofrece el estado costarricense con las
necesidades de contratación de las empresas. En el 2021, esta plata-
forma registró 5,490 personas incluyendo 35 personas refugiadas y
solicitantes de refugio. Asimismo, desarrolló procesos formativos para
aumentar la empleabilidad de 81 personas refugiadas.
SALUD
Aseguramiento médico en salud para personas solicitantes de refugio y
refugiadas. La Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS), brinda ase-
guramiento médico temporal a personas solicitantes de refugio o refu-
giadas en el marco del Convenio suscrito con el ACNUR. Esta medida
garantiza el acceso de las personas solicitantes de refugio y refugiadas
a los servicios de salud públicos en todo el territorio. Actualmente este
convenio beneficia a 6,000 personas.
PROTECCIÓN
Medida de protección complementaria para personas venezolanas, ni-
caragüenses y cubanas. En diciembre del 2020, el Gobierno de la Re-
pública aprobó la medida de protección complementaria que brinda
protección a personas de esas tres nacionales cuya solicitud de refu-
gio ha sido denegada en firme, pero existen elementos que les impiden
regresar a sus países de origen. Esta medida fue un piloto que se ex-
tendió hasta febrero del 2022 el cual brindó seguridad jurídica a estas
personas y les autorizó a realizar actividades remuneradas sin ninguna
restricción. Esta medida fue solicitada por 4,038 personas y beneficia-
do a 3,934 personas, con un promedio de aprobación superior al 99%.
PROTECCIÓN SOCIAL
Acceso de las personas refugiadas y solicitantes de refugio a los pro-
gramas estatales de reducción de la pobreza. Costa Rica garantiza el
acceso de las personas solicitantes de refugio y refugiadas en situación
de pobreza y pobreza extrema a los programas de reducción de la po-
breza del Instituto Mixto de Ayuda Social (IMAS) en igual de condiciones
que las personas costarricenses. El acceso a estos programas permite
acceder a la oferta de programas de protección y movilidad social. En
el 2021, se otorgaron beneficios a 4,134 personas refugiadas y solicitan-
tes de refugio.
promedio de
aprobación
superior al
99%
En el 2021,
se otorgaron
beneficios a
4,134
personas
En el 2021,
esta
plataforma
registró
5,490
personas
Actualmente
este
convenio
beneficia a
6,000
personas
Esta medida garantiza el acceso de las personas
solicitantes de refugio y refugiadas a los servicios
de salud públicos en todo el territorio
Costa Rica garantiza el acceso de las personas
solicitantes de refugio y refugiadas en situación
de pobreza y pobreza extrema a los programas
de reducción de la pobreza del Instituto Mixto de
Ayuda Social (IMAS) en igual de condiciones que
las personas costarricenses.
CLP_AR_004972
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 234 of 1047

MIRPS 2022
49
48
EL SALVADOR
_
EMPODERANDO MUJERES MEDIANTE
EL EMPRENDIMIENTO
Como residente de una zona urbana de El Salvador asediada por pandi-
llas, Letty* veía pocas posibilidades para su futuro. Pero a través de cursos
impartidos en centros de Ciudad Mujer, recibió capacitación para desa-
rrollar ideas de negocio y para incrementar el potencial productivo de mi-
croempresas.
Con ese apoyo Letty logró que su emprendimiento de dulces artesanales
se destacara entre la competencia. Lo hizo innovando las combinaciones de
sabores, como la de su famoso dulce de coco rallado con menta.
“Desde que empecé a ir a Ciudad Mujer me siento más segura por la asis-
tencia psicológica y ayuda para fortalecer mi emprendimiento.” señala.
Los dulces de Letty* son elaborados con ingredientes locales y ella sigue
probando nuevas combinaciones para seguir siendo competitiva. Además,
ahora su marca tiene nombre y logotipo, consciente de lo importante que
es para formalizar el negocio y expandirse. “Ahorita tengo que producir
una orden para uno de mis clientes que va a llevar los dulces a Estados
Unidos,” comparte Letty* con emoción.
La estrategia de Ciudad Mujer busca fortalecer la autonomía económi-
ca de mujeres desplazadas internamente y sobrevivientes de violencia de
género. Las participantes reciben apoyo para expandir su clientela y el al-
cance de sus mercados, asesoría para establecer hojas de ruta para hacer
la transición de sus negocios hacia la economía formal. Este proceso com-
plementa el apoyo que las mujeres han recibido previamente de la Comi-
sión Nacional de la Micro y Pequeña Empresa (CONAMYPE), desarrolladas
en el marco de metodologías de capacitación provistas por la Organiza-
ción Internacional de Trabajo para crear, expandir y sostener pequeñas
empresas.
Ciudad Mujer, administrada por el Instituto Salvadoreño de la Mujer (ISDE-
MU), contribuye a mejorar las condiciones de vida de mujeres salvadoreñas
en áreas como participación en el lugar de trabajo, salud sexual y reproduc-
tiva, prevención y atención de la violencia, y prevención de embarazos en
adolescentes. También tiene como objetivo mejorar las oportunidades so-
cioeconómicas para mujeres en riesgo de desplazamiento forzado y para
mujeres retornadas con necesidades de protección.
© ACNUR/Alejandra Romo
“Desde que empecé a ir
a Ciudad Mujer me siento
más segura por la asistencia
psicológica y ayuda para
fortalecer mi emprendimiento”
*Nombre cambiado
por motivos de
protección
CLP_AR_004973
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50
51
CONTEXTO NACIONAL
AVANCES
En enero de 2020, el país aprobó la legislación
para proteger y ofrecer soluciones duraderas
a las personas desplazadas internamente, así
como, a aquellos en riesgo de serlo. A la vez,
la complejidad del contexto de movilidad hu-
mana en Centroamérica y México se manifiesta
en el aumento progresivo del número de per-
sonas solicitantes de asilo y refugiadas en El
Salvador, para las cuales el país contempla una
respuesta integral.
Los avances existentes en la legislación y en las
respuestas operativas para la protección de las
personas desplazadas forzosamente y refugia-
das representan avances importantes y deben
continuar, así como todas las respuestas inte-
grales para abordar las causas subyacentes de
dichos fenómenos. El Salvador se unió al MIRPS
en 2019, y manifestó su compromiso a través
de un Plan de Acción Nacional, el cual se alinea
con los compromisos asumidos durante el Foro
Global sobre los Refugiados de 2019.
INDICADORES
2022
11 MESES
483
En el periodo comprendido de enero
a junio 2022, se asistió a 3 personas
en áreas fronterizas. Asimismo, se
asistió a un total de 9 personas en la
sede de la Secretaría de la Comisión
para la Determinación de la
Condición de Personas Refugiadas.
El tiempo promedio es alrededor de 11
meses aproximadamente. Es preciso
resaltar que dependiendo del tipo
de caso puede ser menor el tiempo.
En el periodo comprendido de
enero a junio 2022, se acreditó
un total 31 documentos de
identidad a personas solicitantes
de refugio, y a 18 personas
reconocidas como refugiados se
les acreditó un documento de
identidad reconocido legalmente.
Entre 2021 y 2022 han accedido al
programa “Mi Primer Trabajo” del
Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión
Social (MTPS), 483 personas.
PROTECCIÓN
• En 2022, el Gobierno de El Salvador cuenta con los resultados de
un pilotaje como base para la actualización del estudio de caracteri-
zación sobre desplazamiento forzado interno. La información cuanti-
tativa y cualitativa sobre el desplazamiento forzoso que recopilará el
estudio permitirá la toma de decisiones basadas en evidencia para el
diseño de sólidas políticas públicas.
• En 2022, la apertura de dos nuevos espacios de atención “A tu Lado”
en los municipios de San Miguel y Santa Ana fortalece la capacidad
de respuesta territorial a poblaciones desplazadas, y la oferta de in-
formación sobre derechos y asistencia de manera gratuita, segura
y confidencial. Además, continúa el funcionamiento de los 27 Pun-
tos de Atención a Víctimas, que se encuentran descentralizados en
todos los departamentos del país, ubicados en hospitales nacionales,
alcaldías y otros espacios de Apoyo.
• El Salvador, durante el año 2022, ha fortalecido las capacidades de
los servidores públicos que forman parte de la Dirección de Aten-
ción a Víctimas, así como de las instituciones que conforman la ruta
de atención a personas retornadas. Para ello, se han abordado las si-
guientes temáticas: protección humanitaria, gestión de casos, dere-
chos humanos y asistencia a las víctimas.
• El Anteproyecto de Política Nacional de Ordenamiento y Desarrollo
Territorial existente incorpora lineamientos preliminares relacionados
a la atención de personas desplazadas.
• En 2022, se ha fortalecido técnica y operativamente a la Dirección de
Atención a Víctimas (DAV) en el marco de la ampliación de su estra-
tegia de atención a víctimas, específicamente aquellas afectadas por
el desplazamiento forzado interno.
• El Módulo de Protección del Sistema Único de Información Migrato-
ria de la Dirección General de Migración y Extranjería (DGME) se ha
implementado satisfactoriamente. Esta herramienta permite la refe-
rencia oportuna a servicios especializados para personas retornadas
con necesidades de protección, aplicando rutas existentes.
CLP_AR_004974
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53
EDUCACIÓN
• El fortalecimiento de las modalidades educativas ha permitido a los
niños, niñas y adolescentes continuar su educación a través de la im-
plementación de 1) modalidades regulares; y 2) flexibles (aceleradas,
a distancia, semipresenciales, nocturnas y virtuales), que utilizan una
gama de plataformas tecnológicas que incluyen televisión, radio y
otros canales de comunicación.
• Durante el presente año las Consejerías Escolares ofrecen servicios
mejorados de ayuda psicosocial a niños y niñas en condición de des-
plazamiento forzado interno. Este programa trabaja para generar entor-
nos educativos seguros, lo cual contribuye a la continuidad educativa.
• En 2022, se cuenta con un modelo de continuidad educativa en al-
bergues tipo casas cerradas o casas abiertas, a través de un enfoque
inclusivo para niños, niñas y adolescentes.
• En 2022 se han fortalecido las capacidades instaladas para la res-
puesta nacional de atención, protección y continuidad educativa a la
niñez desplazada forzosamente o en riesgo de serlo, así como, para
mejorar la identificación, referencia y gestión de casos de niñez, ado-
lescencia y sus familias.
• El Salvador ha aprobado y ratificado un nuevo marco normativo para
protección de la niñez y la adolescencia, y previo a su entrada en
vigor se han revisado los instrumentos de atención para la población
estudiantil desplazada o en riesgo de desplazamiento forzado inter-
no y sus familias.
EMPLEO Y MEDIOS DE VIDA
• El programa “Mi Primer Trabajo” implementado permite a los jóvenes
en riesgo fortalecer las habilidades para acceder a oportunidades
de empleo, fortaleciendo, a la vez, las alianzas con el sector privado.
• Se ha mantenido un constante trabajo de fortalecimiento con Pro-
gramas especializados y vocacionales que favorecen el acceso a
oportunidades de empleo de jóvenes a través del desarrollo de ha-
bilidades blandas y capacitaciones técnicas para jóvenes en riesgo.
• Mujeres desplazadas internamente y/o sobrevivientes de violencia
de género reciben apoyo psicosocial y fortalecen sus habilidades mi-
croempresariales en talleres específicos sobre fortalecimiento de ha-
bilidades y desarrollo de negocios.
• El Ministerio del Trabajo se sumó al Espacio de Apoyo “A tu Lado” en
el departamento de San Salvador para brindar servicios presenciales
una vez por semana con la finalidad de brinda información y asistencia
sobre derechos laborales, ofertas de trabajo y oportunidades de profe-
sionalización. Se espera que este servicio se amplíe a lo largo del país.
SALUD
• El Protocolo de Atención Psicosocial de las personas afectadas por
violencia con énfasis en desplazamiento forzado interno muestra
avances en su elaboración y revisión interna.
• La continuidad del proceso de formación al personal multidisciplina-
rio y de primer nivel de salud, permite la oportuna atención y segui-
miento de los casos de desplazamiento forzado. De esta forma en
2022, 323 funcionarios del Ministerio de Salud (221 Mujeres y 102
hombres) fueron sensibilizados a través del curso de desplazamiento
forzado, derecho y salud, a fin de brindar una oferta de servicios de
salud especializada de manera inclusiva a mujeres y personas que
requieren atención médica y psicosocial.
• Desde enero hasta junio del 2022 se han atendido clínicamente, desde
el área de psicología, a 315 personas (266 mujeres y 49 hombres) víc-
timas de violencia en riesgo. Se han brindado 12 psicoterapias y 6 gru-
pos de autoayuda, como parte de terapia colectiva y restaurativa.
Desde
enero hasta
junio de 2022
se han atendido
clínicamente a
315
personas víctimas
de violencia
de género
Durante el presente año las Consejerías Escolares
ofrecen servicios mejorados de ayuda psicosocial
a niños y niñas en condición de desplazamiento
forzado interno.
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54
INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
GUATEMALA
_
UNA REFUGIADA SALVADOREÑA AYUDA A QUE OTRAS
MUJERES LOGREN LA INDEPENDENCIA FINANCIERA
Cuando llegó a Guatemala, Alma se sentía sola y desamparada.
Pero superó su dolor y ahora lidera un grupo de ahorros para las muje-
res de su comunidad.
Para Alma, una salvadoreña de 35 años, lo peor del exilio fue la sole-
dad. Ella tuvo que huir de su país para salvar su vida, pues las pandillas ha-
bían tomado el control de su comunidad y las amenazas de muerte eran
constantes.
En Petén, zona en el norte de Guatemala donde encontró protección,
era una desconocida. Abrió un pequeño taller de confección como el que
tenía en su país, pero no logró integrarse con su comunidad de acogida.
Hasta el momento en que pudo solicitar la condición de refugiado, esta-
tus que le dio la posibilidad de residir legalmente en Guatemala, abrir una
cuenta bancaria y tener acceso a servicios de salud y educación. Y lo más
importante: no ser devuelta a su país.
También recibió apoyo económico para su emprendimiento y participó
en actividades organizadas por la alcaldía local, para la integración y gene-
ración de medios de vida entre mujeres guatemaltecas y refugiadas.
Alma hizo parte del programa de asistencia de Ixqik, Asociación de Mu-
jeres de Petén, que acompaña a las sobrevivientes de violencia con un
equipo interdisciplinario de asesoría legal, emocional, médica, liderazgo y
generación de ingresos.
“Sentí confianza en mí misma. Me animé a aprender cosas nuevas y li-
derar”, relata. Participó en una capacitación de ahorro comunitario y se
animó a crear un grupo con las mujeres de su aldea. “Jamás me hubiera
imaginado hacer eso antes”, afirma entre sonrisas.
El grupo cumple ya dos años y cuenta con ocho participantes, quienes
se reúnen cada mes. Funciona a través de consensos y por votación deci-
dieron que Alma fuera la presidenta.
Hoy en día es la diseñadora principal de los trajes de gala de su aldea
y apoya a las demás a cumplir sus sueños. “La independencia económi-
ca hace que las mujeres puedan hacer cualquier cosa que se propongan”,
dice con convicción.
“Sentí confianza en mí misma.
Me animé a aprender cosas
nuevas y liderar”
CONOCE MÁS
SOBRE ESTA HISTORIA
© ACNUR/Ángela Hurtado
CLP_AR_004976
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57
CONTEXTO NACIONAL
INDICADORES

Guatemala es considerado país de origen, tránsi-
to, destino y retorno de personas en contexto de
movilidad humana. Actualmente, Guatemala asu-
me un rol importante como país de acogida para
un número cada vez más creciente de personas
que huyen de sus países para salvaguardar sus
vidas y llegan en búsqueda de protección inter-
nacional. Las instituciones miembros del Equipo
Técnico Nacional -ETN- desde sus distintos man-
datos contribuyen a generar las condiciones de
protección, educación, salud, empleo y medios
de vida a las personas refugiadas, solicitantes de
la condición de refugiados y retornados junto a
las comunidades de acogida.

Actualmente el país, a través de sus institucio-
nes, realiza esfuerzos constantes y dirigidos para
atender a las personas refugiadas, solicitantes de
esta condición y con necesidades de protección
internacional para asegurar:
1. La provisión de condiciones de acogida es-
pecializadas, diferenciadas, seguras y dignas;
2. El fortalecimiento de las instituciones que
se ocupan del tema, especialmente en las
zonas fronterizas y rutas de tránsito;
3. La atención de los retornados con necesi-
dades de protección;
4. El abordaje y atención de grupos en situa-
ción de alta vulnerabilidad;
5. El trabajo y medios de vida para promover la
inclusión laboral; entre otras acciones valiosas
para la protección y las soluciones duraderas.
Es oportuno destacar que las acciones gene-
radas en el seno del Equipo Técnico Nacional,
permiten a Guatemala consolidar una posición
integral, presentada por el Ministerio de Re-
laciones Exteriores, de acuerdo a su compe-
tencia y función de ente coordinador, en los
diferentes foros regionales y multilaterales en
materia de refugio.
Procesos de formación dirigidos
a miembros de la CONARE sobre
temas de Refugio y Protección
Internacional
Procesos de Capacitación sobre
asuntos de Refugio, Protección
Internacional y Procedimientos
de Revisión de Casos dirigido a
funcionarios del IGM
4
7
Personas refugiadas y solicitantes
capacitadas para conocer y utilizar
la plataforma PEX
MINTRAB
54
10
642
20
Permisos de trabajo otorgados a
personas refugiadas

537
Permisos de trabajo otorgados
a personas solicitantes de la
condición de refugiado
25
Funcionarios capacitados en el
uso de la plataforma PEX
70
Acuerdos suscritos con
Municipalidades y Gobernaciones
Departamentales
Beneficiarios
directos
Beneficiarios
indirectos
Atenciones en área
psicosocial
Adolescentes y jóvenes
formados en proyecto
Servidor Cívico Social
3.000.000
765.000
INICIATIVA CIUDADES
SOLIDARIAS
MODELO CASA JOVEN
AMATITLÁN DE LA SBS
Las acciones generadas en el seno del Equipo Técnico Nacional,
permiten a Guatemala consolidar una posición integral, presentada
por el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, de acuerdo a su
competencia y función de ente coordinador, en los diferentes foros
regionales y multilaterales en materia de refugio.
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59
AVANCES
públicas, organizaciones de la sociedad civil,
sector privado, entre otros para la atención,
coordinación y derivación de las familias de
personas refugiadas y solicitantes de esta con-
dición, retornados y guatemaltecos en riesgo.
En marzo 2022, en Flores, Petén, se inauguró
el Centro de Atención Integral Infantil -CAI-
construido por la Municipalidad y El Refugio de
la Niñez con apoyo técnico y financiero del AC-
NUR. Este Centro a cargo de la Secretaría de
Bienestar Social de la Presidencia de la Repú-
blica -SBS- contribuye al desarrollo, el cuidado
y la enseñanza de la niñez local y refugiada en
el municipio. El CAI tiene una capacidad para
80 niños, niñas y adolescentes, de los cuales
recibe actualmente 28, promoviendo espacios
seguros de cuidado y con ello, facilitando a sus
madres el acceso al mercado laboral.
PROTECCIÓN
Para dar continuidad al fortalecimiento del Sistema Nacional de Refugio, los
representantes de la Comisión Nacional para Refugiados –CONARE- realiza-
ron una visita de intercambio de buenas prácticas de la Comisión Mexicana
de Ayuda a Refugiados –COMAR- en México. En dicha misión se conocieron
los mecanismos, procedimientos y herramientas diferenciadas para la aten-
ción, registro y seguimiento de casos de solicitantes y refugiados.
Como resultado de esta visita oficial, el Departamento de Reconoci-
miento de Estatus de Refugiado -DRER- de la Subdirección de Atención
y Protección de los Derechos Fundamentales de los Migrantes del Insti-
tuto Guatemalteco de Migración -IGM- ha desarrollado herramientas va-
liosas para optimizar la revisión de los casos y solicitudes, tales como:
a) Modelo de Informe Técnico; b) Modelo de Registro; y, c) Perfiles de Si-
tuación de País de Origen.
Adicionalmente, el DRER como parte de su mandato continúa realizan-
do acciones coordinadas junto a los puestos de control migratorio en las
fronteras orientadas a garantizar el acceso al sistema nacional de refugio.
A través de la reciente apertura de Casa Joven en el municipio Amatit-
lán de la Secretaría de Bienestar Social de la Presidencia de la Repúbli-
ca -SBS- con el apoyo del ACNUR, ha atendido entre enero y septiembre
2022 un aproximado de 889 casos. De este total, 41.3% corresponde a
jóvenes y adultos de 18 a 59 años; con una tasa de atención similar para
adolescentes entre 12 a 17 años con 39.6%; mientras que, un 17.5% co-
rresponde a niñas y niños de 0 a 11 años de edad. Este puede ser con-
siderado como un Modelo integral, ya que ofrece servicios y atenciones
a niños, niñas, adolescentes y jóvenes quienes junto a sus familias pue-
den acceder a programas de educación, acompañamiento pedagógico,
intervención psicosocial, actividades deportivas y de recreación, forma-
ción para el servicio cívico social, entre otros. Este programa introduce
prácticas novedosas de coordinación y articulación de esfuerzos que
involucra, tanto a la comunidad y sus autoridades locales, instituciones
Se ha
atendido
entre enero
y septiembre
2022 un
aproximado de
889
casos
EMPLEOS Y MEDIOS DE VIDA
El Ministerio de Trabajo y Previsión Social –MINTRAB- ha realizado un
proceso de descentralización y modernización de la Plataforma Elec-
trónica de Permisos de Trabajo para Extranjeros -PEX- con el propósito
de eficientizar esta gestión y permitir realizar el procedimiento en línea
desde cualquier parte del territorio nacional. Así, el MINTRAB ha simpli-
ficado y automatizado el proceso de presentación, emisión y autoriza-
ción del permiso de trabajo para personas solicitantes del estatuto de
refugiado y refugiadas en un promedio de tiempo de gestión de 4 días.
A través de la Campaña “Renaciendo en Guate” impulsada por el MIN-
TRAB se busca sensibilizar al sector empresarial, a los funcionarios pú-
blicos y a la población en general sobre los motivos que obligan a los
refugiados a abandonar sus países y la importancia de brindar oportuni-
dades para su integración.
La Oficina del Adulto Mayor de la Delegación Departamental de Petén
del MINTRAB fue remozada con el apoyo del ACNUR, con el fin de brin-
dar una atención digna a los vecinos y refugiados que habitan en el lugar.
El Instituto Técnico de Capacitación y Productividad –INTECAP- reali-
zó un ajuste a su sistema informático para facilitar a las personas re-
fugiadas y solicitantes de esta condición con el Documento Personal
de Identificación Especial (DPI-E) el acceso a los servicios y programas
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61
que ofrece. Ahora, pueden acceder a capaci-
tación vocacional y técnica, así como, a certi-
ficación de competencias laborales. Asimismo,
el INTECAP está desarrollando un curso de for-
mación y capacitación sobre “Finanzas Básicas
para el Hogar” enfocado en población vulnera-
ble, incluyendo refugiados y solicitantes del es-
tatuto de refugiado. Con ello pretende, que la
población guatemalteca y refugiada pueda me-
jorar su capacidad en la gestión de sus finanzas
personales. Por ejemplo, para el caso del INTE-
CAP en Izabal a partir de julio de este año, seis
personas refugiadas en Puerto Barrios tuvieron
la oportunidad de participar en el Curso sobre
Gastronomía Guatemalteca y obtener un certifi-
cado válido que se traduce en una herramienta
útil y sumamente valiosa para su integración al
mercado laboral local.
SALUD
Como parte de la iniciativa de Ciudades Solidarias, en febrero de este
año, se inauguró el nuevo Centro de Salud Comunitario de San Pedro
Cadenas, en Petén, a cargo del Área de Salud Petén Sur Oriental del
Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia Social –MSPAS-. Dicho Centro
beneficia a los vecinos de las comunidades locales y personas en movi-
mientos mixtos en tránsito y en ingreso a este departamento. Este Cen-
tro ofrece un espacio seguro y de coordinación interinstitucional, en el
cual instituciones como Secretaría de Bienestar Social –SBS-, Procu-
raduría General de la Nación -PGN-, Secretaría contra la Violencia Se-
xual, Explotación y Trata de Personas –SVET-, Procuraduría de Derechos
Humanos –PDH- y organizaciones de la sociedad civil pueden brindar
información, hacer entrevistas y otros abordajes con el fin de mejorar
condiciones de recepción e ingreso a Petén. El Proyecto ha beneficia-
do a 1,700 personas de las comunidades de Cadenas y de Livingston en
Izabal; con un aproximado de 4,680 personas con necesidad de asisten-
cia humanitaria que formaban parte de los movimientos mixtos.
En abril, las Clínicas de Atención a Víctimas de Violencia Sexual de los Hos-
pitales de Melchor de Mencos, Poptún, Sayaxché y San Benito del departa-
mento de Petén recibieron equipos y mobiliario para fortalecer la atención
integral en salud para los usuarios locales, en tránsito y refugiados.
En el marco de la iniciativa de Ciudades Solidarias y como parte de
los esfuerzos que realiza la Municipalidad de Esquipulas, se realizó la
construcción y equipamiento de un Puesto de Salud en la comunidad
Valle de Jesús que beneficia a los habitantes de la aldea, de comuni-
78
personas que
colaboran en
las diferentes
direcciones
municipales
han sido
capacitadas
en protección
internacional
dades cercanas y las personas en flujos mixtos
que transitan por el lugar. Asimismo, se cons-
truyeron y equiparon áreas nuevas del Centro
de Salud de Esquipulas para atender a pacien-
tes con VIH, tuberculosis y niñez con desnu-
trición, beneficiando a poco más de 60 mil
personas. Todo ello con el aval y el liderazgo
del Ministerio de Salud Pública y Asistencia So-
cial –MSPAS- a través del Área de Salud del de-
partamento de Chiquimula.
La Municipalidad de San Benito en Petén cons-
truyó y habilitó la Clínica Municipal que propor-
ciona atención médica gratuita que incluye la
atención en salud, exámenes de laboratorio,
radiografías y rayos X, atención dental, entre
otros. Todo ello en beneficio de los vecinos y
refugiados del municipio.
Desde febrero, la Municipalidad de Livingston,
Izabal cuenta con un bote equipado para aten-
der situaciones de emergencia conocido como
“Ambulancha”, la cual facilita la atención médi-
ca y traslados a personas guatemaltecas y re-
fugiadas que residen a lo largo del Río Sarstún,
áreas cercanas al municipio y comunidades de
acogida en la zona de adyacencia con Beli-
ce. Un modelo novedoso que alcanza a llegar
a las áreas más remotas que únicamente pue-
den accederse por la vía acuática y que, antes
implicaba un trayecto de más de 6 horas para
una atención de emergencia. Con este mode-
lo, se privilegia la atención de mujeres en si-
tuación de vulnerabilidad y sobrevivientes de
violencia, con una fuerte participación de mu-
jeres indígenas.

Como parte de la iniciativa de Ciudades Solida-
rias, la Municipalidad de Puerto Barrios, a través
del Refugio de la Niñez, construyó el Centro de
Atención Integral para Mujeres. El Centro brin-
da asistencia y servicios de protección a sobre-
vivientes de violencia, independientemente de
su nacionalidad. Actualmente cuenta con per-
sonal especializado para brindar atención en
salud, albergue temporal, asistencia legal y psi-
cológica, con una capacidad para atender 40
pacientes por un promedio de 6 días.
La Municipalidad de Guatemala a través de las
cuatro “Casas Móviles de la Mujer” brinda aten-
ción psicológica, nutricional y médica y orienta-
ción legal a mujeres. Las Casas promueven la
prevención de las violencias basadas en géne-
ro, y buscan empoderar a las mujeres a través
de la cobertura en servicios e información.
La Municipalidad de Villa Nueva como Ciudad
Solidaría realiza bimestralmente, Ferias de In-
clusión y Convivencia Pacífica en las cuales se
brindan servicios de salud y orientación legal;
se promueven actividades de sensibilización
para prevención de la violencia de género, y se
realizan actividades deportivas y recreativas.
En dichas ferias intervienen las Direcciones
de Salud, de la Mujer, de Seguridad Integral y
la Secretaría de Obras Sociales de la Esposa
del Alcalde. La Municipalidad ofrece estos ser-
vicios a toda la comunidad, incluyendo perso-
nas refugiadas y solicitantes del estatuto de
refugiado. Estas ferias han alcanzado a la fecha
más de 5 mil personas, entre niñas, niños, ado-
lescente, jóvenes, mujeres, hombres y adultos
mayores. Además, 78 personas que colaboran
en las diferentes direcciones municipales han
sido capacitadas en protección internacional,
violencia de género, mecanismos de referen-
cia de casos de atención y protección.
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EDUCACIÓN
En el marco de la iniciativa Ciudades Solidarias, la Municipalidad de Es-
quipulas en Chiquimula con el apoyo del ACNUR a través de su socio
Save The Children, remozó y equipó tres escuelas que favorecen el ac-
ceso a la educación de los niños, niñas y adolescentes guatemaltecos
en situación de riesgo, refugiados y retornados. Con estos proyectos,
se estima que poco más de 90 niños y niñas sean beneficiados direc-
tamente y aproximadamente 110 familias de manera indirecta, en las co-
munidades rurales de La Ranchería, La Rinconada y el Mirador, Olopita.
La Municipalidad de Puerto Barrios en coordinación con la Dirección
Departamental de Educación del Ministerio de Educación -MINEDUC-
a través del Refugio de la Niñez remozó y equipó tres escuelas (EOUM
Mariano Gálvez, INEB Hugo Leonel Sance y EOUM Mariano Méndez
Montenegro) en el municipio con el propósito de promover y facilitar la
integración al sistema nacional educativo de los niños y niñas guatemal-
tecos, retornados y refugiados.
Dado que el municipio de Guatemala concentra el mayor número de las
personas refugiadas y solicitantes de esta condición, la Municipalidad
ha realizado esfuerzos importantes para integrarlos a través de sus pro-
gramas como: “Bibliotecas Municipales”, “MuniEduca Móviles”, “Inglés
para todas” y Escuela Taller, espacios que hacen parte de las Direccio-
nes de Desarrollo Social, Mujer y Escuela Taller de la Municipalidad. Di-
chas actividades, se vienen implementando desde marzo de manera
escalonada debido a la pandemia y han logrado llegar a 6,600 personas
beneficiarias entre refugiados, solicitantes y comunidad de acogida, mu-
jeres víctimas de violencia de género, y segmentos que cubren desde
la niñez hasta los adultos mayores. Además, con el Centro de Empren-
dimiento y la Dirección de Desarrollo Social se han realizado 5 ferias de
emprendimiento y reactivación económica, teniendo como resultado un
aproximado de 57 mil quetzales en ventas a emprendedores refugiados,
solicitantes y guatemaltecos. Al menos 90 personas que colaboran en
diferentes direcciones de la Municipalidad han sido capacitadas en pro-
tección internacional, violencia basada en género y trata de personas,
así como, en mecanismos de referencia de casos.
© UNHCR/Ruben Salgado Escudero
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65
HONDURAS
_
CON EL APOYO DE INSTITUCIONES, CARLA PUEDE
RECONSTRUIR SU VIDA EN HONDURAS
Cargando solo una bolsa con sus recuerdos familiares, unos cuantos jugue-
tes y lo que traían puesto, Carla*, sus tres hijas y sus dos nietas se vieron for-
zadas a dejar la aldea donde nacieron -en una ciudad de Honduras- luego de
que su esposo fuera asesinado y ellas recibieran amenazas contra sus vidas.
“Recibí una nota en un papel que decía que, si no salía de la casa ese
mismo día, todas nosotras iríamos a acompañar a mi esposo”, recuerda
la madre de familia, quien todavía está en proceso de recuperarse por la
pérdida de su esposo y su hogar. “No tenía tiempo que perder, no podía
arriesgar a mis hijas, a mis nietas, tenía que sacarlas de ahí rápidamente”.
Con ayuda de la policía y de un familiar cercano, Carla y su familia reco-
gieron lo que les cabía en las manos y se subieron al vehículo policial para
salir del único lugar que conocían hasta ese momento. Primero, llegaron a
casa de un hermano de Carla en otra ciudad en Honduras, pero ella tenía
claro que rápidamente tendrían que buscar su propia vivienda.
Una vez instalada, Carla buscó ayuda en la Secretaría de Derechos Hu-
manos (SEDH). “Yo había escuchado que había personas que ayudaban
cuando a uno le pasan cosas malas, pero pensé que no era cierto”, co-
mentó Carla. “Pero, a los pocos días de que llamé, llegaron a visitarme e
inmediatamente nos dieron ayuda; primero con vales para alimentación y
artículos de limpieza personal, eso nos ayudó a subsistir”.
Después de dos semanas, Carla entró al programa para emprendedores
de la SEDH apoyado por ACNUR, donde recibió capital semilla que le permi-
tió empezar a generar ingresos para sostener a su familia. “Yo ya tenía expe-
riencia con negocio de venta de comestibles y bebidas. Con eso apoyaba a
la economía familiar en mi antiguo hogar”, destacó emocionada Carla, quien
en este negocio ha encontrado un respaldo que le permite seguir adelante.
“Me puse a buscar una zona donde no hubiera otras tiendas similares, así en-
contré la casa donde vivimos ahora. Somos la única pulpería (tienda de abastos)
en este sector de la colonia, todos los vecinos me compran tortillas temprano y ya
no tienen que caminar tanto para conseguir lo que necesitan, así que ellos tam-
bién están contentos con nuestra llegada”, finalizó Carla, quien, a pesar de las in-
mensas dificultades, ha encontrado esperanza y la fuerza para seguir adelante.
Carla y sus hijas forman parte de las más de 247,000 personas desplazadas in-
ternamente en Honduras. Como parte de la respuesta, hace cinco años Honduras
se adhirió al MIRPS y en 2022 lideró el mecanismo como Presidencia Pro-Tempo-
re. En este rol, Honduras extendió su respuesta a 13 distintas instituciones, que im-
pulsan programas para la atención de personas con necesidades de protección.
© ACNUR/Danielle Álvarez
“No tenía tiempo que perder, no
podía arriesgar a mis hijas, a mis
nietas, tenía que sacarlas de ahí
rápidamente”
*Nombre cambiado
para proteger la
identidad de la
persona.
CONOCE MÁS
SOBRE ESTA HISTORIA
CLP_AR_004981
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67
CONTEXTO NACIONAL
Secretaría del Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Se-
cretaría de Desarrollo Social, Instituto Nacional
de Formación Profesional, Instituto de la Propie-
dad, Servicio Nacional de Emprendimiento y de
Pequeños Negocios, Dirección De Niñez Ado-
lescencia y Familia, Asociación de Municipios
de Honduras. Asimismo, ha fortalecido su vincu-
lación con las Universidades del país y con el
trabajo coordinado de sociedad civil, avanzan-
do en los mecanismos de atención de personas
con necesidades de protección.
Estos esfuerzos nacionales tanto en la abogacía
por un marco normativo, en la coordinación con
los gobiernos locales, y en la facilitación de acce-
so a servicios para personas en riesgo de despla-
zamiento, demuestran el compromiso del Estado
para: (i) continuar impulsando la consolidación
del marco normativo e institucional; (ii) mejorar las
condiciones de recepción, y los mecanismos de
protección y asistencia; y (iii) vincular los mecanis-
mos de asistencia a los programas de protección
social y medios de vida para ampliar las posibili-
dades de soluciones duraderas, entre otras.
Según datos oficiales al menos 247,090 per-
sonas fueron desplazadas internamente por
violencia entre 2004 y 2018. Las causas están
relacionadas con las amenazas, homicidios,
restricciones a la movilidad, lesiones, extorsio-
nes, violencia sexual, despojo de viviendas,
tierras y propiedades, y reclutamiento forza-
do, afectando principalmente a mujeres, niños,
niñas, adolescentes, jóvenes, líderes comu-
nitarios, transportistas, comerciantes y perso-
nas LGBTIQ. A su vez, desde 2015 a la fecha,
573,6541 hondureños han sido retornados: y
desde el 2014 al 2022, 546 personas solicita-
ron asilo en Honduras. Por otro lado, el aumen-
to de personas que transitan por Honduras en
situación irregular desde 2010 al 2022 ha al-
canzado cifras de 281,167 personas, de los cua-
les 149,837 han sido registradas entre enero y
el 10 de octubre 2022. Estas cifras evidencian
la presión sobre la institucionalidad hondureña
y su capacidad de respuesta para la atención
de personas con necesidades de protección.
En el 2013, el Estado de Honduras reconoció el
desplazamiento forzado causado por la violencia,
impulsando políticas de prevención, atención,
protección y búsqueda de soluciones duraderas
a personas desplazadas, creando así la Comisión
Interinstitucional para la Protección de Personas
Desplazadas por la Violencia (CIPPDV); el nuevo
gobierno a través de las Comisiones de Migra-
ción, Seguridad y Justicia y Derechos Humanos
del Congreso Nacional, discute la ley para la pre-
vención, atención y protección de las personas
1. https://conmigho.hn/comparativo-retornados/
desplazadas forzadamente. Recientemente, du-
rante la reunión sobre la Declaración de los Án-
geles, Honduras se comprometió a priorizar la
finalización de su legislación sobre desplaza-
miento interno, que se encuentra pendiente en
el Congreso Nacional.
Además, Honduras sufre con los impactos del
cambio climático y desastres naturales. Sola-
mente entre el 01 de septiembre y 10 de octu-
bre del 2022, más de 80 mil personas han sido
afectadas por las frecuentes lluvias y los conse-
cuentes deslizamientos de tierra e inundacio-
nes, con más de 20 mil personas evacuadas,
tres mil viviendas afectadas y 130 mil cultivos
de la población campesina dañados. Colonias
como la de Guillén, en Tegucigalpa, y munici-
pios de la zona norte fueran fuertemente afec-
tados por las inundaciones.
Dado este contexto complejo, el Gobierno de
Honduras adoptó el MIRPS en 2017 comprome-
tiéndose de esta manera con el establecimien-
to de una respuesta integral al desplazamiento
forzado por violencia, y de atención e integra-
ción a los retornados con necesidades de pro-
tección, a refugiados y a solicitantes de asilo. En
2022, Honduras ha promovido la ampliación del
equipo nacional del MIRPS ahora extendido a 13
instituciones estatales como ser la Secretaría de
Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Internacio-
nal, Secretaría de Derechos Humanos, Instituto
Nacional de Migración, Secretaría de Educa-
ción, Secretaría de Salud, Secretaría de la Mujer,
INDICADORES
(DATO DE 1 ENERO DE 2022 AL 30 DE SEPTIEMBRE 2022)
Número de personas
que necesitan protección
internacional identificadas,
asistidas y referidas en áreas
fronterizas/de tránsito
Número de bienes
presuntamente abandonados
que se han identificado mediante
ejercicios comunitarios.
Número de retornados/deportados
en municipios de intervención
prioritaria que acceden a
programas de apoyo a condiciones
de seguridad y dignidad
Número de personas desplazadas
o en riesgo de desplazamiento
atendidas por los mecanismos
estatales de protección
94
17
137
230
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AVANCES
• En 2022 se determinó la actualización de
la metodología para incluir fases de análisis
de contexto, diagnóstico situacional y siste-
matización e intercambio de experiencias
en el proceso de construcción de planes y
políticas municipales de respuesta al des-
plazamiento interno. Además, a partir del
escenario de transición gubernamental en
el país, se ha estimado retomar las fases de
sensibilización y capacitación con todos los
municipios, incluyendo a otros que, si bien
no estaban contemplados como priorizados
en un principio, han manifestado interés de
participar del proceso a partir de las nece-
sidades observadas en sus regiones, entre
ellos, La Ceiba, Danlí, Tocoa, Comayagua y
Ocotepeque.
• A partir de 2021, la Comisión Interinstitu-
cional de Protección a Personas Desplaza-
das Internamente por la Violencia (CIPPDV)
cuenta con el “Curso especializado en des-
plazamiento interno por violencia”. Éste
es una oferta formativa en línea desarrollada
por la Secretaría de Derechos Humanos con
el apoyo de ACNUR, que está disponible en
la plataforma de aprendizaje de la SEDH,
cuyo objetivo es mejorar los conocimientos
y fortalecer las capacidades de protección
de funcionarios y funcionarias públicas en
materia de desplazamiento interno. La pri-
mera cohorte culminó en el primer trimestre
de 2022 y contribuyó a fortalecer las capa-
cidades de los representantes de las insti-
tuciones que integran la CIPPDV, mediante
el desarrollo de 5 módulos enfocados en
conceptos básicos y estándares internacio-
nales, situación del desplazamiento interno
en Honduras, protección, aplicación de en-
foques diferenciados y soluciones durade-
ras. Al ser una oferta formativa permanente,
el curso contribuirá a mejorar las capacida-
des de los actores claves de instituciones
del gobierno central y gobiernos locales
que tienen competencias específicas para
la protección de las personas desplazadas
internamente, para contar con un marco
conceptual y normativo común que permita
avanzar en el diseño de las políticas públi-
cas de respuesta.
• El Proyecto de Ley para la Prevención,
Atención y Protección de las Personas Des-
plazadas Forzadamente, fue entregado a
miembros del Congreso Nacional de Hondu-
ras, para su discusión y aprobación. El pro-
yecto de ley es consistente con los Principios
Rectores de los Desplazamientos Internos y
con estándares internacionales. Asimismo,
recoge las recomendaciones del Relator Es-
pecial para los Derechos Humanos de los
Desplazados Internos plasmadas en el Infor-
me de su visita oficial a Honduras (Julio/2016)
y lecciones aprendidas en experiencias en
otros países. Este proyecto de Ley es inte-
gral en la medida que define la estructura na-
cional para la respuesta al desplazamiento,
atribuyendo roles y responsabilidades, tanto
a nivel nacional como local; asimismo, esta-
blece el diseño de medidas específicas de
protección para las personas más afectadas,
promueve la protección de bienes abando-
nados a raíz de la violencia y crea el Siste-
ma de Alertas Tempranas para la prevención
y protección del desplazamiento.
• Por su parte el Instituto Nacional de Migra-
ción, a través de la Gerencia de Derechos
Humanos y Atención al Migrante en las dele-
gaciones de Danlí, Trojes y Choluteca, traba-
ja para organizar y atender a un alto número
PROTECCIÓN
• El Mecanismo de Asistencia Humanitaria en Emergencia (MAHE)
para la atención de personas desplazadas internamente por la violen-
cia implementado por la Secretaría de Derechos Humanos (SEDH),
en el 2022 se ha avanzado en la respuesta del Estado en protección
y ayuda humanitaria a las personas desplazadas internamente por
violencia en el país.
• Honduras avanza en la consolidación de un mecanismo nacional de
protección de los derechos de vivienda, tierra y propiedad (VTP)
de las personas desplazadas internamente por la violencia con el li-
derazgo del Instituto de la Propiedad (IP). Para el 2022, se ha priori-
zado la adecuación de la normativa en materia registral y catastral del
país de manera que sea sensible al conflicto y pueda responder al
contexto de violencia. Por ello, la Dirección de Registro, Catastro y la
Superintendencia del IP, han implementado una hoja de ruta para el
establecimiento de un Registro Especial de Bienes Abandonados por
las Personas Desplazadas Internamente por la Violencia, así como, la
inclusión del enfoque de protección en los Lineamientos Unificados
de Registro de VTP que aplica el IP a nivel nacional. En materia catas-
tral, también se desarrolló una herramienta de inclusión de enfoque
de protección en los procedimientos de mensura catastral que reali-
za el IP, en todas aquellas zonas afectadas por la violencia y con alto
indicio de abandono.
• Desde el 2017 la CIPPDIV -a través de la Secretaría de Derechos Huma-
nos- ha impulsado el fortalecimiento de capacidades técnicas a nivel de
los gobiernos locales, priorizando los municipios de San Pedro Sula,
El Progreso y Distrito Central, así mismo, se ha ampliado la cobertura
a los municipios de Choloma, Choluteca, Juticalpa y Danlí. En ese senti-
do, se ha fortalecido en un pilotaje el municipio de San Pedro Sula sien-
do fundamental la identificación de buenas prácticas y oportunidades de
mejora en la metodología formulada para el trabajo con gobiernos loca-
les; a la fecha, se ha logrado implementar un Mecanismo Municipal de
Asistencia Humanitaria de Emergencia (MMAHE) a través de la instalación
de un Comité Municipal de Respuesta, adscrito a la Alcaldía.
promedio de
aprobación
superior al
99%
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de personas en situación de movilidad que
ingresan al país, proporcionándoles un trato
digno y una atención eficiente al momento
de realizar su control migratorio. El INM ha
fortalecido estas delegaciones con Oficia-
les de Derechos Humanos que tienen pre-
sencia permanente y brindan atención a las
personas con necesidad de protección in-
ternacional, de esta manera agilizar las soli-
citudes de refugio en el país. Por otro lado,
se ha establecido la aplicación de una am-
nistía para la suspensión del cobro de la
sanción administrativa, por lo que desde el
4 de agosto a la fecha se han beneficiado
de esta amnistía más de 80,056 personas
en el país, principalmente de nacionalidad
venezolana, cubana, ecuatoriana y haitiana,
pese a esto continua la tarea de asegurar
que todas las personas reciban protección y
respeto a sus derechos. A su vez, el Estado
hondureño está revisando y actualizando la
política migratoria humanista donde se es-
tablezca un marco estratégico por 10 años.
• Asimismo, se han fortalecido las capacida-
des técnicas del INM en relación al proce-
so de análisis de las solicitudes de permisos
especiales de permanencia en la categoría
migratoria por razones humanitarias y solici-
tudes de refugio. También el INM, para ase-
gurar acciones de asistencia y protección en
el municipio de Danlí, inició el proceso de ins-
talación de un alberge temporal para migran-
tes y personas con necesidad de protección
en el cual recibirán alojamiento, asistencia
humanitaria, registro biométrico. Dicho espa-
cio contará con áreas diferenciadas para nú-
cleos familiares, mujeres, hombres, niñez no
acompañada y con áreas lúdicas.
EMPLEOS Y MEDIOS DE VIDA
La Secretaría de Derechos Humanos por medio de la DIPPDIV ejecuta
acciones del Componente Capital Semilla, que tiene como objetivo ge-
neral, fortalecer y generar oportunidades para las personas desplaza-
das internamente por violencia por medio de actividades económicas
y/o empleabilidad.
Además, la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y Cooperación Interna-
cional y la Asociación de Municipios de Honduras (AMHON) han estable-
cido la firma de un Convenio de colaboración mutua con el objetivo de
coordinar acciones vinculadas a la temática de protección y reinserción
donde los gobiernos locales se vinculan con los procesos administrati-
vos de gestión. Esto lo desarrolla la institución en atención a las perso-
nas retornadas, a la vez que lleva a cabo acciones conducentes para
brindarles atención integral, que permita su reinserción a la sociedad de
forma positiva.
©UNHCR/Santiago Escobar-Jaramillo
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MÉXICO
_
TENER DOCUMENTACIÓN FACILITA A FAMILIA SALVADOREÑA
EL ACCESO A EMPLEO Y EDUCACIÓN EN NUEVO LEÓN
Obtener documentos de identidad oficiales en México cambió la vida de
María, una mujer refugiada salvadoreña, de 30 años, que vive con su espo-
so y sus dos hijos adolescentes en el estado de Nuevo León.
Contar con la Clave Única de Registro de Población (CURP) ha facilitado
que María y su esposo accedan a empleos formales, ella como operado-
ra de empaque en una compañía procesadora de carne y él como guar-
dia de seguridad. La CURP también ha permitido que sus hijos puedan ir
a la escuela.
“Cuando no tenía la CURP era medio difícil porque me la pedían en todos
lados, hasta para la escuela de los niños y ahora que ya la tengo es más fá-
cil, no tengo que batallar”, comentó María.
La CURP sirve para registrar en forma individual a todas las personas que
residen en México, nacionales y extranjeras, para formar parte del regis-
tro poblacional y constituye la llave para acceder a programas y servicios
públicos.
Dentro de los esfuerzos del Marco Integral Regional para la Protección y
Soluciones (MIRPS), la Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, el Re-
gistro Nacional de Población y el Registro Civil de Nuevo León iniciaron un
programa piloto a nivel estatal que permite a las personas solicitantes de
asilo y refugiadas obtener la CURP, acreditar su identidad y acceder a di-
versos servicios como salud, educación y empleo. La familia de María fue
de las primeras beneficiarias.
Antes de tener la CURP, señaló María, sus hijos podían inscribirse en la
escuela, pero no tenían acceso a las calificaciones, hoy no tienen ningún
obstáculo y sus hijos van contentos a sus clases. El más pequeño, de 10
años, quiere ser policía, el de 13, sueña con ser doctor.
“En la pandemia tomaron las clases en línea, casi no podían estudiar,
pero ahora ya están en la escuela y lo disfrutan mucho. Los veo levantar-
se temprano y acomodar sus cosas para irse a la escuela y me da mucho
gusto”, dijo.
Desde diciembre de 2019, se han expedido más de 700 claves CURP a
familias y personas solicitantes de la condición de refugiado como parte
de este programa en Nuevo León. El esquema se ha replicado en Baja Ca-
lifornia, y está previsto que entre en vigor en los estados de México, Que-
rétaro, Chiapas, Tabasco, Veracruz, Oaxaca, Puebla y Coahuila.
“En la pandemia tomaron las
clases en línea, casi no podían
estudiar, pero ahora ya están en
la escuela y lo disfrutan mucho.
Los veo levantarse temprano y
acomodar sus cosas para irse a
la escuela y me da mucho gusto”
© ACNUR/Stephanie Galeana
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CONTEXTO NACIONAL
INDICADORES
En los últimos años, México ha recibido flujos
mixtos cada vez más complejos de migran-
tes y solicitantes de refugio de la región y de
fuera de ella. En 2021, se convirtió en el tercer
país receptor de nuevas solicitudes de refugio
a nivel mundial. México (a través de la Secre-
taría de Gobernación y la Secretaría de Rela-
ciones Exteriores) ha participado en el MIRPS
desde 2017 y ha buscado implementar una se-
rie de compromisos para el diseño de modelos
de protección y soluciones para las personas
solicitantes de refugio y desplazadas interna-
mente, fortaleciendo la autosuficiencia de las
personas refugiadas, solicitantes de refugio y
otros grupos vulnerables; así también se han
adoptado estrategias para apoyar a las comu-
nidades de acogida. Los compromisos asumi-
dos en el proceso del MIRPS se complementan
con una serie de promesas realizadas duran-
te el Foro Mundial sobre los Refugiados 2019.
A nivel regional, México tomó el liderazgo del
proceso MIRPS asumiendo la primera presi-
dencia Pro-tempore en 2019. A nivel nacional,
México diseñó la Mesa Interinstitucional sobre
Refugio y Protección Complementaria, presi-
dida por la Subsecretaría de Derechos Huma-
nos, Población y Migración de la Secretaría de
Gobernación, que ofrece un foro político para
validar las propuestas realizadas por cuatro
grupos de trabajo técnicos del MIRPS centra-
dos en el acceso a la educación (presidido por
la Secretaría de Educación), el acceso a la sa-
lud (Secretaría de Salud), el empleo (Secreta-
ría del Trabajo y Previsión Social), así como la
documentación e identidad (Registro Nacional
de Población-RENAPO). A nivel federal, la Co-
misión Mexicana de Refugiados (COMAR), apo-
yada por el ACNUR, juega un papel importante
de apoyo como secretaría técnica de las me-
sas. Desde el año 2020, la COMAR extendió
las mesas de trabajo del MIRPS al nivel local,
con el objetivo de crear un entorno favorable
de inclusión e integración en los principales
entornos urbanos.
47
859
26,328
86,000
1,629
50
Número de personas refugiadas
y solicitantes de la condición de
refugiado beneficiadas de salidas
de Estaciones Migratorias
Número de NNA no acompañados
solicitantes de asilo canalizados
por la COMAR a autoridades de
protección de niñez
Número de personas solicitantes
y refugiadas beneficiadas por el
Programa de Integración Local
Número de personas solicitantes
de la condición de refugiado
que cuentan con CURP temporal
Número de personas de interés
canalizadas por la COMAR a
servicios públicos de salud
Número de personas solicitantes
y refugiadas atendidas a través
del programa de Educación Sin
Fronteras (INEA)
En los últimos años, México ha recibido flujos
mixtos cada vez más complejos de migrantes
y solicitantes de refugio de la región y de fuera
de ella.
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AVANCES
zar el intercambio de información entre la CO-
MAR y la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores,
sobre las condiciones prevalecientes en el país
de origen de los solicitantes, a fin de contribuir
a reducir los tiempos en la determinación de
las solicitudes.
AUMENTO DE LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS NI-
ÑOS Y ADOLESCENTES EN EL CONTEXTO DE
LA MOVILIDAD HUMANA En enero de 2021 en-
traron en vigor las reformas legales en materia
de niñez en movilidad, que contribuirán a for-
talecer el sistema de protección de la niñez,
concretamente evitando que los niños, niñas y
adolescentes permanezcan en las estaciones
migratorias y en cualquier otro centro de deten-
ción, y garantizando que se priorice su interés
superior. Por otra parte la COMAR forma parte
del Programa Nacional de Protección de Niñas,
Niños y Adolescentes (PRONAPINNA), para for-
talecer las estrategias de atención de los niños,
niñas y adolescentes en contexto de movilidad
y con necesidad de protección internacional,
por lo cual se ha reforzado la comunicación con
las Procuradurías de Protección de Niñas, Niños
y Adolescentes a nivel estatal y federal, para ga-
rantizar el acompañamiento a los niños, niñas y
adolescentes desde el inicio de su trámite de re-
conocimiento de la condición de refugiado.
AVANCES EN LA PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DES-
PLAZADOS INTERNOS. Con la cooperación
de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores y a
la Secretaría de Gobernación (SEGOB) la Re-
latora Especial de la ONU sobre los derechos
humanos de los desplazados internos realizó
su visita oficial a México del 29 de agosto al 9
de septiembre, para evaluar la situación de de-
rechos humanos de las personas desplazadas
internas en el país. Sus observaciones prelimi-
nares ya se encuentran disponibles y en junio
de 2023 se podrán conocer sus recomenda-
ciones finales.
La Ley General de Desplazamiento Interno For-
zado continúa en revisión del Senado. En pa-
ralelo a la aprobación del marco normativo, la
Unidad de Política Migratoria, Registro e Identi-
dad de Personas de la Secretaría de Goberna-
ción en conjunto con el ACNUR realizaron el
informe titulado “Análisis del marco normativo y
de política pública en México a nivel federal para
la atención integral y protección de las personas
en situación de desplazamiento forzado interno”,
el cual busca activar respuestas a partir del mar-
co vigente a la par de la aprobación de la ley, así
como identificar la legislación y políticas públicas
que pueden redirigidas y/o armonizadas.
El Programa Nacional de Derechos Humanos
2020-2024 (PNDH) ha incluido acciones espe-
cíficas en materia de Desplazamiento Forzado
Interno, particularmente sobre prevención, aná-
lisis de riesgos, gestión de información, sensi-
bilización y capacitación a personas servidoras
públicas, entre otras. La Unidad de Política Mi-
gratoria, Registro e Identidad (UPMRIP) creó
un micrositio en el que publica los avances en
materia de desplazamiento interno, y en 2022
realizó dos publicaciones que dan muestra de
una ruta para desarrollar un marco de respues-
ta; además, invitó a las entidades federativas a
desarrollar un marco legislativo que considere
los estándares nacionales e internacionales. La
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN),
con el apoyo del ACNUR y el CICR, emitió en
junio de 2022 el Manual sobre Desplazamiento
Interno el cual ofrece lineamientos claves para
COORDINACIÓN
CONSOLIDACIÓN DE LA MESA INTERINSTITUCIONAL SOBRE REFU-
GIO Y PROTECCIÓN COMPLEMENTARIA. La Mesa interinstitucional
sobre refugio y protección complementaria ha mantenido sesiones es-
pecializadas, a través de las mesas temáticas sobre salud, educación,
documentación de identidad e inclusión en el mercado laboral de solici-
tantes de refugio. Esto facilita la coordinación entre los las distintas Se-
cretarías o autoridades competentes y la Secretaría de Gobernación, las
agencias de la ONU y las organizaciones de la sociedad civil.
PROTECCIÓN
EMISIÓN DE DOCUMENTOS DEL REGISTRO DE POBLACIÓN PARA SO-
LICITANTES DE REFUGIO Y REFUGIADOS. El Registro Nacional de Po-
blación (RENAPO) ha expedido 357 mil Claves de Registro de Población
(CURP) a solicitantes de refugio desde junio de 2018, facilitando su ac-
ceso a programas públicos y su integración. El RENAPO también ha ins-
talado módulos de registro que emiten CURP temporal.
MEJORA EN LA EFICIENCIA DEL REGISTRO Y TRAMITACIÓN DE CA-
SOS La COMAR ha fortalecido los procedimientos de registro, a través
de la adopción de herramientas para la atención de solicitudes de re-
conocimiento de la condición de refugiado de manera simplificada, de-
sarrolladas con el apoyo del equipo de la Iniciativa de Calidad de Asilo
del ACNUR, que facilitan el “triaje” de casos. Por otra parte, se han de-
sarrollado modificaciones en el Sistema de Información Sobre Refugia-
dos (SIRE), con la finalidad de lograr una atención más ágil in situ en cada
una de las Oficinas de Representación de la COMAR. De manera adicio-
nal se está en proceso de consolidar unidades de archivo con la finali-
dad de volverlos más eficientes mediante la digitalización de nuestros
expedientes, los procedimientos de consulta electrónica, para la inter-
vención y seguimiento de casos por parte de las distintas áreas de la
COMAR. Asimismo, mediante la plataforma SIRE se busca también agili-
El Registro
Nacional de
Población
(RENAPO)
ha expedido
357 mil
Claves de
Registro de
Población
(CURP) a
solicitantes de
refugio desde
junio de 2018
CLP_AR_004987
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orientar al Poder Judicial de la Federación en la
resolución de casos de desplazamiento interno.
En el marco del referido PNDH, la Coordina-
ción para la Atención Integral de la Migración
en la Frontera Sur (CAIMFS), en conjunto con
la (COMAR), han realizado acciones en mate-
ria de difusión, entre ellas, el lanzamiento del
libro “Desplazamiento Forzado Interno en Mé-
xico: del reconocimiento a los desafíos”, el cual
contiene 20 artículos escritos por expertos en
la materia, académicos, organizaciones de la
sociedad civil, organizaciones internacionales
y servidores públicos de los diferentes niveles
de gobierno.
Con el objetivo de impulsar el marco norma-
tivo en materia de desplazamiento interno,
dichas instituciones han colaborado en la ela-
boración del proyecto de reglamento para la
Ley de desplazamiento del Estado de Chiapas,
y en el proyecto de Ley sobre desplazamiento
en el Estado de Oaxaca, así como en el diseño
del Programa de Atención Integral al desplaza-
miento del Estado de Guerrero.
En colaboración con el ACNUR, se implemen-
ta el proyecto piloto para la adecuación del
Programa de Inclusión Local para contemplar
a personas internamente desplazadas, que ha
permitido la detección y atención de casos, así
como el desarrollo de instrumentos administra-
tivos para impulsar su acceso a vivienda, em-
pleo, salud y educación, principalmente.
Aunado a lo descrito, se han realizado traba-
jos conjuntos con autoridades de la Unidad de
Política Interior y Análisis de Información de la
SEGOB, con el objetivo de desarrollar una me-
todología para la representación cartográfica
de los incidentes de desplazamiento, particu-
larmente en los estados de Guerrero, Chiapas
y Oaxaca, a fin de que contar con insumos sufi-
cientes para la elaboración de análisis de ries-
gos, así como el diseño e implementación de
programas de prevención. En ese mismo rubro,
se elaboró un proyecto de Protocolo de pre-
vención en materia de prevención al despla-
zamiento, el cual está siendo compartido con
diversas autoridades federales y estatales para
ser retroalimentando con experiencias locales.
Además, la CAIMF-COMAR ha ofrecido cursos
de capacitación y sensibilización en materia de
desplazamiento interno a personas servidoras
públicas del Sistema Nacional y Estatales para
el Desarrollo Integral de la Familia, autoridades
del estado de Chiapas y Guerrero, así como a
los Centros de Justicia para Mujeres en los es-
tados de la frontera sur.
EDUCACIÓN
INCLUSIÓN DE LOS Y LAS NIÑAS SOLICITANTES DE REFUGIO Y REFU-
GIADOS EN EL REGRESO A CLASES En el marco del inicio del ciclo es-
colar 2022-2023, la Subsecretaría de Educación Básica de la Secretaría
de Educación Pública (SEP), la Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugia-
dos (COMAR), ACNUR, y el Instituto Mexicano de la Radio (IMER), pre-
sentaron la campaña “Todas las infancias a la escuela, por el derecho a
la educación de la niñez refugiada”, con la que se busca sensibilizar so-
bre la importancia de la inserción escolar de niñas, niños y adolescentes
refugiados en México, destacando la normativa de inclusión de NNA sin
importar su condición migratoria.
EMPLEO Y MEDIOS DE VIDA
PROGRAMA DE INTEGRACIÓN LABORAL Y REUBICACIÓN Desde 2016,
más de 27,000 personas reconocidas como refugiadas han sido identifi-
cadas en el sur del país han sido reubicadas en el centro y el norte, con-
cretamente en ciudades como Saltillo, Guadalajara y Monterrey, y se les
ha conectado con oportunidades de trabajo con 400 empresas, acceso
a la educación pública y apoyo psicosocial, lo que ha permitido a miles
de familias disfrutar de oportunidades de subsistencia, lo que les ha per-
mitido ser autosuficientes.
CAPACITACIÓN A 700 REPRESENTANTES DEL SECTOR PRIVADO EN
INSERCIÓN LABORAL En conjunto con el Servicio Nacional del Empleo,
la COMAR, el INM y el ACNUR capacitaron a más de 700 representantes
de compañías del sector privado sobre la documentación requerida, al
tiempo que se compartieron buenas prácticas para la inclusión de per-
sonas refugiadas y en movilidad en el mercado laboral mexicano.
El Programa de Inclusión Local contempla a
personas internamente desplazadas, y permite
la detección y atención de casos, e impulsa el
acceso a vivienda, empleo, salud y educación.
Capacitación a
700
representantes
del sector
privado en
inserción
laboral
CLP_AR_004988
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PANAMÁ
_
PROGRAMA DE EMPLEABILIDAD POTENCIA HABILIDADES
DE PERSONAS REFUGIADAS EN PANAMÁ
Desde el primer día que Delsy llegó a Panamá, empezó a practicar su ta-
lento: el arte de la costura. En Colombia, era profesora de educación ar-
tística y tenía su emprendimiento de pijamas hechos a mano. Después de
huir de su país, ella se encontró en Panamá sin otra opción que confiar en
sí misma para seguir adelante.
Los primeros meses fueron muy difíciles para Delsy. Sin acceso a un tra-
bajo digno que pudiera darle estabilidad laboral, Delsy explicó que “La
diferencia es muy grande porque cuando trabajas sin documentación no
tienes los derechos que tiene un trabajador (formal)”.
Para mejorar sus habilidades de atención al cliente, Delsy entró a ser parte
de Talento Sin Fronteras, un programa de empleabilidad para personas refu-
giadas desarrollado por ACNUR, la Agencia de la ONU para los Refugiados,
ManpowerGroup y HIAS. El programa busca potenciar las capacidades y ha-
bilidades de las personas refugiadas y panameñas en condiciones de vulne-
rabilidad, creando oportunidades para mejorar su condición de vida a través
del trabajo digno. Visto el potencial del programa, Talento sin Fronteras fue
incluido en la estrategia de resiliencia del Municipio de Panamá.
“Nos enseñaron que lo primero que hay que hacer cuando llega el clien-
te es preguntarle su nombre, sonreírle y darle la bienvenida”, cuenta Del-
sy, que aplicó inmediatamente lo aprendido en su día a día. “Me funcionó
lo que aprendí, ya que empezaron a felicitar a mi jefa porque yo los aten-
día muy bien”.
Desde 2018, más de 500 personas refugiadas y panameñas fueron ca-
pacitadas por los socios del programa para desarrollar las herramientas y
habilidades necesarias para una postulación laboral de impacto, alineada
a la realidad laboral actual.
Además de trabajar con las personas refugiadas, Talento sin Fronteras
ha sensibilizado a 45 empresas en el país, algunas de las cuales han brin-
dado la oportunidad a algunos de sus participantes para realizar pasantías
en dichas empresas.
“Espero que muchas personas refugiadas puedan aprovechar Talento
Sin Fronteras, porque es un programa que nos ayuda a crecer”, dice Del-
sy con una sonrisa.
© ACNUR/Talento Sin Fronteras/Johanna Ramos
“En la pandemia tomaron las
clases en línea, casi no podían
estudiar, pero ahora ya están en
la escuela y lo disfrutan mucho.
Los veo levantarse temprano y
acomodar sus cosas para irse a
la escuela y me da mucho gusto”
CLP_AR_004989
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CONTEXTO NACIONAL
La República de Panamá es actualmente el ho-
gar de aproximadamente 12,027 personas en
necesidad de protección internacional, con
2,573 refugiados y 9,449 solicitantes de la con-
dición de refugiado; predominantemente de
Colombia, El Salvador, Cuba, Nicaragua y Ve-
nezuela; quienes residen principalmente en
el área metropolitana de la Ciudad de Pana-
má. Además de ser un país que recibe perso-
nas forzadas a huir, Panamá también es un país
de tránsito para miles de personas de Vene-
zuela, Haití, Cuba, África y el sur de Asia que
cruzan el Tapón del Darién, camino al norte, en
búsqueda de nuevas oportunidades, reunifica-
ción familiar o protección. En los últimos años,
el Darién se ha convertido en uno de los pun-
tos de tránsito más importantes y riesgosos de
la región. En 2021, aproximadamente 133,726
personas ingresaron al país de manera irregu-
lar a través de esta frontera, un número récord
de personas en movimientos mixtos que se di-
rigen hacia el norte del continente.
Según el Servicio Nacional de Migración, en los
primeros diez meses de 2022, más de 211,355
personas cruzaron el Tapón del Darién, superan-
do toda la cifra récord del 2021, con entre 1,000-
3000 entradas por día. En 2022, la nacionalidad
más común de quienes han transitado es la ve-
nezolana. La mayoría de las personas que solici-
tan la condición de refugiado en Panamá ingresa
al país por vía aérea, y los casos de personas
que han más han solicitado la condición de refu-
giado en 2022 han sido de Colombia.
INDICADORES
(AL MES DE SEPTIEMBRE DE 2022)
539
Constancia de solicitud
reconocimiento de la condición
de refugiado (nuevos
solicitantes)
48
Permiso de trabajo para solicitantes de la condición de refugiado
admitidos a trámite
39
Renovación de Permiso
de trabajo para
refugiados reconocidos
78
Permiso de trabajo
indefinido para refugiados
que obtuvieron residencia
permanente
208
Carné de solicitantes de
la condición de refugiado
admitidos a trámite
137
133
12
Renovación de Carnet de
refugiado reconocido
Solicitudes de carné de
residencia temporal
Documento como personas en
proceso de reconocimiento de
apatridia
70
Carné de Residencia
permanente
1
Documento de apátrida
reconocido
6 A 12 MESES
Tiempo promedio de
procesamiento de solicitudes
de reconocimiento de la
condición de refugiado desde su
recepción hasta la decisión final
NÚMERO DE PERSONAS SOLICITANTES DE LA CONDICIÓN DE REFUGIADO Y REFUGIADOS RECONOCIDOS QUE
RECIBIERON DOCUMENTO DE IDENTIFICACIÓN OFICIAL DURANTE EL AÑO 2022
NÚMERO DE PERSONAS SOLICITANTES DE LA CONDICIÓN DE REFUGIADO ADMITIDAS AL PROCEDIMIENTO Y
REFUGIADOS RECONOCIDOS QUE HAN SOLICITADO O RENOVADO PERMISO DE TRABAJO DURANTE EL 2022.
CLP_AR_004990
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AVANCES
PROTECCIÓN
Mayores capacidades técnicas de funcionarios gubernamentales en
protección internacional. En 2021 y 2022, más de 900 funcionarios de
estamentos de seguridad pública (de la Policía Nacional, Servicio Nacio-
nal de Fronteras, Servicio Nacional Aeronaval), de la Defensoría del Pue-
blo, Instituto Nacional de la Mujer, CONARE, ONPAR, y el Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores) participaron en entrenamientos sobre protección
internacional. Reconocimiento de la apatridia. El Ministerio de Relacio-
nes Exteriores continúa implementando los compromisos acordados en
una reunión de alto nivel que llevó a la creación de un mecanismo inte-
rinstitucional para facilitar la coordinación e implementación del decreto
ejecutivo que aprueba el procedimiento de apatridia. Con este avance,
otras autoridades relacionadas se han hecho anuentes de sus respon-
sabilidades dentro de este marco legal.
Expansión de la presencia de ONPAR en áreas fronterizas críticas, para
responder a la necesidad de las personas que ingresan al país como
parte de movimientos mixtos a través del Tapón del Darién. Esto ha fa-
cilitado identificar y dar curso a casos específicos que han solicitado
protección internacional en Panamá, y a otros que de otro modo no lo
hubieran hecho. En coordinación con Registro Civil, Servicio Nacional
de Migración y Defensoría del Pueblo, se realizó el registro de 90 re-
cién nacidos en la Provincia de Darién en 2020 de personas que se en-
contraban en los movimientos mixtos. Este es un importante logro para
reducir el riesgo de apatridia en el futuro, ya que se asegura que su re-
gistro de nacimiento y se le reconoce como nacionales del Estado Pa-
nameño al haber nacido en el territorio.
INTEGRACIÓN LOCAL
La participación de los solicitantes de la condición de refugiado y re-
fugiados en consultas públicas. El año pasado, solicitantes de la con-
dición de refugiado y refugiados participaron en una consulta nacional
para la creación de políticas públicas inclusivas orientadas a cerrar bre-
chas económicas, sociales, educativas y de salud, llamada “Pacto Bi-
centenario”. Los solicitantes de la condición de refugiado y refugiados
presentaron 14 recomendaciones como su contribución a esta iniciativa.
Participación en actividades coordinadas por gobiernos locales A través
de un acuerdo con el Municipio de La Chorrera, se incluyó a solicitantes
de la condición de refugiado y refugiados en programas de prevención
de violencia basada en género; no solo como beneficiarios, sino tam-
bién como actores clave, empoderados para brindar apoyo y consejo
para otras personas en la comunidad. Adicionalmente, espacios de co-
existencia pacífica se llevaron a cabo mediante entrenamientos depor-
tivos enfocados en la integración y protección de más de 200 niños y
niñas a través de una oferta innovadora en educación socioemocional
en las instituciones educativas junto a Futbol con Corazón.
Solicitantes de la condición de refugiado
y refugiados participaron en una consulta
nacional para la creación de políticas públicas
inclusivas y presentaron 14 recomendaciones
a esta iniciativa.
CLP_AR_004991
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EMPLEOS Y MEDIOS DE VIDA
Intervenciones efectivas y soluciones duraderas apoyaron a las per-
sonas refugiadas en su inserción en los mercados locales mediante
empleabilidad y emprendimiento. La implementación del programa se-
mipresencial de empleabilidad “Talento sin Fronteras”, en alianza con
ManpowerGroup y HIAS, continuó, para fortalecer las capacidades y ha-
bilidades de personas reconocidas como refugiados promoviendo su
acceso al mercado laboral formal, y facilitando su integración en el país.
Adicionalmente para el área de emprendimiento junto a Fundación Ciu-
dad del Saber, se implementó un nuevo programa de medios de vida
llamado Emprendiendo juntos el cual tiene como objetivo ayudar a los
refugiados y solicitantes de la condición de refugio a recuperarse del
impacto socioeconómico de la pandemia, así como promover asocia-
ciones innovadoras para la inclusión de emprendimientos hechos por
refugiados. Estos programas facilitan la integración de la población refu-
giada en los sistemas económicos y sociales de Panamá promoviendo
su autosuficiencia y mejorando el acceso a los recursos productivos y a
la incorporación de estrategias colectivas que tiendan a la asociatividad.

Acceso a formación profesional para refugiados El Instituto Nacional de
Formación Profesional y Capacitación para el Desarrollo Humano (INA-
DEH) ha habilitado formalmente que los refugiados puedan acceder a
sus programas de capacitación profesional, los cuales solían estar dis-
ponibles solamente para ciudadanos panameños y para extranjeros con
más de 10 años de residir en el país.
El programa de empleabilidad “Talento
sin Fronteras”, fortalece las capacidades
y habilidades de personas refugiadas
promoviendo su acceso al mercado laboral
formal, y facilitando su integración en el país.
© UNHCR/Santiago Escobar-Jarami
CLP_AR_004992
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PLATAFORMA
DE APOYO
AL MIRPS
_
© UNHCR/Pierre Albouy
89
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INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
MIRPS 2022
A tres años de su lanzamiento a los márgenes
del Foro Mundial sobre los Refugiados en 2019,
la Plataforma de Apoyo al MIRPS se presenta
como un mecanismo eficiente para impulsar los
esfuerzos de los países MIRPS en ofrecer pro-
tección y soluciones al desplazamiento forzado
en Centroamérica y México. En línea con el Pac-
to Mundial sobre los Refugiados, la Plataforma
de Apoyo al MIRPS continúa aprovechando el
apoyo de una amplia gama de actores para pro-
mover una mayor responsabilidad compartida.

Actualmente, los miembros de la Plataforma
de Apoyo incluyen a Argentina, Brasil, Cana-
dá, Colombia, la Unión Europea (UE), Francia,
España, Suiza, Uruguay, los Estados Unidos de
América, el Banco Interamericano de Desarro-
llo (BID), el Grupo del Banco Mundial, el Comi-
sión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe
(CEPAL), y la Organización de los Estados Ame-
ricanos (OEA). El Alto Comisionado de las Na-
ciones Unidas para los Refugiados (ACNUR)
actúa como Secretaría de la Plataforma.

MIEMBROS DE LA PLATAFORMA DE APOYO AL MIRPS

Canadá asumió el cargo de Presidencia de
la Plataforma de Apoyo en julio de 2021, lue-
go de que España finalizara su periodo como
Presidencia inaugural. El Evento de Solidari-
dad Internacional para Fortalecer la Protección
y Promover Soluciones para los Desplaza-
dos Forzosos y las Comunidades de Acogida
en Centroamérica y México en septiembre de
2022, marcó la culminación del mandato de
Canadá y el traspaso a los Estados Unidos de
América como Presidencia entrante.

Presidencia de la Plataforma de Apoyo, Cana-
dá centró su trabajo destacando el tema “Pro-
tección y Empoderamiento de Mujeres y Niñas
en Situación de Desplazamiento” buscando lla-
mar la atención sobre las necesidades de protec-
ción de las mujeres, niñas, y personas LGBTIQ+
desplazadas forzosamente en situaciones vulne-
rables. Canadá se centró en tres objetivos princi-
pales durante su mandato como Presidencia de
la Plataforma de Apoyo del MIRPS, que a su vez
promovió los objetivos principales de la Platafor-
ma de Apoyo como una aplicación regional del
Pacto Mundial sobre los Refugiados.
©️ ACNUR/Soo-Jung Kim
CLP_AR_004994
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INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
MIRPS 2022

Objetivo 1: Impulsar los compromisos políticos, financieros, técnicos y materiales
para atender las necesidades de índole humanitaria y de desarrollo identificadas
por los países del MIRPS

Objetivo 2: Incrementar la visibilidad internacional del MIRPS y los compromisos de
apoyo por parte de un espectro más amplio de actores

Canadá generó espacios y diálogos entre los
países MIRPS y los miembros de la Plataforma
de Apoyo al MIRPS para trabajar en colabora-
ción e intercambiar buenas prácticas y experien-
cias. De marzo a junio de 2022, se realizaron
cinco Talleres Técnicos para facilitar el intercam-
bio de las mejores prácticas sobre: i) recepción
y admisión, ii) desplazamiento interno, iii) forma-
ción profesional y participación en el mercado
laboral, iv) gobernanza local, y v) alianzas con el
sector privado. Los Talleres Técnicos resultaron
en la provisión de apoyo técnico entre los Paí-
ses MIRPS y los Miembros de la Plataforma de
Apoyo al MIRPS para avanzar elementos de los
Planes de Acción Nacionales MIRPS, incluso a
través de los Grupos de Trabajo del MIRPS.

La Reunión de Hermanamiento Regional so-
bre Fortalecimiento de los Sistemas de Asilo
en Panamá en mayo de 2022, reforzó la co-
laboración entre los Países MIRPS, reflejando
ejemplos de responsabilidad compartida en la
región. A partir del mismo, se generó un plan
de colaboraciones que se materializaron a lo
largo del año en visitas de terreno y talleres re-
gionales presenciales y virtuales (ver más infor-
mación en la sección sobre Grupo de Trabajo
sobre Recepción, Admisión y Procesamiento
de personas con necesidad de protección in-
ternacional, página 23).
En mayo de 2022, el “Evento Insignia sobre
Reasentamiento, Vías Complementarias, e
integración” reunió a la Plataforma de Apo-
yo al MIRPS, los Países MIRPS, y otros actores
estratégicos para compartir buenas prácticas
y lecciones aprendidas con respecto a la po-
lítica y el procesamiento del reasentamiento,
las vías complementarias, así como políticas y
prácticas de integración. Durante tres días del
evento, participaron 112 representantes de go-
biernos, sociedad civil, academia, Naciones
Unidas y OEA, que conformaron 8 paneles
de expertos con 41 expertos. Los participan-
tes subrayaron la necesidad crítica de que la
comunidad internacional amplíe el acceso a
protección para las personas de Centroaméri-
ca y México. Este evento sentó las bases para
la organización de un taller técnico en junio
de 2022, donde las empresas canadienses,
las Cámaras de Comercio de Canadá, y aso-
ciaciones empresariales con presencia y ope-
raciones en Centroamérica y México lanzaron
discusiones sobre oportunidades para animar
a otras empresas a implementar sus propias
prácticas o iniciativas de contratación inclusi-
va para las personas refugiasdas y desplaza-
das por la fuerza.
El Evento de Solidaridad Internacional para
Fortalecer la Protección y Promover Solu-
ciones para los Desplazados Forzosos y
Múltiples eventos de alto nivel aumentaron la
visibilidad internacional del MIRPS, comenzan-
do con el “Evento virtual de alto nivel sobre
protección y empoderamiento de mujeres y
niñas desplazadas de América Central y Mé-
xico” en diciembre de 2021, coorganizado por
Canadá y Honduras. La Plataforma se unió a
los 16 Días de Activismo contra la Violencia
de Género de la Agencia de la ONU para los
Refugiados, para llamar la atención sobre las
necesidades de protección internacional y la
importancia de empoderar a las mujeres y ni-
ñas refugiadas en la región, así como la ne-
cesidad de proteger los derechos humanos
de las personas desplazadas, mujeres, niñas
y personas LGBTIQ+ en situaciones vulnera-
bles, y movilizar a la comunidad internacional
para ampliar el apoyo a estos esfuerzos re-
gionales. En este evento, Canadá anunció un
compromiso de USD 10 millones durante los
próximos cuatro años, planeando trabajar con
la Organización Internacional para las Migra-
ciones (OIM) y la Agencia de las Naciones Uni-
das para los Refugiados (ACNUR) para ayudar
a las mujeres y niñas afectadas por la migra-
ción irregular y el desplazamiento forzado en
Honduras, Guatemala, y El Salvador.

Canadá buscó involucrar sustancialmente a los
miembros de la Plataforma de Apoyo a lo largo
de su mandato, al mismo tiempo ampliaba la
base de apoyo al involucrarse con nuevos ac-
tores. En el “Evento de Solidaridad Internacio-
nal” en septiembre de 2022, la Plataforma de
Apoyo recibió con satisfacción al Banco Mun-
dial como nuevo miembro. La membresía del
Banco Mundial y del Banco Interamericano de
Desarrollo (BID), así como el involucramien-
to del Banco Centroamericano de Integración
Económica (BCIE), representan una importan-
te oportunidad para continuar aumentado la
colaboración del MIRPS con las instituciones
las Comunidades de Acogida en Centroa-
mérica y México coorganizado por Canadá
y los Estados Unidos de América en colabo-
ración con Honduras, en la ciudad de Nueva
York en septiembre de 2022 a los márgenes
del Asamblea General de la ONU, generó USD
210 millones en compromisos financieros como
amplias expresiones de solidaridad y apoyo a
las respuestas operativas en la región a través
de una variedad de socios, junto con otras for-
mas generosas de apoyo técnico y político en
la región. Se acogió con satisfacción la parti-
cipación de una Una amplia gama de acto-
res, incluidos los países MIRPS y los Estados
Miembros de la Plataforma de Apoyo al MIRPS,
instituciones financieras internacionales, repre-
sentantes del sector privado, la academia, el
Mecanismo Regional de la Sociedad Civil para
el MIRPS, organismos de las Naciones Unidas,
y el CICR participaron en el evento.
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© UNHCR/Tito Herrera
94
95
INFORME ANUAL DEL MARCO INTEGRAL REGIONAL PARA LA PROTECCIÓN Y SOLUCIONES
MIRPS 2022
financieras internacionales, con el propósito
de alinear las agendas de reducción de la po-
breza y desarrollo económico, vinculando las
inversiones en apoyo de las personas despla-
zadas y las comunidades de acogida, y facili-
tando la creación de soluciones duraderas.

Como resultado del acercamiento para au-
mentar el compromiso con el sector privado,
Palliser Furniture y Tent Foundation participa-
ron en el “Evento de Solidaridad Internacional”.
Doce empresas y actores del sector privado
respaldaron una declaración conjunta que re-
conoció el papel fundamental del sector priva-
do en la contribución a las soluciones para las
poblaciones desplazadas y se comprometió a
explorar formas de mejorar las oportunidades
económicas y de capacitación, los medios de
vida y la autosuficiencia de los refugiados, so-
licitantes de asilo, retornados y otras poblacio-
nes desplazadas por la fuerza en la región.
Objetivo 3: Fortalecer la Plataforma de Apoyo como mecanismo eficaz para movili-
zar respuestas integrales a la situación del desplazamiento forzado en la región

Como la segunda Presidencia de la Plataforma
de Apoyo al MIRPS, Canadá se basó en el pro-
greso realizado por España como Presidencia
inaugural al continuar fortaleciendo la gobernan-
za de la Plataforma de Apoyo MIRPS. Canadá
presentó el Modelo de Liderazgo de la Troika,
formalizando los roles de la Presidencia actual,
la Presidencia anterior y la Presidencia entrante,
con el fin de apoyar la sostenibilidad de la Plata-
forma y reforzar su gobernanza.
A lo largo de su mandato, Canadá buscó enfo-
carse en actividades prácticas y técnicas, como
mesas redondas y talleres técnicos, así como el
intercambio de los espacios de diálogo y discu-
sión creados por España para intercambiar ideas
y mejores prácticas entre los países del MIRPS y
los miembros de la Plataforma de Apoyo.

PRÓXIMOS PASOS

En el transcurso de 2022, la Plataforma de
Apoyo al MIRPS, junto con los Países MIRPS,
lograron avances significativos en la adopción
de un enfoque inclusivo de la sociedad como
un todo, que reunió a los gobiernos, la socie-
dad civil, la academia, el sector privado y las
personas refugiadas y desplazadas, y sigue
siendo un ejemplo exitoso de colaboración re-
gional en apoyo a la implementación del Pacto
Mundial sobre los Refugiados.

Desde que asumió el cargo de la Presidencia
de la Plataforma de Apoyo en septiembre de
2022, los Estados Unidos de América ha plan-
teado alinear el trabajo de la Plataforma con
el Plan de la Presidencia Pro-tempore Panamá
2023, para brindar apoyo concreto a los Paí-
ses MIRPS en la implementación de sus Planes
de Acción Nacionales y esfuerzos regionales
para brindar protección y buscar soluciones a
las poblaciones desplazadas forzadamente en
Centroamérica y México.

CLP_AR_004996
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CLP_AR_004997
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Informe anual del Marco Integral
Regional para la Protección y Soluciones
MIRPS 2022
CLP_AR_004998
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 1

*1.- SOLICITUDES
SOLICITUDES POR DELEGACION
2020
CASOS
PERSONAS
BAJA CALIFORNIA
1,306
1-
HONDURAS
15,364
1-
HAITÍ
1-
HONDURAS
**CDMX
5,840
2-
HAITÍ
5,909
2-
HONDURAS
2-
CUBA
CHIAPAS/TAPA.
17,146
3-
CUBA
5,712
3-
CUBA
3-
HAITÍ
CHIAPAS/PALEN.
124
4-
EL SALVADOR
4,011
4-
CHILE
4-
VENEZUELA
TABASCO
1,988
5-
VENEZUELA
3,241
5-
VENEZUELA
5-
NICARAGUA
**VERACRUZ
1,574
6-
GUATEMALA
3,002
6-
EL SALVADOR
6-
EL SALVADOR
TOTAL
27,978
7-
CHILE
806
7-
GUATEMALA
7-
GUATEMALA
8-
NICARAGUA
803
8-
BRASIL
8-
BRASIL
SOLICITANTES AÑOS 2013-2022 (personas)
9-
COLOMBIA
496
9-
NICARAGUA
9-
COLOMBIA
10-
BRASIL
368
10-
COLOMBIA
10-
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA
2014
2015
2016
2021
2022
OTROS PAISES
1,202
OTROS PAISES
OTROS PAISES
2,137
3,423
8,796
129,791
118,478
40,914
Total de solicitantes del 2013 a 2022
419,337
2.- COMPARATIVO ENERO-DICIEMBRE (2020-2021-2022)
****SOLICITANTES DE ENERO-DICIEMBRE 2020
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
SEPT.
OCT.
NOV.
DIC.
5,900
5,278
968
3,309
4,644
4,208
4,762
total Ene-Dic 2020
40,914
SOLICITANTES DE ENERO-DICIEMBRE 2021
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
SEPT.
OCT.
NOV.
DIC.
6,932
8,993
9,061
12,770
17,492
14,787
8,146
total Ene-Dic 2021
129,791
SOLICITANTES DE ENERO-DICIEMBRE 2022
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
SEPT.
OCT.
NOV.
DIC.
10,170
13,130
10,396
8,972
11,487
14,188
6,244
total Ene-Dic 2022
118,478
3.- TASA DE RECONOCIDOS COMO REFUGIADOS (TOP 5)
8,214
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
4,742
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
3,470
EL SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR
1,766
CUBA
CUBA
992
1,316
20,500
7,508
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
4,333
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
3,431
CUBA
CUBA
2,400
EL SALVADOR
2,319
HAITÍ
HAITÍ
2,683
22,674
17,705
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
5,522
HAITÍ
HAITÍ
3,575
EL SALVADOR
3,995
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
2,568
CUBA
4,737
38,102
11,845
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
8,502
HAITÍ
3,888
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
3,100
EL SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR
1,884
CUBA
5,543
34,762
4.- RECONOCIDOS COMO REFUGIADOS, 2013 A 2022 (TOP 7)
REFUGIADOS RECONOCIDOS, POR NACIONALIDAD TOTAL (2013 - 2022).
54,908
22,538
20,765
16,829
9,882
7,201
3,588
6,276
141,987
*
**
*** Los datos presentados son preliminares, tienen carácter informativo y no son definitivos.
****
P.C.= Protección Complementaria.
(Datos al cierre de Diciembre 2022)
31/Diciembre/2022
84%
35%
85%
69%
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
6,123
4,121
3,800
2,894
1,236
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2022.
POSITIVO + P.C.
14,958
1,918
3,040
3,875
1,781
28,200
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
8,214
4,742
3,470
1,766
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2019.
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2019.
POSITIVO + P.C.
6,801
TASA DE P.C.
6%
0%
18%
8%
1,766
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
83%
99%
86%
2,981
474
2,462
48,849
3,437
4,323
129,791
3,484
5,668
17,364
12,798
18,101
11,922
7,764
5,728
3,683
89,540
5,689
7,110
59%
EL SALVADOR
OTROS
85%
98%
49%
TOTAL
7,714
2013
1,296
14,619
29,569
70,314
40,914
157
2,745
2,119
5,595
2019
75,354
26,503
2017
74,477
2,976
74%
3,995
2,568
38,102
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2021.
PC
4
657
-

1
2
846
TASA DE P.C.
0%
EL SALVADOR
CUBA
PAIS
TOTAL
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
17,705
5,522
3,575
2%
97%
HAITÍ
PAIS
CUBA
90%
19%
93%
87%
49%
63%
2,388
43%
POSITIVO + P.C.
10,648
1,657
3,598
2,712
932
21,935
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
TOTAL
2,597
100,919
TOP10
TOP10
312
12%
PC
528
2
617
134
150
1,731
664
1,128
TASA DE P.C.
0%
0%
-

2%
0%
7%
0%
0%
POSITIVOS +
P.C.
44,112
46,127
5,452
76,239
7,967
NACIONALIDAD
-

2,400
2,319
22,674
TOTAL
OTROS
2,683
0%
29%
5%
2022
3,416
8,214
4,742
3,470
34,762
5,543
PERSONAS
2018
CASOS
PERSONAS
4%
PAIS
TOTAL
GUATEMALA
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2020.
PC
7
12
133
PAIS
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
7,508
4,333
3,431
2,406
1,316
300
23%
10,742
3,597
4,678
VENEZUELA
EL SALVADOR
CUBA
2,712
932
HONDURAS
2,446
4,233
1,537
OTROS
467
14,668
POSITIVOS
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
PAIS
6,408
2,003
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
ENE.
MAY.
JUN.
JUL.
AGO.
5,838
8,504
9,675
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
5,966
928
1,225
1,760
1,966
6,497
47%
72%
EL SALVADOR
TOTAL
OTROS
ENE.
12,677
12,930
JUN.
JUL.
AGO.
2,364
340
TASA DE
POSITIVOS
76%
99%
68%
19%
0%
4,737
182
4%
OTROS
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2022.
12%
0%
TOP 10
NACIONALIDAD
NACIONALIDAD
2021
PERSONAS
50,954
36,080
8,249
6,893
4,737
PAIS
2,568
0%
0%
22,674
1,884
27%
31,086
18,087
17,068
14,823
8,971
5,271
2,592
2,482
1,421
8,874
118,478
7,803
992
20,500
846
617
16,399
62%
80%
64%
1,316
CASOS
2021
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
11,845
8,502
3,888
15%
8%
3,575
3,995
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2021.
TASA DE
POSITIVOS
90%
12%
93%
992
20,500
118,478
TASA DE POSITIVOS
1
JUN.
17,705
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL
DE RESUELTOS 2019.
EL SALVADOR
16,092
OTROS
TOTAL
87%
49%
RECONOCIDOS
POSITIVOS
-

731
1,968
277
544
8,889
61%
10,796
682
4,673
11,993
41,068
446
474
NO
RECONOCIDOS
(Negativo)
31
2,509
TOTAL
PAIS
HONDURAS
VENEZUELA
EL SALVADOR
HAITÍ
CUBA
GUATEMALA
NICARAGUA
Se debe tomar en cuenta que la oficina de Veracruz incluye ademas de ese estado a Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Campeche y Yucatan, mientras que la
oficina de la CDMX cubre, la CDMX y todas las entidades restantes con la excepción de las cubiertas por Veracruz, Chiapas, Tabasco y Baja
l f
4,895
4,836
4,195
2,336
3,749
1,862
OTROS
TOTAL
El número de solicitudes, no necesariamente es el número de solicitudes en trámite, toda vez que puede haber anexiones o algunas de ellas se
encuentran aún en prevención.
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
34,762
4,987
OTORGADOS P.C.
72%
70%
TASA DE POSITIVOS
84%
23%
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL
DE RESUELTOS 2021.
PAIS
HONDURAS
27,354
TOTAL
TOTAL
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
POSITIVOS
VENEZUELA
85%
2,628
POSITIVOS
10,647
HONDURAS
PAIS
TOTAL
PAIS
3,100
1,884
PC
TASA DE P.C.
OTROS
38,102
1
596
TOTAL
52%
2,640
8,502
3,888
3,100
1,061
55%
HAITÍ
EL SALVADOR
3,874
5,522
OTROS
2,255
41%
OTROS
5,543
133
2%
OTROS
PAIS
HONDURAS
HAITÍ
97%
69%
1,261
3,040
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL
DE RESUELTOS 2022.
CUBA
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
11,845
Solicitudes refiere al titular del procedimiento, más dependientes en caso de tenerlos. Solicitantes refiere a personas individuales.
4,618
GUATEMALA
NICARAGUA
HAITÍ
VENEZUELA
CUBA
14,954
501
15,956
21,825
13,583
2,868
PAIS
2,053
92,030
21,856
VENEZUELA
41,472
CUBA
21,204
3,006
1,252
3,679
DELEGACION
PERSONAS
1,676
VENEZUELA
OTROS
ENE.
MAY.
6,273
POSITIVOS
OTROS
1,274
EL SALVADOR
HAITÍ
PAIS
HONDURAS
CUBA
GUATEMALA
MAY.
546
9,209
9,132
1,779
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL
DE RESUELTOS 2020.
2020
83%
50%
75%
10,297
PAIS
85%
98%
45%
83%
22%
47%
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2020.
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
7,508
4,333
3,431
2,400
2,319
OTROS
41%
GUATEMALA
TOTAL
4,680
POSITIVO + P.C.
6,415
4,245
1,670
2,003
1,165
17,084
2,683
1,586
***SOLICITANTES X NACIONALIDAD 2020, 2021 Y 2022 (PERSONAS)
JUL.
AGO.
2022
PERSONAS
40,914
5,944
TOTAL
3,497
129,791
2020
TOTAL
TOTAL
5,966
5,900
5,278
968
928
1,225
1,760
1,966
3,309
4,644
4,208
4,762
6,497
6,932
8,993
9,061
9,209
10,297
12,677
12,930
12,770
17,492
14,787
8,146
5,838
10,170
13,130
10,396
9,132
9,675
8,504
10,742
8,972
11,487
14,188
6,244
ENE.
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
MAY.
JUN.
JUL.
AGO.
SEP.
OCT.
NOV.
DIC
COMPARATIVO DE LOS AÑOS 2020, 2021 Y 2022.
2020
2021
2022
CLP_AR_005707
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 261 of 1047

*1.- SOLICITUDES
SOLICITUDES POR DELEGACION
2020
CASOS
PERSONAS
BAJA CALIFORNIA
1,306
1-
HONDURAS
15,364
1-
HAITÍ
1-
HONDURAS
**CDMX
5,842
2-
HAITÍ
5,909
2-
HONDURAS
2-
CUBA
CHIAPAS/TAPACHU.
17,146
3-
CUBA
5,712
3-
CUBA
3-
HAITÍ
CHIAPAS/PALEN.
124
4-
EL SALVADOR
4,012
4-
CHILE
4-
VENEZUELA
TABASCO
1,988
5-
VENEZUELA
3,243
5-
VENEZUELA
5-
NICARAGUA
**VERACRUZ
1,574
6-
GUATEMALA
3,002
6-
EL SALVADOR
6-
EL SALVADOR
TOTAL
27,980
7-
CHILE
806
7-
GUATEMALA
7-
GUATEMALA
8-
NICARAGUA
803
8-
BRASIL
8-
BRASIL
SOLICITANTES AÑOS 2013-2022 (personas)
9-
COLOMBIA
496
9-
NICARAGUA
9-
COLOMBIA
10-
BRASIL
368
10-
COLOMBIA
10-
REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA
2014
2015
2016
2021
2022
OTROS PAISES
1,202
OTROS PAISES
OTROS PAISES
2,137
3,423
8,796
129,813
97,973
40,917
Total de solicitantes del 2013 a 2022
398,861
2.- COMPARATIVO ENERO-OCTUBRE (2020-2021-2022)
****SOLICITANTES DE ENERO-OCTUBRE 2020
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
SEPT.
OCT.
5,900
5,278
968
3,311
4,644
total Ene-Oct 2020
31,947
SOLICITANTES DE ENERO-OCTUBRE 2021
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
SEPT.
OCT.
6,932
8,993
9,061
12,781
17,489
total Ene-Oct 2021
106,880
SOLICITANTES DE ENERO-OCTUBRE 2022
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
SEPT.
OCT.
10,172
13,127
10,393
8,976
11,391
total Ene-Oct 2022
97,973
3.- TASA DE RECONOCIDOS COMO REFUGIADOS (TOP 5)
8,229
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
4,743
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
3,475
EL SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR
1,762
CUBA
CUBA
979
1,312
20,500
7,509
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
4,331
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
3,431
CUBA
CUBA
2,400
EL SALVADOR
2,319
HAITÍ
HAITÍ
2,683
22,673
17,708
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
5,522
HAITÍ
HAITÍ
3,574
EL SALVADOR
3,991
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
2,568
CUBA
4,737
38,100
10,258
HONDURAS
HONDURAS
7,731
HAITÍ
3,331
VENEZUELA
VENEZUELA
2,700
EL SALVADOR
EL SALVADOR
1,727
CUBA
4,435
30,182
4.- RECONOCIDOS COMO REFUGIADOS, 2013 A 2022 (TOP 7)
REFUGIADOS RECONOCIDOS, POR NACIONALIDAD TOTAL (2013 - 2022).
53,294
21,942
20,360
16,056
9,725
6,870
3,505
5,510
137,262
*
**
*** Los datos presentados son preliminares, tienen carácter informativo y no son definitivos.
****
P.C.= Protección Complementaria.
(Datos al cierre de Octubre 2022)
01/Noviembre/2022
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2022.
POSITIVO + P.C.
14,961
1,920
3,040
3,870
1,778
28,198
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
84%
35%
85%
69%
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
5,945
97,973
TOTAL
6,651
3,493
129,813
3,683
89,566
5,689
7,110
2020
TOTAL
TOTAL
6,122
4,121
3,800
2,894
1,236
8,229
4,743
3,475
1,762
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2019.
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2019.
POSITIVO + P.C.
6,813
TASA DE P.C.
6%
0%
18%
8%
1,762
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
83%
99%
86%
2,987
470
2,462
48,850
3,437
4,323
129,813
3,485
5,669
12,457
9,097
18,096
11,920
6,712
4,900
59%
EL SALVADOR
OTROS
85%
98%
49%
TOTAL
7,716
2013
1,296
14,619
29,570
70,317
40,917
157
2,745
2,119
4,783
2019
62,002
26,504
2017
74,477
2,521
74%
3,991
2,568
38,100
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2021.
PC
4
657
-

1
2
846
TASA DE P.C.
0%
EL SALVADOR
CUBA
PAIS
TOTAL
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
17,708
5,522
3,574
2%
97%
30,182
4,435
HAITÍ
PAIS
CUBA
90%
20%
93%
89%
50%
63%
1,830
41%
POSITIVO + P.C.
9,262
1,582
3,108
2,391
866
19,039
TASA DE POSITIVO y P.C.
TOTAL
2,211
97,856
TOP10
TOP10
312
12%
PC
528
2
617
134
150
1,731
664
1,128
TASA DE P.C.
0%
0%
-

2%
0%
7%
0%
0%
***SOLICITANTES X NACIONALIDAD 2020, 2021 Y 2022 (PERSONAS)
40,917
POSITIVOS + P.C.
42,701
38,987
4,501
64,360
6,505
NACIONALIDAD
-

2,400
2,319
22,673
TOTAL
OTROS
2,683
0%
29%
5%
2022 Octubre.
3,039
8,229
4,743
3,475
PERSONAS
2018
CASOS
PERSONAS
4%
PAIS
TOTAL
GUATEMALA
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2020.
PC
7
12
133
PAIS
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
7,509
4,331
3,431
2,113
1,312
300
23%
10,762
3,107
4,679
VENEZUELA
EL SALVADOR
CUBA
2,391
866
HONDURAS
2,447
4,231
1,536
OTROS
454
14,668
POSITIVOS
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
PAIS
6,408
2,003
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
ENE.
MAY.
JUN.
JUL.
AGO.
5,839
8,506
9,677
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
5,966
928
1,226
1,760
1,966
6,497
46%
72%
EL SALVADOR
TOTAL
OTROS
ENE.
12,677
12,943
JUN.
JUL.
AGO.
2,370
336
TASA DE
POSITIVOS
76%
99%
68%
19%
0%
4,737
182
4%
OTROS
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2022.
12%
0%
TOP 10
NACIONALIDAD
NACIONALIDAD
2021
PERSONAS
50,972
36,085
8,249
6,896
4,737
PAIS
2,568
0%
0%
22,673
1,727
979
20,500
844
604
16,399
62%
80%
64%
1,312
27%
26,223
15,730
13,493
10,214
8,313
4,460
2,146
2,091
1,154
7,498
Oct. 2022
PERSONAS
CASOS
2021
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
10,258
7,731
3,331
15%
8%
3,574
3,991
TASA DE P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS 2021.
TASA DE
POSITIVOS
90%
13%
93%
979
20,500
97,973
TASA DE POSITIVOS
1
JUN.
17,708
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE
RESUELTOS 2019.
EL SALVADOR
15,766
OTROS
TOTAL
89%
50%
RECONOCIDOS
POSITIVOS
-

678
1,917
277
540
8,834
61%
10,593
605
4,594
11,297
39,406
446
474
NO
RECONOCIDOS
(Negativo)
31
2,509
TOTAL
PAIS
HONDURAS
VENEZUELA
EL SALVADOR
HAITÍ
CUBA
GUATEMALA
NICARAGUA
Se debe tomar en cuenta que la oficina de Veracruz incluye ademas de ese estado a Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Campeche y Yucatan, mientras que la oficina de la
CDMX cubre, la CDMX y todas las entidades restantes con la excepción de las cubiertas por Veracruz, Chiapas, Tabasco y Baja California.
4,828
4,759
3,974
2,280
3,528
1,806
OTROS
TOTAL
El número de solicitudes, no necesariamente es el número de solicitudes en trámite, toda vez que puede haber anexiones o algunas de ellas se encuentran aún
en prevención.
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
30,182
4,897
OTORGADOS P.C.
72%
70%
TASA DE POSITIVOS
84%
23%
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE
RESUELTOS 2021.
PAIS
HONDURAS
27,352
TOTAL
TOTAL
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
POSITIVOS
VENEZUELA
85%
2,629
POSITIVOS
9,261
HONDURAS
PAIS
TOTAL
PAIS
2,700
1,727
PC
TASA DE P.C.
OTROS
38,100
1
547
TOTAL
52%
2,640
7,731
3,331
2,700
1,035
55%
HAITÍ
EL SALVADOR
3,869
5,522
OTROS
1,701
38%
OTROS
4,435
129
3%
OTROS
PAIS
HONDURAS
HAITÍ
97%
69%
1,263
3,040
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE
RESUELTOS 2022.
CUBA
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
10,258
Solicitudes refiere al titular del procedimiento, más dependientes en caso de tenerlos. Solicitantes refiere a personas individuales.
4,551
GUATEMALA
NICARAGUA
HAITÍ
VENEZUELA
CUBA
14,957
501
15,953
21,306
13,257
2,842
PAIS
1,671
89,022
21,337
VENEZUELA
40,061
CUBA
18,361
2,896
1,225
3,299
DELEGACION
PERSONAS
1,676
VENEZUELA
OTROS
ENE.
MAY.
6,285
POSITIVOS
OTROS
1,274
EL SALVADOR
HAITÍ
PAIS
HONDURAS
CUBA
GUATEMALA
MAY.
544
9,209
9,130
1,776
TASA DE POSITIVOS EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE
RESUELTOS 2020.
2020
83%
50%
75%
10,298
PAIS
85%
98%
45%
83%
22%
47%
TASA DE POSITIVOS MAS P.C. EN RELACION AL TOTAL DE RESUELTOS
2020.
RESUELTOS:
Positivo, PC,
Negativo.
7,509
4,331
3,431
2,400
2,319
OTROS
41%
GUATEMALA
TOTAL
4,681
POSITIVO + P.C.
6,415
4,243
1,669
2,003
1,165
17,081
2,683
1,586
JUL.
AGO.
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
2020
2021
2022
5,900
6,932
10,172
5,278
8,993
13,127
968
9,061
10,393
928
9,209
9,130
1,226
10,298
9,677
1,760
12,677
8,506
1,966
12,943
10,762
3,311
12,781
8,976
4,644
17,489
11,391
Comparativo Enero-Octubre de los años (2020, 2021, 2022)
FEB.
MAR.
ABR.
MAY.
JUN.
JUL.
AGO.
SEP.
OCT.
CLP_AR_005752
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 262 of 1047

Hon. Merrick Garland Attorney General
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530

Hon. Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)
3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
David Neal, Director
Executive Office for Immigration Review
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

Ur Jaddou, Director
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS)
DHS
Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director
Office of Policy
Executive Office for Immigration Review
DOJ
Daniel Delgado, Acting Director,
Border and Immigration Policy,
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans,
DHS

Richard Revesz, Administrator
Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA)
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Executive Office of the President

March 1, 2023

Re:
Request to Provide a Minimum of 60 days for Public Comment in Response to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) (the Departments) Joint Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM): Circumvention of Lawful Pathways

Dear Attorney General Garland, Secretary Mayorkas, Director Neal, Director Jaddou, Assistant
Director Reid, Acting Director Delgado, and Mr. Revesz:

We, the undersigned 172 national, state, and local organizations, write to urge the Departments
to allow at least 60 days for public comment on the above referenced NPRM. We make this
request due to the length and complexity of the 153-page proposed rule and the critical interests
it implicates. As explained below, the Departments have no basis for merely providing a
CLP_AR_006669
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By ESEC at 9:47 am, Mar 03, 2023

2
truncated comment period. A robust comment period is particularly important given the
devastating impact of this NPRM.

As President Biden recognized upon taking office, Executive Order 12866 governs the
regulatory process and requires agencies to “afford the public a meaningful opportunity to
comment on any proposed regulation, which in most cases should include a comment period of
not less than 60 days.” Executive Order 13563 likewise directs agencies to “...afford the public a
meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a
comment period that should generally be at least 60 days.” 60 days is the minimum, with some
courts referencing 90 days as the “usual” length period for comments. Nevertheless, the
Departments proceed with a 30-day comment period, citing their plan to “move as expeditiously
as possible” to implement this rule prior to the termination of Title 42 expulsions. Their haste
also indicates their intent to predetermine the outcome of this notice-and-comment period, rather
than afford a meaningful opportunity to impacted stakeholders.

There is no compelling reason to truncate the public comment period by half or two thirds, and
thereby deprive stakeholders of a meaningful opportunity to weigh in on the vast changes
proposed in this rule. Rather, the highly technical, nuanced, legal and policy issues the NPRM
addresses — and, above all, the severe human cost it is certain to inflict — illustrate why a
minimum of 60 days must be allowed for the public to file comments in response to the rule.
Despite this, the Departments have provided no plausible justification for providing only 30 days
for public comment.

The Departments explain this expedited time frame by citing the expected termination date for
Title 42 by May 11, when the COVID-19 public health emergency will expire. They cite the
possibility of increased encounters of asylum seekers who have waited for processing and lament
that DHS lacks the resources to prepare for this increase. They thus propose a rule that would
result in the summary returns of many asylum seekers, rather than offer them the process they
require under domestic and international law.

There is little merit to the Departments’ alarm regarding the impending end of Title 42; the
Departments have known this policy had an expiration date since the moment President Biden
took office. Indeed, the Biden administration has faced significant pressure to end the Trump-era
Title 42 policy since its inauguration, fielding letters from scores of epidemiologists and medical
experts, more than 100 members of Congress, as well as civil, human, and refugee rights
organizations urging the program’s end. This pressure extended to senior Biden administration
officials, who proceeded to resign in protest of the Biden administration’s continued use of Title
42.

Importantly, the Departments are relying on the impending expiration date of the Title 42 policy
CLP_AR_006670
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 264 of 1047

3
to truncate the comment period even though the Biden administration itself formally sought to
end the Title 42 policy nearly one full year ago. In April 2022, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention announced its plan to do away with this Trump-era policy which it deemed “no
longer necessary.” DHS’ Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the highest funded federal law
enforcement agency in the nation, began to prepare for the end of Title 42 since April 2022 and
received $14.8 billion in the December 2022 omnibus appropriations package — significantly
more than the President’s budget request. In addition to its own preparations to end Title 42
months ago, the administration has faced the prospected end of Title 42 as it fought back
litigation from asylum seeking families who have challenged the legality of Title 42 for years.

In sum, the Biden administration has faced pressure to end Title 42 from the day it took office,
sought to end it nearly a year ago, has prepared for its end and received boosted funding from
Congress while facing years of litigation challenging the legality of this expulsion policy, and
now anticipates its predictable demise once the public health emergency lapses on May 11, 2023.
To claim, as the Departments do, that they now face an “urgent and extreme situation” appears
hyperbolic at best — and disingenuous at worst. This cannot justify truncating the comment
period and rushing towards the finalization of a rule of this magnitude.

This rule has vast implications on all stages of asylum processing, imposing new and complex
requirements on asylum seekers before they reach the border, during their initial fear screening,
as well as during immigration court review. The rule implicates substantive areas in domestic
asylum law as well as U.S. obligations under the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).

Recycling prior Trump bans, this rule would foreclose asylum access to people via
unprecedented new requirements during their fear screenings, while in CBP detention, without
access to counsel, and with limited linguistic and legal access to understand the complex rules
they must navigate. The proposed rule further codifies the usage of a CBP app that has proven to
be chaotic, nearly inaccessible for Black asylum seekers, and altogether disastrous for its own
purported goal of orderly processing at ports of entry.

The Departments engineered this rule to adversely impact large numbers of asylum seekers and
“decrease the number of asylum grants,” resulting in a five-year bar for people returned to harm.
In other words, the implications of this proposed rule are potentially deadly for countless asylum
seekers, including children. The human cost is beyond measure and demands the most careful
research, analysis, and public consultation. It is highly inappropriate to afford the public a mere
30 days to comment on a proposal that violates domestic laws and international obligations on its
face.

CLP_AR_006671
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 265 of 1047

4
To honor the public’s right to a meaningful and fair opportunity to respond to the NPRM,
consistent with the Executive Orders cited above and the spirit and intent of the Administrative
Procedure Act, a comment period of a minimum of 60 days must be provided.

Please contact Azadeh Erfani at aerfani@heartlandalliance.org with any questions or concerns,
and we look forward to your prompt response.

Sincerely,

National
The Advocates for Human Rights
African Communities Together (ACT)
African Human Rights Coalition
Alianza Americas
America's Voice
American Immigration Lawyers Association
Americans for Immigrant Justice
Amnesty International USA
Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC
Asian Pacific Institute on Gender-Based Violence
ASISTA Immigration Assistance
Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP)
The Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI)
Border Kindness
Boston University School of Law, Immigrants' Rights and Human Trafficking Program
Bridges Faith Initiative
Capital Area Immigrants' Rights (CAIR) Coalition
CASA
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies
Center for Law and Social Policy
Center for Popular Democracy
Center for Victims of Torture
Children's HealthWatch
The Children's Partnership
Church World Service
Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center
Communities United for Status & Protection (CUSP)
Community Change Action
CLP_AR_006672
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 266 of 1047

5
Comunidad Maya Pixan Ixim
Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, U.S. Provinces
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship
Disciples Immigration Legal Counsel
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
Esperanza United
Fight for the Future
FIRM Action
First Focus on Children
Franciscan Action Network
Freedom Network USA
Friends Committee on National Legislation
Futures Without Violence
Government Information Watch
Haitian Bridge Alliance
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program
HIAS
Hope Border Institute
Human Rights First
Immigration Center for Women and Children
Immigration Equality
The Immigration Hub
Immigration Law & Justice Network
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Innovation Law Lab
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti
International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP)
Japanese American Citizens League
Justice Action Center
Justice for Migrant Women
Justice in Motion
Kids in Need of Defense
Kino Border Initiative
Latin America Working Group (LAWG)
Lawyers for Good Government
MPower Change
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns
Mennonite Central Committee U.S.
MomsRising/MamásConPoder
Muslim Advocates
CLP_AR_006673
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 267 of 1047

6
NAKASEC
National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
The National Domestic Violence Hotline
National Education Association
National Immigrant Justice Center
National Immigration Law Center
The National Immigration Project (NIPNLG)
National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights
National Network to End Domestic Violence
National Partnership for New Americans
NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice
Never Again Action
Oxfam America
Refugees International
Sakhi For South Asian Women
Save the Children
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas Justice Team
South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT)
Southern Border Communities Coalition
Southern Poverty Law Center
Sunita Jain Anti-Trafficking Policy Initiative , Loyola Law School
Tahirih Justice Center
Taylor Levy Law
T'ruah
UndocuBlack Network
Unitarian Universalist Association
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
USAHello
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI)
VECINA
Washington Office on Latin America
We Are All America
#WelcomeWithDignity campaign for asylum rights
Welcoming America
Witness at the Border
Women's Refugee Commission
Young Center for Immigrant Children's Rights

CLP_AR_006674
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 268 of 1047

7
State
Advocates for Basic Legal Equality
Alabama Coalition for Immigrant Justice
Aldea - The People's Justice Center
Al Otro Lado
Catholic Charities Community Services, Immigrant & Refugee Services, NY
Center for Safety & Change
Central Washington Justice For Our Neighbors
The Children's Partnership
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA)
Colorado Children's Campaign
Daya Inc.
Fellowship Southwest
Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project
Honest Law Group
Hope Border Institute
Immigrant ARC
Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project
Immigrant Legal Center
Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice
Just Neighbors
Legal Aid Justice Center
Make the Road Nevada
Make the Road New York
Mariposa Legal, Program of COMMON Foundation
Michigan Immigrant Rights Center
Mobilization for Justice, Inc.
New York Immigration Coalition
Oasis Legal Services
OneAmerica
Our Children Oregon
Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network
Safe Passage Project
Sanctuary for Families
Surveillance Technology Oversight Project
Tennessee Justice for Our Neighbors
Texas Civil Rights Project
Wind of the Spirit Immigrant Resource Center

CLP_AR_006675
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 269 of 1047

8
Local
American Gateways
Arizona Justice for Our Neighbors
Ayuda
Bhutanese Community Association of Pittsburgh (BCAP)
Central American Minors Working Group
Central American Legal Assistance
Central American Resource Center of Northern CA - CARECEN SF
Cleveland Jobs with Justice
DC Dorothy Day Catholic Worker House
Galveston-Houston Immigrant Representation Project (GHIRP)
The Healing Trust
Houston Immigration Legal Services Collaborative
Human Rights Initiative Of North Texas
Immigrant Defenders Law Center
Indivisible Brooklyn
Jewish Activists for Immigration Justice of Western MA
Jewish Family Service of San Diego
Justice for Our Neighbors El Paso
Justice For Our Neighbors North Central Texas
The Legal Aid Society (New York)
The Legal Project
New Sanctuary Movement of Philadelphia
New York Justice for Our Neighbors
Queens Defenders
Rockland Immigration Coalition
Student Clinic for Immigrant Justice
Westchester Jewish Coalition for Immigration
Womankind

CLP_AR_006676
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 270 of 1047

LCA
March 27, 2023
BY FIRST CLASS MAIL AND EMAIL
The Honorable Alejandro Mayorkas
Office of the Executive Secretary
MS 0525
Department of Homeland Security
2707 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave SE
Washington, DC 20528-0525
LAWYERS FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS
BOSTON
Re:
Concerns Relating to CBP One Mobile Application
Dear Secretary Mayorkas:
Lawyers for Civil Rights (LCR) writes to express concerns surrounding features of the CBP One
mobile application that create unfair and unnecessary obstacles for people seeking immigration
protection and relief in the United States. At best, CBP One appears to be technologically
deficient, and, at worst, it functions in a racially discriminatory manner. We respectfully request a
meeting with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) to discuss our concerns
regarding the implementation and functionality of CBP One.
Haitian families and individuals affiliated with Haitian-Americans United, a community-based
group in Boston, have contacted LCR regarding their experiences with CBP One, including: ( I)
serious language access issues, and (2) the required photo submission process disproportionately
rejects people with darker skin tones. Because the use of CBP One is mandatory for certain
immigration applications, these obstacles place a prohibitive burden on the ability to apply for,
much less actually obtain, immigration protection and relief.
Language Access
With regard to language access issues, certain CBP One prompts and informational displays on
the app are not fully translated from English into other languages, including Haitian Creole. For
example, certain instructions and error messages are either not translated at all or are not
translated thoroughly. This inconsistency creates a language barrier to entry at the first step of the
immigration application process, and it runs contrary to DHS and CBP standards and guidance
for interaction with those seeking immigration protection.
DHS has internal regulations requiring that CBP provide meaningful language access to those
seeking immigration protection, as set forth in the CBP Language Access Plan. The Language
Access Plan "sets forth the standards, principles, and guidelines which CBP w ill use to provide,
and improve, meaningful access to agency programs and activities" to those with limited English
61 BATIERYMARCH STREET • 5TH FLOOR • BOSTON, MA 02110
(617) 482-1145 (TELEPHONE) • (617) 482-4392 (FACSIMILE)
WWW.LA WYERSFORCIVILRIGHTS.ORG
CLP_AR_006715
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-8 Filed 06/05/23 Page 271 of 1047
By ESEC at 12:51 pm, Apr 04, 2023

proficiency. 1 The DHS regulations are mandated by Executive Order 13166 (2000), which
directs federal agencies to identify and address the language needs of the public they serve. See
65 C.F.R. 159 (2000). CBP acknowledges that many individuals with whom they interact "do not
read, write, speak, or understand English as their primary language."2 CBP also recognizes that
"[l]anguage barriers can negatively impact interactions with the public, provision of services, and
law enforcement activities," and, therefore "[e]nsuring effective communication with all persons,
including persons who are limited English proficient, facilitates the CBP mission."3 The
language access issues with CBP One demonstrate an area in which DHS and CBP have failed to
live up to that mission by rolling out CBP One without adequate translation, effectively denying
access to those with limited English proficiency.
Photo Requirement
CBP One requires applicants to take and submit a photo of themselves in real time to complete
the application process. However, in many instances photos taken by applicants with darker skin
tones have been repeatedly rejected by CBP One. For example, LCR is aware of applicants who
attempted to submit a photo more than 30 times over the course of several days and using a
variety of lighting conditions before CBP One would accept a photo. Practically speaking, unless
CBP One eventually accepts a photo, the applicant cannot move forward in the process and will
not be eligible for immigration protection, all as a result of merely having darker skin. This result
- disproportionate exclusion of people with darker skin tones from this immigration process - is
untenable. In addition, as the demand for access to CBP One increases, the disproportionate
impact on people with darker skin tones will almost certainly increase.
Conclusion
Issues with language access and the photo submission process create significant burdens for
those seeking immigration protection and relief. For example, in some instances, applicants were
required to miss days of work and spend significant sums of money to travel long distances to
areas where they could find and utilize translation services. In this manner, CBP One's
deficiencies create insurmountable burdens on applicants that are tantamount to a denial of the
opportunity to seek immigration protection and relief.
LCR urges DRS and CBP to: (l) thoroughly translate the application, including instructions and
error messages, for all languages currently available on the platform; (2) immediately upgrade
the photo submission software to eliminate the issue of rejecting applicants with darker skin
tones; and (3) thoroughly test any new technology with the demographic expected to use it, prior
to implementing it for full use.
1 CBP Language Access Plan (Nov. 2016). Available at
https: /www.cbp.gov:sites. default/files/assets docurnents/2017-
Oct/CBP°o20Language0'o20Access0o20Plan%2011%2018%202016.pdf.
2 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Language Access in Customs and Border Protection. Available at
https: /www.cbp.gov/aboutJlanguage-access.
3 See note 2.
2
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It is crucial that DHS and CBP address these issues expeditiously to minimize the
disproportionate burdens placed on non-English speakers and people with darker skin tones, in
accord with the goal of fostering equitable access to immigration protection and relief. Further,
LCR requests the opportunity to meet and discuss the resolution of these issues.
Sincerely,
Isl Michael A. Kippins
Michael A. Kippins
Lawyers for Civil Rights
61 Batterymarch Street, 5th Floor
Boston, MA 02110
mkippins@lawyersforcivilrights.org
(781) 591-0123
cc:
Troy A. Miller
Commissioner
U.S. Customs and Border Protection
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20229
Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
2707 Martin Luther King, Jr. Avenue, SE
MS 0190
Washington, DC 20528-0190
3
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December 2022
HUMAN RIGHTS
STAIN, PUBLIC
HEALTH FARCE

Evasion of Asylum Law
and Title 42 Abuse Must End—
and Never Be Revived
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Introduction
For nearly two years, the Biden administration has wielded the Trump administration’s Title 42
policy to block people from seeking asylum at official ports of entry, expel to grave dangers
asylum seekers and migrants who cross the border, and evade the due process and refugee
protection provisions of U.S. immigration and asylum law. Though efforts to force continuation
of this cruel and counterproductive policy continue, after a federal district court in Washington
DC vacated it in November for violating U.S. law, it is scheduled to end on December 21, 2022.
The misuse of Title 42 has been a public health, border management and human rights fiasco.
Human Rights First has, as of the date this report was issued, tracked over 13,480 reports of
murder, torture, kidnapping, rape, and other violent attacks on migrants and asylum seekers
blocked in or expelled to Mexico under Title 42 since President Biden took office. It is a
staggering number that will continue to mount every day that Title 42 or similar policies that
evade refugee law are in place.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) attempted to end the Title 42 policy in
May 2022, but in the wake of a court order issued by a federal judge in Louisiana forcing the
policy’s continuation in a case brought by state attorneys general aligned with the former Trump
administration, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continued to use it. In October
2022, in a disturbing step backwards, the Biden administration announced it would expand use
of the policy to expel Venezuelans seeking refuge at the southern U.S. border without allowing
them to apply for asylum, attempting to justify this abrogation of asylum law by pairing it with a
limited parole program available to some Venezuelans. Since then, DHS has expelled thousands
of Venezuelans to dangerous conditions in Mexico where they are also at risk of refoulement, i.e.
illegal return, to persecution in Venezuela. In response to the October parole announcement, the
U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR), IOM and UNICEF immediately warned that such efforts “cannot
come at the expense of the fundamental human right to seek asylum.”
The targeted, expanded use of Title 42 against Venezuelans again confirms that this policy has no
basis in public health. As medical and public health experts have repeatedly affirmed and
recently-revealed Congressional testimony of a top CDC scientist confirms, the Title 42 policy has
no scientific basis. It was adopted at the behest of Stephen Miller and other Trump
administration officials as yet another discriminatory effort to restrict immigration and block
asylum. As leading epidemiologists and public health experts warned President Biden in
November, the continued and expanded use of Title 42 is “a travesty” that manipulates, misuses
and undermines trust in public health, and “feeds and propagates racially-based tropes that
falsely paint migrants as vectors of disease, fostering stigma and heightening the vulnerability of
already marginalized groups in a manner that is antithetical to the tenets of good public health
practice.”
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Some members of Congress have attempted to force continuation of Title 42 or a similar
suspension of asylum at the border – a codification of failed Trump policy that would eviscerate
U.S. refugee law and subvert international refugee law globally. At the same time, the Biden
administration is considering replacing Title 42 with other inhumane Trump policies or versions
of them, including an asylum transit ban – an illegal policy that, when in effect, turned refugees
away to danger and deprived other refugees of a path to family reunification, stability and
citizenship, as Human Rights First detailed in a 2020 report.
Senior Biden administration officials are reportedly planning to impose other harsh policies as
Title 42 ends, as well as use the notorious migrant detention center at Guantánamo Bay or other
third country detention facilities to hold Haitians interdicted at sea. The United States recently
returned 180 men, women and children – who had attempted to reach safety in the United
States by boat – to Haiti despite multiple U.N. authorities’ calls for states to halt returns to Haiti
given the life-threatening conditions there.
A ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that took effect in May 2022 prohibits
DHS from using Title 42 to return asylum-seeking families “to places where they will be
persecuted or tortured.” As the policy’s scheduled end date approaches, DHS retains clear
authority, consistent with the various court rulings, to except individuals from Title 42. It also
remains obligated under U.S. refugee law and binding treaty commitments, and a November D.C.
Circuit Court decision, not to return anyone—family, adult, or child—to persecution or torture,
consistent with the legal rationale of the D.C. Circuit Court. In his November ruling concluding
that the Title 42 policy violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the D.C. District Court judge
who vacated the Title 42 policy cited Human Rights First’s prior research documenting violent
attacks against people impacted by the policy and emphasized the “harms Plaintiffs face if
summarily expelled to countries [where] they may be persecuted or tortured” as well as the
earlier finding by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that “the record is replete with
stomach-churning evidence of death, torture, and rape.” The Trump-aligned state attorneys
general who initiated the Louisiana litigation are now seeking to intervene in the separate case
before the D.C. District Court and also seeking to stay that court's November ruling requiring the
Title 42 policy to end on December 21. Their stay request is now pending before the D.C. Circuit
Court after the District Court denied it.
It is far past time to end this illegal, inhumane, and ineffective policy and all attempts to force its
continuation. After nearly two years in office, the Biden administration should institute a more
effective and humanitarian response to the reception, identification, and processing of refugees
seeking protection in the United States – a response that upholds U.S. refugee and immigration
laws, as Human Rights First has outlined in its recommendation papers. The Biden administration
should not replace one failed and illegal Trump policy with another by embracing, supporting or
employing the ineffective, inhumane, xenophobic and racist immigration policies of the prior
administration.
This report is based on in-person interviews Human Rights First conducted with asylum seekers
in Tijuana in September 2022 and Ciudad Juárez in December 2022; and interviews by telephone
and in-person with attorneys, other humanitarian workers, and additional asylum seekers in
Mexico conducted from October to December 2022; reports of attacks drawn from an ongoing
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survey of asylum seekers in Mexico conducted by Al Otro Lado between mid-June and early
November 2022; open-source information identified by students from the University of California
Network for Human Rights and Digital Fact Finding (Berkeley, Santa Cruz, Los Angeles); review of
U.S. government data; and media and other human rights reporting.
Human Rights First published prior research on the Title 42 policy in June 2022, April 2022 (with
Al Otro Lado and Haitian Bridge Alliance), March 2022, February 2022, January 2022, December
2021, November 2021 (with Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project), October 2021,
August 2021, July 2021 (with Hope Border Institute), June 2021, May 2021 (with RAICES and
Interfaith Welcome Coalition), April 2021 (with Al Otro Lado and Haitian Bridge Alliance),
December 2020, and May 2020.
Key Findings
• The use of the Trump-initiated Title 42 policy over the nearly two years since President Biden
took office, its forced continuation through court order, and its recent expansion by the
administration have inflicted terrible human rights abuses. Human Rights First has tracked
13,480 reports of murder, kidnapping, rape, torture, and other violent attacks against people
blocked in or expelled to Mexico due to Title 42 since January 2021. These numbers are likely
just the tip of the iceberg as many victims have not spoken with investigators, journalists, or
attorneys. Some recent examples include: Mexican officers kidnapped a Guatemalan family
with two young children after DHS expelled them to Nuevo Laredo, and turned them over to a
cartel that held them hostage for three months and tortured them; a Honduran asylum seeker
and her four-year-old daughter were kidnapped, the daughter beaten and the mother raped in
front of her daughter as they waited in Tijuana due to Title 42; a 13-year-old girl was nearly
abducted at gunpoint in Juárez after her family fled political persecution in Venezuela but was
expelled under Title 42; and a Guatemalan lesbian trans woman was raped by Mexican police
in Piedras Negras after CBP turned her away from protection at the Eagle Pass port of entry.
Black and Indigenous asylum seekers continue to be targets of bias-motivated violence and
discrimination while stranded in Mexico.
• The Biden administration’s expansion of Title 42 to Venezuelans in October 2022 has denied
thousands access to the U.S. asylum process in flagrant violation of U.S. refugee law. The
expansion has stranded adults, families, and children in dangerous Mexican border cities
where they are targets of kidnapping, torture, and brutal attacks. It has subjected others to
onward refoulement to persecution and torture. It has also separated many families. In some
cases, this expansion has resulted in the separation of married couples and the delivery of
mothers, wives, teenage daughters, and other family members to grave dangers in Mexico.
CBP has subjected many Venezuelans to “lateral expulsions,” transporting them to areas far
from where they entered the United States and to locations where they have no knowledge of
the specific dangers or local refugee shelters. In many cases, asylum seekers appear to have
been transported to cities that lack shelter capacity.
• Mexican asylum seekers fleeing persecution and torture have been trapped in or expelled by
CBP to the very country they are trying to flee without access to the U.S. asylum process in
violation of U.S. law and non-refoulement legal obligations. They include: a woman who was
decapitated by the cartel that had threatened her after DHS, citing Title 42, would not let her
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seek asylum; a lesbian women who had suffered multiple attacks, rape, and threats due to her
sexual orientation and was refused the right to seek asylum at the San Ysidro port of entry; a
gay man who had suffered beatings, sexual assaults, and an attempted kidnapping due to his
sexual orientation and was turned away from asylum at the El Paso port of entry; and an
Indigenous woman who had been attacked by police, threatened, and her family members
murdered for her activism defending her Indigenous community was turned away from
seeking asylum with her three children at the San Ysidro port of entry in September 2022 and
subsequently suffered sexual abuse by Mexican police.
• Faith-based, humanitarian, and legal workers assisting asylum seekers stranded in Mexico by
the Title 42 policy face acute and mounting threats and attacks from violent cartels that
exercise widespread control over territory in Mexico. Recent threats and attacks include the
June 2022 kidnapping and November 2022 threats against a Baptist pastor in Nuevo Laredo,
the armed raiding of a shelter in Ciudad Juarez in late November 2022, the forced closure of a
Nuevo Laredo shelter after threats demanding that the shelter pay a “protection fee,” and the
robbery at gunpoint of a staff member of a legal organization in a Tijuana plaza near the San
Ysidro port of entry while the staff member accompanied asylum seekers instructed by CBP to
appear at 6 a.m. to be processed for a Title 42 exemption.
• CBP and Border Patrol officers continue to use Title 42 to expel migrants and asylum seekers
in ways that make them even more vulnerable to harm in Mexico and undermine their
ability to seek asylum in the United States – including by sometimes expelling asylum seekers
in the middle of the night, depriving them of necessary medical care, or taking their passports
or other identity documents, religious items, medical items, or other documents necessary for
their asylum cases. Many were expelled to deplorable conditions without secure housing,
leaving some sleeping on the streets. Mexican authorities transported some expelled
Venezuelans to other parts of Mexico, abandoning them in cities where migrant shelters are
full beyond capacity.
• The Title 42 policy has continued to inflict disorder at the border, triggering multiple border
crossings, artificially inflating CBP border statistics, pushing dangerous crossings away from
ports of entry, and facilitating exploitation. With Title 42 spurring dangerous attempts to cross
into the United States outside of ports of entry, at least 853 asylum seekers and migrants have
died in border crossings in FY 2022, making it the deadliest year since the U.S. government
began record keeping on border crossing deaths in 1998.
Recommendations
•
Congress: Reject any efforts to codify or legislatively extend the Title 42 policy or similar
policies that suspend refugee law or improperly block refugees from seeking asylum, direct
sufficient appropriations for asylum adjudications and to community-based, non-profit
organizations providing temporary housing, transportation, and other assistance to people
seeking refuge at the border, and continue to conduct oversight of the disorder and human
rights abuses caused by the Title 42 policy and any similar policies that deny access to asylum.
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•
Biden Administration: Take all steps to ensure a final end to the Title 42 policy, restore
compliance with U.S. refugee law and treaties, continue to request appropriations to conduct
timely asylum adjudications and address backlogs, oppose any efforts to force continuation or
resurrection of the Title 42 policy or similar policies, and reject any proposals to replace Title 42
with other policies that block, ban or prevent refugees from seeking asylum in the United
States and/or turn them away to danger. Never again use an actual or purported pathway to
the U.S. as an excuse to evade refugee law or abrogate the right to seek asylum.
•
Department of Homeland Security: As Title 42 ends, uphold U.S. refugee law at U.S. ports of
entry and along the border, ramp up asylum adjudication capacity and end attempts to replace
it with other illegal and inhumane Trump-era policies, and during the time Title 42 is still in
place, take all legally available actions to restore asylum access at and between ports of entry
and mitigate the harms of Title 42, including through the use of exceptions to Title 42 and by
affirmatively screening individuals subjected to Title 42 for fear of return to persecution and
torture, as U.S. law and international treaty obligations require.
•
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Publicly identify steps to ensure public health
authority is never again misused to evade refugee law and endanger the lives and safety of
people seeking protection, and if the Title 42 policy should be prolonged yet again, take any
additional steps necessary to help ensure its firm and final termination.
• The Government of Mexico: End cooperation with U.S. policies that violate international law
and/or result in human rights violations, and take steps to end Mexican police and other
officers’ perpetration of and complicity or acquiescence in attacks, extortions, kidnappings,
rape and other harms inflicted on migrants and asylum seekers.
Title 42 expansion returns Venezuelans fleeing persecution and humanitarian catastrophe to danger, deplorable conditions

On October 12, 2022, the Biden administration announced it would expand the use of Title 42 to
expel Venezuelans to Mexico, through a "New Migration Enforcement Process,” pairing the
expansion with a new limited humanitarian parole program that would enable some Venezuelans
to enter the United States. The parole program’s requirements actually preclude many refugees
from accessing it, including due to its identification, sponsorship, and airline ticket purchase
requirements, as well as its numerical limitations. The Hope Border Institute, which interviewed
expelled asylum seekers in October, concluded that the program “left no path for relief for the
people in the most vulnerable situations” and left thousands of Venezuelans in Mexico “in a cruel
state of limbo.”
While UNHCR and other U.N. agencies welcomed efforts to provide safe pathways for displaced
persons, they warned that such pathways “cannot come at the expense of the fundamental
human right to seek asylum.” In their statement, these U.N. authorities specifically reminded the
United States that: "Access to safe territory for asylum seekers is a cornerstone of the 1951
Refugee Convention and of international refugee law. We remain concerned by asylum
restrictions that are inconsistent with international law standards, including those imposed
through Title 42 public health action, and reiterate the call for their urgent termination.” Days
after the Biden administration’s decision to expand Title 42 to expel Venezuelans seeking U.S.
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asylum, CBP again acknowledged in an October 21, 2022 statement that recent arrivals at the
southern border included “an increased number of asylum seekers fleeing [the] authoritarian
regime[] in Venezuela.”
Venezuelans expelled to or blocked in Mexico due to Title 42’s expanded use are now stranded in
highly dangerous Mexican border cities as well as other locations in Mexico that lack capacity to
safely accommodate them. Many are also at risk of onward refoulement – illegal return - to
persecution and torture, with some Venezuelans pushed across the border into Guatemala and
others flown directly back to Venezuela by Mexican authorities. Title 42 expulsions of
Venezuelans by DHS are also separating families at the border.
The expanded use of Title 42 has already resulted in thousands of Venezuelans expelled to
Mexico without access to the U.S. asylum process. Between October 12 and mid-November
2022, more than 8,000 Venezuelans were expelled by DHS to Mexico. As of November 7, more
than 2,100 Venezuelans had been expelled to Ciudad Juárez alone since the policy was expanded
less than a month prior. Human Rights First researchers interviewed multiple sources who
indicated that around December 1, 2022, DHS in the El Paso region began conducting lateral
expulsions of Venezuelans to Matamoros and other cities and appeared to have halted direct
expulsions to Ciudad Juárez.
As it has wielded Title 42 to expel Venezuelans to Mexico, CBP has separated some families at
the border and turned away mothers, daughters, wives, partners, and other family members to
danger in Mexico. For example:
• In October 2022, DHS released Miguel Peñaranda, a Venezuelan man, and his 18-year-old
stepson into the United States but expelled to Mexico Peñaranda’s wife, Heyllyn Yepez, and
his 18-year-old stepdaughter. The family members, who had entered the United States in El
Paso, were separated and flown to other parts of the border within Texas: Peñaranda and his
stepson were flown to Brownsville, where they were released, while Yepez and her daughter
were flown to Laredo, where they were expelled at the border and then bused to Acapulco,
Mexico. Yepez told The New York Times, “I never, ever could have imagined this
happening…How can they do this to families? It’s so inhuman.”
• DHS separated a Venezuelan family of four in October 2022, releasing the father and son into
the United States to pursue their asylum claims while expelling the mother and daughter to
Mexico under Title 42, according to a migrant shelter director in Austin, Texas.
• A young Venezuelan woman was separated from her mother at the border in October 2022,
and while she was processed into the United States, her mother was expelled to Mexico,
according to a migrant shelter director in Austin, Texas.
• DHS has separated numerous Venezuelan married couples since October 2022. A woman
who was returned to Ciudad Juárez without her husband in October 2022 told Reuters, "I am
alone in a country where I have no one to help me. He was my only companion, my only help,
my only support.”
• In October 2022, DHS expelled a mother to Mexico while her 20-year-old son was permitted
to seek asylum in the United States.
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• DHS separated Luis Alexander Bonilla from his mother, sister, and nine-year-old nephew at
the border, detained Bonilla for 11 days, and expelled him to Tijuana, Mexico in October
2022. Bonilla told Milenio his mother had been expelled to Ciudad Juárez, Mexico. Two weeks
after the family had entered the United States, Bonilla was unaware of the whereabouts of his
sister and nephew.
Venezuelans who are stranded after expulsion or are unable to seek asylum at ports of entry due to
Title 42’s continuation face grave dangers in Mexico. As UNHCR, IOM and UNICEF publicly warned
the United States after it announced this Title 42 expansion in October, “[m]any people subject to
this measure since its implementation in March 2020 have been sent to border communities with
significant security challenges, limited support networks and inadequate shelter capacities, making
their return to Mexico both dangerous and unsustainable.” Many Venezuelan asylum seekers have
already been targeted by cartels and corrupt officials in Mexico for kidnappings and other violent
attacks in the wake of this Title 42 expansion. Some recent examples include:
• In November 2022, a Venezuelan police investigator fleeing death threats for investigating
cases of disappeared people was assaulted and robbed by armed men who bashed his head
with the back of a gun, ordered him off the bus he was riding near Ciudad Juárez, and tried
to kidnap him. He managed to escape, but when he arrived in Ciudad Juárez, police stopped
him and stole his money. The man told Human Rights First he is terrified to stay in Juárez,
where he remains stranded due to Title 42, because the cartel hunting him in Venezuela also
operates there.
• In November 2022, a gay Venezuelan man was sexually assaulted and robbed in the public
plaza where he had been sleeping in Ciudad Juárez. The man told Human Rights First that he
had been staying in a makeshift tent encampment near the El Paso port of entry while blocked
from seeking U.S. asylum due to Title 42. After Mexican authorities forced him to leave the
encampment, he moved to the plaza where he was then attacked.
• A 13-year-old girl was nearly abducted at gunpoint in Juárez after her parents and sibling,
who had fled political persecution in Venezuela, were denied the right to seek asylum and
expelled to danger in Mexico in November 2022 by CBP under the Title 42 Venezuelan
expansion. They were detained by CBP for 10 days without blankets or access to showers. A
CBP officer told them “You should have stayed in your country,” confiscated and kept their
documents, and lied to the family, telling them they were being transferred to a U.S. shelter
only to then laugh at them as they were instead subjected to a lateral expulsion and sent to
Sonora. The family made their way back to Juárez only to face the attempted abduction and a
cartel shooting outside their shelter, as the mother explained to Human Rights First
researchers.
• A Venezuelan family with two young daughters stranded in Mexico due to Title 42 was
kidnapped from a hotel in Ciudad Juárez by two hooded, armed men. The family had been
waiting for an opportunity to seek asylum in the United States. The kidnappers held the family
captive for 12 days until their relatives were forced to pay a $30,000 ransom.
The U.S. government’s expulsion of Venezuelans to Mexico violates U.S. non-refoulement legal
obligations not only by exposing them to serious harm in Mexico but also because returned
individuals are at high risk of onward or so-called chain refoulement to countries where they
would face persecution or torture. Mexican officials ordered some expelled Venezuelans to
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depart Mexico through the southern border within 15 days, while others were provided Mexican
migration documents (forma migratoria múltiple or FMM) leaving them with temporary status in
Mexico for reportedly as little as one week in some cases.
Expelled Venezuelans are at risk of detention and potential deportation by Mexican authorities
without access to the asylum process in Mexico. For instance, a video posted online in October
2022 appears to show hundreds of Venezuelans and other nationals detained in a Mexican
National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración or INM) facility near the U.S.-
Mexico border, reporting they had been held in crowded, unsanitary conditions for weeks.
Venezuelans, as well as other asylum seekers and migrants in Mexico often report that Mexican
police and other government officials routinely extort them by threatening them with
deportation. In Ciudad Juárez, Mexican National Guard officers have reportedly entered hotels
where Venezuelans are staying, demanded their documents, and detained those without valid
visas, according to a witness account in a video posted to social media.
In early November 2022, INM began flying some Venezuelans, who supposedly agreed to be
repatriated, directly to Venezuela – though there is no indication that any international or
independent authorities observed these returns to confirm that they were voluntary.
Concerningly, displaced Venezuelans transiting through Mexico reported in October 2022 that
Mexican migration officials forced them to sign false documentation stating that they had
voluntarily requested to leave Mexico through the southern border to Guatemala. In late
September 2022, just prior to the Title 42 expansion, hundreds of Venezuelans were reportedly
deceived by Mexican authorities into boarding buses that transported them to the land border
with Guatemala. These incidents reflect a well-documented history of failures by Mexican
immigration officers to inform detained migrants of their right to seek asylum and failure to
forward their requests to the Mexican asylum agency.
Displaced Venezuelans in Guatemala may face further chain expulsion. In 2022, with support
from the U.S. government, Guatemalan authorities expelled more than 9,000 Venezuelans across
the border into Honduras without consistently administering protection screenings.
Many Venezuelans expelled by DHS to Mexico have been stranded in deplorable conditions
without secure housing, leaving some sleeping on the streets. Mexican authorities have
transported some expelled Venezuelans to other parts of Mexico, abandoning them in cities
where migrant shelters are full beyond capacity. For instance:
•
DHS has expelled hundreds of Venezuelans to Tijuana since October 2022, including some
who were flown from the Texas border and expelled to Tijuana without being provided any
information about what was happening to them. Mexican immigration officers also
reportedly abandoned at a bus station in Tijuana 60 Venezuelans whom DHS had expelled.
With Tijuana shelters full, some spent several nights sleeping on the ground. A fitness center
was later prepared to provide temporary shelter for 300 Venezuelans expelled to Tijuana from
the United States.
• On a Saturday in October 2022, Mexican migration officers bused approximately 100
displaced Venezuelans whom DHS had expelled to Mexico City, abandoning them without
food, accommodation, or basic support outside an office of the Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda
a Refugiados (COMAR), the Mexican refugee assistance agency, which was closed for the
weekend. As of December 2022, migrant shelters in Mexico City are full beyond their capacity
as Venezuelans expelled from the United States continue to be bused there, resulting in
hundreds sleeping in city streets. Shelters are operating at double capacity with many sleeping
on mattresses in common spaces, according to Gretchen Kuhner, director of the Instituto para
las Mujeres en la Migración (IMUMI). Kuhner said IMUMI and other nonprofit organizations in
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Mexico City have had to provide food, shelter, medications, and other supplies to Venezuelans
arriving in the city.
• The Mexican government has bused at least 600 Venezuelans whom DHS had expelled from
the United States to the central Mexican city of Hermosillo, where shelters struggling to
meet their needs are requesting food and clothing donations. Those bused to Hermosillo
include 24-year-old Juan Carlos García, who reported that he could not afford to travel to
Mexico City to reunite with his relatives, from whom DHS separated him at the border.
• Thousands of Venezuelans, including many who had been expelled from the United States
under Title 42, have been sleeping in dangerous conditions in makeshift tent encampments.
Approximately 12,000 migrants and asylum seekers, most of whom are Venezuelan, have been
sleeping in a makeshift tent encampment on a muddy sports field in San Pedro Tapanatepec in
Oaxaca state, Mexico. In Ciudad Juárez, in November 2022, as many as a thousand
Venezuelans were staying in a tent encampment on the Rio Grande near the El Paso port of
entry, where temperatures had dropped below freezing and many fell ill. In November 2022,
members of an organized criminal group attempted to kidnap residents of the encampment, rt
thm into separate lines for men, women, and families, and instructed them to enter nearby
vehicles, but the kidnappers retreated when law enforcement intervened. Ciudad Juárez
government officials cleared the camp in late November 2022, citing safety concerns.
The Hope Border Institute in El Paso concluded based on its interviews with asylum seekers and
migrants that the expanded expulsions of Venezuelans “separated family units and placed
individuals, including vulnerable people such as young children, single mothers and elderly people
on the streets, lacking access to food, shelter and medical support.”

Court-ordered Title 42 continuation condemns asylum seekers and migrants expelled to or blocked in Mexico to grave dangers

The continued implementation of Title 42 is causing mounting human rights abuses against asylum
seekers and migrants blocked in or expelled to Mexico. Individuals and families who are expelled or
blocked from protection due to Title 42 are targeted for attacks in Mexico by corrupt officials as
well as powerful cartels that exercise control throughout the border region and profit from
kidnapping, torturing, and extorting asylum seekers turned away by the United States. These
attacks often target asylum seekers and other migrants on account of their race, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, and nationality. Black and Indigenous asylum seekers continue to be
targets of bias-motivated violence and discrimination while stranded in or transiting through
Mexico.
As of the date this report was published in December 2022, Human Rights First has tracked at
least 13,480 reports of murder, kidnapping, rape, torture, and other violent attacks against
people blocked in or expelled to Mexico due to Title 42 since January 2021. This count is likely just
the tip of the iceberg since many asylum seekers have not spoken with investigators, journalists, or
attorneys. Some recent attacks on people stranded in or expelled to Mexico due to Title 42’s court-
ordered continuation and recent expansion by DHS include:
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• Ibrahima Gueye, a 39-year-old Senegalese man, was shot and killed in a Tijuana park in broad
daylight on October 18, 2022. Police believe Gueye, who was carrying a backpack with clothing
and personal belongings, was attacked by members of the violent “de la Castillo” group, which
is engaged in criminal migrant smuggling in the area. With asylum seekers unable to approach
ports of entry to request asylum, some have attempted to cross into the United States,
unaware of danger from violent groups that control access to the border.
• In October 2022, a Guatemalan lesbian trans woman was violently raped by Mexican police
officers in Piedras Negras soon after CBP officers turned her away from protection at the
Eagle Pass port of entry. The woman reported to Al Otro Lado that she had sought protection
due to her gender and sexual orientation.
• A Haitian asylum seeker, whom DHS had previously expelled to Haiti under Title 42, was
robbed at gunpoint in Tijuana in summer 2022 while unable to seek U.S. asylum at a port of
entry due to the continuation of Title 42. The armed assailants pulled the man’s pants down
and groped him looking for money, according to his cousin, another asylum seeker who spoke
with Human Rights First.
• A Guatemalan woman and her four-year-old son were kidnapped in Nogales and held captive
for four days after DHS expelled them under Title 42. The family had sought U.S. protection
to escape threats from the son’s father. The man who kidnapped the family had approached
them offering help after DHS expelled them to Nogales, where they had no support and were
unfamiliar with the area, according to Kino Border Initiative, who spoke with the woman in July
2022.
• Mexican immigration (INM) officers kidnapped and turned over to the Zetas cartel a
Guatemalan family with two young children after DHS expelled them to Nuevo Laredo. The
cartel held the family hostage for three months, tortured them, and extorted their relatives.
The mother told Kino Border Initiative in July 2022 that the family had watched as their captors
killed other migrants who attempted to escape.
• An Indigenous Guatemalan woman and her three young children were kidnapped and
extorted after CBP officers turned them away from asylum protection at the Nogales port of
entry. The woman told Kino Border Initiative in September 2022 that after the family was
expelled, a woman approached them offering to bring them to a free shelter, but instead led
them to a house where they were held captive for ransom.
• In August 2022, a Salvadoran woman and her two children were held captive for hours by
members of an armed group who forced them to strip and robbed them of all their
belongings, including their clothing, shoes, and water. The family had been attempting to
enter the United States near Calexico to seek asylum when the armed group approached them.
“They were asking their boss what to do with us…I thought they were going to kill us,” the
woman told Human Rights First.
• Juárez police sexually assaulted a Honduran mother and her four-year-old daughter after the
family was blocked from seeking protection in Ciudad Juárez in August 2022, then turned
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them over to cartel members who held the family captive for 22 days, raped the mother in
front of the daughter, and physically attacked the daughter. The mother reported the
incident to Al Otro Lado.
With Title 42 still in place, Mexican asylum seekers fleeing persecution and torture are trapped in or
expelled by DHS to the very country they are trying to flee without access to the U.S. asylum
process in violation of U.S. law and non-refoulement legal obligations. Mexican asylum seekers
stranded in Mexico or turned away from U.S. protection due to Title 42 have been brutally attacked
and threatened, including:
• A young asylum-seeking woman was decapitated by cartel members who had previously
threatened her in southern Mexico after DHS turned her and her children away and would
not allow them to seek asylum at a port of entry, citing Title 42. The woman’s brother-in-law,
who is also seeking asylum, told Human Rights First in September 2022 that the family had
been unable to find space in Tijuana shelters and after spending several nights in the streets,
had no choice but to return to their hometown where they had been threatened.
• In late October 2022, DHS used Title 42 to turn away a transgender woman from southern
Mexico who had sought protection at a port of entry near Tijuana, Mexico, after an assailant
had tried to kill her. She reported to Al Otro Lado that she had suffered violence and
discrimination based on her gender and sexual orientation, including multiple rapes, in Mexico.
• A trans woman from the south of Mexico and her Indigenous partner remain stranded in
Ciudad Juárez after fleeing death threats based on their race, gender, and sexual orientation
by a criminal group who disappeared the woman’s gay cousin and warned her not to look for
him. The woman told Human Rights First, “I am harassed every day of my life. I am afraid to go
outside. There is so much hate. Even churches won’t help us.”
• A woman from Michoacán who travelled to the Calexico port of entry in August 2022 with
her infant and her younger brothers, ages 10 and 13, was threatened by cartel members
after DHS officers turned them away due to Title 42. The cartel members shot and killed the
woman’s husband in front of the family while they were eating lunch together, then
threatened the woman after she reported the murder to police. The family had attempted to
seek asylum at the Calexico port of entry, but U.S. officers turned them away because of Title
42. The woman told Human Rights First they fled to another city after receiving messages from
neighbors warning them that the cartel members who had threatened them knew they were
in Mexicali.
• A Mexican lesbian woman who had suffered multiple attacks in her hometown due to her
sexual orientation, including being kidnapped, raped, and threatened with death by police
officers, was turned away from asylum protection at the San Ysidro port of entry in October
2022. The woman reported her experience to Al Otro Lado.
• A gay man from southern Mexico who had suffered beatings, sexual assaults, and an
attempted kidnapping in his hometown due to his sexual orientation was turned away from
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asylum at the El Paso port of entry in October 2022. The man reported to Al Otro Lado that
the people threatening him had killed his nephew to intimidate him.
• A Mexican family of five was nearly kidnapped after DHS turned them away from seeking
asylum at the San Ysidro port of entry in November of 2022. The mother reported to Al Otro
Lado that her husband and son had been kidnapped, beaten, and held for ransom in their
home state in southern Mexico. After the expulsion, the family continued to receive death
threats.
• An Indigenous Triqui woman from Oaxaca who had been beaten by police, threatened, and
her family members murdered for her activism defending her Indigenous community was
turned away from seeking asylum with her three children at the San Ysidro port of entry in
September 2022 in Tijuana. She shared with Al Otro Lado that after the family was turned
away, she was sexually abused by Mexican police in Tijuana.
The broad reach of cartels and other organized criminal groups in Mexico, which often have ties to
government authorities (including Mexican military collusion with cartels that was recently
confirmed by data leaks), can make relocation within Mexico impossible for Mexicans fleeing
persecution and torture. For instance, at least three Mexican asylum seekers reported to Kino
Border Initiative in October 2022 that the organized criminal groups persecuting them had pursued
them to multiple cities within the country where they had moved in an attempt to escape these
threats, confirming the national reach of these organizations.
In addition, humanitarian, faith, and legal workers assisting asylum seekers stranded in Mexico
continue to face threats, as Human Rights First has previously documented, including:
• In June 2022, cartel members kidnapped Baptist Pastor Lorenzo Ortiz, who has long provided
humanitarian aid to asylum seekers in Nuevo Laredo and Monterrey, including those
expelled or blocked under Title 42. In July 2022, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights
defenders condemned the kidnapping, indicating that the cartel who kidnapped Ortiz accused
him of stealing their business and refused to believe he aids migrants free of charge. The
Special Rapporteur said, “Ortiz’s case shows the extraordinary risk that human rights defenders
run to provide basic support in the region. This is not an acceptable state of affairs.” In
November 2022, the Special Rapporteur continued to express grave concern that Pastor Ortiz
was being “threatened, surveilled and harassed for his work in defence of the rights of
migrants,” and that asylum seekers and migrants “in his shelters are being abducted, harassed
and extorted, with the alleged acquiescence of local police.”
• Another shelter in Nuevo Laredo was forced to shut down after a violent cartel demanded
the shelter pay a “protection fee,” according to a migrant who had been staying there and
who reported the incident to Kino Border Initiative in October 2022. The migrant said that
when the shelter closed, their family and other shelter residents were forced onto Nuevo
Laredo streets, where members of a cartel photographed and threatened them.
• In August 2022, an Al Otro Lado staff member was robbed at gunpoint in Tijuana in a plaza
near the San Ysidro port of entry while accompanying asylum seekers who had been
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instructed by CBP to appear at the port at 6 a.m. to be processed under an exception to Title
42.
• Members of organized criminal groups have threatened numerous staff and residents of
several Tijuana shelters, including Ágape Misión Mundial and Espacio Migrante, in
connection with their work assisting migrants with the Title 42 exemption process. In
November 2022, Embajada Migrante, a migrant shelter in Tijuana, was forced to close due to
threats by members of an organized criminal group. A director of Embajada Migrante told EFE
that members of an organized criminal group that controls the area have been harassing
shelter staff for months, and at one point forcibly entered the shelter at night, demanding
$200 from each of the migrants as a fee for crossing the border.
• In November 2022, members of a violent cartel attacked a migrant shelter in Ciudad Juárez,
plowing down its gate with a truck. The cartel members forced the migrants to line up against
a wall and ordered them to turn over their cell phones. The cartel retreated after realizing the
space was a faith-based migrant shelter.
Triggering Multiple Crossings, Artificially Inflating CBP’s Border Encounters Statistics

The continued and now expanded use of Title 42 is, while in place, trampling on U.S. refugee and
immigration laws, preventing them from being upheld, prolonging disorder at the border, and
inflating Customs and Border Protection (CBP) encounter statistics due to repeat entry attempts.
Due to Title 42, the percentage of individuals who have attempted to repeatedly cross the southern
border has increased, according to government data. Information released by CBP shows that in FY
2019 repeat crossings made up 7 percent of Border Patrol encounters, but with Title 42 in place
since March 2020, repeated crossings rose to 27 percent of Border Patrol encounters in FY 2021,
were 22 percent in August 2022 and 19 percent in September and October 2022 (the last months
with data available).
Repeat crossings triggered by Title 42 expulsions have artificially inflated CBP’s border
apprehension statistics. CBP has concluded that the number of border encounters “was partly
driven by high recidivism rates (repeat encounters) among individuals processed under the CDC’s
Title 42 public health authorities, meaning the actual number of unique individuals attempting to
cross the border was substantially lower than total encounters.” For example, in September 2022,
government data shows that at least 43,000 encounters with Border Patrol were with individuals
who had crossed the border multiple times, such that CBP acknowledged that its encounters
statistics “overstate the number of unique individuals arriving at the border.” Recent analysis by
Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse emphasizes the need for more
accurate CBP data on repeat entry attempts. The American Immigration Council estimates that
there were over 1.2 million repeat border encounters from August 2021 to September 2022 with
Title 42 in place – inflating CBP’s border apprehension data.
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Pushing dangerous crossings, resulting in record deaths as asylum remains blocked at ports of entry

As Title 42 continues to block asylum at ports of entry, tens of thousands of migrants and asylum
seekers are waiting in border cities for the opportunity to enter the United States through a limited
exemption process. The exemption process requires nonprofit organizations and service providers,
including migrant shelters, to refer migrants and asylum seekers with particular vulnerabilities in
Mexico to DHS for consideration for Title 42 exemptions. Border cities in Mexico lack capacity to
serve the thousands of migrants and asylum seekers stranded in Mexico awaiting the opportunity
to request Title 42 exemptions. For example, shelters are full beyond capacity in Reynosa, forcing
many migrants and asylum seekers to sleep in tent encampments or on the streets, often in
sweltering heat or freezing temperatures. In September 2022, Haitian migrants frustrated by the
slow Title 42 exemption process protested outside Reynosa shelters. Likewise, small tent
encampments have emerged outside shelters in Tijuana, where tens of thousands of migrants and
asylum seekers remain stranded as they await the opportunity to request Title 42 exemptions.
For people seeking refuge from persecution, the denial of access to asylum at U.S. ports of entry
leaves them stranded in dangerous border cities and pushes some to attempt risky and sometimes
life-threatening border crossings. These crossings result in severe injuries, dehydration, starvation,
and drownings as well as kidnappings and other violent attacks by cartels and organized criminal
groups that control border crossings. At least 853 asylum seekers and migrants have died in border
crossings in FY 2022, making it the deadliest year since the U.S. government began tracking and
recording border crossing deaths in 1998. The true number of deaths is likely much higher, as
Border Patrol only counts deaths of individuals the agency identifies.
Some of the people who have died or were seriously injured while attempting to cross the U.S.-
Mexico border to reach refuge in the United States include:
• Dozens of migrants and asylum seekers have drowned since July 2022 attempting to cross
the Rio Grande to enter Texas from the Mexican state of Chihuahua. They include a five-year-
old Guatemalan girl who drowned after a strong current ripped the girl from her mother’s
arms in August 2022, a 3-year-old boy who died in August 2022, nine individuals whose bodies
were recovered on a single day in September 2022, and 12 people whose bodies were
recovered on a single day in July 2022. Eagle Pass fire chief Manuel Mello said, “it's basically a
drowning a day that you're seeing.”
• Twenty-two migrants and asylum seekers have drowned in the river and in the agricultural
canals of the El Paso, Texas region in 2022 while attempting to cross the U.S.-Mexico border.
They include a young Colombian man whose body was recovered from the Rio Bravo in
Reynosa, Mexico in November 2022.
• In December 2022, a Russian man and another migrant drowned in the Pacific Ocean while
attempting to swim across the U.S. border from Tijuana.
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• In August 2022, Mexican brothers Carlos Enrique Mendoza and Edgar Mendoza died from
dehydration, and were found with their bodies embracing, in the Arizona desert after a
criminal smuggling organization abandoned them.
• A Guatemalan asylum seeker fleeing death threats in his country who had previously been
expelled under Title 42 was hospitalized after he became lost in the desert in the Arizona
border region as he attempted to seek U.S. protection for the second time in September
2022. He was expelled again after recovering, according to Kino Border Initiative.
• In December 2022, an Indian man and his 3-year-old son died after falling off the border wall
attempting to enter the United States from Tijuana, Mexico. An Indian woman also fell off the
border wall and sustained injuries.
CBP misconduct exacerbates danger for people subjected to Title 42

CBP and Border Patrol officers continue to use Title 42 to expel migrants and asylum seekers in
ways that increase their vulnerability to danger and violent crime in Mexico. Some Border Patrol
agents have failed to provide medical attention to people with injuries, carried out Title 42
expulsions in the middle of the night, and expelled migrants and asylum seekers without their
personal belongings. These practices exacerbate the risks migrants and asylums seekers face in
Mexico after expulsion.
For example, CBP has endangered the lives of migrants at the Arizona border by carrying out
expulsions in the middle of the night. Kino Border Initiative reported that CBP expelled at least
sixteen migrants and asylum seekers to Nogales between the nighttime hours of 12:00 and 3:00
a.m. in August 2022. The organization also reported that some migrants were expelled in the
rain, at times when shelters and services were closed, and had to sleep in the streets. After these
CBP expulsions, some migrants were then robbed by Mexican police and other individuals. Those
expelled at night include a Mexican mother and daughter fleeing sexual violence, who were
expelled to Nogales at 3:00 am in August 2022.
CBP also continues to separate families subjected to Title 42 expulsions. In addition to the many
examples of Venezuelan family separations detailed in a previous section, CBP separated a
Mexican family fleeing death threats by cartel members in Guerrero who burned their house and
killed a relative. CBP allowed the mother and younger brother to seek U.S. asylum but expelled
the 18-year-old sister to Ciudad Juárez alone, according to a shelter director who assisted the
young woman.
In its research, Human Rights First heard numerous accounts of instances where Border Patrol
and CBP agents engaged in abusive conduct or failed to provide necessary medical attention for
migrants and asylum seekers with serious medical conditions or injuries before expelling them to
Mexico, including:
• Border Patrol agents refused to provide medical attention to a woman who was eight
months pregnant and who requested aid for complications with her pregnancy. The woman
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told Kino Border Initiative in October 2022 that she had requested a medical examination on
three occasions while in Border Patrol custody after she had not felt the baby move in hours,
but Border Patrol officers expelled her to Nogales, Mexico without allowing her to see a
doctor. The following morning, the woman experienced severe pain and went to a hospital,
where she learned the baby had died.
• In July 2022, a Border Patrol officer beat an asylum seeker who requested water in the
Arizona desert and told him “if you want water, go get it in your own country,” The man told
Kino Border Initiative that the officer had shoved his face into the ground, kicked him
repeatedly, and stood on the back of his head, causing the man to bleed and lose
consciousness. Officers eventually took the man to the hospital after repeated requests but
expelled him to Mexico without any of his medical paperwork. He said, “I’m trying to escape
death in my country, only to nearly die here [in the US].”
• Border Patrol agents denied medical attention to a migrant who was stung on his hip by a
venomous scorpion and was having difficulty breathing. A Border Patrol agent told him to “sit
down and be quiet” when he asked for medical attention for the sting. He was only brought to
the emergency room and provided an anti-venom shot many hours later, after his condition
had worsened while he waited in a holding cell. The man told Kino Border Initiative in October
2022 that Border Patrol agents later expelled the man to Mexico without returning his
personal belongings.
• Border Patrol agents ignored the pleas for medical attention of a man who had been severely
beaten by members of an organized criminal group before seeking U.S. protection. The man
told Kino Border Initiative in October 2022 that Border Patrol agents expelled him to Mexico
without providing medical attention and instructed him to ask Mexican authorities for help for
his injuries.
CBP and Border Patrol officers also seize and fail to return migrants’ personal property. In October
2022, ACLU of Arizona and other nonprofit organizations assisting migrants at the Arizona border
sent a letter expressing concern about the practice to CBP Commissioner Chris Magnus. They
wrote: “Border Patrol agents in Arizona are forcing migrants they apprehend to discard all their
belongings into on-site dumpsters, the only exceptions being a single layer of clothing and certain
items that can fit into a 7-by-7-inch plastic bag…The mass dispossession of migrants’ belongings by
Border Patrol agents is not new, yet the problem has now reached unprecedented levels of
magnitude and severity.” Personal belongings migrants have been forced to discard include “items
of religious, sentimental, medical, and legal significance.” The letter indicates that in some cases,
Border Patrol has provided claim tickets that would supposedly enable migrants to reclaim seized
belongings, but the agency expelled those individuals to Mexico under Title 42 without providing
them an opportunity to reclaim their property.
In November 2022, members of Congress Bennie Thompson, Joaquin Castro, Raúl Grijalva and
Nanette Barragán requested that the Government Accountability Office "conduct a review of
[CBP's] activities, policies, and procedures regarding the handling of personal property belonging to
individuals in its custody."
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During the course of its research, Human Rights First also heard reports of CBP and Border Patrol
taking personal possessions from asylum seekers or migrants, or forcing them to discard passports,
religious items, money, and other essential personal items. For example:
• Several Venezuelan asylum seekers told Human Rights First in December 2022 that CBP
expelled them without their personal possessions. One family was expelled in November
2022 without any of the documents they had brought that were critical to their asylum case,
including identification documents, birth certificates, and evidence for their asylum cases.
• In October 2022, CBP expelled dozens of migrants and asylum seekers, including many
Venezuelans, to Tijuana without any of their personal possessions, including their passports
and clothing. Nicole Ramos, Al Otro Lado’s Border Rights Project director, said Al Otro Lado has
had to purchase clothes and other basic supplies for individuals whose personal belongings had
been seized by CBP.
• At least thirty migrants and asylum seekers have reported to Kino Border Initiative that
Border Patrol or CBP destroyed or failed to return their personal possessions from
September to November 2022. One man said Border Patrol agents confiscated his cash, a
diamond ring his father had given him, a bible, the keys to his home, his cell phone with all his
contacts, and his identity documents, including his birth certificate.
• Another person reported to Kino Border Initiative that Border Patrol officers seized the SIM
card from his cell phone, pocketed the cash and credit cards from his wallet, and tore up his
birth certificate in front of him. Another individual observed a Border Patrol agent rip up
$3,000 pesos from a migrant they had apprehended. The officer said, “this is trash, this is of no
value to you here” before disposing of the ripped bills in a trash can.
Expansive use of Title 42 further undermines specious public health rationale, violates U.S. refugee obligations

The increasingly expansive use of Title 42 and the calls to further prolong its use as a tool – albeit
an ineffective and counterproductive one – for border management have completely
undermined the already flimsy pretense that the Title 42 policy is justified on public health
grounds. Indeed, Marty Cetron, the director of the CDC’s Division of Global Migration and
Quarantine, told congressional investigators in May 2022 that the CDC order issued by the Trump
administration to expel asylum seekers and migrants under Title 42 “did not originate from CDC.”
It has long been confirmed that the White House pressured the CDC to issue the order after the
CDC’s medical experts objected to its lack of justification as a public health measure. Cetron
noted that he had refused to sign the CDC order, asked to be “excused” from the policy, and
warned of the “significant harms” that could arise from its use. In addressing a statement he had
reportedly made to colleagues at the time, Cetron confirmed to congressional investigators that
this statement was consistent with some of his concerns about the order: “to use public health
authority that has never, ever been used this way, it’s to keep Hispanics out of the country and
it’s wrong.”
The Biden administration’s decision to expand use of Title 42 to Venezuelans, which was clearly a
decision based on migration management considerations, was additional confirmation that the
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policy has nothing to do with public health. Following the announcement of this expansion,
which made no mention of public health in the context of Title 42 expulsions and repeatedly
described the expansion as part of a migration management strategy, leading epidemiologists
and public health experts wrote to President Biden emphasizing that the continued and
expanded use of Title 42 is a “travesty” and that the Biden administration was “manipulating and
misusing public health to advance immigration control objectives.”
Not only has DHS expanded its misuse of Title 42 public health authority by adding a new
nationality to its expulsion list, but some DHS officers appear to be using the supposed public
health policy to expel people who have been in the United States for weeks or years, evading the
(minimal but critical) due process protections of U.S. immigration law. Some DHS officers have
used Title 42 as cover to expel individuals who have long resided in the United States to Mexico
without due process, in some instances in coordination with Texas state officers. For example:
• In 2022 DHS expelled to Mexico a young Honduran man who had been living in the United
States for nine years and had a pending immigration court hearing in Houston, Texas
scheduled for December 2022, as his attorney reported to Human Rights First. After being
expelled to Mexico, the man was beaten by Mexican police officers, kidnapped by a cartel, and
threatened at gunpoint. He was only able to reenter the United States with assistance from his
attorney.
• DHS also expelled a middle-aged Mexican man who had been in the United States for at least
several weeks after a Texas state sheriff pulled over the trailer truck he was driving in a small
Texas town in July 2022. The sheriff demanded to see the man’s permit to drive the truck,
which he produced, and then asked for his work permit, which the man did not have. The
sheriff detained the man in an isolated area where the man was provided no opportunity to
speak with U.S. officials or to make any phone calls before DHS expelled him to Mexico,
according to Kino Border Initiative.
The U.S. government is also using Title 42 to expel asylum seekers and migrants to Mexico after
they have been arrested, jailed for weeks or months, and subjected to state prosecution under
Texas’ illegal Operation Lone Star. These prosecutions violate Article 31 of the Refugee Convention
which generally prohibits the penalization of asylum seekers for their entry or presence in a country
to seek refugee protection. DHS’s expulsion of asylum seekers subject to Operation Lone Star also
interferes with their ability to defend themselves against pending state criminal charges and to
challenge abusive and discriminatory treatment by state and local authorities. Examples of these
wrongful expulsions include:
• In August 2022, DHS expelled to Honduras a 22-year-old Honduran asylum seeker who had
spent three weeks in Texas state custody after he was charged with criminal trespass under
Operation Lonestar. The young man had posted bond so that he could be released to
challenge the criminal charges against him, but Texas authorities immediately turned him over
to CBP upon release from custody. Though the man was visibly distressed and expressed his
fear of returning to Honduras on multiple occasions, DHS expelled him to Honduras, where he
remains in hiding from individuals who threatened his life, according to a South Texas legal
services provider.
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• The same legal services office assisted two other Honduran individuals whom DHS expelled
to Mexico under Title 42 after they had spent two months in Texas state custody on pending
criminal charges under Operation Lonestar, which were dismissed.
The expansive and expanded misuse of Title 42 is additional confirmation that the Title 42 policy
has nothing to do with public health but has instead been wielded to punish people for migrating or
for exercising their human right to seek asylum from persecution.

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Acknowledgements
This report was written and researched by Julia Neusner, Kennji Kizuka, Eleanor Acer, Ana Ortega
and Alejandra Aguilar Ruiz. Rebecca Gendelman, Ruby Ritchin, Robyn Barnard, Licha Nyiendo,
and Jim Bernfield contributed edits to the report. Camille Chabot, Crystal Choi, Rosie Foulds,
Lauren Good, Leslie Herrera, Hannah Ismael, Akif Khan, Diana Padilla Legaspi, Ana Linares,
Valeria Gerber Mariscal, Chris Mathrua, Neeka Mirpour, Samantha Navarrete, Semantha Norris,
Ivette Orozco, Jemma Paradise, Ashley Quezada, Kathleen Quinn, Rachel Raps, Gwenyth
Rodriguez, Cole Seither, and Syeda Shagufta of the University of California Network for Human
Rights and Digital Fact Finding (Berkeley, Santa Cruz, Los Angeles) contributed additional
research for this report. Our thanks to the many colleagues, including those from Al Otro Lado,
Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, Hope Border Institute, Immigrant Defenders Law
Center, Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración, Kino Border Initiative, UC Hastings Center for
Gender and Refugee Studies, and other attorneys, law firms, and service providers who provided
case examples and assisted in referring asylum seekers for interview. Human Rights First thanks
the donors and foundations who provide invaluable support for the organization’s research on
access to asylum and representation of asylum seekers. We thank the numerous asylum seekers
who bravely shared their stories in hopes of bettering the system for all those who seek
protection and refuge in the United States.
Mission Statement
Human Rights First works to create a just world in which every person’s intrinsic human rights are
respected and protected, to build societies that value and invest in all their people. To reach that
goal demands assisting victims of injustice, bringing perpetrators of abuse to justice, and building
institutions that ensure universal rights.
Human Rights First is a nonprofit, nonpartisan international human rights organization based in Los
Angeles, New York, and Washington D.C.
© 2022 Human Rights First All Rights Reserved.
This report is available online at humanrightsfirst.org

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2201 Wisconsin Ave. Suite 200, Washington, DC 20007 |Tel. (617) 227-9727 Fax (617) 227-5495 | nipnlg.org
@nipnlg

March 23, 2023
Submitted via: https://www.regulations.gov.

Daniel Delgado

Lauren Alder Reid

Acting Director

Assistant Director,
Border and Immigration Policy

Office of Policy,
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
Executive Office for Immigration Review
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Department of Justice
telephone (202) 447-3459

telephone (703) 305-0289

Re: National Immigration Project’s (NIPNLG) Comment on the Proposed Rule by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration
Review (EOIR) on Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, CIS No. 2736-22; Docket No:
USCIS 2022-0016; A.G. Order No. 5605-2023

Dear Acting Director Daniel Delgado and Assistant Director Lauren Alder Reid:

The National Immigration Project (NIPNLG) submits this comment in response to the
request for comments on the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) (the agencies) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on “Circumvention of
Lawful Pathways,” CIS No. 2736-22; Docket No: USCIS 2022-0016; A.G. Order No. 5605-
2023,” 88 Fed. Reg. 11704 (February 27, 2023).

NIPNLG is a national nonprofit membership organization that provides support, referrals,
and legal and technical assistance to attorneys, community organizations, families, and advocates
seeking to advance the rights of noncitizens. NIPNLG focuses especially on the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions, and its mission is to fight for justice and fairness for
noncitizens who have contact with the criminal legal system. Additionally, we fight for fairness
and transparency in immigration adjudication systems and believe that all noncitizens should be
afforded the right to fair adjudications of their claims to remain in the United States. We have
engaged in litigation to ensure that asylum seekers are afforded their right to pursue protection in
the United States, especially in the face of unlawful and discriminatory border policies.

NIPNLG strongly urges the agencies to withdraw this proposed rule in its entirety. The
rule would be unlawful and conflict with the statutory right to seek asylum as set forth at
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208(a)(1). By finalizing this rule the Biden
administration would renege on its promise to restore faith in the immigration system.
Furthermore, as the administration plans to enforce this rule only at the border, and not as to
those with greater financial means arriving at airports, the rule will have a disproportionate
impact on Black, Indigenous and People of Color (BIPOC) noncitizens, again betraying promises
to advance racial equity throughout the federal government.1

Throughout the preamble to the rule, the agencies consistently talk about the goal of
decreasing “non-meritorious” cases, which it equates with cases where an asylum seeker does
not ultimately prevail. We strongly disagree with this fundamental premise of the rule.2 There are
many reasons that an asylum seeker may not be successful with their claim including: being
unable to find, or afford counsel;3 appearing in a “no asylum” zone where immigration judges
deny the vast majority of cases without regard to the merit of the case; 4 years-long backlogs may
make it more difficult to prove cases;5 and ever-changing legal standards governing asylum
eligibility.6 The implication throughout the NPRM, that those who pass a credible fear interview
but do not ultimately prevail on their claims necessarily had non-meritorious claims that take
resources away from claims with merit, is fundamentally flawed and improperly colors the
underlying premises of the rulemaking.7

As asylum seekers’ procedural rights are curtailed, we have seen administrations in the
past create self-fulfilling prophesies—asylum grant rates plummet when they do not have
counsel and are placed through expedited proceedings, and administrations then use those low
grant rates to justify their reduction in procedural rights claiming that the asylum seekers did not

1 President Joe Biden, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities
Through the Federal Government, (Jan. 20, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-advancing-racial-equity-and-support-for-underserved-communities-through-the-
federal-government/.
2 The statistics cited in the NPRM are misleading. See EOIR, Executive Office for Immigration Review
Adjudication Statistics: Asylum Decision and Filing Rates in Cases Originating with a Credible Fear Claim (Oct. 13,
2022), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062976/download. Of cases adjudicated on the merits in the cited
statistics, the asylum grant rate is actually higher than the denial rate. Moreover, the “No Asylum Filed” rate which
peaked in 2013 at over 56% was below 28% in 2022. Thus, the implication in the NPRM that noncitizens who pass
credible fear are not truly coming to the United States to seek asylum, if not borne out by EOIR’s own statistics.
3 Jacob Czarnecki and Haley Hamblin, “Legal Representation for Asylum Seekers: An Overlooked Area of Reform
for a System in Crisis,” Niskanen Center, (Aug. 24, 2021) https://www.niskanencenter.org/legal-representation-for-
asylum-seekers-an-overlooked-area-of-reform-for-a-system-in-crisis/. (Asylum seekers “represented by counsel are
at least three times more likely to have their claims approved.”).
4 See, Innovation Law Lab and Southern Poverty Law Center, The Attorney General's Judges How The U.S.
Immigration Courts Became A Deportation Tool, 2019,
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/com_policyreport_the_attorney_generals_judges_final.pdf.
5 See Guilia McDonnell Nieto del Rio, “Court Cases in New York Are Scheduled Out to 2023, Leaving Asylum
Seekers Hopeless,” DOCUMENTED (Aug. 22, 2021) (Heather Axford, legal director at Central American Legal
Assistance explains, “‘Witnesses get hard to find, and facts get old . . .when you’re looking at a forward-looking
benefit like asylum where really the question is what happens if we go back now.’”)
6 See, for example, Matter of L-E-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021) (restoring a 2017 decision recognizing family
group membership as a potential protected characteristic for asylum purposes after that 2017 decision had been
vacated in 2019.)
7 The NPRM also implies that noncitizens may be coming to the United States to seek employment authorization, 88
Fed. Reg. 1105, but gives no citation as to how it reached this conclusion.
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have meritorious cases from the outset.8 We call on the administration to live up to the promise it
laid out in its early executive orders, and restore faith in our immigration system9 and advance
racial equity10 rather than repackaging unlawful Trump-era regulations justified by similar
disingenuous rationalizations.

What the Agencies Laud as “Orderly Processing” Is Actually Prohibiting
Vulnerable Noncitizens from Accessing the U.S. Asylum System

The NPRM claims success in reducing the number of border encounters with Cuban,
Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan noncitizens, 88 Fed. Reg. 1106, but the primary cause of
this “success” is expelling noncitizens from those countries at the border, leaving them with no
opportunity to seek protections guaranteed by law in the United States. It is hardly surprising that
swift removal “can reduce migratory flows,” 88 Fed. Reg. 11713, but the administration cannot
do so by violating asylum seekers’ statutory rights. It is difficult to see how this denial of access
to the asylum system and denial of fundamental procedural rights, can be claimed as a “success,”
notwithstanding the fact that some percentage of this population that had not yet fled their
countries might be able to obtain parole in the future under this rule.

Throughout the preamble, the government focuses on quantitative analysis at the expense
of discussing the qualitative issues that are raised by the rule: human beings seeking protection in
the United States. For example, the preamble notes that Cubans and Nicaraguans have recently
accounted for 32 percent of border encounters, 88 Fed. Reg. 11712, but it does not discuss the
human rights abuses that have escalated in those countries, causing their citizens to seek
protection elsewhere. In July 2021, the White House issued a plan to address the root causes of
migration from the Northern Triangle of Central America,11 however, it has not issued a similar
plan to address the increased migration from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, or Venezuela.

The preamble says that the agencies considered but rejected maintaining the “status quo”
because “the numbers of migrants have increased, and demographics of encounters have shifted
over the past nine months.” 88 Fed. Reg. 11730-31. Put another way, this rulemaking is the
agencies’ response to the increasing numbers of failed states creating humanitarian crises in the
Western Hemisphere. For example, UNHCR has recently accused Nicaraguan President, Daniel

8 See Jeff Sessions, Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the National Association of School Resource
Officers (June 25, 2018) https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-national-
association-school-resource-officers. (“[O]ur courts find that 80 percent of asylum claims are without merit.”)
9 President Joe Biden, Executive Order on Restoring Faith in Our Legal Immigration Systems and Strengthening
Integration and Inclusion Efforts for New Americans (Feb. 2, 2022) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/presidential-actions/2021/02/02/executive-order-restoring-faith-in-our-legal-immigration-systems-and-
strengthening-integration-and-inclusion-efforts-for-new-americans/. [Hereinafter, “Restoring Faith.”]
10 President Joe Biden, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities
Through the Federal Government (Jan. 20, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-advancing-racial-equity-and-support-for-underserved-communities-through-the-
federal-government/.
11 The White House, “U.S. Strategy For Addressing The Root Causes Of Migration In Central America,” (Jul. 2021)
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Root-Causes-Strategy.pdf.
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Ortega, of “crimes against humanity.”12 The shifting demographics have led thousands to flee
ruthless dictatorships; this unprecedented rise of violence within the Western Hemisphere should
be met with an unprecedented response in welcoming those fleeing harm, not by treating those
seeking safety as numbers on a spreadsheet that must be reduced. That is, while the “status quo”
may not be a viable option for the government, the NPRM does not seriously consider adding
resources to process increased numbers of asylum seekers as a result of the humanitarian crises
in Nicaragua, Cuba, Haiti, and Venezuela.13

The preamble also considers, and rejects, restarting the so-called Migrant Protection
Protocols. 88 Fed. Reg. 11731. Secretary Mayorkas has acknowledged the due process and
humanitarian deficiencies in that program, and recognized the need for asylum seekers to be on
U.S. soil to have “the ability to appeal, be represented by counsel, and present additional
evidence as necessary to ensure due process, respect for human dignity, and equity.”14 NIPNLG
strongly agrees that MPP must not be restarted.

Likewise, the preamble considers and rejects resurrecting so-called Safe Third Country
agreements. 88 Fed. Reg. 11731-32. As discussed elsewhere in this comment, many of the
countries through which asylum seekers travel are extremely dangerous. It is irrational both to
consider sending asylum seekers to unsafe countries with which they have no connection and to
force them to seek asylum (as this rule does) in those countries in order to access the U.S. asylum
system. NIPNLG strongly agrees that these agreements should not be resurrected.

NIPNLG supports the alternative solution that the preamble rejects—placing asylum
seekers into INA § 240 proceedings without going through expedited removal. As the preamble
correctly states, 88 Fed. Reg. 11732, this course of action would free up asylum officers to
address the affirmative backlog and to conduct asylum merits interviews. The expedited removal
process is inherently flawed;15 NIPNLG would support changes to the rules which would
eliminate expedited removal and afford noncitizens who arrive at the border greater due process
rights.

While the agencies highlight their claimed inability to fairly implement the 1996
immigration laws, given changes in migration flows at the border over the past three decades, 88
Fed. Reg. 11716, changes in numbers at the border, like increases in population generally,16 do
not justify abandoning the law as devised by Congress. When Congress created the expedited
removal process in 1996, it greatly curtailed existing rights that noncitizens presenting at the

12 UNHCR, “Nicaragua: Crimes Against Humanity Being Committed Against Civilians for Political Reasons,
Investigation Says,” (Mar. 2, 2023) https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/nicaragua-crimes-against-
humanity-being-committed-against-civilians.
13 See American Immigration Lawyers Association, Policy Brief: What Does a Secure Border Look Like? (Dec. 27,
2022) https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-policy-briefs/policy-brief-what-does-a-secure-border-look-like
(emphasizing an “all of government” approach to quickly and fairly processing noncitizens at the border.)
14 DHS, Explanation of the Decision to Terminate the Migrant Protection Protocols, at 36 (Oct. 29, 2021)
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/21_1029_mpp-termination-justification-memo-508.pdf.
15 Human Rights First, Pretense of Protection, Biden Administration and Congress Should Avoid Exacerbating
Expedited Removal Deficiencies (Aug. 3, 2022) https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2023/01/PretenseofProtection-21.pdf.
16 U.S. population has increased 24 percent since the enactment of 1996 immigration laws.
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5
border had at the time. Rather than receiving a full exclusion hearing before an immigration
judge, anyone presenting at a port of entry without a visa, or apprehended near the border, could
be given a removal order by DHS that could only be vacated by passing a credible fear
interview.17 The entire expedited removal system has been criticized as having racist origins.18
President Biden called on agencies to begin a review of procedures for individuals placed in
expedited removal through the Executive Order on Creating a Comprehensive Regional
Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to Manage Migration Throughout North and
Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United
States Border.19 Advocates for noncitizens, including NIPNLG, hoped that the administration
would reimagine expedited removal, and wrote to the administration urging it to end the use of
expedited removal for asylum seekers.20 Instead, the agencies now seek to further curtail the
rights of those arriving at the border, making it impossible for most asylum seekers to access the
statutory asylum system. The expedited removal system already prevents bona fide asylum
seekers from accessing the U.S. asylum system; the agencies’ plans to further vitiate rights at the
border flies in the face of this administration’s promises to restore faith in the immigration
system, and unlawfully restricts statutory rights.

The NPRM devotes considerable space to discussing its view on the authority given to
the agencies to issue this proposed rule. 88 Fed. Reg. 11732-35. However, the agencies cannot
issue regulations that contradict the INA. Section 208 (a)(1) of the INA unequivocally grants the
right to any noncitizen physically present in the United States to apply for asylum. This rule will
prevent the vast majority of asylum seekers apprehended near the border from exercising this
right. Claiming that “discretion” allows the agencies to foreclose asylum to most asylum seekers
at the border, is a misuse of the agencies’ discretionary authority, which has been used on a case-
by-case basis for asylum seekers. Moreover, the agencies’ argument that Congress only required
the ability to “apply” for asylum and not to actually “win” asylum contradicts Congress’s actual
intent and is disingenuous at best. 88 Fed. Reg. 11735.

While NIPNLG shares the administration’s goal of decreasing the role of smugglers who
prey on noncitizens, 88 Fed. Reg. 11713, we fundamentally disagree that this rule will limit that
role. In fact, once it becomes clear to those fleeing harm that they cannot access the asylum
system through ports of entry, it is likely that the role of smugglers will increase for noncitizens

17 8 CFR§ 208.30(f).
18 See Ebba Gebisa, Constitutional Concerns with the Enforcement and Expansion of Expedited Removal,
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM: Vol. 2007: Iss. 1, Article 18, 565 at 586 -87,
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2007/iss1/18. (“By allowing a high level of discretion that is influenced
by the racist sentiments of the time, this arrangement aggravates the problem that facially neutral immigration laws
can, in practice, discriminate on the basis of race. This could be particularly problematic in the enforcement of
expedited removal because statistics covering the first few years of its enforcement clearly indicate that, from its
inception, the procedure has been used disproportionately to remove certain nationalities.”)
19 President Joe Biden, Executive Order on Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes
of Migration, to Manage Migration Throughout North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly
Processing of Asylum Seekers at the United States Border, (Feb. 02, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/presidential-actions/2021/02/02/executive-order-creating-a-comprehensive-regional-framework-to-address-
the-causes-of-migration-to-manage-migration-throughout-north-and-central-america-and-to-provide-safe-and-
orderly-processing/.
20 Various NGOs, Re: Use of Expedited Removal Process for Asylum Seekers at the Border (Feb. 16, 2021)
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/LetterDHSExpeditedRemoval_2.16.21.pdf.
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6
who have traveled to Mexico and understand that they will be ineligible for asylum if they
present at a port of entry without the difficult-to-obtain CBP One appointments.21

Parole Is Not a Reasonable Alternative to Border Processing Because Many Asylum
Seekers Cannot Safely Remain in Their Countries and Do Not Meet the Parole Criteria

While NIPNLG commends the agencies for expanding parole options for noncitizens,22
those options cannot be a substitute for permitting noncitizens to exercise their legal rights to
seek protection on U.S. soil.

Among the processes that the preamble states have made a positive difference in border
encounters is the parole process it established for Venezuelans. For example, the preamble notes
that the “new process for Venezuelans . . . created a strong incentive for Venezuelans to wait in
safe places to access an orderly process to come to the United States.” 88 Fed. Reg. 11718
[emphasis added]. But for most asylum seekers, their home country is not a “safe place,” and
requiring them to remain in danger hoping that their parole applications will be approved is
unreasonable and unsafe.

Additionally, as laid out in the preamble, noncitizens abroad can only access the parole
pathway if they have a U.S. supporter who can file an application and promise financial support
on their behalf. 88 Fed. Reg. 11718. But as was witnessed during the controversial bussing of
asylum seekers to interior cities, many Venezuelans (and other asylum seekers) have no U.S.
supporters.23 Thus while the parole program may be politically expedient—preventing mayors in
interior cities from complaining of recently arrived noncitizens—it fails to offer protection to
those who are most at risk of imminent harm, that is those whom the asylum statute is designed
to protect. While NIPNLG supports expanding pathways to entry into the United States, the
parole program cannot substitute for access to the asylum system at the border, especially when
those at the border are most likely to be people without financial means and BIPOC people.

CBP One Provides Insurmountable Barriers to Many Asylum Seekers

A key aspect of the proposed rule is that asylum seekers who are in Mexico must
download a smart phone application (App) to make an appointment with Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) prior to presenting at a port of entry. 88 Fed. Reg. 11719-20. This requirement
creates unreasonable barriers to protection. Already, there have been reports about the failures of
the CBP One system. These failures include:

21 See, Ivón Padilla-Rodríguez,” U.S. Policies Like Title 42 Make Migrants More Vulnerable To Smugglers,”
WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 3, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/made-by-history/2023/01/03/us-policies-like-
title-42-make-migrants-more-vulnerable-smugglers/. (“The lesson here is that the multibillion-dollar smuggling
industry is enriched, not obstructed, by punitive border enforcement.”)
22 The preamble also sets forth other steps the administration has taken to ease backlogs and allow noncitizens from
Cuba and Haiti to enter the United States. 88 Fed. Reg. 11718-19. While NIPNLG supports efforts to eliminate
backlogs in other entry categories, we do not see these proposed improvements as a substitute for complying with
the statute that allows noncitizens on U.S. soil to seek asylum.
23 See PBS NEWSHOUR, “NYC Opens Emergency Shelter For Surge Of Migrants Bused From Border States,” Oct.
19, 2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/nyc-opens-emergency-shelter-for-surge-of-migrants-bused-from-
border-states.
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• Asylum seekers may not have smart phones;
• Asylum seekers may not be literate;
• Asylum seekers may not speak one of the five languages that are available on the
App24
• Asylum seekers may not have adequate access to Wi-Fi or data networks to use
the App
• There are not enough appointments available for those seeking them, forcing
asylum seekers to remain in dangerous conditions as they did under the unlawful
CBP “metering” policy.25

As with the parole section of the rule, the need to have a functioning smart phone and
access to reliable data or Wi-Fi mean that asylum seekers who are wealthier will have a greater
ability to access the asylum system; there should never be a wealth test for protection from
persecution or torture. Under the proposed rule, wealthier noncitizens will be more likely to have
working smart phones, will be more likely to be tech-savvy, and will be more likely to have
access to data plans or rented space with Wi-Fi.

While the proposed rule does include limited exceptions to the requirement to
successfully use CBP One, the exceptions will likely prove impractical to access at the border.
Proposed 8 CFR § 208.33(a)1)(ii) provides the following exceptions to making a CBP One
appointment: “if the alien demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not
possible to access or use the DHS scheduling system due to [a] language barrier, illiteracy,
significant technical failure, or other ongoing and serious obstacle.” However, neither the
proposed rule, nor the explanatory preamble material, provides any guidance on how this
provision would be implemented.

Perhaps the most significant flaw in requiring a noncitizen to prove their inability to use
CBP One is that in practice it would likely be impossible for the asylum seeker to even access a
CBP officer to attempt to prove “by a preponderance of the evidence” that they were shut out of
the system by one of these barriers. Since the purpose of CBP One is to limit interaction of CBP
officials to only those asylum seekers who have made appointments, how would an asylum
seeker without a pre-scheduled appointment even be allowed access to a port of entry?

Even if there is some mechanism for asylum seekers to try to put forth their claimed
inability to access CBP One, which is not discussed in the proposed rule, it would be a nearly
impossible hurdle for an asylum seeker to have to prove a negative. How does an individual
prove that they are illiterate? Does a “significant technical failure” include not being able to
afford a smart phone, having that phone stolen or broken, or being unable to access stable Wi-Fi?
How would a noncitizen prove any of these facts by a preponderance of the evidence, and to
whom would they make this showing?

24 CBP One Fact Sheets are available in English, Spanish, Haitian Creole, Portuguese, and Russian. It is not clear
whether the App itself functions in these five languages. https://www.cbp.gov/about/mobile-apps-
directory/cbpone#:~:text=Fact%20sheets%20for%20CBP%20One,are%20available%20in%20English%20and .
25 Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Mayorkas, No. 17-CV-02366-BAS-KSC, 2021 WL 3931890, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
2021), judgment entered, No. 17-CV-02366-BAS-KSC, 2022 WL 3970755 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2022).
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Additionally, noncitizens are required to upload a photo and the technology has been
rejecting photos of asylum seekers with “darker complexions,”26 creating barriers based on race
to accessing the U.S. border. And there are many languages used by asylum seekers that are not
available on the App, including indigenous languages. Similarly, already in the early days of the
CBP One rollout, there have been significant reports of the App crashing and of noncitizens
waking up at dawn to try to get very limited appointments.27 Would the inability to get an
appointment at all after repeated efforts constitute an “other ongoing and serious obstacle”?
Again, to whom would the asylum seeker make that showing and how would they document
their many unsuccessful efforts to make an appointment?

Instead of promoting orderly entry at the border, the CBP One will act as a gatekeeper. It is a
high tech implementation of the “metering” system that a federal court rejected in Al Otro Lado,
Inc. v. Mayorkas.28 In that case, a federal district judge granted summary judgment, finding:

an asylum seeker must only arrive and indicate an intention to apply for asylum for
inspection and referral to commence. Requiring asylum seekers to arrive again at POEs
requires an additional step neither stated in nor contemplated by [8 U.S.C.] §
1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). Therefore, failing to inspect and refer class members upon arrival, and
instead turning them back, conditions the ability to apply for asylum “on a migrant’s
manner of entry,” and “flouts this court's and the BIA’s discretionary, individualized
treatment of refugees’ methods of entry[.]” E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 993 F.3d at 675.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that turning back asylum seekers at POEs without
inspecting and referring them upon their arrival unlawfully withholds Defendants’
statutory duties under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) and § 1225.

If CBP One is simply a high tech roadblock to accessing ports of entry, it will serve the same
function as CBP officials turning asylum seekers away and telling them there is no room for
them. The agencies cannot limit asylum access through a glitchy App that will disproportionately
benefit wealthy (those with high quality smart phones and access to data plans); white (those
who do not have “darker complexions”); and educated (literate and tech savvy) asylum seekers.

26 See Suzanne Monyak, “House Democrats Call to Improve Border Appointment App Lawmakers Say Glitches,
Accessibility Limits on CBP One App Have Caused 'Grave Harm,'” ROLL CALL, Mar. 14, 2023,
https://rollcall.com/2023/03/14/house-democrats-call-to-improve-border-appointment-
app/?utm_campaign=HubSpot-AILA8-03-15-2023&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=250418420&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-
97rsaHGnJV_9l7OiLqPTGBYsZywUMh5uWNCmcb7-
3loXsBE2lKILrh44QRB_wjBzzU3H2ICbphYLNoWZe0f6lmzUFbNQ&utm_content=250418420&utm_source=hs
_email.
27 Bernd Debusmann Jr, “At US Border, Tech Issues Plague New Migrant Applications, BBC, Mar. 8, 2023,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-64814095. (“‘The CBP One app has left thousands of people out of the
process,’ [Raul Pinto, an attorney at the American Immigration Council,] said.”).
28 Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Mayorkas, No. 17-CV-02366-BAS-KSC, 2021 WL 3931890, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2,
2021), judgment entered, No. 17-CV-02366-BAS-KSC, 2022 WL 3970755 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2022).
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The Proposed Rule Would Codify Family Separation

One of the most insidious aspects of this proposed rule is its resurrection of the Trump-
era asylum transit ban. While this administration promised to end family separation, there is no
question that limiting those fleeing harm to withholding of removal or Convention Against
Torture (CAT) protection will result in family separation. Neither of these forms of protection
provide derivative status. Thus, families are likely to face permanent separation and have to
make the impossible choice between living in safety in the United States or living forever
separated from immediate relatives.

The proposed rule makes a nod to avoiding family separation by allowing family
members to enter the United States along with a principal asylum seeker, even though that
principal asylum seeker would only be eligible for withholding or CAT protection under the new
asylum ban. Proposed 8 CFR 1208.33(d). However, this provision would only preserve family
unity for those family members who traveled together, and not for spouses or minor children
who traveled separately or remained in the home country. As a result of this provision, there may
be an incentive for whole families to travel to the United States together, including young
children, rather than having the family member most at risk leave on their own, once noncitizens
come to understand that splitting up before travel will likely result in permanent separation.

Whether the family travels together to the United States, or whether only the family
member facing the most immediate threat of harm comes to the United States alone, the result
would be the same. If the noncitizen is granted withholding or CAT and the family member who
is with them cannot meet this very high legal standard, the family member will be ordered
removed. Likewise, if the noncitizen came to the United States alone and wins their withholding
or CAT case, they will have no ability to bring their family member to the United States.
Moreover, with a removal order against the noncitizen, they would never be able to travel abroad
to see family members and be permitted to return to the United States. The NPRM discusses the
effect of the proposed rule on families in its Family Assessment section and incorrectly
concludes that the rule will not have an impact on families because it includes provisions that
accommodate families that are traveling together across the border during the credible fear
process only. 88 Fed. Reg. 11749. This rule would codify cruelty and legalize separating
families, in direct contravention of President Biden’s Executive Order on the Reunification of
Families.29

Countries Through Which Asylum Seekers Transit Do Not Provide Adequate
Asylum Protections

Under the proposed rule, asylum seekers who have not been paroled into the United
States, or granted a CBP One appointment, would be foreclosed from asylum unless they had
applied for asylum and been denied in a country en route to the United States. Proposed § 8 CFR

29 President Joe Biden, Executive Order, on the Establishment of Interagency Task Force on the Reunification of
Families, (Feb. 2, 2021) (“My Administration condemns the human tragedy that occurred when our immigration
laws were used to intentionally separate children from their parents or legal guardians (families). . .”).
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/02/executive-order-the-establishment-of-
interagency-task-force-on-the-reunification-of-families/.
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208.33(a)(1)(ii). The preamble to the rule devotes considerable space to justifying this aspect of
the rule by explaining how the agencies believe that protection systems in other Western
Hemisphere countries have improved. 88 Fed. Reg. 11719-23.The agencies acknowledge,
without expanding on the point, that many of the countries in which the United States would now
be requiring noncitizens to seek asylum, are themselves countries from which high numbers of
asylum seekers flee. (“While some of the countries below are the origin for sizable numbers of
asylum seekers in the region, they also demonstrably provide protection for others who do
consider those countries to be safe options where they are free from persecution or torture.”) 88
Fed. Reg. 11720.

It is difficult to reconcile this language with the realities in the countries from which
asylum seekers flee. In fact, it has been well documented that Mexico, one of the primary
countries in which those fleeing harm would be expected to seek asylum under the rule, has been
extremely unsafe for asylum seekers. Secretary Mayorkas himself recognized the safety concerns
for asylum seekers in Mexico in issuing his memo seeking to end the so-called Migrant
Protection Protocols, stating, that the “adverse living conditions and violence experienced by
migrants returned to Mexico pursuant to MPP are of grave concern to the Secretary.”30

The preamble goes on to commend the development of the Guatemalan asylum system,
even though it appears to receive fewer than 2,000 application per year 88 Fed. Reg. 11721 and
Guatemala continues to be a primary country from which asylum seekers flee.31 Likewise, the
preamble lauds Ecuador for receiving several thousand asylum applications from Venezuelans,
88 Fed. Reg. 11723 but, again, does not acknowledge the recent increase in Ecuadorian asylum
seekers, fleeing conditions in that country.32

The United States cannot outsource its obligations to provide protection to those fleeing
persecution and torture. This is especially true when the countries through which noncitizens
travel are themselves documented to be dangerous and lack protections.

A cornerstone of the proposed rule is to cut off asylum eligibility for noncitizens who do
not seek asylum in one of the countries through which they transit. Since the vast majority of
Northern Triangle asylum seekers, as well as other Central American and South American
asylum seekers can neither afford plane tickets nor qualify for tourist visas, they have no choice
but to transit over land to seek safety in the United States. As with the CBP One App and the
parole options, the third country transit ban disproportionately affects low income asylum
seekers including BIPOC asylum seekers. NIPNLG calls on the administration to live up to its

30 DHS, Explanation of the Decision to Terminate the Migrant Protection Protocols, at 14, (Oct. 29, 2021)
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/21_1029_mpp-termination-justification-memo-508.pdf.
31 Between 2018 and 2020 more Guatemalans sought asylum defensively than from any other country; Guatemala
was also the third highest country for affirmative asylum during that period. DHS, “Fiscal Year 2020 Refugees and
Asylees Annual Flow Report,” at 17, (Mar. 8, 2022) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-
03/22_0308_plcy_refugees_and_asylees_fy2020_1.pdf.
32 Vincent Ricci, “More Ecuadorians leaving for US amid ‘burst in migration’” AL JAZEERA, Sep. 23, 2021,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/23/more-ecuadorians-leaving-for-us-amid-burst-in-migration.
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promise of seeking racial equity33 under U.S. law, rather than codifying racial and economic
animus into the regulations.

Exceptions to the “Rebuttable Presumption” Are Insufficient

Under the proposed rule, asylum seekers would be subject to a presumption of
ineligibility for asylum unless they meet specific exceptions that very few asylum seekers will be
able to meet. Pursuant to proposed 8 CFR §§ 208.33(a)(1) and 1208.33(a)(1), those fleeing harm
would be barred from asylum unless they had valid entry documents; entered through the parole
programs which are limited to only four countries; applied for asylum in a third country and was
denied; or successfully made an appointment using CBP One (unless they qualify for limited
exceptions to the CBP One requirement.) Additionally, the presumption can be rebutted if
“exceptionally compelling circumstances exist.”

The only categories of per se rebuttable grounds listed at proposed 8 CFR §1208.33(a)(2)
are for noncitizens (or immediate family members with whom they are traveling) who: (i) Faced
an acute medical emergency; (ii) Faced an imminent and extreme threat to life or safety, such as
an imminent threat of rape, kidnapping, torture, or murder; or (iii) Satisfied the definition of
‘‘victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons’’ provided in 8 CFR §214.11.

These exceptions are inadequate for many of the same reasons that the exceptions to
using CBP One are inadequate. First, again, there is no discussion of how a noncitizen would
even approach a port of entry to explain to a CBP officer that they fall under one of these
exceptions. While it would seem to be easiest to demonstrate an “acute medical emergency,”
there is no explanation of how this exception would work in practice. If the emergency is truly
severe, the noncitizen might need hospitalization in Mexico. If the noncitizen needs life-saving
future treatment, how would they prove to a CBP officer that the issue they face is “acute”?

Similarly, it is difficult to understand, in practice how an asylum seeker would be able to
prove to a CBP official that they are in imminent danger of kidnapping, rape, torture, or death.
These are the types of claims that require full evidentiary interviews before asylum officers or
hearings before immigration judges to prove. Would CBP officers receive specialized training to
assess the likelihood that the noncitizen is in “imminent” danger? Would a noncitizen who had
already been subjected to one of these harms qualify for an exception, or is the exception only
forward-looking?

Finally, again, it is difficult to comprehend how a trafficking victim would be able to
prove this harm to a CBP officer. Most trafficking victims do not understand the legal definition
of trafficking and require extensive counseling both by mental health and by legal professionals
to fully comprehend that the harm they experienced is legally defined as “trafficking.” For these
populations all of whom, by definition, are vulnerable, the proposed rule provides no mechanism
for them to present their exceptions to a trained CBP official.

33 President Joe Biden, Executive Order On Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities
Through the Federal Government (Jan. 20, 2021) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/2021/01/20/executive-order-advancing-racial-equity-and-support-for-underserved-communities-through-the-
federal-government/.
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The proposed rule does explain that for asylum seekers who have been put into expedited
removal, presumably those who entered the United States without inspection, asylum officers
will conduct a two-tiered interview, first determining whether any of the three above exceptions
have been met, and then, if not, conducting a reasonable fear interview. “Accordingly, the
proposed rule would implement changes to and build on this existing system and would instruct
asylum officers to apply the lawful pathways rebuttable presumption during credible fear
screenings.” 88 Fed. Reg. 11724. While asylum officers have more training on humanitarian
relief than CBP officers, the questions still remain how an asylum seeker would be able to prove
“imminent” danger or to even comprehend what trafficking is.

Thus, in addition to conducting credible fear or reasonable fear interviews, asylum
officers would have to conduct extensive questioning concerning the potential exceptions under
the proposed rule. That questioning will add to the length of interviews, further straining asylum
office resources, and adding to Asylum Office backlogs that already number over 600,000.34 The
NPRM recognizes the greater resources the rule would require, and it even explains why it was
wrong under the “Global Asylum Rule” to have asylum officers apply all bars in fear screenings,
88 Fed. Reg. 11744, yet states that applying the new bars under the current rule will not be that
resource-intensive. The preamble further justifies the use of these greater resources at the border
finding that increased expenditure of resources acceptable because “fewer will pass the screening
process.” 88 Fed. Reg. 11737. Thus, the purpose of the rule is crystalized—allow fewer
noncitizens access to asylum protections.

Equally disturbing is the fact that the three exceptions listed in the proposed rule appear
to be the only exceptions. That is, the rule does not state that the “exceptionally compelling
circumstances” include the three listed exceptions; it states that they are the exceptions. While
the preamble states, “In addition to the per se grounds for rebuttal, the presumption also could be
rebutted in other exceptionally compelling circumstances, as the adjudicators in the sound
exercise of their judgment may determine,” 88 Fed. Reg. 11707, the language of the actual
proposed regulation does not include such expansive language. Thus, it is unclear whether other,
“equally compelling exceptions,” would even be considered. For example, a parent could be
separated by smugglers from a young child who has already entered the United States, but it does
not appear that there would be a way for an asylum seeker to bring that situation to the attention
of CBP or to rebut the presumption against asylum in the course of a fear-based interview with
an asylum officer.

The preamble expends considerable space discussing litigation that found similar
Trump-era regulations to be unlawful. 88 Fed. Reg. 11738-42, and seeking to differentiate the
current rule because there are some potential legal pathways, as discussed above, that favor
wealthy and well-educated asylum seekers, that some noncitizens may use. Notwithstanding
those limited legal pathways, the proposed rule is resurrecting the Trump-era asylum bans, and
no number of pages in the NPRM’s preamble can disguise the fact that the agencies are
defending the indefensible.

34 USCIS, Asylum Quarterly Engagement and Listening Session Script & Talking Points, 5 (Dec. 13, 2022)
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/foia/Asylum_Quarterly_Engagement-
FY23_Quarter_1_Script_and_Talking_Points.pdf.
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Further, with the ports of entry essentially closed, other than to the fortunate few who
have secured CBP One appointments, asylum seekers in desperate situations, in dangerous
border towns, will have no choice but to cross unlawfully into the United States and be placed
into the flawed (and, under this rule, more restrictive) expedited removal system. That reality,
along with the more in-depth asylum officer interviews, will further strain the asylum system.

Finally, as discussed above, the expedited removal system already severely limits rights
of asylum seekers. It is extremely difficult for asylum seekers who have just completed a
harrowing journey to the United States, and who often do not have the benefits of consulting
with legal counsel, to explain why they fled their country in a way that aligns with the
complexities of U.S. asylum law. Under this rule, the stakes would be even higher, as those
fleeing harm would have to meet a “reasonable possibility” standard rather than the “significant
possibility” standard that Congress enshrined in the INA. Necessarily, thousands of noncitizens
who could meet the “significant possibility” standard will be unable to meet the higher
“reasonable possibility” standard and will be promptly removed—even though they have met the
standard prescribed by Congress.

The Proposed Rule Would Constitute an Abrupt Departure from Conclusions
Reached by the Agencies Less Than One Year Ago

The NPRM acknowledges that less than a year ago, in the Asylum Processing Rule
regulation, the agencies recommitted to the statutory “significant possibility” standard yet, now
the agencies claim that it is acceptable to use the higher “reasonable possibility” because of the
high number of expected border encounters. The agencies now claim that “the interests balance
differently and warrant a different approach from the one generally applied in credible fear
screenings.” 88 Fed. Reg. 11742. They then attempt to justify using the “reasonable possibility”
standard for withholding and CAT claims, even though that standard is not set forth in the
statute, for future fear claims at the border.

The agencies thus set up a strawman for expedited fear claims: the statute requires the use
of the “significant possibility” standard for asylum, so, rather than implement Congressional
intent that an inclusive standard be used, the agencies knock out the possibility of seeking
asylum so that the Congressional standard is no longer applicable. It is wrong for the agencies to
use this gamesmanship to subvert Congressional intent. Moreover, this abrupt change in
reasoning from less than a year ago, indicates that the impetus behind this proposed rule is
political rather than based on reasoned decision making.35

The preamble further explains that if a noncitizen succeeds in demonstrating a reasonable
possibility of persecution or torture, they will be placed in INA section 240 proceedings and the
immigration judge would not owe deference to the asylum officer’s determination that they did

35 Zachary B. Wolf, “Don’t Try to Make Sense of Biden’s Border Policy,” CNN, Jan. 9, 2023,
https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/09/politics/biden-border-title-42-what-matters/index.html. (“President Joe Biden’s
immigration policy is confusing and full of contradictions. . . Even though he is essentially expanding the policy, the
president also acknowledged last week his move could makes things worse because it almost encourages people
turned away at the border to try repeatedly to enter the US.”)
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14
not rebut the presumption of asylum ineligibility. 88 Fed. Reg. 11742. While that result is better
for asylum seekers who still have some possibility of winning their claim (and not facing the
permanent legal limbo of withholding of removal), it also reinforces the fundamental unfairness
of applying the higher standard at the border, and the likelihood that many thousands of asylum
seekers will face summary removal because they were not able to marshal the evidence they
needed during expedited removal interviews to demonstrate why they qualify for an exception to
the presumptions against asylum eligibility.

NIPNLG Strongly Opposes the Removal of Automatic Immigration Judge Review
of Negative Fear Interviews and the Ability to Request Reconsideration of Wrongful
Credible Fear Interview Decisions

At the same moment that the agencies propose dramatically altering accepted standards at
the border and curtailing the rights of noncitizens, the NPRM simultaneously proposes to require
noncitizens to affirmatively request IJ review of negative fear interviews. We strongly oppose
this change. Many noncitizens are disoriented and do not understand the American legal system
at the time they go through a credible or reasonable fear interview process. Requiring them to
affirmatively request immigration judge review of a negative fear finding will result in more
people being removed who should have been permitted to pursue fear claims inside the United
States. Immigration judges overturn asylum officer credible fear denials in 25 percent of all
cases.36 The proposed rule will likely exacerbate problems with asylum officer fear-based
interviews, since officers would have to learn how to implement the two-tiered approach,
evaluate exceptions to the new bans, and then apply either the “significant possibility” standard
or the “reasonable possibility” standard based on the results of their asylum ban analysis. Given
the significant error rate by asylum officers and the incredibly high stakes in expedited
removal—removal with no hearing on the merits—the agencies should not remove automatic
review of asylum officer denials. Automatic review of asylum officer denials has been an
important safeguard against (substantial) asylum officer errors in these interviews; it would be
wrong to eliminate this safeguard at the moment that the agencies force noncitizens to meet a
higher threshold in their fear interviews. The USCIS Asylum Division continue to be plagued by
high attrition rates and is struggling to fill funded positions. As of December 2022 fully 50
percent of its AO2 officers had been on the job for under one year.37 The stakes for asylum
seekers are too high to leave these decisions in the hands of inexperienced asylum officers with
no required review.

Likewise, NIPNLG strongly condemns removing the ability of noncitizens and their
counsel to request reconsideration from USCIS asylum officers. NIPNLG and partner
organizations have filed complaints with CRCL outlining egregious misapplication of the law by
Houston Asylum Officers in credible fear interviews.38 Already under the Asylum Processing
Rule’s restrictions on RFRs it has been nearly impossible to gather needed information and file

36 TRAC, Immigration Judges Overturn Asylum Officer's Negative Credible Fear Findings in a Quarter of All
Cases, (Mar. 14, 2023), https://trac.syr.edu/whatsnew/email.230314.html.
37 USCIS, Asylum Quarterly Engagement and Listening Session Script & Talking Points, 4 (Dec. 13, 2022)
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/foia/Asylum_Quarterly_Engagement-
FY23_Quarter_1_Script_and_Talking_Points.pdf
38 See, NIPNLG et al, CRCL Complaint, (Apr. 27, 2022) https://nipnlg.org/PDFs/2022_27April-CFI-complaint.pdf.
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15
within the 7-day period. Stating that USCIS retains discretion to reconsider its decisions—but no
one can ask them to do so—is, in practice, eliminating requests for reconsideration before
USCIS. Removing any ability for advocates to seek asylum office review of wrongful credible
fear denials—no matter how egregious the error may be or how imminent the danger to the
asylum seeker may be—will result in asylum seekers being wrongly returned to the country they
fled and put at risk of potential persecution or torture.

The 24-Month Sunset Date Is Entirely Arbitrary

The rule includes a sunset date 24 months after it is finalized. The preamble to the rule
primarily cites to the impending end of Title 42 expulsions to justify the radical restrictions on
asylum eligibility. 88 Fed. Reg. 11727. While it may be correct that the lifting of Title 42 will
temporarily increase border entries, that is a problem of the agencies’ own making by using
COVID as a pretext to unlawfully expel asylum seekers. The preamble gives no explanation of
how it arrived at 24 months as a time when the provisions would sunset, simply stating that it
needs more than a “short period” to account for the end of Title 42. Id. Moreover, while the
preamble emphasizes that the rule is temporary, it also makes clear that the rule could be
extended beyond this 24 month period.

If the rule actually does end in 2025, (which of course is preferable to a permanent rule),
there is no logical reason that two people who are situated identically would have radically
different rights and futures in the United States based on the timing of a rule that offers no
explanation about its own reasons for this period of time. Cynically, it appears that the 24-month
end date was chosen so that the rule would remain in effect through the next presidential election
cycle.

The NPRM Would Radically Redefine Asylum Eligibility and Should Not Have
Been Issued with a Mere 30-Day Comment Period

The Administrative Procedures Act (APA) § 553 requires that the public “interested
persons” have “an opportunity to participate in the rule making.” In general, the agencies, must
afford “interested persons a reasonable and meaningful opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking process.”39 Courts have found that for the agencies to comply with this participation
requirement the comment period they give must be “adequate” to provide a “meaningful
opportunity.”40 Given the importance of the public’s participation in the rule-making process,
Executive Order 12866 specifies that “in most cases should include a comment period of not less
than 60 days.”41 Executive Order 13563 explicitly states, “To the extent feasible and permitted
by law, each agency shall afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment through the
Internet on any proposed regulation, with a comment period that should generally be at least 60
days.”42 Despite the radical changes the proposed rule would make to the rights of asylum

39 Forester v. CPSC, 559 F.2d 774, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
40 N.C. Growers’ Ass’n v. UFW, 702 F.3d 755, 770 (4th Cir. 2012).
41 See Exec. Order No. 12866, § 6(a), 58 Fed. R. 51,735 (October 4, 1993)
42 See Executive Order 13563—Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review (Jan. 18, 2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/18/executive-order-13563-improving-regulationand-
regulatory-review. [emphasis added].
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16
seekers, it does not even attempt to justify the short time frame for comments other than the
impending end of Title 42 expulsions. Indeed, the NPRM states that the agencies intend to
implement the rule on May 11—meaning that they have already determined they will have time
to respond to the comments and make any required revision to the rule within just over a month’s
time of the close of the comment period. It is arbitrary and capricious for the agencies to decide
in advance how long their response to comments will take before the agencies know how many
comments they will receive or what the content of the comments will be. Indeed, as of March 23,
2023, over 15,200 comments have been submitted.43

NIPNLG Supports the Sections of the Rulemaking that Will End Trump-Era
Asylum Bans

The proposed rule would formally rescind several Trump-era asylum rules designed to
severely restrict access to the asylum system. NIPNLG fully supports the recission of “Aliens
Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for Protection
Claims,” 83 FR 55934 (Nov. 9, 2018) and “Asylum Eligibility and Procedural Modifications,”
85 FR 82260 (Dec. 17, 2020). As discussed above, asylum seekers have statutory rights to seek
asylum and NIPNLG opposes any rules that restrict these rights. Thus, we fully support a formal
recission of restrictions on asylum access. NIPNLG urges the agencies to withdraw this proposed
rulemaking except for the sections that rescind the Trump era rules.

Conclusion

NIPNLG is appalled that the agencies are seeking to reissue some of the worst
regulations that were proposed under the Trump administration. The NPRM is designed to curtail
the rights of asylum seekers in order to reduce the number of individuals who seek safety at the
Southern Border. The administration should not abridge statutory rights and rights under
international law in an effort to score political points. This rule resurrects Trump-era policies that
have been found unlawful. Moreover, it represents a stark departure from President Biden’s
commitment to restoring faith in our immigration system and in addressing historic problems of
racial equity.
We request that the agencies withdraw this rule in its entirety or, at a minimum, make
significant changes before finalizing it. Please do not hesitate to contact Victoria Neilson at
victoria@nipnlg.org if you have any questions or need any further information. Thank you for
your consideration.
Victoria Neilson
Supervising Attorney
National Immigration Project (NIPNLG)
2201 Wisconsin Ave., NW, Suite 200
Washington, DC 20007
(202) 742-4447

43 See https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/02/23/2023-03718/circumvention-of-lawful-pathways.
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March 24, 2023

Daniel Delgado
Acting Director
Border and Immigration Policy
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
telephone (202) 447-3459

Lauren Alder Reid
Assistant Director,
Office of Policy, EOIR
U.S. Department of Justice
telephone (703) 305-0289

Re: Comment on the Proposed Rule by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) on Circumvention of Lawful
Pathways, CIS No. 2736-22; Docket No: USCIS 2022-0016; A.G. Order No. 5605-2023

Dear Acting Director Daniel Delgado and Assistant Director Lauren Alder Reid:

The Kino Border Initiative (KBI) submits this comment to urge the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to withdraw the proposed rule: “Circumvention
of Lawful Pathways” in its entirety. These regulations would ban individuals and families fleeing
violence and persecution from accessing the protection they desperately need, deserve, and are
entitled to under both international (UN 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol) and
domestic law (Refugee Act of 1980), regardless of how they enter.

To exclusively condition access to asylum at ports of entry on having the means and knowledge
to download and operate the CBP One application on a cell phone or tablet device is cruel,
inhumane, and completely disconnected from the difficulties endured by people seeking asylum
at the southern border. Furthermore, it is unfair to punish individuals and families for the decisions
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they are forced to make to seek safety when US officials deny them regular access to asylum
processing at ports of entry.

The KBI is a binational Catholic organization that provides direct humanitarian assistance, such
as food, shelter, clothing, and medical attention, to migrants in Nogales, Mexico. Our faith teaches
us to welcome the stranger and protect people from violence, especially those most at risk in our
society, like women and children. Our faith also informs our involvement in advocacy, since we
believe we have a moral obligation to promote laws and policies that protect life and oppose those
that treat some lives as disposable. This proposed regulation violates Catholic teaching in that it
blocks certain families from seeking protection, which we know in the past has led to death for
some of our most at-risk brother and sister migrants.

In 2022, we provided direct assistance and accompaniment to 4485 migrants who expressed
violence as their primary reason for migration. These individuals come from a range of geographic
locations: 3,730 from Mexico, 268 from Guatemala, 136 from Honduras, 86 from Venezuela, 69
from El Salvador, 58 from Nicaragua, 49 from the U.S., 39 from Haiti, 23 from Ecuador, 12 from
Peru, 8 from Cuba, 6 from Russia, and 1 from Guinea.

This direct assistance provides us with a unique understanding of the on-the-ground realities of the
southern border. We also collaborate closely with the Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights
Project to provide legal orientation and basic legal assistance to individuals and families who are
currently stranded in Nogales, Mexico and attempting to access safety in the US. Current border
policies, such as Title 42, force people fleeing violence and persecution to navigate extremely
limited options to access safety, placing them in ongoing danger.

The Proposed Rule Violates US/International Law and Treaty Obligations
In 1980, Congress passed the Refugee Act, codifying the US’ obligations under the 1951 Refugee
Convention and Protocol. The Refugee Act of 1980 incorporated into US law non-discriminatory
access to asylum, the prohibition against returning refugees to places they would face persecution
and the prohibition against improper penalties on asylum seekers based on manner of entry. The
proposed rule conditions access to the asylum system on manners of transit and entry, in violation
of US and international refugee law. People seeking asylum are fleeing for their lives, which in
most cases means their options for when and how they leave their place of origin are extremely
limited, as has been recognized since the 1951 Refugee Convention. As we have seen time and
again, placing the burden of further restrictions on families in these dire circumstances simply
means some will not be able to access safety.

Asylum Seekers Cannot Access to Meaningful Asylum Processes in Transit Countries
The proposed rule would require all asylum seekers to make appointments through the CBP One
app or be subject to a presumption of ineligibility, unless they can prove they applied for and were
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denied asylum in a country through which they traveled through. In reality, the asylum processes
in transit countries have numerous shortcomings, which means that they are not a viable alternative
to protection in the US. The regulation as proposed overestimates the functionality of other
countries’ asylum processes.

Specifically in Mexico, the authority in charge of receiving refugee applications, COMAR
(Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance), does not have adequate funding to decide cases.
In part as a result of funding limitations, officers with the authority to decide refugee cases are not
present in most geographical locations. When a COMAR officer is not in a physical location, they
rely on the support of the National Institute of Migration for case resolution despite the fact that
agency is the authority in charge of surveillance, control, security, and expulsion of migrants. In
other words, an applicant who is in a place in Mexico where COMAR does not have a presence is
forced to submit their application to the same authority that could deport them. Understandably
many applicants out of fear of deportation do not go to the National Institute of Migration to initiate
an asylum case.

Even when the case makes it to COMAR either directly or through the National Institute of
Migration, the few trained personnel in COMAR are saturated with unresolved applications.
Legally, the office must resolve all cases within 45 days but in practice, it takes an average of one
year and in the worst case up to two years. In the meantime, applicants must remain in the
geographical area where they originally applied, unless granted a transfer by COMAR. If they
move, which is frequently necessary for their own safety or economic stability, their case is
considered abandoned. Importantly, that abandoned case is not considered a denial under Mexican
law and would not meet the regulation’s current threshold of “received a final decision denying
that application.” Therefore, they neither have legal status in Mexico, nor do they qualify for full
asylum consideration in the US under this proposed regulation.

The aforementioned obstacles are exacerbated by the fact that people in need of protection
encounter a void of information and support in the process. COMAR is limited to only receiving
refugee applications and does not carry out effective dissemination of people’s rights in the
process. Unless an applicant is lucky enough to be in a Mexican entity where they find assistance
from civil associations and/or public defenders it is unlikely that they will be aware of how to
proceed in their case.

To illustrate the difficulties with arriving at a final case resolution, we share the details of one case
the KBI accompanied with representation by our Mexican attorney:

*Mario, a native of Nicaragua, arrived in Mexico asking COMAR for protection due to political
persecution in his country. He began his refugee status recognition process in April 2021 in the
state of Chiapas, Mexico. A month after he submitted his application, he was persecuted and
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harassed by members of organized crime in that state and requested support from a nonprofit legal
services provider to transfer his proceedings to the state of Sonora. COMAR took a month to agree
to the request for a transfer, during which time Mario was terrified, living in hiding and unable to
go out to work. When he arrived in the state of Sonora, he had to appear before the National
Migration Institute and continue his refugee process. He was afraid to visit that office because of
the risk of deportation, and only followed up on his case because KBI provided legal representation
through our Mexican attorney. It took a total of 2 years and 1 month for Mario to receive a final
resolution of his process, including a year in which he had to work irregularly since the COMAR-
issued Visitor Card for Humanitarian Reasons expired after the first year. If it were not for the
extraordinary support of civil society groups, especially KBI, Mario would not have been able to
finalize his process and may have tried to cross into the US, in which case the proposed regulation
would have severely limited his chance at accessing protection.

Asylum Seekers Cannot Find Safety in Transit Countries
Not only do asylum seekers lack access to a meaningful asylum procedure but they also face
persecution and insecurity in transit countries. Our first hand experience makes clear that Mexico
is not a safe third country for non-Mexican nationals. There have been over 13,000 reported attacks
against asylum seekers stranded in Mexico under Title 42 in just the past two years. At KBI, we
directly hear stories of extortion, abuse of power, and crimes committed against migrants and
asylum seekers stranded in and returned to Mexico, including the following examples.

Wilhelmina* fled Venezuela after her parents were killed. She left with her 2 children and her
cousin, who is a transgender woman. In early February, they were all kidnapped in a Mexican
border city and her cousin was raped by their captors. Wilhemina escaped with her children, and
they turned themselves into Border Patrol. They begged the agents not to send them back to
Mexico, as they feared for their lives and safety. Border Patrol took away all their clothing and
expelled them back to the same city where they had been kidnapped. Whilhelmina has not heard
from her cousin since February 8, 2023.

Reina* fled Venezuela earlier this year to save herself and her son after her husband and brother
were killed. In Mexico, the mafia forced them off of the bus they were traveling on and kidnapped
them for 15 days until her niece in the US could pay the ransom fee. They have tried twice to cross
into the US and CBP expelled them twice, which puts them in danger of the mafia targeting them
yet again.

Madeline* is an asylum seeker from Haiti and had been trying to get an appointment in Reynosa,
where she had experienced numerous abuses. One night, at 3 am, Mexican police broke down the
front door of the house and pointed their guns at all the inhabitants, yelling, “Do you have
Venezuelans here? Cubans? Colombians?” After checking all their identifications at gunpoint
and finding only Haitians, they left. In other instances, Madeline had been stopped by armed
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organized crime members to check if she had tattoos and told by organized crime members at
gunpoint that it was too late to be outside at 7 pm.

Jovani* fled Ecuador due to discrimination based on his sexual orientation. He was detained by
Mexican Immigration in Southern Mexico, and when the agents found out he was HIV positive,
they said so in front of everyone in the detention center. They detained him in a separate cell,
where sick people were, and each time they detained an additional person there, they told them
that Jovani had HIV.

Juan* a young man from Venezuela fled due to political persecution and violence. He trekked
through the Darien Gap, one of the most treacherous migration routes in the world. Juan recounted
seeing people dead along the way and he feared that he would not make it. But he did. And he
continued his journey through Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and lastly,
Mexico. In Mexico, Juan was extorted numerous times by Mexican authorities, and he was
kidnapped three times. He explained that during one of these kidnappings,Mexican Immigration
authorities with their faces covered kidnapped him in collusion with organized crime. By the grace
of God, he survived and managed to make it to the southern border where he now battles to secure
an appointment to seek asylum through the CBP One application. When asked if he tried to seek
asylum in another country before seeking asylum in the United States, he said, "My journey
through Mexico was worse than anything that I experienced in the Darien Gap. Why would I ever
seek asylum in a country that has nearly killed me several times? I cannot stay here. I am not safe
here."

The Proposed Rule Would Force More Asylum Seekers to Cross in Dangerous Ways
Obstacles to the asylum process, such as Title 42 and the proposed rule, ignore the lived experience
of asylum seekers and force families and individuals to seek protection in whatever way they can.
Since mid-May of 2018, there has been some type of policy blocking regular, timely access to the
asylum system at ports of entry, beginning with the border-wide policy of so-called metering,
which forced families to wait weeks or months in Mexico before accessing a process at a port of
entry. Families forced to wait in Mexico have faced discrimination as they attempt to piece together
the resources to survive, from hospitals that deny them services in life-threatening situations to
schools and daycare centers that refuse to admit students for fear that the violence they are fleeing
will follow them. Due to this widespread discrimination, and despite the efforts of the KBI and
others, civil society organizations in northern Mexico cannot fill the gap created when families are
forced to wait in uncertainty in a region plagued by organized crime and ill-equipped to support
families for months while they attempt to access a process that is increasingly designed to exist
beyond their reach. For families and individuals in a desperate humanitarian situation, or who fear
for their lives in northern Mexico, restrictions on access to the port of entry may make crossing
between ports the only viable option. In fact, the DHS Office of the Inspector General concluded
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that limiting the numbers processed at ports does lead asylum seekers who would have otherwise
presented legally to cross the border between ports of entry.

The asylum ban does not advance the national security objectives of the federal government. Most
asylum seekers do not wish to evade detection but instead to present themselves to CBP to start
the asylum process. In the event that people seeking safety who are not able to get an appointment
through CBPOne are blocked from access to asylum, smuggling operations and organized crime
in Mexico will only gain more power, take individuals on more treacherous routes to evade
detection, and Border Patrol will have to invest more resources to detain individuals. In Nogales,
we already see the strong control that organized crime exercises over vulnerable individuals.
Migrants report that they are forced to pay from $1,000 USD to $15,000 USD to cross into the US
to access safety when they would prefer to cross through legal channels. Researchers have
documented the way obstacles to asylum strengthen organized crime groups at the border, and this
ban will only contribute to the problem, rather than promoting safety and security.

The Proposed Rule Would Disproportionately Harm Vulnerable Asylum Seekers
The proposed rule also disproportionately harms the most vulnerable asylum seekers. The rule
would discriminate against people seeking safety based on their manner of transit and entry,
disproportionately impacting people who do not have the resources to enter the US by plane and
who must present themselves at the Southern border. What distinguishes a person who presents at
the port of entry and a person who crosses between ports is not their desire to follow the law, but
rather the resources they have access to: whether or not they can get a visa to travel to the US
based on their country of origin, whether they can financially afford to travel by plane, what kind
of access to legal information they have, and whether they can afford passport processing fees,
among other factors. The ban on access to asylum for individuals who cross between ports is an
unjust approach and punishes people based on lack of access to resources.

For example, Brenda* and her 2 children are fleeing violence in Southern Mexico. They spent 4
months in Matamoros, Tamaulipas, Mexico waiting for a chance to seek asylum and tried for 6
weeks to schedule an appointment through CBPOne. They felt very unsafe in Matamoros and
almost never went outside. Finally, they decided to try to cross through the desert, out of their
desperation to access safety in the US.

CBPOne Denies Access to Asylum and Inflicts Harm
Further, this rule requires asylum seekers at the southern border to use the CBPOne application to
access the asylum system, despite the well-documented reality that CBPOne is impossible for
many asylum seekers to use or access. The application requires that asylum seekers own a
smartphone, can pay for internet and phone data to use the application, are literate in one of the 3
languages in which the application is offered, have the technological literacy to navigate an
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application, and the resources to spend months trying to schedule an appointment on an application
full of technological glitches and offering an extremely limited number of slots.

This requirement bans the most vulnerable asylum seekers from seeking asylum, such as Black
and Brown asylum seekers who encounter racialized facial recognition bias in the application,
people who speak indigenous languages or other languages not offered in the application, people
with literacy challenges or learning disabilities, and those with scarce financial resources. This
month, 35 Members of Congress expressed their opposition to the proposed rule and its
requirement that asylum seekers use the CBPOne application due to the grave harm it has already
caused. For instance, after a family from Cuba had been trying for weeks to get an appointment
and finally scheduled one for February 3, 2023 , their 17-year old son was murdered in Monterrey,
Mexico before that day ever came. At KBI, we have also received reports about the dangers that
families and individuals face while waiting for their appointments.

Jaime,* his wife and his son fled Venezuela and arrived in Piedras Negras, Coahuila. There, they
were able to schedule an appointment through CBP One, but the only available appointment was
in San Ysidro, Baja California, over 1200 miles away. While traveling to San Ysidro by bus, the
entire family was kidnapped, tortured, and extorted by a criminal group. The people who boarded
the bus identified themselves as Mexican immigration agents, and after asking Jaime and his
family where they were from, told them they needed to get off the bus so they could check their
documents. These supposed immigration agents brought them to a house, where they were held
for 20 days, extorted, and tortured. One night at 3:00 a.m., they were blindfolded, put in a truck
and taken to the border wall. They said they had to walk and cross and if they tried to come back,
their captors would kill them. Once they crossed, they called 911 and explained what happened.
Border Patrol arrived and they explained that they had been kidnapped, had missed their CBP One
appointment while being held hostage, and were forced to cross. The agent responded that they
were the criminals, as they had crossed illegally. A few hours later, Border Patrol expelled them
to Nogales, Mexico.

The CBPOne application also separates families. The extremely limited number of appointments
available means every morning that new appointments are released, they are gone in a matter of
seconds. Average-sized families of 3 or 4 people have found it nearly impossible to get an
appointment for all members of their family. This means that families are forced to separate when
they can only secure appointments for 1 or 2 family members at a time.

KBI has been advocating for 17 families who faced family separation/rejection at the POE in
February 2023. Out of these families, 5 are from Haiti. These families reported that they had been
attempting to schedule an appointment for all their family members for weeks, but were not able
to. Some of them missed the larger batch of appointments that were originally made available on
January 12, 2023 because at that time, CBPOne was not available in Haitian Kreyol. All of the
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Haitian families have a child/children 5 years or younger, were only able to schedule CBPOne
appointments for one parent, and therefore, faced family separation and/or rejection at the Nogales
POE.

These families reported that even though none of them were allowed to enter as a complete
family unit, they saw other families who were able to do so, despite not having all family
members on their appointment. Some of these families were made to form a line at the POE with
other families whose children lacked appointments and saw 8-9 families before them be allowed
to enter, only to be denied the same opportunity because CBP officers told them they had already
let in enough families. When the families began to speak out against this injustice, CBP officers
began to threaten to call the Mexican police if they didn’t leave and started yelling loudly: “GO!
GO AWAY!”

In the case of 3 families, CBP refused to allow their young child[ren] to enter with the parent
who had the appointment because the children’s names were not on the appointment. This
resulted in family separations that have greatly affected these children. These families report that
their young children who have been separated from their mothers or fathers cry nonstop, have
difficulty sleeping, refuse to eat, or fear being out of sight of the parent they remain with for even
a moment.

To illustrate this pattern, here are the details of one of these instances:

In mid-February 2023, Jesús*, Rosa* and their 2 kids approached the port of entry with a
CBPOne appointment. The application would only allow the family to list Jesús and Rosa and
would not permit them to add their 2 children, ages 4 and 6, to the same appointment. The CBP
agent at the Nogales POE said the children could not be admitted because they were not
registered, and if Jesús and Rosa wanted to keep their appointment, they would have to cross and
leave their children behind. Jesús asked if he and his son could cross together instead, so that
Rosa would only have to try to secure an appointment for 2 people, rather than 4 if they all
stayed. The official aggressively responded that he could not. As they tried to figure out what to
do, CBP officials said if they didn’t vacate the premises they were going to call the Mexican
police to remove them. Jesús finally decided he would cross alone, so that he could find a way to
support his family, figuring it would be slightly easier for Rosa to secure 3 appointments. After
informing the officer of his decision, the officer asked Jesús, “Are you really going to leave your
family all alone?” As a result of these obstacles to seeking asylum as a family unit, Jesús and his
family decided he would cross alone.

Inadequate Safeguards for Rogue Officer Behavior: Case of CBPOne Rejections
In Nogales, the Port of Entry processes 40 CBPOne appointments daily: 20 at 7 am and 20 at 12
pm. On March 18, 2023, KBI received 13 reports of people who presented at the POE with
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CBPOne appointments and were rejected. They reported this happened to at least 15 people out
of the 20 who had appointments at 12 pm. The port rejected a similar number the following day
and on March 21, 2023, while arriving in Mexico at the POE, I personally ran into a group of 15
people who all had CBPOne appointments at 12 pm and had been rejected. That same day, I met
a family from Haiti who told me they had an appointment scheduled for March 23 and had
decided to camp out at the POE to try to understand this sudden change, fearing they would also
be turned away on the day of their appointment.

KBI has spoken with 30 people who have arrived at our migrant aid center and reported a POE
rejection. The experiences and circumstances of the rejections were inconsistent, causing
confusion for migrant people. However, nearly all of the cases KBI has received involve people
from countries other than Mexico. In some cases, CBP officers asked individuals and families
fear screening questions, such as “Why did you leave your country of origin?”; “Have you been
threatened in Mexico?”. In some cases, people told Kino they expressed fear of persecution in
their home country and were still rejected. CBP officers asked some people other questions, such
as those directed toward Venezuelans and Haitians: “If you crossed through 8 countries, why
didn't you seek asylum in one of those countries? Why the US?”

In some cases, CBP officers did not ask any questions and simply told people they were rejected,
told them to leave and to try again to get another appointment through CBPOne. In other cases,
CBP officers rejected people for only having a photocopy of their identification, even though
these people explained they had lost their original in the Darien Gap.

On March 19, 2023, Ariel* arrived for his appointment at the Nogales POE. He fled Venezuela
and after trying for months to schedule an appointment from Ciudad Juarez, finally got one in
Nogales, Sonora. At the appointment, the CBP officers asked him when and why he had left
Venezuela and he explained he faced government persecution due to the job he had there. They
asked how many countries he had traveled through and why he didn’t stay in one of those
countries or in Mexico. He waited for a while in the CBP station and saw other people and
families receiving Notices to Appear with court dates. Then, an agent called Ariel and 3 others,
opened the door and told them to leave, saying that they were not accepted and that they try to
get another appointment. A woman who was rejected alongside Ariel asked the agent why she
had been rejected while another person she was traveling with had been accepted and the agent
responded, “Do you want me to reject him too?”

On the same day, Javier* of El Salvador presented at the POE for his appointment. He is a gay
man fleeing persecution in his home country. The agents did a DNA swab on him and rejected
him with no explanation along with about 15 other people. For Jonathon* of Venezuela, CBP
officers asked him, “Why didn’t you stay in Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama or Mexico?” and
rejected him in the group of 15 people.
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After advocacy and case documentation by KBI, CBP OFO provided a pathway to remedy for
those affected individuals and families that remained in Nogales, Sonora. However, this situation
is a troubling case study and relevant to the rationale for our rejection of this proposed rule. The
rule relies on impeccable port of entry processing of asylum seekers, including CBP officers
consistently acting in good faith and in compliance with all relevant law, policy, and protocol. In
practice, CBP is an agency with a track record of abuse of power and impunity. Asylum seekers
risk encountering arbitrary and abusive decisions by officers at the port, which can drive them to
seeking asylum between ports of entry. Vulnerable individuals and families should not have to
pay the consequences of government failure.

Conclusion
Given the legal, moral, and practical issues with this rule, we at the KBI oppose this regulation
banning access to asylum for those who enter between ports. We urge the government to withdraw
this rule and to develop solutions that humanely and fairly process asylum seekers who arrive at
the Southern Border.

Sincerely,

Joanna Williams
Executive Director
Kino Border Initiative

*Names changed to protect privacy.
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March 24, 2023

Submitted via www.regulations.gov

Daniel Delgado, Acting Director
Border and Immigration Policy
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, Office of Policy,
Executive Office for Immigration Review
U.S. Department of Justice

RE: DHS RIN 1615-AC83/EOIR RIN 1125-AB26 or Docket No. USCIS 2022-0016/A.G.
Order No. 5605-2023
Public Comment Opposing Proposed Rule: Circumvention of Lawful Pathways

Dear Acting Director Delgado and Assistant Director Reid:

The Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota submits this comment in response to the proposed rule
published in the Federal Register on February 23, 2023. Our organization urges the Department
of Justice (DOJ) and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to withdraw this proposed rule in
its entirety.

The Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota (ILCM) has provided legal services to low-income
immigrants since 1996. ILCM’s mission is to enhance opportunities for immigrants and refugees
through legal representation for low-income individuals, and through education and advocacy
with diverse communities. ILCM has offices across Minnesota and serves thousands of clients
each year in a wide variety of humanitarian immigration cases.

ILCM works directly with asylum seekers, usually in our deportation defense program. We also
help successful applicants to adjust their status after a year, and to apply for citizenship when
eligible. Among these clients are individuals who leave behind their homes and families, and
travel long and arduous journeys, often at great financial expense, in order to escape danger. The
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new rule would endanger asylum seekers by forcing them to seek asylum in countries facing
problems similar to those they are attempting to flee.

This proposed rule echoes the previous administration’s transit ban, with very limited exceptions.
Its reliance on the CBP One app implements a variation of prior metering policies that severely
restrict access to interviews at border ports of entry, thereby denying migrants the ability to seek
protection from persecution and harm.

Based on our work with these vulnerable populations, ILCM strongly opposes the rule for the
following reasons:

I. The proposed rule contravenes international and U.S. asylum law.
The proposed rule states that asylum seekers would be barred from obtaining asylum in the
United States, should they have passed through a third country to reach the United States, unless
they have applied for asylum in that country and been denied. Such refusal to consider migrants’
applications for asylum contravenes international and national immigration law.

In 1968, the United States ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees without
reservation. The 1967 Protocol extends protection to asylum seekers beyond the 1951 Refugees
Convention and applies to people seeking asylum in the United States. In ratifying the protocol,
the United States was bound to uphold Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. As such,
under Article 33, the United States cannot send asylum seekers back to dangerous countries.
Article 33 states: “No contracting state shall expel or return (refoul) a refugee under any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.” 1

Because the United States incorporated its international legal obligations into the U.S.
immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the proposed Rule also contradicts U.S. immigration
law. Under the INA, “any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in
the United States (whether or not a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is
brought to the United States after being interdicted in international or United States waters),
irrespective of such alien’s status, may apply for asylum.” 2

According to international law and U.S. immigration law, migrants entering the United States
have the legal right to apply for asylum regardless of the countries through which they transited.
The proposed rule pays lip service to the right to apply for asylum by framing the bar to asylum
as a “rebuttable presumption” rather than as a bar to application.

“First, the presumption would not prohibit noncitizens from applying for asylum. Section
208 draws a distinction between those permitted to apply for asylum and those eligible to
receive a grant of asylum.“3

1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 33
2 Immigration and Nationality Act, 208(a)(1)
3 Federal Register/Vol. 88, No. 36/Thursday, February 23, 2023/Proposed Rules, p. 11735.
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While the proposed rule purports to be in compliance with U.S. asylum law by allowing the
asylum seeker to ask for asylum, it then rejects the asylum seeker based on this rebuttable
presumption against eligibility, without even a preliminary consideration of the merits of their
request. This is a violation of both the letter and the spirit of U.S. asylum law.

II. The conditions under which asylum seekers may still request asylum under the
rule are so limited as to make nearly all asylum seekers ineligible to apply for asylum.

The proposed rule creates an unreasonable “rebuttable presumption” that an asylum seeker is
ineligible for asylum unless the individual

1. has been granted parole through one of the established “humanitarian parole” programs,
or
2. has presented themselves at a port of entry through a pre-scheduled time and place by
using the CBP One app, or
3. has sought asylum or other protection in any country they traveled through and received a
final denial.

Establishing a “rebuttable presumption” of ineligibility is inconsistent with U.S. law, which
allows “any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States” to apply for asylum.

A. The presumption of asylum ineligibility can be rebutted only in very narrow
and extreme circumstances.

The presumption of asylum ineligibility could potentially be rebutted if, at the time they entered
the United States, the asylum seeker or a family member traveling with them suffered a severe
medical emergency, faced an imminent or extreme threat to their life or safety, was a victim of a
severe form of human trafficking, or faced other exceptionally compelling circumstances. The
exceptions to the proposed rule are very narrow and require a showing by a “preponderance of
the evidence.” Even those who could potentially meet one of these exceptions may not be in
possession of medical documentation or proof of imminent harm other than their own testimony
in order to meet this evidentiary standard. Moreover, asylum officers and immigration judges are
not medical experts with the required expertise to evaluate these types of medical issues. Asylum
seekers without counsel will have yet another hurdle to contend with to meet the heightened
“preponderance of the evidence” standard to rebut the presumption of asylum ineligibility.

B. A majority of asylum seekers who arrive at the U.S. southern border are not,
and will likely never, be eligible to enter the United States through one of the
established humanitarian parole programs.

The recently implemented humanitarian parole programs only apply to a select number of
nationalities — Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan or Venezuelan — and require the person fleeing to
have contacts in the United States with specific immigration statuses able to financially sponsor

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them. While these humanitarian parole programs may help some people fleeing conflict zones
and/or authoritarian regimes, these programs only benefit those who have the ability to obtain
passports or travel documents and who have U.S.-based contacts with ample resources to provide
money for airfare and a place to stay in the United States.

Even for people from the select few countries designated for humanitarian parole, these
programs require asylum seekers to wait in their home countries until they can obtain visas,
airline tickets, sponsorship, and approval. Such waiting periods further endanger asylum seekers
whose safety is already at risk. Conditioning the possibility of parole or asylum on financial
resources and close personal connections in the United States is inconsistent with U.S. law.

The vast majority of asylum seekers come from countries other than Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, or
Venezuela, and thus are completely ineligible for these humanitarian parole programs. In
February 2023, 61 percent of migrant encounters at the southern border were nationals of
Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador.4 While not all of these individuals are asylum
seekers, many are—and none would be eligible for the humanitarian parole programs. Nor would
more than 4,500 Russians and additional thousands from China, India, and other countries.5

C. Requiring the use of the CBP One application as a precondition for asylum
eligibility violates U.S. asylum law.

The proposed rule requires that asylum seekers download the CBP One application on their
phones, register themselves and their families, and search for an appointment to present
themselves to Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, in order to seek asylum.

The small number of slots available through CBP One means that it functions as a metering
system. In February 2023, fewer than 800 CBP One slots were available daily, distributed among
eight ports of entry.6 These slots usually filled within minutes of the 6 a.m. release time each
day.7

In addition to the small number of slots available, CBP One functions to exclude many asylum
seekers. Many of those waiting at the border have weak wi-fi connections, making the

4 “Migrant encounters from Mexico and the Northern Triangle and From Elsewhere.” Washington Office on
Latin America. 3/16/2023. <https://borderoversight.org/2023/03/16/migrant-encounters-from-mexico-and-the-
northern-triangle-and-from-elsewhere/> Consulted March 18, 2023.
5 “All Port of Entry, Non-Expelled Migrant Encounters at the U.S.-Mexico Border (Country List)” Washington
Office on Latin America. 3/16/2023. <https://borderoversight.org/2023/03/16/all-port-of-entry-non-expelled-
migrant-encounters-at-the-u-s-mexico-border-country-list/> and “All Border Patrol Migrant Encounters at the U.S.-
Mexico Border (Country List)” Washington Office on Latin America, 3/16/2023.
<https://borderoversight.org/2023/03/16/all-border-patrol-migrant-encounters-at-the-u-s-mexico-border-country-
list/> Consulted March 18, 2023.
6 “Asylum Processing at the U.S.-Mexico Border: February 2023.” The University of Texas at Austin Strauss
Center for International Security and Law. February 2023. <https://www.strausscenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/Feb_2023_Asylum_Processing.pdf> Consulted March 18, 2023.
7 Kate Morrissey, “Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few
appointments into the U.S.,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, January 22, 2023,
<https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/ immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana>
Consulted 3/18/2023.
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application impossible to use. Because of the small number of slots available, families needing
multiple slots are often rejected, or only a single family member manages to get an appointment.
Difficulties with the photo function result in disproportionate and discriminatory rejection of
applications by darker-skinned applicants.8

Further, CBP One is available in only a few languages, which excludes asylum seekers who do
not speak, read, and write in English, Spanish, or Haitian Kreyol. Of particular note: this
excludes many indigenous people of Mexico and Central America who may not be fluent in
Spanish.

The proposed rule does allow for an exception if a person is unable to utilize the CBP One app,
but the individual bears the burden of proving that they were unable to use the app. This poses a
hardship to those who face language barriers and illiteracy who are the most vulnerable and
unlikely to be able to explain how their challenges make it harder for them to navigate these
byzantine asylum procedures. Many people who are unable to use the app will find it difficult or
impossible to demonstrate that the app was inaccessible to them.

III. The proposed rule would return asylum seekers to danger.

The requirement to seek asylum in a third country ignores the rates of violence and persecution
and the inadequate asylum systems that are realities in Central American countries and Mexico.

A. Applying for asylum and awaiting a subsequent denial in a third country is
dangerous for most fleeing asylum seekers.

The rates of violence and, in particular, the rates of sexual and gender-based violence in the
Northern Triangle countries of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador is alarming.9 Honduras
has the highest rate of femicide per capita in the world.10 At least 62 women per month are killed
in Guatemala, a country roughly the size of Tennessee.11 In El Salvador, a woman was murdered

8 Melissa del Bosque, “Facing Bias: CBP’s Immigration App Doesn’t Recognize Black Faces, Barring
Thousands from Seeking Asylum,” The Border Chronicle, February 7, 2023,
<https://www.theborderchronicle.com/p/facing-bias-cbps- immigration-app> Consulted March 18, 2023.

9 Kids in Need of Defense, Latin America Working Group, Women’s Refugee Commission, “Sexual and Gender
Based Violence (SGBV) & Migration Fact Sheet,” July 2018. <https://supportkind.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/SGBV-Fact-sheet.-July-2018.pdf > Consulted March 19,2023.
10 Id. See also Juju Chang Et al. “Men Can do Anything they Want to Women in Honduras: Inside One of the Most
Dangerous Places on Earth to be a Woman” ABC News, May 3, 2017. <http://abcnews.go.com/International/men-
women-honduras-inside-dangerousplaces-earth-woman/story?id=47135328> Consulted March 19, 2023.
11 “At Least 62 Women Killed every Month in Guatemala: Report”, Telesur, November 3, 2017.
<https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/At-Least-62-Women-Killed-Every-Month-in-Guatemala-Report-20171103-
0028.html> Consulted March 19,2023.
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every 16 hours in 2015.12 Many women and children arriving at the border are fleeing terrible
violence at the hands of intimate partners, criminal gangs, or police or other authorities.13 These
individuals undertake perilous journeys because their abusers and ubiquitous criminal gangs are
able to commit atrocities without accountability and government institutions fail to provide
protections.

ILCM currently represents women and children from each of these countries. Some of our clients
have fled abuse by domestic partners or parents, while others are seeking safety from criminal
gangs who have targeted them. One of our clients came to the United States because his life
repeatedly was threatened because he testified against a gang member.

By compelling asylum seekers to apply for asylum in transit countries such as Guatemala and
Mexico, the United States exposes these individuals to the exact problems they are fleeing.
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “The [Northern Triangle]
countries have recently experienced some of the highest homicide rates ever recorded. While a
rate above 10 intentional homicides per 100,000 people per year is classified as ‘epidemic’, in
Guatemala, homicide rates have reached 30-40 in recent years. In Honduras the homicide rate
peaked at over 90 in 2011-2012, and reached 103 in El Salvador in 2015.” 14

Central American migrants are not only unsafe in their own countries where they face
persecution based on race, nationality, religion, or membership in a particular social group, but
they are also not safe while transiting in Mexico or Guatemala, countries grappling with criminal
gang problems of their own. According to Just Security, “…Central American migrants are in
actual danger in both Mexico and Guatemala, where they are victims to threats, extortion and
violence by both government officials and criminal gangs. Such threats are aimed at them
because of their nationality and arguably because of their ‘membership in a particular social
group.’ They are regarded as vulnerable prey by both corrupt government officials and criminals
who operate with impunity and, in some cases, with the cooperation of government officials.”15

B. Applying for asylum and awaiting a subsequent denial in a third country is nearly
impossible for most fleeing asylum seekers.

Mexico, while a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, lacks
the will and capacity to carry out its obligations to asylum seekers. According to Human Rights
Watch, while “on paper, Mexican law and procedures reflect international standards in many

12 Kids in Need of Defense, Neither Security nor Justice: Sexual and Gender Based Violence in El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala, May 4, 2017, available at: https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Neither-
Security-nor-Justice_SGBV-Gang-Report-FINAL.pdf [internal citations omitted] Consulted March 19,2023.
13 Kids in Need of Defense, Latin America Working Group, Women’s Refugee Commission, “Sexual and Gender
Based Violence (SGBV) & Migration Fact Sheet,” July 2018, available at: https://supportkind.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/SGBV-Fact-sheet.-July-2018.pdf> Consulted March 19,2023.
14 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Call to Action: Protection Needs in the Northern Triangle of Central
America. UNHCR Discussion Paper. A Proposal for a Strategic Regional Response, August 2016, available at:
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/57a8a8844.html> Consulted March 19,2023.
15 Gzesh, Susan. Just Security, “’Safe Third Country’ Agreements Would Be Unlawful”. July 15, 2019.
<https://www.justsecurity.org/64918/safe-third-country-agreements-with-mexico-and-guatemala-would-be-
unlawful/ > Consulted March 19,2023.
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respects, our research found wide discrepancies between Mexico’s law and the way it is
enforced. Those who may have claims for refugee recognition confront multiple obstacles in
applying for refugee recognition from the moment they are taken into custody by INM16. These
obstacles include:17

1. The limited number of COMAR locations for asylum applications in Mexico—10
locations, many of which have been overwhelmed by applications in recent years;
2. The requirement for weekly check-ins after application, which confines applicants to the
vicinity of the often-remote COMAR office, without access to employment opportunities.
3. A huge increase in applications has overwhelmed the capacity of the underfunded
COMAR system: from 1,296 in 2014 to 129,791 in 2021. While the number decreased
slightly in 2022, to 118,478, implementation of the proposed rule would greatly
accelerate the growth of applications. While COMAR’s budget increased from $1.1
million USD in 2017 to $10.3 million in 2023, that remains far too little to cope with
application processing.

In addition, Mexico’s capacity to absorb migrants is limited by both economic and demographic
factors. With a population that is much younger than that of the United States, Mexico already
has excess workers, leaving little capacity to employ asylum seekers. And, as noted above,
Mexico’s gang and gender-related violence endangers asylum seekers there.

Other transit countries, particularly Guatemala, have asylum systems that are in far smaller and
in far worse shape than that of Mexico, as well as infinitely less capacity to absorb migrants.

Guatemala is not a safe country in which migrants can seek refuge. According to reports by the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 34,800 Guatemalans sought asylum in the
United States in 2018 alone. 18 These individuals fled due to “persecution based on their status as
indigenous people, women threatened with domestic violence and young people subjected to
gang recruitment.” 19

Guatemala’s recently-enacted laws seeking to criminalize people who help migrants are further
evidence of the futility of seeking asylum there.20

16 The National Migration Institute (Instituto Nacional de Migración) the governmental unit which controls and
supervises migration in the country.
17 Arturo Castellanos-Canales. “Mexico’s Asylum System: Good in Theory, Insufficient in Practice” National
Immigration Forum, 3/15/2023. <https://immigrationforum.org/article/mexicos-asylum-system-good-in-theory-
insufficient-in-practice/#_ftn39> Consulted March 18, 2023.
18 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Trends, Forced Displacement in 2018.
<https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5d08d7ee7/unhcr-global-trends-2018.html> Consulted
3/18/2023.
19 Gzesh, Susan. Just Security, “’Safe Third Country’ Agreements Would Be Unlawful”. July 15, 2019.
<https://www.justsecurity.org/64918/safe-third-country-agreements-with-mexico-and-guatemala-would-be-
unlawful/> Consulted 3/18/2023.
20 Jeff Abbott. “The Other Americans: Migration Crackdowns Are Targeting Migrant Shelters in Guatemala”
The Progressive, 2/15/2023. <https://progressive.org/latest/other-americans-migrant-shelters-targeted-abbott-
24223/> Consulted 3/18/2023.
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C. The proposed rule irresponsibly delegates U.S. obligations to asylum seekers to
already-overburdened third countries.

Other countries in the hemisphere, with smaller populations and less economic capacity to
absorb migrants, have admitted far more migrants, in proportion to their populations, than the
United States.

As Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos points out:21

“Since the beginning of last decade, countries throughout the hemisphere have taken in
millions from Haiti, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. All told, more than seven million
Venezuelans and hundreds of thousands from each of the other two countries have fled in
search of survival; nearly all have found a new home in Latin America and the Caribbean.”

More than 200,000 refugees and asylees have been admitted to Costa Rica since 2018. Asylees
and refugees arriving in the past five years make up nearly five percent of its population of five
million.

Expecting other countries in the hemisphere to absorb even more asylum seekers is not realistic
or fair.

IV. The proposed rule is discriminatory against certain asylum seekers based on racial,
economic, and other factors.

Migrants at the southern border should be able to safely seek asylum without discrimination. The
proposed rule discriminates against certain asylum seekers based on racial, economic, and other
factors.

A. The proposed rule is discriminatory against Black, Brown and Indigenous
asylum seekers.

The requirement to apply for asylum in a transit country is disproportionately dangerous for
Black asylum seekers who have historically been turned away from the asylum process or
suffered race-based discrimination in transit countries such as Mexico.

Both Haitians and migrants from Africa report discrimination in the handling of their asylum
claims in Mexico.22 They also report extortion by officials, threats of deportation to Guatemala,
and confiscation or destruction of documents.

21 Juan Manuel Santos. “Time for the Americas to step up (again) on migration.” El País, 3/6/2023.
<https://english.elpais.com/opinion/2023-03-06/time-for-the-americas-to-step-up-again-on-migration.html>
Consulted 3/18/2023.
22 Shahid Meighan. “Black migrants see nothing in Tapachula but racism and a dead end.” Tucson Sentinel,
7/28/22. <https://www.tucsonsentinel.com/nationworld/report/072822_black_tapachula/black-migrants-see-nothing-
tapachula-but-racism-and-dead-end/> Consulted March 19, 2023.
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A report by the National Migration Institute details the difficulties faced by African immigrants
throughout Latin America, summarizing:

“In addition to the challenges associated with understanding and acquiring humanitarian
protection or other statuses in Latin American countries, African migrants face
considerable obstacles to accessing their rights during transit and to long-term
integration. Throughout the route, African migrants face myriad difficulties rooted in
differences between their nationalities, languages spoken, religions practiced, and their
race and ethnicity and those of the societies through which they travel.167 Racism, a lack
of interpretation and translation services, and a lack of understanding of cultural and
individual practices make transit and longer-term settlement particularly difficult for
African migrants in the Americas. These factors set the dynamics of African migration
apart from those of migrants transiting the region from Venezuela, Central America, and
other parts of Latin America.”23

In addition to the general challenges posed by cultural and language differences, African
immigrants in Mexico face discrimination at many levels, including discrimination by
government officials:

“The challenges in Mexico fit into three main categories. First, there is wide-ranging
direct and structural racism, including discrimination in detention centers, police
violence, employment discrimination, and a lack of access to Mexico’s education system.
In interviews conducted as part of this study, researchers and members of civil society in
Mexico described African migrants being refused food in Mexican migrant detention
centers unless there is food left after all non-Black migrants have eaten; factory workers
refusing to work on the line with Black employees; and teachers walking out of
classrooms to avoid teaching Black children. Africans are also targeted by criminal
groups, based on the understanding that the Mexican police will not punish them for
crimes committed against Black migrants.176 Local police forces themselves also
reportedly extort some African migrants, threatening to report them to the migration
authorities if they do not pay.” 24

B. The proposed rule unfairly privileges asylum seekers with economic means.

Those who have a working smartphone and can remain in an area with the sustained and reliable
internet needed to make an appointment using CBP One have greater access to the asylum
system. This privileges individuals with sufficient funds to stay in more expensive hotels and
discriminates against those who wait in crowded camps or on the streets of border cities.

During the first days of CBP One appointment availability, observers in Tijuana saw mainly
Russians arriving for appointments. The explanation was simple: the Russian migrants had

23 Caitlin Yates and Jessica Bolter. “African Migration Through the Americas.” Migration Policy Institute,
October 2021. p. 33. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/mpi-african-migration-
americas-eng_final.pdf> Consulted March 19, 2023.
24 Ibid, p. 34.
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money to stay in hotels, which gave them better access to the CBP One process.25 Observers
documented the difficulties experienced by immigrants who lived in camps and were repeatedly
unable to connect to CBP One for the few appointments available each day.26

Due to the limitations of the CBP One application, asylum seekers who cannot read or
understand English, Spanish or Haitian Kreyòl; people with darker complexions not recognized
by facial recognition software; and people with disabilities have a hard time making an
appointment using CBP One and will therefore have less opportunity to apply for asylum.
Hinging asylum eligibility on having the right connections in the United States or having
economic resources is discriminatory and unfair.

C. The proposed rule endangers LGBTQI asylum seekers.

These asylum seekers are already at grave risk of assault and worse while on their journey to the
United States. More than half of those from the Northern Triangle countries have already
experienced sexual and physical violence, Once they arrive in Mexico, they face continuing
discrimination and violence.27, 28 The U.S. Department of Homeland Security itself has
acknowledged that migrants are “at increased risk of harm in Mexico due their sexual orientation
or gender identity.”29

V. The proposed rule violates asylum seekers’ due process rights, and arbitrarily raises
the standard of proof for asylum seekers at the initial credible fear determination.

A. The proposed rule violates the due process rights of legitimate asylum seekers.

Critically, the proposed rule eviscerates two safeguards for asylum applicants who are given
negative credible fear findings: it would require asylum seekers to affirmatively request
immigration judge review of a negative credible fear finding, and it would eliminate asylum
office reconsideration of negative decisions.

25 Kate Morrissey. “Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few
appointments into the U.S..” San Diego Union Tribune, 1/22/23.
<https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana >
Consulted 3/19/2023.
26 “Asylum Processing at the U.S.-Mexico Border: February 2023.” The University of Texas at Austin Strauss
Center for International Security and Law. February 2023. Pp. 8-9. <https://www.strausscenter.org/wp-
content/uploads/Feb_2023_Asylum_Processing.pdf> Consulted March 18, 2023.
27 Katherine Fobear. “Addressing Central and South American LGBTQ Asylum Seekers.” Georgetown Journal
of International Affairs. November 16, 2021. <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/11/16/addressing-central-and-
south-american-lgbtq-asylum-seekers/> Consulted March 17, 2023.
28 “Every Day I Live in Fear: Violence and Discrimination Against LGBT People in El Salvador, Guatemala,
and Honduras, and Obstacles to Asylum in the United States.” Human Rights Watch, October 2020. p. 122 et seq.
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2020/10/centralamerica_lgbt1020_web_0.pdf> Consulted March 17,
2023.
29 “Guidance regarding the Court-Ordered Reimplementation of the Migrant Protection Protocols.”
Memorandum from Department of Homeland Security. December 2, 2021.
<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/21_1202_plcy_mpp-policy-guidance_508.pdf> Consulted March
17, 2023.
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The use of reconsiderations is needed to safeguard the rights and due process of asylum seekers
where the asylum officer in the first instance issues an erroneous decision.30 Erroneous decisions,
hearings held in a language that the applicant does not understand, and denial of the right to
counsel in credible fear hearings have all been reported, and can be most readily rectified by
prompt reconsideration of erroneous decisions.

Many asylum seekers in credible fear proceedings do not have access to an attorney and would
not know to affirmatively ask for immigration judge review. Review of rulings is essential
because of the high error rate documented in past years—just over one in four credible fear
denials is overturned on appeal to an immigration judge:

“On average slightly over 25 percent of IJ decisions over the last 25 years have found that
migrants had established having a credible fear of persecution or torture after an asylum
officer initially denied the claim. It is important to remember that most credible fear
reviews are conducted by asylum officers in US Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS). The cases Immigration Judges hear are only those which were first turned down
by asylum officers, that is the asylum officer did not find credible fear to be established.
This means that IJ decisions found that 25 percent of asylum seekers who didn’t pass this
first screening, actually should have passed and, as a result, the IJ overturned these
asylum officers’ decisions.”31

Moreover, these appeal decisions are not protracted affairs: “On average, these decisions are
made within ten days. Last month in February 2023, cases took an average of just five days.”32

Eliminating these safeguards would certainly send many asylum seekers back into the hands of
their persecutors.

B. The proposed rule arbitrarily raises the standard of proof for findings of
probable persecution or torture justifying withholding of removal or protection
under the Convention Against Torture .

The statute setting forth the standard of proof for credible fear hearings, 8 U.S.C.
1225(b)(1)(B)(v), provides that “For purposes of this subparagraph, the term ‘credible fear of
persecution’ means that there is a significant possibility …” The proposed rule changes the
standard of proof for withholding of removal and CAT petitions from “significant possibility” to
“reasonable possibility,” noting that “This . . . screening process is modeled on the credible-fear
screening process, but requires the alien to meet a higher screening standard.” (p. 11743)

30 Rebecca Gendelman. “Biden Administration Move to Eliminate Requests for Reconsideration Would
Endanger Asylum Seekers, Deport Them to Persecution and Torture.” Human Rights First, 10/1/22.
<https://humanrightsfirst.org/library/biden-administration-move-to-eliminate-requests-for-reconsideration-would-
endanger-asylum-seekers-deport-them-to-persecution-and-torture/ > Consulted 3/19/2023.
31 “Immigration Judge Decisions Overturning Asylum Officer Findings in Credible Fear Cases.” Transactoinal
Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC), Syracuse University, 3/14/23. <https://trac.syr.edu/reports/712/> Consulted
March 19, 2023.
32 Ibid.
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DHS explains that using a higher screening standard will reduce “the impact on the immigration
adjudication system overall” by reducing the number of people who could gain protection.
Denying protection to people who may be in danger of persecution or torture and who have been
arbitrarily excluded from asylum eligibility because of the “rebuttable presumption” is a failure
of the moral obligation of the United States.

Conclusion

The conditions under which asylum seekers may still request asylum under the proposed rule are
so limited as to make nearly all asylum seekers ineligible to apply for asylum. The proposed rule
is discriminatory against certain asylum seekers based on racial, economic, and other factors.
The proposed rule violates asylum seekers’ due process rights, and arbitrarily raises the standard
of proof for asylum seekers at the initial credible fear determination. The proposed rule, if
enacted in its current form, would return scores of asylum seekers to danger in Mexico, another
transit country, or their country of origin. The proposed rule is similar in substance to the asylum
bans issued by the Trump administration.

The United States' asylum system has been a model for countries around the world to welcome
refugees who come to its door. This proposed rule is not in line with the American value of
welcoming refugees and asylum seekers and, more importantly, the proposed rule is contrary to
U.S. and international law which protects the right to safely seek asylum.

Instead of devoting U.S. resources to adjudication of a newly-created rebuttable presumption
against asylum, we need to increase the number of immigration judges and asylum officers
prepared to give a full, fair, and prompt hearing to asylum claims. Rather than making asylum
less accessible, our goal should be to make the asylum system work. We call upon the
administration to withdraw this proposed rule in its entirety.

Respectfully submitted,

Veena Iyer, Executive Director
Immigrant Law Center of Minnesota
450 North Syndicate Street, Suite 200
Saint Paul, Minnesota 55104
Phone: 651-641-1011
veena.iyer@ilcm.org

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8757 Georgia Avenue ● Suite 850 ● Silver Spring, MD 20910● Tel: 301.565.4800● Fax: 301.565.4824 ● Website: www.cliniclegal.org

Submitted via www.regulations.gov

March 24, 2023

Daniel Delgado, Acting Director
Border and Immigration Policy
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director, Office of Policy,
Executive Office for Immigration Review
U.S. Department of Justice
5107 Leesburg Pike, Falls Church, VA 22041

RE: DHS RIN 1615-AC83/EOIR RIN 1125-AB26 or Docket No. USCIS 2022-0016/A.G. Order No. 5605-
2023 Public Comment Opposing Proposed Rule: Circumvention of Lawful Pathways

The Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc. or CLINIC1, submits these comments regarding the Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, or proposed rule, titled Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, which would deny most
people the right to seek asylum at the southern border and disqualify asylum seekers who don’t seek asylum at an
official U.S. port of entry. Our organization strongly urges the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to withdraw this proposed rule in its entirety.

Embracing the Gospel value of welcoming the stranger, CLINIC has promoted the dignity and protected the rights
of immigrants in partnership with a dedicated network of Catholic and community legal immigration programs
since its founding in 1988. CLINIC’s network, originally comprised of 17 programs, has now increased to more
than 450 diocesan and community-based programs in 49 states and the District of Columbia. CLINIC is the largest
nationwide network of nonprofit immigration programs. In partnership with its affiliates, CLINIC advocates for
the just and humane treatment of noncitizens. Many of CLINIC’s affiliates offer legal services to help qualified
noncitizens apply for asylum, an immigration benefit that will be affected by this proposed rule.

As a Catholic organization, we base our work with immigrants on our belief in the fundamental and equal dignity
of all people as created in the image of God, as well as our call as Christians to welcome the stranger and care for
the vulnerable. Catholic social teaching on immigration strongly supports the right of migrants to seek asylum.
The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops has consistently condemned policies that would weaken asylum access,
including this and previous iterations of an asylum or transit ban.

1 Reena Arya, Supervising Senior Attorney; Elnora Bassey, Policy Advocate; Elizabeth Carlson, Senior Attorney; Joanna Mexicano
Furmanska, Senior Attorney; and Tania Guerrero, Project Attorney authored these comments. The authors would like to thank
Michelle Sardone for her contributions to this comment.
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This proposed rule is all too reminiscent of the previous administration’s transit ban and is also very similar to its
metering2 policy, which denied migrants the ability to seek protection from persecution and harm. Asylum is a
lifeline for tens of thousands of vulnerable noncitizens seeking refuge, and this proposed rule violates the United
States’ obligations under both domestic and international law to accept applications for asylum and offer asylum
seekers protection if they meet certain criteria. The rule on its face would erase the possibility of asylum
protections for nearly all individuals who seek asylum at the southern border. The proposed rule would leave
many applicants who qualify for asylum only eligible to be considered for withholding of removal or protection
under the Convention Against Torture. While both avenues allow for some limited protection in the United States,
they do not provide the full rights and protection of asylum, including family reunification and permanent
immigration status.

Our organization objects to the proposed rule for the following reasons:

I.
Thirty days is insufficient time to comment on and respond to the Notice of Proposed Rule
Making.

The Biden administration is providing a 30-day comment period for the proposed rule, which is an insufficient
timeframe given the complexity of the rule and that the rule denies people the right to seek asylum in violation of
U.S. law. Executive Order 128663 states that “each agency should afford the public a meaningful opportunity to
comment on any proposed regulation, which in most cases should include a comment period of not less than 60
days.”

The proposed rule is approximately 50 pages long and many of these pages include technical background
language. The proposed rule includes very detailed language concerning asylum procedures, specifically credible
fear interviews, and how the rule purportedly differs from similar rules enacted by the previous administration.
Given this complexity, it is unconscionable for the government to give a brief 30-day comment period on such a
procedurally complicated rule that will have an impact so severe on asylum seekers that it will surely result in
significant harm, and even worse, death. Thus, we urge the administration to rescind the proposed rule. If it wishes
to reissue the proposed regulations, it should grant the public at least 60 days to have adequate time to provide
comprehensive comments. On March 1, 2023, 172 organizations wrote to the agencies urging them to provide at
least 60 days to comment on this complex rule.4

2 US: Mexican Asylum Seekers Ordered to Wait, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (December 23, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/23/us-mexican-asylum-seekers-ordered-wait.
3 Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R, Vol. 58, No. 190 (1993), https://www.archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-
orders/pdf/12866.pdf.
4 Letter from Nongovernmental Organizations to Merrick Garland, Attorney General, et al., Request to Provide a Minimum of 60 days
for Public Comment in Response to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) (the Departments) Joint Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM): Circumvention of Lawful Pathways (March 1, 2023),
https://immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/content-type/commentary-item/documents/2023-03/Biden%20Asylum%20Ban%20-
%20Extension%20letter%20to%2030-days%20comment%20period%20FINAL.pdf.
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II.
The Notice of Proposed Rule Making conflicts with U.S. and international law on asylum
eligibility.

Should this proposed rule move forward, most migrants seeking refuge at the U.S. southern border would be
found ineligible for asylum and sent into harm’s way. The proposed rule would require that asylum seekers jump
through unnecessary hoops to access the U.S. asylum system—contrary to the intent of the 1980 Refugee Act and
the United States’s treaty obligations under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explicitly found an earlier proposed regulation restricting eligibility for asylum
based on manner of entry ran afoul of these treaty obligations, as an unlawful entry is not considered a serious
crime or danger to the United States that would justify barring asylum eligibility under these treaties.5

This proposed rule is contrary to Congress’s intent for asylum eligibility. By law, asylum seekers can apply for
asylum regardless of how and where they enter the United States.6 Specifically, the statutory language provides
any noncitizen “who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not
at a designated port of arrival...)” the right to apply for asylum in accordance with this section.7 This proposed
rule is in direct conflict with this statutory language. While the statute does provide authority to the Attorney
General to “establish... limitations and conditions” on asylum eligibility, the proposed rule introduces severe
restraints on the availability of asylum, going above and beyond the other restrictions on asylum specified in the
statute itself.8 While prior administrations have invoked their authority to enact bars beyond those required by
statute, most of these proposed rules were enjoined by federal courts as unlawful.9

The proposed rule attempts to distinguish between those who may “apply” for asylum and those who may be
“granted” asylum.10 This is a distinction without a difference, as the practical implication is the same. Those with
meritorious asylum claims will be denied relief, contrary to Congressional intent, which allowed for expansive
access to the asylum system. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected such reasoning when it struck down a
prior regulation severely curtailing eligibility for asylum, finding that drawing a distinction between those who
may apply and those who may be granted asylum “borders on absurdity.”11

The proposed rule offers various policy rationale for its adoption, arguing that the asylum system was designed
“decades ago” when migratory flows were “dramatically different” than they are today.12 However, if the asylum
system needs reforms, Congress has the authority to enact legislation addressing these concerns. Congress’s
failure to do so does not justify enacting regulations that are in clear conflict with the statute.

III.
The conditions under which asylum seekers may still request asylum under the rule are so
limited as to make nearly all asylum seekers ineligible to apply for asylum.

The proposed rule creates an unreasonable “rebuttable presumption” that an asylum seeker is ineligible for
asylum unless the individual is granted parole prior to arrival or has presented themselves at a port of entry through

5 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2020).
6 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 208(a)(1), 8 USC 1158 (2006).
7 Id.
8 INA § 208(b)(2)(C).
9 See, e.g., Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704, at 11735 (proposed Feb. 23, 2023) (listing five regulations
limiting asylum eligibility proposed by prior administrations, three of which were enjoined as unlawful by courts).
10 Id.
11 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant, 993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2020).
12 Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704, at 11715.
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a pre-scheduled time and place by using the CBP One app and has sought asylum or other protection in any
country they traveled through and received a final denial. It is nearly impossible for an asylum seeker without the
assistance of a legal representative to establish any of these three prerequisites to preserve asylum eligibility, and
furthermore, setting these additional standards is currently inconsistent with U.S. law.

A. A majority of asylum seekers who arrive at the U.S. southern border are not and will likely
never be eligible to enter the United States through one of the established humanitarian
parole programs.
One of the exceptions to the proposed rule’s application is that the asylum seeker must travel to the United States
through one of the newly established parole programs. While these programs are a welcome opportunity for
individuals to travel to the United States, they should not be a substitute for a fair asylum system. The recently
implemented humanitarian parole programs only apply to a select number of nationalities, namely Cuban, Haitian,
Nicaraguan or Venezuelan.
While these humanitarian parole programs may help some people fleeing conflict zones and/or authoritarian
regimes, they are no trade-off for a safe, fair, transparent and humane asylum system. These programs only benefit
those who have the ability to obtain passports or travel documents and who have contacts with ample resources
to provide money for airfare and a place to stay in the United States.
For instance, a family of three from Venezuela has been in Juarez for over six months. They fled
Venezuela and once they arrived in Mexico, they made their way to the United States-Mexico
border, in hopes of seeking asylum, only to be expelled back to Mexico under Title 42. The U.S.
immigration officers who processed and expelled them, took their passports and did not return
them. When the parole program for Venezuelans was rolled out, they thought they would be
eligible; however, as it turns out, without their passports they discovered they are not eligible to
apply. To make matters worse, they are not able to return to Venezuela to obtain new passports
due to receiving death threats. If this family tries to contact anyone to initiate any kind of renewal
process from afar, which is likely to take months, it might alert those who are threatening to harm
them. This family is now stranded in an overcrowded shelter in Juarez and they are ineligible to
apply for the parole program, nor can they present themselves at an official U.S. port of entry to
request asylum.
Significantly, migrants who enter the U.S., Mexico or Panama, after January 9, 2023, without meeting the
eligibility requirements, or Venezuelans who arrive before October 19, 2022, will be barred from the parole
programs. Effectively, these parole programs punish those who would benefit from it the most—asylum seekers
in search of safety. Most asylum seekers fleeing for their lives should not have to risk jeopardizing their safety,
and they certainly do not have the privilege to wait in their home countries in order to apply for humanitarian
parole.
The commentary in the proposed rule mentions the countries chosen for the parole programs—Cuba, Haiti,
Nicaragua and Venezuela—had the highest border encounters for FY 2021 and FY 2022.13 While Venezuela and
Cuba have seen the highest net increases since 2021, in the number of pending asylum cases before EOIR, the
number of cases pending from Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador), for example, remain

13 Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704, at 11708.
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high.14 Similarly, the three Northern Triangle countries remain in the top ten countries for numbers of affirmative
asylum grants by USCIS.15 And although the numbers of asylum seekers from the Northern Triangle at the border
have dropped in recent years,16 this drop is likely due to the use of Title 42 policies curtailing asylum access at
the border, not to a decrease in viable claims for asylum. A program that only benefits those who can wait patiently
in their home countries, demonstrate proven connections with those in the United States that have resources, have
access to passports and only benefit a small subset of the countries of origin for all migrants arriving at the border,
is not a sufficient substitute for an asylum system in the United States.
B. Requiring the use of the CBP One application as a precondition for asylum eligibility violates
U.S. asylum law.

The proposed rule requires that asylum seekers download the CBP One application on their phones and search
for an appointment to present themselves to Customs and Border Protection, or CBP, in order to seek asylum.
Given the technical difficulties many have with using CBP One, its existence has been equated to another
‘metering’ system, which the courts have found to be illegal.17 Under the metering system, asylum seekers had to
schedule a time to come to the U.S. Port of Entry to seek asylum.

The administration’s requirement that asylum seekers must access this application in order to be eligible to apply
for asylum is also concerning for a variety of other reasons.18 For one, advocates and asylum seekers have both
complained that the application requires reliable internet for a sustained period of time in order to successfully
and consistently search within it for an appointment with CBP. Many asylum seekers on the border do not have
access to reliable and consistent internet, which means scheduling an appointment via their mobile phones is not
a viable option for them. These asylum seekers should not be deemed ineligible for asylum simply because they
lack the technological capacity to make an appointment on a mobile application or because the government has
placed an unlawful condition on the right to seek asylum.

The proposed rule indicates that the majority of asylum seekers at the border have cellphones. However, the CBP
One app is not compatible with all cellphones. Many times, the glitches are due to the incompatibility between
app and cellphone. It is plainly inequitable to condition the right to seek asylum on an individual’s ability to obtain
a smart phone, particularly a recent model, just to be able to schedule an appointment and present themselves at
a port of entry.

Another significant glitch in the CBP One app is in the facial recognition feature. As a requirement to complete
registration, asylum seekers must have their faces scanned for facial recognition. Many times, this feature freezes
or marks error.

14 A Sober Assessment of the Growing U.S. Asylum Backlog, TRAC IMMIGR. (Dec. 22, 2022), trac.syr.edu/reports/705/.
15 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics 2021, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., tbl 17, "Individuals Granted Asylum Affirmatively by
Region and Country of Nationality: Fiscal Years 2012 to 2021,” https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2021 (last
updated 3/3/2023).
16 Diana Roy, Ten Graphics that Explain the U.S. Struggle with Migrant Flows in 2022, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Dec. 1,
2022, https://www.cfr.org/article/ten-graphics-explain-us-struggle-migrant-flows-2022
17 Al Otro Lado Inc., Et al. V. Mayorkas, et al., S. POVERTY L. CENTER, https://www.splcenter.org/seeking-justice/case-docket/al-otro-
lado-inc-et-al-v-mayorkas-et-al (last visited Mar. 24, 2023).
18 Jack Herrera, Fleeing for Your Life? There’s an App for That, TEX. MONTHLY, March 2, 2023,
https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/cbp-app-asylum-biden-administration/.
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In Juarez, an advocate who was trying to assist asylum seekers complete their registration,
struggled for one hour to take the picture of a young man. This young asylum seeker was one of
several dozen awaiting assistance. The facial recognition feature in the app is a serious limitation
for asylum seekers to complete registration and be able to utilize the app to schedule an
appointment. Another asylum seeker shared she had finalized her registration, and when she tried
to enter the app later in the day, it failed to recognize her. After many attempts, she was able to
access the platform; however, she continues to have this recurring issue.

The CBP One app has a feature that does consider the loss or destruction of the cellphone which allows for people
to access their accounts through borrowed cellphones with a series of codes as a security measure. This in practice,
translates into people locking themselves out of the app and having to re-register. Also, despite an asylum seeker
having the option to borrow a phone to register, the app continues to place asylum seekers who do not own a
compatible smart phone at a disadvantage because it reduces their probability to obtain an appointment. It is
taking months for someone who does own a compatible smart phone to schedule an appointment; for someone
who does not own a phone, it is essentially impossible. The CBP One app is inequitable and marginalizes those
who are already in dangerous circumstances.

The proposed rule does allow for an exception to asylum ineligibility if a person is unable to utilize the CBP One
app, but the individual bears the burden of proving that they were unable to use the app. A person arriving at the
southern border can rebut the presumption of asylum ineligibility if they can show by “a preponderance of the
evidence that it was not possible to use the scheduling system [due to illiteracy, a language barrier or significant
technical challenge] and other compelling reasons.” However, those who face language barriers and illiteracy are
the most vulnerable and unlikely to be able to explain how their challenges make it harder for them to navigate
these intricate asylum procedures. Many people who are unable to use the app will find it difficult or impossible
to demonstrate that the app was inaccessible to them.

There is an extremely vulnerable group of people who are disenfranchised by the CBP One app, such as those
without cellphones, those who are illiterate, those who lack access to a working internet, and those with
disabilities. The proposed rule does carve out exceptions for this group but only in theory. In practice, this
population is not able and/or is unaware of how to make these circumstances known to an officer without being
intimidated by them or threatened and physically assaulted by Mexican authorities.

For instance, Magdalena*19, a woman fleeing her home in Guerrero, Mexico with her three minor
children has been stranded in a border town for three months. She and her children are perceived
as foreigners in their own country. They are Mixteco and speak very little Spanish. They have
experienced prolonged homelessness, racial discrimination, and physical abuse while attempting
to not be found by the cartel that murdered her husband and her children’s father. Magdalena and
her children have unsuccessfully attempted to present themselves at a U.S. port of entry. Mexican
authorities serve as the first barrier to safety. U.S. officers have expelled the family, returning them
directly to danger. Magdalena never had an opportunity to explain her situation to anyone.

The CBP One app is the ultimate barrier for this family to seek protection. Magdalena does not have a cellphone.
She does not know how to read or write in any language and is constantly worried about the safety and well-being
of her children, while mourning the loss of her husband and her entire life as she knew it.

19 Names with asterisks have been changed for privacy purposes.
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Conditioning the access to asylum on the use of the CBP One app has left Magdalena and her family in immense
danger without an opportunity to explain her circumstance to any U.S. immigration authority. Under the proposed
rule, Magdalena bears the burden of proving that she and her children were unable to use the app to be able to
rebut the presumption of asylum ineligibility if they can show by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not
possible to use the scheduling system due to Magdalena’s illiteracy and technical challenge. Despite exceptions
in the proposed rule, it is certain that in practice, having an opportunity to prove any of these exceptions would
be impossible.

C. Applying for asylum and awaiting a subsequent denial in a third country is nearly impossible
for most fleeing asylum seekers.

The proposed rule outlines that one can be exempted from the presumption of asylum ineligibility if they apply
for and are denied asylum in a third country. This is essentially a transit ban similar to the one the prior
administration issued in 2019, which was finally struck down by the courts in 2021. In East Bay Sanctuary
Covenant v. Barr, the Ninth Circuit held the prior “transit ban” was “not in accordance with the law” or “in excess
of statutory limitations” because it was inconsistent with the safe third country bar to eligibility to apply for
asylum or the firm resettlement mandatory bar to asylum.20

The Ninth Circuit made clear that the prior administration’s Transit Ban ran afoul of the safeguards established
by Congress. One such safeguard, is the safe third country bar which explicitly requires that there be a formal
agreement between a ‘safe third country’, such as we have with Canada, and that there should be a ‘full and fair’
asylum system.21 The second safeguard, found within the exceptions to the firm resettlement mandatory bar to
asylum, applies to asylum seekers who face persecution in the country of asylum or those who never intended the
country of asylum to be their final destination. The Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]he sole protection provided by
the [Final] Rule is its requirement that the country through which the barred [asylum seeker] has traveled be a
‘signatory’ to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol” without requiring these countries have any meaningful
or established asylum procedures.22 The Ninth Circuit twice held that “[t]his requirement does not remotely
resemble the assurances of safety built into the two safe-place bars of § 1158 [firm resettlement bar exceptions
and safe third country bar],” and in fact is inconsistent with those provisions.23 The Transit Ban was finally struck
down in 2020.24

The countries asylum seekers most often travel through, namely Mexico and other Central American countries,
do not have asylum procedures similarly structured to that of the United States, have backlogged asylum
systems, and are generally unsafe.25

For example, in Mexico, asylum seekers must reside in the state where they applied for asylum and cannot go to
other parts of the country where they have connections or are able to find work. They also must apply for asylum
within 30 days after entering Mexico,26 rendering many migrants ineligible by the time they start to understand

20 East Bay v. Barr, 964 F.3d 832, 841, 845-49 (9th Cir. 2021).
21 Id. at 841.
22 Id. at 847.
23 Id. at 845-49.
24 CAIR Coalition v. Trump, 19-2117, 2020 WL 3542481 (D.D.C. Jun. 30, 2020).
25 Is Guatemala Safe for Refugees and Asylum Seekers?, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (June 2019), available at
https://humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/IsGuatemalaSafeforRefugeesandAsylumSeekers.pdf.
26 Key Points on Access to Asylum in Mexico, Protections for Migrant Children and U.S. Cooperation, WOLA (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://www.wola.org/analysis/key-points-migration-march-2021/.
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the various legal systems to which they are subject. While asylum seekers await decisions, some end up suffering
worse persecution from gangs or organized crime or are confronted with the same persecutors from whom they
fled.27 The proposed rule does not address the dangers to vulnerable populations, such as members of the LGBTQI
community, where Human Rights Watch reports that:

Six asylum seekers and migrant rights workers reported that some of the shelters in Ciudad Juárez
that accepted LGBT asylum seekers subjected them to discriminatory treatment, including the
shelter where LGBT asylum seekers were forced to go to Christian religious services. Shelters in
Ciudad Juárez are at capacity, meaning they would be homeless if they did not agree to go to the
service. Some migrant shelters in Ciudad Juárez would not accept LGBT asylum seekers at all,
migrant rights workers there said.28

Moreover, indigenous groups, women with children, pregnant women29 and those with disabilities will continue
to face discrimination, violence, extortion, sexual and gender-based violence and detention in transit countries
such as Mexico and Guatemala. Strikingly, the proposed rule ignores the wealth of reports that highlight the
dangerous and even deadly situation Black asylum seekers face in countries of transit, such as Mexico. A recent
report from Black Alliance for Just Immigration and Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración states:

Due to their skin color, African and other Black migrants are often more visible to immigration
authorities when travelling without documentation. They are afraid to challenge officials and are
also easy targets for local gangs. Some attempt to evade apprehension by travelling north by boat
off Mexico’s Pacific Coast, but this journey is dangerous and has proved fatal. For example, in
October 2019, a small boat carrying Cameroonian migrants sank off the coast of Chiapas, killing
two of the men on board.30

Haitian asylum seekers continue to face discrimination and in some cases persecution in transit countries. For
example, Haitians are subject to a much narrower definition of asylum than those applicable to Venezuelan and
Central American applicants. 31 According to a recent report from Refugees International, Haitian asylum seekers
have also been targeted for attacks, detention and face hurdles even accessing the Mexican asylum system.32

27 Mexico: Asylum Seekers Face Abuses at Southern Border, Improve Conditions, Procedures; US Should End Pressure to Block
Arrivals, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (June 2022), available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/06/06/mexico-asylum-seekers-face-abuses-
southern-border.
28 US: LGBT Asylum Seekers in Danger at the Border, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (May 31, 2022) available at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/31/us-lgbt-asylum-seekers-danger-border.
29 Migrant and Refugee Caravans: Failed Responses to Women and Children in Need of International Protection and Humanitarian
Aid, WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMMISSION (May 2019) available at http://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/Migrant-and-Refugee-Caravans-Failed-Responses-to-Women-Children-in-Need-of-International-Protection-
Humanitarian-Aid.pdf.
30 S. PRIYA MORLEY ET AL., BLACK ALLIANCE FOR JUST IMMIGR., “THERE IS A TARGET ON US” – THE IMPACT OF MEXICO’S ANTI-
BLACK RACISM ON AFRICAN MIGRANTS AT MEXICO’S SOUTHERN BORDER, (2021), available at
https://www.immigrationresearch.org/system/files/The-Impact-of-Anti-Black-Racism-on-African-Migrants-at-Mexico.pdf.
31 Not Safe Anywhere: Haitians On The Move Need Urgent International Protection, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 2021), available at
www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/AMR3649202021ENGLISH.pdf.
32 Pushed into the Shadows: Mexico’s Reception of Haitian Migrants, REFUGEES INT’L (Apr. 2022), available at
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/6288057cedeca34f11b74610/1653081471581/Mexico+Report+-
+April+2022+-+5.20.22+-+ENGLISH.pdf.
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The proposed rule is no different from the prior administration’s Transit Ban. The government argues in the
commentary that asylum seekers can rebut the presumption of asylum ineligibility with evidence of serious illness,
imminent threats, or severe forms of trafficking. As mentioned later in this comment, most asylum seekers will
not be able to rebut the presumption with a preponderance of the evidence leaving many to languish in countries
of transit, namely Mexico. This proposed rule would have the same deleterious effect as the prior administration’s
illegal transit ban.

CLINIC Case: One of CLINIC’s clients, Inez,* fled Nicaragua with her two minor children after
suffering domestic violence from her ex-partner, and after suffering persecution from the
Nicaraguan government for her anti-government political activities. En route to the US border,
where she wanted rebuild her life, Inez was raped by the “coyote” who was guiding her and her
family to the United States. Inez was held captive for days before she was able to escape and
eventually arrive to the U.S. border. She was placed in MPP and suffered PTSD, nightmares,
headaches, and anxiety thinking about her future and reliving the trauma she suffered in Mexico
and Nicaragua. She eventually was allowed to come into the United States and seek asylum when
MPP was discontinued.

Under the proposed rule, Inez would not be able to seek asylum. Inez could never have stayed in Nicaragua long
enough to apply for parole, nor would she be able to obtain a passport. Moreover, Inez did not seek asylum in
Mexico, where she was sexually assaulted and terrified, and needed to get her family to safety.

In another instance, Carmen,* an 18-year-old woman, fled Nicaragua in late 2019, due to her
political activism against the ruling political party. She traveled across several countries before
reaching the United States-Mexico border. She was returned to Mexico under Migrant Protection
Protocols or Remain in Mexico (MPP) and suffered gender-based violence and xenophobia while
in Mexico. CLINIC staff met with her and were able to obtain pro bono representation for her. At
the time, the prior transit ban was in place and pro bono counsel was successful in obtaining
withholding of removal for Carmen. Despite her grant, she was detained for days. She had
overcome all obstacles, survived attempts against her life and met all legal U.S. requirements and
yet she was still being detained and denied a pathway to stability and safety within the U.S. Her
pro bono counsel appealed when the third country transit ban was struck down by federal courts.
Carmen was granted asylum and is thriving in her safe and stable new home in the United States.

Under this proposed rule, Carmen would be denied asylum. She is the tangible representation of luck and
persistence. Carmen is one of thousands who entered the United States through the southern border in search of
asylum and who had to transit through several countries to do so. She also is in the minimal percentage of those
who were represented, and even smaller percentage of those who were able to appeal under the previous transit
ban and ultimately be granted asylum.

If implemented, this proposed rule will effectively eliminate the possibility for people like Carmen who enter the
southern border to seek protection by asylum.

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IV.
The presumption of asylum ineligibility can be rebutted only in very narrow and extreme
circumstances.

The presumption of asylum ineligibility could potentially be rebutted if, at the time they entered the United States,
the asylum seeker or a family member traveling with them suffered a severe medical emergency, faced an
imminent or extreme threat to their life or safety, was a victim of a severe form of human trafficking, or faced
other exceptionally compelling circumstances. The exceptions to the proposed rule are very narrow and require a
showing by a “preponderance of the evidence.” These exceptions only cover the most extreme situations, such as
imminent harm or a severe medical condition. Moreover, those who could potentially meet one of these exceptions
to the presumption of asylum ineligibility may not be in possession of medical documentation or proof of
imminent harm other than their own testimony, and asylum officers and immigration judges are not medical
experts with the required expertise to evaluate these claims. Pro se asylum seekers will have yet an additional
hurdle to contend with to meet the heightened “preponderance of the evidence” standard to rebut the presumption
of asylum ineligibility.

Asylum Officers and Immigration Judges are not medical experts and will not have the required expertise to
determine whether something is considered an “acute” medical emergency. By the time the determination is made,
the asylum seeker’s health emergency may have worsened or the imminent threat they feared may have been
carried out. Requiring a separate legal process to determine if asylum ineligibility has been rebutted will further
strain limited government resources and will inefficiently prolong the asylum process for legitimate asylum
seekers.

In practice, before an asylum officer or immigration judge, border patrol and CBP are the first filter for an asylum
seeker to enter the United States. In most instances, these officers are who make the first determination of what
is a medical emergency or what constitutes being in imminent threat of danger. Domingo*, a Guatemalan asylum
seeker at the southern border was a witness to this:

Domingo* fled Guatemala with his 13-year-old son. While traveling through Mexico, they had
endured a great ordeal. Once in northern Mexico, Domingo and son presented at a U.S. port of
entry and were pushed back to Mexico. While they decided what their next steps were going to be,
Domingo took odd jobs to be able to provide for his son and himself. Both being fully aware of
the dangers they could face, they created a pact; if Domingo did not return to his son after four
days, his son would do everything possible to enter the United States and flee from there.

One day an unknown man approached Domingo on the street and offered him a job. Domingo
eagerly accepted and did not return to his son. Domingo was kidnapped by organized crime. He
was released on the condition he would always be available and cooperative with them. By the
time Domingo returned, his son was gone. Domingo ran to the border and tried to turn himself in
to U.S. immigration officers. Immigration officers told him he was lying because he had no
evidence to prove what had happened to him and that he did not look like he was in any danger.

Domingo’s story serves as another reason why the proposed rule should not enter effect. Border officers are
demonstrably ineffective at providing protection in situations of imminent threat.

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U.S. immigration authorities also do not have the requisite expertise in evaluating medical emergencies.

In another instance, a man by the name of Jesus* arrived in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico in the fall of
2022, after fleeing from the organized crime network that had murdered his spouse, children, and
mother by burning them alive. He managed to escape with the help of others and presented himself
before U.S. immigration officers at the Santa Fe, port of entry in Ciudad Juarez, completely
unaware of the internal injuries he suffered during the attack, yet was unwell and extremely weak.
Despite the officers observing Jesus’ weak appearance, they informed him that the border was
closed due to Title 42. The same night he was expelled back to Mexico, he was rushed to the
emergency room and operated on immediately due to the injuries he sustained during his
persecution by the organized crime network. Yet again, another asylum seeker is turned away due
to the lack of medical expertise officials have to determine whether the individual presenting at
the border is suffering from an acute medical emergency.

Finally, this proposed rule, by means of narrow exceptions and asterisks excludes and punishes individuals and
families whose only crime is trying to seek safety and peace for themselves and their loved ones. This proposed
rule is part of a continued effort to prioritize deterrence at the cost of human life.

Asylum seekers left stranded at the U.S.-Mexico border, are targets of many levels of violence, and the complicity
between the United States and Mexico’s governments in building intangible walls to deny access to asylum cannot
be ignored. Mexico’s immigration officers have increased raids and detention and use excessive force to do so.
The human rights violations committed in order to implement and carry out policies that revive asylum bans of
the recent past such as the proposed rule, should not be overlooked simply because they are being done in another
country. The U.S. government’s externalization of its legal and moral obligations is reprehensible and should end
once and for all.

V.
The proposed rule is discriminatory against certain asylum seekers based on racial, economic,
and other factors.

Migrants at the southern border should be able to safely seek asylum without discrimination. The proposed rule
discriminates against certain asylum seekers based on racial, economic, and other factors.

First, the proposed rule is discriminatory against Black asylum seekers. Advocates and asylum seekers have long
complained about the widespread discrimination,33 disparate treatment, and violence, Black asylum seekers suffer
both in Mexico and in the United States. One need only look to the incidents of CBP officers rounding up Black
asylum seekers at the border on horseback34 to see that this is true. The proposed rule would only heighten the
barriers and dangers these asylum seekers already face. For one, in order to be eligible to apply for asylum, an
asylum seeker must apply for asylum and wait for a decision in a transit country, such as Mexico. This can be
dangerous for Black asylum seekers who have historically been turned away from the asylum process and have
suffered race-based harassment and persecution in Mexico. Second, the CBP One application uses facial

33 MORLEY, supra note 30.
34 US: Treatment of Haitian Migrants Discriminatory, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sep. 21, 2021, 2:49 PM),
hrw.org/news/2021/09/21/us-treatment-haitian-migrants-discriminatory.
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recognition software which does not easily recognize children or people with darker complexions.35 Unless these
technological glitches are addressed, Black asylum seekers will have a harder time getting appointments to seek
asylum and will continue to face further discrimination.

In addition, the proposed rule unfairly privileges asylum seekers with economic means. Some asylum seekers
who have connections to sponsors in the United States with economic resources are able to enter via a
humanitarian parole program and subsequently apply for asylum. Asylum seekers who lack these connections to
sponsors in the United States who have the necessary resources, are unable to seek asylum. This is discriminatory
and inequitable.

Even if some asylum seekers were to have connections to people in the United States who can financially support
them, a requirement for seeking parole, the humanitarian parole programs currently established are only available
to migrants from certain countries. As described above, at present, these countries are Ukraine, Cuba, Haiti,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Offering humanitarian protection to only these countries ignores the significant
numbers of individuals continuing to seek protection from a host of other source countries. Presuming ineligibility
for all asylum seekers who do not first seek parole through one of the established parole programs is
discriminatory against those whose countries are not part of the programs, particularly those from the Central
American countries that continue to represent the greatest numbers of migrants needing protection. Although
there is a mechanism to apply for humanitarian parole outside of these programs, it is well known that there are
extreme backlogs in the processing of these applications. Further, much is described below in relation to requiring
individuals to register through CBP One, individuals who have limited resources to apply for parole through the
USCIS website or other agency channels due to financial, educational, linguistic, or other restraints will be
prejudiced by this parole requirement. Requiring individuals to apply for and await adjudication of parole before
coming to the border to seek asylum places them in danger of further persecution and harm.

The proposed rule also favors those who have the resources to remain in an area with sustained internet to make
an appointment using CBP One. Those with better access to technology and the financial resources to wait in
Mexico will have increased access to asylum as compared to those without these resources. Life-saving
humanitarian protection should not be limited to those who have the educational background, linguistic
understanding, or mental or physical ability to access and understand the complicated process of registering
through CBP One. Asylum seekers who cannot read or understand English, Spanish or Haitian Kreyol, those with
larger families with small children, and people with disabilities all have a hard time making an appointment using
CBP One and will therefore have less opportunity to apply for asylum. This is assuming they even know that they
need to register for and enroll through CBP One in the first place and speak or read in one of the three languages
offered in the app. These same individuals who have limited access due to financial constraints or other cultural,
educational, or linguistic limitations will also be less likely to even learn of CBP One.

CLINIC has obtained anecdotal examples from our partners in the field exemplifying the above
problems. Recall Magdalena and her Mixteco family from Guerrero, Mexico, fleeing the cartel in
their hometown after it murdered the patriarch. This family, which speaks very little Spanish, has
already experienced discrimination as indigenous refugees inside Mexico; requiring them to apply
for an appointment on CBP One would further discriminate against them on this basis. They do
not have a mobile phone to access the application, and even if they did, their limited Spanish skills
would make it impossible in practice to use. There is no established parole program for Mexican

35 Kade Crockford, How is Face Recognition Surveillance Technology Racist? AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 16, 2020),
aclu.org/news/privacy-technology/how-is-face-recognition-surveillance-technology-racist.
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families seeking protection, and discriminating against an indigenous family with limited
resources and even more limited Spanish essentially sends them into the arms of the cartel.

VI.
The proposed rule would lead to the permanent separation of families.

The proposed rule makes some effort to maintain family unity for those subject to the “lawful pathways”
rebuttable presumption. Specifically, where a principal asylum applicant is eligible for statutory withholding of
removal or CAT protection and would be granted asylum but for the “lawful pathways” rebuttable presumption,
and where the denial would lead to the separation of the family, the family separation constitutes an “exceptionally
compelling circumstance” to rebut the lawful pathways presumption of ineligibility.36

However, this provision does not go nearly far enough to protect family unity. This provision as written benefits
only those families who are physically present in the United States and in section 240 removal proceedings
together. It does not assist applicants whose family members remain outside the United States. Individuals granted
withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3) or CAT protection live in a constant state of limbo. They cannot
travel internationally; they cannot work if their employment authorization expires; they can never become
residents or citizens; and, perhaps most importantly, they can never petition for family members to join them in
the United States. With no ability to travel abroad and no ability to petition for relatives, a grant of withholding
or CAT only leads to de facto, permanent family separation. This includes the permanent separation of parents
from their minor children.

The imposition of the one-year filing deadline by Congress for asylum cases already has a devastating impact on
family unity.37 However, it is within Congress’s authority to place such a restriction on asylum eligibility in the
statute. The proposed rule looks to the one-year filing deadline as a policy support for its position, stating that
“Congress concluded that the interest in ensuring overall system efficiency outweighed the fact that there would
be applicants who would have received asylum but for the one-year deadline. The Departments have made a
similar calculation in the interest of system efficiency.”38 However, it is only within Congress’s authority to make
such a determination. The administration lacks the power to deny asylum to huge numbers of asylum seekers
when Congress has not explicitly authorized it. It is unconscionable as a matter of policy for the administration
to seek to further separate families from each other. However, it is also illegal as a matter of law to make such
sweeping changes to the asylum system and the goals of family unity in the absence of explicit Congressional
authorization.39

VII.
The proposed rule violates asylum seekers’ due process rights.

The proposed rule violates the due process rights of legitimate asylum seekers. Critically, the proposed rule
eviscerates two safeguards for asylum applicants who are given negative credible fear findings. First, when an
asylum officer issues a negative credible fear determination to an asylum applicant, the officer explains that the
asylum applicant has the right to have the finding reviewed by an immigration judge or IJ. Under the new rule,
asylum applicants will have to affirmatively request immigration judge review, or they will be deported. This part

36 Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704, at 11752 (Proposed 8 C.F.R. § 1208.33(d)).
37 See Lindsay M. Harris, The One-Year Bar to Asylum in the Age of the Immigration Court Backlog, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1185, 1193
(2016) (detailing separation of mothers from their children).
38 Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704, at 11737.
39 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2021) (striking down prior transit ban as contrary to statute).
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of the proposed rule is identical to the previous administration’s attempt40 to destroy due process protections for
credible fear applicants and contradicts President Biden’s promise to a fair immigration system for asylum
seekers.

One of the bedrock principles of the credible fear process is full review of a negative credible fear determination
by an IJ to ensure full due process. When an asylum officer gives a negative credible fear determination to an
applicant, the asylum officer must explain the due process rights available to the asylum seeker. One of these core
rights is that the applicant can seek review with the immigration judge. During this explication process, many
asylum seekers do not completely understand what is going on, many are still tired and traumatized from their
journeys, and some have been separated from their children and families by the U.S. government.41 During this
time, many asylum seekers, mostly unrepresented, will not understand what it means to seek “IJ review” and
many will simply not answer the question.42 That indication, historically, has meant asylum officers must request
this review on behalf of the asylum seekers. The proposed rule would reverse existing policy and force asylum
officers to mark that the asylum applicant does not want “IJ review” when the asylum seekers are understandably
unresponsive.

The proposed rule does not include any statistics on how many asylum seekers succeeded in their credible fear
claims before the IJ without having articulated a desire for IJ review to the asylum officer. Nor does it contain
any data on how many of these IJ reviews are, “expeditiously” resolved after the IJ explains the asylum seeker’s
rights and the asylum seeker may choose to not pursue IJ review. CLINIC has grave concerns that asylum officers
will increase denials of credible fear interviews and bona fide asylum seekers will never receive a day in court,
not even to have their credible fear interview denial reviewed by an IJ. A recent report43 from Syracuse University
states IJs continue to overturn asylum officer decisions nearly a quarter of the time. The highest percentage of
overturned decisions are those of Cameroonian and Syrian asylum seekers – both countries with bad human rights
records.44

In creating the expedited removal system, Senator Patrick Leahy aptly stated in discussing the case of Fauziya
Kasinga:

The bill gives virtually final authority to immigration officers at 300 ports of entry to this country.
Each is directed to interview people seeking asylum and exclude them if he finds that they do not
have ‘a credible fear of persecution.’ That phrase is unknown to international law. The officer’s
summary decision is subject only to ‘Immediate review by a supervisory office at the port.’ The
bill prohibits further administrative review, and it says, ‘no court shall have jurisdiction’ to review
summary denials of asylum or to hear any challenge to the new process. (Our present system for

40 Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 36264 (June 15,
2020), EOIR Docket No. 18-0002, A.G. Order No. 4714-2020, 8 CFR § 208.20; 8 CFR § 1208.20.
41 See Family Separation Policy Continues Two Years After Trump Administration Claims It Ended, S. POVERTY L. CENTER (June 18,
2020), https://www.splcenter.org/news/2020/06/18/family-separation-policy-continues-two-years-after-trump-administration-claims-
it-ended.
42 Samantha Balaban et al., Without a Lawyer, Asylum-Seekers Struggle with Confusing Legal Processes, NPR, Feb. 25, 2018,
https://www.npr.org/2018/02/25/588646667/without-a-lawyer-asylum-seekers-struggle-with-confusing-legal-processes.
43 Immigration Judge Decisions Overturning Asylum Officer Findings in Credible Fear Cases, TRAC IMMIGR. (March 14, 2023),
available at https://trac.syr.edu/reports/712/.
44 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-
country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cameroon/; 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE
(2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/syria.
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handling asylum applications works efficiently, so there is no administrative need for change.)
Stripping away the protection of the courts may be the most alarming feature of the legislation.45

Requiring an asylum applicant to ask for immigration review of a negative credible fear decision would, in many
cases, effectively bar them from receiving independent review. Giving one agency unfettered power to decide
whether an asylum seeker ever has a day in court goes against the intent of Congress.46 Review by an immigration
judge is critical to ensure the due process rights of asylum seekers in credible fear cases, and preventing
unrepresented asylum seekers the opportunity to request review is wrong and unfair. As with the previous
administration’s attempt to destroy due process protection to credible fear applicants, this proposed rule will
eventually fail.

The second safeguard the proposed rule eviscerates is the opportunity for asylum seekers to request
reconsideration of a negative credible fear finding. Currently, when an asylum seeker is given negative credible
fear finding, they can request that the decision be reconsidered by the asylum office. The request for
reconsideration was placed in the regulations, 8 CFR 208.30, as a safeguard in the expedited removal process.
Reconsideration of officer decisions is critical to protecting asylum seekers from erroneous decisions and ensuring
their due process.47

VIII. Conclusion

This proposed rule contains several procedural elements that require a full 60-day comment period to be
adequately addressed. The proposed rule, if enacted in its current form, would return scores of asylum seekers to
danger in Mexico, another transit country, or their country of origin. The proposed rule is similar in substance to
the asylum bans issued by the Trump administration then struck down by the courts. The United States' asylum
system has been a model for countries around the world to welcome refugees who come to its door. This proposed
rule is not in line with the American value of welcoming refugees and asylum seekers and, more importantly, the
proposed rule is contrary to U.S. and international law which protects the right to safely seek asylum. As stated
by Bishop Seitz in a recent article on this administration’s proposed rule, “Policies that fail to secure protections
for the vulnerable are morally deficient. Death simply cannot be an acceptable part of the overhead costs of our
immigration policies.” 48 Therefore, we call upon the administration to withdraw this proposed rule in its entirety.

45 142 Cong. Rec. S4461 (daily ed. May 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
46See Katherine Shattuck, Comment, Preventing Erroneous Expedited Removals: Immigration Judge Review And
Requests For Reconsideration of Negative Credible Fear Determinations, 93 WASH. L. REV. 459, 459 (2018).
47 Biden Administration Move To Eliminate Requests For Reconsideration Would Endanger Asylum Seekers, Deport Them To
Persecution And Torture, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST (Oct. 2021), available at https://humanrightsfirst.org/library/biden-administration-
move-to-eliminate-requests-for-reconsideration-would-endanger-asylum-seekers-deport-them-to-persecution-and-torture/
48 Mark J. Seitz, Bishop Seitz on Biden’s new asylum policy: Death cannot be the cost of our immigration laws, AMERICA: THE JESUIT
REV., March 14, 2023, https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-society/2023/03/14/biden-asylum-immigration-244876 .
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Thank you for your consideration of these comments. Please do not hesitate to contact Karen Sullivan, Director
of Advocacy, at ksullivan@cliniclegal.org, with any questions or concerns about our recommendations.

Sincerely,

Anna Gallagher
Executive Director
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Mexican Asylum System for U.S. Immigration Lawyers FAQ
November 2019

Summary

Mexico has adopted a broader refugee deﬁnition than the U.S. and grants a higher
percentage of asylum applications. Recognized refugees in Mexico can access rights to
work, healthcare, education, and family reuniﬁcation. Recent U.S. policy changes,
however, have overwhelmed the Mexican asylum system and pushed Mexico to
militarize its southern border, leading to long wait times, poor-quality decisions, and high
levels of detention and deportation without access to the asylum system. Legal barriers,
including a bar to applications submitted more than 30 days after entering the country,
further limit access to the asylum process. The legal and practical challenges within
Mexico’s asylum system make clear that it cannot replace the U.S. role in refugee
protection. Nonetheless, Mexico may offer better options for certain refugees who
cannot ﬁnd international protection in the U.S. A better understanding of the Mexican
asylum system may help U.S. lawyers advise clients who are subject to the U.S.
third-country-asylum rule or who are deciding where to seek asylum.

Who is protected by Mexico’s asylum law?
2
What is the Mexican asylum process?
3
What rights do asylum seekers have during the process?
4
What rights are granted with asylum status?
4
What is the grant rate?
5
What are the barriers to asylum?
5
How has recent U.S. policy affected asylum in Mexico?
6
Accessing and interpreting Mexican asylum records as a U.S. immigration lawyer
8
What does a denial of asylum look like? What are other possible statuses from the
Mexican asylum system?
8
How do I get my client’s records from the Mexican asylum system?
9
How can I get more involved with Asylum Access Mexico?
10
What other resources are available on the Mexican asylum system?
10
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Who is protected by Mexico’s asylum law?
Legal Framework:
1. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
2. Mexican Constitution, Article 11, guarantees the right to seek & receive asylum
3. Cartagena Declaration: voluntary regional protection framework
4. Law of Refugees, Political Asylum, and Complementary Protection (2011) and its
implementing Regulation (2012)

Mexico has acceded to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Optional Protocol,
and signed the Cartagena Declaration, a nonbinding regional protection framework. The
Mexican Constitution guarantees the right to seek and receive asylum. The Mexican
Refugee Law, passed in 2011, establishes the asylum process. This law has a broad
deﬁnition of refugees eligible for asylum.

A refugee in Mexico is someone who is outside their country of origin and:
●
cannot return to that country due to a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, membership in a particular
social group (1951 Convention categories), or gender (added by Mexican asylum
law); or
●
has ﬂed their country because their life, safety, or freedom was threatened by
generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conﬂict, massive human rights
violations, or other circumstances that have gravely disturbed public order
(Cartagena Decl.).

An asylum seeker may be recognized under either prong of the refugee deﬁnition. All
asylum petitions are decided under the same process and all recognized refugees enjoy
the same protections. It is incumbent upon the government to analyze all potential
grounds for protection and to issue a well-reasoned decision explaining the rationale for
a grant or denial of any individual petition. If a person does not meet the refugee
deﬁnition, they still may be eligible for complementary protection if they have a well
founded fear of torture or their life is in danger in their country of origin.

The Mexican government has indicated to the UN High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR) that it will apply the Cartagena Deﬁnition to all Honduran and El Salvadoran
asylum seekers. This implies prima facie recognition that these countries are plagued
by generalized violence and/or massive human rights violations. Therefore, an asylum
seeker from these countries only needs to show (1) they are from the country (2) they
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left due to violence or human rights violations; and (3) they are not excluded for
committing a serious crime or human rights violation in their country of origin.

Other relevant laws to know:
1. Law for the Protection of Children:
a. Outlaws administrative detention of children
b. Obligates the state to act according to the best interest of the child
2. Immigration Law :
a. Deﬁnes legal statuses, including the humanitarian status
b. Recognizes rights to free transit, healthcare, and education
c. Creates immigration detention and deportation process

What is the Mexican asylum process?

Agencies:
●
COMAR: Mexico’s refugee commission, la Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a
Refugiados
●
INM: Mexico’s immigration institution, el Instituto Nacional de Migración

Petition: Asylum petitions should be presented to either COMAR or INM. COMAR is
ultimately responsible for the process and its staff are specially trained in asylum
practice. INM acts as an intermediary in the many parts of the country without COMAR
oﬃces.

Documentation: Upon application, an asylum seeker should be issued a constancia . This
document proves legal status, is valid throughout the process and protects against
deportation. Constancias should be issued immediately but may take weeks to months
because of administrative delays.
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Consideration: Under law, COMAR has 45 working days to make a decision or 90
working days under exceptional circumstances. Due to backlog, COMAR has recently
said that all cases are exceptional and thus subject to the 90-day deadline. This
deadline is regularly missed. Consideration can now take 6 months to a year.

Interview: COMAR interviews asylum seekers. The applicant may bring an attorney but
is not provided with one. An attorney can help an applicant prepare for the interview,
compile evidence and country of origin information, and ensure the interviewer
conducts a thorough and legally compliant interview.

Decision : COMAR is required to issue a well-reasoned, written decision, laying out the
justiﬁcation for a grant or denial. If asylum is granted, the applicant becomes a
permanent resident. Denials may be appealed administratively and then subjected to
judicial review.

What rights do asylum seekers have during the process?

While waiting for a ﬁnal decision, an asylum seeker should be issued a constancia ,
which documents legal status, and an ID called a Clave Único de Registro de Población
(CURP) that permits them to access employment, education, and healthcare. Due to
administrative issues, many asylum seekers are not issued CURPs, and even those who
have them may be denied access to rights. Legal aid signiﬁcantly improves the chances
of an asylum seeker receiving a CURP and/or accessing rights.

What rights are granted with asylum status?

If asylum is granted, the asylum seeker becomes a permanent resident with the right to
stay indeﬁnitely, access employment, healthcare, and education, and apply for
naturalization after four years. The naturalization process is long and expensive,
however, and few refugees have, as of this date, availed themselves of this process.

Recognized refugees can pass on derivative beneﬁciary status to family members with
them in Mexico and may ﬁle reuniﬁcation petitions for family members outside the
country. Family reuniﬁcation is available for extended family members (up to 4th-level
relatives, including cousins, great-grandparents, great-grandchildren, aunts, uncles, etc.),
but the petitioner must show a ﬁnancially-dependent relationship with the beneﬁciary.
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What is the grant rate?

The 2019 asylum grant rates averaged 71%, according to COMAR. This varies by
nationality. The grant rate for Guatemalans was only 34% while the rate for Venezualans
was 99%. When complementary protection is considered, the grant rate rises to 86%.
However, this does not count abandoned cases or people deported without the
opportunity to apply for asylum.

What are the barriers to asylum?

1. 30-Day Bar

Mexican law requires that asylum applicants apply within 30 days of entering the
country or show good cause for not having done so. COMAR interprets good cause
broadly, and has issued waivers based on lack of information about the process,
language barriers, detention, incapacity, incompetence, or similar circumstances.
Applicants with competent counsel usually receive waivers. Mexico regular deports or
coerces “voluntarily return” of pro se asylum seekers subject to the 30 day bar. Asylum
Access Mexico is challenging this law in the courts but it is in force currently.

2. Travel Restrictions

An asylum seeker must remain in the state where they ﬁrst applied throughout the
pendency of their claim, and must sign a form in the state’s COMAR or INM oﬃce
weekly or biweekly to prove their presence. Violation of this regulation will lead COMAR
to deem the application abandoned.

Because most asylum seekers are near the southern and northern borders, this
restriction is a signiﬁcant burden. Mexico’s southern border is poorer, has worse
infrastructure, and fewer job opportunities than the rest of the country. There is also a
signiﬁcant presence of Central American gangs and other agents of persecution in the
southern states. The northern border states are plagued by violent crime, kidnappings,
and high presence of drug cartels. In either case, with the current backlog, asylum
seekers may be stuck where they apply for over a year.

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3. INM processing instead of COMAR

In many parts of the country, including many of the places refugees are gathered at the
northern border, there are no COMAR oﬃces. Therefore, refugees must solicit asylum
through INM. This creates substantial problems. INM acts as an intermediary, sending
applications to COMAR for issuance of status documents and ﬁnal decisions, which
slows down the process considerably. Moreover, INM oﬃcers are not trained to
sensitively interact with vulnerable or traumatized populations. Although eligibility
interviews are done by COMAR (often by phone), INM oﬃcials supervise check-ins,
receive and transmit documents, and regularly provide erroneous legal advice to asylum
seekers.

4. Language barriers

Many refugees in Mexico do not speak Spanish ﬂuently. Some speak indigenous
languages, Hatian Creole, or come from African or Asian countries. Mexican law
requires that the asylum process be conducted in a language the asylum seeker
understands, but this requirement is routinely ignored and translators are rarely
provided.

5. Militarized immigration enforcement : see below

How has recent U.S. policy affected asylum in Mexico?

Recent U.S. policies, including metering, the Migrant Protection Protocols, the third
country transit rule and tariff threats, have had substantial effects on the Mexican
immigration system, leading to an overburdened system and militarized enforcement.

Overburdening of the Asylum System

U.S. policies have made it much more diﬃcult for refugees to claim asylum at the U.S.
border. Under the “metering” system, Customs and Border Patrol allows only a small,
unpredictable, number of asylum seekers to approach a border gate in a day. Asylum
seekers are required to put their names on informal lists at the border and wait for
weeks or months for their number to be called. Under the Migrant Protection Protocols,
asylum seekers are required to wait in Mexico for their hearings in U.S. immigration
court. Under the Third Country Transit rule, the Trump Administration has announced
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the intention to deny asylum to any applicant who passed through a third country on
their way to the U.S. border without soliciting asylum there. The combined effect of
these policies is to leave tens of thousands of refugees who intended to seek asylum in
the U.S. waiting in Mexico. Some of the affected migrants will decide to stay in Mexico.

These policies have contributed to a substantial increase in refugees seeking asylum in
Mexico and the Mexican government has not provided a commensurate budgetary
increase to process the applications. COMAR is severely under resourced in comparison
with current demand. It only has around 48 protection staff deciding the cases of up to
80,000 asylum seekers.
There have been 60,000 asylum petitions so far in 2019 and COMAR estimates there
will be 80,000 by the end of the year. In 2015, there were 5,000 claims and the number
was increasing linearly before skyrocketing in 2019 due to U.S. policy changes. The
2015 budget was 25 million pesos (est. $1.3M USD), while the 2019 budget was only 20
million pesos (est. $1M USD). The current 2020 budget is 27 million (est. $1.4M USD).
Under these circumstances, COMAR cannot hire or train the needed staff or give
applications the necessary attention. This new demand has put a huge stress on the
Mexican asylum system and led to an enormous backlog in applications, leaving
refugees waiting for over a year.

7
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Militarized Immigration Enforcement under Tariff Threats
In June 2019, the Trump administration threatened signiﬁcant tariffs on virtually all
Mexican exports unless Mexico acted immediately to curtail migration to the U.S.
Mexico responded drastically, deploying 6,000 National Guard troops to the southern
border, militarizing the southern states and making it much harder for migrants to travel.
It increased detention and deportations. It stopped regularly issuing travel permits for
refugees to travel to the U.S. border. It threatened private transportation companies and
migrant rights activists with human traﬃcking prosecutions.

This has had a signiﬁcant impact on the safety and security of migrants throughout
Mexico. Refugees are attempting more dangerous routes and have drowned trying to
take boats up the Chiapas coast. Those who are detained are frequently deported
without the opportunity to claim asylum.

Accessing and interpreting Mexican asylum records as a U.S. immigration lawyer

The Trump Administration’s third country transit rule requires U.S. authorities to deny
asylum to anyone who passed through another country without seeking asylum there
before arriving at the U.S. border. The rule does not apply to anyone who receives a
“ﬁnal judgment” denying protection in a third country. This rule is being challenged in
court but the Supreme Court has permitted it to go into effect during litigation. Many
U.S. immigration lawyers are attempting to determine how this rule will be applied.
Immigration lawyers may need to show that their client has been denied asylum in
Mexico or to advise a client to attempt to seek asylum in Mexico prior to entering the
U.S. Asylum Access cannot provide an opinion as to how the U.S. government will
interpret this rule, but the following sections may help U.S. immigration lawyers to
access and interpret Mexican asylum records.

What does a denial of asylum look like? What are other possible statuses from the
Mexican asylum system?

We do not know how the U.S. immigration system will apply this policy or interpret
Mexican law. However, here are some possible scenarios:
1. Denial on the merits: the client’s case has been fully adjudicated and found not to
meet the criteria for Mexican asylum. The ﬁrst denial will be issued by COMAR. It
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is unclear if US Immigration Judges and Courts will consider this to be a “a ﬁnal
judgment denying the alien protection” under the IFR. As noted, a denial from
COMAR can be administratively appealed through a ‘Recurso de Revision,’ within
15 days of issuance of the decision. It is virtually impossible for an asylum
seeker to be successful in this administrative appeal without legal counsel, and
pro se appeals will likely be denied on procedural grounds. Following
administrative denials, an asylum seeker may seek judicial review through an
‘Acción de Amparo’ (similar to a request of injunction or writ of mandamus).
Asylum Access cannot offer any opinion as to how the U.S. government will
interpret the term ‘ﬁnal judgment,’ and as of this writing, no oﬃcial guidance has
been issued. A redacted example of a ﬁnal denial is available here .
2. Denial for the 30-day bar: the client’s application has been rejected because they
applied more than 30 days after entering the country without showing good
cause. This denial can also be subject to administrative or judicial review. Their
case has not been adjudicated on the merits. Again, it is unclear how this type of
denial will be interpreted under the IFR.
3. Abandonment: the client left the state in which they initially applied for asylum, or
failed to comply with the signing/registration requirements to prove presence,
and COMAR determined the case to be abandoned.
4. Humanitarian status
a. Asylum seekers are granted temporary humanitarian status during the
pendency of their claims.
b. The document does not mean the application has been accepted or
denied. It is not permanent residency.
5. Grant of Complementary Protection: COMAR determines an asylum seeker does
not meet the refugee deﬁnition but has a well founded fear of torture, cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, or death in their country of origin. This
protection includes a grant of permanent residence, but no family reuniﬁcation or
straightforward path to naturalization.
6. Asylum grant

How do I get my client’s records from the Mexican asylum system?
There are several options:
1. Go to a Mexican consulate in the U.S. with a written authorization from a client
(preferably notarized) and ﬁle a formal records request. The consulate will then
request the records from COMAR. This is the process COMAR suggests but not
all consulates have cooperated consistently.
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2. Have your client give power of attorney to a Mexican attorney to request the
records from COMAR.
3. Request the records from UNHCR with a privacy waiver from your client.

How can I get more involved with Asylum Access Mexico?

Asylum Access Mexico (AAMX) has 7 oﬃces throughout Mexico where we help
refugees access their rights through legal services, help them ﬁnd jobs and cultural
opportunities through the Hospitality Route, and advocate for improvements to access
to and quality of asylum.

We have a robust volunteer program and are frequently hiring staff. See
asylumaccess.org for more information.

Follow Asylum Access Mexico on Twitter @AsylumAccessMX (mostly in Spanish) and
Asylum Access global @AsylumAccess (mostly in English).

Any other questions? Email brynne.oneal@asylumaccess.org

What other resources are available on the Mexican asylum system?

Mexico’s Secretary of Government has collected legal sources on refugee and asylum
law: https://www.gob.mx/comar/documentos/marco-juridico-en-materia-de-refugiados

COMAR: https://www.gob.mx/comar

United Nations Refugee Agency Mexico: https://www.acnur.org/mexico.html
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March 27, 2023
Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas
Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
5900 Capital Gateway Drive
Camp Springs, MD 20746
Re: DHS Docket Number USCIS 2022-0016, Circumvention of Lawful Pathways
Dear Secretary Mayorkas,
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this comment regarding the Department of
Homeland Security’s proposed changes to the asylum regulations. We are both student-attorneys
at the George Washington University Law School’s Immigration Clinic. As a community legal
clinic serving clients in the Washington, D.C. area since 1979, we provide pro bono
representation to clients from around the world on immigration law matters, including removal
proceedings and petitions for affirmative and defensive asylum, before federal administrative
tribunals. Both of us currently represent incredibly brave individuals who escaped unbelievable
circumstances and endured grueling hardship to make a new life for themselves in this great
country through asylum. One of our clients, E-M-G, is a young woman from El Salvador who
faced a vicious gang that murdered her brother and claimed her as their prize before escaping
through a coyote and being admitted at our southern border. M-P-M, also a native and citizen of
El Salvador, fled her home country because the local gangs and police targeted her on the basis
of her identity as a transgender woman and work as a health rights activist. E-M-G now works
full-time and cares for her five-year-old daughter as a single mother, and M-P-M has similarly
established a new life for herself utilizing the protections afforded to her as an asylum seeker.
Both of these women faced true desperation, entrusted their lives to the benevolence of
the United States, and now are already contributing to the country that saved their lives. Simply
put, these women represent the purest form of the American Dream. However, the proposed rule
perversely denies deserving asylum seekers like them an opportunity to have their cases fairly
adjudicated by imposing unrealistic technological, logistical, and evidentiary requirements,
exposing migrants to additional harm and serving as a constructive ban on asylum in direct
contravention of domestic law and international treaties.
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I.
The proposed rule violates our legal and moral commitments to asylum seekers.
Although we commend the Department of Homeland Security for introducing parole
processes for nationals of Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, such an expansion cannot
serve as a justification for the proposed restrictions on asylum seekers. In particular, it is
unconscionable to restrict asylum pathways at the southwest border to individuals who have
either scheduled an appointment to arrive at a port of entry or sought asylum in a third country
before entering the United States but were denied. Because those requirements are unrealistic,
the proposed rule flies in the face of well-established domestic law which provides that, “any
alien
who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States…irrespective of [their] status, may apply for asylum.”1 This unambiguous statutory
language reflects and implements our international treaty obligations to a widely inclusive
definition of “refugee” and the principles of non-discrimination and non-penalization for asylum
seekers.2 The proposed rule, however, would exploit the statutory language of "may apply"3 to
impose a discriminatory condition on asylum seekers' eligibility for protections that penalizes
statutorily eligible asylum seekers based on adherence to arbitrary procedural requirements, in
clear violation of the letter and spirit of our domestic law and international treaty obligations. If
enacted, the proposed rule will fail to serve as any type of fix to a broken immigration system.
Rather, it will inevitably impose further harms on migrants simply seeking to exercise a legal
right codified under both U.S. and international law.
II.
The proposed rule denies asylum seekers a meaningful and realistic opportunity to
seek protection in the United States.
Setting aside the parole pathways program, which applies only to nationals of certain
countries, the proposed rule requires the broad swath of migrants entering at the southwest
border to seek asylum in the United States via one of two burdensome pathways: an appointment
to arrive at a port of entry or proof of application and denial of asylum in a third country through
which they traveled. The former incorrectly presumes that the average migrant has the means to
possess and maintain a fully functioning smartphone on their journey to the United States and the
latter disregards the discrimination, including other serious harms, migrants often face in third
countries, especially Mexico.
A. The CBP One App imposes unrealistic technological and logistical requirements on
asylum seekers.
The proposed rule provides that, “once the Title 42 public health Order is terminated, the
United States will expand implementation of the CBP One application…for noncitizens to
schedule a time to arrive at ports of entry...to allow an increasing number of migrants who may
3 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
2 Protocol on the Status of Refugees art. 31, Jan. 31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
1 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1).
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wish to claim asylum to request an available time and location to present and be inspected and
processed at certain ports of entry.”4 This proposal, based on limited data gathered by Customs
and Border Protection officers on December 11, 2022,5 is impractical. It incorrectly assumes that
the average migrant seeking asylum at the southwest border has the financial resources,
technological literacy, and access to wireless infrastructure required to regularly access the CBP
One application via a smartphone, let alone secure an appointment to arrive at a port of entry.
Furthermore, it contradicts data released by U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, which
reveals that the Biden Administration issued over 322,000 smartphones to migrants awaiting
hearings in immigration court, in FY22, at a cost of approximately $300,000 per day.6
Consider the story of our client, M-P-M. A native and citizen of El Salvador, M-P-M fled
her home country, leaving behind her friends and family, because the local gangs and police
targeted her on the basis of her identity as a transgender woman and work as a health rights
activist. Although M-P-M had a cell phone in her possession when she fled El Salvador for
Guatemala, it was as functional as a brick cube given that charging stations were few and far
between. On the rare occasion that M-P-M was able to charge her cell phone at the various
shelters she encountered on her journey to the United States, the charge could not be sustained in
between. Moreover, she was required to purchase a SIM card in each country she traveled
through on her way to the United States to ensure her cell phone was functional. When she
entered Mexico, her cell phone broke. However, M-P-M fortunately had the financial resources
to replace her cell phone, such that she entered the United States with a functional smartphone
two and a half months after fleeing El Salvador. Her story evinces the fact that even those asylum
seekers fortunate enough to frequently have access to a cell phone will encounter problems that
make using the CBP One app impractical.
The story of our client E-M-G provides another illustration of the proposed rule’s
blindness to the reality of asylum seekers’ situations and access to the technology and resources
required to successfully use the CBP One App. E-M-G had only one practical option to escape
the persecution of MS-18, the gang that killed her brother and claimed her as their prize: the
services of a coyote. Traveling by group through a coyote ensured E-M-G had a planned route by
bus and car and reasonably safe sleeping accommodations in those vehicles, but she and the
other migrants had to leave their cellphones behind because of the reality that it would be
impossible for everyone in the group to keep their phones charged, putting aside the carrier and
SIM card issues inherent to their international journey. E-M-G and the other asylum seekers
chose the safest and most affordable option to escape their persecution, but the practical reality is
6 U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, Detention Management,
https://www.ice.gov/detain/detention-management (last visited Mar. 14, 2023).
5 Id.
4 Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704 (proposed Feb. 23, 2023) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
208).
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that it necessarily cut off all access to cellphones, a circumstance which would likely be damning
for asylum seekers under the proposed rule.
Finally, consider the story of another Immigration Clinic client, M-B-S. A native and
citizen of Honduras, she fled her home country to escape abuse at the hands of her Aunt and
Uncle, who served as her guardians because her parents moved to the United States when she
was young. M-B-S left home with a non-smart cell phone, which only permitted her to make
phone calls. Because she could only afford to purchase a cell phone that lacked a built-in camera
and did not provide wireless connectivity, she would have been precluded from accessing the
CBP one application as a means to gain asylum in the United States. Although M-B-S purchased
a non-smart cell phone to call her parents during her journey, she recounted that it was nearly
impossible to do so because she struggled to access charging stations along the way. Since
coming to the United States, M-B-S has reunited with her parents and continued her education.
Given her lack of access to a smartphone, however, this outcome would not have been likely if
the proposed rule was in place at the time of her crossing at the southern border.
Even if we ignore the obvious technological access problems that M-P-M, E-M-G, and
M-B-S faced, and that countless other asylum seekers face today, the CBP One App’s scheduling
requirements impose another barrier that will deny many deserving migrants protection, or
worse, render them more vulnerable to exploitation during their journey to the United States.
M-P-M’s and E-M-G’s stories evince the impossibility of knowing the exact date and time of
arrival at the border: M-P-M’s solo journey took approximately three months and was affected
by technological and other problems that delayed her, and E-M-G’s month-long journey through
a coyote still couldn’t guarantee any given date of arrival. This uncertainty means that asylum
seekers could be forced to spend days waiting in the dangerous area surrounding the border,
exacerbating the ongoing humanitarian disaster there.
B.
The rebuttable presumption imposes an unrealistic evidentiary burden on asylum
seekers.
Our asylum system already forces asylum seekers to play “discretion roulette,” but the
proposed rule’s rebuttable presumption makes asylum seekers take another spin while stacking
the odds even further against them. This is because the only way to rebut the presumption
requires a showing of an “imminent and extreme threat” present at the time the applicant reached
the border,7 such an unrealistically high evidentiary burden on asylum seekers as to force them to
prove the merits of their case twice over or else face automatic denial of their claims.
7 Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704 (proposed Feb. 23, 2023) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt.
208).
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Even the most clearly deserving asylum seekers will be hard-pressed to produce evidence
that shows their persecutors’ threats are “imminent” simply because persecution frequently
doesn’t leave a paper trail, leaving them subject to adjudicators’ discretion and subjective
evaluations of credibility. E-M-G escaped physical and sexual abuse at the hands of MS-18 and
her circumstances clearly meet the statutory requirements for a grant of asylum, but the merits of
her case mean absolutely nothing under the proposed rule if the adjudicator doesn’t believe that
her persecution still constituted an “imminent and extreme” threat when she reached our
southwestern border.
But what evidence could she produce to prove her persecution is ongoing? Fleeing
persecution by a murderous gang doesn’t exactly leave one in a position to fight a legal battle:
MS-18 had violently coerced her family into silence and she didn’t have police reports since she
knew they didn’t have the capacity or willingness to protect her. This leaves her with only one
option: to verbally recount every traumatic detail and hope she’s lucky enough to be given the
benefit of the doubt rather than a crash course in “expedited removal.” Under the existing
system, as long as she shows a well-founded fear of persecution her asylum claim can be
successful; but the proposed rule would add the additional hurdle of proving that the reasons for
her fear followed her from El Salvador and remained “imminent” all the way to our southwestern
border. The cruel absurdity of demanding that asylum seekers carefully document their own
persecution and come to the border prepared with receipts just for the chance at protection is
painfully evident in stories like E-M-G’s, and it’s equally clear that countless meritorious claims
will be denied and countless asylum seekers sent back to their persecutors if the proposed rule
goes into effect.
The CBP One App’s check-in and appointment scheduling requirements are an inhumane
farce, standing in stark contrast to the reality of asylum seekers’ circumstances and providing a
meaningful opportunity only to the mythical asylum seeker who can escape persecution while
maintaining consistent cellular connection and a spotless itinerary. The proposed rule’s
allowance for a showing of inability to use the App provides no meaningful exceptions but
instead places another significant evidentiary burden on those least equipped to satisfy it.
III. The proposed rule will expose migrants to further harm.
Individuals should be able to access our asylum system regardless of how they enter, as
has been the law for decades. They should not be forced to seek asylum in transit to the United
States, especially not in countries where they may also face harm. Requiring asylum seekers to
seek and be denied asylum in a third country on their journey to the United States will inevitably
expose them to discrimination and other serious harms.
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M-P-M, who fled El Salvador through Guatemala and traveled through Mexico before
reaching the United States, recounted that she faced similar harassment in Mexico as she did in
her home country because the Mexican people are not accepting of LGBTQ individuals, let alone
migrants. In Tabasco, Mexico, locals would often yell at her on the streets telling her to leave,
calling her derogatory names and threatening physical violence if she remained in the country.
Members of the Los Zetas gang also made it their goal to run M-P-M out of town with threats to
harm her. Threats to M-P-M’s safety did not end there. While in Mexico, she was routinely
approached by the cartels who insisted she needed their assistance to cross the border and
demanded payment. Despite her attempts to make clear that she had no interest in engaging with
them, they attacked her with a screwdriver to her arm in an attempt to coerce her to utilize their
services. Given the traumatic experiences she endured during her brief stay in Mexico, is it any
wonder that she declined to prolong her stay by seeking asylum? M-P-M’s experience in Mexico
is not unique. Migrants often experience discrimination in Mexico8 and are discouraged from
applying for asylum and awaiting a resolution of their case.
The proposed rule further complicates the asylum process by imposing a rebuttable
presumption of asylum ineligibility for those seeking to enter via the southwestern border who
neither made an appointment to appear at a port of entry nor sought asylum in a third country
through which they traveled. If enacted, the rebuttable presumption will inevitably preclude the
average migrant from exercising their legal right to seek asylum in the United States, as it
unrealistically assumes that migrants fleeing their home countries, often due to imminent danger,
are capable of compiling adequate evidence to demonstrate that they experienced an
“exceptionally compelling circumstance” by a “preponderance of the evidence.”9
In our role as student-attorneys, we require weeks, if not months, to carefully develop our
clients’ asylum applications and pretrial filing materials. Unlike migrants crossing the
southwestern border following a long and arduous journey, we are equipped with legal training
and access to resources to understand and attempt to satisfy the evidentiary requirements. It is
unjust to place this burden on individuals seeking protection on U.S. soil in addition to the
significant traumas they are very likely experiencing.
If enacted, asylum seekers with otherwise meritorious claims will inevitably be
negatively impacted by this rule. Their inability to rebut the presumption of asylum ineligibility
will limit their possible avenues for protection on U.S. soil to include only Withholding of
9 Id.
8ACLU, Asylum-Seelers Stranded in Mexico Face Homelessness, Kidnapping, and Sexual Violence,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rights-and-detention/asylum-seekers-stranded-mexico-fac
e, (last visited Mar. 14, 2023).
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Removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture, neither of which provide a path to
legal permanent residency nor other protections comparable to those resulting from a grant of
asylum. Moreover, the protections would be harder to obtain given the higher evidentiary
standard required to demonstrate reasonable fear.
IV. The proposed rule will fail to accomplish its goal of reducing border traffic.
The proposed rule has no real chance of achieving its goal of improving border
conditions by reducing smuggler traffic because it fundamentally ignores the reasons asylum
seekers choose to make the journey to our southwestern border, whether through coyotes or
otherwise. E-M-G, for instance, didn’t choose to enlist a coyote out of ignorance or out of
disrespect for official immigration channels; rather, she made that choice because a coyote was
her only safe and affordable opportunity to reach the United States. Asylum seekers like E-M-G
will continue to enlist the services of coyotes as long as they promise an escape from
persecution, no matter the chance of successfully receiving asylum protections. The proposed
rule won’t ameliorate border conditions or reduce the exploitation of asylum seekers, but instead
will deprive countless deserving asylum seekers of protection, rendering them even more
vulnerable to exploitation on either side of the border.
The proposed rule assumes asylum seekers have perfect knowledge of current U.S.
asylum policy as well as a wide range of choices in how and when to arrive at the southern
border, but the reality is that even the draconian “rebuttable presumption” still affords a better
chance at safety than continuing to endure violent persecution. Because of this, the rule’s cruelty
won’t provide a meaningful travel disincentive to asylum seekers, even though it may cripple
their chances at receiving the asylum protections they need.
Take the example of E-M-G, who endured a living nightmare of physical, sexual, and
psychological abuse in El Salvador so vile and demoralizing that she attempted to take her own
life on three separate occasions. When she made plans to leave her home, she had in mind only
the chance at escaping her living nightmare and creating a better life for herself. It would be
contrary to logic as well as morality to believe that the fact that she may not win asylum, or the
legal ramifications of the circumstances of her eventual entry into the United States, should
shape her plans and lead her to comply with such inaccessible requirements as those set forth by
the proposed rule.
The proposed rule will be completely ineffective in reducing border traffic because no
matter how cruel and draconian the requirements for asylum protections, those facing
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life-or-death decisions will always choose life. Deserving asylum seekers like M-P-M, E–M-G,
and M-B-S will always take the opportunity to create a better life for themselves in the United
States, even if they’ll ultimately be denied the asylum protections they seek, and the cruelty of
the proposed rule’s arbitrary requirements, rebuttable presumption, and expedited removal will
only evince the righteousness of their claims.
IV. Conclusion
The United States must adhere to our obligations under domestic law and international
treaties to protect the right to seek asylum and to not return people to countries where they would
face persecution or torture. As drafted, this proposed rule would deny families and other
vulnerable migrants along the southwest border a fair chance at receiving asylum protections
while not providing meaningful exceptions. We cannot, and must not, increase legal pathways
via parole pathways for entry for some at the expense of restricting access for asylum seekers
who are coming to the United States for protection. This proposed rule does not fully anticipate
the human aspects of immigration. Accordingly, we strongly encourage the Department of
Homeland Security to restore full access to our asylum system once Title 42 is lifted.
Sincerely,
_____________________________
_____________________________
Jeremy Reiner
Wintana Yohannes
J.D. Candidate, May 2024
J.D. Candidate, May 2023
Student-Attorney, Immigration Clinic
Student-Attorney, Immigration Clinic
The George Washington University Law
The George Washington University Law
School
School
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1
March 27, 2023

Submitted via https://www.regulations.gov/commenton/USCIS-2022-0016-0001

Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director
Office of Policy
Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice
Falls Church, VA

Daniel Delgado, Acting Director
Border and Immigration Policy
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Washington, D.C.

RE: Comment in Opposition to the Joint Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Circumvention
of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704 (proposed Feb. 23, 2023).

Dear Assistant Director Reid and Acting Director Delgado:

The Yale Law School Immigrant Justice Project respectfully submits the following comment to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ), Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR)
(“the agencies”) in response and opposition to the above-referenced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM or “the Rule”) issued by the agencies on February 23, 2023. We staunchly
oppose the Proposed Rule, for the reasons detailed below, and urge the agencies to withdraw the
Rule in its entirety.

The Yale Law School Immigrant Justice Project organizes law students in support of immigrant
communities within New Haven, Connecticut and beyond. We engage in direct legal services
under supervision and advance strategic advocacy to support immigrant justice. On March 17,
2023, our team traveled to Brownsville, Texas in partnership with Project Corazón and Lawyers
for Good Government (L4GG) to meet with immigration advocates and stakeholders in the Río
Grande Valley and visit migrant camps and shelters in the cities of Matamoros and Reynosa in
Mexico. Over the course of several days, we provided Know Your Rights trainings, conducted
intake interviews for humanitarian parole requests, fielded questions from migrants and
community leaders, and spoke with dozens of migrants about their experiences using the CBP One
mobile application. We also documented abhorrent conditions across several migrant camps in
Reynosa. Our experiences with migrants and asylum-seekers in Reynosa and Matamoros directly
inform our deep opposition to this Rule.
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2
I.
General Opposition to the Proposed Rulemaking

While the proposed Rule purports to “encourage migrants to avail themselves of lawful, safe, and
orderly pathways into the United States, or otherwise to seek asylum or other protection in
countries through which they travel, thereby reducing reliance on human smuggling networks that
exploit migrants for financial gain,” in practice, the Rule’s implementation undermines its own
stated purpose.

First, the proposed Rule impermissibly redefines the statutory right to asylum under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and further erodes the provision of due process in
the application for asylum. The Rule states that migrants will have a “rebuttable presumption of
asylum ineligibility if they neither avail themselves of a lawful, safe, and orderly pathway to the
United States nor seek asylum or other protection in a country through which they travel.”
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. 11704, 11704 (proposed Feb. 23, 2023) (to be
codified at 8 C.F.R. 208 & 1208) (emphasis added). The INA grants that “[a]ny alien who is
physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival . . . may apply for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2018). The proposed
rebuttable presumption of ineligibility for asylum effectively creates a new legal framework by
which to evaluate asylum claims. This framework goes far beyond the statutory exceptions
Congress enacted, upending existing asylum law under the INA. Further, this proposed change
will reduce the scope of asylum adjudication to an admissibility determination and expedited
removal process by Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), shifting asylum determinations away from
USCIS and EOIR. As such, this proposed change denies migrants access to the due process and
fairness they might receive if their asylum claim were adjudicated properly, with sufficient time
to seek counsel, gather documentation, and prepare effective declarations, as is their legal right.

Second, this proposed Rule will, in effect, disable any semblance of a “lawful, safe, and
orderly” process for migrants seeking asylum. The Rule states that the “Departments expect the
proposed Rule to lead to a reduction in the numbers of migrants who seek to cross the [Southwest
border] without authorization to enter, thereby reducing the reliance by migrants on dangerous
human smuggling networks, protecting against extreme overcrowding in border facilities, and
helping to ensure that the processing of migrants seeking protection in the United States is done in
an effective, humane, and efficient manner.” Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. at
11704. However, due to the significant technological and logistical hurdles posed by the CBP One
application, migrants are functionally unable to present at the border, and are forced to wait at the
border for months attempting to secure scarce appointments. While waiting, these vulnerable
migrants are often completely dependent on third parties for shelter, water, food, electricity and
internet access. Those they depend on are typically Mexican nationals who must make
arrangements with the cartels that control the area, or are members of the cartels themselves.
Accordingly, under this process, migrants are forced to rely on cartels to secure access to basic
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3
human necessities, and as a result, endure economic and physical exploitation. For example, we
spoke with several migrants who had been kidnapped by cartel members in exchange for ransom.
At least one migrant we spoke with was sexually exploited during the course of their kidnapping.
The Rule will increase migrants’ reliance on cartel networks and further encourage cartels to
capitalize on the vulnerability of the migrants who are forced to wait months to secure an
appointment to present at a port of entry.

Third, the proposed Rule unlawfully bars applicants who traveled through another country
en route to the United States and did not stop in that country to apply for asylum. As the Rule
currently stands, there is no assessment of whether the transit country is actually safe or if it has a
functioning immigration/asylum system. As evidenced by rigorous research and country
conditions reports published by expert organizations including the U.S. Department of State,
common transit countries including Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico are not safe
countries for asylum-seekers and other migrants. Furthermore, these countries do not have
immigration systems capable of providing access to a “full and fair” procedure for determining
asylum, as mandated by U.S. and international law. As a result of this Rule, many asylum-seekers
may be wrongfully refouled to these countries, where they will face immediate grave danger and
could be harmed, assaulted, tortured, or killed in direct violation of INA 208(a)(2)(A) and our
international legal obligations as a nation that ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, the United Nations Convention Against Torture, and the International Convenant on
Civil and Political Rights. The procedures contemplated by the Rule are blatantly inconsistent with
the existence of a fair, impartial, and independent process for all asylum-seekers who seek a
determination of whether their fear of persecution or torture is well-founded, to which they are
legally entitled.

Fourth, implementing the Rule through the expedited removal process means that applicants
must rebut the presumption of ineligibility through an already problematic procedure
without prior knowledge of the Rule and without access to counsel, all within hours or days
from the trauma of their flight. The Rule states that “the applicability of the rebuttable
presumption would be adjudicated during the credible fear process for noncitizens processed for
expedited removal, as well as applied to merits adjudications.” Circumvention of Lawful Pathways,
88 Fed. Reg. at 11725. Since its initial inception over 20 years ago, expedited removal has been
rife with error and misconduct. A 2005 study commissioned by Congress documented “serious
problems” in the expedited removal process “which put . . . asylum seekers at risk of improper
return.” Report on Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: Volume I: Findings &
Recommendations, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom 4-5, 10 (Feb. 2005),
https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf.
CBP officers systematically interfere with the rights of individuals in expedited removal to pursue
asylum claims. For example, officers regularly fail to record statements by individuals subject to
expedited removal that indicate a fear of return; fail to refer individuals who express fear of return
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4
for Credible Fear Interviews (CFIs); fail to ask individuals in expedited removal proceedings about
their fear of return; and subject these individuals to harassment and misinformation that actively
interferes with their ability to pursue asylum claims. See, e.g., “You Don’t Have Rights Here”: US
Border Screening and Returns of Central Americans to Risk of Serious Harm, Hum. Rts. Watch 6
(Oct. 2014), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1014_web_0.pdf (finding that fewer
than half of individuals interviewed who claimed a fear of return were referred for credible fear
hearings); Discretion to Deny: Family Separation, Prolonged Detention, and Deterrence of
Asylum Seekers at the Hands of Immigration Authorities Along the U.S.-Mexico Border,
Borderland
Immigr.
Council
12
(2017),
http://media.wix.com/ugd/e07ba9_72743e60ea6d4c3aa796becc71c3b0fe.pdf (“In 12% of the
cases documented for this report, individuals expressing fear of violence upon return to their
country of origin were not processed for credible fear screenings and instead, were placed into
removal proceedings.”); Off. Inspector Gen., Dep’t Homeland Sec., OIG-18-84, Special Review—
Initial Observations Regarding Family Separation Issues Under the Zero Tolerance Policy 5
(Sept. 27, 2018) (describing CBP practices amounting to failure to properly refer asylum-seekers
for CFIs in order to “regulat[e] the flow of asylum-seekers at ports of entry”). The Rule’s proposed
expansion of expedited removal would only amplify these systemic problems which have long
gone unresolved by DHS.

Fifth, the 30-day comment period provided by the government for this Rule flagrantly
violates the policies set out in prior Executive Orders governing the regulatory process,
namely Executive Order 12866, which require federal agencies to “afford the public a meaningful
opportunity to comment on any proposed regulation, which in most cases should include a
comment period of not less than 60 days.” Exec. Order No. 12866, Regulatory Planning and
Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735, 51740 (Oct. 4, 1993) (emphasis added). Relevant federal agencies
have failed to provide any compelling explanation for the abbreviated public comment period.
Such rash conduct is painfully reminiscent of prior administrations’ attempts to suppress the voices
of immigration non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and advocates, and limit their ability to
provide necessary insight and expertise on these critical issues.

II.
Documented Technological and Accessibility Concerns with the CBP One
Application

The Rule currently alleges that use of the CBP One Application “protects migrants from having to
wait in long lines of unknown duration at the ports of entry, and enables the ports of entry to
manage the flows in a safe and efficient manner.” Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed.
Reg. at 11707. Based on our own observations, this is patently false. Instead, the application
significantly limits the number of people who may obtain appointments for inspection and
gravely undermines fairness and due process.
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On March 20, 2023, we visited migrants waiting at migrant camps and shelters in Reynosa,
Mexico, near the McAllen-Hidalgo International Bridge leading to Hidalgo, Texas. On March 21,
2023, we visited migrants waiting in Matamoros, Mexico, in visible sight of the Gateway
International Bridge leading to Brownsville, Texas. On both days, we interviewed dozens of
migrants and observed the use of the CBP One application in real-time as new appointments
became available. Our first-hand observations below are supplemented with reports from legal
service providers, asylum-seekers, and other aid workers operating in the border region during the
rollout and implementation of the CBP One application.

1. The application reduces the number of people who may obtain appointments for
presentation at the border. The number of individuals seeking entry at the Southwest
border fluctuates between approximately 7,100 and 9,700 per day, averaging
approximately 8,500 per day, with encounters exceeding 9,000 per day on 12 different
occasions during the 30-day stretch preceding December 24, 2022. Circumvention of
Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. at 11708.

a. In February 2023, the total number of CBP One entry appointments across the
entire Southwest border was “capped” at approximately 740 per day, Defendants’
Report at 3, Louisiana v. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, No. 6:22-cv-
00885 (W.D. La. Apr. 3, 2022), despite the presence of more than 9,000 individuals
seeking asylum each day, Circumvention of Legal Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. at 11705.
Importantly, this “cap” is a fictitious creation of the Biden Administration and is
not statutorily or legally binding. The Administration has the power to increase the
number of migrants it processes each day. The minimal number of people CBP is
currently processing per day is a gravely insufficient response to the existing need,
and significantly curtails access to the right to seek asylum, leaving migrants
vulnerable to violence and disease while living in inhumane conditions mere miles
from the United States.

b. The Rule provides no information on how the government will apportion daily
appointments. Given that there are no current plans to increase capacity and
infrastructure at the Port of Entry to process migrants asylum-seekers, the United
States is undermining its commitment to ensuring the legal right of vulnerable
individuals to seek asylum, enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the Refugee Convention of 1951 and in its 1967 Protocol. Importantly, the
INA itself does not provide for a numerical cap on the number of migrants allowed
to present at the border daily.

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2. There are accessibility issues with the CBP One application that undermine fairness
and due process. There are significant issues with the implementation of the CBP One
application that have serious consequences for access, fairness, and due process. Below,
we document several categories of concern that warrant immediate attention and
improvement:

a. Given the insufficient number of appointments available, wait times and the
ensuing delays are unconscionably long. See infra Figures B3-4.
i.
Migrants frequently report that the time to receive an appointment is several
months. Though the application has been in use since mid-January, many
have reported that they have been unable to obtain a CBP One appointment,
despite trying to do so every single day since the application has launched.
During this time, migrants – including young children – have been waiting
in deplorable conditions without consistent access to running water, food,
basic sanitation, or medical care. Interviews with migrants and asylum-
seekers in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023); Interviews with migrants and
asylum-seekers in Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).1
ii.
As of March 2023, the majority of migrants currently in Reynosa and
Matamoros have already endured these conditions for weeks to months,
with no end in sight. Interview with Priscilla Orta, Attorney, L4GG, in
Brownsville, Tex. (Mar. 18, 2023). If the Proposed Rule proceeds as
written, there is no viable pathway to ending the long-term delay migrants
will face at the Southwest border, which will exacerbate the already horrific
humanitarian crisis. We can safely assume that these conditions will
continue to intensify as months and years pass.
iii.
Further, many migrants are seeking asylum and a safe haven from
persecution. As a result, they are particularly vulnerable to violence and
extortion by both the individuals they are fleeing from, as well as the local
cartels in the areas where they are waiting. Interview with Brendon Tucker,
Global Response Medicine, in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023).
iv.
Migrants report significant psychological impact of the anxiety of waiting
and seeking a CBP One appointment. In Matamoros alone, we encountered
dozens of individuals who said they had been trying to schedule
appointments daily since the application launched in January. We spoke
with one Venezuelan applicant who has been trying to secure an
appointment for her family of four. She told us that her eldest daughter, a
minor, was experiencing severe anxiety and suicidal ideation as a result of
living in an encampment for a prolonged, indefinite period of time. Another

1 We omit the names of the migrants and asylum-seekers to protect their safety.
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asylum-seeker, who is a survivor of domestic violence and fleeing her
homicidal abuser, reported daily severe migraines and lack of appetite as a
result of the stress induced from constantly reloading CBP One in the hopes
of securing an appointment and escaping her abuser who had recently
identified her location in Matamoros. Interviews with asylum-seekers in
Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).
v.
Appointments are usually gone within minutes of release at 10 AM. See
infra Figure B4 (showing that by 10:02 AM, all appointments have been
reserved). The CBP officials with whom we spoke encouraged migrants to
check for appointments throughout the day, in the case of a cancellation.
This practice forces migrants to constantly check the application at all hours
of the day, increasing anxieties, exacerbating financial inequities of data and
battery usage, and straining migrants’ feelings of hope. CBP officials
likened obtaining an appointment through CBP One to “buying tickets for
a really popular concert.” Meeting with CBP Officers in Hidalgo, Tex.
(Mar. 20, 2023). This sentiment, referring to the capacity of the application,
has been echoed by legal service providers in recent news articles. See Nick
Miroff, How Biden Officials Aim To Use a Mobile App To Cut Illegal U.S.
Entries,
Wash.
Post
(Feb.
20,
2023),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2023/02/20/cbpone-boder-
app-biden-migrants/.
vi.
Being forced to wait in unsanitary and inhumane camps for months to get
an appointment through a glitching, inaccessible application is a significant
violation of migrants’ right to safety and security under United States’
asylum law. See infra Part III, Section 2.

b. The application’s photo requirements discriminate against migrants with
darker skin tones. See infra Figure B9.
i.
Many of the migrants currently waiting at the Reynosa and Matamoros ports
of entry are Haitian and Venezuelan. These migrants have much darker skin
tones than migrants from other countries of origin. The application often
fails to recognize the facial features of darker-skinned individuals, and
therefore does not allow these users to pass what CBP calls a “liveness
check,” which requires two photos taken in real-time to verify identity.
Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20,
2023); see also Nick Miroff, How Biden Officials Aim To Use a Mobile App
To
Cut
Illegal
U.S.
Entries,
Wash.
Post
(Feb.
20,
2023),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2023/02/20/cbpone-boder-
app-biden-migrants/.
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ii.
Migrants frequently report issues with the camera function that requires an
initial and final photo to be taken when requesting an appointment, or the
“liveness check” discussed above. The initial photo is to be captured during
the account creation stage, while the final photo is to be captured during the
appointment scheduling stage. Many migrants with darker skin tones report
difficulties uploading both of these photos on the application, as the camera
function regularly fails to recognize their faces and therefore does not allow
them to capture a photo. Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in
Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023).
iii.
Because of the limited number of appointments available, even the slightest
delay in entering the required final photo can impact who is able to schedule
their appointment. In the one or two minutes that available appointments
are taken each day, many darker-skinned migrants find themselves stuck
trying to upload their final photo. Interviews with migrants and asylum-
seekers in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023).
iv.
This issue has particular implications for unequal treatment by race, raising
significant concerns for future equal protection discrimination claims by
Black and Indigenous migrants who are severely disadvantaged from
accessing appointments through the CBP One application.
v.
In light of the changing racial demographics among migrant groups at the
border, more systematic data is needed to determine which groups are able
to access the application, and which groups are being excluded, through
various mechanisms including the CBP One application, from accessing
appointments.

c. The application has connectivity issues and functions poorly, undermining fair
and equal access. See infra Figures B1-2; B5-8.
i.
One hundred percent of the dozens of migrants we spoke with said that the
application is glitchy, poorly implemented, and essentially, nonfunctional
in the vast majority of cases. In addition to crashing frequently, many users
complained that the application operates slowly, that they cannot correct
errors, and that it freezes unpredictably, without options to correct the
submitted materials. Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in
Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023); Interviews with migrants and asylum-
seekers in Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).
ii.
Users commonly reported needing to create a new account every day to
request appointments. This was due, in part, to the inadequacy of the
software and the nonfunctional camera feature. Users state that the
application’s data validation and error messaging is poorly designed.
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Oftentimes, error messages are nonsensical and displayed in programming
language. Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in Reynosa, Mex.
(Mar. 20, 2023); Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in
Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).
iii.
Even when error messages appear properly, they only appear in English and
oftentimes do not identify the source of the error. Users also describe
difficulties with editing fields to address these errors. These issues lead
users to create new accounts daily, as they see no way to correct the errors
in their accounts otherwise. See infra Figures B5-8.
iv.
Individuals also saw themselves forced to create new accounts every day to
circumvent the inadequacy of the glitchy application and to resolve issues
with the camera feature. As described in the above section, to ensure that
their initial and final photos can both be captured and will match, users often
create a new account daily in order to capture each photo under similar
conditions. Even when attempting to take both photos in one sitting, the
facial recognition software continues to lag in recognizing the faces of those
with darker skin tones. See, e.g., infra Figure B9. Previous queries

d. The requirement of an application is economically inaccessible for individuals
living in poverty, without access to reliable internet and/or smartphones.
i.
Many of the border regions lack sufficient internet infrastructure to support
the need in the area to access the internet. One local legal provider noted
that even her own premium phone and international service plan does not
provide quality service in either Reynosa or Matamoros. Interview with
Priscilla Orta, L4GG, in Brownsville, Tex. (Mar. 18, 2023).
ii.
During our visit, migrants reported spending all of their savings to buy
minutes and access wifi and data, in order to use the CBP One application.
Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20,
2023); Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in Matamoros, Mex.
(Mar. 21, 2023). We witnessed hundreds of migrants crowded around gas
stations, convenience stores, and outside of private homes, as well as
waiting in long lines in the street for hours at a time, hoping to get a signal.
iii.
Migrants reported that the CBP One application drains their phone batteries.
They are then forced to pay businesses and other third parties, including
cartels, to charge their phone batteries every day in order to access the
application the following day. Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers
in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023); Interviews with migrants and asylum-
seekers in Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023). The requirement to rely on a
digital application is financially unsuitable for vulnerable migrants living in
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poverty who are also at significant risk of extortion in order to access the
internet.
iv.
The above points also presume that the majority of people seeking access
to the United States through the Southwest border have smartphones
capable of downloading a mobile application. The Rule states that, “A CBP
survey of migrants at the Hidalgo and Brownsville Ports of Entry on
December 11, 2022, substantiates that observation—finding that 93 of 95
migrants of all ages had smartphones.” Circumvention of Lawful Pathways,
88 Fed. Reg. at 11720. First and foremost, the Rule provides no information
as to how, where, or with whom the study was conducted. Second, based on
our observations of the limited technology access in several of the informal
migrant encampments in Reynosa, that number is likely a significant
overestimate. CBP officials are also aware that, of the migrants who do own
smartphones, many own smartphones from brands that are not functionally
reliable or compatible with the application. Nonetheless, CBP officials
maintain that the application is a tool to advance equity for migrants.
Meeting with CBP Officers in Hidalgo, Tex. (Mar. 20, 2023).
v.
CBP officials claimed that developing a desktop application would improve
issues with accessibility. Meeting with CBP Officers in Hidalgo, Tex. (Mar.
20, 2023). However, this option has yet to be implemented despite repeated
requests. Government Documents Reveal Information About the
Development of the CBP One App, Am. Immigr. Council (Feb. 28, 2023),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/FOIA/government-
documents-reveal-information-about-development-cbp-one-app. There is
little clarity as to whether and when such an option would be implemented,
despite officials’ knowledge of the issue.
vi.
In addition, access to desktop computers is nonexistent for the vast majority
of migrants and asylum-seekers. Interview with Brendon Tucker, Global
Response Medicine, in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023). The nonprofit
organizations who would be expected to provide such services to migrants
lack the necessary resources and security to do so. Id. Further, NGOs have
no governmental support to provide computers or internet access. Id.

e. There are language-access issues within the application and for non-Spanish
speakers.
i.
Currently, the application is only written in English and Spanish. Only a
few parts are also written in Haitian Kreyòl.
ii.
Importantly, many parts of the application are not translated at all.
Specifically, the terms of service, error messages, and other crucial
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communications within the application are not sufficiently translated to
guarantee fair access. See, e.g., infra Figures B5-8.
iii.
Further, the error messages are not clear, leaving migrants with no recourse
to fix the errors or resubmit their requests. Often, errors will appear as a mix
of unintelligible code and text that does not make sense in English, let alone
in any other language. Id. As a result, migrants are unable to appropriately
access and engage with the application.
iv.
This barrier to access is particularly relevant for Indigenous asylum-seekers,
as well as those from other countries inside and outside of Latin America
who do not speak Spanish or English, and significantly undermines the
purported aims to “increase the accessibility of humanitarian protection”
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, 88 Fed. Reg. at 11707.

f. Families face additional difficulties obtaining CBP One appointments. See
infra Figure B10.
i.
Currently, families apply for a CBP One appointment via one family
member acting as the primary applicant. This applicant adds, through their
own account, the identities and basic biographical information of all other
family members seeking to present at the border.
ii.
Rather than assigning each family a slot, the CBP One application attempts
to assign each additional family member their own appointment slot. For
example, a family of five would require five appointments, as opposed to
one. Additionally, if there are only four slots available, a family of five
would not be able to get any appointments. Id.
iii.
One CBP Field Office on the Southwest border reported that it has not
interviewed families with more than six family members, and it has
interviewed few families even of this size. Meeting with CBP Officers in
Hidalgo, Tex. (Mar. 20, 2023). This is extremely concerning in light of how
many families are waiting near the border with over six family members.
Interview with Priscilla Orta, L4GG, in Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).
iv.
Based on our experience, and those of the service providers in the area, it
has been effectively impossible for larger families to obtain interview slots.
Some families have been trying to obtain interview appointments by
splitting up. For example, even within three-person families, we’ve heard
of fathers trying to obtain one appointment, while their respective spouses
and children try to obtain a second appointment, exacerbating the likelihood
of family separation. Interview with Priscilla Orta, L4GG, in Matamoros,
Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).

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g. The application has an inconsistent and unclear prioritization structure, with
significant implications for fairness and equality.
i.
Currently, the application’s first-come, first-serve scheduling design
appears to result in a type of haphazard lottery. As such, there is no priority
pathway for migrants who have been waiting longer, those with particular
vulnerabilities, or those who are enduring harsher or more dangerous
conditions. It is not clear that CBP or any other agency tracks the amount
of time individuals have been waiting at a port of entry for an appointment.
ii.
Further, there is no prioritization of individuals or families who have
obtained an appointment and are turned away at that appointment for a
logistical issue. For example, we spoke to a Venezuelan man in Matamoros
who was able to obtain an appointment in February for himself, his spouse,
and his child, only to be turned away for a photo verification issue, despite
having no control over the photo verification process and its race-based
problems. He and his family have not been able to get an appointment since.
Interview with asylum-seeker in Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).
iii.
Alarmingly, there is also a growing resale market for CBP One
appointments, which further endangers vulnerable migrants who are at risk
for kidnapping, extortion, and violence from the local cartels, desperate
community members, and scammers. Interview with Priscilla Orta, L4GG,
in Brownsville, Tex. (Mar. 21, 2023). The risk of appointment resale
suggests that the security function of the CBP One application is internally
insufficient as a matter of application design, and in addition, may
exacerbate the existing danger and violence. There are widespread concerns
about the explosion of a secondary market for CBP One appointments
following the implementation of this requirement under the proposed Rule.
Id. Further, legal service providers have indicated that, although the CBP
One application includes a geo-fence feature that aims to limit those who
can apply for an appointment to people located along the U.S.-Mexico
border, some migrants may be able to get around this security feature
through the use of VPNs, further exacerbating inequity and the persistent
access issues. Together, the poor application function and apparent lack of
security directly contravenes the stated purpose of the Rule to promote
“lawful, safe, and orderly” pathways to entry.

III.
Documented Logistical and Humanitarian Concerns as a Result of the Proposed Rule

1. The new parole programs’ requirements disadvantage asylum-seekers in most dire
need of protection.
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a. In Matamoros, we spoke with dozens of Venezuelan migrants regarding the
existing alternative humanitarian parole process available to Venezuelans, Cubans,
Haitians, and Nicaraguans that functions somewhat similarly to the proposed new
parole programs. Processes for Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans,
U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs. (Mar. 22, 2023), https://www.uscis.gov/CHNV.
These conversations clearly demonstrated that such parole programs are
functionally inaccessible to the vast majority of migrants we encountered.
Interviews with migrants and asylum-seekers in Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).
i.
First, many of the migrants we spoke with were not aware of the parole
program prior to our conversations. Id. As a result, they would never have
been able to apply for the programs from their countries of origin or in
neighboring countries prior or during their journey to the Southwest border.
ii.
Several migrants we spoke with also did not have government passports or
any access to immigration officials in their country of origin that might be
able to provide such documents. Many of these migrants had lost their
documents while traveling through the jungle or had them stolen. Id.
iii.
Furthermore, in the event that migrants are able to remain safely in their
home country before attempting to fly to the United States, there are a
significantly limited (and often prohibitively expensive) number of weekly
flights from Venezuela, Haiti, Cuba, and Nicaragua, which poses broader
access issues. See, e.g. Off. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Transp., Order No. 2019-5-5,
Suspension of Air Service to and from Venezuela 1 (May 15, 2019) (limiting
air travel between the United States and Venezuela).
iv.
Finally, many of the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan migrants and asylum-
seekers we spoke with did not know anyone currently living in the U.S. and
thus had no viable sponsors. Among the few who did have contacts living
in the U.S., those contacts were most often recent arrivals who could not yet
establish the financial requisites of sponsorship. Interviews with migrants
and asylum-seekers in Matamoros, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023). We can safely
assume that thousands of other migrants are similarly situated.

2. The use of CPB One creates unconscionable conditions and a humanitarian crisis in
migrant encampments in Reynosa, Mexico. See infra Figures A1-3.
a. During our visit to Reynosa, we observed how the appointment system under CBP
One has forced migrants to live in abysmal conditions while awaiting the
opportunity to present at the border. We visited several migrant shelters and
encampments, all of which were struggling with limited resources to meet the high
volume and severe needs of migrants – including men, women, and children – who
are seeking asylum in the United States.
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b. We highlight the conditions at Camp Río as a particularly acute example of the
humanitarian crisis U.S. policy, current scheduling restraints under the CBP One
application, has caused. The proposed Rule change would only exacerbate these
conditions.
i.
In Camp Río, approximately 700 migrants were crowded into a makeshift
tent camp, with no access to running water, sanitation, or consistent medical
care. Interview with Brendon Tucker, Global Response Medicine, in
Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023).
ii.
At the camp, the few existing portable toilets were extremely unsanitary or
non-functional. It was clear that they were insufficient to meet the physical
needs of all the camp members. In addition, Camp Río has only two small
water containers to serve the entire camp. As a result, the nearby open fields
and cliff sides were used as makeshift toilets, with open defecation sites
directly adjacent to the tents. Alarmingly, these open defecation sites are
located next to and above the river, and runoff from the sites goes directly
into the river. As a result, the river water, which is simultaneously used for
bathing, washing clothes, and food preparation, is heavily contaminated
with human feces, thereby posing enormous health risks for migrants who
reside in Camp Río and the surrounding communities. This humanitarian
health risk poses significant and immediate concerns for serious feces-borne
illnesses. See infra Figures A2-3. We were told by a medical professional
who visited Camp Río that the camp has already shown widespread rates of
communicable gastrointestinal and skin diseases across all age groups,
particularly among young children. The camp has also seen incidences of
fatal infections, including cholera. Interview with a Mexican medical
doctor, Global Response Medicine, in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 21, 2023).2
iii.
Further, the camp has no access to sanitation or waste disposal services, and
as a result, trash is burned in open fires near the tent encampments. See infra
Figure A3. Burning waste and trash is well-documented to carry serious
health hazards and toxic environmental risks, such as the emission of toxic
fumes. See, e.g., Env. Prot. Agency, EPA530-F-03-012, The Hidden
Hazards of Backyard Burning (Aug. 2003) (“Burning household waste
produces many toxic chemicals . . . . These pollutants can have immediate
and long-term health effects such as: Asthma, emphysema, or other
respiratory illnesses. Nervous system, kidney, or liver damage.
Reproductive or developmental disorders.”).
iv.
According to legal service providers, migrants, and other aid workers we
spoke with, there is no consistent or reliable access to medical care for

2 We omit the name of the doctor to protect his safety.
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migrants awaiting CBP One appointments in Camp Río. Interview with a
Mexican medical doctor, Global Response Medicine, in Reynosa, Mex.
(Mar. 21, 2023).
v.
In addition, migrants who are forced to wait in these unconscionable
conditions are at serious risk for kidnapping, extortion, and other types of
violence, including sexual and domestic violence, as a result of their
vulnerability, poverty, and dependency on the United States to allow them
to present at the border. Interview with Brendon Tucker, Global Response
Medicine, in Reynosa, Mex. (Mar. 20, 2023). As these asylum-seekers are
unlikely to return to the site of their persecution in their home states, the
proposed Rule is effectively recreating conditions of abject poverty and
fueling a serious humanitarian crisis which will not be solved until access
to seek asylum at the Southwest border is accessible and functional.

IV.
Concluding Comments in Opposition to the Proposed Rule and the continued use of
the CBP One Application

Few U.S.-based groups – including U.S. officials whose policies directly affect asylum-seekers –
have observed migrants’ use of the dysfunctional CBP One application or the inhumane conditions
of migrant settlements at locations such as Camp Río. The Yale Law School Immigrant Justice
Project’s firsthand observations, coupled with our knowledge of the legal obligations owed by the
United States to asylum-seekers, inform our group’s staunch opposition to the Proposed Rule.

There is a clear technological and humanitarian crisis at our Southern border. The CBP One
application’s technical inadequacies, racial discrimination against dark-skinned migrants, and
economic inaccessibility have actively harmed migrants’ right to seek asylum and have
exacerbated the humanitarian crisis the application is ostensibly seeking to redress. Additionally,
the Proposed Rule creates significant legal and prudential issues, including disparate treatment,
fairness, and due process concerns, and directly contravenes the stated aims of the Rule.
Functionally, the Proposed Rule impermissibly rewrites asylum law to fit into a badly-coded,
discriminatory smartphone application.

The asylum-seekers we met are fleeing devastating violence and unthinkable horrors in their home
countries. They have arrived at our Southwest border after traveling for months across treacherous
terrain, facing insurmountable odds, and living in perpetual fear, only to be obstructed by
dysfunctional technology and abysmal conditions while they are delayed and denied their rightful
entry into the United States. All the while, they have preserved their hope and employed impressive
creativity to stay alive.

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Given our experiences, and those of the migrants we met, we categorically reject this Rule as
proposed and strongly urge the agencies to withdraw the Rule in its entirety. The CBP One
application is not the equity-preserving, digital future that the U.S. government envisions it to be;
in practice, the application exacerbates what is already a catastrophic humanitarian crisis and even
more of the government’s time and resources will be required to rectify the problems the
application creates. We strongly urge the U.S. government to reply appropriately to these concerns,
not by bulldozing more migrant settlements or troubleshooting an application at the expense of
migrant lives, but by fully repealing the Proposed Rule. We appreciate your careful consideration
of these comments in response and opposition to this NPRM. We look forward to your response.

Respectfully,
Yale Law School Immigrant Justice Project
Jennifer Dikler
Dylan Farrell-Bryan
Megan Handau
Audrey Huynh
Rosalyn Dietrich Leban
María Mendoza
Neha Srinivasan
Gabriela Torres-Lorenzotti

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Appendix A: Conditions in Camp Río, Reynosa

Figure A1: Tent Encampment

Figure A2: Open defecation field

Figure A3: Waste fire; Run-off pipe

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Appendix B: Documentation of Application Errors

Figures B1-2: Frozen Application Screen for Appointments at the Hidalgo International Bridge

Figures B3-4: No available appointments for April 2023 (as of March 21, 2023)

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Figures B5-8: Unintelligible Error Messages

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Figure B9: Camera Function Unable to Capture Darker Skin Tones

Figure B10: No availability or application support for larger families, here, a family of five.
Identifying information redacted.

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March 27, 2023
Submitted via: https://www.regulations.gov.
Daniel Delgado
Acting Director
Border and Immigration Policy
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
telephone (202) 447-3459
Lauren Alder Reid
Assistant Director,
Office of Policy, EOIR
U.S. Department of Justice
telephone (703) 305-0289
Re: Comment on the Proposed Rule by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) on
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, CIS No. 2736-22; Docket No: USCIS
2022-0016; A.G. Order No. 5605-2023
Dear Acting Director Delgado and Assistant Director Alder Reid:
The Round Table of Former Immigration Judges is composed of more than 50 former
Immigration Judges and Appellate Immigration Judges of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. We were appointed by and served under both Republican and Democratic
administrations. We have centuries of combined experience adjudicating asylum

1
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applications and appeals. Our members include nationally-respected experts on
asylum law; many regularly lecture at law schools and conferences and author articles
on the topic.
Our members issued decisions encompassing wide-ranging interpretations of our
asylum laws during our service on the bench. Whether or not we ultimately reached
the correct result, those decisions were always exercised according to our “own
understanding and conscience,”

and not in acquiescence to the political agenda of the
1
party or administration under which we served.
We as judges understood that whether or not we agreed with the intent of Congress,
we were still bound to follow it. The same is true of the Attorney General, Secretary
of Homeland Security, and for that matter, the President.
The 30-Day Comment Period Provides Insufficient Time to Comment on the
Rule
The Biden administration has provided only 30 days for the public to comment on the
proposed rule, effectively denying the public the right to meaningfully comment under
the notice and comment rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. This timeframe is insufficient for a sweeping proposed rule that would
deny many people access to asylum in violation of U.S. law. On March 1, 2023, 172
organizations wrote to the agencies urging them to provide at least 60 days to
comment on the complex 153-page rule that would have enormous implications for
asylum access at the border and in USCIS and immigration court asylum
proceedings.
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 state that agencies should generally provide at
least 60 days for the public to comment on proposed regulations. A minimum of 60
days is especially critical given the rule’s attempt to ban asylum for many refugees in
violation of U.S. law and international commitments and return many to death,
torture, and violence. While the agencies cite the termination of the Title 42 policy in
May 2023 as a justification to curtail the public’s right to comment on the proposed
rule, this reasoning is specious especially given that the administration itself sought to
formally end Title 42 nearly a year ago and has had ample time to prepare for the end
of the policy.
See Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1954).
1

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Because of the insufficient time frame provided for comments, we will regrettably
have to limit our comments to a few specific issues.
Comments on Specific Issues:
The rule creates a bar, and not a rebuttable presumption.
The proposed rule refers to the bar it seeks to create as a “rebuttable presumption of
asylum ineligibility.” This term is a misnomer. The rule seeks to create an outright bar
to asylum, with three very narrow exceptions that most applicants will not be able to
fall within.
The Merriam Webster online dictionary includes as definitions for the word
“presumption” “an attitude or belief dictated by probability: Assumption; the ground,
reason, or evidence lending probability to a belief; a legal inference as to the existence
or truth of a fact not certainly known that is drawn from the known or proved
existence of some other fact.”2
Asylum law does contain actual rebuttable presumptions. For example, 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b)(1) creates a presumption that one who has suffered past persecution has a
well-founded fear of persecution, while 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(ii) creates a
presumption that where the persecutor is the government or is government sponsored,
internal relocation would not be reasonable. These presumptions are logically drawn
from established facts. For example, it is logical to presume that where conditions
have not changed, one who has already been persecuted might be persecuted again in
the future. It is also reasonable to assume a national government’s reach is country-
wide and cannot be avoided by moving within the country it governs.
However, as to the proposed rule, there is nothing about the fact of arriving at the
border without having procured an appointment that would give rise to a logical
presumption that one is either not a refugee, or is undeserving of or no longer in need
of protection.
The proposed rule is actually akin to the one-year bar found in section 208(a)(2) of the
I&N Act. Significantly, that requirement was made by Congress through the
legislative process, while the present rule attempts to create an additional bar through
regulation alone. Although section 208(2)(D) creates two exceptions (for changed or
extraordinary circumstances), we have never heard the one-year bar referred to as a
rebuttable presumption; it is rather a bar to asylum.
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/presumption.
2

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While it may sound less harsh to refer to the rule as a “rebuttable presumption,” the
term is misleading and inaccurate. And because the proposed bar conflicts with
international law and Congressional intent, and will invariably result in wrongful
removals, the rule should be withdrawn in its entirety.
The proposed bar conflicts with international law.
In a precedential en banc decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals (which at the
time included three current members of our Round Table) stated:
In enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102,
Congress sought to bring the Act’s definition of “refugee” into conformity
with the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees and, in so doing, give “statutory meaning to our national
commitment to human rights and humanitarian concerns.” See S. Rep. No.
256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144.
Such an approach is designed to afford a generous standard for protection in
cases of doubt.
Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486, 492 (BIA 1998) (en banc) (quoting S. REP. NO.
256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 144). See also
Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 1997).
Given the explicit intent of Congress in passing the 1980 Refugee Act of bringing
our domestic laws into compliance with international law, it is particularly
necessary for the agencies to construe section 208 of the Act in conformity with
such law. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (noting that construing
federal statutes to avoid violating international law has 'been a maxim of statutory
construction since the decision' in Charming Betsy); Lauritizen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 578-79 (1953); MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 434 (1913); Murray
v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
With this goal, for more than 35 years, our courts have sought guidance from
UNHCR’s Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status
in interpreting the 1980 Refugee Act. See INS. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
438-39 (1987).
We note that paragraph 28 of the UNHCR Handbook states:

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