Court filing
Country Conditions Exhibit — East Bay Sanctuary v. Trump
Filed June 5, 2023 in East Bay Sanctuary v. Trump; one of 67 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | N.D. Cal. |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2023-06-05 |
N.D. Cal. · No. 4:18-cv-06810-JST · Doc. 169-9 · 2023-06-05 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2022
United States Department of State • Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
HONDURAS 2022 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Honduras is a constitutional, multiparty republic. The most recent national and
local elections were held in November 2021. Voters elected Xiomara Castro of the
LIBRE Party as president for a four-year term beginning in January. International
observers generally recognized the elections as free and fair.
The Honduran National Police maintain internal security and report to the
Secretariat of Security. The armed forces, which report to the Secretariat of
Defense, are responsible for external security but also exercise some domestic
security responsibilities in support of the national police and other civilian
authorities. Some larger cities have police forces that operate independently of the
national police and report to municipal authorities. The Military Police of Public
Order report to military authorities but conduct operations sanctioned by civilian
security officials as well as by military leaders. The National Interinstitutional
Security Force coordinates the overlapping responsibilities of the National Police,
Military Police of Public Order, National Intelligence Directorate, and Public
Ministry during interagency operations. Civilian authorities maintained effective
control over security forces. There were reports that members of the security
forces committed some abuses.
Significant human rights issues included credible reports of: unlawful or arbitrary
killings, including extrajudicial killings; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment by government agents; harsh and life-
threatening prison conditions; arbitrary arrest or detention; serious restrictions on
freedom of expression and media, including threats to media members by criminal
elements; serious government corruption; lack of investigation of and
accountability for gender-based violence; and crimes involving violence or threats
of violence against Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities, and against
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex persons.
The government prosecuted some officials who committed human rights abuses or
engaged in corruption, but a weak judicial system and corruption were major
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obstacles to obtaining convictions.
Criminal groups, including local and transnational gangs and narcotics traffickers,
were significant perpetrators of violent crimes and committed acts of homicide,
torture, kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, intimidation, and other threats
and violence directed against human rights defenders, judicial authorities, lawyers,
business community members, journalists, bloggers, women, and other vulnerable
populations. The government investigated and prosecuted some of these crimes,
but impunity was widespread.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person
a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically
Motivated Killings
There were several reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or
unlawful killings. The reported killings took place during law enforcement
operations or were linked to criminal activity by government agents. The Ministry
of Security’s Directorate of Disciplinary Police Affairs investigated members of
the Honduran National Police accused of human rights abuses. The Office of the
Inspector General of the Armed Forces and the Humanitarian Law Directorate
investigated and arrested members of the military accused of human rights abuses.
The National Human Rights Commission (CONADEH) reported two arbitrary or
unlawful killings by security forces as of August.
On May 31, members of the National Anti-Gang Unit shot and killed Wilson Ariel
Pérez Hernández in San Pedro Sula, Cortés Department. He was allegedly killed
while antigang unit officials tried to arrest him for assaulting a police officer at a
soccer match on May 29. On October 17, the Public Ministry charged four unit
officials for their involvement in Pérez’s killing.
The murder trial of police officer Jarol Rolando Perdomo Sarmiento concluded on
October 17. Perdomo was charged with the February 2021 murder of Keyla
Martínez in La Esperanza, Intibucá Department. The final verdict was pending a
constitutional appeal.
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Criminal groups, such as drug traffickers and local and transnational gangs
including MS-13 and the 18th Street gang, committed killings, extortion,
kidnappings, human trafficking, and intimidation of police, prosecutors,
journalists, women, human rights defenders, and others. Major urban centers and
drug trafficking routes experienced the highest rates of violence.
On July 14, alleged members of the MS-13 gang wearing antigang unit uniforms
killed Said Lobo Bonilla, son of former President Porfirio Lobo, and three other
persons in a targeted attack in Tegucigalpa. On September 22, the court in a
preliminary hearing charged Eber Ezequiel Espinoza and Erick David Macías
Rodríguez with quadruple homicide. Authorities continued to search for the
individuals who ordered the homicide.
On January 9, unknown assailants killed Pablo Hernández in San Marcos de
Caiquín, Lempira Department. Hernández had worked to promote Indigenous
rights in a variety of roles including as president of the Network of Agroecologists
of the Cacique Lempira Biosphere, as a member of the Network of Human Rights
Defenders of the Department of Lempira, and as a radio host of the Lenca radio
program Radio Tenan. Authorities continued to investigate the incident.
The government continued to prosecute individuals allegedly involved in the 2016
killing of environmental and Indigenous activist Berta Cáceres. On June 20, the
National Tribunal Court sentenced Roberto David Castillo Mejía to more than 22
years in prison for his role as one of the alleged coauthors of her murder.
b. Disappearance
There were no credible reports of disappearances by or on behalf of government
authorities.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, and Other Related Abuses
Although the law prohibits such practices, government officials received
complaints and investigated alleged abuses by members of the security forces on
the streets and in detention centers.
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CONADEH reported 31 cases of alleged torture or cruel and inhuman treatment by
security forces through August, while the Public Ministry received 10 such reports
through July. The quasi-governmental National Committee for the Prevention of
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment (CONAPREV) received 28
complaints of the use of torture or cruel and inhuman treatment through
September.
On January 13, National Police officials in Trujillo, Colón Department, allegedly
detained and tortured Luis Alberto Gutiérrez and Leonard Brown, beating
Gutiérrez and Brown in the police station.
Corruption along with a lack of investigative resources and judicial delays led to
widespread impunity, including for members of security forces. The Directorate of
Disciplinary Police Affairs investigated abuses by police forces. The Office of the
Inspector General of the Armed Forces and the Humanitarian Law Directorate
investigated abuses by the military. CONADEH received complaints involving
human rights abuses and referred them to the Public Ministry for investigation.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison conditions were harsh and at times life threatening due to pervasive gang-
related violence and the government’s failure to control criminal activity within the
prisons. Prisoners suffered from gross overcrowding; insufficient access to food,
water, and medical supplies; violence; and alleged abuse by prison officials.
Abusive Physical Conditions: Prisoners suffered from severe overcrowding,
malnutrition, lack of adequate sanitation and medical care, and, in some prisons,
lack of adequate ventilation and lighting. The National Prison Institute reported
that as of October 13, the total prison population was 19,619 in 25 prisons and one
detention center. According to CONAPREV, the system was designed for
approximately 13,000 inmates. Long periods of pretrial detention remained
common, with many pretrial detainees held with convicted prisoners. Nearly 46
percent of incarcerated individuals were in pretrial detention.
Authorities did not generally segregate those with tuberculosis or other infectious
diseases from the general prison population. There was limited support for persons
with mental illnesses or disabilities. CONAPREV reported every prison had a
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functioning health clinic with at least one medical professional, but basic medical
supplies and medicines were in short supply throughout the system. In most
prisons, only inmates who purchased bottled water or had water filters in their cells
had access to potable water.
The government failed to control pervasive gang-related violence and criminal
activity within the prisons. Many prisons lacked sufficient security personnel.
Many prisoners had access to weapons and other contraband, inmates attacked
other inmates with impunity, and inmates and their associates outside prison
threatened prison officials and their families. These conditions contributed to an
unstable, dangerous environment in the penitentiary system. Media reported
violent confrontations and killings between gang members in prisons throughout
the year.
CONAPREV reported 17 violent deaths in prisons as of September. On July 4,
alleged members of the 18th Street gang killed six fellow gang members at the El
Pozo maximum security prison in Ilama, Santa Bárbara Department.
As of September, CONAPREV reported the country’s detention center for high-
profile suspects and those in need of additional security, including police and
military officials, held 29 individuals. The center, administered by the National
Prison Institute, was on a military installation and received some support services
from the military.
Administration: The judicial system is legally responsible for monitoring prison
conditions and providing for the rights of prisoners. The government tasks
CONAPREV with visiting prisons and making recommendations for protecting the
rights of prisoners. Prisoners can submit complaints through a lawyer that may
emerge from an NGO before the Public Ministry.
Media noted that family members often faced long delays or were unable to visit
detainees.
Independent Monitoring: The government generally permitted prison visits by
independent local and international human rights observers, including the
International Committee of the Red Cross.
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Improvements: On March 10, the armed forces officially transferred control of
the National Prison Institute to the National Police as part of a government
initiative to demilitarize prisons. Following the transfer, the National Prison
Institute reported progress on visitation rights, food nutrition and quality, and
potable water access.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any
person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court. The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported that authorities at times
failed to enforce these requirements effectively.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
By law, police may make arrests only with a warrant unless they make the arrest
during the commission of a crime, there is strong suspicion that a person has
committed a crime and might otherwise evade criminal prosecution, or they
encounter a person in possession of evidence related to a crime. The law requires
police to inform persons of the grounds for their arrest and bring detainees before a
competent judicial authority within 24 hours. It stipulates that a prosecutor has 24
additional hours to decide if there is probable cause for indictment, whereupon a
judge has 24 more hours to decide whether to issue a temporary detention order.
Such an order may be effective for up to six days, after which the judge must hold
a pretrial hearing to examine whether there is probable cause to continue pretrial
detention. The law allows bail for persons charged with some felonies and gives
prisoners the right of prompt access to family members. The law allows the
release of other suspects pending formal charges, on the condition that they
periodically report to authorities, although management of this reporting
mechanism was often weak. The government generally respected these provisions.
Persons suspected of any of 21 specific felonies must remain in custody, pending
the conclusion of judicial proceedings against them. Some judges, however, ruled
that such suspects may be released on the condition that they continue to report
periodically to authorities. The law grants prisoners the right to prompt access to a
lawyer of their choice and, if indigent, to government-provided counsel, although
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the public defender mechanism was weak, and authorities did not always abide by
these requirements.
Arbitrary Arrest: CONADEH reported 33 cases of arbitrary arrest through
August. The Public Ministry reported 11 cases of alleged illegal detention or
arbitrary arrest as of September.
On January 19, alleged security force members detained Indigenous community
leader Nicolás Rodriguez in Azacualpa, Copán Department, for more than 24 hours
before he was released.
Pretrial Detention: Judicial inefficiency, corruption, and insufficient resources
delayed proceedings in the criminal justice system, and lengthy pretrial detention
was a serious problem. For crimes with minimum sentences of six years’
imprisonment, the law authorizes pretrial detention of up to two years. The
prosecution may request an additional six-month extension, but many detainees
remained in pretrial detention much longer, including for more time than the
maximum period of incarceration for their alleged crime. The law does not
authorize pretrial detention for crimes with a maximum sentence of five years or
less.
The law mandates that authorities release detainees whose cases have not yet come
to trial and whose time in pretrial detention already exceeds the maximum prison
sentence for their alleged crime. Nonetheless, many prisoners remained in custody
after completing their full sentences, and sometimes even after an acquittal,
because officials failed to process their releases expeditiously.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
The law provides for an independent judiciary, but the justice system was poorly
staffed, inadequately equipped, often ineffective, and subject to intimidation,
corruption, politicization, and patronage. Low salaries and a lack of internal
controls rendered judicial officials susceptible to bribery. Powerful special
interests, including criminal groups, exercised influence on the outcomes of some
court proceedings.
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Trial Procedures
The law provides for the right to a fair and public trial; however, the judiciary did
not always enforce these rights.
Credible observers noted problems in trial procedures, such as a lack of admissible
evidence (i.e., prosecution failed to submit sufficient evidence of guilt), judicial
corruption, witness intimidation, and an ineffective witness protection program.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
There were no reports of political prisoners or detainees.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
The law establishes an independent and impartial judiciary in civil matters,
including access to a court to seek damages for human rights violations. Litigants
may sue a criminal defendant for damages if authorized by a criminal court.
Individuals and organizations may appeal adverse domestic decisions to the Inter-
American Human Rights system.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home,
or Correspondence
Although the law generally prohibits such actions, a legal exception allows
government authorities to enter a private residence to prevent a crime or in case of
another emergency. There were credible complaints that police occasionally failed
to obtain the required authorization before entering private homes. As of August,
CONADEH had received 35 complaints.
On May 26, National Police officers allegedly entered the home of human rights
defender Deninson Escalante in El Palenque, Choluteca Department, without a
warrant, searched the house, and beat Escalante’s parents, brother, and nephew.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties
a. Freedom of Expression, Including for Members of the Press and
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Other Media
The law provides for freedom of expression, including for members of the press
and other media, with some restrictions, and the government generally respected
this right. Although many press outlets were politically aligned, the press and
prevailing democratic norms combined to promote freedom of expression,
including for members of the media.
The government allocated a budget of 20 million lempiras ($796,000) to operate a
protection mechanism for journalists, human rights defenders, and judicial sector
operators. As of August, it provided protection to 11 journalists and 16 social
media communicators, among other types of activists and human rights defenders.
Some nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) expressed concern regarding weak
implementation of the law, limited resources available to operate the government’s
protection mechanism, and insufficient training for new personnel after significant
personnel turnover during the year. Civil society organizations criticized the
government’s failure to investigate threats adequately.
The Honduran National Police’s Special Victim’s Investigations Unit, formerly
known as the Violent Crimes Task Force, investigated crimes against high-profile
and particularly vulnerable victims, including journalists as well as judges,
lawyers, and members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and
intersex (LGBTQI+) community.
Violence and Harassment: On May 26, unknown assailants shot and killed
Metro TV journalist Ricardo Ávila in Marcovia, Choluteca Department.
Authorities continued to investigate the incident. Journalists and other members of
civil society reported they were self-censoring due to fear of criticism, harassment,
and retribution by the government and its supporters. Others reported direct acts of
intimidation or threats of violence from government officials or supporters for
publicly being critical of the government.
Censorship or Content Restrictions for Members of the Press and Other
Media, Including Online Media: Media members and NGOs stated the press
self-censored due to fear of retaliation from criminal groups, drug trafficking
organizations, or corrupt government officials. The media also engaged in self-
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censorship to avoid losing lucrative advertising contracts with the government. On
September 16, the cabinet approved an executive decree to create a General
Directorate of Information and Press under the Ministry of Strategic Planning. The
government noted the decree was to better organize its own public relations efforts
and was not intended to monitor or control content.
Libel/Slander Laws: Citizens, including public officials, may initiate criminal
proceedings for libel and slander. No cases were reported during the year.
Nongovernmental Impact: Some journalists and other members of civil society
reported threats from members of criminal groups. It was unclear how many of
these threats were related to the victims’ professions or activism. Several
anonymous social media sites, possibly linked to political parties, criticized
journalists (as well as activists and civil society organizations) who were critical of
the government or of opposition party policies.
Internet Freedom
The government did not restrict or disrupt access to the internet or censor online
content, and there were no credible reports that the government monitored private
online communications without appropriate legal authority.
b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The constitution provides for the freedoms of peaceful assembly and association,
and the government generally respected these rights.
c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at
https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
d. Freedom of Movement and the Right to Leave the Country
The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration,
and repatriation, and the government generally respected these related rights.
In-country Movement: There were areas where authorities could not assure
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freedom of movement because of criminal activity and a lack of significant
government presence.
e. Protection of Refugees
The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and
assistance to refugees, returning refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as other
persons of concern.
Access to Asylum: The law provides for granting asylum or refugee status. The
government had a nascent system to provide legal protection to refugees. Its
operations to receive and process cases relied on substantial support from UNHCR.
Its support focused on providing training to officers of the National Institute for
Migration, ensuring support to deal with the backlog of asylum claims submitted
during the COVID-19 lockdown, and supporting the improvement of reception
conditions for asylum seekers.
Abuse of Migrants and Refugees: Transiting migrants, forcibly displaced
populations, and asylum seekers with pending cases were vulnerable to abuse and
sexual exploitation by criminal organizations. Women, children, and LGBTQI+
individuals were especially vulnerable to abuse. Transiting migrants, refugees, and
other vulnerable populations continued to face acute security risks in border zones.
f. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Center estimated there were approximately
247,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to violence in the country as of
2021. Gang activity, including attacks on and exploitation of nonmembers, was
the primary contributor to violence-related internal displacement. In addition, the
monitoring center estimated approximately 937,000 individuals were forcibly
displaced by 2020 natural disasters. Official data on forced displacement,
especially displacement due to violence, was limited in part because gangs
controlled many of the neighborhoods where individuals were forced from their
homes and communities (see section 6, Displaced Children). NGOs reported IDPs
were at increased risk of victimization and exploitation by criminal groups.
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The government maintained the Interinstitutional Commission for the Protection of
Persons Displaced by Violence and created the Directorate for the Protection of
Persons Internally Displaced by Violence within the Secretariat of Human Rights.
Both the secretariat and the commission focused on developing policies to address
IDPs. Additionally, under the Comprehensive Regional Protection and Solutions
Framework, with significant support from UNHCR, the Secretariat of Human
Rights and Secretariat of External Relations and International Cooperation
continued to build capacity to provide services to vulnerable populations, including
IDPs, those at risk of forced displacement, refugees, and returned migrants.
Despite incremental progress, government capacities remained relatively nascent
and limited.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
The law provides citizens the right to choose their government in free and fair
periodic elections held by secret ballot and based on nearly universal and equal
suffrage. The law does not permit active members of the military or civilian
security forces to vote. The constitution prohibits practicing clergy from running
for office or participating in political campaigns.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: In November 2021, Xiomara Castro of the LIBRE Party won a
four-year presidential term in elections that were generally considered free, fair,
and transparent. Some NGOs and political parties reported irregularities, including
late delivery of technology needed to transmit results, late opening of the polls,
poll workers with varying degrees of preparation and knowledge of the electoral
law and processes, and lack of transparency in campaign financing. International
observers acknowledged some of these irregularities but reported they were not
systematic and not widespread enough to affect the outcome of the presidential
election. Observers noted several significant improvements in transparency
procedures, including electoral reforms, an updated voter registry, new national
identification cards, and new technologies that included a biometric verification
system and a preliminary results transmission system.
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Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No laws limit the
participation of women or members of minority groups in the political process, and
they did participate.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in
Government
The law provides for criminal penalties for corruption by officials, but authorities
did not implement the law effectively, and officials continued to engage in corrupt
practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of government corruption.
On February 2, the National Congress passed a retroactive amnesty law that
absolved public officials who worked during the Zelaya Administration (2006-09)
of crimes. As of October, at least 24 defendants used the law to have corruption
cases dismissed.
On March 1, the National Congress repealed the Law for the Classification of
Public Documents Related to National Security and Defense, better known as the
Secrets Law. Civil society had criticized the law for limiting transparency and
allowing officials to use the classification of documents to hide corruption.
Corruption: On June 10, Marco Bográn, former director of INVEST-H, the
government entity tasked with making COVID-19 pandemic relief contracts with
private firms, was found guilty of aggravated fraud and sentenced to more than 10
years in prison and ordered to pay a fine of 1.475 billion lempiras ($58.7 million).
The court acquitted him of charges of violating official duties and fraud, but the
Public Ministry appealed the ruling on July 25.
On September 6, the Public Ministry charged former Minister of National Risk and
Contingency Management Gabriel Rubí and two other government officials with
fraud and violation of official duties for the nearly six million lempira ($239,000)
purchase in 2020 of a mobile hospital and COVID-19 isolation unit that was only a
tent. A lower court provisionally dismissed Rubí’s fraud charge on September 20,
and the Public Ministry appealed the decision.
Former First Lady Rosa Elena Bonilla de Lobo was found guilty of fraud and
misappropriation of public funds during a retrial on March 17. On September 21,
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the court sentenced her to more than 14 years in prison and ordered her to pay a
fine of more than 13 million lempiras ($518,000).
Section 5. Governmental Posture Towards International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally
operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials were somewhat cooperative
and responsive to their views, but some human rights organizations criticized
government officials for lack of access and responsiveness.
Government Human Rights Bodies: A semiautonomous commissioner for
human rights, Blanca Izaguirre, served as ombudsperson and investigated
complaints of human rights abuses. NGOs and other civil society groups generally
considered the commissioner independent but at times ineffective. With offices
throughout the country, the ombudsperson received cases that otherwise might not
have risen to national attention.
The Secretariat of Human Rights served as an advocate for human rights within the
government. The Public Ministry’s Office of the Special Prosecutor for Human
Rights handled cases involving charges of human rights abuses by government
officials. The Public Ministry also has a Special Prosecutor’s Office for the
Protection of Human Rights Defenders, Journalists, Social Communicators, and
Justice Officials. There is also a Human Rights Committee in the National
Congress. The Ministries of Security and of Defense both have human rights
offices that coordinate human rights-related activities with the Secretariat of
Human Rights.
Section 6. Discrimination and Societal Abuses
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes all forms of rape, including
spousal rape. The government considers rape a crime of public concern, and the
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state prosecutes suspected rapists even if survivors do not press charges. The
penalties for rape range from nine to 13 years’ imprisonment. The law was not
effectively enforced, and weak public institutional structures contributed to the
inadequate enforcement.
The law does not criminalize domestic violence but provides penalties of up to 12
years in prison for violence against a family member, depending on the severity of
the assault and aggravating circumstances. If a victim’s physical injuries do not
reach the severity required to categorize the violence as a criminal act, the legal
penalty for a first offense is a sentence of one to three months of community
service. Survivors of domestic violence are entitled to certain protective measures,
such as removing the abuser from the home and prohibiting the abuser from
visiting the victim’s work or other frequently visited places. Abusers caught in the
act may be detained for up to 24 hours as a preventive measure. The law provides
a maximum sentence of three years in prison for disobeying a restraining order
connected with the crime of violence against a woman.
Civil society groups reported that women often did not report domestic violence or
withdrew charges because they feared, or were economically dependent on, the
aggressor. In addition, women experienced delays in accessing justice due to
police who failed to process complaints in a timely manner or judicial system
officials who deferred scheduling hearings. The government attempted to enhance
its response to domestic violence by elevating the National Women’s Institute to a
cabinet-level secretariat in March. Observers noted this effort was insufficient due
to inadequate budget allocations, limited or no services in rural areas, absence of or
inadequate training about and awareness of domestic violence among police and
other authorities, and male-dominant culture and norms.
The government operated six consolidated reporting and support centers in major
cities and one mobile unit for the departments of Yoro and Cortés where women
could report crimes, seek medical and psychological attention, and receive other
services. These reporting centers were in addition to the 298 government-operated
women’s offices – one in each municipality – that provided a wide array of
services, focusing on education, personal finance, health, social and political
participation, environmental stewardship, and prevention of gender-based violence.
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Sexual Harassment: The law criminalizes sexual harassment, including in
employment, and stipulates penalties of one to three years in prison and possible
suspension of the abusers’ professional licenses. The government did not
effectively enforce the law.
Reproductive Rights: There were no reports of coerced abortion or involuntary
sterilization on the part of government authorities.
Contraception supplies were limited, as were many other critical medicines, due to
the government’s dismantling of its public health procurement system in May. The
law prohibits the sale, distribution, and use of emergency contraception for any
reason, including by survivors of sexual violence. The government provided
survivors of sexual violence access to other health-care services, such as
psychological and social support as well as testing and treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases.
In 2019 (most recent data), 94 percent of births were attended by skilled health-
care personnel; however, NGOs reported significant gaps in obstetric care,
especially in rural areas. The United Nations reported the adolescent birth rate was
89 births per 1,000 girls ages 15 to 19. UN human rights experts stated the lack of
access to contraception, particularly in rural areas, together with the prohibition of
emergency contraception, contributed to a high rate of adolescent pregnancy.
Discrimination: Although the law accords women and men the same legal rights
and status, including property rights in divorce cases, many women did not fully
enjoy such rights due to barriers in access to justice and lack of information
regarding legal protections. Most women in the workforce engaged in lower-status
and lower-paying informal occupations, such as domestic service, without the
benefit of legal protections.
Systemic Racial or Ethnic Violence and Discrimination
The law criminalizes discrimination based on race and ethnicity and includes
crimes committed against individuals because of race or ethnicity as aggravating
circumstances to increase penalties for criminal offenses.
CONADEH received no reports of racial or ethnic discrimination as of August.
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Nevertheless, observers said social discrimination against racial and ethnic groups
persisted, as did physical violence.
On May 1, unknown assailants killed Alonso Salgado, a former member of the
neighborhood council of the Río Tinto Garífuna community and a member of the
Garífuna rights organization OFRANEH, in Tela, Atlántida Department.
Authorities continued to investigate the incident.
The government’s National Policy to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination
seeks to promote equality and combat discrimination related to the country’s two
Afro-descendent and seven Indigenous groups (see below), with a focus on social
and political participation; access to education, health care, justice, and
employment opportunities; and rights to ancestral lands and natural resources.
NGOs reported the government did not effectively combat discrimination or
promote equal access to government services and employment opportunities.
NGOs also reported the government did not make sufficient efforts to comply with
Inter-American Court of Human Rights rulings, specifically cases related to
territorial rights for Garífuna communities.
Indigenous Peoples
In the 2013 census (most recent data), approximately 8.5 percent of the population
identified themselves as members of Indigenous communities, but other estimates
were higher. Indigenous groups included the Miskito, Tawahka, Pech, Tolupán,
Lenca, Maya-Ch'ortí, and Nahua. They had limited representation in the national
government and consequently little direct input into decisions affecting their lands,
cultures, traditions, and the allocation of natural resources.
Indigenous communities continued to report threats and acts of violence against
them and against community and environmental activists. Violence was often
rooted in a broader context of conflict over land and natural resources, corruption,
lack of transparency and community consultation, other criminal activity, and
limited state ability to protect the rights of vulnerable communities.
Ethnic minority rights leaders, international NGOs, and farmworker organizations
claimed the government failed to redress actions taken by security forces,
government agencies, private individuals, and businesses to dislodge Indigenous
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persons from lands over which they claimed ownership based on land reform law
or ancestral land titles.
Persons from Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities continued to
experience discrimination in employment, education, housing, and health services.
A 2019 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report noted there were
insufficient hospital beds and inadequate supplies at the only hospital that serviced
Gracias a Dios Department, home to most of the Miskito community.
Children
Birth Registration: Children derive citizenship by birth in the country, from the
citizenship of their parents, or by naturalization. Birth registration was provided
on a nondiscriminatory basis. Failure to register resulted in denial of public
services, including access to health services or school enrollment.
Child Abuse: The law establishes prison sentences of up to two and one-half
years for child abuse.
Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The minimum legal age of marriage for
both boys and girls is 18.
Sexual Exploitation of Children: The commercial sexual exploitation of
children, especially in sex trafficking, remained a problem, and the government did
not effectively enforce the law. The country was a destination for child sex
tourism, particularly in the tourist area of the Bay Islands. The legal age of consent
is 18. The law prohibits the use of children younger than 18 for exhibitions or
performances of a sexual nature or in the production of pornography.
Displaced Children: Civil society organizations reported that common causes of
forced displacement for youth included death threats for failure to pay extortion,
attempted recruitment by gangs, witnessing criminal activity by gangs or criminal
groups, domestic violence, attempted kidnappings, family members’ involvement
in drug dealing, victimization by traffickers, rape (including commercial sexual
exploitation by gangs), discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender
identity, sexual harassment, and discrimination for having a chronic medical
condition.
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According to data (most recent available) from the government and UNHCR, more
than 247,000 persons were displaced by violence between 2014 and 2018, of
whom 43 percent were children and adolescents.
Antisemitism
The Jewish community numbered approximately 150 members. There were no
reports of antisemitic acts.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on
Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity or Expression, or Sex
Characteristics
Criminalization: No laws exist to criminalize same-sex conduct.
Violence against LGBTQI+ Persons: NGOs reported police or other government
agents incited, perpetrated, condoned, or tolerated violence against LGBTQI+
individuals. Impunity for such crimes was high. The Public Ministry reported 17
violent deaths of LGBTQI+ persons as of September. NGOs reported 33 violent
deaths as of October and 17 hate crimes against LGBTQI+ persons as of August.
On January 10, unknown assailants shot and killed transgender activist Thalía
Rodríguez in her home in Tegucigalpa, Francisco Morazán Department.
Authorities charged two individuals with her murder, one of whom remained at
large. On December 2, the court found Aarón Jeriel Álvarez Pavón guilty of
Rodríguez’s murder. The sentencing hearing was scheduled for January 2023.
NGOs reported gangs engaged in “corrective rape” of lesbian or transgender
individuals.
Discrimination: The law criminalizes discrimination based on sexual orientation
and gender identity characteristics and includes crimes committed against
individuals because of their sexual orientation or gender identity as aggravating
circumstances to increase penalties for criminal offenses. Nevertheless,
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discrimination against LGBTQI+ persons throughout society persisted. As of
August, CONADEH received 25 reports of discrimination based on sexual
orientation. Same-sex couples and households headed by same-sex couples are not
eligible for the same legal protections available to opposite-sex married couples.
LGBTQI+ rights groups asserted that government agencies and private employers
engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. Transgender women were particularly
vulnerable to employment and education discrimination; many could find
employment only as sex workers, increasing their vulnerability to violence and
extortion.
Availability of Legal Gender Recognition: Transgender persons are prohibited
from changing their name and legal gender status.
Involuntary or Coercive Medical or Psychological Practices Specifically
Targeting LGBTQI+ Individuals: There were no reports of unnecessary
surgeries performed on intersex persons.
Restrictions of Freedom of Expression, Association, or Peaceful Assembly:
There were no restrictions of freedom of expression, association, or peaceful
assembly regarding LGBTQI+ matters or events.
Persons with Disabilities
The law requires that persons with disabilities have access to buildings, but few
buildings were accessible, and the government did not effectively implement laws
or programs to provide such access.
According to government estimates, children with disabilities attended school at a
lower rate than the general population. The Institute for National Statistics put net
enrollment for primary school at 77 percent in 2021, but the National Center for
Social Sector Information stated that in 2020, 43 percent of persons with
disabilities received no formal education.
The government has an Office for Persons with Disabilities located within the
Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion, but its ability to provide services to
persons with disabilities was limited. Mental-health professionals expressed
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concern regarding social stigma by families and communities against persons with
mental disabilities and a lack of access to mental-health care throughout the
country.
Other Societal Violence and Discrimination
Persons with HIV and AIDS continued to be targets of discrimination, and they
suffered disproportionately from gender-based violence.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The law grants workers the right to form and join unions of their choice, bargain
collectively, and strike. It prohibits employer retribution against employees for
engaging in trade union activities. The law places restrictions on these rights, such
as requiring that a recognized trade union represent at least 30 workers, prohibiting
foreign nationals from holding union offices, and requiring that union officials
work in the same substantive area of the business as the workers they represent.
The law prohibits members of the armed forces and police, as well as certain other
public employees, from forming labor unions. The Secretariat of Labor and Social
Security also requires that union leaders be employed under permanent contracts,
limiting the ability of seasonal agricultural workers to exercise their right to
freedom of association.
The law requires an employer to begin collective bargaining once workers
establish a union, and it specifies that if more than one union exists at a company,
the employer must negotiate with the largest.
The law allows only local unions to call strikes, prohibits labor federations and
confederations from calling strikes, and requires that a two-thirds majority of both
union and nonunion employees at an enterprise approve a strike. The law prohibits
workers from legally striking until direct negotiations and government-
accompanied mediation and conciliation have failed. The Secretariat of Labor has
the power to declare a work stoppage illegal and grants employers the ability to
discipline employees consistent with their internal regulations, including by firing
strikers, if the secretariat rules that a work stoppage is illegal. In addition, the law
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limits strikes in a wide range of sectors that the government designates as essential
services or that it considers would affect the rights of individuals in the larger
community to security, health, education, and economic and social well-being.
The law permits workers in public health care, social security, staple food
production, and public utilities (municipal sanitation, water, electricity, and
telecommunications) to strike if they continue to provide basic services. The law
also requires that public-sector workers involved in the refining, transportation,
and distribution of petroleum products submit their grievances to the Secretariat of
Labor before striking. The law permits strikes by workers in export-processing
zones and free zones for companies that provide services to industrial parks, but it
requires that strikes not impede the operations of other factories in such parks.
The government did not effectively enforce the law. Employers frequently refused
to comply with Secretariat of Labor orders that required them to reinstate workers
who had been dismissed for participating in union activities. Both the Secretariat
of Labor and the courts may order a company to reinstate workers, but the
secretariat lacked the personnel and transportation resources to verify compliance.
By law, the secretariat may fine companies that violate the right to freedom of
association. The law permits fines, and the penalty is commensurate with those for
other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination. Penalties were
sometimes applied against violators, but the failure of the government to collect
fines facilitated continued violations.
Workers had difficulty exercising the rights to form and join unions and to engage
in collective bargaining. Public-sector trade unionists raised concerns regarding
government interference in trade union activities, including its ignoring or
suspending collective agreements and its dismissals of union members and leaders.
Some employers either refused to engage in collective bargaining or made it very
difficult to do so. Some companies also delayed appointing or failed to appoint
representatives for required Secretariat of Labor-led mediation, a practice that
prolonged the mediation process and impeded the right to strike. Unions also
raised concerns that employers used temporary contracts to prevent unionization
and to avoid providing full benefits.
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The government investigated violence and threats of violence against union
leaders. Impunity for such crimes remained high, as was the impunity rate for all
types of crime.
The trial on murder charges of Josué Exequiel Martínez, Siriaco Mejía Santos,
Francisco López Lazo, and Mario Aníbal López Velásquez began on November
25. The four were accused of the 2020 killing of Félix Vásquez, leader of the
Union of Field Workers, a member of the Lenca community, an environmental
activist, and a LIBRE Party candidate for Congress. The court found the accused
guilty of the murder of Vásquez; at year’s end a date for sentencing was pending.
Medical personnel held nationwide strikes and protests on March 30, April 20-30,
May 31, and in certain regions on October 24. The purpose of the labor stoppage
and demonstrations was to denounce the nonpayment of wages by the Secretariat
of Health and other issues.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law prohibits and criminalizes all forms of forced labor, but the government
did not effectively implement or enforce the law.
Forced labor occurred in street vending, domestic service, the transport of illegal
drugs and other illicit goods, other criminal activity, and the informal sector.
Victims were primarily impoverished individuals in both rural and urban areas (see
section 7.c.). Children, including from Indigenous and Afro-descendant
communities, particularly Miskito boys, were at risk for forced labor in the
agriculture, manufacturing, fishing, mining, construction, and hospitality
industries. The law requires prisoners to work at least five hours a day, six days a
week.
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
See the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/child-labor/findings/.
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d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation
The law prohibits employment discrimination based on gender, age, sexual
orientation, gender identity, political opinion or affiliation, marital status, race or
ethnicity, national origin, language, place of residence, religion, family or
economic situation, disability, or health, including HIV or AIDS status. The law
prohibits employers from requiring pregnancy tests as a prerequisite for
employment. The law states that a woman’s employment should be appropriate to
her physical state and capacity. There were no reports of this law being used to
limit women’s employment.
The government did not effectively enforce these laws and regulations. Although
penalties include prison sentences of up to two years and fines, they were not
sufficient to deter violations. They were, however, commensurate with penalties
for violating laws related to civil rights, such as election interference. Penalties
were sometimes applied against violators.
The law criminalizes sexual harassment, including in employment. Violators face
penalties of one to three years in prison and possible suspension of their
professional licenses, but the government did not effectively enforce the law.
Many employers discriminated against women. The Secretariat of Labor posted
job opportunity announcements that specified a gender requirement. Most women
in the workforce engaged in lower-status and lower-paying informal occupations,
such as domestic service, without the benefit of legal protections. Persons with
disabilities, Indigenous and Afro-descendant persons, LGBTQI+ persons, and
persons with HIV or AIDS also faced discrimination in employment and
occupation (also see section 6).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Wage and Hour Laws: There are 45 categories of monthly minimum wage,
based on the industry and the size of a company’s workforce; minimum wages
were above the poverty line. The law does not cover domestic workers, the vast
majority of whom were women.
The law applies equally to citizens and foreigners, regardless of gender, and
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prescribes a maximum eight-hour shift per day for most workers, a 44-hour
workweek, and at least one 24-hour rest period for every six days of work. It also
provides for paid national holidays and annual leave. The law requires overtime
pay, bans excessive compulsory overtime, limits overtime to four hours a day for a
maximum workday of 12 hours, and prohibits the practice of requiring workers to
complete work quotas before leaving their place of employment. On April 28, the
National Congress repealed the 2014 hourly wage law, thus bringing all employees
under the national labor code and eliminating the previous differences in labor
benefits between hourly, temporary, and permanent employees. The repeal went
into effect on June 28.
In some industries, including agriculture, domestic service, and security, employers
did not respect maternity rights or pay minimum wage, overtime, or vacation. In
these sectors, employers frequently paid workers for the standard 44-hour
workweek irrespective of any additional hours they worked. In the security and
domestic service sectors, workers were frequently forced to work more than 60
hours per week but paid only for 44 hours. Employers frequently penalized
agricultural workers for taking legally authorized days off. Employers paid the
minimum wage inconsistently in other sectors.
Occupational Safety and Health: Occupational safety and health (OSH)
standards are appropriate for the main industries in the country, and OSH experts
actively identified unsafe conditions, including lack of personal protective
equipment against COVID-19, in addition to responding to workers’ OSH
complaints. There was no information available on any major industrial accidents.
By law, workers may remove themselves from situations that endanger their health
or safety without jeopardizing continued employment. Under the inspection law,
the Secretariat of Labor has the authority to temporarily shut down workplaces
where there is an imminent danger of fatalities.
Wage, Hour, and OSH Enforcement: The Secretariat of Labor is responsible for
enforcing wage, hour, and OSH laws, but it did so inconsistently and ineffectively.
Enforcement of OSH standards was particularly weak in the construction, garment
assembly, and agricultural sectors, as well as in the informal economy. Penalties
for violations of OSH law were commensurate with penalties for similar crimes but
rarely applied against violators and rarely collected.
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Civil society continued to raise problems with minimum wage violations,
highlighting agricultural companies in the south as frequent violators. The law
permits fines for wage and hour violations; these were commensurate with the
penalties for similar crimes, such as fraud. The government sometimes applied
penalties against violators, but failure to collect fines facilitated continued labor
code wage and hour violations. The Secretariat of Labor had an insufficient
number of inspectors to enforce the wage, hour, and OSH laws effectively. As of
August, inspectors conducted 14,221 total inspections, compared with 8,846 total
inspections for the same period in 2021. Inspectors have the authority to make
unannounced inspections and initiate sanctions.
While all formal workers are entitled to social security, there were reports that both
public- and private-sector employers failed to pay into the social security system.
The Secretariat of Labor may levy a fine against companies that fail to pay social
security obligations, but the amount was not sufficient to deter violations.
Informal Sector: Most workers were in the informal sector. According to 2021
Secretariat of Labor figures, approximately 75 percent of workers worked in the
informal economy, equivalent to approximately 2.7 million persons, while a 2020
UN Development Program report estimated that 82 percent of workers were part of
the informal economy. According to the report, informal workers played a large
role in nearly every industry, including agriculture and fishing; mining;
manufacturing; utilities; construction; wholesale, retail, hotels, and restaurants;
transport and storage; and personal services. These workers are not covered by the
contributory social security system and are not protected by the labor code.
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Hon. Merrick Garland Attorney General
Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
Hon. Alejandro Mayorkas
Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)
3801 Nebraska Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20016
David Neal, Director
Executive Office for Immigration Review
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
Ur Jaddou, Director
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS)
DHS
Lauren Alder Reid, Assistant Director
Office of Policy
Executive Office for Immigration Review
DOJ
Daniel Delgado, Acting Director,
Border and Immigration Policy,
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans,
DHS
Richard Revesz, Administrator
Office of Information & Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA)
Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
Executive Office of the President
March 1, 2023
Re:
Request to Provide a Minimum of 60 days for Public Comment in Response to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) (the Departments) Joint Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM): Circumvention of Lawful Pathways
Dear Attorney General Garland, Secretary Mayorkas, Director Neal, Director Jaddou, Assistant
Director Reid, Acting Director Delgado, and Mr. Revesz:
We, the undersigned 172 national, state, and local organizations, write to urge the Departments
to allow at least 60 days for public comment on the above referenced NPRM. We make this
request due to the length and complexity of the 153-page proposed rule and the critical interests
it implicates. As explained below, the Departments have no basis for merely providing a
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2
truncated comment period. A robust comment period is particularly important given the
devastating impact of this NPRM.
As President Biden recognized upon taking office, Executive Order 12866 governs the
regulatory process and requires agencies to “afford the public a meaningful opportunity to
comment on any proposed regulation, which in most cases should include a comment period of
not less than 60 days.” Executive Order 13563 likewise directs agencies to “...afford the public a
meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed regulation, with a
comment period that should generally be at least 60 days.” 60 days is the minimum, with some
courts referencing 90 days as the “usual” length period for comments. Nevertheless, the
Departments proceed with a 30-day comment period, citing their plan to “move as expeditiously
as possible” to implement this rule prior to the termination of Title 42 expulsions. Their haste
also indicates their intent to predetermine the outcome of this notice-and-comment period, rather
than afford a meaningful opportunity to impacted stakeholders.
There is no compelling reason to truncate the public comment period by half or two thirds, and
thereby deprive stakeholders of a meaningful opportunity to weigh in on the vast changes
proposed in this rule. Rather, the highly technical, nuanced, legal and policy issues the NPRM
addresses — and, above all, the severe human cost it is certain to inflict — illustrate why a
minimum of 60 days must be allowed for the public to file comments in response to the rule.
Despite this, the Departments have provided no plausible justification for providing only 30 days
for public comment.
The Departments explain this expedited time frame by citing the expected termination date for
Title 42 by May 11, when the COVID-19 public health emergency will expire. They cite the
possibility of increased encounters of asylum seekers who have waited for processing and lament
that DHS lacks the resources to prepare for this increase. They thus propose a rule that would
result in the summary returns of many asylum seekers, rather than offer them the process they
require under domestic and international law.
There is little merit to the Departments’ alarm regarding the impending end of Title 42; the
Departments have known this policy had an expiration date since the moment President Biden
took office. Indeed, the Biden administration has faced significant pressure to end the Trump-era
Title 42 policy since its inauguration, fielding letters from scores of epidemiologists and medical
experts, more than 100 members of Congress, as well as civil, human, and refugee rights
organizations urging the program’s end. This pressure extended to senior Biden administration
officials, who proceeded to resign in protest of the Biden administration’s continued use of Title
42.
Importantly, the Departments are relying on the impending expiration date of the Title 42 policy
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3
to truncate the comment period even though the Biden administration itself formally sought to
end the Title 42 policy nearly one full year ago. In April 2022, the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention announced its plan to do away with this Trump-era policy which it deemed “no
longer necessary.” DHS’ Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the highest funded federal law
enforcement agency in the nation, began to prepare for the end of Title 42 since April 2022 and
received $14.8 billion in the December 2022 omnibus appropriations package — significantly
more than the President’s budget request. In addition to its own preparations to end Title 42
months ago, the administration has faced the prospected end of Title 42 as it fought back
litigation from asylum seeking families who have challenged the legality of Title 42 for years.
In sum, the Biden administration has faced pressure to end Title 42 from the day it took office,
sought to end it nearly a year ago, has prepared for its end and received boosted funding from
Congress while facing years of litigation challenging the legality of this expulsion policy, and
now anticipates its predictable demise once the public health emergency lapses on May 11, 2023.
To claim, as the Departments do, that they now face an “urgent and extreme situation” appears
hyperbolic at best — and disingenuous at worst. This cannot justify truncating the comment
period and rushing towards the finalization of a rule of this magnitude.
This rule has vast implications on all stages of asylum processing, imposing new and complex
requirements on asylum seekers before they reach the border, during their initial fear screening,
as well as during immigration court review. The rule implicates substantive areas in domestic
asylum law as well as U.S. obligations under the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
Recycling prior Trump bans, this rule would foreclose asylum access to people via
unprecedented new requirements during their fear screenings, while in CBP detention, without
access to counsel, and with limited linguistic and legal access to understand the complex rules
they must navigate. The proposed rule further codifies the usage of a CBP app that has proven to
be chaotic, nearly inaccessible for Black asylum seekers, and altogether disastrous for its own
purported goal of orderly processing at ports of entry.
The Departments engineered this rule to adversely impact large numbers of asylum seekers and
“decrease the number of asylum grants,” resulting in a five-year bar for people returned to harm.
In other words, the implications of this proposed rule are potentially deadly for countless asylum
seekers, including children. The human cost is beyond measure and demands the most careful
research, analysis, and public consultation. It is highly inappropriate to afford the public a mere
30 days to comment on a proposal that violates domestic laws and international obligations on its
face.
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4
To honor the public’s right to a meaningful and fair opportunity to respond to the NPRM,
consistent with the Executive Orders cited above and the spirit and intent of the Administrative
Procedure Act, a comment period of a minimum of 60 days must be provided.
Please contact Azadeh Erfani at aerfani@heartlandalliance.org with any questions or concerns,
and we look forward to your prompt response.
Sincerely,
National
The Advocates for Human Rights
African Communities Together (ACT)
African Human Rights Coalition
Alianza Americas
America's Voice
American Immigration Lawyers Association
Americans for Immigrant Justice
Amnesty International USA
Asian Americans Advancing Justice | AAJC
Asian Pacific Institute on Gender-Based Violence
ASISTA Immigration Assistance
Asylum Seeker Advocacy Project (ASAP)
The Black Alliance for Just Immigration (BAJI)
Border Kindness
Boston University School of Law, Immigrants' Rights and Human Trafficking Program
Bridges Faith Initiative
Capital Area Immigrants' Rights (CAIR) Coalition
CASA
Catholic Legal Immigration Network, Inc.
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies
Center for Law and Social Policy
Center for Popular Democracy
Center for Victims of Torture
Children's HealthWatch
The Children's Partnership
Church World Service
Civil Rights Education and Enforcement Center
Communities United for Status & Protection (CUSP)
Community Change Action
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5
Comunidad Maya Pixan Ixim
Congregation of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, U.S. Provinces
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship
Disciples Immigration Legal Counsel
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC)
Esperanza United
Fight for the Future
FIRM Action
First Focus on Children
Franciscan Action Network
Freedom Network USA
Friends Committee on National Legislation
Futures Without Violence
Government Information Watch
Haitian Bridge Alliance
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program
HIAS
Hope Border Institute
Human Rights First
Immigration Center for Women and Children
Immigration Equality
The Immigration Hub
Immigration Law & Justice Network
Immigrant Legal Resource Center
Innovation Law Lab
Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti
International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP)
Japanese American Citizens League
Justice Action Center
Justice for Migrant Women
Justice in Motion
Kids in Need of Defense
Kino Border Initiative
Latin America Working Group (LAWG)
Lawyers for Good Government
MPower Change
Maryknoll Office for Global Concerns
Mennonite Central Committee U.S.
MomsRising/MamásConPoder
Muslim Advocates
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6
NAKASEC
National Advocacy Center of the Sisters of the Good Shepherd
National Coalition Against Domestic Violence
The National Domestic Violence Hotline
National Education Association
National Immigrant Justice Center
National Immigration Law Center
The National Immigration Project (NIPNLG)
National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights
National Network to End Domestic Violence
National Partnership for New Americans
NETWORK Lobby for Catholic Social Justice
Never Again Action
Oxfam America
Refugees International
Sakhi For South Asian Women
Save the Children
Sisters of Mercy of the Americas Justice Team
South Asian Americans Leading Together (SAALT)
Southern Border Communities Coalition
Southern Poverty Law Center
Sunita Jain Anti-Trafficking Policy Initiative , Loyola Law School
Tahirih Justice Center
Taylor Levy Law
T'ruah
UndocuBlack Network
Unitarian Universalist Association
Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
USAHello
U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI)
VECINA
Washington Office on Latin America
We Are All America
#WelcomeWithDignity campaign for asylum rights
Welcoming America
Witness at the Border
Women's Refugee Commission
Young Center for Immigrant Children's Rights
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7
State
Advocates for Basic Legal Equality
Alabama Coalition for Immigrant Justice
Aldea - The People's Justice Center
Al Otro Lado
Catholic Charities Community Services, Immigrant & Refugee Services, NY
Center for Safety & Change
Central Washington Justice For Our Neighbors
The Children's Partnership
Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights (CHIRLA)
Colorado Children's Campaign
Daya Inc.
Fellowship Southwest
Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project
Honest Law Group
Hope Border Institute
Immigrant ARC
Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project
Immigrant Legal Center
Iowa Migrant Movement for Justice
Just Neighbors
Legal Aid Justice Center
Make the Road Nevada
Make the Road New York
Mariposa Legal, Program of COMMON Foundation
Michigan Immigrant Rights Center
Mobilization for Justice, Inc.
New York Immigration Coalition
Oasis Legal Services
OneAmerica
Our Children Oregon
Rocky Mountain Immigrant Advocacy Network
Safe Passage Project
Sanctuary for Families
Surveillance Technology Oversight Project
Tennessee Justice for Our Neighbors
Texas Civil Rights Project
Wind of the Spirit Immigrant Resource Center
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8
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CLP_PC_025287
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 34 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
1/12
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through
mobile app error messages for few appointments into
the U.S.
! " #$% & ' (
)* +,,-$$+)
CLP_PC_025454
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 35 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
2/12
On a recent morning, a woman from central Mexico held a phone up to
her face outside of the Tijuana municipal building and took a picture. It was the first
day that a U.S. government phone app offered port of entry appointments to migrants
hoping to request asylum.
Error, the app said.
A city official rushed to help her. Together, they took another photo close to her face.
Error again.
The official moved her to spot where the splotchy shadows from the trees didn’t reach
her face. They took another picture. Another error.
The woman’s experience was similar to that of many migrants across the city who
have been trying to use the app, called CBP One, now the only way to walk into a port
of entry to request protection in the United States. The facial recognition technology
used to submit a photo to the app has been particularly prone to error since it
launched on Jan. 12, and it is one of many issues that migrants and their advocates
have noted since the app’s rollout.
CLP_PC_025455
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 36 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
3/12
!
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CBP One is part of a series of border policy changes that continue to shift the United
States away from the international norm of migrants being allowed to apply for
asylum once they’re on the soil of the country where they plan to seek protection.
Many of these changes, including CBP One, have meant that those with more
resources have easier access to asylum screenings while many of the most vulnerable
cases are left out.
Lack of reliable Internet and limited digital savvy, as well as language barriers, are
among the issues that are already separating who can get appointments in the new
process and who cannot.
The application is now the only way for migrants to request exemptions to Title 42, a
policy that blocks asylum seekers and other undocumented migrants from coming
onto U.S. soil and instructs border officials to expel those who do so without
CLP_PC_025456
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 37 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
4/12
permission, skipping the generally legally-required screening to see if they qualify for
protection.
The exemptions are supposed to be for particularly vulnerable migrants, such as
those who have immediate medical or safety concerns while waiting in Mexico.
Asylum seekers have to attest that they meet at least one vulnerability category when
they submit their applications, but they do not know until they get to CBP at the port
of entry whether they will be accepted.
!"#$ % &'
On the first day that migrants could request appointments in the CBP One app,
Tijuana’s Office of Migrant Services set up a Wi-Fi zone outside of the municipal
CLP_PC_025457
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 38 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
5/12
building with officials ready to help migrants submit their information to Customs
and Border Protection.
A small number of migrants found the support tent, and officials walked them
through the process. Officials even took their height and weight measurements to be
as accurate as possible.
By mid-afternoon, the officials had managed to finish the process for three families, a
total of nine people, according to Enrique Lucero, the head of the office.
But the appointments quickly filled.
A 22-year-old woman who had fled the Mexican state of Michoacán started the
process with city officials that morning, but by the time they had gotten the
application to accept photos for her and all of her three children, there were no more
appointments, she said.
Over a week later, she still hadn’t been able to book one. She said that in the shelter
where she’s staying, the app moves very slowly, likely a result of poor Internet quality.
CLP_PC_025458
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 39 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
6/12
! " #
When it launched the app as a way for migrants to request entry, CBP said that it
would offer two weeks of appointments at a time. That means that every morning at 6
a.m., one more day of appointments opens up.
There are 200 appointments per day at the San Ysidro Port of Entry, according to
CBP. The agency declined to say how many were available borderwide.
Further complicating matters, as appointments on the app filled up, some migrants
only saw available slots at far away ports of entry, according to Marcos Tamariz,
deputy head of mission in Mexico for Doctors Without Borders. That meant that
some of the Tijuana appointments were booked by migrants in Matamoros, a city on
the eastern end of the border across from Brownsville, Texas.
CLP_PC_025459
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 40 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
7/12
Routes along the border from Matamoros to Tijuana are among the most dangerous
in Mexico, he said, “so asking them to move from one place to another is not as easy
as it seems.”
“There is lots of frustration behind this and not sufficient guidance or information
that would allow people to make the best decision,” he said.
!
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#! $ %&
The use of the app, especially when coupled with the quick disappearance of
appointments, has led to disparities.
CLP_PC_025460
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 41 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
8/12
People who have weak Internet connections struggle to get the app to work. While the
city of Tijuana reinforced the Wi-Fi network at a city-run shelter it opened up late last
year to receive expelled Venezuelans, migrants in other shelters or on the street often
have little access to reliable Internet. Some don’t have cellphones.
The first appointments offered by the app were Thursday.
On that morning, the Union-Tribune observed mostly groups of Russians showing up
for appointments as migrants arrived at El Chaparral plaza on the south side of the
port of entry and walked up to the special entrance for CBP One processing.
Russian asylum seekers tend to have the financial resources to stay in hotels in
Tijuana rather than shelters, meaning they have access to better Internet.
As the Russians walked by, a man, his wife and four children who had recently fled
Michoacán sat on the sidewalk. The man held two phones, trying to navigate the app.
The first several pages were in English.
Once he managed to get past those, he still struggled even though the rest of the app
was in Spanish. After missing the link to create an account for several minutes, he
finally managed to input an email address. He waited for the confirmation email, but
it never came. He tried again, still no email. It was not clear what the man needed to
do differently.
That same day, at Templo Embajadores de Jesus migrant shelter, where well over
1,000 migrants are waiting to request asylum in the United States, only one of the
people interviewed by the Union-Tribune had heard of the app — and only because
she had been at the city building.
The shelter had had more immediate issues to deal with besides the app. The rains
that flooded much of San Diego and Tijuana shortly after the app’s launch had
CLP_PC_025461
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 42 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
9/12
destroyed the road leading up to the canyon shelter.
! "# $ % &
Those storms also created more difficult conditions for the migrants waiting inside.
New arrivals to the Embajadores shelter sleep on mats on the floor until beds open
up. They shared stories of the building flooding, soaking them and their bedding.
Many had gotten sick as a result.
Since then, none of those interviewed by the Union-Tribune have succeeded in
booking appointments. They try every morning at 6 a.m., but it is always full.
The app is even more complicated for those who don’t speak English or Spanish.
Even though Haitians are one of the nationalities recently included in expulsions, the
app is not available in Haitian Creole.
CLP_PC_025462
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 43 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
10/12
“We are already seeing rampant misinformation and scams around this program, and
the lack of equity around language access is opening yet another avenue for the
exploitation of Haitian migrants who are left confused, frustrated and in limbo,” said
Guerline Jozef, executive director of Haitian Bridge Alliance. “We are extremely
disappointed that once again the system continues to fail Black migrants in search of
protection.”
Erika Pinheiro, executive director of legal services nonprofit Al Otro Lado, said she
was concerned about reports from migrants in Tijuana that those with darker skin,
including both Black and Indigenous migrants, were having a particularly hard time
getting the photo portion of the app to work.
Studies of facial recognition software have shown that the technology tends to have
more errors when screening these demographic groups.
CLP_PC_025463
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 44 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
11/12
! "#
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Jesús, a Cuban man who asked not to be fully identified because of his ongoing
vulnerable situation, is waiting anxiously for his CBP One appointment.
Jesús fled Cuba in December and was expelled from the United States in early
January.
He left because of government surveillance and harassment and the effect that had on
his business fixing washing machines, he said.
“I’ll summarize it in one sentence — there is no freedom,” he said of Cuba. “There is
no freedom for anything.”
He said Border Patrol agents made him throw away his belongings except for his
documents when they apprehended him after he crossed in the Mexicali area. Then
CLP_PC_025464
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 45 of 1030
3/15/23, 2:19 PM
Asylum seekers in Tijuana are scrambling through mobile app error messages for few appointments into the U.S. - The San Diego Union-Tribune
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/immigration/story/2023-01-22/cbp-one-app-asylum-tijuana
12/12
!"
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Kate Morrissey
they put him on a bus and, without telling him where he was going, sent him to the
border where he was expelled to Tijuana.
“My world fell,” he said in Spanish. “I made so many sacrifices. To be returned is
something really hard.”
He’s been staying at the shelter run by the city of Tijuana converted from a sports
complex. He filled out the CBP One application on the first morning it was available,
he said, and was able to get an appointment. His friend who tried later in the day was
not.
Still, he’s fearful that CBP could reject him.
Los Angeles Times staff writer Andrea Castillo contributed to this report.
CLP_PC_025465
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 46 of 1030
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Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 56 of 1030
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The app is now the only way for people seeking asylum outside the U.S. to make an appointment for a claim
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NOGALES, México — Lidia is frowning at the smartphone screen. The face staring
back at her, a blonde-haired woman wearing a Carhartt beanie and heavy mascara
around her large blue eyes, is modeling how asylum-seekers should position their
faces on the federal government’s CBP One mobile app.
“Captura de Rostro,” the message above the blonde woman’s face reads. “Face
Capture,” followed by “Touch anywhere to continue.”
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Lidia is an Indigenous Mam woman from Oaxaca. Mam are a Mayan people who
speak the Mam language primarily in Guatemala and in the states of southern
México. She touches the screen of her phone, where the blonde-woman’s face is,
and tries to take a selfie.
“Error,” the screen responds.
“I don’t look like her,” Lidia says, repositioning herself to try to catch more light
from the window. “Maybe that’s the problem.”
Lidia is short, hardly 5-feet tall, has round cheeks, dark brown hair. She helps her
little girl climb into the chair next to her.
Lidia is one of more than two dozen asylum-seekers who, on a recent Friday in
early February, are attending a troubleshooting workshop in Nogales, Sonora.
Migrant-rights volunteers have been hosting the crash courses around a long card
table in a large room with a whiteboard.
Currently, the app is the only way for asylum-seekers outside the United States to
gain an exemption and make an appointment at a port of entry to levy an asylum
claim. Nogales is the only port in Arizona where asylum-seekers can make an
appointment, which concentrates asylum-seekers in a city where they have few
resources or people to depend on.
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In the closed-in patio visible through a wall of windows, volunteers are finishing
cleaning up and eating a late breakfast. In the classroom, other volunteers are
helping people navigate their legal and human rights via a flawed Custom and
Border Protection app.
For years, the number of people coming to the United States to seek asylum has
been rising.
In March of 2020, the Trump administration invoked an antiquated public health
code, known as Title 42, to automatically expel anyone crossing the U.S. border
without authorization. Since then, the overwhelming majority of people coming to
or crossing the U.S.-México border to seek humanitarian protection have been
blocked or pushed back.
The move was the culmination of years of efforts to limit asylum, turning various
sites in northern México into de facto refugee camps.
AZ Luminaria stories
delivered to your inbox
Enter your email
To mitigate the crisis, the Kino Border Initiative, or KBI, which has been assisting
migrants in northern Sonora for decades, offering a safe space, beds, food, medical
assistance, as well as some legal and social services, expanded its role and capacity.
Now volunteers also assist the new population of people blocked from seeking
safety, dealing with the precarity of northern México, and unable to return to their
home states or countries.
KBI holds twice-weekly workshops, basically asylum-seeker Geek Squad sessions,
says Gia Del Pino, the organization’s director of communications.
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CBP One, purported to help streamline access to claiming asylum, uses facial
recognition software to compare the faces of people seeking asylum with their
other identity documents. It also runs their faces through a terrorist and national
security database.
The problem? The technology seems unable to recognize many faces, especially
when people have darker skin tones or Indigenous features — when they don’t look
like the blonde model on the screen’s background.
Advocates are finding that Black asylum-seekers, from Haiti and African countries,
or elsewhere, face greater bias using the app, as the algorithm doesn’t recognize
their skin tone.
Lidia and all other asylum-seekers in this article — all of whom fear persecution in
their home countries and insecurity and danger in northern México — are only
identified by their first names.
Critics argue that long-standing legal complications, discrimination and other
hurdles to gaining asylum have now been compounded by the Biden
administration’s new app mandate.
Faltering facial recognition technology is only one of a host of complaints asylum-
seekers and advocates have enumerated about the app. It also needs a strong
signal or Wi-Fi to work and requires two-factor authentication. That’s a problem
for less wealthy or less tech-literate people without emails. And it is only available
in three languages — English, Spanish, and, as of recently and after criticism from
Haitian migrants, Haitian Creole.
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All of that puts what was once a straightforward, though harrowing and legally
difficult, act for asylum-seekers behind a technological wall. Human-rights
advocates argue that the process of fleeing to the border and asking for asylum
protection is now derailed by an app that’s endangering lives as people worry at
their phones and languish in northern México.
The app has been around for years, but was recently updated as part of a series of
new initiatives by the Biden administration.
Ports of entry were closed to asylum-seekers because of the Title 42 public health
order. After multiple lawsuits and missed expiration dates, the measure could end
in May, as the federal government reviews public comments on new asylum
regulations and moves to terminate the COVID-19 national and public health
order.
The app, according to a Jan. 12 Department of Homelands Security announcement,
was meant to “reduce wait times and help ensure safe, orderly, and streamlined
processing.”
But as Lidia and many others testify, the app is having the opposite effect: one
more tool used by the U.S. government to deny asylum and push impoverished and
endangered migrants away from U.S. territory.
Eleanor Acer, Director, Refugee Protection, Human Rights First, said in a recent
press call that the Biden administration is effectively “advancing the Trump
administration’s agenda.”
“Neither U.S. or international law requires access to technology in order to be able
to exercise your human rights to seek asylum,” Acer said. “There’s no question that
the CBP One app should not be, legally, morally, or otherwise, the only way in
which people can access asylum in the United States.”
A March 13 letter from 35 members of Congress, including Raúl Grijalva, D-Ariz.,
addressed to DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas cites their offices having
“received numerous reports of inusability, inaccessibility, and inequity that have
already resulted in grave harm to asylum-seekers” because of reliance on the CBP
One app.
In the KBI workshop in Sonora, less than a mile from the U.S. border, Lidia
repositions herself, tries to find better light from the window, and again faces the
blonde model.
Lidia explains that she doesn’t know how to read very much, having only attended
one year of school. She is struggling to figure out not just how to take and upload
her photo, but how to complete all the other portions of the app that would allow
her to present at the U.S.-México border.
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“I have to figure it out,” she says, looking at her kids. “More than anything it’s for
them.”
Her two children, 6 and 4, are playing in chairs next to her. Lidia explains that
violence in her small community in Chiapas has forced teachers to abandon the
local school. Shootouts became common, and she was scared not only that she’d be
unable to give her kids an education, but that she’d be unable to keep them alive.
After a weeks-long bus journey to the U.S.-México border, the biggest obstacle she
now faces is a phone app.
Since the passage of the Refugee Act in 1980, which brought U.S. law into line with
protocols first established in the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, anybody
who is inside the United States, no matter how they arrived, or who shows up at
the U.S. border, was given a chance to apply for asylum.
While there have long been exceptions to who may be granted asylum, and in
practice the policy discriminated against certain nationalities, the principle of
offering protection to those who needed it was unquestioned. That began to
markedly change during the Trump administration when White House and the
Department of Homeland Security officials made concerted efforts to restrict both
asylum and refugee procedures.
In the two months since the Biden administration announced its overhaul of the
system for seeking asylum, which is pending possible changes that would not go
into effect until May, policymakers and national and international lawyers have
been talking with people on the ground.
They’re trying to assess how the rollout of CBP One for asylum-seekers is already
causing turmoil. They hear stories from people like the volunteer Geek Squad at
KBI in Nogales trying to help migrants like Lidia and her children secure their
safety, rights and navigate a technological nightmare.
The CBP One App is part of a multipronged strategy the Biden administration is
implementing in attempts to reduce the numbers of migrants, mostly asylum-
seekers, arriving at the U.S. southern border.
Other efforts include a policy that permits as many as 30,000 people from
Venezuela, Cuba, Haiti, and Nicaragua to be paroled into the U.S. every month, at
the same time that 30,000 from each country can be immediately expelled into
México. The program has expanded from last fall when it initially applied only to
Venezuelans, and which was, in turn, modeled on a similar program for Ukrainians.
Parole is only temporary, not a pathway to citizenship, and does not let those who
qualify to bring family members over as well.
On Feb. 21, the Biden administration announced its most restrictive measures,
which would deny asylum to people who passed through another country without
seeking protection there first and penalize them if they cross the border without
authorization. The penalization directly contravenes existing U.S. law, which states
that any migrant “who is physically present in the United States,” regardless of
status or where they are, may apply for asylum.
In the text of the proposed new regulation, which is up for public comment and is
scheduled to go into effect in May, the CBP One app is described as “an innovative
mechanism for noncitizens to schedule a time to arrive at ports of entry.”
People may provide feedback on the proposed regulation through March 27.
The new rule would expand the use of the app, as most asylum-seekers outside of
the United States would need to use the app to request protection.
“Use of this app protects migrants from having to wait in long lines of unknown
duration at the ports of entry, and enables the ports of entry to manage the flows
in a safe and efficient manner,” according to the text of the new rule.
While the rule claims that the app is “creating efficiencies” in asylum processing,
the administration also acknowledges that they are “aware of concerns regarding
the accessibility” of the app.
They also note that there may be exceptions to the requirement to use the app, as
long as the asylum-seeker “demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that
it was not possible to access or use the CBP One app due to language barrier,
illiteracy, significant technical failure, or other ongoing and serious obstacle.”
CBP officials did not respond to detailed questions about the inaccessibility of the
app.
The proposed asylum regulations are “a death sentence for the poor, Indigenous,
LGBTQ+, African, and other communities who don’t have the luxury of buying a
direct ticket to the United States,” said Bilal Askaryar, interim campaign manager
of the #WelcomeWithDignity campaign.
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#
The facial-recognition software that Lidia and others are contending with is only a
small part of the problem with CBP One. “The app is very glitchy,” says Gia, the KBI
spokesperson.
Erika Pinheiro, the executive director of Al Otro Lado, a migrant rights
organization based in Tijuana, echoed Gia’s sentiment: “You have to go through
multiple screens and it just keeps on crashing.”
At the KBI workshop, one man, José, from the state of Guerrero, holds out his
phone to explain that his Google Chrome operating system kept wanting to fill in
the boxes itself, but when he gave it permission to do so, it wouldn’t, and when he
denied it permission, it just asked again.
“What do I do?” José asks his neighbor, Rafael, an asylum-seeker from Peru. Rafael
shows him his own phone, which was displaying the message: “The code sent is
invalid.”
Another man, his voice pitched with desperation, says. “I don’t even have an email.”
Gia is standing at the head of the series of tables around which two dozen men and
women along with a few children are thumb-stumbling on their phones
CLP_PC_025499
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 57 of 1030
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John Washington is an investigative journalist based in Tucson with a focus on
immigration and borders, as well as criminal justice and literature. His first
book, "The Dispossessed: A Story of Asylum... % ! "
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women, along with a few children, are thumb stumbling on their phones.
“Is anybody else trying to figure out how to get an email?” she asks.
Six hands go up.
“Does anybody else have problems simply putting in their email”?
Eight hands.
“Anybody have trouble understanding what the app is asking you?”
Five hands.
“Anyone struggling to take a photo?”
Nine hands.
“The application no está bien hecha,” Gia says. It’s not well-built.
She suggests trying to close it and restart, but admits that doing so will require
you to fill out everything again. With the patience and equanimity of a
schoolteacher, after further general announcements and answers, Gia begins a
series of circles around the tables, leaning over shoulders, swiping across screens,
and trying to answer and troubleshoot specific issues.
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“There’s things that we anticipated that are even worse than what we thought,
especially the racially-disparate access,” said Erika, from Al Otro Lado.
Asylum-seekers from Haiti face particular difficulties. When the app was first
expanded in January to be used by asylum-seekers, it didn’t have an option for
Haitian Creole speakers. As of March 16, the app’s Haitian Creole website is a
nearly illegible word jumble. It’s not the only instance of CBP websites not being
accessible to Haitians.
Laura Wagner, the Haitian Creole Team Lead at Respond Crisis Translation, said
that some of CBP’s websites are clearly just using Google translation services.
“Haitian migrants are faced not only with glitchy web platforms that don’t work
well, display error messages in English, and often fail to recognize people with
darker skin,” Wagner said, “but also with poorly-translated Kreyòl — when those
websites or platforms are translated at all.”
Jean Jeef Nelson, a case manager for Haitian Bridge Alliance, explained that even
when the Haitian Creole translations do work on the app, they only do so for the
first steps of trying to book an appointment. Then the app switches back to English
or Spanish. All of the error messages, he noted, are in English.
“We have folks who are illiterate who were compelled to pay as much as $500
dollars for help filling out the app,” Nelson said, describing the situation with
Haitian asylum-seekers in Tijuana.
Jake Wiener, an attorney at Electronic Privacy Information Center, or EPIC, a DC-
based organization that focuses on privacy and freedom of expression, worries
that “an app that functions poorly can deter people from applying for asylum or
spread mistrust of programs that are designed to protect and benefit asylum-
seekers.”
When CBP pushes migrants to use an app like CBP One, they are asking migrants
to trust them to handle their data safely and use it responsibly.
Jake worries about the new technology “creating virtual border walls.”
“Any tech should be used to solve real problems and improve access to services,”
Jake added, “not to expand surveillance and discourage migrants.”
Reliance on new technology can be frustrating for anyone. When it’s a matter of
life or death, the frustration takes on a new dimension.
“It can also be traumatizing to have your family’s safety come down to luck with an
app,” said Chelsea Sachau, managing attorney of the Florence Immigrant & Refugee
Rights Project’s Border Action Team.
“Many of the people we serve have told us they feel powerless to protect their kids
and families when they aren’t able to get an appointment despite trying every
morning.”
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The problems asylum-seekers are facing with the app are more than just technical.
The app’s failures have repercussions beyond the frustration familiar to anyone
who deals with modern technology.
Asylum-seekers are, by definition, fleeing for their lives. And while many of them
may have left the most pressing dangers far behind them — in South America, the
Caribbean, or elsewhere — northern México has repeatedly proven itself to be
dangerous, even deadly, for migrants.
Over the past years, as successive U.S. administrations have sought to block
asylum-seekers from accessing U.S. territory, various organizations have
extensively documented a host of abuses against migrants, including intimidation,
extortion, kidnapping, rape, enslavement, and murder.
Omar, 22, has been struggling with the CBP One app for a month. He is terrified of
what may become of him.
Originally from El Salvador, Omar was forced to flee after a gang in his hometown
gave him an ultimatum: either join their ranks, or, they said to him, “we’ll deal with
you.”
He knew what dealing with him meant: almost certain death. So he and his family
collected all the money they could, about $700 dollars, and he headed north.
Soon after crossing the border from Guatemala into México, he says he was
kidnapped by armed men in police uniforms. He suspects they were not actual
police officers, but isn’t sure. After three days of threats, and watching a fellow
migrant beaten to the precipice of death, he escaped.
His travails in México were not over.
As he continued north by bus, he was robbed by police, who forced him to pay a
bribe to continue traveling. And once he arrived in Nogales, a group of young men,
recognizing that he wasn’t a local, told him he’d have to start paying a fee to live in
Nogales.
A few days after first trying to schedule his appointment on the app and find safety
across the border, with no luck, his cellphone broke. That meant he was out of the
game for nearly two weeks as he struggled to raise the money to buy a new phone.
He eventually got a Samsung Galaxy S10e, which cost him more than $300.
After staying for a bit more than a week at the KBI shelter, Omar was now sharing
a small apartment, and had even landed a job. But after more than a month of
struggling with the app, he still hasn’t found an appointment.
Omar says that he’s dealing with discrimination in Nogales. He’s paid less at the
laundromat than his coworkers who are Mexican, and he’s scared to ask for more.
With hundreds of publicized cases of asylum-seekers being extorted, kidnapped, or
murdered, he’s trying as much as possible to maintain a low profile.
“I’m scared something will happen to me here. I wasn’t going to stay in El Salvador
to die, and I don’t want to stay here and die either,” Omar says.
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“The stress is killing us,” says Rafael, another asylum seeker from Peru. He
continues fussing at his phone, showing screen-grabs of error messages. He holds
the phone up and a CBP seal, ringed by a blue line continuously circling.
“No carga, no carga, no carga, no carga, no carga,” Rafael says, complaining about
the app not loading.
“It’s like they’re making fun of us,” he says. And then adds, “I want to cry.”
A man next to Rafael has a torn off bit of a candy box with his email and password
scratched onto it. He’s quiet and patiently waiting for help.
Another man was standing against a wall for at least twenty minutes, staring at the
blonde woman’s face and trying to break through the facial recognition: “No me
sale,” he says. It’s not coming out.
Omar says, “I remember when Biden, before he became president, said he’d help
migrants, but he’s doing the opposite.”
“Just give us a chance,” he says, getting choked up behind his mask. “We’re not
coming because we want to, but we have to, it’s our destiny. We’re not trying to do
anything bad, we just want to live.”
He pulls his cap down low, trying to hide his tears. That’s the constant predicament
asylum-seekers in northern México deal with: hide or blend in so as not to become
targets of crime at the same time they need to make their faces visible to a CBP
algorithm that, in many cases, refuses to recognize them.
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CLP_PC_025500
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 58 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
57,674
192,001
227,547
50,014
209,840
204,087
40,929
213,593
200,162
33,049
189,034
207,834
23,237
180,597
241,136
17,106
178,795
235,785
34,460
173,277
222,574
36,687
101,099
166,010
154,998
36,585
78,414
154,874
156,770
40,565
73,994
179,253
251,995
42,643
72,113
174,845
234,930
45,139
71,929
164,837
231,260
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
1M
2M
3M
Encounter Count
1,105,925
1,663,278
353,168
699,482
479,728
560,646
271,597
70,994
146,925
152,057
33,239
57,673
2,108
2,963
1,201
687
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
458,088
1,734,686
2,378,944
1,029,953
0K
100K
200K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
All
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
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CLP_PC_025573
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 59 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
3,883
14,358
11,900
3,103
18,806
11,341
2,509
18,954
13,268
1,691
15,230
15,250
1,008
14,052
14,675
741
17,067
12,169
3,221
18,870
14,137
3,490
9,402
11,979
10,870
3,076
5,820
8,748
9,382
3,639
4,965
11,878
12,279
3,677
4,591
13,929
13,127
3,201
4,810
12,783
12,015
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
50K
100K
150K
Encounter Count
146,925
152,057
33,239
57,673
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
33,239
146,925
152,057
57,673
0K
5K
10K
15K
20K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
UC / Single Minors
Citizenship
All
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV 8&6LQJOH0LQRUV
CLP_PC_025574
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 60 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
2,359
4,812
26,178
2,181
4,496
19,060
1,567
3,559
20,098
947
3,072
16,172
535
2,664
25,643
164
3,288
34,839
432
5,700
32,153
596
3,848
16,557
753
655
1,899
9,721
6,433
949
2,067
7,986
42,653
1,182
1,590
6,605
34,710
1,843
1,679
5,896
28,845
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
100K
200K
Encounter Count
168,286
11,907
31,088
80,134
51,652
32,111
1,437
7,552
1,146
966
57
32
9
2
4
3
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
13,410
38,674
220,908
113,394
0K
10K
20K
30K
40K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
CUBA
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV &XED
CLP_PC_025575
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 61 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
882
17,638
5,163
55
7,569
6,551
155
5,521
5,380
154
5,904
4,069
8
2,817
10,514
20
1,250
5,739
586
3,084
2,171
839
827
1,877
7,430
490
1,718
3,372
3,174
657
237
7,144
5,138
459
97
1,022
5,472
230
593
908
6,718
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied..
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2023
(FYTD)
10K
20K
30K
Encounter Count
22,385 22,196
18,415
371
24,778
31,426
4,140
9,427
283
24
92
87
5
3
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
4,535
47,255
53,910
27,932
0K
5K
10K
15K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
HAITI
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV +DLWL
CLP_PC_025576
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 62 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
192
7,298
18,199
126
9,979
11,749
110
13,456
12,073
97
7,435
11,200
70
4,414
19,034
89
3,074
12,565
215
1,930
16,017
209
706
13,296
639
218
534
11,564
3,377
304
640
15,297
35,387
313
387
13,627
34,242
348
256
9,255
20,916
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
100K
200K
Encounter Count
130,809
29,404
76,188
1,637
18,776
29,901
16,704
534
1,925
3,158
1,665
117
3
4
8
4
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
2,291
50,109
163,876
94,561
0K
10K
20K
30K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
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Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
NICARAGUA
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV 1LFDUDJXD
CLP_PC_025577
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 63 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
46
10,814
33,804
49
6,301
25,361
36
6,126
17,647
13
7,583
13,199
10
7,499
5,088
9
6,048
4,107
166
2,566
4,053
206
913
3,073
5,559
243
295
22,779
9,100
693
206
24,801
8,166
588
184
20,388
7,955
728
143
13,416
22,037
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
50K
100K
150K
Encounter Count
120,208
26,041
32,642
878
22,302
66,343
19,642
1,875
1,139
315
500
22
12
20
26
33
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
2,787
48,678
187,716
52,817
0K
10K
20K
30K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
VENEZUELA
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV 9HQH]XHOD WRWDO
CLP_PC_025578
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 64 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
37
10,791
33,749
45
6,211
25,302
36
6,018
17,602
12
7,467
13,141
8
7,386
5,064
9
5,850
4,075
100
2,356
4,031
132
892
3,065
1,451
139
284
22,748
2,346
399
192
24,764
6,182
105
171
20,349
6,745
205
134
13,396
21,822
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
50K
100K
Encounter Count
119,959
25,675
23,790
424
21,762
66,198
14,377
796
1,129
315
379
7
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
1,227
47,752
187,286
38,546
0K
10K
20K
30K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
U.S. Border Patrol
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
VENEZUELA
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV 9HQH]XHOD 86%3
CLP_PC_025579
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 65 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
9
23
55
4
90
59
108
45
1
116
58
2
113
24
198
32
66
210
22
74
21
8
4,108
104
11
31
6,754
294
14
37
1,984
483
13
39
1,210
523
9
20
215
Single Adults
FMUA
Accompanied Minors
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2022
2023
(FYTD)
5K
10K
Encounter Count
8,852
454
366
249
1,079
5,265
540
145
12
20
26
33
121
15
10
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
1,560
926
430
14,271
0K
2K
4K
6K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
Office of Field Operations
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
VENEZUELA
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV 9HQH]XHOD 2)2
CLP_PC_025580
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 66 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
54,195
151,439
144,203
47,603
181,495
141,366
39,061
184,931
144,964
31,838
165,040
163,194
22,614
163,203
180,857
16,824
165,135
178,535
33,061
159,997
168,180
34,837
94,805
131,207
140,617
34,979
73,968
107,438
134,686
37,962
70,844
124,025
160,651
40,101
69,855
133,203
152,551
41,990
69,258
135,362
152,744
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
1M
2M
Encounter Count
1,221,779
338,375
997,007
492,103
406,320
381,324
193,713
63,008
144,561
146,511
33,019
54,275
2,082
2,920
1,158
663
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
435,065
1,549,970
1,752,534
741,249
0K
50K
100K
150K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
Multiple values
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV $OO&LWL]HQVKLSV([FOXGLQJ&XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD9HQH]XHOD 7RWDO
CLP_PC_025581
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 67 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
2,867
6,388
14,862
2,696
12,243
15,801
2,354
12,158
13,199
2,182
9,910
11,265
1,624
7,652
13,767
918
4,838
30,941
3,809
3,797
11,041
6,258
3,387
6,633
13,790
6,978
3,062
6,831
17,684
6,941
2,808
8,535
23,148
7,715
2,919
7,706
20,771
7,639
2,866
5,680
19,532
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
50K
100K
Encounter Count
31,691
40,168
76,153
43,130
16,983
27,698
64,308
48,937
2,644
2,080
2,880
1,700
2,082
2,920
1,158
663
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
51,981
72,028
146,261
94,925
0K
10K
20K
30K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
Office of Field Operations
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
Multiple values
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV $OO&LWL]HQVKLSV([FOXGLQJ&XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD9HQH]XHOD 2)2
CLP_PC_025582
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 68 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
51,328
145,051
129,341
44,907
169,252
125,565
36,707
172,773
131,765
29,656
155,130
151,929
20,990
155,551
167,090
15,906
160,297
147,594
29,252
156,200
157,139
28,579
91,418
124,574
126,827
28,001
70,906
100,607
117,002
31,021
68,036
115,490
137,503
32,386
66,936
125,497
131,780
34,351
66,392
129,682
133,212
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
0M
1M
2M
Encounter Count
1,145,626
306,684
956,839
448,973
378,622
317,016
144,776
46,025
142,481
143,631
30,375
52,575
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
383,084
1,477,942
1,606,273
646,324
0K
50K
100K
150K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
U.S. Border Patrol
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
Multiple values
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV $OO&LWL]HQVKLSV([FOXGLQJ&XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD9HQH]XHOD 86%3
CLP_PC_025583
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 69 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
51,365
155,842
163,090
44,952
175,463
150,867
36,743
178,791
149,367
29,668
162,597
165,070
20,998
162,937
172,154
15,915
166,147
151,669
29,352
158,556
161,170
28,711
92,310
127,639
128,278
28,140
71,190
123,355
119,348
31,420
68,228
140,254
143,685
32,491
67,107
145,846
138,525
34,556
66,526
143,078
155,034
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
0M
1M
2M
Encounter Count
1,265,585
307,108
982,514
472,763
400,384
383,214
159,153
46,821
142,796
144,760
30,382
52,954
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
384,311
1,525,694
1,793,559
684,870
0K
50K
100K
150K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
U.S. Border Patrol
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
Reset
Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
Multiple values
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV $OO&LWL]HQVKLSV([FOXGLQJ&XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD 86%3
CLP_PC_025584
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST Document 169-9 Filed 06/05/23 Page 70 of 1030
OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
3,443
40,464
78,256
2,376
27,262
56,209
1,829
27,885
50,069
1,180
23,519
40,470
603
17,103
57,280
276
13,402
55,910
1,137
13,016
54,042
1,498
6,225
34,596
2,050
1,204
4,410
47,270
11,911
1,832
3,105
55,112
84,190
1,138
2,233
41,518
75,650
1,051
2,640
29,431
71,649
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
200K
400K
Encounter Count
106,446
428,755
179,261
11,180
165,946
72,465
63,009
6,205
2,353
5,462
3,180
182
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
17,567
181,264
600,163
245,450
0K
20K
40K
60K
80K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
U.S. Border Patrol
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
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Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
Multiple values
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
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OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
3,406
29,673
44,507
2,331
21,051
30,907
1,793
21,867
32,467
1,168
16,052
27,329
595
9,717
52,216
267
7,552
51,835
1,037
10,660
50,011
1,366
5,333
31,531
599
1,065
4,126
24,522
9,565
1,433
2,913
30,348
78,008
1,033
2,062
21,169
68,905
846
2,506
16,035
49,827
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
100K
200K
300K
Encounter Count
308,796
155,471
10,756
80,771
50,703
99,748
48,632
5,409
2,038
4,333
2,801
175
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
16,340
133,512
412,877
206,904
0K
20K
40K
60K
80K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
U.S. Border Patrol
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
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FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
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All
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FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV &XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD 86%3
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OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
51,365
155,842
163,090
44,952
175,463
150,867
36,743
178,791
149,367
29,668
162,597
165,070
20,998
162,937
172,154
15,915
166,147
151,669
29,352
158,556
161,170
28,711
92,310
127,639
128,278
28,140
71,190
123,355
119,348
31,420
68,228
140,254
143,685
32,491
67,107
145,846
138,525
34,556
66,526
143,078
155,034
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
0M
1M
2M
Encounter Count
1,265,585
307,108
982,514
472,763
400,384
383,214
159,153
46,821
142,796
144,760
30,382
52,954
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
384,311
1,525,694
1,793,559
684,870
0K
50K
100K
150K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
U.S. Border Patrol
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
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FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
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Multiple values
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All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV $OO&LWL]HQVKLSV([FOXGLQJ&XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD 86%3
CLP_PC_025587
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OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
36
98
5,088
35
1,083
6,512
39
777
5,129
31
475
4,170
20
291
2,999
6
258
1,340
262
264
352
352
69
207
12,331
402
36
166
10,173
771
45
116
7,154
1,404
25
124
6,729
2,098
31
44
6,867
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
10K
20K
30K
40K
Encounter Count
12,744
28,118
3,613
2,472
13,376
14,875
1,781
943
218
38
11
84
24
26
43
43
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
5,456
3,452
26,247
43,254
0K
5K
10K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
Office of Field Operations
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
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Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
Multiple values
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All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV &XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD9HQH]XHOD 2)2
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OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
51,365
155,842
163,090
44,952
175,463
150,867
36,743
178,791
149,367
29,668
162,597
165,070
20,998
162,937
172,154
15,915
166,147
151,669
29,352
158,556
161,170
28,711
92,310
127,639
128,278
28,140
71,190
123,355
119,348
31,420
68,228
140,254
143,685
32,491
67,107
145,846
138,525
34,556
66,526
143,078
155,034
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
0M
1M
2M
Encounter Count
1,265,585
307,108
982,514
472,763
400,384
383,214
159,153
46,821
142,796
144,760
30,382
52,954
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
384,311
1,525,694
1,793,559
684,870
0K
50K
100K
150K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
U.S. Border Patrol
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
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Filters
FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
Demographic
All
Citizenship
Multiple values
Title of Authority
All
State
All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV 3HUX&RORPELD(FXDGRU 86%3
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OCT
NOV
DEC
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
2023
(FYTD)
2022
2021
2020
3,479
40,562
83,344
2,411
28,345
62,721
1,868
28,662
55,198
1,211
23,994
44,640
623
17,394
60,279
282
13,660
57,250
1,399
13,280
54,394
1,850
6,294
34,803
14,381
1,606
4,446
47,436
22,084
2,603
3,150
55,228
91,344
2,542
2,258
41,642
82,379
3,149
2,671
29,475
78,516
Single Adults
FMUA
UC / Single Minors
Accompanied Minors
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
2020
2021
2022
2023
(FYTD)
200K
400K
600K
Encounter Count
108,918
441,499
207,379
14,793
179,322
73,408
77,884
7,986
2,364
5,546
3,398
220
24
26
43
43
FY Comparison by Demographic
Total
23,023
184,716
626,410
288,704
0K
20K
40K
60K
80K
Encounter Count
Choose Region
Southwest Land Border
FY
All
Component
All
Area of Responsibility
All
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Encounters
Nationwide, Southwest Land Border,
and Northern Land Border Encounters by Fiscal Year (FY)
Source: USBP and OFO official year end reporting for FY20-FY22; USBP and OFO month end reporting for FY23 to date. Data
is current as of 3/3/2023.
..
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FY Southwest Land Border Encounters by Month
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All
FY
2020
2021
2022
2023 (FYTD)
6:/DQG%RUGHU(QFRXQWHUV &XED+DLWL1LFDUDJXD9HQH]XHOD WRWDO
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1
EXPERT DECLARATION OF DR. ERIC HERSHBERG
I, Eric Hershberg, under penalty of perjury declare that the following information is true and
correct:
1. This comprehensive declaration explains the conditions that are causing families and
individuals to flee Guatemala as well as the conditions that non-Guatemalan asylum seekers
would face upon removal to Guatemala under the Asylum Cooperative Agreement. The
“Findings” are organized into six sections. Sections I through II address overall country
conditions regarding levels of violence in the country, the presence of transnational gangs,
and the modus operandi of the gangs and organized criminal actors. Section III concerns the
persecution of migrants within the country. Section IV through VI, address the inadequacies
of state protection of the population and the lack of resources available to assist migrants in
Guatemala.
2. I am a recognized expert on, among other things, the interplay between various forms of
violence in Guatemala and the resulting emigration of youth, families, and other Guatemalan
citizens targeted by transnational street gangs and organized crime groups and unprotected by
the state. I have been credentialed as an expert and have submitted approximately sixty
affidavits supporting asylum claims on behalf of petitioners from Guatemala and neighboring
Central American countries, including El Salvador and Honduras.
Professional Qualifications
3. I hold a PhD in political science (1989) from the University of Wisconsin, Madison.
4. I am currently employed as Director of the Center for Latin American & Latino Studies
(CLALS) and Professor of Government at American University in Washington, DC. From
2007 to 2009, I was Professor of Political Science and Director of Latin American Studies at
Simon Fraser University (SFU) in Canada. Prior to these appointments, I served as the
Program Director overseeing Latin American initiatives at the Social Science Research
Council in New York City for fifteen years. In addition to my professorships at SFU and
American, I have taught at Columbia University, New York University, Princeton
University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison and Southern Illinois University. I have
also served as a consultant to many development and education agencies, including the Ford
Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the World Bank, and the Swedish International
Development Agency.
5. In my capacity as a professor and director of Latin American and Latino Studies at American
University, I work closely with scholars, think tanks, and policy makers in understanding
human rights conditions in various countries in Latin America. Among other topics, my
current research projects include an analysis of social exclusion and state failure in
contemporary Central America. Over the past twenty-five years I have traveled frequently to
Guatemala, both to conduct research and to meet with academic colleagues and officials from
various government and international development agencies. I have a deep understanding of
the social, economic and political factors that determine the realities faced by the diverse
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segments of Guatemalan society. Under my supervision, American University has recently
completed a multiyear, Department of Justice-funded study on the transnational criminal MS-
13 gang, which has a substantial presence in Guatemala. In January 2020, CLALS published
an exhaustive report on the work of the United Nations-sponsored International Commission
Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) and the troubling implications for accountability
and democratic governance of the government’s disbanding the commission.1
6. I have published extensively on the comparative politics of Latin America and the politics of
development. I have authored over forty peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, and I have
edited a dozen academic volumes. Other non-peer-reviewed publications total over sixty. In
addition, I have co-authored study of the circumstances driving the surge of unaccompanied
child migrants from Central America to the United States, which I published in November
2014.2 Issues raised in that study were among the foci of a September 2018 academic
seminar at which I was an invited participant at the Universidad Rafael Landivar, in
Guatemala City, and I again discussed these issues with Guatemalan scholars and think tank
officials during a three-day visit in January, 2020.
Summary of Findings
7. Guatemala cannot provide the protection and resources to afford even minimal levels of
safety and well-being of asylum seekers sent to the country under the Asylum Cooperative
Agreement. The country suffers from high levels of violence, which particularly impact
vulnerable groups of women, the LGBTQ community, indigenous people, and human rights
leaders.3 The country has long been plagued with corruption at all levels of government,
which has prevented the state from providing basic services and protections to its own
citizens.4 Moreover, economic and political conditions leave much of the Guatemalan
population underemployed, undernourished, poorly housed and underprotected by state
agencies. These factors explain why more than two million Guatemalan citizens have fled the
country over the past quarter century, and underscore how extraordinarily implausible it is to
suppose that the country is in condition to accommodate asylum seekers from third countries.
8. Migrants relocated to Guatemala will be especially vulnerable to serious harm. Deposited
into a country with extraordinary levels of violence and a dysfunctional state, they are
unlikely to have access to local family and social networks that provide some degree of
protection to longstanding residents. Nor will they have nuanced understanding of the
1 Charles T. Call and Jeffrey Hallock, “¿Una iniciativa demasiado exitosa? El legado y las lecciones de la Comisión
Internacional contra la Impunidad en Guatemala”, (Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, January 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3516753#%23
2 Dennis Stinchcomb and Eric Hershberg, “Unaccompanied Migrant Children from Central America: Context,
Causes, and Responses” (Working Paper Series No. 7, American University Center for Latin American & Latino
Studies, Washington, DC, November 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2524001.
3 Adriana Beltran, “Guatemala is No Safe Third Country: Why the Asylum Deal is a Mistake”, (Foreign Affairs,
September 25, 2019), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/guatemala/2019-09-25/guatemala-no-safe-third-
country
4 Id.
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landscape in which criminal gangs and drug trafficking organizations operate throughout
much of the national territory, or the degree to which illicit actors interact with local
populations and state authorities with whom they are often allied.
Findings
I.
Epidemic Homicide Rates
9. High levels of societal violence carried out by street gangs and organized crime groups, often
in alliance with state security forces and quasi-state actors such as the Security Commissions,
have earned Guatemala the distinction of being one of the most dangerous countries in the
world. The U.S. Department of State rates the level of violent crime in the country as
“critical,” citing an abundance of weapons, a legacy of societal violence, and weak law
enforcement and judicial systems as key contributing factors.5
10. Since peaking in 2009, Guatemala’s homicide rate has been on the decline. However, despite
falling to 26.1 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2017, the country’s murder rate is still nearly five
times the global average and is the sixth highest in the Western Hemisphere, surpassed only
by neighboring El Salvador and Honduras, and by Venezuela, Jamaica, and Brazil.6
Guatemala ended 2018 with a homicide rate of 22.4 per 100,000 people, a slight decrease
from 2017, but still a remarkable rate.7 Moreover, the Guatemalan non-profit group Diálogos
has expressed serious doubts about the reliability of homicide statistics kept by the national
police.8 This echoes similar findings by Insight Crime – a journalism foundation dedicated to
investigating organized crime in Latin America –which found crime records handled by a
“creaky, antiquated 20th century bureaucratic machine” that frequently loses data crucial for
solving, tracking, and analyzing criminal behavior.9
11. A recent study from Vanderbilt University found that “the toll of insecurity on daily life in
Central America is widespread and significant,” with the behavioral impact of insecurity in
the Northern Triangle region of Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador most strongly felt in
5 U.S. Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council, “Guatemala 2018 Crime & Safety Report” (May 9,
2018), https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=24030.
6 Tristan Clavel, “InSight Crime’s 2017 Homicide Round-Up” (January 19, 2018),
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/2017-homicide-round-up; Claire McEvoy and Gergely Hideg, Global
Violent Deaths 2017: Time to Decide (December 2017), http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-
Reports/SAS-Report-GVD2017.pdf.
7 Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza, “InSight Crime’s 2018 Homicide Round-up”, (InSight Crime, January 2019),
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/insight-crime-2018-homicide-roundup/
8 Tristan Clavel, “Report Analyzes Guatemala’s Shaky Murder Data, Urges Improvements” (InSight Crime, August
18, 2017), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/report-analyzes-guatemala-shaky-murder-data-urges-
improvements.
9 Steven Dudley, “Homicides in Guatemala: Collecting the Data (InSightCrime, April 20, 2017),
http://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/homicides-in-guatemala-collecting-the-data.
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terms of economic activity.10 The study, which was funded by the United States Agency for
International Development, ranked Guatemalans second among Central Americans in “crime
avoidance behavior”; nearly half of those surveyed reported avoiding public transportation or
purchasing consumer goods for fear of crime, while nearly a third kept their children from
school and over two-thirds kept them from playing in the streets.11
12. Homicides in Guatemala rarely go punished, with Amnesty International reporting that less
than 4 percent of homicide cases result in the conviction of those responsible.12 Amnesty
International adds that this number is even lower when the victim is female.
13. The drug trade through Guatemala has been accompanied by increased levels of violence.
Roughly 90% of the cocaine consumed in the United States passes through Guatemala, which
has created a territorial battle between rival drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), often
connected to Mexican and Colombian cartels, to stake out claims to the transit corridors.13
These territorial disputes have led to the murders of rivals as well as innocent civilians
caught in the crossfire.
14. In addition to violence perpetuated by the gangs and DTOs, the country has become
overwhelmed with routine instances of vigilantism in vulnerable neighborhoods. Roughly
two thirds of Guatemala’s adult male population carry firearms, which has facilitated the
killing of suspected criminals by civilians in areas that are underserved by security forces.14
II.
Transnational Gangs in the Northern Triangle
Guatemala
15. The high rates of violence in Guatemala predate the expansion of street gangs over the past
20 years. Under a succession of military governments during the 1970s and 1980s, genocidal
levels of violence were carried out in rural, primarily indigenous areas, with urban areas also
experiencing high levels of state repression in response to political opposition and sporadic
guerrilla resistance.15 By the time that the Peace Accords were signed in 1996, ending 36
10 Jonathan Hiske, “Violence and Migration in Central America” (AmericasBarometer Insights, 2014),
https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO901en.pdf
11 Id. at 4–7.
12 Amnesty International, “Why does Guatemala have one of the highest rates of femicides in the world?” (Amnesty
International, 2019), https://www.amnestyusa.org/why-does-guatemala-have-one-of-the-highest-rates-of-femicide-
in-the-world/
13 InSight Crime, “Guatemala Elites and Organized Crime”, (InSight Crime, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/889611/download
14 Id. at 12
15 International Crisis Group, “Mafia of the Poor: Gang Violence and Extortion in Central America,” Crisis Group
Latin America Report No 62 (April 6, 2017) at 2, https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/062-mafia-of-the-
poor_0.pdf.
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years of conflict, state violence had left an estimated 200,000 Guatemalans dead and 40,000
displaced (mostly to Mexico and the United States).16
16. During the war, criminal organizations with clear linkages to state security forces took
advantage of the weakened state to operate human and drug smuggling operations near
border crossings, unpopulated jungles, and ports.17 These criminal groups were of secondary
concern to the government and they often provided services to both sides in the conflict –
including the military and police forces who became deeply intertwined with organized
crime.18
17. The protracted conflict in Guatemala not only contributed to rising levels of violence, but
also poverty and malnutrition.19 Today, roughly 60% of Guatemalans live below the
country’s national poverty line.20 Poverty and chronic malnutrition drove rural to urban
migration – which resulted in overcrowding of urban areas that lack both the infrastructure
needed to support population growth and potential employment opportunities that could
provide livelihoods for the influx of urban dwellers.21 All these factors contributed to the rise
of street gangs, which take advantage of hungry and poor populations to expand their
criminal activities and recruit new members into their ranks.22
18. The two major rival gangs in Guatemala (and the region) are Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and
Barrio 18 (variably referred to as Mara 18, M-18, and 18th Street).23 MS-13 and Barrio 18
both originated among Central American immigrant communities in Los Angeles during the
1980s, and they have cells operating from Central America to Canada, as well as in Spain
and Italy.24 The gangs spread to Central America and Mexico largely as a result of U.S.
immigration enforcement measures passed in the 1990s, which increased the number of
criminal charges for which foreign-born persons could be deported.25
16 Id.
17 InSight Crime, “Guatemala Profile”, (InSight Crime, November 2017), https://www.insightcrime.org/guatemala-
organized-crime-news/guatemala/#History
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Amelia Cheatham, " Central America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle”, (Council on Foreign Relations, October
2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulent-northern-triangle
21 Id.
22 InSight Crime, supra, note 17
23 U.S. Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council, “Guatemala 2019 Crime & Safety Report”
(United States Department of State, 2019), https://www.osac.gov/Content/Report/ff459385-017d-4ff2-8a02-
15f4aec15a69.
24 InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS), MS-13 in the
Americas: How the World’s Most Notorious Gang Defies Logic, Resists Destruction at 3 (February 2018),
https://www.insightcrime.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/MS13-in-the-Americas-InSight-Crime-English.pdf;
“Barrio 18” (InsightCrime, January 13, 2017), https://www.insightcrime.org/el-salvador-organized-crime-
news/barrio-18-profile/.
25 Id.
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19. In 2012, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime calculated the total number of gang
members in Guatemala at around 22,000;26 the Guatemalan government has tallied
approximately 19,000.27 Additionally, the National Civil Police estimate that there are
30,000 gang sympathizers, or individuals who are complicit in their criminal activities, in
Guatemala.28
20. These gangs, as well as drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), have demonstrated a capacity
to challenge the Guatemalan state directly. Several mayors with personal links to the DTOs
or who oversaw towns along smuggling routes have been murdered in recent years, including
two in the opening months of 2017.29 In 2018, Mayor Julio Alberto Enriquez Sanchez of
Zacapa was found killed in his vehicle from a suspected ambush by local narcotraffickers.30
In 2019, there were two instances of mayoral candidates being murdered; the first being
Marvin Peña in February, and then later Luis Xol in August.31 In March of 2017,
incarcerated members of Barrio 18 incited a prison riot, demanding the transfer of 200
prisoners to their facility and better living conditions. When officials put down the riot, gang
members launched nine attacks against police stations around the country.32
El Salvador & Honduras
21. The surge of gang and DTO related violence, which impacts innocent civilians on a daily
basis, is not unique to Guatemala. El Salvador and Honduras experience similar levels of
violence and crippled states who struggle to combat the spread of the gangs.
22. An estimated 60,000 Salvadorans are members of the two major rival gangs in El Salvador
MS-13 and Barrio 18.33 The number of gang members in El Salvador exceeds the
26 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Transnational Organized Crime in Central American and
the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment at 29 (September 2012), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/Studies/TOC_Central_America_and_the_Caribbean_english.pdf.
27 Mariela Castañón, “Informe: Hay 19 mil pandilleros en el país; sin opciones de reinserción” (La Hora, December
1, 2014), http://lahora.gt/informe-hay-19-mil-pandilleros-en-el-pais-sin-opciones-de-reinsercion/.
28 Guatemala Human Rights Commission, “Gangs in Guatemala”, (GHRC, 2018), https://www.ghrc-
usa.org/Publications/GangFactSheet.pdf
29 David Gagne, “Drug Groups Suspected in Murders of Guatemalan Mayors” (InSight Crime, February 2, 2017),
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/drug-groups-suspected-murders-guatemala-mayors/.
30 AP, “Guatemala mayor slain in ambush” (AP News, March 17, 2018),
https://www.apnews.com/a978f40f36554cd384e5f5fb2dc311a9
31 Irving Escobar and Carlos Álvarez, “Matan a candidato proclamado por Fuerza para alcalde de Tiquisate” (Prensa
Libre, February 12, 2019), https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/matan-a-candidato-proclamado-por-
fuerza-para-alcalde-de-tiquisate/; Dony Stewart and Óscar García, “Luis Xol, alcalde electo de Lívingston, y su
hermana son ultimados a balazos”, (Prensa Libre, August 29, 2019),
https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/luis-xol-alcalde-electo-de-livingston-es-ultimado-a-balazos/
32 David Gagne, “Barrio 18 Members Arrested in Series of Attacks on Guatemala Police” (InSightCrime, March 21,
2017), http://www.insightcrime.org/news-briefs/barrio-18-members-arrested-series-attacks-guatemala-police.
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approximately 52,000 Salvadoran police and military officers — not including the estimated
500,000 people in the gangs’ social support base, which includes both active collaborators
and ordinary citizens indirectly related to these groups, but not necessarily supporting them.
In Honduras, government officials estimate that in 2019 there were roughly 40,000 active
members in either MS-13 or Barrio 18 within the country.34
Modus Operandi of Gangs in the Northern Triangle
23. The two largest gangs in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador — the Northern Triangle of
Central America — are MS-13 and Barrio 18, which operate in a similar manner and with
various degrees of coordination throughout the region. In asserting their dominion over
territory, these gangs often take the view that they own not just the streets but the people as
well; they believe in turn that they have the right to force others to help in their illicit
activities.35 The gangs are involved in criminal activities such as murder-for-hire, drug
distribution, prostitution, kidnapping and, especially, extortion.36
24. Both gangs are involved in a diverse array of criminal activities such as extortion, drug
distribution to local markets, car theft and resale, murder-for-hire, kidnapping, prostitution,
human smuggling and trafficking, money laundering, and bribery.37 The International Crisis
Group describes the gangs in the Northern Triangle countries as “organisations that coerce,
threaten and kill to produce a menial subsistence for their members.”38
25. Gang “ownership” of a particular territory involves effective governance of these zones. As
rival gangs and government security forces vie for control of contested territories,
municipalities become pockmarked with invisible borders that separate one gang’s territory
from another. These borders are dynamic and frequently change as a result of inter-gang
violence.39 An individual who inadvertently crosses from one gang’s territory into another’s
could be denied entry, beaten, or killed.40 As a result, freedom of movement is greatly
restricted, limiting where people live and whether they attend school, work, access justice,
and seek medical care.41 Outsiders of any kind—whether native Guatemalans or asylum
35 UNODC, supra, note 26
36 Id.
37 Héctor Silva Ávalos, “Political Mafias Helped Empower Gangs, says El Salvador Security Expert” (January 24,
2019), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/el-salvador-political-mafias/; InSight Crime and CLALS, supra,
note 24 at 39–47.
38 International Crisis Group, supra, note 15 at 2
39 Oscar Martínez, Living Within the Boundaries of El Salvador’s Gang ‘War’ InSight Crime (Jan. 7, 2016),
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/living-within-the-boundaries-of-el-salvador-gang-war/.
40 U.S. Dep’t of State, El Salvador 2016 Human Rights Report, 16 (2017),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265798.pdf.
41 Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, “El Salvador: figure analysis – displacement related to conflict and
violence”, (IDMC, January 2019), http://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/2019-
05/GRID%202019%20-%20Conflict%20Figure%20Analysis%20-%20EL%20SALVADOR.pdf
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seekers from other countries—trying to navigate this territorial landscape to find housing,
employment, or schools face extraordinary risks to life and limb.
26. The strict territorial mandates set by the gangs make it increasingly difficult for people to
move from one part of a city to another – let alone from one region of the country or a
neighboring country. The U.S. Department of State draws out the degree and sophistication
of the gangs’ territorial control by noting that authority over in-country movement is
effectively ceded to the gangs:
The major gangs controlled their own territory. Gang members did not allow persons
living in another gang’s-controlled area to enter their territory, even when travelling in
public transportation. Gangs forced persons to present identification cards (containing
their addresses) to determine their residence. If gang members discovered that a person
lived in a rival gang’s territory, that person risked being killed, beaten, or not allowed to
enter the territory.42
In addition, rival gangs are known to force victims to provide access to their cellphones to
further assess who they are and whether they might be affiliated with rival gangs or security
forces.
27. It is common practice for gangs to seek retribution from both their opponents as well as their
opponents’ family members. Gang threats do not lose validity over time; rather, gangs are
likely to pass down knowledge of their enemies, thereby ensuring that death threats are never
neutralized.43 The UNHCR emphasizes the permanency of gangs’ threats in areas of the
world with notable gang populations, such as Central America. It states, “[O]nce an
individual has been targeted, the gravity of the threat does not diminish over time.”44
28. Among gang members, threats can rise to the level of providing the “luz verde” or “green-
lighting” of an individual; by gang edicts, an individual who has been green-lighted must be
executed on sight by any gang member who comes in contact with him/her. If a gang
member fails to carry this order through, he in turn is also green-lighted. Such orders extend
across the country and the region, and have been enforced transnationally as well. It is worth
noting, too, that helping or assisting an individual who has been green-lighted by the gang
can be dangerous for non-gang affiliates as well, which discourages local police and
community members from intervening on the individual’s behalf. This, in turn, further
isolates those who have been identified as interfering in gang business.
29. Even if an individual from Honduras or El Salvador were granted asylum in Guatemala due
to persecution by the MS-13 or Barrio 18 in their home country, it is reasonable that the gang
42 U.S. Department of State, “El Salvador 2017 Human Rights Report,”
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/pages/attachments/2018/04/24/dos-hrr_2017_el_salvador.pdf
43 Michael Boulton, Living in a World of Violence: An Introduction to the Gang Phenomenon at 16 (United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 2011),
http://www.unhcr.org/4e3269629.pdf.
44 Id.
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would learn of their presence in the country due to networks of communication utilized by
gangs. These include linking with and communicating with other gang cliques in Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador as well as, in some cases, the capacity to access state security
databases. Regardless, the UNHCR finds that “[g]iven the geographical size of many of the
Central American countries affected by the maras, there is often no internal flight alternative
for those wishing to flee.”45
30. Efforts by individuals or families targeted by a gang to relocate within or between Northern
Triangle countries to flee gang persecution risk further antagonizing the gang. Per the 2011
UNHCR Report on areas of the world with notable gang populations, such as Central
America, gangs interpret “fleeing to avoid future persecution…as insubordination and
challenges to the authority of the gang. These actions are normally met with a violent and
punitive response.”46
III.
Vulnerability of Migrants
31. Individuals sent to Guatemala under the Asylum Cooperative Agreement are particularly
vulnerable to gang violence. First, these individuals may lack sufficient knowledge of
Guatemalan communities to be able to safely navigate from one gang-controlled
neighborhood to another without suffering serious harm or death. Second, amidst the
endemic poverty, an individual’s wealth—or perceived wealth—does not go unnoticed and
frequently makes an individual a target for extortion. Gangs frequently target returned
Guatemalan migrants as reliable sources of extortion payments, based on the assumption that
returnees have accumulated substantial financial resources while residing in the U.S., and it
is reasonable to believe the gangs will target asylum seekers sent to Guatemala in a similar
manner.47
32. Many of the criminal structures that are prompting Hondurans and Salvadorans to flee to the
United States are present within Guatemala. It is probable that using their vast
communication networks, gangs and criminal organizations in one country would easily find
people seeking asylum in Guatemala.48
IV.
Lack of State Protection
33. Because of the entrenched symbiotic relationships between organized criminal groups and
corrupt state officials at every scale of government, in many cases it is difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish between the operations and interests of the two. Too often, any
attempt to disaggregate one from the other in essence forces a false dichotomy that obscures
the true power and reach of organized criminal groups. It is these murky relationships, and the
45 Id. at 17.
46 Id. at 17.
47 Id. at 17-18
48 Sergio Morales Rodas, “Hondureños y salvadoreños que huyen de su país estarán igual de vulnerables en
Guatemala”, (Prensa Libre, July 30, 2019), https://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/migrantes/hondurenos-y-
salvadorenos-estaran-igual-de-vulnerables-en-guatemala/
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extraordinary influence and power it allows drug-trafficking organizations and other criminal
groups, that put victims of gang violence in such grave danger. Some analysts estimate that
somewhere between 30 to 80% of the national police force is in the pay of narco-traffickers
and other organized criminal groups.49
34. Guatemala suffers from an almost complete lack of protection by the police and the judiciary
due to pervasive corruption of security institutions, which have been penetrated by both
transnational criminal gangs and domestic criminal networks that routinely resort to violence
to sustain their activities. The U.S. Department of State has recognized that Guatemala
suffers from widespread institutional corruption, particularly in the police and judicial
sectors.50 Police are absent from many of the most violence-ridden zones of the country, and
in areas where there is a police presence, the underpaid and poorly trained police and security
forces are frequently in league with criminal organizations. Local officials are widely
reported to accept payments in exchange for conceding authority to criminal networks that
they ought to be policing.
35. Public confidence in local law enforcement has eroded as a result, and many in Guatemala
choose not to report crimes to the police because they know the crime will go uninvestigated,
for fear of retaliation by the perpetrators, or for fear of victimization at the hands of security
forces.51 According to Guatemala’s Minister of the Interior, more than 1,000 police officers
were removed from duty between 2012 and 2014 for crimes including kidnapping and
extortion.52 A recent nationwide operation targeting extortion networks led to the arrest of an
army colonel, tasked with combatting organized crime, for laundering money on behalf of
MS-13, as well as a police commissioner for leaking operational information about the
gang.53 It is widely understood, however, that the overwhelming majority of cases of police
abuse remain unreported, and that fewer still are prosecuted, suggesting that the degree of
impunity is extraordinary.
36. Even when complaints are filed, investigation and prosecution are unlikely to follow. In
April 2017, the head of the United Nations-sponsored International Commission Against
49 See Fontes, Anthony et al. El impacto de las politicas de drogas en los carceles de Guatemala. (The impact of
drug policy in Guatemalan prisons) Open Society Foundations and the Social Science Research Council, in
cooperation with the Guatemalan Presidential Drug Policy Commission. (forthcoming), pg. 28 and in-person
interview conducted by Fontes in Guatemala City, Guatemala on 3/12/2016 with former chief of Guatemala’s anti-
drug unit who for reasons of security chooses to remain anonymous.
50 U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017: Guatemala” (2018),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2017&dlid=277335.
51 Dennis Stinchcomb and Eric Hershberg, supra, note 2.
52 José Elías, “Las extorciones tiñen de sangre Guatemala y ponen freno al desarrollo” (El País, August 15, 2014),
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2014/08/15/actualidad /1408057388_234326.html.
53 Felipe Puerta, “Arrest of Colonel With MS-13 Ties Reveals Sophisticated Gang Tactics” (InSight Crime, April 24,
2018), https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/arrest-colonel-ms13-ties-reveals-sophisticated-gang-tactics/.
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Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) reported that 97 percent of crimes there go unpunished.54
The U.S. Department of State has recognized that in Guatemala impunity is widespread, with
corruption and inadequate investigation making prosecution of gangs difficult.55 Indeed the
Attorney General’s office, which acts as the prosecuting office in Guatemala, is only present
in just over ten percent of the country’s municipalities, highlighting the disparities in the
state’s reach.56 Furthermore, the judicial system is inadequate because it has “failed to
provide fair or timely trials due to inefficiency, corruption, insufficient personnel, and
intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses.”57
37. Police officers throughout the Northern Triangle have faced retaliation from gang members
in the form of violence against them and their family, resulting in the use of balaclava masks
to conceal their identities.58 In recent years, police officers from all three countries tasked
with combatting the gangs have had to flee abroad in search of protection due to the high
levels of risk associated with being a police officer in a gang-controlled area.59 Héctor Silva
Ávalos, a journalist and researcher, confirmed that Central American gang members receive
more respect within the gang if they kill a police officer, using “death as exchange
currency”.60
38. Corruption and impunity have pervaded the highest levels of the Guatemalan government,
undermining efforts to strengthen government institutions and weaken the influence of
organized crime. Between 2017 and 2019, President Jimmy Morales attempted to block
investigations by the Attorney General’s office and the CICIG into accusations of illegal
campaign financing leveled against his administration and political party. In 2017, Morales
tried unsuccessfully to expel the commissioner of the CICIG, and his allies in Congress
passed a so-called “impunity pact” shielding political elites from graft-related prosecution,
relenting only under significant public pressure. In April 2018, new accusations against
Morales prompted him in turn to accuse the Attorney General’s Office and the CICIG of
abusing its authority, after 12 years of operation, CICIG was shut down on September 3,
2019 following President Morales’ refusal to renew the mandate of the United Nations
backed commission.61
54 Jessica Gramajo, “La impunidad supera el 97% en Guatemala” (Prensa Libre, April 3, 2017),
http://www.prensalibre.com/guatemala/politica/la-impunidad-supera-el-97-en-guatemala.
55 U.S. Department of State, supra, note 53
56 Jessica Gramajo, supra, note 57
57 U.S. Department of State, supra, note 53
58 International Crisis Group, “Life Under Gang Rule in El Salvador”, (International Crisis Group, November 26,
2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/life-under-gang-rule-el-
salvador
59 Kevin Sieff, “It’s so dangerous to police MS-13 in El Salvador that officers are fleeing the country” (Washington
Post, March 3, 2019), https://beta.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/its-so-dangerous-to-police-ms-13-in-el-
salvador-that-officers-are-fleeing-the-country/2019/03/03/e897dbaa-2287-11e9-b5b4-1d18dfb7b084_story.html
60 Id.
61 Jeff Abbott, “Guatemala's CICIG: UN-backed anti-corruption body shuts its doors”, (Aljazeera, September 2,
2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/guatemala-cicig-backed-anti-corruption-body-shuts-doors-
190903132411201.html
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39. Without this independent investigative body, corruption and impunity are likely to flourish in
Guatemala. The recently elected president of Guatemala, Alejandro Giammattei, inaugurated
on Jan. 14, 2020, was himself at the center of a CICIG case in 2010, when he was prosecuted
for his alleged involvement in extrajudicial executions while serving as the head of the
Guatemalan prison system.62
40. The rate of crimes that go unpunished in Guatemala averaged 94 percent in the past decade,
with the rate jumping to 97.6 percent in 2018.63 Corruption crimes in Guatemala saw the
highest rate of impunity at almost 99 percent.64 Considering that Guatemalan citizens
themselves experience little to no state or institutional support and protection, it is unlikely
that an adequate level of protection could be provided to asylum seekers sent to Guatemala
under a Safe Third Country Agreement. In a recent poll, only 18 percent of the Guatemalan
people agreed with the safe third country agreement, with the opposition citing the lack of
basic infrastructure and state power Guatemala currently experiences as proof that Guatemala
cannot fulfill the requirements to be a safe third country.65
V.
Economic Misery in Guatemala
41. More than half (59%) of the Guatemalan population lives in poverty, with 23% in extreme
poverty.66 More than a third of Guatemalan children are deemed by international agencies as
undernourished, and much of the population lacks access to even the most basic of health
services. Among Guatemalans who are employed, it is reported that the vast majority earn
wages that are insufficient to meet a family’s basic needs.67
42. According to Habitat for Humanity, the current housing deficit in Guatemala is over 1.8
million homes, and the problem will continue as not enough homes are being built to
accommodate the population.68 The Central Housing Association Guatemala Chapter notes
that without serious reforms, the housing market will not meet the needs of the public, with
62 Claire Parker, “Four things to know about Guatemala’s new president-elect”, (The Washington Post, August 12,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/08/12/four-things-know-about-guatemalas-new-president-
elect/
63 Parker Asmann, “Guatemala Impunity Report Shows Limits of Anti-Graft Body”, (InSight Crime, June 2019),
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/guatemala-impunity-report-limits-anti-graft-body/
64 Id.
65 Adriana Beltran, supra, note 3
66 Id.
67 Maria Veraza, “Poverty, Unemployment, violence drive Guatemalan emigration”, (AP News, October 26, 2018),
https://apnews.com/0b7f28a8ab5645e58fb2d708d27e3adf
68 Habitat for Humanity, “Country Profile: Guatemala” (Habitat for Humanity, 2019),
https://www.habitatforhumanity.org.uk/country/guatemala/
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the perceived negative impact being an increase in precarious settlements in urban areas.69 A
large influx of asylum seekers would only worsen the housing crisis within Guatemala.
43. The housing crisis is further burdened by the fact that only 54% of Guatemalans have access
to proper sanitation services.70 The rest of the population uses poorly constructed latrines or
lacks sewage systems altogether, with waste not being disposed of properly or treated -
which is of major concern for health and human safety.
VI.
Lack of Resources for Asylum Seekers
44. In addition to the dismal economic conditions and the housing crisis that Guatemala is
currently facing, the country’s asylum system is not prepared or capable of handling the
volume of asylum petitioners that could be sent to the country. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees for Central America has estimated that at its best operating
efficiency Guatemala currently has the capacity to process about 200 asylum requests per
year, given that there are only 12 national staff members working in the national migration
office, with only three asylum interview officers.71
45. In 2018, an estimated 50,000 Hondurans and Salvadorans applied for asylum in the United
States.72 Guatemala would be incapable of handling a flow of asylum seekers anywhere
remotely near this volume given its primitive asylum system. In addition, the United States
State Department has stated explicitly, as recently as 2018, that the Guatemalan asylum
system is inadequate in identifying and referring potential asylum seekers, putting asylum
seekers at risk of deportation back to their countries of persecution.73 There have been no
meaningful changes to the country’s asylum system in the one year since the United States
State Department reached this conclusion.
46. Government-run migrant reception services in Guatemala have centered around Guatemalan
deportees. The services have been limited, but in recent years have begun to expand
capacities for receiving returning unaccompanied children and families.74 Many of the
returning migrants are from rural communities where economic opportunities are lacking,
69 Central Housing Association Guatemala Chapter, “Guatemala and the Housing Deficit”, (Central America Data,
2015), https://www.centralamericadata.com/en/article/home/Guatemala_and_the_Housing_Shortage
70 Habitat for Humanity, “More than Houses: Guatemala”, (Habitat for Humanity, 2019),
https://www.habitatguate.org/eng/mas-que-casas/
71 UNHCR, “Guatemala Factsheet” (UNHCR, April 2019), http://www.globalcrrf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Fact-Sheet-Guatemala-Final-April-2019.pdf; Human Rights First, “Is Guatemala Safe for
Refugees and Asylum Seekers?” (Human Rights First, July 1, 2019),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guatemala-safe-refugees-and-asylum-seekers
72 Id.
73 U.S. Department of State, “Guatemala 2018 Human Rights Report”, (United States Department of State, 2018),
https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/GUATEMALA-2018.pdf at 13
74 Ariel Ruiz Soto, Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Luis Argueta, and Randy Capps “Sustainable Reintegration
Strategies to Support Migrants Returning to Mexico and Central America”, (Migration Policy Institute, January
2019), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPI-ReceptionReintegration-FinalWeb.pdf
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prompting them to want to stay in urban areas.75 However, these are the same urban areas
that have increasingly been taken over by street gangs obsessed with territorial control, and
the government has not established long-term shelters or places for adult migrants to stay
protected. Asylum seekers are likely to face the same limitations in integrating into
Guatemala.
47. Deported Guatemalans have stated that they have been unable to receive reintegration
services and protections because high levels of violence impede their ability to access
services.76 Some returned migrants have reported that they feel more unsafe upon returning
to Guatemala.77 Asylum seekers abandoned in Guatemala would face even greater
vulnerability to violence, which would further impede their ability to access whatever
minimal services and protections might theoretically be on offer. Asylum seekers from other
regions will also be at risk of violence as they will be marked as outsiders by the gangs who
control the neighborhoods in Guatemala. If they are unfamiliar with the territorial control of
gangs, they risk violent retaliation if they unknowingly enter into an area controlled by a
different gang than the neighborhood they live in.
Conclusions
48. Based on my understanding of the current country conditions in Guatemala, including the
high levels of violence, the territorial reach of transnational gangs, lack of state protection,
and lack of jobs, shelter basic services and integration resources for migrants, it is my
professional opinion that potential asylum seekers would be at high risk of substantial danger
if sent to Guatemala under the Asylum Cooperative Agreement.
49. The challenges of limited economic opportunities, high levels of insecurity and violence, and
distrust of government institutions which have motivated so many people to flee from
neighboring countries of Honduras and El Salvador, are also present within Guatemala.78
50. A large number of the Honduran and Salvadoran asylum seekers who would be sent to
Guatemala are fleeing from the same gangs that have taken up a large presence in Guatemala.
It is reasonable to believe that MS-13 or Barrio 18 in Honduras and El Salvador would be
able to track down someone in Guatemala, given the interconnectedness of the gangs and
their extensive communication systems.
51. The Guatemalan government’s inability to provide for the needs and protection of its own
citizens, demonstrating its inability to provide the minimum standard of protection needed
for asylum seekers and refugees. The Guatemalan asylum system has been criticized for
75 Id. at 18
76 Ariel Ruiz Soto, Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Luis Argueta, and Randy Capps, supra, note 77 at 24
77 Id. at 24
78 Id. at 24
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being insufficiently developed to handle an influx of asylum seekers, which is evidenced by
the severely understaffed asylum office.79
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is true
and correct. Executed in the District of Columbia, on January 20, 2020.
Eric Hershberg
79 Zolan Kanno-Youngs, “Mexican Asylum Seekers Could Now Be Deported to Guatemala”, (The New York Times,
January 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/us/politics/mexican-asylum-seekers-guatemala.html
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ERIC HERSHBERG
Curriculum vita, June, 2019
OFFICE:
Director, Center for Latin American and Latino Studies
Professor of Government
American University
4400 Massachusetts Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20016
Tel. 202-885-6172
HOME:
2264 Cathedral Ave., NW
Washington, DC 20008
Tel. 202-270-5421
e-mail: hershber@american.edu
Table of Contents
CREDENTIALS AND APPOINTMENTS ................................................................................. 2
PUBLICATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 3
TEACHING ................................................................................................................................. 11
UNIVERSITY SERVICE ........................................................................................................... 13
EXTERNAL SERVICE .............................................................................................................. 15
Editorial ........................................................................................................................................15
Institutional ..................................................................................................................................15
Evaluations ............................................................................................................................................ 15
Governance............................................................................................................................................ 16
Consulting.............................................................................................................................................. 17
Public Service ........................................................................................................................................ 17
GRANTS AND FUNDRAISING ............................................................................................... 18
LECTURES AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS (Selected, 1991--) ......................... 22
MEDIA INTERVENTIONS (2007--) ........................................................................................ 37
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CREDENTIALS AND APPOINTMENTS
EDUCATION
Ph.D., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison
M.A., Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison
B.A., Spanish and French, Indiana University-Bloomington
LANGUAGES
English and Spanish
Fluent written, spoken, and reading
French
Fluent spoken and reading
Portuguese
Fluent reading, communicate with ease
APPOINTMENTS
Director, American University Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, 2010-
Prof. of Government, American University, 2010-
Prof. of Political Science and Director of Latin American Studies, Simon Fraser University (2007-09)
President, Latin American Studies Association (2007-09)
Vice President, Latin American Studies Association (2006-07)
Senior Advisor, Social Science Research Council (2005-07)
Program Director, Social Science Research Council (1990-2005)
Adjunct Professor, The New School (Spring 2006)
Adjunct Assoc. Professor, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (1999-2006)
Affiliated Researcher, International Organization for Knowledge Economy and Development (IKED),
Malmo, Sweden 2003-2005 (in residence August-September 2004)
Visiting Prof., Princeton University, Dept. of Politics, Inst. of Intl & Regional Studies (2003-04)
Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Latin American Studies, Columbia University (1997-2006)
Visiting Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, New York University (Spring 1994)
Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science, Southern Illinois University (1989-90)
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PUBLICATIONS
PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS
A New Chapter in US-Cuba Relations: Economic, Political and Social Implications, co-edited with
William M. LeoGrande. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
“Introduction: US-Cuba Diplomatic Rapprochement and Washington’s Relations with Latin America,” in
Eric Hershberg and William M. LeoGrande, eds., A New Chapter in US-Cuba Relations:
Economic, Political and Social Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Conclusion: Keys to Assessing Progress toward Establishing Normal Relations between the United States
and Cuba," in Eric Hershberg and William M. LeoGrande, eds., A New Chapter in US-Cuba
Relations: Economic, Political and Social Implications. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
“The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis in Latin America: Economic and Political Determinants,” in
Carol Wise, Saori Katada and Leslie Elliott Armijo, eds., Unexpected Outcomes: How Emerging
Economies Survived the Global Financial Crisis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015.
Foreword, in Oliver Stuenkel and Matthew M. Taylor, eds. Brazil and the International Liberal Order.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
“Prologo” in Alejandro Foxley and Barbara Stallings, eds., Economias Latinoamericanas:Como Avanzar
Mas Alla del Ingreso Medio. Santiago, Chile: CIEPLAN, 2014.
“El hemisferio en transformación: regionalismos, multilateralismo y políticas exteriores en un entorno
cambiante,” co-authored with Andres Serbin and Tullo Vigevani in Pensamiento Propio Vol 39,
No. 1. Spring 2014.
“Washington and the Hemispheric Order: Explanations for Continuity and Change," (with Phillip J.
Brenner) in Pensamiento Propio, Vol 39, No. 1. Spring 2014.
“Hemisferio Americano em Transformaçao: Relaçoes Internacionais, Multilateralismo e Perspectivas das
Relaçoes Interamericanas,” co-authored with Andres Serbin and Tullo Vigevani, “Hemisferio em
Transformaçao” Lua Nova n. 90. 2013 (Special Journal Issue ISSN 0102-6445).
“Washington e a ordem hemisferica,” co-authored with Philip Brenner, in “Hemisferio em
Transformaçao”
Lua Nova n. 90. 2013 (Special Journal Issue ISSN 0102-6445).
“Cuba: An Economy Careening Forward, Destination Unknown,” Foreword to Economic Transformation
in Cuba, edited by Claes Brundenius and Ricardo Torres. London: Springer, 2013.
New Institutions for Participatory Democracy in Latin America: Voice and Consequence, co-edited with
Maxwell A. Cameron and Kenneth Sharpe. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012. (Spanish
edition: Instituciones nuevas para la participación democrática en América Latina: voz y
consecuencia. Mexico City: FLACSO, 2012).
Translation of three lengthy chapters (approximately 40,000 words) of C.I. Degregori: How Difficult it is
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to be God: Shining Path's Politics of War in Peru, 1980-1999. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press, 2012.
“Colombia Policy Under the Obama Administration: Sustaining an Inherited Paradigm,” with Anne
Gillman. Pensamiento Propio (Buenos Aires) No. 31 (Jan.-April 2010), pp. 77-102.
Latin America’s Left Turns: Politics, Policies and Trajectories of Change, co-edited, with Maxwell A.
Cameron. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010.
“Latin America’s Left Turns: A Tour D’Horizon” with Jon Beasley-Murray and Maxwell A. Cameron, in
Cameron and Hershberg, eds., 2010.
“Latin America’s Lefts: The Impact of the External Environment,” in Cameron and Hershberg, eds.,
2010.
“Democracy in Latin America: A Review of Recent Literature.” Canadian Journal of Latin American
and
Caribbean Studies, (summer, 2009 – published summer 2010).
“Paradoxical Inequalities in Latin America,” prologue to Paul Gootenberg and Luis Reygadas, eds.,
Durable Inequalities in Latin America. Durham: Duke University Press (2010).
“Latin America’s Left Turns: an Introduction” with Jon Beasley-Murray and Maxwell A. Cameron. Third
World Quarterly, (March 2009, special issue co-edited with Cameron).
“América Latina fragmentada: Economía y empleo en la era de la globalización,” Nueva Sociedad. No.
214, 2008 (March-April), pp. 152-161.
“Globalization and Labor: Reflections on Contemporary Latin America,” International Labor and
Working Class History, No. 72, Fall 2007, pp. 164-172.
“Democracy Promotion in Latin America,” Democracy and Society, Vol. 4, Issue 2 (Spring 2007).
"Opening the Ivory Tower to Business: University Industry Linkages in Asia," Special Issue of World
Development, co-edited and with introductory essay written with Shahid Yusuf and Kaoru
Nabeshima (2007).
Turning the Tide? Latin America After Neoliberalism. Volume co-editor, with Fred Rosen. New York:
The New Press (2006).
“Turning the Tide? The Quest for Social Justice in Latin America,” in Hershberg and Rosen, eds.
State and Society in Conflict: Comparative Perspective on Andean Crises, co-edited with Paul W. Drake.
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press (2006).
“The Crisis of State-Society Relations in Post-1980s Andes,” (with Paul W. Drake) in Drake and
Hershberg, eds., (2006).
“Technocrats, Citizens and Second Generation Reforms: Considerations on Colombia’s Andean
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Malaise,” in Drake and Hershberg, eds. (2006).
Memorias militares: visiones en disputa en dictadura y democracia, co-edited with Felipe Aguero.
Madrid: Siglo XXI (2005).
.
“Las Fuerzas Armadas y las memorias de la represión en el Cono Sur,” in Hershberg and Aguero, eds.,
(2005).
Keys to Latin America’s Security: Economic Development and State Strengthening (with Juan Carlos
Moreno Brid), University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Occasional Paper 94. (May 2005).
“Global Restructuring, Knowledge and Learning” in Voprosy Ekonomiki (Issues in Economics—in
Russian). Moscow (August, 2004).
Critical Views of September 11: Analyses from Around the World, co-editor, with Kevin W. Moore. New
York: The New Press (2002)
“Place, Perspective and Power: Interpreting September 11,” co-author, with Kevin W. Moore, in
Hershberg and Moore, eds., (2002).
“Change and Continuity in Hemispheric Affairs: Latin America after September 11,” (with Francisco
Gutierrez and Monica Hirst), in Hershberg and Moore, eds., (2002).
“Development: Economic and Social Dimensions,” in Paul Baltes and Neil Smelser, eds., The
International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences. Vol. 6, London: Elsevier (2001).
Economic Governance and Flexible Production in East Asia, (volume co-edited with Frederic Deyo and
Richard F. Doner). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers (2001).
“Conclusion: Network Governance, Flexibility and Development Amid Crisis” (with Frederic Deyo and
Richard F. Doner) in Deyo, Doner and Hershberg, eds. (2001).
“Sector privado, democracia y desarrollo: Los empresarios y las transiciones en Chile,” in Amparo
Menéndez Carrión and Alfredo Joignant, eds. La Caja de Pandora: el retorno de las transiciones
en Chile. Santiago: Planeta (1999).
“Flexible Production and Political Decentralization in the Developing World: Elective Affinities in the
Pursuit of Competitiveness?” (with Richard F. Doner), Vol. 33, No. 4 (1999), Studies in
Comparative International Development. (Abbreviated version in Portuguese, published in
Nadya Araujo Guimarães and Scott Martin, eds., Competividade: Atores e Instituçoes Locais. Sao
Paulo: Editora SENAC, 2001.)
“Democracy, and its Discontents: Extending Political Citizenship in Latin America,” in Howard
Handelman and Mark Tessler, eds. Democracy and Its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America
and the Middle East. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press (1999).
“From Cold War Origins to a Model for Academic Internationalization: Latin American Studies at a
Crossroads,” Dispositio/n Vol. 22, Issue 50, 1999. (University of Michigan Press).
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“Market-Oriented Development and State-Society Relations in Contemporary Spain and Chile,” in
Douglass Chalmers, et. al., The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America. Oxford University
Press (1997).
“Democratic Transition and Social Democracy in Spain,” in PROKLA, Periodical of Critical Social
Science (Berlin, in German), Issue 105, Vol. 26, No. 3 (December, 1996).
Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America, coedited with
Elizabeth Jelin. Boulder, CO: Westview Press (1996).
Construir la democracia: derechos humanos, ciudadanía y sociedad en América Latina. (Spanish
version of Constructing Democracy...) Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1996. (Portuguese version
published by the Editorial da Universidade de Sao Paulo, Brazil, 2007).
"Human Rights and the Construction of Democracy," with Elizabeth Jelin, in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric
Hershberg, eds. (1996).
"Convergent Developments, Diversity and Change: Visions of Human Rights" (with Elizabeth Jelin) in
Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hershberg, eds. (1996).
NON-PEER REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS
American University Latin America Blog (www.aulablog.net) entries
“Puerto Rico: A Mess with Structural Causes,” (with F. Armstrong) August 14, 2019
“New Leadership in El Salvador: Breaking from the Past?,” J;u 15, 2019
“Venezuela: Washington Trying to Tighten the Noose,” April 11, 2019
“Venezuela: A Test of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America,” Jan. 31, 2019
“Nicaragua: Might Trump See Opportunity?” (with F. Armstrong), Aug. 7, 2018)
“Summit of the Americas: Awkward Agenda, Dim Prospects,” Feb. 6, 2018
“Honduras: Hernandez Stealing an Election, Too?” (with F. Armstrong), Dec. 4, 2017.
“U.S. Immigration Policy: Not Just Getting Rid of ‘Bad Hombres’,” (with F. Armstrong and D.
Stinchcomb) Feb. 27, 2017
“U.S.-Mexico Tensions: Harbinger for Latin America?” (with F. Armstrong), Jan. 31, 2017
“Deciding Asylum: Challenges Remain as Claims Soar” (with D. Stinchcomb), Jan. 19, 2017
“2017: Happy New Year in Latin America?” (with F. Armstrong), Jan. 4, 2017
“What Comes After TPP?” (with F. Armstrong), Nov. 22, 2016
“The Cataclysm that the Latino Vote Couldn’t Stop,” Nov. 10, 2016
“U.S. Elections: Latino Voters Lost in the Noise?” (with F. Armstrong), Oct.20, 2016
“El Salvador: Dealing with the New Reality of Violence,” Sept. 26, 2016
“How Sustainable are Latin America’s Advances on Poverty and Inequality?” June 3, 2016
“Political Upheaval in South America,” May 26, 2016
“Trumping GOP Resistance to Rapprochement with Cuba” May 21, 2016
“U.S. Colombia: Launching "Peace Colombia," Feb. 8, 2016
“What Does Macri's Win Mean for Latin American's Left Turns?" (with F. Armstrong), Dec. 2, 2015
“Puerto Ricans in Florida: Swing Constituency in a Swing State” (with F. Armstrong), Sept. 21, 2015
“Is a CICIH the Answer to Honduras’ Crisis? Co-authored with F. Armstrong, Sept. 15, 2015
“Guatemala’s Crisis is not Over” Sept. 3, 2015
“Dilma, and Brazil, in Crisis” August 24, 2015
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“Can Republicans Close Their Gap with Latinos (with Rob Albro), August 18 2015
“Remittances and Sustainable Community Development in Latin America” (with A. Bell), Aug. 4, 2015
“OAS: Almagro’s Challenge, co-authored with Fulton Armstrong, July 27, 2015
“Mexico Elections: Successful Balloting, Mixed Results” (with F. Armstrong), June 11, 2015
“Peru: The Shuffling Continues” with Fulton Armstrong, May 11, 2015)
“The Summit of the Americas: Important Progress,” with Aaron Bell, April 13, 2015
“Implications of Normalization of U.S.-Cuban Relations”, April 2, 2015
“Central American Minors: Headed Home?” with D. Stinchcomb, March 26, 2015
“Venezuela: Crossing the Line” with Fulton Armstrong, February 23, 2015
“Elite Power and State Strength: A Timely Focus of Academic Studies,” February 5, 2015
“Cuba Welcomes Normalization, but only on its Own Terms” January 26 2015
“Executive Underreach: Migrants on the Edges of Reform” (with D. Stinchcomb) Dec. 11, 2014
“Social Science that Matters: Perez Sainz on Latin America's Inequalities” Dec. 4, 2014
“Unaccompanied Migrant Children from Central America: Context and Causes” Nov. 20, 2014.
“Elections in the US: Latino Vote not Decisive” co-authored with Fulton Armstrong, Nov. 7, 2014
“Brazil: Implications of Dilma’s Victory” co-authored with Matthew M. Taylor, October 27, 2014
“Elections in Brazil” co-authored with Luciano Melo, Oct. 10, 2014
“Who Will Attend the Presidential Summit?” co-authored with Fulton Armstrong, Oct. 2, 2014
“Sanctions on Venezuela: Why?” co-authored with Fulton Armstrong, August 16, 2014
“Colombia: Four More Years of Santos” June 16, 2014
“Trans-Pacific Partnership: A Framework for U.S.-Latin America Relations?” May 22, 2014
“Downsides of Decentralization: Lessons from Peru” May 5, 2014
“Obama’s Deportation Debacle” co-authored with Dennis Stinchcomb, April 23, 2014
“ALBA Governments and Presidential Succession” March 21, 2014
“Cuban Infrastructure and Brazilian State Capitalism: The Port of Mariel” February 20, 2014
“Chile Elections: Bachelet’s Partial Victory” co-authored with Maribel Vásquez, Nov. 22, 2013
“The September 11 Coup in Chile: Global Ramifications” Sept. 17, 2013
“Ben Kohl: The Loss of a Scholar Activist who Taught About Bolivia” August 12, 2013
“US-Cuba: Time to End the Visa Charade” June 4, 2013
“Chavismo Wins a Battle but the Tide May Have Turned” April 23, 2013
“Venezuela: a New Start?” co-authored with Fulton Armstrong, March 6, 2013
“The Overlooked Dimension of US Immigration Reform” March 4, 2013
“Is Chairman Menendez the Right US Signal for Latin America?” co-authored with William M.
LeoGrande, Feb. 15, 2013
“Country Conditions in Central America and Asylum Decision-Making (co-authored with Jayesh Rathod
and Dennis Stinchcomb), CLALS Working Paper Series No. 15. Center for Latin American and
Latino Studies, 2017.
“Political Economy of Colombia and Ecuador.” Bibliographic review essay, Handbook of Latin
American
Studies. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Vol. 71, (2016).
"Opening to Cuba Before There Was an Opening to Cuba: Reflections on Two Decades of Work at the
SSRC," (with Stanley Katz), Items: Insights from the Social Sciences, June 7, 2016.
“What's Left of the Republican Party? A Dialogue with Eric Hershberg," (Josep Colomer’s
Political Science blog), May 8, 2016
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“Obama's Visits: Late is Better than Never," (Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Economicas y
Sociales blog), 2016
"Violence and Community Capabilities: Insights for Building Safe and Inclusive Cities in Central
America." (with Daniel Esser et al.),CLALS Working Paper Series No. 8, Nov. 2015.
“North-South Relations in the Western Hemisphere: The Shifting Distribution of Sovereignty in the 21st
Century," (co-authored with Sebastian Bitar), (unpublished paper).
“Unaccompanied Migrant Children from Central America: Context, Causes and Responses,” (with Dennis
Stinchcomb). Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (CLALS) Working Paper 7 (2014).
“Political Economy of Colombia and Ecuador.” Bibliographic review essay (co-authored with A.
Ruddle), Handbook of Latin American Studies. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Vol. 69,
(2014).
“Las Elites de Centro América y la Trampa de Ingresos Medios,” invited comment in Lente Fiscal.
Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Fiscales, Guatemala City, (February, 2014).
"Lo Que Chávez se Llevó," (with Maxwell Cameron) in Poder 360. Lima, Perú. (2013).
“Political Economy of Colombia and Ecuador.” Bibliographic review essay, Handbook of Latin
American Studies. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Vol. 67 (2012).
“Salvaging a Revolution: Cuba at a Crossroad,” guest editor and introductory essay, “Salvaging a
Revolution?” NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July – August, 2011).
“Latin American Studies Programs in the 21st Century U.S. University. LASA Forum (Fall 2010, Vol.
XLI, No.4).
“Political Economy of Colombia and Ecuador.” Bibliographic review essay, Handbook of Latin
American Studies. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Vol. 65 (2009).
“Comparative Perspectives on Institutional Origins and Evolution,” preface to Richard F. Doner, ed.,
Explaining Institutional Innovation: Case Studies from Latin America and Asia. New York:
Social Science Research Council, 2010.
“The Funes Government and El Salvador’s Opportunity,” introduction to NACLA Report on the
Americas devoted to El Salvador (guest co-editor). Nov-Dec. 2009.
LASA Forum, edited six issues, 2008-2009, scholarly debates on “Inequalities” and “On the Profession.”
“Waiting For a Bus to Somewhere: Reflections on Change in Cuba.” Social Science Research Council
Web Forum on Change in Cuba (April, 2008). (www.ssrc.org/changeincuba)
“Human Rights and Accountability in the Southern Cone,” in Cynthia Arnson and Jose Raul Perales, eds.
The New Left and Democratic Governance in Latin America. Washington, DC: The Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars (2007).
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“Political Economy of Colombia and Ecuador.” Bibliographic review essay, Handbook of Latin
American Studies. Washington, DC: Library of Congress,Vol. 63 (2007).
The Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales (CLACSO): An Evaluation, (with Rodrigo Arocena
and Rosemary Thorp). Stockholm: SIDA (2005).
“The Political Economy of Development: Trends in Latin American Studies.” Contribution to a Dossier
on “Studies of Latin America From Latin America and the Caribbean,” LASA Forum, Vol.
XXXVI, No. 3 (Fall 2005).
The Development Imperative: Toward a People-Centered Approach, co-edited with Christy Thornton,
Social Science Research Council, 2005.
“Global Restructuring, Knowledge and Learning: Notes on Industrial Upgrading and Development.”
American University of Paris Working Paper Series, No. 15, 2004 (October).
“Political Economy of Colombia and Ecuador.” Bibliographic review essay, Handbook of Latin
American Studies. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Vol. 61 (2005).
“Hacia un Consenso Centroamericano.” Revista Virtual de Economía Centroamericana, Guatemala:
ASIES, Vol. 2 (January, 2004).
Guest editor, special issue of NACLA Report on the Americas, “Beyond the Washington Consensus,”
(November, 2003).
“Latin America’s Crossroads,” in NACLA Report on the Americas (Nov. 2003).
Prefacio to Carlos Ivan Degregori, ed. Luchas por las memorias de la represion en Peru. Instituto de
Estudios Peruanos, Lima (2003).
“Why Argentina Crashed, and is Still Crashing,” in NACLA Report on the Americas (August, 2002).
“Who Crashed Argentina?” in Connections to the Americas. Minneapolis (March, 2002).
“Governance in Colombia: A Time for Rethinking Priorities.” Consultant report, (25,000 words)
commissioned by the World Bank (July, 2001).
“Collective Memory of Repression in Latin America’s Southern Cone.” Items. Vol. 53, No. 1 (March
1999).
“Trends in Funding for Graduate Student Field Research in Comparative Politics: Evidence from a
Review of SSRC Fellowship Programs,” with Kenton Worcester, APSA-CP Newsletter, Summer
1999, pp. 25-29.
“Expanding U.S.-Cuban Scholarly Relations,” with Rachel Price. LASA Forum, Vol. XXX, No. 2
(Summer, 1999).
“The Social Sciences in Latin America” in World Social Science Report. (Unsigned essay). Paris:
UNESCO. (1999).
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“Industrial Upgrading: Workshop Notes.” Items. Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1998).
“Prólogo: Centroamerica en restructuración” (with Rafael Menjivar), in Juan Pablo Pérez Sainz, et. al.,
Centroamerica en restructuración. 3 vols. San José: FLACSO-Costa Rica (1998).
“Is Latin America the Future of Eastern Europe?” with Melvin Croan, Lawrence Graham, David Ost and
Thomas Skidmore, in Problems of Communism (June, 1992).
“Toward an Agenda for Comparative and Transnational Research,” Items (Summer, 1992).
“Environmentalism and the Poor,” with Juan Martínez-Alier, Items (Spring, 1992).
BOOK REVIEWS
“The Obama Doctrine in the Americas,” International Affairs. Vol. 93, No. 1 (January 2017)
Eduardo Dargent, Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Reviewed for Apuntes (Apuntes, 77, pp. 193-193, 2016).
Ignacio Walker, Democracy in Latin America: Between Hope and Despair, Notre Dame, Notre Dame
University Press. Reviewed for The Americas: A Quarterly Review of Latin American History.
Vol. 71(2), pp. 374-375 (October 2014).
Laura Macdonald and Arne Ruekert, Post-Neoliberalism in the Americas, Routledge, 2009, reviewed for
Times Higher Education, (London). 2009.
“Vamos Bien?: The Cuban Revolution at 50,” London Review of Books, May 29, 2009.
Caroline F. Levander and Robert S. Levine, eds., Hemispheric American Studies, New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 2008, reviewed for Journal of American History (2008).
Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds., Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective.
Institute of Latin American Studies, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2003
reviewed in Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Vol. 30, No 59&60
(Winter 2005).
David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, Shaping the Political Arena. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press, reviewed in Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Vol. 29, No.
57&58 (2004).
Christopher Chase-Dunn, Susanne Jonas and Nelson Amaro, (eds.), Globalization on the Ground: Post
bellum Guatemalan Democracy and Development, in Latin American Politics and Society. (Fall
2002).
Louis Perez, Jr., Becoming Cuban (University of North Carolina Press) in Lingua Franca, “Breakthrough
Books” section (April, 2001).
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Victor Perez Diaz, Spain at the Crossroads: Civil Society, Politics and the Rule of Law (Harvard
University Press) in Political Science Quarterly (Summer 2000).
Sonia Alvarez, E. Dagnino and A. Escobar, eds., Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Revisioning
Latin American Social Movements (Westview Press, 1998) in American Anthropologist (Dec.
1999).
Lucy Taylor, Citizenship, Participation and Democracy: Changing Dynamics in Chile and Argentina.
(St. Martin’s Press, 1998) in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Winter 1998).
Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo, eds., Transnationalism from Below (Transaction
Publishers, 1998), in Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1999).
Unarmed or Disarmed, Jorge Castañeda's Utopia Unarmed. New Politics (December 1994).
Benjamin Martin, The Agony of Modernization: Labor and Industrialization in Spain. in Hispanic
American Historical Review (November 1993).
Richard Gunther (ed.), Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe
(Cambridge University Press, 1992), in Hispanic American Historical Review (May 1993).
TEACHING
COURSES TAUGHT
Political Economy of Development in Latin America and Asia (Fall 2019)
Political Economy of Development in the Global South (American University, 2017, 2019)
Political Economy of Inequality in the Global South (American University, 2015)
Introduction to Comparative Politics (American University, 2012, 2013, 2018)
Political Economy of Inequality in Latin America (American University, 2012)
Social and Political Change in Latin America (Simon Fraser University, 2007, 2009)
Introduction to Latin American Issues (Simon Fraser University, 2007, 2008)
Comparative Development Experience (The New School, 2006)
Globalization and Politics (Princeton University, 2004)
Development Policy Workshop (Columbia University, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006)
Labor in the Global Economy (Columbia University, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002)
Development Policy Analysis (Columbia University, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2005)
Contemporary Spain (New York University, 1994)
Politics of Western Europe (Southern Illinois University, 1989, 1990)
Politics of Latin America (Southern Illinois University, 1989, 1990)
Introduction to Politics (Southern Illinois University, 1990)
Introduction to Comparative Politics (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988, 1989)
Introduction to Central America and Mexico (University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1988)
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Intro to Comparative Politics; Intro to Political Thought, Teaching Asst, (UW-Madison, 1985-88)
THESIS SUPERVISION
Dania Al-Awadi, Department of Government, American University, 2017 – Present
Luciano Melo, Department of Government, American University, 2014 – Present
Emma Fawcett, School of International Service, American University, (chair, Ph.D. defended July 2016).
Dawn Farthing, School of International Service, American University, “Globalization and Resistance in
Latin America: Communities and Extractive Industries.” (MA thesis defended November 2012).
Hayley Jones, School of International Studies, Simon Fraser University, “Conditional Cash Transfer
Programs and Inequality in Latin America,” (MA thesis defended April 2011).
Michael Toal, Latin American Studies Program, Simon Fraser University, “Transnational Solidarity
Networks and the Peace Movement in Colombia,” (MA thesis defended May 27, 2010).
Valerie Duquette, Latin American Studies Program, Simon Fraser University, Political Decentralization
and Participatory Budgeting in Lima, Peru: Analysis from a Gender Perspective. (MA thesis
defended Nov. 2009).
Julie Stevens, School of International Studies, Simon Fraser University, “Canadian Mining Companies
and Corporate Social Responsibility in Latin America.” (MA paper defended August 2009).
Mel Bricker, School of International Studies, Simon Fraser University, “Democracy and Inequality in
Latin America” (MA paper defended August 2009).
Santiago Anria, Latin American Studies Program, Simon Fraser University, The MAS: Informal Structure
in Urban Bolivia. (M.A. thesis defended April 2009).
Catherine Craven, Latin American Studies Program, Simon Fraser University, Garifuna Youth and
Community Development in Honduras. (MA thesis defended April 2009).
Chelsey Branch, School of International Studies, Simon Fraser University, “Conditional Cash Transfers
and Poverty Relief in Latin America.” (MA paper defended August 2008).
Lorenza Gallia, Latin American Studies Program, Simon Fraser University, “The Recuperated Factories
of Argentina.” (MA thesis defended October 2007).
THESIS COMMITTEES
Marcela Torres, Department of Government, American University. Ph.D. dissertation committee.
(defended December, 2016).
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Maya Barak, Dept. of Justice, Law and Criminology, American University, Ph.D. dissertation committee.
(defended July, 2016).
Aaron Bell, Department of History, American University, Ph.D. dissertation committee. (defended May
2015).
Jason Tockman, University of British Columbia, Department of Political Science, Ph.D. thesis on
Bolivia’s Indigenous Autonomies. (defended October 2014).
Sebastian Bitar, School of International Service, American University, Ph.D. dissertation committee.
(defended 2014).
Luis Moncayo, Latin American Studies Program, Simon Fraser University, M.A. thesis on sustainable
food systems in Bolivia, (defended December 2009).
Ashley Buncic, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, M.A. thesis on “Sustainable
Tourism in the Dominican Republic,” Second Supervisor, (defended December 2008).
Robert Huish, Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University, Ph.D. thesis on “Cuba’s Latin
American School of Medicine,” External Reader, (defended May 2008).
Julie Stewart, Dept. of Sociology, New York University, "To Help or to Harm: How transnational
ties shape communities in post-war Guatemala," (Ph.D. thesis defended June 2006).
LaDawn Haglund, Dept. of Sociology, New York University, "Democracy and the Privatization of
Utilities: Costa Rica and El Salvador." (Ph.D. thesis defended July 2005).
UNIVERSITY SERVICE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Chair, AU Ad-hoc Advisory Committee on Research and Centers, (Academic year 2019-20)
Sub-Committee Member, American University Strategic Plan Development (2018)
Award Recipient: 2018 American University Award for Contributions to Fostering Collaborative
Scholarship
Committee Chair, School of Public Affairs Dean Search Committee (2017)
Committee Member, William M. LeoGrande Prize Committee (2014-17)
Committee Member, Search Committee for Faculty Director of CCPS (2016)
Delivered a book lecture, A New Chapter in U.S.-Cuba Relations, SIS Alumni (2016)
Search Committee for Senior Government Department faculty and Director of the Center for
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Congressional and Presidential Studies (2015-16 and 2016-17)
Dean of School of Public Affairs Committee on Excellence and High Impact Research (2014-15)
Provost’s Advisory Committee on High Impact Research (academic year 2013-14)
Faculty Research Grant Ad hoc Review Committee (February 2014)
Provost’s Task Force on Recruitment of International M.A. students (2012)
Strategic Plan Advisory Process Site Visit Committee, School of Public Affairs (2012)
Campus-wide committee for accreditation review; sub-committee on “New Technologies” (2012)
Committee Chair, William M. LeoGrande Prize Committee (2012-13)
Search Committee, Multi-year faculty appointment in Brazilian Portuguese and Culture (2013)
Search Committee for Director of Sponsored Programs (Spring 2012)
Advisory Committee for development of campus-wide work in the field of Metropolitan Studies (2012)
Department of Government Merit Review Committee (2012)
Search Committee for tenure track faculty position in the Comparative and Regional Studies division of
the School of International Service (Fall 2011)
“Funding Collaborative Research Programs,” panel presentation at the School of International Service
Retreat, (September, 2010)
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Dept. of Political Science Renewal Committee
Dept. of Political Science Comparative Politics Committee, Chair
Dept. of Political Science Appointments Committee
World Literature Program Tenure and Promotion Committee
Dean’s Committee to Assess the Language Training Institute
Pacific Century Graduate Fellowship Competition, Proposal Review
SSHRC M.A. Awards Committee
Campus-wide International Working Group, Member
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Organizing Committee, SSHRC Research Workshop on Health Inequalities
EXTERNAL SERVICE
EDITORIAL
Editorial Review Board Member, CEBRAP, Novos Estudos CEBRAP, Sao Paulo, Brazil, Appointed.
(2016-2017)
Editorial Committee, Apuntes, peer-reviewed journal of the Universidad del Pacífico, Lima, Perú, 2014 -.
Editorial Advisory Committee, Pensamiento Propio, Journal of the Consejo Regional de Investigación y
Estudios Sociales, Buenos Aires, (2007 -- )
Editorial Advisory Committee, Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, (2007--2010)
International Editorial Board, Revista Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales, FLACSO, 2004 – 2007
Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Connections to the Americas, Minneapolis (1999-2006).
Contributing Editor, Political Economy in Colombia. Handbook of Latin American Studies (Library of
Congress).
Manuscript Review: Overseas Development Council (1994); Oxford University Press (1995); Journal of
Economic Development (1997); Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power (1999); UN Economic
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (1999); World Politics (1999; 2009); Comparative
Politics (1999; 2009); Latin American Research Review (2003; 2007); Canadian Journal of Latin
American and Caribbean Studies (2003; 2007); the New Press (2003); University of Alabama Press
(2004); Revista Centroamericana de Ciencias Sociales (2005); Blackwell Publishers (2006); Columbia
University Press (2007); Temple University Press (2008); Revista de Ciencia Política (2009); Latin
American Politics and Society (2009; 2013; 2015; 2018); Pensamiento Propio (2010; 2012); University of
Calgary Press (2011; 2015); Journal of International Relations and Development (2012); Palgrave-
Macmillan (2012; 2016); Taylor and Francis Publishers (2013; 2015; 2018); Apuntes: Revista de
Ciencias Sociales (2014); Third World Quarterly (2016); International Affairs (2016); University of
Wisconsin Press (2016); Routledge (2017; 2019); Cambridge University Press (2017); International
Journal of Human Rights (2018).
INSTITUTIONAL EVALUATIONS
Program for Centers of Excellence in Science and Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology,
Government of Chile, program evaluations, Dec. 2013; September, 2016; November 2018-May
2019, Dec. 2019
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Evaluation of candidacy for Ted Hencken for promotion to Full Professor, Baruch College (2016)
German Institute for Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany. Participated in external evaluation
team, October, 2014.
Program for Centers of Excellence in Science and Technology, Ministry of Science and Technology,
Government of Chile, proposal review, Fall 2010; July, 2014; Sept. 2016.
Evaluation of candidacy for Paul Gootenberg as Distinguished Professor (Stonybrook University, 2012)
Evaluation of candidacy for Benjamin Kohl for promotion to Full Professor, Temple University (2012)
Evaluation of candidacy for Kimberly Theidon for promotion with tenure (Harvard University, 2012)
International Planned Parenthood Federation, member, fact finding delegation to assess aid programs for
reproductive health in Peru (May, 2010); subsequent Capitol Hill briefings with Congressional
staff and members of Congress (Jan. 2011)
Evaluation of candidacy for Shawn Greene for promotion with tenure (Indiana University, 2010)
Ontario Council of Colleges and Universities, External Reviewer of Latin American Studies Program at
University of Guelph (June, 2008)
Ad-hoc Tenure Review Committee, Department of Government, Harvard University (Dec. 2007)
Chair, Evaluation team to review programs and activities of the Latin American Council of Social
Sciences, (CLACSO), commissioned by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA)
and the Norwegian Agency for Development (NORAD) (Spring, 2005)
Selection Committee, Research Grants for Central American Institutions (ASIES, Guatemala), 2004
Program Evaluator, Latin American Studies, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee (2003).
Selection Committee, LASA Labor Section Award for the Best Manuscripts in Latin American Labor
Studies (2002)
Selection Committee, Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships on “Cultural Aspects of Regional Integration
in Mercosur,” IDES, Buenos Aires (2000).
Selection Committee, Rockefeller Foundation Fellowships on “Globalization and Culture in the Andes,”
Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima (1999).
Proposal Review, U.S. Institute of Peace (1993); U.S.-Mexico Foundation for Science (1996); SSRC
MacArthur Foundation Program on Global Security and Cooperation (2004).
GOVERNANCE
Board of Directors, InSight Crime, Bogotá, Colombia (2012 --)
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Board of Directors, Central American Institute for Research on Development (INCIDE), San Salvador, El
Salvador, 2014 – 2017
Social Science Research Council, Member, SSRC Working Group on Cuba, 2010 –
Advisory Board, Library of Congress, for the Handbook of Latin American Studies (2008--2017).
Advisory Committee, University of British Columbia program on Andean Democracy (2008- 2010)
Latin American Studies Association, Chair, LASA-Mellon Program Committee (2008-13)
Canadian Business Council for the Americas, Board member (2007 -- 2010)
International Advisory Group, Ford Foundation program to support Central American Social Science
(2006).
Steering Committee, International Forum for Development (2003-04)
Program Committee, SUNY-Stony Brook Program Rockefeller Foundation Humanities Institute
Residential Fellowships on Inequalities in Latin America (2002—2005)
Program Advisory Board, Project Spera, San Francisco-based Civic Education Initiative, (2002-07)
Board of Directors, North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) (1996-2011); Chair (1999-
2010).
Member, Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee, and Coordinator, Social Science Proposal
Review, U.S.-Mexico Foundation for Science (1993-1996).
Member, Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Task Forces on Labor (1993); Scholarly Relations
with Spain (1991-1994); and Scholarly Resources (1994-1996).
CONSULTING
Centra Technology, Western Hemisphere Board of Advisors, 2017-2019
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, advising Board on potential avenues for philanthropy in Latin America (2016)
National Intelligence Council, preparation and presentation of a 40 page study of the future of North
America to inform the NIC Global Trends study (2016)
Gerson Lehrman Group, research on contemporary Cuban affairs (2006).
World Bank, Governance and Policy Reform, Colombia (July 2002).
Consultant to the Latin American Studies Planning Committee, School of International Studies and
College of Arts and Sciences, University of Miami (1998).
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PUBLIC SERVICE
Expert Declarations, Asylum cases in United States District Courts of Maryland and Virginia, and
numerous immigration courts around the United States and Canada (roughly 100 country
condition reports on El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, from 2012-2020).
GRANTS AND FUNDRAISING
FELLOWSHIPS
Faculty Research Support Grant, American University Office of the Provost, for research on “Household
Characteristics and School Integration of Central American Youth,” ($15,000, 2017).
Presidential Research Grant ($10,000) and Directors Research Grants ($5,000, $5,000 and $5,000),
Simon Fraser University (2007-09).
Laporte Fellow, Dept. of Politics, Princeton University; Visiting Research Fellowship, Princeton Institute
for International and Regional Studies (2003).
Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies (PIIRS), $300,000 institutional support for a
2004-07 project on “Paradoxical Inequalities in Latin America,” co-directed with Jeremy
Adelman.
American Association for the Advancement of Science, Science Fellow (2000-2001, Award declined).
Southern Illinois University Graduate School Summer Research Fellowship (1990).
Fulbright Lectureship, University of Port Au Prince, Haiti (1989, Award declined).
Tinker Foundation Pre-dissertation field work grant, University of Wisconsin-Madison (1986).
University of Wisconsin-Madison Campus-wide Award for Excellence in Teaching (1985).
University of Wisconsin-Madison, Pol. Science Dept. Distinguished Teaching Award (1985).
INSTITUTIONAL GRANTS (approximately $12 million)
American University Center for Latin American and Latino Studies (over $5 million 2010-19)1
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, University of California Hastongs College of Law, for written
materials on asylum requests for Central Americans fleeing violence, $10,000 (2019-20200
Multiple Foundations, for research on Lessons Learned from Anti-Impunity Commissions in Latin
America, $75,000 (2019)
Henry Luce Foundation, for research on Religion and Environmentally-Induced Migration in Latin
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America and the Caribbean, $300,000 (2019)
Open Society Foundations, for research on Prospects for an International Commission against Corruption
and Impunity in El Salvador, $60,000 (2018)
Department of State, for a project on transnational criminal organizations and the state in Argentina,
Brazil and Paraguay, $450,000 (2018)
UNICEF, for a program or orientation sessions for senior staff assigned to Latin American and Caribbean
offices (sequence of fixed service contracts, estimated value $50,000 over three years) (2018).
Department of State, for a project on illicit wildlife and timber trafficking in Latin America, $350,000
(2017)
Open Society Foundations, for research on the Mission Against Impunity and Corruption in Honduras,
$100,000 (2017)
Christopher Reynolds Foundation, for project on “Central American Refugee Assistance,” $5,000 (2017).
University of Houston / Department of Homeland Security, for research on “The Impact of Central
American Child Migration on U.S. Communities,” $100,000 (2016).
National Science Foundation, for research on “Country Conditions in Central America and Decision-
Making on Asylum Claims,” $35,000 (2016).
American University Provost Office, for research on “School Enrollment and Retention of Central
American Migrant Youth in the DC Metro Area," $15,600 (2015).
Henry Luce Foundation, for research on Religion and Climate Change, $450,000 (2015).
Sphere Consulting, for a study of television news coverage in Venezuela, $94,000 October, 2014.
Ford Foundation, for preparation of a report on factors driving migration to the U.S. of unaccompanied
minors from Central America, $20,000 (2014)
National Institute of Justice, for research on Latino Gangs in Washington, Los Angeles and San Salvador,
$671,000 (2013)
Henry Luce Foundation, for research on Religion and Conflict in Latin America, $300,000 (2013)
Inter-American Development Bank, for research on Emergent Issues and Challenges for Latin American
and Caribbean Economies, $450,000 (2013)
International Development Research Centre (Canada) and FLACSO-Costa Rica, for a project on Social
Exclusion and Violence in Central America, $50,000 (2013)
Christopher Reynolds Foundation, for Cuba Initiatives, $190,000 (total from grants awarded in 2010;
2011, 2013, 2015)
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Tinker Foundation, for a Graduate Student Field Research Program, $30,000 (2010-2013).
Ford Foundation, for a research program on Central American Elites, $452,000 (2011-2013)
Open Society Foundations, for multi-media projects $50,000 (2012)
U.S. State Department, for research on organized crime in Colombia, $99,000 (2012)
Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, for a workshop on gender and sexuality in law school curricula,
$7,000 (2012)
Open Society Foundations, for research fellows program $100,000 (2012)
Tinker Foundation, general support $10,000 (2012)
Henry Luce Foundation, for a program on religion and violence in Latin America, $375,000 (2011)
Open Society Institute, for a project on organized crime in Latin America, $25,000 (2010)
Latin American Studies Association ($500,000)
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, for support of a series of Mellon-LASA Workshops, $500,000 (2008)
Simon Fraser University ($32,000)
Social Science and Humanities Research Council (Canada), Aid to Research Workshops, $22,000 grant in
support of an April 2008 workshop at Simon Fraser University on “Latin America’s Left Turns:
Parties, Movements and Policies.”
Association of University and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) award for graduate student research on
decentralization in Peru, $10,000 (2008)
Social Science Research Council (principal investigator only, approx. $5.8 million 1992-2006))
The Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for International Scholarly Exchange, for a conference on Economic
Governance and Flexible Production in East Asia," $25,000 (1996)
The Ford Foundation, to establish at the SSRC the Interim Secretariat of the International Forum for
Development, $265,000 (2003)
-------- design and conduct a training workshop in Hanoi for participants in the worldwide International
Fellowship Program, $98,400 (2001)
-------- a program of support for Libraries and Archives in Cuba, $800,000 (2001, 2003, 2006)
-------- workshops and publications on Cultural Studies in the Americas, $270,000, (2000).
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-------- training workshops in Cuba on International Cooperation, and research on social capital and
economic networks, $165,000 (2000)
-------- a research and training program devoted to “Collective Memory of Repression and Processes of
Democratization in Latin America’s Southern Cone,” $800,000 (1998)
-------- continuation of research and training on Collective Memory of Repression, $375,000, (2000)
-------- a series of workshops in Cuba on International Cooperation and Research Funding, $150,000
(1998)
------- a research and training program devoted to "Restructuring Central American Polities and
Economies," $230,000 (1996)
------- a program of workshops to train junior social scientists in Central America and the Caribbean,
$250,000 (1994)
------- foster hemispheric collaboration in social sciences, $36,000 (1991)
William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, for Latin America-related programs, $150,000 (1998).
Inter-American Development Bank (INTAL-IDB), to support workshops and publications on Income
Inequality in the Caribbean $40,000 (2000).
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, to support an SSRC-ACLS working group on academic
exchanges between North America and Cuba, $450,000 (1996-2000).
------- a research project on Environmentalism and the Poor, $31,000 (1992).
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for a research workshop on “Industrial Upgrading in
Transitional Economies,” $52,000 (1999).
Organization of American States (OAS), for a research network on “Industrial Upgrading and Equity in
Central America,” $65,000 (2000).
Pew Charitable Trusts, for academic conferences, policy seminars and publications on Economic
Liberalization and Democratic Consolidation, $200,000 (1993).
Christopher Reynolds Foundation, to support an SSRC-ACLS working group on academic exchanges
between North America and Cuba, $630,000 (multiple grants, 1997- 2006).
-------- two workshops on economic reform in Cuba, two grants totaling $70,000 (2000).
-------- organize study by Cuban economists in China and other transitional economies, $180,000
(multiple grants, 2001- 06).
Rockefeller Foundation, to support programs on “Collective Memory and Repression” in Peru and
elsewhere in Latin America, $132,000 (2000).
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------- for a program to link researchers concerned with reconfiguration of cultural boundaries in the
Americas, in the context of migration and urban change, $200,000 (2002).
------- to launch an effort to restore the papers of Ernest Hemingway in Cuba, $75,000 (2002).
UNESCO, for a series of seminars devoted to the state of the social sciences in the developing world,
$32,000 (1998).
United States Institute of Peace, for a conference on Economic Liberalization and Democratic
Consolidation, $30,000 (1992).
The World Bank, to prepare a report on Governance in Colombia, $20,000 (2001).
The World Bank, for research on University-Industry Linkages in Asia, $35,000 (2004).
LECTURES AND CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS (Selected, 1991—2018)
“US policy toward Cuba as part of an overall US strategy toward Latin America,” presentation at the
meeting of the Center for International Policy, Havana, Cuba, December 16, 2019
“US policy and Venezyuela” presentation at a seminar in the Foreign Ministry of Spain, November 21,
2019
“ Democracy and Civil Society in Central America” Lecture at the Universidad de Oriente, San Miguel,
El Salvador, June 21, 2019
“Social Justice in 21st Century Latin America: threats and opportunities,” Roundtable discussion
participant, Latin American Studies Association, Boston. (May 24, 2019)
“Institutional Reforms in the 21st Century: Toward Higher Quality Democracies,” Panel discussant, Latin
American Studies Association, Boston. (May 25, 2019)
The Role of Business in Fostering Inclusive Neighborhoods, panel discussion leader, Greater Washington
Hispanic Chamber of Commerce Annual Business Expo, March 28, 2019
“Challenges of Economic Reforms in Latin America,” Inaugural Lecture for the Masters
Program
in Public Policy, Escola Nacional d’Administracao Publica, Brasilia, March 14,
2019
“Considerations on the Cuban Economy,” presentation on a panel devoted to Cuba in 2019,
American University, January 22, 2019.
“Cuba-US Security Cooperation,” Panel Moderator, ISRI, Havana, Cuba, Dec. 14, 2019.
“Latin American Studies at IU and Beyond,” panel presentation at the conference on
International Education at the Crossroads, Indiana University, October 29, 2018
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“Community Integration of Recent Central American Immigrants: Insights from the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area,” presentation at the 2nd Annual Metropolis North American Migration Policy
Forum, Mexico City, September 27, 2018
“Lejos del buen vecino: consecuencias de la belicosidad Trumpiana para los ciudadanos y las sociedades
centroamericanas.” Presentation at the Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economica, Mexico
City (Sept. 26, 2018)
“Lejos del buen vecino: consecuencias de la belicosidad Trumpiana para los ciudadanos y las sociedades
centroamericanas.” Presentation at the 2nd Annual Semana Cientifica, Universidad Rafael
Landivar, Guatemala City (Sept. 24, 2018)
“Lejos del buen vecino: consecuencias de la belicosidad Trumpiana para los ciudadanos y las sociedades
centroamericanas.” Keynote presentation at a seminar convened by the Facultad Latinoamericana
de Ciencias Sociales, San Jose, Costa Rica (July 12, 2018)
“Community Integration of Recent Central American Immigrants in Washington, DC, Houston and the
Carolinas,” public presentation at AU’s Washington College of Law (June 27, 2018)
“The Mission Against Corruption and Impunity in Honduras: A Two Year Report” panelist at an
American University event in Tegucigalpa, Honduras (June 21, 2018)
“Community Integration of Recent Central American Immigrants in Washington, DC, Houston and the
Carolinas,” presentation to the Immigration Legal Services Coalition, Houston, TX (June 7,
2018)
“Integration of Central American immigrants in U.S. communities,” lecture delivered at UNITEC,
Tegucigalpa, Honduras (March 16, 2018)
"American Pullback and Canadian Opportunities in Latin America,” Invited lecture for diplomats, Dept of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canadian Embassy, Washington. (January 22, 2018)
Democracies Amidst Headwinds, workshop discussion participant, workshop on Opportunities and
Challengees in Latin America Through 2018. National Intelligence Council, (Dec. 11, 2017).
“Integration of Central American immigrants in U.S. communities,” lecture delivered at Border, Trade
and Immigration Institute conference, Washington, DC (Dec. 4, 2017).
“Central American Refugees and U.S. Asylum Shortcomings,” Webinar presented by the Care and
Protection of Children Network (CPC), Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health
(October, 2017)
Panel discussion leader, "Structural and Institutional Underpinnings of Varieties of Democracy in Latin
America," Democracy Assessment in Latin America, Estado de la Nacion and University of
British Columbia, San Jose, Costa Rica. (May 5, 2017)
Panel discussion leader, "Revisiting Economic Reforms in Cuba," Latin American Studies Association,
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Lima, Peru. (May 1, 2017)
Lecture, "Drivers of Bilateral U.S.-Cuba Relations," AU (April 25, 2017)
Lecture, "The Political Economy of Reforms in Cuba," AU (April 4, 2017)
Featured speaker in 2-hour session of training program for Central American youth leaders, "The Political
Economy of Central America until 1980," Development and Democracy in Central America,
INCIDE, San Salvador, El Salvador, by skype. (March 31, 2017)
Invited participant in two-day seminar, The Liberal Arts Confront Globalization, NYU Abu Dhabi, Abu
Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. (March 14, 2017)
Panel discussion participant, "US-Latin American relations in a changing environment," The New World
Order and Latin America, CRIES, Panama (via skype). Scope: International. (March 6, 2017)
Talk, "Pre-trip introduction to Cuban issues -- class guest lecture," School of Education course on
education in Cuba, AU School of Education. (February 1, 2017)
Panel discussion participant, "Trends in Central America," 2017 Trends in Latin America, National
Intelligence Council, McLean Virginia. Scope: National. (January 23, 2017)
Panel discussion participant, "Immigration and Border Issues under a Trump administration," Teach,
Teach-in sponsored by AU Faculty Senate: Organize, Engage: Contemporary Politics and the
Future, presentation on immigration and social justice issues (January 18, 2017)
Talk, "The Impact of Political Trends in Latin America on US-Cuban Relations during 2016," US-Cuba
Relations, ISRI, Havana, Cuba. (December 15, 2016)
Talk, "Latin America's Left Turns: Domestic and External Sources of Sustainability," Left Behind: Latin
America after the Left Turns, Simon Fraser University and Univ of British Columbia, Vancouver.
Scope: (December 5, 2016)
Panel discussion leader, Discussant, O'Rourke, M., Hershberg, E., Lawless, J., Leighley, J., Nelson, C. J.,
Post Election: AU Expert Forum, Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, Mary
Graydon. (November 10, 2016)
Panel discussion leader, Briefing: Central American politics and security, Central Intelligence Agency.
(June 13, 2016)
Paper presentation, "North America's Future Scenarios 2020 and 2035," North America Future Scenarios,
National Intelligence Council, Mexico City. (July 11, 2016)
Paper presentation, The Power of the Re-set Button: Impacts of Rapprochement with Cuba for US-Latin
American Relations," Latin American Studies Association, New York. (May 30, 2016)
Panel discussant, Alternative Futures for the United States, Centra Technologies. (May 23, 2016)
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Lecture, "Elite power and social change in Central America," Public Policies and Governance in Central
America, PRISMA, San Salvador (via skype). (May 20, 2016)
Lecture, "The Current Political Context in Central America," Public Policies and Governance in Central
America, PRISMA, San Salvador (via skype). (May 19, 2016)
Panel discussion participant, "Domestic and International Factors Driving US Policy Toward Cuba,"
Trends in US-Cuba Relations, CRIES, Mexico City (via skype). (April 13, 2016)
Panel discussion participant, "The Left Turn in El Salvador," Conference on “Political Change in Latin
America: Challenges to the Left Turn,” Tulane University, New Orleans. (April 12, 2016)
Lecture, "Latin American and Latino Studies: Institutional and Intellectual Configurations and Tensions,"
Conference on Latin American and Latino Studies of the Global South, University of Richmond.
(March 25, 2016)
Lectures, "Democracy and Development: Latin American Experiences" and "Democracy and
Development: Theoretical Perspectives," Latin American Summer Graduate Program in
Development, Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo, Uruguay. (March 17-18, 2016)
Panel discussant, "Central American Immigrant Youth: Who are they, where are they, and what are their
needs?" NIH Conference on Children and Migration, University of Texas-Austin. Scope:
(February 25, 2016)
Panel discussant, "U.S. Cuba diplomatic rapprochement in regional context," U.S. Cuba Relations: A
View from Washington, CIPI/ISRI, Havana, Cuba. (December 17, 2015)
"The Power of the Re-set Button: How the Obama Administration's Opening to Cuba has Impacted
Relations with Latin America," paper presented at a conference on Cuba in U.S. Foreign Policy,
CIPI/ISRI, Havana, Cuba. (December 14, 2015)
"Trajectories of Change Forecast for Latin America," paper presented at a Global Trends Project
workshop, Centra Technologies, Arlington, VA. (November 18, 2015)
Lecture, "Why Central American Youth Flee," Rockefeller Brothers Fund, New York City.
(October 16, 2015)
"The Migration of Unaccompanied Children and Families from Central America: Causes, Consequences
and Advocacy Responses," conference presentation at Columbia University Mailman School of
Public Health, New York City (October 15, 2015).
“Governance Challenges in Latin America,” paper presentation at on Conference on Political Trends in
the
Western Hemisphere, Centra Technologies, Arlington, VA, (Sept. 28, 2015).
“Fiscal Pacts for Development: Building Modern Democratic States Through Fiscal Pacts,” presentation
on a panel at the 10th Anniversary conference of the Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios
Fiscales, Guatemala City (August 28, 2015)
“Technocracy and Democracy in Latin America” commentator on a panel devoted to a 2014 book
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published by Cambridge University Press. Annual meeting of REPAL, Montevideo (July 8,
2015).
"Domestic consequences of US attempts to normalize relations with Cuba," lecture delivered at
Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, Quito, Ecuador. (April 29, 2015).
"Prospects for US-Cuba diplomatic normalization," panelist at Universidas Andina Simon
Bolivar/Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Quito, Ecuador. (April 28, 2015).
"Obama and Latin America," lecture delivered at Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar and Friedrich Ebert
Foundation, Quito, Ecuador. (April 27, 2015).
“The Changing contours of regionalism in the Americas,” panelist at a CRIES-sponsored workshop,
Panama City, Panama (via skype). (April 9, 2015).
"Unaccompanied Child Migrants, Context, Causes and Legal Relief," paper presented at Immigration
Law Clinic, Columbia University Law School, New York. (March 23, 2015).
"Political Implications of Fiscal Trends in South America," presented at Economic Tendencies in South
America, Social Science Research Council, New York. (March 11, 2015).
"US Political Dynamics and Cuba's Relations with Latin America," panelist at a workshop on the Impact
of the Incorporation of Cuba in the Inter-American system, CRIES/Ministry of Foreign Relations
of Chile, Santiago, Chile (via skype). (March 9, 2015).
"Latinos and the Democratic Party," panelist at a workshop sponsored by AU College Democrats,
American University, Washington. (February 28, 2015).
"Unaccompanied Child Migrants: Context, Causes and Legal Relief," paper presentation at Immigration
Law Clinic, Cadwalader (corporate law firm), New York City. (February 25, 2015).
"The Agenda for the Latin American left," panelist at El Futuro de las Izquierdas en Centroamerica,
INCIDE, San Salvador, El Salvador. (February 20, 2015).
"Reconfiguration of Elites and Power in Central America: An Overview of a multi-year Research
Program," lecture at Elites and Power in Central America, AU/ICEFI/Univ Rafael Landivar,
Guatemala City. (February 19, 2015).
"The Left and Latin American Politics," Guest speaker in an undergraduate course at George Washington
University, (February 12, 2015).
"Immigration Policy during the Obama years: introduction to a panel," American University Latino
Public Affairs Forum, American University. (January 14, 2015).
“U.S. Cuba Policy during the Final Years of the Obama Administration," Lecture presented at a
conference on US-Cuba Relations, Higher Institute for the Study of International Relations,
Foreign Ministry of Cuba, Havana, Cuba. (December 15, 2014).
“Institutions and Interests Shaping US Policy Toward Latin America," presentation at the Argentine
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Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Academy (Dec. 10, 2014).
“US Latin America Relations During the Remainder of the Obama Administration,“ presentation at the
Fundacion Nueva Mayoria, co-sponsored by Universidad de San Andres and the Centro
Argentino de Relaciones Internacionales (CARI), Buenos Aires, Argentina (Dec. 10, 2014).
“Emergent Economic Development Challenges in Latin America,” presentation at a book launch at the
Corporacion de Investigaciones para America Latina (CIEPLAN), Santiago, Chile (Dec. 11
2014).
“Unaccompanied Central American Migrant Children and Families: Drivers of Migration and Strategies
for Protecting Migrant Rights." Paper presentations (with Dennis Stinchcomb) at four locations in
Los Angeles: the University of Southern California, California State University Northridge;
CARECEN and Esperanza Immigrant Rights Coalition. Los Angeles, CA (Nov. 19-20) and at the
Kay Spiritual Center of American University (Dec. 4, 2014) and the Institute for Migration and
Refugee Policy, Buenos Aires, Argentina (Dec. 9).
"US-Latin American relations," guest lecture, Washington Semester Program, AU, Nov. 18, 2014.
“The Latin American Left and US-Latin American Relations” guest lecture on US-Latin American
Relations at American Univ. School of International Service, Washington, DC. (October 2014).
Unaccompanied Central American Migrant Children and Families: Drivers of Migration and Strategies
for Protecting Migrant Rights" Panel discussion leader, Advocacy for Migrant Children and
Families Conference, American University and “The Door”, New York City, NY. (September
22).
Panel discussion participant at Cuba and the 2015 Summit of the Americas Conference, sponsored by
American University and University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada. September 2014).
“Political Economy of Taxation in Latin America” panel discussant, Latin American Political Economy
Network, Santiago, Chile. (June 2014).
“US-Cuba Relations and the Influence of Latin American Governments” Panel discussion participant,
CRIES/ITAM America Latina y Cuba: el rol de Mexico ante los nuevos desafios de la dinamica
hemisferica Conference, Mexico City, Mexico. (June 2014)
“Inequality, Structural Transformations and External Shocks” Panel discussion participant, Thirty Years
of Democracy in Latin America Conference, Rockefeller Brothers Foundation and the New
School, Pocantico, NY. (May 2014).
“Cultural Industries and Comparative Advantages” Panel discussion participant, Cultural and Creative
Industries Conference, Broward County Cultural Affairs Office, Ft. Lauderdale, FL. (May 2014).
“The U.S. and Central American Elections” Keynote speaker, Elections in Central America Conference,
INCIDE, San Salvador, El Salvador. (April 2014).
“Findings of an AU Research Program” Panel discussion participant, Elites and Power in Central
America” San Salvador, El Salvador. (April 2014).
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“Shifting Configurations of Power in Latin American International Relations” Guest lecture, George
Washington University, Washington, DC. (March 2014)
“Multilateralization as a Mechanism for Normalizing US-Cuba Relations (in Spanish)” Panel discussion
participant, El rol de Brasil, Colombia y Mexico frente a las relaciones Cuba-Estados Unidos,
University of Javeriana, Bogata, Colombia. (March 2014).
“The Reconfiguration of Elites and Power in Central America” Paper presented at Mid-Atlantic Council
on Latin American Studies, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. (March 2014).
“The Republican Party’s Latino Problem” Panel discussion leader, American University, Washington,
DC. (March 2014).
“The Role of Minorities in U.S. Politics,” invited lecture delivered to a State Department-sponsored
international delegation. Institute for International Education, Washington, DC. (Jan. 2014).
“Washington and the Hemispheric Order: Explanations for Continuity Amid Change," Paper presented at
a conference on US-Cuba Relations, Higher Institute for the Study of International Relations,
Foreign Ministry of Cuba, Havana, Cuba. (December 2013).
“The Chilean Coup as a Critical Juncture for Politics in Southern Europe and South America,"
presentation for a panel on Global Ramifications of the Sept 11 Chilean Coup, 40 Years Later.
American University (September 2013).
“The Reconfiguration of Elites and Power in Central America," lecture delivered (by Skype) to InSight
Crime workshop on “Elites and Organized Crime in Central America,” Managua, Nicaragua.
(Sept. 2013).
Discussant, seminar on Latin American Relations with Cuba, Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum and
Norwegian Dept of International Affairs, United Nations, New York City (June 2013).
Panel participant, Political Parties and the New Social Contract, Latin American Studies Association,
Washington, DC. (June 2013).
“Elites and Power in Central America," paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association,
Washington, DC (May 2013).
Discussant, Hemisphere in Flux: New Roles, Institutions and Agendas in Hemispheric Relations, Latin
American Studies Association, Washington, DC (May 2013).
Panel presentation, “New Institutions for Participatory Democracy in Latin America.” Latin American
Studies Association, Washington, DC (May 2013).
Discussant, panel on Accountability and Transparency in Latin America, National Endowment for
Democracy, Washington, DC. (April, 2013).
“Challenges to Economic Innovation in Cuba: Lessons from Around the World.” Conference
presentation, University of Havana, Havana, Cuba (April 2013).
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“Cuba’s Economic Reforms in Context,” guest lecture, Colorado College (April 2013).
Cuba-U.S. Relations: The Potential Role of Latin American Governments in Breaking a 50 Year Impasse,
panel presentation, Latin American Regional Council for Economic and Social Research
(CRIES), Buenos Aires, Argentina (March 2013).
The Rise of Brazil and Future Challenges, presentation for a panel on Brazil and India as Emerging
Powers, National Association of Public Administration, Washington, DC. (March 2013).
“Brazil the Rising Superpower: Implications for the United States,” panel presentation at the Center for
National Policy, Washington, DC (December 2012).
“Washington and the Hemispheric Order: Explanations for Continuity Amidst Change,” paper (co-
authored with Phillip Brenner” presented at a workshop on Hemispheric Affairs, Sao Paulo,
Brazil (Nov. 2012), and at a workshop on the future of U.S.-Cuba Relations, Havana, Cuba (Dec.
2012).
“Analytic Approaches to the Study of Elites in Central America,” Skype presentation to a workshop on
Elites and Organized Crime sponsored by InSight Crime, Medellin, Colombia (November, 2012),
and conference presentation at the AU-FLACSO workshop on the Reconfiguration of Elites in
Central America, San Jose, Costa Rica (November, 2012).
“Latinos and the 2012 Election Results,” contribution to a Nov. 8 panel discussion of the 2012 Election,
Center for Congressional and Presidential Studies, American University.
“Rapid Rebound: Economic and Political Determinants of Financial Crisis Impacts in Latin America,”
paper presented at the University of Southern California workshop on “Rapid Rebound” in the
Global South (July 2012).
“The 2012 Election and the Role of the U.S. in the World: Implications for Latin America,” Lecture
delivered at the Universidad Estadual de Sao Paulo, Sao Paulo, Brazil (July 2012).
“Democracy in the Andes,” panel discussant, Latin American Studies Association meeting, San Francisco
(May 2012).
Post-Neoliberal Development Strategies in South America, Paper presented at the Latin American Studies
Association San Francisco (May 2012).
Discussant, panel on “Latin America’s Entangled Inequalities,” Latin American Studies Association, San
Francisco (May 2012).
Post-Neoliberal Development Strategies in South America, Paper presented at the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago (April 2012).
Protest, Mobilization and Democracy in Latin America, Session chair, Midwest Political Science
Association (April 2012).
The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis in Latin America: Economic and Political Determinants, paper
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presented at the International Studies Association, San Diego, CA (April 2012).
Regionalism and Hemispheric Affairs, panel discussant, International Studies Association, San Diego,
CA. (April 2012).
North-South Relations in the Western Hemisphere: The Shifting Distribution of Sovereignty in the 21
Century, paper presented at the Mid-Atlantic Council on Latin American Studies, Washington,
DC (March 2012).
Striving for Modernity: Development Strategies and Democracy in Post-Neoliberal South America,
lecture delivered at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles (November 2011).
“Crafting Latin American Studies Programs for the 21st Century,” keynote address at the “Futures
Conference” convened by Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. (November, 2011)
“Latin America’s Left Turns,” guest lecture in a graduate course on Latin American Politics, American
University (Nov. 2011)
“North-South Relations in the Western Hemisphere: The Shifting Distribution of Sovereignty in the 21st
Century,” (with Sebastian Bitar), paper presented at the annual meeting of ANPOCS, Caxambu,
Brazil (October, 2011).
“The Cuban Economy After the Party Congress,” presentation to foundation officers at the Synergos
Institute, New York City (September, 2011).
“2011 Elections in Latin America: Implications for Democracy and Human Rights,” American University
(September, 2011).
“The Cuban Economy After the Party Congress,” and “Social Policy in Cuba,” panel commentator,
conference on the contemporary Cuban economy, Oslo, Norway (June 2011).
“Notes on the Impact of the Crisis in Latin America,” paper presented at an International Studies
Association sponsored workshop, Montreal (March 2011).
“The Impact of Migration on Sending Communities in Latin America,” guest lecture in a course on
immigration policy, University of Maryland (February, 2011).
“Hemisphere in Flux: Inter-American Relations and Foreign Policies in the Americas,” lecture presented
to graduate students in the American University Washington Semester Program (February 2011).
“Development and Distribution in Latin America,” panel presentation at George Mason University,
Fairfax, Virginia. (February 2011).
“U.S. Brazil Policy in the Wake of the Mid-Term Elections,” panel presentation at the Centro Argentino
de Relaciones Exteriores,” Buenos Aires (December, 2010).
“Emerging Approaches to the Study of Development and Democracy in South America,” panel
presentation at the Universidad Nacional de San Martin, Buenos Aires (December, 2010).
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“Pensando el Caribe desde los Estados Unidos: Divergencias entre la academia y la oficialidad,” keynote
lecture delivered at the conference on the contemporary Caribbean sponsored by the University of
Havana, Havana, Cuba. (December, 2010).
"Brazil Rising: Implications for South America,” lecture presented in the Table Talk series, Kay Spiritual
Center, American University, (September, 2010).
Desarrollo y democracia en Suramérica: Agendas para el siglo XXI," lecture presented at the Universidad
del Pacífico (Lima, Peru) and the Universidad Central, Bogota, Colombia (July 2010).
“Enfrentando las desigualdades en América Latina: Políticas y Practicas en la Época pos-neoliberal,”
lecture presented at the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Lima, Peru (June 2010).
“Latin American Studies for the 21st Century,” lecture presented at the conference marking the 20th
anniversary of the establishment of Latin American and Caribbean Studies at the University of
Maryland (April 2010).
“One Year of the Funes Administration in El Salvador,” panel presentation at Meridian House,
Washington DC (March 2010).
“Brazilian Exceptionalism and Latin America,” respondent to a paper by Leslie Bethell, Woodrow
Wilson Center for International Scholars, Washington DC (February 2010).
“The State of Democracy in the Andes,” presentation at George Washington University, Washington,
D.C. (October 2009).
“The Latin American Studies Association and Contemporary Scholarship,” lecture presented at Indiana
University (March 2009) and the University of Victoria, Victoria, British Colunbia. (April 2009).
“The International Context and Development Strategies of the Latin American Left,” lecture presented at
the University of Washington, Seattle (November 2008,) and at American University (March
2009).
“The International Context and Development Strategies for Latin America” paper presented at meeting of
the Canadian Association of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Vancouver (June 2008).
“Latin America’s Pink Tide: Implications for State Capacity and Development Strategies,” keynote
address delivered at a conference on Latin American Development, University of Aalborg,
Denmark (May 2008).
“Latin America’s Insecurities: Reflections on Violence and Social Exclusion,” discussion paper presented
at a University of Calgary workshop on “Arms Violence and Politics in Latin America” (April
2008).
Social Exclusion and Violence in Latin America, lecture delivered at Glenbow Museum, Calgary (April
2008).
Area Studies in American Universities: Perspectives of a Latin Americanist, lecture delivered at Emory
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University, Atlanta, GA (October 2007).
“Unprecedented Autonomy: South America’s Relations with the United States.” Presentation for a panel
on “Empire and Dissent,” Latin American Studies Association Congress, Montreal (Sept. 2007).
“Latin America’s Left Turn,” lecture delivered to the World Affairs Council of Juneau, Alaska (May
2007).
Political Economy Research on Latin America: Trends and Characteristics North and South, public
lecture delivered at the Universidad Andina Simon Bolivar, Quito, Ecuador (November, 2006).
Human Rights and Accountability in the Southern Cone, workshop presentation, Woodrow Wilson
Center for Scholars, Washington (November, 2006).
The Production and Consumption of Social Science: Reflections on the History of the Social Science
Research Council, keynote presentation at the 40th Anniversary conference at the Research
Policy Institute, University of Lund, Sweden (September, 2006).
Bolivia's Election and the Latin American Left, Panel Discussant, Yale University (February 2006).
The Politics of Inequality, Panel Discussant, Stonybrook University (December, 2005).
Potential and Pitfalls of an Americas Study Programs, Workshop participant, University of Toronto
(October, 2005).
Technocrats and Citizens: Policy-making in Colombia during the 1990s, lecture delivered at the
University of Toronto (October, 2005).
University-Industry Linkages: European Experiences, panel discussant, World Bank-CMI Workshop on
University-Industry Linkages in Europe and North America, Cambridge, U.K. (September 2005).
“Political and Economic Dimensions of Andean Crises,” lecture presented at the Yale Latin American
Studies Program Summer Institute for Teachers, (July, 2005).
University-Industry Linkages and Innovation in East Asia, panel discussant, World Bank/SSRC
Workshop, National University of Singapore (May, 2005).
“Industrial Upgrading in Developing Countries: Social and Environmental Implications,” Distinguished
Open Lecture Series, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine Campus, Port of Spain,
Trinidad and Tobago (February 2005).
“Public Policy Research in Latin America,” presentation delivered at a Mellon Foundation workshop on
scholarly resources and Latin American Studies (February, 2005).
“Globalization and Labor in Developing Countries,” panel discussant, Watson Institute for International
Studies. Brown University (December, 2004).
“Central America in the World Economy,” keynote lecture, Conference on Structural Transformations in
Central America, Guatemala City (November, 2004).
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“Crises in the Andes: Comparative Perspectives,” lecture delivered at the Kellogg Institute, Notre Dame
University (November, 2004).
“Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone,” lecture delivered at Indiana University
Bloomington (November, 2004).
“Violence and Human Rights in Latin America,” panel presentation, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor
(November, 2004).
“Labor and Globalization in Latin America,” panel discussant, workshop on Globalization and Labor. Las
Vegas (October, 2004).
"Paradoxical Inequalities," with Jeremy Adelman, co-authored paper presented at LASA, Las Vegas
(October, 2004).
Institutional and Knowledge-based Underpinnings of Industrial Upgrading in Latin America, lecture at
American University in Paris (September, 2004).
“Beyond the Washington Consensus,” lecture, Vassar College (April, 2004).
“Persistent Inequalities in Latin America,” commentator, Princeton-Oxford workshop (November 2003).
"Re-defining Security in Contemporary Latin America: Development and Citizenship as the Foundation
for a Post-neoliberal order," paper presented at the UW-Milwaukee conference on "Rethinking
Global Security" (April 2003).
“Economic Dimensions of Contemporary Andean Crises,” presentation to the Council on Foreign
Relations Commission on "US Andean Policy" (April, 2003).
"Historical and Structural Roots of Crises in the Andes," paper (co-authored with Paul Drake) different
versions presented at the Latin American Studies Association meeting (Dallas, March 2003),
Columbia University (Feb. 2003), and Princeton University (November 2003); earlier versions
presented at workshops at University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and FLACSO- Ecuador,
Quito (September and October, 2001).
“Global Restructuring, Knowledge and Learning: Preliminary Notes on Upgrading and Development in
Cuba and Beyond,” paper presented in different versions at a MOST-UNESCO conference,
Havana, Cuba (October 2002), at the Higher Institute of Economics, Moscow, Russia (Nov.
2002), and at the Annual Conference on Development and Change, Antigua, Guatemala (July
2003).
“Latin Americanism Sans Political Science?” paper presented at a Conference on the New Latin
Americanism and Cultural Studies, University of Manchester, U.K. (June 2002).
“Industrial Upgrading, Equity and Development,” lecture delivered at a forum sponsored by the Centro
Nacional de Alta Tecnología (CENAT), San Jose, Costa Rica (June 2002).
"North-South or South-South: Challenges for Latin American Area Studies," colloquium/conference
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presentations at SUNY-Binghamton (April, 2002), Dartmouth College (May 2002), Syracuse
University (Nov. 2002), Northeast Council of Latin American Studies, Hanover, NH (Oct. 2003).
Lecture: “Democracy and Civil Society in Latin America,” Inter-American Democracy Network
conference on “Participation, Democracy and Civil Society,” Washington DC (Nov., 2001).
Discussant, panel on “Higher Education in Latin America,” Latin American Studies Association (LASA)
Congress, Washington, DC (September 2001).
Discussant, panel on “Collective Memory of Repression in the Southern Cone and Peru,” LASA
Congress, Washington, DC (September 2001).
“Industrial Upgrading, Employment and Equity in Costa Rica: an Emerging Cluster in Electronics and
Software?” paper (co-authored with Jorge Monge) presented at a workshop organized by the
SSRC and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences, FLACSO-Costa Rica, San Jose (March
2001).
“Pacted Transitions, Civil Society and the Phenomenon of Desencanto,” lecture at the King Juan Carlos
Center, New York University (November 2000).
“Changes in Enterprise Structure and Consequences for Latin American Labor,” research memorandum
presented at a workshop of the SSRC and the Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences,
FLACSO-Costa Rica, San Jose (July, 2000).
“Industrial Upgrading and Equity in Central America: an agenda for research on semi-conductors and
software industries in Costa Rica,” paper (co-authored with Jorge Monge) presented at a
workshop organized by Columbia University and the University of Puerto Rico, San Juan
(August, 2000).
Panelist, workshop on “The Crisis of the University in the Americas,” sponsored by the North American
Congress on Latin America (NACLA), Columbia University (April 2000).
“Human Rights Policies and Political Conflict in post-transition Chile,” presentation at an SSRC fellows
workshop, La Lucila, Argentina (March, 2000).
Panelist, session on “The Future of Regional Studies,” Northeast Council on Latin American Studies,
Yale University (October, 1999).
“Globalization and Labor in Latin America,” seminar presentation at the Fashion Institute of Technology,
New York City (September, 1999) and at the Columbia University School of Social Work
(Spring 2001).
“Globalizacion y las ciencias sociales,” seminar presentation to the doctoral program in Latin American
societies, Universidad Arcis, Santiago, Chile (June 1999).
“Flexible Production and Decentralization in the Developing World,” SUNY-Stony Brook, Department of
Sociology colloquium (May 1999).
Discussant, panel on “Economic Reform and Social Welfare Policy,” LASA Congress, Chicago
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(September 1998).
Panelist, Special Presidential Session, on “The Future of Regional Studies,” LASA Congress, Chicago
(September 1998).
“Legacies of Authoritarianism and the Travails of Latin American Democracies,” conference
presentation, Di Tella and Columbia University workshop, Buenos Aires (August 1998).
“Regional Studies and the Disciplines,” seminar presentation; Department of Political Science and
International Studies Institute, University of California-Berkeley (April 1998).
Panel discussant, conference on “Violence in Contemporary Latin America,” New School for Social
Research (April 1998).
“Trends in International and Area Studies,” conference presentation, American Association of Colleges
and Universities annual meeting, Washington, DC (January, 1998).
“Democracy and its Discontents in Latin America,” seminar presentation, Princeton University
(December, 1997).
Panel discussant, conference on Political Effects of Unemployment in Southern Europe, Princeton
University (November, 1997).
“Latin American Studies and International Studies in Transition,” seminar presentation, State University
of New York at Stony Brook (October 1997).
“Economic Governance and Flexible Production in East Asia and Latin America: Challenges of Cross-
regional Comparisons,” seminar presentation, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (September,
1997).
Discussant, panel on “Spatial Dimensions of Economic Restructuring and Labor Organization,” American
Political Science Association Meeting (APSA), Washington, DC (Aug. 1997).
“Political Science and the Debate over the Future of Regional Studies,” roundtable presentation, APSA,
Washington, DC (August 1997).
“Democracy and its Discontents: Obstacles to the Extension of Political Citizenship in Contemporary
Latin America,” paper presented at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee conference on
“Democracy and its Limits” (May, 1997).
Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America (with Elizabeth Jelin),
seminar presentation, Columbia University (October, 1996).
Flexible Production and Political Decentralization in the Developing World (with Richard F. Doner),
paper presented at the Annual Meeting of APSA, San Francisco (Sept. 1996).
Democratic Transition and Social Democracy in Spain: Reflections on the Construction of Ideal Types,
presentation at a seminar sponsored by the European Studies Program and the Department of
Political Science, Princeton University (May, 1996).
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International Factors and Processes of Democratization, Presentation at a workshop sponsored by the
Program on Peace and Cooperation, New School For Social Research (December, 1995).
Economic Governance and Flexible Production in the Developing World, Presentation at the Annual
Meeting of the Association of Post-Graduate Programs in the Social Sciences, Caxambu, Brazil
(Nov. 1994).
Economic Liberalization, Popular Representation and the Future of Social Democracy: Notes on
Experiences in Spain and Chile. Paper presented at an SSRC-sponsored conference, Warsaw,
Poland (September, 1994).
Social Democracy and Economic Liberalization, presentation at a roundtable at the Nucleo de Estudos
Politicos, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Brazil (June 1994).
Globalization, Society and Alternative Trajectories of Development, Presentation at the Annual
Conference of Learned Societies of Canada, Calgary (June 1994).
Latin Americanism' and the Social Sciences, keynote address presented at a conference on Latin
Americanism and Cultural Politics. Duke University (March, 1994).
The Triple Crisis of Democracy in Contemporary Spain, roundtable discussion, Institute for West
European Studies, Columbia University (March 1994).
State Reform and Social Welfare in Latin America, discussant, Latin American Studies Association,
Atlanta (March 1994).
Economic Liberalization and Popular Representation in Contemporary Spain and Chile, paper presented
at the XVIIIth Meeting of LASA, Atlanta (March 1994) and at a conference on Inequality and
New Forms of Popular Sector Representation, Columbia University (March 1994).
Socialism, Democracy and the Market in Contemporary Chile: Implications for Political Theory,
discussion paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Modern Language Association,
Minneapolis (November, 1993).
Discussant, panel on Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe. Northeast
Political Science Association, Newark (November, 1993).
Reconfiguring State and Society: Social and Political Consequences of Neo-Liberalism in Latin America,
discussion paper presented at a conference on Political and Economic Restructuring, University
of California-Berkeley (April, 1993).
Discussant, panel on Western Conditionality and Reform in Latin America, conference on the
International Dimensions of Liberalization and Democratization, Overseas Development Council,
Washington, D.C. (April, 1993).
Workers and the State in Twentieth Century Spain: Notes on the Colliers' Critical Junctures Model, paper
presented at LASA (LASA). Los Angeles (September 1992).
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Discussant, panel on Economic Reform and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe, LASA.
Los Angeles (September 1992).
Discussant, panel on The End of the Cold War and Third World Development, conference on The New
International Context of Development, UW-Madison (May, 1992).
The Spanish Model and the Future of Eastern Europe. Discussion piece presented at the Annual Meeting
of the American Assoc. of Slavic Studies, Miami (Nov. 1991).
Notes on the Crisis of Communism in Spain: Is There Any Alternative (on the) Left? paper presented at
the Annual Meeting of the APSA, Washington (September, 1991).
Myth and Reality: Is Spanish Policy in Latin America Really Different?, paper presented at the XVI
Meeting of LASA, Washington (April 1991).
MEDIA INTERVENTIONS (2011--)
NBC interview,El Salvador June 17 2019
TeleSur, 20 minute interview on prospects for an AMLO presidency in Mexico, Dec. 10, 2018
NBC Universal, interview on “the migrant caravan,” Nov.26, 2018
Arizona Republic, cited in article on immigrant family separation, July 10, 2018
CQ Researcher, interviewed for an article on anti-impunity efforts in Central America, July 6, 2018
Univision, interview regarding Central American immigrant youth, May 17, 2018
US News and World Report, interview about political protests in Nicaragua, May 8, 2018
Univision, interview regarding qualifications of Colombian presidential candidate Duque, May 8, 2018
La Vanguardia, interview with Barcelona daily on trends in Latin American democracy, April 20, 2018
Jamaican national radio, panel discussion about Cuban political leadership transition, April 18, 2018
Carta Capital, Brazilian bi-weekly magazine, interview on Cuban political leadership, April 14, 2018
BBC Mundo, Impact of US corporate tax cuts on Latin American economies, Dec. 20, 2017
Peruvian National Television, interview on Trump administration and democracy (May 2, 2017)
Fox Business, e-mail interview regarding Trump administration claims about border control and illicit drug
traffic, April 27, 2017
Washington Post, Interview with video documentary journalists about topics and approaches to investigative
reporting in Honduras, April 13, 2017
Harpers, Interview with editor re Latin America-related items for "Harpers Index" (March 8, 2017)
El Mercurio, Interview with leading daily in Chile regarding impact of Trump administration immigration
orders, February 21, 2017
Christian Science Monitor, Interview on U.S. sanctions against Venezuelan Vice President, February 14,
2017
El Mercurio, Interview with leading daily in Chile regarding courts blocking Trump administration
immigration decrees, February 4, 2017
Telesur, TV Interview on implications of the Trump administration with Latin America's leading television
journalist, January 19, 2017
Associated Press, Interview for story on impact of Fidel Castro's death on US-Cuban relations, November 29,
2016
Thomson Reuters, Interview on implications of Obama administration designees to attend Fidel Castro's
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funeral, November 29, 2016
Daily signal, Interviewed and quoted for story on impact of Fidel Castro's death on US-Cuban relations,
November 28, 2016
CNN en espanol, Panelist for discussion of impact of Fidel Castro's death on US-Cuban relations, November
28, 2016
Telesur, Interview on Latinos and the US election after the 3rd Presidential Debate, October 20, 2016
Fox News Latino, Interview on Ecuadoran government cutting internet connection of Julian Assange,
October 18, 2016
Telesur, 20 min. on-camera talk show interview on US elections and implications for Latin America
September 7, 2016
Agence France Presse, interview re Latin American perception of US presidential campaign, Sept. 7,
2016
La Vanguardia, interview re Latin American perception of US presidential campaign, Sept. 7, 2016
Associated Press, Interview regarding Latinos, the 2016 election, the Trump candidacy and the Trump visit to
Mexico, September 1, 2016
De Standaard, Interview on President Obama’s trip to Cuba and Argentina, March 21, 2016
NTN-24 TV Interview on Latino impact on Super Tuesday primary elections, Feb. 29, 2016
Latin Pulse, interview on contemporary Latin America, aired on multiple programs during January, 2016
Telesur TV, on camera interview re meeting of Presidents Obama and Castro at the UN, Sept. 29, 2015
TV Azteca, on camera interview on opening of US and Cuban embassies, Aug. 17, 2015
CBS News, on camera interview on opening of US and Cuban embassies, Aug. 14, 2015
Christian Science Monitor, interview on Latinos and the Republican Party, August 5, 2015
Fox News Latino, interview on U.S.-Venezuela relations, August 3, 2015
Deutsch Welle, interview on opening of embassies in Havana and Washington, July 14, 2015
National Press Club, Release of AU Report on Media Coverage in Venezuela, May 19, 2015.
BC1 TV. British Columbia broadcasting 4 minute interview on US policies toward Cuba, April 16, 2015.
New York Times. Interview and quoted in articles re: US-Latin America policies, April 11, 2015.
Southern California Public Broadcasting, Radio, interview on the Summit of the Americas, April 9, 2015.
Bloomberg news, Interview about the Summit of the Americas (article subsequently appeared in
Washington Post and other outlets, April 8, 2015.
Hearst, TV. Interview about the Summit of the Americas; aired on ABC television channels, April 10.
Bloomberg News, interview regarding the upcoming Summit of the Americas, March 30, 2015.
Semana, Magazine. interview with leading Colombian weekly magazine concerning US -Cuba relations
and the Summit of the Americas, March 30, 2015.
TeleSur, English, TV. on camera interview regarding the third round of talks between US and Cuban
officials pursuing re-established diplomatic relations, March 16, 2015.
Voice of America in Spanish, TV. On camera interview on House vote to reverse Executive actions on
immigration policy, January 14, 2015.
Op-ed (with Jayesh Rathod) "The Case for Protected Status for Central American Migrants," in Roll Call
Dec. 24, 2014.
Interviews related to the Dec. 18, 2014 announcement of normalization of US-Cuba Relations (selected
list) Caijing Magazine, Beijing (Dec. 21); Newsmax, (Dec. 18); Isto E Magazine, Sao Paulo,
Brazil. (Dec. 18); BBC News (Dec 17, 2014); New York Times, (Dec. 17, 18 and 19, 2014);
National Public Radio, Chicago. (Dec.17); Latin Pulse podcast (Dec. 26, aired Jan. 2, 2015).
Interview and published excerpts, La Tercera newspaper (Santiago Chile) on Detroit’s Future After
Bankruptcy (published Dec. 11, 2014 as "el futuro de Detroit esta en duda").
Interview, WMAL radio, re: Obama administration executive action on immigration policy Nov. 13,
2014.
Interview, Corporation for Public Broadcasting "Great Decisions", for special magazine show on
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contemporary Brazil, to be aired in January 2015. September 9, 2014.
Interview, Notimex, July 27 story on unaccompanied Central American migrants. July 25, 2014.
Interview, Christian Science Monitor, response to President Obama meeting with three Central American
Presidents to discuss migration. July, 24, 2014. Quotes published July 25.
Interview, LA Times, response to President Obama meeting with three Central American Presidents to
discuss migration. July, 24, 2014.
Interview and quoted, Bloomberg News, coverage of unaccompanied Central American minors arriving
in the US. July, 16, 2014.
Interview, National Review, interview regarding how Hondurans in the US are responding to a growing
influx of unaccompanied minors from their country. July 15, 2014.
Interview, El Mundo, lengthy newspaper interview for major daily in San Salvador, El Salvador. April
15, 2014.
Quoted, Diario Latino (San Salvador), story on AU research program and launch of a new think tank in El
Salvador. April 10, 2014.
Quoted. La Prensa Grafica, story on AU research program and launch of a new think tank in El Salvador.
April 9, 2014.
Interview, Main TV station in El Salvador, one-hour talk/interview on elites and power in El Salvador
Interview, C-SPAN live-streamed coverage of CLALS panels on Republican Party’s Latino Problem.
March 7, 2014.
Quoted, To Vima newspaper, Athens (Greece), U.S.-Cuba Relations, December 12, 2013.
Interview, BBC Brazil, Venezuelan regional election results, December 12, 2013.
Interview, El Mercurio (Chile), interview on Latino vote in the U.S. election. October 18, 2012.
Interview, Al Jazeera-English, 10-minute television segment on the 40th anniversary of the military coup
in Chile, its origins, and similarities with military intervention in Egyptian politics. Sept. 13,
2013.
Interviewed, Radio France International, on diplomatic consequences of revelations that the US National
Security Agency had tapped the e-mails of Brazilian and Mexican presidents Sept 3, 2013.
Quoted, BBC in print, on Obama at summit of Central American Presidents, May 9, 2013.
Interview, La Vanguardia newspaper, Barcelona, on contemporary Latin American affairs, April 22,
2013.
Quoted, BBC in print, story on Latin American governments' responses to contested election in
Venezuela, April 18, 2013.
Interview, Associated Press, regarding Presidential election in Venezuela, April 12, 2013.
Interview, Canadian television (CTV), on Chavez funeral and political developments in Venezuela,
March 9, 2013.
Quoted, Christian Science Monitor, in article on Hugo Chavez funeral and imagery, March 8, 2013.
Quoted, Le Soleil (Quebec) Newspaper, in article about Venezuelan politics after Chavez, March 6, 2013.
Interview, Latin Pulse, Radio, on Venezuela after the death of Hugo Chavez, March 8, 2013.
Interview, BBC World Radio, live report on the death of Hugo Chavez, March 6, 2013.
Quoted, Fox News Latino, in story on the death of Hugo Chavez, March 5, 2013.
Quoted, ABC News/Univision, in article about Venezuelan subsidies for heating bills for the poor in the
U.S., March 3, 2013.
Interview, Univision/ABC TV, for story on Venezuela February 28, 2013.
Interview, El Universal (Caracas, Venezuela), for story on U.S. budget sequestration, Feb. 25, 2013.
Quoted, El Faro, on-line newspaper (El Salvador) in story on US politics and immigration reform (Feb.
2013).
Quoted, BBC Latino, in article on Republican response to state of the union and implications for Latino
vote, Feb. 13, 2013.
Quoted, BBC Latino, in article on State of the Union address and implications for Latinos, Feb. 12, 2013.
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Quoted, BBC Mundo (BBC Spanish), quotes in Wm. Marquez on the 2nd U.S. presidential debate.
October 17, 2012.
Interview, Canadian Television, 5 minute interview on Venezuela’s presidential election results. October
8, 2012.
Interview, Correiro Braziliense (Brasilia, Brazil), with reporter covering the October 7 Presidential
election in Venezuela. October 7, 2012.
Quoted, BBC Mundo (on Latinos and the US election), August 29, 2012
Interview, BBC World (Spanish language version), concerning Latino voter satisfaction with Obama
administration and anticipate role in 2012 election. July 30, 2012.
Interview, Television News Show (El Salvador, for story on Washington’s response to El Salvador’s
constitutional crisis. Broadcast live. July 18, 2012.
Interview, national television channel (El Salvador). One hour panelist on “Central American elites and
political change,” July 16, 2012.
Interview, LINK TV, extended segment on the presidential impeachment in Paraguay (July 5, 2012).
Panelist on an episode of “Inside Story” (Al-Jazeera English) devoted to Mexico’s election (July 2, 2012).
Letter to the editor, New York Times, (on the impact of deportations) June 29, 2012.
_______, Security implications of July 2012 Mexican elections, June 26, 2012.
Interview on Mexico’s election, CCTV, June 25, 2012.
Interview, Al-Jazeera English, on ramification of presidential impeachment in Paraguay, June 22, 2012.
Interview, Univision television, on Obama administration deportation policies, June 15, 2012.
Interview, 90 minute panel on Latin American affairs, China Radio International (Beijing), April 22,
2012.
Quoted, Miami Herald and Christian Science Monitor (on the Summit of the Americas), April 15, 2012.
Quoted, Wall Street Journal (on the Summit of the Americas), April 12, 2012.
Interview, LINK TV, 2 ten-minute segments, on contemporary Cuba and on 2011 elections in Latin
America. (March 2012).
Interview with reporter from “Embassy,” a Canadian foreign policy weekly, for a story on Canada's
Americas Strategy and its implications for Canada-Latin America relations, July 22, 2011.
Interview, “Detrás de la noticias” RTV, 15 minute interview on International Affairs in the Western
hemisphere.” July 22, 2011.
Interview, The Riz Kan Show, Al Jazeera-English. Half hour live television segment on “Cuba’s
Evolution.” April 20, 2011.
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Claudia Paz y Paz Bailey
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Member of the Interdisciplinary Group of Independent Experts IRU WKH
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Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement | HRW
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Two asylum seekers, one from El Salvador, one from Honduras, wait inside a migrant house in Guatemala City after
being sent to Guatemala from the United States on Tuesday, December 3, 2019, under an “asylum cooperative
agreement” between the two countries. © 2019 AP Photo/Oliverde Ros
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An agreement between the United States and Guatemala, the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative
Agreement (ACA), enables the United States to rapidly expel non-Guatemalan asylum seekers to
Guatemala without allowing them to lodge asylum claims in the United States, but also leaves them
without access to effective protection in Guatemala. As a result, they are effectively compelled to
abandon their asylum claims, and some who have a well-founded fear of persecution appear to be
returning to their home countries where they are at real risk of serious harm.
Guatemala does not meet the standard required in US law for a “safe third country” – the ability to
provide “access to a full and fair procedure for determining a claim to asylum or equivalent temporary
protection.”
Guatemala’s asylum system is hamstrung by a limited legal framework that only allows
high level officials to approve claims, which causes massive bottlenecks in a system that has only
recently begun to function at all. At the end of March 2020 there was a backlog of 713 cases,
including every one of the few asylum applicants among ACA transferees;
the interministerial
committee that decides asylum cases had not met from the time Covid-19 restrictions went into place
in mid-March through the time of writing this report in late April.
Prior to the suspension of the ACA on March 16, 2020, local nongovernmental partners for the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) had interviewed a portion of the people transferred under
the ACA and found that about two-thirds of those interviewed had international protection concerns.
However, only a small proportion of those who expressed fear of return to their home countries
applied for asylum in Guatemala, UNHCR said. Many also told UNHCR’s partners they were unwilling
to stay in Guatemala, citing their inability to support themselves there, distrust of the authorities, and
Guatemala’s proximity to their home countries, fearing that their persecutors could still reach them.
Refugees International and Human Rights Watch conducted research on the impact of the ACA in
Guatemala in February 2020, investigating the vulnerabilities of transferees and the lack of support for
them in Guatemala, as well as their access to the Guatemalan asylum system and its capacity to provide
protection to those needing it.
All 30 of the ACA transferees Refugees International and Human Rights Watch interviewed described
abusive conditions at the US border, including receiving inedible frozen food, having no access to
showers for several days at a time, being unable to sleep because lights were constantly left on, being
denied medical care, and being subjected to insults and degrading treatment while in custody. All
transferees interviewed by Refugees International and Human Rights Watch said that while detained by
CBP, they were denied meaningful access to an attorney and only allowed to make between one and
three rushed, non-private phone calls. A Salvadoran man said that a US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) official told him “there is no asylum” and “there are no Central Americans allowed into
the United States.” Two women showed Refugees International evidence of abuse by domestic
[1]
[2]
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Guatemala without allowing them to lodge asylum claims in the United States, but also leaves them
the United States.” Two women showed Refugees International evidence of abuse by domestic
abusive conditions at the US border including receiving inedible frozen food having no access to
abusive conditions at the US border, including receiving inedible frozen food, having no access to
showers for several days at a time, being unable to sleep because lights were constantly left on, being
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Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement | HRW
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partners – pictures of physical injuries from brutal beatings and a copy of a protective order from a
court in El Salvador – which they said US officials at the border refused to let them present as evidence
to support their claims of fear of return.
The ACA transferees also gave accounts showing that their registration and processing at the
Guatemalan airport was inadequate, lacking in both humanitarian reception care and access to
information. Transferees, including small children, waited hours on the tarmac with no food, water, or
adequate medical attention.
The actual registration process took a cursory two-to-three minutes,
during which transferees were not provided any information regarding what would happen to them in
Guatemala.
Transferees under the ACA were thrust into a high-pressure situation in which they lacked adequate
time and resources to make truly informed, voluntary choices about what to do. Once transferees were
registered at the airport, they had 72 hours to make the decision about whether they would remain in
Guatemala, return to the countries they fled, or try to find refuge elsewhere.
The Guatemalan
government’s 72-hour time limit is arbitrary and coercive, giving transferees insufficient time to make
such monumental decisions.
Only one person out of the 30 people subject to the ACA interviewed by Refugees International and
Human Rights Watch said they were applying for asylum in Guatemala. Several said they had no family
or support networks in Guatemala and that they feared for their safety in Guatemala. Many indicated
they would return to El Salvador and Honduras despite continuing to express a fear of persecution
there.
The United States transferred 939 Honduran and Salvadoran asylum seekers, the vast majority of them
women and children, to Guatemala under the US-Guatemala ACA between November 21, 2019 and
March 16, 2020.
Only 20 of the 939 transferees – about 2 percent – applied for asylum in Guatemala
even though many of them had well-founded fears of persecution in their home countries.
Our interviews indicate that the ACA has been implemented in a way that effectively compels
transferees to abandon their claims. In Guatemala, transferees have an unreasonably short time frame
to make a decision whether to apply for asylum in Guatemala, which has a cumbersome and ineffectual
asylum system and fails to ensure adequate social support while asylum seekers’ claims are pending.
Given security conditions in Guatemala, many transferees also say they fear they would be subjected to
the same harms in Guatemala from which they fled in their home countries. As our interviews and
UNHCR partner organization interviews indicate, some people who have a well-founded fear of
persecution appear to be abandoning their claims and returning to their home countries where they are
at real risk of serious harm. Given Guatemala’s incapacity to provide effective protection and the risk
[7]
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to support their claims of fear of return.
at real risk of serious harm. Given Guatemala’s incapacity to provide effective protection and the risk
transferees to abandon their claims In Guatemala transferees have an unreasonably short time frame
transferees to abandon their claims. In Guatemala, transferees have an unreasonably short time frame
to make a decision whether to apply for asylum in Guatemala, which has a cumbersome and ineffectual
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Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement | HRW
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that some transferees would face the threat of serious harm either in Guatemala or after returning to
their home countries, the United States violates its domestic and international nonrefoulement
obligations by not examining the asylum claims of asylum seekers it is forcibly sending to Guatemala.
Transfers under the ACA were temporarily suspended in mid-March in response to the Covid-19
pandemic.
Refugees International and Human Rights Watch call on the US and Guatemalan
governments to rescind the Guatemalan ACA completely, rather than plan for its resumption. The
United States should also halt plans to begin transferring asylum seekers to El Salvador and Honduras
under asylum cooperative agreements that have been signed but are not yet implemented.
| News Release
Agreement Denies Hondurans, Salvadorans Effective Protection
In February 2020, Human Rights Watch and Refugees International interviewed 30 Hondurans and
Salvadorans whom the United States had removed or “transferred” to Guatemala under the ACA. The
interviews began when the policy was still new, but also when transfers under the policy hit their peak.
The interviews were conducted in a migrant shelter out of earshot of other individuals at the shelter
and with assurances of confidentiality.
Researchers identified interview subjects by observing their initial orientation process and then joined
transferees when they arrived at the shelter. Human Rights Watch and Refugees International told
[12]
[13]
[14]
obligations by not examining the asylum claims of asylum seekers it is forcibly sending to Guatemala.
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Salvadorans whom the United States had removed or “transferred” to Guatemala under the ACA. The
interviews began when the policy was still new, but also when transfers under the policy hit their peak.
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Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement | HRW
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5/26
interview subjects that they would receive no payment, service, or other personal benefit for the
interviews. All interviewees were told they could decline to answer questions and could end the
interview at any time. The interviews were conducted in Spanish by three female researchers. To
protect confidentiality, pseudonyms are used for all interview subjects.
Additional interviews and conversations were held with nongovernmental service providers, UN
agencies, academics, lawyers, and shelter workers. Researchers also interviewed officials in
Guatemala’s Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman.
On April 16, 2020, Human Rights Watch and Refugees International sent letters to the acting secretary
of the US Department of Homeland Security, the acting commissioner of Customs and Border
Protection, and the director of Guatemala’s Institute for Migration to share our findings and
recommendations and to give them the opportunity to respond. As of the time this report went to
press, we had not received a response.
Beginning in the late 1980s, several European countries, the United States, and Canada began signing
bilateral or multilateral agreements and adopting domestic laws to enable countries with comparable
asylum standards and procedures to transfer asylum seekers to countries designated as “safe” where
they would be guaranteed access to full and fair examination of claims for international protection.
Many, but not all, of the agreements required the asylum seeker to have first transited through the
designated safe third country, as they have been based generally on the principle of country of first safe
arrival having responsibility to examine the claim. Such arrangements are known as safe third country
agreements. Transfer to these countries is sanctioned under international law under the assumption
that the asylum seekers have already found, or could find, effective protection there. UNHCR has
stipulated that safe third country transfers should not take place if there is a risk that they will lead to
refoulement (persecution in the third country) or indirect or chain refoulement (through removal
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interview at any time. The interviews were conducted in Spanish by three female researchers. To
refo lement (persec tion in the third co ntr ) or indirect or chain refo lement (thro gh remo al
refoulement (persecution in the third country) or indirect or chain refoulement (through removal
Many, but not all, of the agreements required the asylum seeker to have first transited through the
designated safe third country as they have been based generally on the principle of country of first safe
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Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement | HRW
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from third country to the country of origin).
The concept of effective protection also requires, inter
alia, that each transferred asylum seeker is guaranteed:
· An individual assessment of the appropriateness of the transfer, subject to procedural safeguards,
prior to transfer;
· Access to fair and efficient procedures for the determination of refugee status and/or other forms
of international protection;
· Treatment during reception in accordance with accepted international standards;
· Access to health, education, and basic services;
· Identification and assistance for persons with specific needs, including operating on the principle
of the best interests of the child; and
· For those recognized as being in need of international protection, the granting of asylum and/or
access to a durable solution.
The ACA agreements involve countries with highly dissimilar standards, procedures, and capacity; lack
transparency and UNHCR monitoring; allow for the transfer of asylum seekers to countries they never
transited through on their way to the United States (such as Mexicans to Guatemala or Guatemalans to
Honduras or El Salvador); and provide minimalistic screenings at the US border that do not provide
asylum seekers a meaningful opportunity to challenge the finding that they are subject to transfer.
In a letter to the US Congress in late 2017, US President Donald Trump outlined several policies that
would limit access to asylum at the southern border of the United States, including “expand[ing] the
ability to return asylum seekers to safe third countries.”
Safe third country designations are usually
based on an assessment that the country in question has an asylum system that is functioning
according to international standards and that will not place asylum seekers and refugees at risk of
direct or indirect refoulement.
Mexico resisted a safe third country deal with the United States but ultimately acquiesced to the
“Remain in Mexico” policy, which requires asylum seekers to wait in Mexico for their proceedings in
the United States.
In the spring of 2019, a US federal court issued a preliminary injunction halting
[15]
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[17]
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In the spring of 2019 a US federal court issued a preliminary injunction halting
the United States [20]
the United States.
In the spring of 2019, a US federal court issued a preliminary injunction halting
[20]
based on an assessment that the country in question has an asylum system that is functioning
according to international standards and that will not place asylum seekers and refugees at risk of
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Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement | HRW
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returns to Mexico under this policy.
Then, the Trump administration began negotiating an asylum
transfer agreement with then-president of Guatemala Jimmy Morales.
In late May 2019, the secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) met with the
director of the Guatemalan Institute for Migration (IGM), who requested a “five-year bar” on
readmission for those transferred from the United States to Guatemala (or transferees) under a
possible agreement, presumably in an effort to deter transferees from attempting to return to the
United States.
Tens of thousands of asylum seekers had left Guatemala, or transited through
Guatemala, on their way to the United States in the previous year. When, in mid-June 2019, the Trump
administration publicized negotiations over the US-Guatemala agreement, it was well aware (from an
assessment done by the US embassy in Guatemala) that Guatemala was “among the most dangerous
countries in the world” and that a backlog of a few hundred cases existed in Guatemala’s very
rudimentary asylum system.
Initially, the agreement faced opposition from the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman in
Guatemala and from four former Guatemalan foreign ministers who filed a complaint with the
Constitutional Court to stop the president from implementing the agreement, stating that it was a
“certain and imminent threat”
and would violate the human rights of asylum seekers.
On July 14,
the Guatemalan Constitutional Court issued a preliminary injunction against the president proceeding
with the ACA unless he followed constitutional procedures for entering international agreements,
which might require Guatemalan congressional authorization.
On July 15, a day after the injunction, the Trump administration attempted to implement a unilateral
policy that barred anyone from seeking asylum at the US border if they had transited through a third
country without seeking asylum there.
On July 23, a federal court halted this policy.
The Trump
administration next threatened Guatemala with tariffs unless it agreed to the asylum agreement.
Three days later, on July 26, the two countries signed an agreement providing for the transfer from the
United States to Guatemala of asylum seekers from any country except Guatemala.
President Morales filed a motion with the Guatemalan Constitutional Court asking it to lift the
preliminary injunction on the agreement.
In September 2019, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court
rescinded the injunction and left open the possibility that outgoing Morales could enter the ACA
without the approval of Congress, provided that, in doing so, he followed the “legal route established in
the Constitution,”
which allows the president to move forward with a treaty that might impact the
country’s finances, so long as its impact does not exceed one percent of the state’s revenue.
Still, the
Constitutional Court warned that, “depending on the circumstances,” it could review the legality of the
agreement again.
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
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preliminary injunction on the agreement
In September 2019 the Guatemalan Constitutional Court
[3 ]
preliminary injunction on the agreement.
In September 2019, the Guatemalan Constitutional Court
rescinded the injunction and left open the possibility that outgoing Morales could enter the ACA
[3 ]
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In November 2019, despite having received information from both the US Department of State and
UNHCR regarding problems faced by asylum seekers in Guatemala, including long waiting periods for
decisions on asylum cases and lack of access to social services and work,
the US Attorney General
certified that Guatemala qualified as a safe third country with full and fair access to asylum as required
by the US Immigration and Nationality Act.
DHS and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) then published an interim final rule (hereafter, “the
rule”) allowing for the implementation of ACAs not only with Guatemala, but also with El Salvador and
Honduras, framing them as attempts to “share the burden” of protection between the United States
and the three Central American countries.
In practice the ACAs will shift the responsibility of
protection to countries significantly less able to bear it. Supplementary information accompanying the
published rule makes clear that a principal motivation for the ACAs is to “reduce the flow” of asylum
seekers to the United States as quickly as possible.
The ACA with Guatemala was the first Central
American agreement to be implemented; transfers began in late November 2019.
Besides the agreements with the Central American governments, the United States’ only other asylum
transfer agreement is its “safe third country agreement” with Canada, which has a robust asylum
system. The US-Canada agreement provides an exception for asylum seekers with close family
members in the United States, acknowledging the UNHCR’s conclusion that the choices of asylum
seekers as to their country of refuge “should as far as possible be taken into account” especially when
the asylum seeker has “a connection or close link” with that country.
The US-Canada agreement
also includes a provision inviting the UNHCR to monitor its implementation to ensure its consistency
with international refugee law.
In contrast, the ACA with Guatemala fails to adopt any such
exception or oversight. Though the ACA implementation plans from the summer of 2019 indicated that
the UNHCR would be running a “care center” in Guatemala for transferees, no such center has been
established.
Indeed, UNHCR has expressed “serious concern” that the ACA “could result in the
transfer of highly vulnerable individuals to countries where they may face life-threatening dangers.”
Negotiations over the agreement and its expanding implementation have been shrouded in secrecy.
Only the main text of the agreement is available to the public, while the annexes containing additional
terms of the agreement remain secret to the public to this day.
Former President Morales hid the
agreement in its entirety not only from government institutions and the media, but also from civil
society – the very people who would later oversee the very limited care available for ACA transferees.
Alejandro Giammattei was sworn in as Guatemala’s president on January 14, 2020. Prior to his
presidency, Giammattei had only seen the publicly available text, not the secret annexes, and he had
previously expressed hesitation to take on the role of a safe third country.
He eventually reaffirmed
Guatemala’s commitment to the ACA,
and the program expanded substantially.
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
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decisions on asylum cases and lack of access to social services and work,
the US Attorney General
[3[3[3 ]5]5]5]
Guatemala’s commitment to the ACA,
and the program expanded substantially.
[4[4[45]5]5]
terms of the agreement remain secret to the public to this day
Former President Morales hid the
[43]
terms of the agreement remain secret to the public to this day.
Former President Morales hid the
agreement in its entirety not only from government institutions and the media, but also from civil
[43]
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Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement | HRW
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DHS has also not released the agreement in its entirety including all its annexes and has not publicly
released data on the number of transferees under the agreement.
At the height of transfers in early February 2020, Refugees International and Human Rights Watch
investigated the policy to assess its impact on asylum seekers sent to Guatemala.
Until the Guatemalan ACA was suspended because of the Covid-19 pandemic, it established a process
for transferring asylum seekers to Guatemala from US custody.
In violation of its own procedural standards, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detained ACA
transferees at the US border in February 2020 for much longer than the 72-hour limit outlined by DHS
policy without adequate access to food, bedding, showers, and medical care.
The 30 people Refugees
International and Human Rights Watch interviewed said that CBP detained them, many with their
young children, for between 7 and 20 days in El Paso or McAllen and Donna, Texas, before their
transfer to Guatemala. All described receiving inedible frozen food, having no access to showers for
several days at a time, being unable to sleep because lights were constantly left on, being denied
medical care, and being subjected to insults and degrading treatment while in custody:
· In denying a request for a blanket for a two-year-old child who had fallen ill with the flu in
detention, an officer told her 19-year-old Salvadoran mother, “If I give you a blanket, I will have to give
them to everyone.”
· One woman from El Salvador said that her 4-year-old son vomited and had diarrhea from eating
almost exclusively chips for 10 days because he refused to eat burritos that were frozen.
· When the detergent CBP used to wash asylum seekers’ clothes gave a Honduran teenager a terrible
rash, the guard told him that he must be “allergic to washing himself.”
· One Honduran woman said an agent mocked her detained children’s cries.
· Two parents said their children over the age of ten were separated from them and held in separate
cells.
(CBP standards say that family units should be held together.
)
· When a 20-year-old Salvadoran woman asked a guard to use the restroom (located outside of the
cell), the guard responded, “Chinga tu madre” (“Fuck your mother”).
(CBP standards require that, if
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[53]
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cell) the guard responded “Chinga tu madre” (“Fuck your mother”)
(CBP standards require that if
[53]
cell), the guard responded, “Chinga tu madre” (“Fuck your mother”).
(CBP standards require that, if
[53]
· One Honduran woman said an agent mocked her detained children’s cries.[5[5[50]
0]
0]
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restrooms are not available in a secure area, guards must allow detainees to access restrooms upon
request.)
The rule implementing the ACA provides for only “threshold” screening by United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) asylum officers to determine whether the asylum seekers can be
subject to the agreement.
The rule does not provide asylum seekers with even a “minimal
consultation period” before the screening.
All transferees interviewed by Refugees International and
Human Rights Watch said that while detained by CBP, they were denied meaningful access to an
attorney and only allowed to make between one and three rushed, non-private phone calls:
· A Salvadoran man said that a DHS official told him, “There is no asylum,” and, “There are no
Central Americans allowed into the United States.”
· A 20-year-old Honduran woman said that CBP agents told her the United States “wasn’t giving
asylum anymore,” and that she had to choose between being sent to Honduras or Guatemala.
· One woman showed Refugees International pictures of her bruises from where her domestic
partner had physically assaulted and beaten her in El Salvador,
and another woman showed
Refugees International copies of a Salvadoran court order detailing her domestic abuse.
Both
women said US officials at the border refused to let them present these as evidence to support claims
of fear of return to El Salvador.
· A 20-year-old Salvadoran man said agents told him that he had to choose between calling an
attorney or family, and gave him only two-to-five minutes to talk.
· A Honduran man said a US border official told him he would be released from detention in the
United States sooner if he accepted transfer to Guatemala under the ACA rather than deportation to
Honduras.
With the exception of the Honduran man just mentioned, all the transferees we interviewed said they
were afraid to return to El Salvador or Honduras, and that they were never given an opportunity to
seek asylum in the United States or to explain why they fled their home countries.
Under the regular expedited removal process, people who express a fear of return to their home
countries are transferred to US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody, where USCIS
asylum officers conduct credible fear interviews with them, and where they can try to access attorneys.
Each asylum seeker subjected to ACA, however, was held in CBP custody, where they were unable to
meet with an attorney and were given a brief phone interview with an asylum officer during which they
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59]
[60]
[61]
[62]
)
meet with an attorney and were given a brief phone interview with an asylum officer during which they
,
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y
,
y
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y
seek asylum in the United States or to explain why they fled their home countries.
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were asked only their nationality and when they arrived in the United States; they were not asked about
their fear of return to their home countries. The asylum officers then told them they were potentially
subject to removal to Guatemala under the ACA.
A brief by the asylum officer’s union in litigation against the ACA asserts: “The ACA Rule reflects a
dramatic departure from longstanding refugee screening processes and a stark re-interpretation of the
asylum officer’s role.”
Under the rule, DHS officers do not ask asylum seekers being considered for removal to Guatemala
whether they fear persecution or torture in that country.
Rather, the migrant is supposed to be
provided a “written notice” in the form of a document – or “tear sheet” – stating that if the applicant
fears removal to that country due to the likelihood of torture or persecution on the basis of a protected
ground, the applicant should affirmatively state such fear.
But asylum officers did not provide transferees with written notice that they should raise the issue of
fear of return to Guatemala.
Fourteen transferees Refugees International interviewed who were held
at a CBP tent facility in Donna, Texas, in early February said they never even received this tear sheet.
They received only three documents – a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal (Form I-860), a
Notice to Alien Ordered Removed/Departure Verification (Form I-296), and a US-Guatemala Asylum
Cooperation Agreement Threshold Screening Assessment Notice. The threshold screening notice says
only that “you were interviewed by a DHS asylum officer” who determined “you are subject to removal
to Guatemala under the US-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement for consideration of your
asylum or other protection claims.” Without access to a lawyer or an English translation to explain
this, it is not surprising that all of those Refugees International interviewed were under the impression
that they could apply for asylum in the United States from Guatemala.
Ten of the transferees interviewed by Human Rights Watch and Refugees International received an
additional Spanish language explanation of the ACA that notified them of the need to affirmatively
express fear of return to Guatemala and that, if transferred under the agreement, they could no longer
seek protection in the United States but only in Guatemala. However, asylum seekers often said they
did not understand its meaning. This is a violation of the instruction to asylum officers that they
ensure all those subject to the ACA understood the contents of the tear sheet.
A Honduran transferee told Human Rights Watch that when an agent gave her the I-296 departure
form to sign, she asked him what the document was for and he told her “it’s to continue your case.”
One man from Honduras fled the country with his wife and infant daughter after his father was
murdered and he began receiving death threats. He told Refugees International that a CBP officer
signed the form for him after he refused.
A transferred married couple told Refugees International
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
[67]
[68]
[69]
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y
subject to removal to Guatemala under the ACA.
signed the form for him after he refused.
A transferred married couple told Refugees International
[6
[6
[ 9]
9]
9]
did not understand its meaning This is a violation of the instruction to asylum officers that they
did not understand its meaning. This is a violation of the instruction to asylum officers that they
ensure all those subject to the ACA understood the contents of the tear sheet.[6
[6
[6
[6
[6
[
]
7]
7]
7]
7]
7]
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that they believed that, so long as they did not sign the form, they would be able to seek asylum in the
United States from Guatemala.
Though given this form, several transferees said they thought they
were being transferred within the United States and were not aware that they were being flown to
Guatemala until they arrived there.
According to the rule implementing the ACA, even when an asylum seeker affirmatively expresses fear
of removal to Guatemala, the resulting secondary interview requires that the asylum seeker
demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that they will face persecution or torture in Guatemala, an
evidentiary standard significantly higher than the one applied in normal credible fear interviews.
Without adequate time to prepare or access to counsel, it is functionally almost impossible for asylum
seekers to prevail in the interviews.
Only one person Refugees International interviewed, a 22-year-old pregnant Salvadoran woman, was
given a second phone interview because she told the asylum officer that she did not want to be sent to
Guatemala because she was pregnant and feared she would be detained there and have difficulty
accessing healthcare. She had already been detained in Mexico on her way to the US border. But, she
said, the second interview was almost identical to the first and she was found subject to removal under
the ACA.
Only one person to whom Human Rights Watch spoke, a 20-year-old Salvadoran man, was
given a second interview, but he said the officer did not ask him for details about why he was afraid to
go to Guatemala.
Under USCIS guidance for implementing the ACA rule, asylum officers cannot
make a finding that future persecution in Guatemala is “more likely than not” based solely on evidence
of past persecution there.
A Refugees International interview with one transferee encapsulates the poor treatment, lack of due
process, and arbitrary placement in the ACA at the border. “Jorge C.,” a former police officer from
Honduras, said that CBP officials at the border “threw away” documents he had brought with him from
Honduras. He said that these papers proved he was a witness in a case against gang members who
would kill him if he returned home. US Department of State reports that show that police officers are
often intimidated and targeted by gangs in Honduras support Jorge’s account.
His wife and child
had already fled to the United States and applied for asylum based upon the threats directed against
him.
Jorge said that he complained to officials at the border about poor interpretation during his interview
with an asylum officer. He said an officer told him he had 15 days to talk to a judge about his case, but
then he was rapidly transferred to Guatemala. Indeed, under the ACA rule an immigration judge is
prohibited from reviewing an officer’s determination that an asylum seeker is not eligible for asylum in
the United States and is subject to removal to Guatemala.
The ACA, its implementing rule, and
USCIS guidance give officers the discretion to exempt from the agreement anyone they determine it is
[70]
[71]
[72]
[73]
[74]
[75]
[76]
[77]
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y
were being transferred within the United States and were not aware that they were being flown to
USCIS guidance give officers the discretion to exempt from the agreement anyone they determine it is
him
him.
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in the “public interest” to allow to pursue a claim for asylum in the United States.
But DHS did not
consider Jorge for this exception despite members of his family already being asylum applicants in the
United States and his role in combatting gangs in Honduras – an effort the US government supports.
Instead, like many of the adults sent to Guatemala from the Donna facility, Jorge was shackled at the
waist, wrist, and ankles for the 12-hour transfer despite CBP transport standards that mandate humane
use of restraints.
He told us that he fears remaining in Guatemala, where he is sure gang members
can find him, and he remains uncertain where or how he can find safety.
Until the ACA was suspended due to the Covid-19 pandemic, transferees under the ACA were thrust
into a tragic situation in which they lack adequate time and resources to make a truly informed,
voluntary choice about what to do. ACA transferees were flown to La Aurora Airport in Guatemala City,
typically on the same plane with Guatemalan nationals who were also being deported.
They
disembarked from the plane at the Guatemalan Air Force hangar.
Transferees, including small children, waited hours on the tarmac with no food, water, or adequate
medical attention.
The actual registration process itself took two-to-three minutes, during which
transferees were not provided any information regarding what will happen to them in Guatemala.
Until the suspension of the ACA, representatives from the Institute of Migration and the Foreign
Relations Ministry registered the ACA transferees.
The Guatemalan Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, an independent government office charged
with investigating human rights violations in the country, monitors the registration process.
Workers from Casa del Migrante, an NGO-run shelter, accompanied transferees during this process.
Once transferees are registered at the airport, they have 72 hours to decide whether to apply for asylum
or temporary residence in Guatemala or be returned to their country of origin. [86] The 72-hour time
limit not only provides insufficient time for transferees to make such a monumental decision, but is
[78]
[79]
[80]
[81]
[82]
[83]
[84]
[85]
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United States and his role in combatting gangs in Honduras – an effort the US government supports.
limit not only provides insufficient time for transferees to make such a monumental decision but is
limit not only provides insufficient time for transferees to make such a monumental decision, but is
The Guatemalan Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, an independent government office charged
with investigating human rights violations in the country monitors the registration process [8
[8
[8
[8
[8
[
]5]5]5]5]5]
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also arbitrary, as the Central America-Four Border Control Agreement allows passport-free land transit
for up to 90 days for nationals of the signatory countries, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and
Nicaragua.
It was only after the ACA transferees were taken to civil society organizations, Refugio de la Niñez
(Children’s Refuge) and Casa del Migrante, that they were given their first meal and access to
psychologists and social workers.
Only then did they receive any humanitarian attention or
information regarding their status in Guatemala.
At Refugio de la Niñez, a lawyer gave a rights orientation to the transferees and explained their options.
The lawyer informed them that they had 72 hours to decide whether to ask for asylum or temporary
residence in Guatemala or be returned to their country of origin. In the orientation Refugees
International witnessed, all transferees expressed dismay upon being told they could not apply for
asylum in the United States. For most, if not all of the transferees, this was the first time they learned
they were not going to be allowed to lodge asylum claims in the United States. Transferees cried out in
frustration, “They [CBP officers] lied to us,” and “They didn’t tell us that we couldn’t go back.” Despite
their disappointment at receiving this information, some transferees stated that the first time in the
process they felt they were being “treated like human beings” was when they arrived at Refugio de la
Niñez.
Once ACA transferees finished at Refugio de la Niñez, they were taken to the church-run Casa del
Migrante, one of the few shelters in Guatemala and the only one available to ACA transferees.
Despite having only 50 beds,
Casa del Migrante sometimes shelters more, including migrants from
many countries in transit through Guatemala, members of caravans,
and some deported
Guatemalans. Before the Covid-19 suspension of the ACA, Casa del Migrante provided them basic
humanitarian care and gave them the opportunity to speak with lawyers from Refugio de la Niñez and
Pastoral de Movilidad Humana (Pastoral for Human Mobility), another church-run organization that
provides legal support.
During their stay for up to 72 hours at Casa del Migrante, they had to make a
decision among the following three options:
1. Apply for asylum in Guatemala: Lawyers from Refugio de la Niñez and Pastoral de Movilidad
Humana provide information on how to apply for asylum in Guatemala and how the process works.
2. Apply for temporary residence in Guatemala: Those who wish to obtain a regularized status
quickly and who can afford the $500 USD fee can apply for temporary residency in Guatemala, which
can last up to five years.
[87]
[88]
[89]
[90]
[91]
[92]
[93]
[94]
[95]
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Nicaragua.[8
[8
[8
[8 ]
7]
7]
7]
1
Apply for asylum in Guatemala: Lawyers from Refugio de la Niñez and Pastoral de Movilidad
1. Apply for asylum in Guatemala: Lawyers from Refugio de la Niñez and Pastoral de Movilidad
Humana provide information on how to apply for asylum in Guatemala and how the process works.[9
[9
[9
[9
[9 ]
4]
4]
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4]
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3. Return home: Transferees can return home at their own expense or through the International
Organization for Migration (IOM)’s Assisted Voluntary Return Program.
Once the 72 hours passed, the transferees who did not wish to stay in Guatemala typically returned to
their home country or migrated to another country. Although Refugees International researchers have
stayed in touch with two ACA transferees who returned to their home country, El Salvador, and one
who went to Mexico, there is no general monitoring of those who returned to their home countries
without assistance.
Despite their limited resources, the task of caring for ACA transferees falls solely on civil society
organizations. Refugio de la Niñez and Casa del Migrante both have mandates that extend beyond
assisting ACA transferees. Refugio de la Niñez operates in 15 offices throughout the country,
providing protection for people in transit, assists non-ACA asylum seekers with their asylum claims
and assists the government in finding cases of child trafficking.
They receive very little government
funding for their work and rely mostly on private funders.
Casa del Migrante hosts a variety of
populations, but they are a church-run organization and rely on donations to carry out their work.
The more people transferred to Guatemala under ACA, the more likely it is that civil society will have
to divert limited resources away from other marginalized groups to take care of ACA transferees, given
the transferees’ extreme vulnerability and the lack of government support.
The Guatemalan government provides no money to civil society organizations to care for ACA
transferees.
The constitutional provision under which Morales signed the ACA without
congressional approval required that the agreement not entail additional expenses for the government
– any agreement involving additional expenses would have, as the Constitutional Court warned in its
preliminary injunction, required the legislature to approve it.”
Then-acting head of USCIS Ken
Cuccinelli, however, indicated that the Guatemalan government would be responsible for taking care of
arriving transferees, including costs.
The US government is giving money to the Guatemalan
government to prevent irregular migration, although it is unclear that any of this money is to be used
for the ACA.
The publicly available text of the agreement does not stipulate who, in fact, should
assume financial responsibility for the transferees. Article 8, section 5, states: “Nothing in this
Agreement shall be construed in such a way as to oblige the Parties to disburse or obligate funds.”
This has allowed the Guatemalan and US governments to shirk any financial responsibility for the
transferees, even though international law requires each country to respect and uphold the rights of
people under their control.
[96]
[97]
[98]
[99]
[100]
[101]
[102]
[103]
[104]
[105]
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Agreement shall be construed in such a way as to oblige the Parties to disburse or obligate funds ”[105]
Agreement shall be construed in such a way as to oblige the Parties to disburse or obligate funds.”
This has allowed the Guatemalan and US governments to shirk any financial responsibility for the
[105]
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Prior to the implementation of the ACA, the majority of migrants that passed through Casa del
Migrante were single men, who were housed in shared dormitory-style rooms. In discussions over the
implementation of the ACA, the US government learned that Casa del Migrante had only one room for
families.
And yet, as of March 16, 2020, of the 939 asylum seekers from Honduras and El Salvador
DHS sent to Guatemala, 75 percent were women and children.
DHS has also transferred LGBT
(lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender) individuals to Guatemala under the ACA, according to research
conducted by Refugees International and Human Rights Watch, as well as reporting by Buzzfeed News.
Gender-based violence, including violence against women and girls and violence on the grounds of
sexual orientation and gender identity, is prevalent in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
Abuse of women and girls in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras is endemic, rooted deeply in social
norms and exacerbated by generalized violence and impunity in these countries.
Despite some
reform efforts in Guatemala, such as specialized women’s courts and dedicated units in the Attorney
General’s Office, formidable obstacles remain for women seeking police protection, investigation, or
justice through the courts. Guatemala has among the highest rates of gender-related murder of women
or girls in the world when counting the number of women murdered for reasons of their sex per
100,000,
yet less than six percent of female homicides result in a conviction in the country.
Sexual and domestic violence “remain widespread and serious,” according to the US Department of
State.
“Jane L.,” an ACA transferee from El Salvador, shared pictures with Refugees International
documenting the injuries her partner caused her. Although she had gone to the police to report her
partner and six of his family members and then spent three months testifying in court, her case was
never resolved. The US government is aware of the particular dangers such victims face in El Salvador,
the US Department of State noting in a recent report: “Laws against domestic violence remained
poorly enforced, and violence against women, including domestic violence, remained a widespread and
serious problem” in El Salvador.
After Jane was transferred from the US border to Guatemala under
the ACA, she did not think it would be safe for her to return to El Salvador or remain in Guatemala. She
is now in Monterrey, Mexico, while she decides what to do next.
[106]
[107]
[108]
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[111]
[112]
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implementation of the ACA, the US government learned that Casa del Migrante had only one room for
serious problem” in El Salvador
After Jane was transferred from the US border to Guatemala under
[114]
serious problem” in El Salvador.
After Jane was transferred from the US border to Guatemala under
the ACA, she did not think it would be safe for her to return to El Salvador or remain in Guatemala. She
[114]
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DHS has sent LGBT people to Guatemala under the ACA, even though LGBT people experience
persecution in both their home countries and in Guatemala.
Human Rights Watch confirmed that at
least two gay men and one transgender woman were transferred to Guatemala under the ACA.
According to Lambda, an LGBT rights organization based in Guatemala City, the number of LGBT
transferees is probably much higher, since LGBT asylum seekers are often afraid to identify themselves.
The Guatemalan migration code states that migrants should not be discriminated against on the basis
of sex or sexual orientation but contains no explicit protections on the grounds of gender identity.
Guatemalan law has no non-discrimination provision to protect people from violence based on gender
identity and sexual orientation in accessing employment, housing, health care, and public or private
services.
According to Lambda Director Carlos Valdez, LGBT asylum seekers often experience
discrimination in Guatemala.
In research conducted in 2019 and 2020, Human Rights Watch found
that LGBT people in Guatemala, some of whom had fled the country as a result of violence, had
suffered from domestic violence, gang violence based both on sexual orientation and gender identity,
as well as increased vulnerability to violence from members of the public and police.
“Josue M.” fled Honduras after being assaulted and receiving death threats for being gay.
Shortly
after US authorities sent Josue to Guatemala under the ACA, a group of homophobic men threatened
and pursued him. Josue sustained multiple injuries to his face and body when he fell trying to escape
them, according to immigration attorney Linda Corchado. Josue told Corchado he did not feel safe
remaining in Guatemala and that he could not return to Honduras.
ACA transferees who have been targeted by gangs in their home countries of Honduras and El Salvador
(which may also include women, girls, and LGBT people) have good reason to believe that they are not
safe in Guatemala, as many of the same gangs have a presence in the country and maintain links across
borders.
High levels of impunity in Guatemala mean that criminal organizations could target
asylum seekers without being held to account and that victims cannot expect to access justice or
protection.
Shelter operators in Guatemala City working with asylum seekers subjected to the ACA
repeatedly stressed that the same violent gangs from which asylum seekers had fled also operate in
Guatemala. Migrant shelters and shelter workers in Guatemala have also received serious threats,
according to workers interviewed by Human Rights Watch and Refugees International, as well as media
reports.
[115]
[116]
[117]
[118]
[119]
[120]
[121]
[122]
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least two gay men and one transgender woman were transferred to Guatemala under the ACA.
asylum seekers without being held to account and that victims cannot expect to access justice or
asylum seekers without being held to account and that victims cannot expect to access justice or
protection.
Shelter operators in Guatemala City working with asylum seekers subjected to the ACA
[1[1[1[1[ 24
24
24
24]
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Like the Honduran police officer “Jorge C.,” many of the transferees Human Rights Watch and
Refugees International spoke to expressed fear of remaining in Guatemala, saying they faced the same
risk of persecution or torture as in their home countries. For example, “Yana E.” fled Honduras with
her two-year-old daughter after a gang brutally murdered her husband. She showed Refugees
International his death certificate. When Yana asked for asylum at the US border, an official told her
that the United States “wasn’t giving asylum anymore.” She was transferred to Guatemala under the
ACA despite having no family or friends in Guatemala. She said that she felt unsafe in Guatemala
because she said the gang knew where she was and had since received a threatening video message
from the same people who murdered her husband.
Human Rights Watch spoke to a woman and her two sons (17 and 11) from Honduras. Because of a
series of threats against them by gangs, they had moved to different places within Honduras four times.
At the last place they lived, the woman said, she was told to pay a “war tax” every Thursday. When the
gang gave her a note saying they would kidnap her younger son from school unless she paid, she
decided to travel to the United States to ask for asylum. She said they could not return to their home
country, but she said she knew no one in Guatemala and could not support her children there. She said
she did not know what to do next.
A staff member at Refugio de la Niñez described the whole process of the ACA – from the experience at
the US border, to the flight and reception at the airport, to the 72-hour time limit – as “a series of
deceptions and intimidations” that break down people who already have “extremely complicated
protection needs.” He emphasized the need to “return people’s dignity.”
According to psychologist Sucely Donis, who works with migrants at Casa del Migrante, the ACA
creates a seemingly never-ending “circle of violence” in which asylum seekers are in a constant state of
mental stress and never have the opportunity to pause and decompress in a safe environment.
She
has noticed a significant difference between the psychological responses of migrants and asylum
seekers who are in transit on their way north versus the asylum seekers sent to Guatemala under the
ACA. “People in transit [northward] are more prepared to deal with the things they may face because
they have fortified themselves,” she said. “But people [returned under the ACA] are not given any
information and are unable to prepare themselves for what happens.”
Combined with abusive CBP detention conditions and the trauma they have experienced at home and
potentially along the way, the experience of suddenly arriving in Guatemala is a shock for ACA
transferees. Donis described the experience as leaving transferees mentally and emotionally defeated,
[126]
[127]
[128]
[129]
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risk of persecution or torture as in their home countries. For example, “Yana E.” fled Honduras with
transferees. Donis described the experience as leaving transferees mentally and emotionally defeated,
seekers who are in transit on their way north versus the asylum seekers sent to Guatemala under the
seekers who are in transit on their way north versus the asylum seekers sent to Guatemala under the
ACA. “People in transit [northward] are more prepared to deal with the things they may face because
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especially when they believed the United States would hear their case and give them access to a fair
process. She said those who arrive under the ACA are often suffering from post-traumatic stress
disorder and chronic stress, as well as physical illnesses – respiratory infections, headaches,
palpitations – that she said are in part physical manifestations of that stress. Meanwhile, children in the
shelter are showing signs of anxiety, aggression, and arrested development. “We are destroying a
generation,” she said.
Many of the ACA transferees interviewed by Human Rights Watch and Refugees International were
young adults between 18 and 20 years old, separated from parents in the United States, at heightened
risk of being targets of gangs, and experiencing increased difficulty making decisions. A 20-year-old
Salvadoran woman told Human Rights Watch that her mind was “completely worn out” (desgaste) by
CBP detention. In Guatemala City where she knew nobody, she said she did not know what she was
going to do – she was fearful of persecution should she return to El Salvador and separated from her
family in the United States.
“Freddie G.,” a 19-year-old Honduran, told Refugees International he was in a complete panic. Freddie’s
mother abandoned the family when he was four and his father later left for the United States, leaving
his sister, brother, and him in the care of their grandmother, now ill and infirm. A gang leader
kidnapped his sister and kept her as “his woman” until she managed to escape and flee to the United
States. In response, the gang tried to recruit his brother and then mutilated his brother’s legs with a
machete. Next, the gang members came after Freddie, blaming him for the sister’s escape and robbing
him. Freddie sought help from his employer to no avail; the gang leader found him and severely beat
him, prompting him to flee to the United States. Freddie said that he felt panicked and spent much of
his time crying at the crowded shelter in Guatemala, where he could not sleep or eat knowing that he
had only three days to figure out what to do – fearing persecution in Honduras, knowing no one in
Guatemala, and having his entire family in the United States seeking asylum for the same reasons that
he needed to. Freddie was desperate for help from a psychologist and a lawyer, but neither were
available to provide him services beyond initial consultations in Guatemala. He could not understand
why the lawyer his father found for him in the United States could not help him apply for asylum there.
Like Freddie G., several transferees had immediate relatives living in the United States pursuing asylum
cases based upon the same fears as the transferees to Guatemala, which underscores how the ACA is
contributing to family separation. In contrast, under the US-Canada Safe Third Country agreement, an
asylum seeker who has even a distant relative (aunt or uncle, grandparent, nephew or niece) with an
outstanding asylum claim in the United States is exempted from transfer and permitted to pursue
asylum in the United States.
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disorder and chronic stress, as well as physical illnesses – respiratory infections, headaches,
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Like Freddie G., several transferees had immediate relatives living in the United States pursuing asylum
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Most asylum seekers Refugees International and Human Rights Watch interviewed indicated that they
considered Guatemala to be no different than their home countries in terms of safety and opportunity.
Indeed, many transferees noted that in their home countries they at least understood the context and
had social networks that they could rely on. Few found remaining in Guatemala to be a feasible option
because it is a dangerous and poor country where they lack familial or social ties.
Prior to the suspension of the ACA, UNHCR’s local nongovernmental partners had interviewed a
portion of the people transferred under the ACA and found that about two-thirds of those interviewed
had international protection concerns.
However, only a small proportion of those who expressed
fear of return to their home countries applied for asylum in Guatemala, UNHCR said. Many also told
UNHCR’s partner they were unwilling to stay in Guatemala, citing their inability to sustain themselves
there, distrust of the authorities, and proximity to their home countries, fearing that their persecutors
could still reach them.
Guatemala has not historically been a country of destination for many asylum seekers; it only began to
receive a few claims in 2002.
It received fewer than 50 new asylum claims per year from 2002-2014.
In June 2019, a US embassy cable reported that the Guatemalan Institute for Migration (IGM) had
not processed any asylum cases in more than a year while the Rules of Procedure for Refugee Status
were being drafted, and that from March 2019 through the time of writing that cable, the National
Migration Authority, which is the only authorized body to make refugee status decisions, had not met.
The US embassy’s June 2019 cable reported that the Office of International Migration Relations
(ORMI), a specialized unit in IGM for the processing of asylum claims, had a staff of three caseworkers,
three investigators, and one supervisor.
The US embassy estimated that ORMI had capacity to
process 100 to 150 claims per year at a time when the backlog stood at about 400. Nine months after
the US embassy cable, at the end of March 2020, the backlog had grown to 713 cases, an increase of 78
percent.
At the time of the writing of this report, late April 2020, the National Migration Authority that decides
asylum cases had not met from the time Covid-19 restrictions went into place in mid-March.
Given
Covid-19-related slowdowns, it is hard to predict how long it will take to process claims in the current
caseload, including those of the 20 ACA transferees who lodged asylum claims. Bottlenecks in the legal
framework, the lack of technical capacity to process asylum claims, and a lack of qualified adjudicators
point to serious gaps in this nascent asylum system.
[133]
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[136]
[137]
[138]
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Most asylum seekers Refugees International and Human Rights Watch interviewed indicated that they
At the time of the writing of this report, late April 2020, the National Migration Authority that decides
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Guatemala’s asylum system is hamstrung by a limited legal framework that only allows high level
officials to approve claims. Under the Guatemalan Migration Code, all requests for refugee status are
decided by the National Migration Authority, a committee comprised of the Vice President; the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Social Development, Labor and Social Welfare, and the Interior; the
Director of the Guatemalan Institute of Migration; and the Executive Secretary of the Migrant
Assistance Council of Guatemala. None of these members, including the Vice President, can delegate
this responsibility.
The result is bottlenecks in the system that can only be addressed by changing
the Guatemalan Migration Code – no amount of support or technical capacity can remedy this
problem.
The lack of technical capacity is also of serious concern. People seeking asylum must file an application
with the ORMI,
which then forwards it for review by the National Refugee Commission
(CONARE), an advisory body that examines applications and issues recommendations, opinions, and
suggestions.
The CONARE is a technical working group whose members are appointed by various
government ministries, but it does not employ asylum lawyers or persons trained in international
asylum law.
While the General Director of Migration and a representative from UNHCR, who has
this expertise, are also members of CONARE, they participate solely in an advisory capacity and
neither one has the authority to provide final recommendations regarding refugee status.
The
United States has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with UNHCR to build up the capacity of
the Guatemalan asylum system,
but problems with lack of relevant expertise in CONARE persist.
Asylum seekers in Guatemala also face difficulties sustaining themselves while their claims are pending
and the government has done little to help them.
Although asylum seekers have the right to work, it
is difficult for them to find formal employment using the “refugee ID” that the government provides
them as many employers do not recognize it as valid; also, Guatemalan labor laws cap at 10 percent the
number of foreign workers that employers may hire.
Starting in 2017, the National Registry of
Persons (RENAP) took over the responsibility of issuing an ID card for asylum seekers, refugees, and
temporary residents that looks more like the ID cards that citizens use.
But the process of applying
for the new ID card – with fees to RENAP, the Migration Directorate, notaries, and other personnel – is
cost-prohibitive for many people.
To make matters worse, an informed observer reported that
RENAP has not been consistently issuing the new IDs for asylum seekers and refugees as required by
law.
Asylum seekers, refugees, and temporary residents have a right to access health, education, and other
state services under the Guatemalan Migration Code.
But the state does not cover the costs of
specialist health care and medications; for that, they need either sufficient funds or health insurance,
[142]
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[144]
[145]
[146]
[147]
[148]
[149]
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decided by the National Migration Authority, a committee comprised of the Vice President; the
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cost-prohibitive for many people.
To make matters worse, an informed observer reported that
RENAP has not been consistently issuing the new IDs for asylum seekers and refugees as required by
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which is typically provided through an employer.
Generally, in Guatemala, the quality and
availability of public health care, particularly for low-income people, is poor.
This leaves asylum
seekers in a catch-22 situation; they need employment to receive many services, but employers will not
hire them, so they cannot obtain health insurance and struggle to access needed care. Many ACA
transferees arrive with children, some with very young children,
creating another barrier to access
work as childcare options are quite limited.
From November 2019 through March 16, 2020, only 20 of the 939 people transferred to Guatemala
under the ACA had applied for asylum despite that many more of them were likely to have well-
founded fears of persecution in their home countries, as indicated in the interviews by UNHCR’s local
partners, cited above,
by the fact that nearly three times the number who formally lodged asylum
claims initially indicated to the Guatemalan Air Force an interest in applying for asylum,
and in
interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch and Refugees International.
Given the insufficiencies of the Guatemalan asylum system, the non-viability of temporary residency,
and the 72-hour deadline to decide, many transferred asylum seekers feel compelled to return to their
home countries. To return home, transferees can enroll in the International Organization for Migration
(IOM)’s Assisted Voluntary Return Program (AVR) or return to their home countries using their own
resources. However, IOM assisted in the repatriation of only 44 of the more than 900 transferees.
It
declined to facilitate the return of 7 of the 51 transferees because of protection concerns.
Only one person out of the 30 people subject to the ACA interviewed by Refugees International and
Human Rights Watch at Casa del Migrante said they were applying for asylum in Guatemala. Several
said they had no family or support networks in Guatemala and that they feared for their safety in
Guatemala. Many indicated they would return to El Salvador and Honduras despite continuing to
express their fear of persecution there:
· A 33-year-old Salvadoran woman said that, though she feared her former partner would harm her,
“I don’t know what else I can do” but return to El Salvador.
· A woman said that she felt she had no alternative but to return to Honduras because she had no
place to stay and no means to support herself and her baby in Guatemala. She said she feared attack in
Honduras by the same gang that had forced her husband to flee to the United States.
· A 20-year-old Salvadoran man said “[t]here is no asylum here in Guatemala,” and that he could not
stay without any family support. He said that he feared persecution in El Salvador but did not know
where else he could go.
[156]
[157]
[158]
[159]
[160]
[161]
[162]
[163]
[164]
[165]
[166]
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seekers in a catch-22 situation; they need employment to receive many services, but employers will not
A woman said that she felt she had no alternative but to return to Honduras because she had no
A woman said that she felt she had no alternative but to return to Honduras because she had no
place to stay and no means to support herself and her baby in Guatemala. She said she feared attack in
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· A woman said that she was afraid to stay in Guatemala and planned to return to Honduras with her
12-year-old daughter despite fear of attack there.
· Terminate the ACA with Guatemala, halt plans to begin transferring asylum seekers under the ACA
with Honduras, and do not implement the ACA with El Salvador;
· Remove the five-year bar to entry into the United States for persons subjected to any asylum
cooperative agreements;
· Allow asylum seekers who are or were subject to the Guatemala ACA to restart their asylum claims
in the United States;
· Disclose the number of individuals subjected to the Guatemala ACA and a breakdown of this
number by nationality, gender, age, and port of entry or Border Patrol Sector through which the
individual was initially processed; the number of individuals who expressed fear of being sent to a third
country under an ACA and were provided a non-refoulement interview; and the pass rate of those
interviews.
· Hold hearings at which State and Justice Department officials are called to answer questions about
the negotiations and legality of the ACAs and hearings that require DHS to disclose how the Guatemala
ACA is being implemented;
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· Defund the ACAs by barring the Department of Homeland Security from using any funds,
resources, or fees to implement or enforce the ACAs with El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.
· Terminate the ACA with the United States, or, at least, do not resume acceptance of ACA transfers,
which have been suspended because of the Covid-19 pandemic;
· Release the annexes of the agreement publicly and allow the Guatemalan Congress to review and
determine whether the agreement should be signed;
· Revise the Guatemalan Legal Code to allow the National Migration Authority to delegate asylum
determination decisions to individuals trained in international asylum law;
· Continue to work with UNHCR to improve the capacity of the asylum system.
This report was researched and written by Yael Schacher, senior advocate, and Rachel Schmidtke,
advocate, with Refugees International, and Ariana Sawyer, US border researcher in the US Program at
Human Rights Watch. The report was edited by Hardin Lang, vice president for programs at Refugees
International and Bill Frelick, director of the Refugee and Migrant Rights Division at Human Rights
Watch. Eric Schwartz, president of Refugees International, reviewed the report. Human Rights Watch
reviewers of the report were Grace Meng, senior researcher, US Program; Tamara Taraciuk Broner,
acting deputy director, Americas Division; Michael Bochenek, senior counsel, Children’s Rights
Division, Amanda Klasing, acting co-director, Women’s Rights Division, Neela Ghoshal, senior
researcher, LGBT Rights Division, Joseph Saunders, deputy program director, Maria McFarland
Sánchez-Moreno, senior legal advisor, and Aisling Reidy, senior legal advisor.
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reviewers of the report were Grace Meng, senior researcher, US Program; Tamara Taraciuk Broner,
acting deputy director, Americas Division; Michael Bochenek, senior counsel, Children’s Rights
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Refugees International and Human Rights Watch would like to thank the asylum seekers and migrants
who generously shared their experiences with us. Refugees International and Human Rights Watch
would also like to thank Leonel Dubon, director at Refugio de la Niñez; Father Mauro Verzeletti,
director of the Casa del Migrante; and Gabriela Mundo, director of international relations at the Office
of the Human Rights Ombudsman.
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would also like to thank Leonel Dubon, director at Refugio de la Niñez; Father Mauro Verzeletti,
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F I E L D R E P O R T | J U N E 2 0 2 0
Yael Schacher and Rachel Schmidtke
Harmful Returns
T H E C O M P O U N D E D V U L N E R A B I L I T I E S O F R E T U R N E D
G U AT E M A L A N S I N T H E T I M E O F C O V I D - 1 9
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Cover Photo: Migrants, part of a group of 76 Guatemalans deported from the United States, wear
face masks as a preventive measure against the novel coronavirus COVID-19 as they board a
bus upon landing at the Air Force base in Guatemala City on May 4, 2020. (Photo by Johan OR-
DONEZ / AFP via Getty Images).
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Contents
4
Summary and Recommendations
8
Background
Pre-COVID 19 Policy Changes in the United States
Pre-COVID Policy Changes in Mexico
U.S. and Mexico Deportation Policy Changes under COVID-19
17 Protection Concerns in Guatemala upon
Return
Crime
Discrimination and Mistreatment of Women and Indigenous Groups
Increased Vulnerability for Children
23 Socioeconomic Barriers to Integration
Barriers to Economic Integration
Health Care
25 Compounded Challenges during the
COVID-19 Pandemic
26 Conclusion
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4 | Harmful Returns: The Compounded Vulnerabilities of Returned Guatemalans in the Time of COVID-19
Summary
In recent years, the United States and Mexico have taken a series of steps that make it easier
to return Guatemalans back to their home country. These steps include policies and programs
related to detention, deportation, and limits in asylum, such as the Remain in Mexico program
(officially called the Migrant Protection Protocols or MPP by its acronym). These measures force
home many Guatemalans with valid refugee claims who are at risk of persecution upon return.
Others have legitimate fears for their security and safety when they get home because return-
ees are at greater risk of becoming targets of violence and extortion. Once back, Guatemalans
often struggle to reintegrate. They face unique challenges in earning a livelihood; and women,
indigenous groups, and children face particular barriers to accessing many basic public ser-
vices. Also, health care is lacking, particularly for psychological or specialized services.
Deportations and returns carried out in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic compound these
challenges and contribute to the spread of the virus. Indeed, at the end of April 2020, deport-
ees from the United States made up nearly 20 percent of the 500 coronavirus cases in Gua-
temala and, as of early June, deportees continue to test positive for COVID-19 upon arrival in
Guatemala despite having clean bill of health documents from the United States.1
In the United States, the administration has responded to the pandemic by insisting on contin-
ued detention of asylum seekers by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) rather than
using alternatives that would allow for social distancing.2 On May 24, 2020, a 34-year-old Gua-
temalan man was the second detainee to die from COVID-19 in ICE custody.3 The United States
is also making it more difficult for unaccompanied children in the care of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement (ORR) to unite with relatives already in the country. In addition, the administration
has expanded its efforts to deport children to Guatemala—both children in the custody of the
ORR or those who have just crossed the border and been picked up by Customs and Border
Protection (CBP).4
Since late March, under the claimed authority of Title 42 of the Public Health Safety Act, CBP
has expelled Guatemalan asylum seekers to Mexico without any fear screening. Singling out
asylum seekers in this way is neither justified nor necessary for public health; an alternative
1. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “‘Exporting the Virus: Migrants Deported by U.S. Make up 20% of Guatemala’s Coronavirus Cas-
es,” CBS News, April 27, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/deported-migrants-guatemala-coronavirus-cases/; Monique
O. Madan and Jacqueline Charles, “ICE Has Been Testing Migrants before Deportation. But How It’s Doing So Is Problematic.,”
Miami Herald, May 29, 2020, https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/immigration/article243054631.html.
2. “The Real Alternatives to Detention,” Justice for Immigrants, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, June 2019,
https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/immigrant-detention/real-alternatives-detention/.
3. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “Second Immigrant Dies of Coronavirus Complications While in ICE Custody,” CBS News, May 25,
2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/second-immigrant-dies-of-coronavirus-complications-while-in-ice-custody/.
4. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, ““The table below (in Spanish) by the Guatemalan government shows that while the number of
children deported with their parents has declined since January, deportations of unaccompanied minors increased signifi-
cantly in March”
Twitter, April 1, 2020, https://twitter.com/camiloreports/status/1245379977396322307; Molly O’Toole, “Under Trump Policy,
U.S. Plays Custody Keep-Away with Migrant Children,” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/politics/sto-
ry/2020-05-18/unaccompanied-migrant-kids-deportations-coronavirus;
Lomi Kriel, “The Trump Administration Is Rushing Deportations of Migrant Children During Coronavirus,” ProPublica, May 18,
2020, https://www.propublica.org/article/the-trump-administration-is-rushing-deportations-of-migrant-children-during-corona-
virus; Caitlin Dickerson and Kirk Semple, “U.S. Deported Thousands Amid Covid-19 Outbreak. Some Proved to Be Sick,” The
New York Times, April 18, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/18/us/deportations-coronavirus-guatemala.html.
Camillo Montoyo-Galvez, “The U.S. gave her refuge from gangs. But her 13- year old daughter was expelled under Trump’s
new border policy,” CBS News, June 10, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/13-year-old-daughter-refugee-expelled-trump-
new-border-policy/
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safe screening process could be adopted at the border.5 Before invoking Title 42 authority, CBP
placed thousands of asylum-seeking Guatemalans in the MPP program, and they continue to
live in dangerous and poor conditions in northern Mexico.6 Health care workers in Tijuana, Ciu-
dad Juarez, and Matamoros warn that conditions for asylum seekers waiting there will make an
outbreak of COVID-19 a “public health disaster.”7 This disaster could be averted through parole
of those in MPP to homes of family and friends in the United States, a circumstance that would
be available to the vast majority of them, and allowing for social distancing, quarantine, and
isolation.8
Mexico has worked to reduce the number of people in detention during the pandemic; as of
May 27, 2020, 234 migrants remained in detention across Mexico’s 65 migration detention cen-
ters.9 Although the number of detained migrants has been greatly reduced since March, Mexico
has returned nearly 5,000 Central Americans to their home countries since the pandemic be-
gan.10 Four adolescents deported from Mexico had tested positive for COVID-19 as of May 20,
but the number of deportees could be higher because it is difficult to track these cases, given
that many Guatemalans return through informal channels, frequently after being bused from the
north and abandoned near the Guatemalan border.11
In Guatemala, the government has focused its efforts on providing some basic reception ser-
vices for deportees and other returnees. However, it has struggled to provide meaningful rein-
tegration programs. The pandemic has exacerbated the impact of this failure. If a returnee has
been exposed to COVID-19 or is COVID-19 positive upon arrival, there are few if any health care
services to treat them, nor is there adequate shelter to allow for either quarantine or isolation.
Guatemalans deported during the pandemic arrive home to face rising levels of food insecurity
and a stagnant economy further hobbled by border closures and movement restrictions. Adults
and children alike face stigma and a growing risk of violent attack as fear and misinformation
about the disease continue to spread. A senior UN aid official in Guatemala recently observed
5. Yael Schacher and Chris Beyrer, “Expelling Asylum Seekers Is Not the Answer: U.S. Border Policy in the Time of COVID-19,”
Refugees International, April 27, 2020, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/4/26/expelling-asylum-seekers-is-
not-the-answer-us-border-policy-in-the-time-of-covid-19; Ruthie Epstein and Shaw Drake, “How to Co-Opt a Pandemic to Ban
Asylum,” American Civil Liberties Union, May 20, 2020, https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/how-to-co-opt-a-pan-
demic-to-ban-asylum/.; “Public Health Measures to Safely Manage Asylum Seekers and Children at the Border,” Human Rights
First, May 15, 2020, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/public-health-measures-safely-manage-asylum-seekers-and-
children-border.
6. “Deportation and Disease: Central America’s COVID-19 Dilemmas,” International Crisis Group, April 28, 2020, https://www.
crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/guatemala/deportation-and-disease-central-americas-covid-19-dilem-
mas; Kennji Kizuka, Eleanor Acer, and Rebecca Gendelman, “Pandemic as Pretext: Trump Administration Exploits COVID-19,
Expels Asylum Seekers and Children to Escalating Danger,” Human Rights First, May 13, 2020, https://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/resource/pandemic-pretext-trump-administration-exploits-covid-19-expels-asylum-seekers-and-children
7. Julia Ainsley, “As COVID-19 Looms, Conditions for Migrants Stalled at U.S. Border Are a ‘Disaster in the Making’,” NBCNews.
com, May 12, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/covid-19-looms-conditions-migrants-stalled-u-s-border-
are-n1204506.
8. An October 2019 study of 607 asylum seekers subject to the Remain in Mexico program found that nearly 92 percent had
family or close friends in the United States; Tom K. Wong and Vanessa Ceceña, “Seeking Asylum: Part 2,” US Immigration
Policy Center, October 29, 2019, https://usipc.ucsd.edu/publications/usipc-seeking-asylum-part-2-final.pdf.
9. INM, “Da seguimiento a las medidas cautelares emitidas por @CNDH,” Twitter, May 29, 2020, 8:15 p.m., https://twitter.com/
INAMI_mx/status/1266523701467475968.
10. “México Ha Deportado a Cerca De 5 Mil Centroamericanos Durante La Pandemia,” Conexión Migrante,” Voz de America,
May 19, 2020, https://conexionmigrante.com/2020-/05-/19/mexico-deportaciones-5000-centroamericanos-durante-pan-
demia/.
11. “Interview with Rosi Siu, Asylum Access Mexico in Tenosique, Tabasco,” Asylum Access, May 13, 2020, https://asylumac-
cess.org/asylum-in-a-pandemic-refugio-en-una-pandemia-tenosique-tabasco/.
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that “many communities are rejecting returnees because they fear being infected.” Indeed,
even those returnees who test negative for COVID-19 have been violently attacked.12
Refugees International has called for testing before deportation, and the Guatemalan govern-
ment has required evidence of such testing from the United States. However, U.S. authorities
are not conducting comprehensive and effective testing, and deportees continue to test posi-
tive upon arrival in Guatemala.13 This situation puts additional strain on the Guatemalan govern-
ment and civil society, which already lack an adequate response.
Recommendations
To the United States Government:
•
Release from detention all Guatemalans who have passed their credible fear interviews or
are at a higher risk of succumbing to COVID-19 owing to age or pre-existing medical condi-
tions.
•
Release Guatemalan unaccompanied children from the custody of the ORR into the care of
sponsors in the United States.
•
Ensure that Guatemalans seeking asylum and humanitarian protection at the border are
afforded access to screenings as required under domestic and international law.
•
Guatemalans in the Remain in Mexico (MPP) program should be paroled to friends and fam-
ily in the United States to await their asylum hearings. Guatemalans in MPP who have been
“deported in absentia” after returning to Guatemala should be able to reopen their cases.
•
Institute a temporary moratorium on deportations to Guatemala during the pandemic.
•
Fund reintegration programs for returned Guatemalans, including efforts to remove barriers
to economic integration, providing loans and job trainings, and offering additional support
for women and indigenous groups. This funding should also support efforts to contain and
mitigate the coronavirus pandemic, such as providing medical equipment and cash transfer
programs.
To the Mexican Government:
•
Institute a temporary moratorium on voluntary returns and deportations to Guatemala
during the pandemic. Once the pandemic eases, coordinate with the Guatemalan gov-
12. Adolfo Flores, “Guatemalans Deported from the US Are Being Threatened with Violence at Home over Corona-
virus Fears,” BuzzFeed News, May 1, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adolfoflores/guatemala-us-deport-
ees-threats-coronavirus.
13. “US deportation flights to Guatemala resume,” The Washington Post, June 9, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/the_americas/us-deportation-flights-to-guatemala-resume/2020/06/09/e24acbe2-aab0-11ea-a43b-be9f6494a87d_sto-
ry.html.
Jonathan Blitzer, “The Trump Administration’s Deportation Policy Is Spreading the Coronavirus,” New Yorker, May 13, 2020,
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/the-trump-administrations-deportation-policy-is-spreading-the-coronavirus.
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ernment to ensure that returns are conducted through regular routes, with proper health
checks before return.
•
The Mexican National Migration Institute should properly screen those Guatemalans who
arrive at the Mexico-Guatemala border for international protection and allow those who
wish to do so to apply with the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR).
•
End the detention of migrant and refugee children in immigration facilities in accordance
with Mexican law and invest in additional open-door shelter options for migrant and refugee
children. Train immigration and child welfare officials to provide child-friendly information
about their right to seek asylum. In determining where it may be in the child’s “best interest”
to reside, Mexican child protection officials should consider the United States as a possible
destination.
To the Guatemalan Government:
•
Provide proper shelters for returned Guatemalans to quarantine upon arrival and ensure
that they have access to necessities such as food, water, and sufficient space to maintain a
safe distance from others.
•
Conduct multilingual information campaigns in Mayan languages and Spanish to combat
stigma directed at deportees released from coronavirus quarantine. Coordinate with return-
ee organizations to provide social support and community reintegration.
•
Work with international humanitarian, civil society, and church organizations to provide
emergency support services to vulnerable Guatemalans, including returnees. These ser-
vices should include measures to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic. Look to the best
practices of cash-based transfer programs, food distribution, and mobile clinics that other
countries in the region are implementing.
•
Strengthen reintegration programs for Guatemalan deportees and returnees that include
targeted services for women, girls, and indigenous groups. Work with civil society organiza-
tions with experience in reintegration to build from their best practices and include pro-
grams tailored to returnees’ culture, gender, and location.
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Background
Deportations from the United States and
Mexico to Guatemala have increased over
the past decade, but recent policy changes
make it easier for these countries to deport
people quickly, often without proper
screening regarding their protection needs.
In 2019, the United States deported nearly
55,00014 Guatemalans to Guatemala. Mexico
and the United States voluntarily returned
96,74015 people the same year.
14. Jeff Abbott, “U.S. Deportations of Guatemalans Doubled over Past Decade,” Reuters, January 3, 2020, https://www.reu-
ters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-guatemala/u-s-deportations-of-guatemalans-doubled-over-past-decade-idUSKBN1Z223M;
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (website), “U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Fiscal Year 2019 Enforce-
ment and Removal Operations Report,” n.d., accessed June 7, 2020, https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Docu-
ment/2019/eroReportFY2019.pdf.
15. IOM; “Guatemala,” Iniciativa de Gestión de Información de Movilidad Humana en el Triángulo Norte (International Organi-
zation for Migration), accessed June 4, 2020, https://mic.iom.int/webntmi/guatemala/.
16. Dora Schriro, “Weeping in the Playtime of Others: The Obama Administration’s Failed Reform of ICE Family Detention
Practices,” Journal on Migration and Human Security 5, no. 2 (2017): 452–480, https://doi.org/10.1177/233150241700500212.
17. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) (website), “In-Country Refugee/Parole Processing for Minors in Hondu-
ras, El Salvador and Guatemala (Central American Minors – CAM),” November 15, 2017, https://www.uscis.gov/CAM.
Pre-COVID 19 Policy Changes
in the United States
Since 2014, the United States has responded
to increased forced migration of children
and families from Guatemala (as well as
El Salvador and Honduras) with a strategy
of deterrence through detention.16 Yet the
Obama administration also created the
Central American Minors program to allow
parents in the United States to apply to
bring their children to the United States as
refugees.17
Salcajá
Quetzaltenango
Huehuetenango
Tapachula
Guatemala City
Guatemala
Tecun Uman
Mexico
belize
Honduras
El salvador
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Research Overview
Refugees International traveled to Guatemala in February of 2020 to assess the protection
landscape for deportees and returnees from the United States and Mexico. The team traveled
to Quetzaltenango, Salcajá, and Guatemala City. They interviewed Guatemalan asylum seekers
and migrants who were deported or returned from the United States or Mexico. The team also
interviewed staff of various returnee organizations and of local and international NGOs as well
as U.S. and Guatemalan government representatives.
Family separation and detention of chil-
dren: The Trump administration canceled this
program in 2017, began prosecuting relatives
who paid smugglers to bring children to the
United States, and then initiated its “zero tol-
erance policy,” which led to the arrest of par-
ents who crossed the border without authori-
zation and separating them from any children
who had accompanied them. Some deported
Guatemalan parents have been reunited with
their children, whereas other families remain
separated to this day.18 The Trump admin-
istration also implemented several policies
that dramatically increased the detention of
Central American children under deteriorat-
ing conditions.19 Between late 2018 and early
2019, five Guatemalan children died in Cus-
toms and Border Protection (CBP) custody,
18. “First Separated Parents Returning from Guatemala to U.S. as Part of Court Order,” Kids in Need of Defense, news release,
January 22, 2020, https://supportkind.org/press-releases/first-separated-parents-returning-from-guatemala-to-u-s-as-part-of-
court-order/; Kevin Sieff, “They Were One of the First Families Separated at the Border. Two and a Half Years Later, They’re
Still Apart,” Washington Post, February 17, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/they-were-one-of-
the-first-families-separated-at-the-border-two-and-a-half-years-later-theyre-still-apart/2020/02/17/38594c98-4152-11ea-99c7-
1dfd4241a2fe_story.html.
19. Christopher Sherman, Martha Mendoza, and Garance Burke, “US Held Record Number of Migrant Children in Custody in
2019,” Associated Press, November 12, 2019, https://apnews.com/015702afdb4d4fbf85cf5070cd2c6824; Caitlin Dickerson,
“‘There Is a Stench’: Soiled Clothes and No Baths for Migrant Children at a Texas Center,” New York Times, June 21, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/migrant-children-border-soap.html; Jonathan Blitzer, “To Free Detained Children,
Immigrant Families Are Forced to Risk Everything,” New Yorker, October 16, 2018, https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/
to-free-detained-children-immigrant-families-are-forced-to-risk-everything; “No Home for Children: US Government Detention
of Children at Homestead Facility Cruel and Unlawful,” Amnesty International USA, July 17, 2019, https://www.amnestyusa.org/
reports/no-home-for-children-us-government-detention-of-children-at-homestead-facility-cruel-and-unlawful/.
20. “After Six Deaths, Is DHS Doing Enough to Ensure the Health and Safety of Children in Their Care?” America’s Voice,
news release, January 14, 2020, https://americasvoice.org/press_releases/after-six-deaths-is-dhs-doing-enough-to-ensure-
the-health-and-safety-of-children-in-their-care/.
whereas there had been no child deaths in
CBP custody in the previous decade.20
Limiting protection for unaccompanied
children: In 2019, CBP apprehended more
unaccompanied children (30,000) from
Guatemala than any other country. These
children were sent by CBP to the Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR), where they
are supposed to receive services, seek
asylum via a child-appropriate interview,
and be placed in the least restrictive setting
(as mandated by the Trafficking Victims
Reauthorization Act). However, information-
sharing policies between ORR and the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and policy changes relating to filing claims
for relief inhibited the placement of children
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This mural in Quetzaltenango depicts
Claudia Patricia Gómez González, a 19
year old woman from nearby San Juan
Ostuncalco, who was shot dead by a Border
Patrol agent on May 28, 2018 after she
crossed the U.S. border near Laredo, Texas.
Photo by: Refugees International.
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with relatives and made it more difficult
for them to succeed in their applications
for protection. Upon turning 18, children
were transferred from ORR to Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) custody.21
Rather than remain in detention to fight
their cases, some young people requested
“voluntary departure,” which does not carry
the mandatory 10-year bar from future
admissibility to the United States that
deportation requires.22 In late 2019, the
Trump administration also began a program
to speed unaccompanied minors through
immigration courts to rapidly deport them
before they were released to sponsors in the
United States.23
Increased barriers to asylum: Under the
Trump administration, DHS’s policy of refus-
ing to parole asylum seekers who passed
credible fear screenings—instead keeping
them detained for months or even years
waiting for immigration court hearings—has
led many Guatemalan asylum seekers to
abandon their claims.24 Further, decisions by
Attorney General Sessions and Barr have
narrowed asylum eligibility for those fleeing
21. “Lawsuit against Homeland Security Says New Asylum Policy Violates Child Immigrants’ Rights,” Kids in Need of Defense,
press release, July 8, 2019, https://supportkind.org/press-releases/homeland-security-lawsuit/;
“Resources on Special Immigrant Juvenile Status,” Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (Catholic Legal Immigration Network
(CLINIC), April 7, 2020, https://cliniclegal.org/resources/childrens-issues/special-immigrant-juvenile-status; “The ORR and DHS
Information-Sharing Agreement and its Consequences,” Justice for Immigrants, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops,
October 3, 2019, https://justiceforimmigrants.org/what-we-are-working-on/unaccompanied-children/orr-and-dhs-informa-
tion-sharing-agreement-its-consequences/; Hannah Dreier, “Trust and Consequences,” Washington Post, February 15, 2020,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/national/immigration-therapy-reports-ice/.
22. There is nothing truly voluntary about that provision; the leaving is mandatory; Nicholas Novy, “The Problem of Coerced
Consent: When Voluntary Departure Isn’t So Voluntary,” Kansas Law Review 68, no. 2 (2019): 315–349.
23. Golden McCarthy, “The Fast-Tracking of Detained Unaccompanied Children to Deportation,” Florence Immigrant and
Refugee Rights Project, January 28, 2020, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU01/20200129/110402/HHRG-116-JU01-
20200129-SD012.pdf.
24. Laura Riviera and Dan Werner, “No End in Sight: Why Migrants Give Up on Their U.S. Immigration Cases,” Southern Pover-
ty Law Center, 2018, https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/leg_ijp_no_end_in_sight_2018_final_web.pdf.
25. “Report Card: The Trump Administration’s Performance on Refugee and Humanitarian Protection,” Refugees International,
June 20, 2018, https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2018/6/19/report-card-on-the-trump-administrations-perfor-
mance-on-refugee-and-humanitarian-protection; The Attorney General’s narrowing of the standard also conflicts with determi-
nations of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. See “Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of
Organized Gangs,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, March 2010, https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bb21fa02.
pdf;
Chiara Cardoletti-Carroll, Alice Farmer, and Leslie E Velez, eds., “Women on the Run,” United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, October 2015, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/publications/operations/5630f24c6/women-run.html.
26. “Fact Sheet: Grant Rates Plummet as Trump Administration Dismantles U.S. Asylum System, Blocks and Deports Refu-
gees,” Human Rights First, June 2020, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/AdministrationDismantlingUSAsy-
lumSystem.pdf.
gang or domestic violence, or violence di-
rected toward family members. As Refugees
International has indicated in other reports,
these decisions by the Attorneys General
overturned rulings by the Justice Depart-
ment’s own Board of Immigration Appeals
and have been opposed by some federal
courts.25 The AG decisions have resulted in a
dramatic drop in asylum grant rates for Gua-
temalans.26 In 2019, the administration further
barred asylum seeking by those who transit
a third country. These policies have led to
increasing returns and deportations of Guate-
malans at great risk of harm.
Migrant Protection Protocols: Also in
2019, in the face of increasing numbers of
asylum-seeking Central American families
at the southern border, the administration
initiated its Remain in Mexico—officially, the
Migration Protection Protocols (MPP)—policy,
requiring these families to wait in Mexico for
months while their cases proceed through
the U.S. immigration courts. Of the almost
16,000 Guatemalans in the MPP program in
May 2020, less than 600 have been able to
secure legal representation, thus making it
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12 | Harmful Returns: The Compounded Vulnerabilities of Returned Guatemalans in the Time of COVID-19
very difficult for them to succeed in court.27
Many Guatemalan families, especially
indigenous language speakers, have found
conditions in northern Mexico too dangerous
and difficult to survive (especially the lack
access to food, shelter, work, and services),
and have felt forced to abandon their
cases. As one Guatemalan mother told an
immigration judge in El Paso, “Over there (in
Guatemala), if they do something to me, my
children have somewhere to go. Over here
(in Mexico), they have nothing if something
happens to me.”28 The Remain in Mexico
program has also led to the separation of
many Guatemalan families,29 with some family
members in the United States and others
waiting in Mexico or returned to Guatemala.30
PACR: In late 2019, the Trump administration
initiated a new program called Prompt
Asylum Claim Review (PACR) to fast track
the deportation of Central American asylum
seekers. Before PACR, asylum seekers at the
border typically were transferred from CBP
27. “Details on MPP (Remain in Mexico) Deportation Proceedings,” TRAC Immigration, May 2020, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/
immigration/mpp/.
28. Robert Moore, “Guatemalan Family First to Be Deported from U.S. in Trump ...,” Borderzine: Reporting Across Fronteras,
May 10, 2019, https://borderzine.com/2019/05/guatemalan-family-first-to-be-deported-from-u-s-in-trumps-remain-in-mexico-
program/.
29. Daniella Silva, “Migrant Families Are Being Separated under Remain-in-Mexico Policy, Complaint Alleges,” NBCNews,
August 20, 2019, https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/migrant-families-are-being-separated-under-remain-mexico-pol-
icy-complaint-n1044466; Adolfo Flores, “Asylum-Seekers Keep Getting Sent Back To Mexico Without Their Children Based
On Unreliable Information” BuzzFeed News, December 26, 2019, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adolfoflores/
asylum-seekers-families-separated-bad-info; “New Report Reveals Danger of ‘Remain in Mexico’ Including New Cases of
Family Separation, Confiscated Identity Documents, New Inhumane CBP Custody Tents,” Women’s Refugee Commission
press release, May 16, 2019, https://www.womensrefugeecommission.org/press-releases/new-report-reveals-danger-of-re-
main-in-mexico-including-new-cases-of-family-separation-confiscated-identity-documents-new-inhumane-cbp-custody-tents/;
Priscilla Alvarez, “At Least 350 Children of Migrant Families Forced to Remain in Mexico Have Crossed over Alone to US,”
CNN, January 24, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/24/politics/migrant-children-remain-in-mexico/index.html; “Forced
Apart: How the ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy Places Children in Danger and Separates Families,” Kids in Need of Defense, Febru-
ary 24, 2020, https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/MPP-KIND-2.24updated-003.pdf.
30. At least one federal court objected to DHS sending a Guatemalan child to wait in Mexico with her father rather than unit-
ing her mother in the United States. E.O.H.C.; M.S.H.S., a minor child v. Secretary DHS et. al. (19-2927, U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, February 13, 2020), https://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/opinarch/192927p.pdf.
31. Robert Moore, “Trump Administration Testing Rapid Asylum Review, Deportation Process in Texas,” Washington Post,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/trump-administration-testing-rapid-asylum-review-deportation-process-in-tex-
as/2019/10/24/caa91a62-f5d8-11e9-a285-882a8e386a96_story.html;
“Policies Affecting Asylum Seekers at the Border,” American Immigration Council, January 29, 2020, https://www.americanim-
migrationcouncil.org/research/policies-affecting-asylum-seekers-border.
32. “LAWG Strongly Condemns Administration’s Abrupt & Irrational Announcement to Cut Aid to Central America & Punish
Refugees for Seeking Protection,” Latin America Working Group, press release, April 1, 2019, https://www.lawg.org/press-re-
lease-lawg-strongly-condemns-administrations-abrupt-irrational-announcement-to-cut-aid-to-central-america-punish-refu-
gees-for-seeking-protection/;
“As Central America Aid Resumes, the U.S.’s Return of Refugees and Immigrants May Undermine Impact,” Kids in Need of De-
fense, press release, April 29, 2020, https://supportkind.org/press-releases/as-central-america-aid-resumes-the-u-s-s-return-
to ICE custody, where they might consult
with counsel before their interviews with
asylum officers. Under PACR, asylum seekers
are held exclusively in CBP custody (where
conditions are poor and they cannot access
supporting evidence) and have limited access
to counsel before their asylum interviews.31
Within 10 days of crossing the U.S.-Mexico
border, asylum-seeking Guatemalans whose
claims are summarily denied have been
deported back to Guatemala through this
program.
Cuts to development and anti-corrup-
tion initiatives: Beyond border and deporta-
tion policy, U.S. foreign policy toward Guate-
mala since 2018 has focused on forcing the
Guatemalan government to stop migration
rather than supporting humanitarian and civil
society efforts to address the violence, impu-
nity, corruption, and poverty pushing Guate-
malans to migrate.32 This focus was evident
in the Trump administration’s effort to under-
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mine the International Commission against
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), the UN agen-
cy effectively combatting government corrup-
tion in that country.33 It is also evident in the
U.S. State Department’s reorientation of pro-
grams from the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) and Bureau of Interna-
tional Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
toward migration prevention,34 and its insis-
tence that foreign aid is contingent on imple-
menting an asylum cooperative agreement
(ACA) with the United States.35 Honduran and
Salvadoran asylum seekers returned under
an ACA in early 2020 filled the only migrant
shelter in Guatemala City, making it unable to
accommodate Guatemalan returnees.
Pre-COVID Policy Changes in
Mexico
Strict enforcement and inhumane
detention: Since 2014, Mexico has been
increasing its enforcement capacity on its
southern border with Belize and Guatemala.36
of-refugees-and-immigrants-may-undermine-impact/.
33. Colum Lynch, “Corrupt Guatemalans’ GOP Lifeline,” Foreign Policy, February 5, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2019/02/05/trump-republican-lawmakers-weaken-u-n-anti-corruption-commission-guatemala-jimmy-mo-
rales-white-house-putin/.
34. This reorientation is evident in the responses of Kirsten D. Madison, Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs, to questions by members of Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a September 25, 2019 hearing
on the migration crisis at the U.S. border: U.S. Policy in Mexico and Central America: Ensuring Effective Policies to Address the
Crisis at the Border: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing before the United States Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, September 25, 2019, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/us-policy-in-mexico-and-central-amer-
ica-ensuring-effective-policies-to-address-the-crisis-at-the-border.
35. Michael R. Pompeo, “United States Continues U.S. Foreign Assistance for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—
United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State, press statement, April 13, 2020, https://www.state.gov/unit-
ed-states-continues-u-s-foreign-assistance-for-el-salvador-guatemala-and-honduras/.
36. Clay Boggs, “Mexico’s Southern Border Plan: More Deportations and Widespread Human Rights Violations,” Washington
Office on Latin America (WOLA), March 19, 2015, https://www.wola.org/analysis/mexicos-southern-border-plan-more-deporta-
tions-and-widespread-human-rights-violations/.
37. Jeff Ernst and Kirk Semple, “Mexico Moves to Encourage Caravan Migrants to Stay and Work,” New York Times, January
25, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/25/world/americas/migrant-caravan-honduras-mexico.html.
38. Stephanie Eschenbacher, Miguel Angel Lopez, and Roberta Rampton, “Mexico Expects Relief on U.S. Tariff Threat as
Migrant Flows Drop,” Reuters, September 6, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-mexico/mexico-expects-
relief-on-u-s-tariff-threat-as-migrant-flows-drop-idUSKCN1VR1KC.
39. “The Comprehensive Development Plan Is an Innovative Proposal that Addresses the Structural Causes of Migration,
With a Focus on Growth, Equality and Environmental Sustainability,” United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), press release, January 15, 2020, https://www.cepal.org/en/pressreleases/comprehensive-devel-
opment-plan-innovative-proposal-addresses-structural-causes.
40. “México Refuerza La Presencia De La Guardia Nacional En La Frontera Sur Para Frenar La Migración,” Agencia EFE, July
4, 2019, https://www.efe.com/efe/usa/mexico/mexico-refuerza-la-presencia-de-guardia-nacional-en-frontera-sur-para-fre-
nar-migracion/50000100-4015529.
41. “Overcrowding, Abuse Seen at Mexico Migrant Detention Center,” Associated Press; NBCNews.com, June 17, 2019,
Although Andrés Manuel López Obrador
began his presidency with a welcoming
stance toward migrants,37 policies quickly
shifted toward stricter enforcement,
particularly after tariff threats from the
United States in the summer of 2019.38 The
Mexican government’s stance was that it
wanted to end the drivers of migration, and
it even launched a development program
with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador.
39 However, these initiatives have done
little to stem the flow of migrants, and the
government has moved its focus toward
enforcement. The Mexican government has
legislated significant policy shifts, militarizing
the southern border with the deployment of
the National Guard,40 issuing regulations that
prohibit bus companies from selling tickets
to undocumented migrants, and using force
to keep immigrant caravans from entering
the country. The Mexican National Migration
Institute (INM) holds migrants and asylum
seekers in “prison-like” enclosed settings
with overcrowded facilities, food scarcity,
and a lack of proper hygiene.41 Migrants
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have been detained for extended periods,
including children and other vulnerable
groups.42
Rapid deportation of children: Many Gua-
temalan children who migrate north for sur-
vival (fleeing extortion, poverty, and violence)
or to reunite with parents do not make it to
the United States. Instead, they are blocked
from accessing U.S. ports or detained further
south in Mexico and rapidly deported without
a substantive evaluation of their best inter-
ests or the dangers they could face upon
return. Civil society organizations that monitor
the human rights situation of migrants and
refugees in Tapachula reported that about 50
unaccompanied children who traveled with
the January 2019 caravan were detained by
migration officials and deported within 24
hours. Even if INM turns children over to the
Mexican child welfare agency, they receive
little help in applying for asylum, and most
best-interest determinations do not consider
the option of placing children with relatives in
the United States.43
Lack of funding for Mexico’s asylum sys-
tem: Mexico has adopted a broader refugee
definition than the United States and grants
a higher percentage of asylum applications.44
The overall 2019 asylum grant rates averaged
71 percent, according to the Mexican Com-
mission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR), but
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/overcrowding-abuse-seen-mexico-migrant-detention-center-n1018231.
42. The shelter for unaccompanied children in Quetzaltenango Guatemala told Refugees International in an interview that
some children were detained for 20 to 30 days in Mexico.
43. “The Invisible Wall: Obstacles to Protection for Unaccompanied Migrant Children Along Mexico’s Southern Border,” Kids
in Need of Defense, July 26, 2019, https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Tapachula-report-FINAL-7-26-19-002.
pdf; “Blocked from Safety: Unaccompanied Children Along the U.S.-Mexico Border,” Kids in Need of Defense, April 29, 2019,
https://supportkind.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Blocked-From-Safety-KIND-Border-Report-FINAL.pdf.
44. Asylum Access, “Mexican Asylum System for U.S. Immigration Lawyers FAQ,” November 2019, https://asylumaccess.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Mexican-Asylum-FAQ-for-US-Immigration-Lawyers.pdf.
45. “Mexican Asylum System.”
46. Asylum Access, “Mexican Asylum System.”
47. Boletín Estadístico Anual 2020, Secretaria de Gobernación, Mexico, http://www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx/es/PoliticaMigra-
toria/CuadrosBOLETIN?Anual=2020&Secc=.3.
48. Carrie Kahn, “Migrants In Mexico Face Crackdown, But Officials Say They’re Being ‘Rescued,’” National Public Radio,
January 29, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/01/29/800385857/migrants-in-mexico-face-crackdown-but-officials-say-theyre-
being-rescued.
49. “Overlooked, Under-Protected: Mexico’s Deadly Refoulement of Central Americans Seeking Asylum,” Amnesty Interna-
tional, January 2018, https://www.amnestyusa.org/reports/overlooked-under-protected-mexicos-deadly-refoulement-of-cen-
tral-americans-seeking-asylum/.
for Guatemalans this number is much lower,
at only 34 percent. In comparison, the rate for
Venezuelans was 99 percent.45 The restric-
tionist policies of the United States have
directly affected the Mexican asylum system,
contributing to a significant rise in asylum
claims in the last few years. The capacity of
the Mexican system is limited. It has not pro-
vided a commensurate budgetary increase to
process the applications. COMAR is severely
under-resourced—approximately 48 protec-
tion staff decided the cases of up to 80,000
asylum seekers in 2019.46
Increased deportations and “volun-
tary returns”: Although Mexico’s asylum
system is more generous than that of the
United States, its apprehension and return
numbers have been on the rise since June
2019.47 According to Mexican government
data, deportations from Mexico to Guatemala
appear low because the INM uses ambiguous
terminology to describe enforcement actions.
“Assisted returns” of Central Americans are,
in fact, deportations and not voluntary at all.48
Many Guatemalans who flee serious harm
have been dissuaded from pursuing their
legitimate asylum claims in Mexico because
of detention conditions and discouragement
by officials there. In Mexico, Guatemalans are
often returned before they have the chance
to make asylum claims.49
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While in Guatemala in February, Refugees In-
ternational interviewed recently returned asy-
lum seekers who had first-hand experience
with changing U.S. and Mexican enforcement
policies. Marco (a pseudonym) told us of
having fled his hometown in Peten in June
2019, fearful of violent retribution against him
and his pregnant wife after her family report-
ed a theft to the police. Upon reaching the
U.S. border, Marco was placed in the Remain
in Mexico program and his wife was allowed
to pursue her case from within the United
States. After three weeks of living on the
streets of Juarez, Marco went to Campeche
to find work. On his way back to Juarez to re-
port for his November hearing, INM detained
him. INM did not give him his MPP paperwork
when they released him from Villa Hermosa.
“I couldn’t travel north, and my only option
was to go home,” Marco said. He took a bus
to Peten. “I haven’t seen my wife and son.”
U.S. and Mexico Deportation
Policy Changes under
COVID-19
Since the March 20, 2020 order by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
invoking Title 42 of the Public Health Safety
Act, CBP has been refusing to accept protec-
tion requests and expelling asylum seekers at
50. “Indefinite Suspension of Protections for Asylum Seekers and Unaccompanied Children Under May 19, 2020 Order
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,” Refugees International, Advocacy Letter, May 27, 2020, https://www.
refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/5/27/indefinite-suspension-of-protections-for-asylum-seekers-and-unaccompanied-
children-under-may-19-2020-order-by-the-centers-for-disease-control-and-prevention.
51. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “U.S. Suspends Protections for Migrant Kids at Border, Expelling Hundreds amid Pandemic,” CBS
News, May 7, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-immigration-migrant-children-protections-border/. ; Hamed
Aleaziz, “A 16-Year-Old Boy Is Suing The Trump Administration, Claiming It’s Using The Pandemic As An Excuse To Deport
Him,” Buzzfeed News, June 10, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/hamedaleaziz/trump-admin-coronavirus-de-
port-children-asylum-lawsuit
52. “Citing Coronavirus, U.S. Won’t Release Migrant Kids,” Los Angeles Times, May 12, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/politics/
story/2020-05-12/trump-officials-coronavirus-refuse-releasing-migrant-kids.
53. Adolfo Flores, “Guatemalan Immigrants Are Caught Between ICE Detention or Deportation. Either Way, They Fear Getting
COVID-19,” Buzzfeed News, April 30, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adolfoflores/coronavirus-immigrants-gua-
temala-deported-ice-jail-covid19.
54. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “ICE Asked Migrant Parents Whether They Wished to Be Separated from their Children, Agency
Tells Court,” CBS News, May 17, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/ice-asked-migrant-parents-whether-they-wished-to-be-
separated-from-their-children-agency-tells-court/.
55. Kera Mallory Falk, “Asylum Seekers in Mexico Worry about Waiting Longer in Dangerous Conditions Due to
COVID-19,” Houston Public Media, April 28, 2020, https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/politics/immigra-
tion/2020/04/28/368196/asylum-seekers-in-mexico-worry-about-waiting-longer-in-dangerous-conditions-due-to-covid-19/.
the U.S. southern border, including Guatema-
lans. The order allows DHS to return asylum
seekers—including children—to Mexico or
deport them directly to their home countries
without any real screening regarding the
dangers they would face.50 Guatemalans
expelled by CBP are just pushed into Mexico
and left there with no support or help from
Mexican officials. CBP is expelling rather than
referring unaccompanied Central American
minors to the care of the ORR within the
Department of Health and Human Services as
required by the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act.51 Also, fewer Guatemalan
children are being released by the ORR to
sponsors in the United States; instead, they
are being deported; 417 minors were de-
ported from the United States to Guatemala
between March and early May.52
Many other Guatemalan migrants are in
a panicked limbo. Those in ICE custody
awaiting deportation worry that they will
be infected in detention or be quarantined
upon return.53 ICE has begun to ask asylum-
seeking parents currently detained with their
children in family detention centers to give
up custody in exchange for the children’s
release from detention.54 Guatemalans in
the Remain in Mexico program are waiting in
desperate circumstances.55 In April, Refugees
International spoke with Martin, a Guatemalan
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asylum seeker in the program, who was
waiting for his El Paso court hearing in Juarez
while living in a house with 15 others and
with little access to food. Martin’s situation
is not untypical of the thousands of asylum
seekers who must wait for months in northern
Mexico without security, means of support, or
adequate protection from COVID-19.56 Out of
desperation, many of these asylum seekers
in the Remain in Mexico program, as well
those being expelled, are trying to enter to
the United States undetected via remote and
perilous routes.57
In May, even when the Guatemalan
government suspended flights in response to
the arrival of returnees who tested positive
for COVID-19, it continued to accept flights
of unaccompanied minors and families and
individuals that the United States claimed
tested negative. Many of these individuals
nonetheless tested positive upon arrival in
Guatemala. 58 In June, Guatemala resumed
acceptance of flights with less than 50
people aboard.59
Guatemala called on the Mexican
government to halt deportations in early
March, but assisted returns continue, as
do unregulated voluntary returns. Since
the pandemic began, Mexico has returned
56. Jasmine Aguilera, “Many Asylum Seekers in Mexico Can’t Get U.S. Court Hearings Until 2021. A Coronavirus Outbreak
Could ‘Devastate’ Them,” Time, May 19, 2020, https://time.com/5830807/asylum-seekers-coronavirus-mpp/.
57. Camilo Montoyo-Galvez, “U.S. Ramps Up Mass Expulsions of Migrants as Border Crossings Rise,” CBS News, June 13,
2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-ramps-up-mass-expulsions-migrants-border-crossings-rise-coronavirus-restrictions/.
58. Sonia Perez D., “More Guatemalans Deported from US Test Positive for Virus,” Associated Press, May 18, 2020, https://ap-
news.com/a16adc250c399aaa3a360c44de26c877; Madan and Charles, “ICE Has Been Testing Migrants before Deportation”;
Sonia Perez D., “Guatemala President Fumes over Infected Deportees from US,” Associated Press, May 21, 2020, https://ap-
news.com/6d7909336525780f3b21f10a7928cb04.
59. “U.S. Resumes Deportation Flights to Guatemala,” Time, June 10, 2020, https://time.com/5851118/guatemala-deporta-
tions-u-s-immigration/
60. INM,“INM da seguimiento a las medidas cautelares.”
61. Paula Dupraz-Dobias, “Coronavirus in Guatemala Compounds a Long List of Problems,” The New Humanitarian, May 4,
2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2020/05/04/coronavirus-Guatemala-violence-drought-poverty.
62. Sofia Menchu, “Cuatro Adolescentes Guatemaltecos Dan Positivo a Coronavirus Tras Ser Deportados de México,” Reu-
ters, May 7, 2020, https://lta.reuters.com/articulo/salud-coronavirus-guatemala-inmigracion-idLTAKBN22J395.
63. https://twitter.com/palabrasdeabajo/status/1272712839954944002?s=20
64. Maria Verza, Elliot Spagat, and Astrid Galvan, “EEUU y México Cierran Paso a Solicitantes Asilo por COVID-19,” Associat-
ed Press, April 9, 2020, https://apnews.com/44ccc46fb18944b5b80ce5953f061b2d.
65. Marcos González Díaz, “Coronavirus en Guatemala: Los Contagios de Covid-19 Entre Migrantes Que Llevaron Al País a
Suspender los Vuelos de Deportados Desde EE.UU,” BBC News Mundo, April 21, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noti-
cias-america-latina-52364025.
nearly 5,000 Central Americans back to
their home countries.60 Mexican officials only
take deportees’ temperatures but do not
test for COVID-19.61 The number of people
who returned of their own accord is likely
far higher. As of May 20, four adolescents
deported from Mexico tested positive for
COVID-19.62 On June 15, 40 Guatemalan
migrants were deported from Mexico.63
However, migration experts in Guatemala
state that there are many voluntary returns
from Mexico who do not pass through
authorized border points. Recent reports
claim that Mexican officials have even
encouraged Central Americans to return
home via irregular routes.64 Many people
are returning to their communities and not
being quarantined.65 For example, Salvadoran
and Honduran migrants are passing through
Guatemala on their way back home without
any screenings.
Although deportations continue,
Guatemalans can still seek asylum in
Mexico during the pandemic; there are
limitations, however. COMAR briefly halted
accepting applications in March but has
resumed accepting and processing claims.
Hundreds of people are applying each
week despite the pandemic, attesting to
the fact that those fleeing persecution have
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no choice but to cross a border to seek
refuge. 66 Unfortunately, COMAR’s hours are
inconsistent, and it is issuing only a limited
number of the identification cards needed for
access to health care.67
Upon return to Guatemalan, deportees and
returnees face heightened levels of pover-
ty and food insecurity.68 As one indigenous
teenager rapidly deported from the U.S.
border said, “I didn’t get the opportunity to
say why I was coming” and now “we owe a
big debt.”69 By early June, Guatemala’s public
hospitals were overwhelmed by COVID-19
cases,70 and flooding from a tropical storm
was causing extensive displacement within
the country.
Protection Concerns
in Guatemala upon
Return
Guatemalans who fled violence, crime, and
persecution, and were unable to receive
international protection, may face the same
or exacerbated protection concerns upon re-
turn. Other Guatemalans may have legitimate
fears for their security and safety when they
go home because returnees are at greater
risk of being targets of violence and extortion.
Although there are government and civil soci-
66. “Death Threats Drive Refugees to Flee Coronavirus Lockdown,” Relief Web, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, April
28, 2020, https://reliefweb.int/report/mexico/death-threats-drive-refugees-flee-coronavirus-lockdown.
67. “Interview with Rosi Siu.”
68. Jeff Abbott, “Guatemala’s White Flags Indicate Pandemic’s Deadly Side Effect: Hunger,” The Guardian, May 22, 2
020, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/may/22/guatemala-white-flags-hunger-coronavirus.
69. Camilo Montoya-Galvez, “Citing Coronavirus, the U.S. Is Swiftly Deporting Unaccompanied Migrant Children,” CBS News,
March 30, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-us-swiftly-deporting-unaccompanied-migrant-children-cit-
ing-covid-19/.
70. Elsa Coronado, “Zulma Calderón, PDH: ‘El 90 % De Los Pacientes Con COVID Nunca Debieron Ser Hospitalizados,’”
Plaza Publica, May 30, 2020, https://plazapublica.com.gt/content/zulma-calderon-pdh-el-90-de-los-pacientes-con-covid-nun-
ca-debieron-ser-hospitalizados.
71. “Salienda Adelante: Why Migrants Risk It All,” Creative Associates International, accessed June 8, 2020, http://www.cre-
ativeassociatesinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Migration-Study-Brief.pdf.
72. Chris Dalby, “Gang Presence in Guatemala City,” InSight Crime, April 26, 2019, https://www.insightcrime.org/investigations/
extortion-gang-presence-in-guatemala-city/.
ety organizations that provide integration and
support services for returnees, offering pro-
tection against crime, violence, gender-based
violence, and discrimination is outside of the
mandate of these organizations. Corruption,
high levels of violence and extortion, and a
lack of accountability in government and in-
stitutions all contribute to a fragile protection
ecosystem that often does not afford return-
ees the ability to reintegrate safely. These
challenges are only compounded during the
pandemic.
Crime
Guatemalans migrate to Mexico and the Unit-
ed States for a complex mix of reasons, but
crime and insecurity often play an important
role in their decision to leave.71 Returning to
Guatemala can amplify vulnerability to crime;
extortionists, gang members, and narco-traf-
fickers target returned Guatemalans because
criminals perceive them to have money due
to their ability to migrate and their time spent
working abroad.
Returned Guatemalans are especially
vulnerable to crimes at the airport because
gang presence is more prevalent in
Guatemala City than in other areas of the
country.72 Deportees from the United States
stand out; most arrive without shoelaces and
carrying plastic bags given to them while in
CBP custody. Exiting the airport is chaotic—
the presence of many taxis, buses, money
exchangers, and families of returned often
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cause crimes to go unnoticed. Outside of the
airport, the Guatemalan government provides
transport to the north and south bus terminals
for leaving Guatemala City. Both terminals
are in areas of the city with elevated crime
rates.73 Returned Guatemalans must pay
for their bus fare; returnees described to
Refugees International that those who have
no money to get back to their hometowns
have to beg on the street.74
The risks do not abate once returned
Guatemalans arrive in their hometowns.
Refugees International spoke with one
Guatemalan who returned to his town
and attempted to start a business. He was
robbed repeatedly, extorted, and threatened.
He claimed the extortionists targeted him
because they knew he had returned from
the United States with money. Stories
like this one are not unique; Refugees
International spoke with multiple individuals
and organizations about the pervasiveness
of extortion. In Guatemala City, one returnee
organization had to move several returned
Guatemalans because their businesses were
being extorted. Extortion is one of the most
prevalent crimes in Guatemala.75 Gangs
commit some of it, but a growing number of
extortions originate in prisons,76 revealing
just how little control the police system has
over this crime—or their complicity in it.
Low-level corruption and impunity make it
difficult to report crimes or receive justice. In
2018, Guatemala had a 97.6 percent impunity
73. Dalby, “Gang Presence in Guatemala City.”
74. Refugees International interviewed a deportee who begged for days before getting enough money to board a bus north.
75. “Study: Over 63,000 Victims of Extortion in Guatemala,” teleSUR English, June 28, 2019, https://www.telesurenglish.net/
news/Study-Reports-Over-63000-Victims-of-Extortion-in-Guatemala-20190628-0018.html.
76. Phoebe Studdert-Kennedy, “Half of Extortion Calls in Guatemala Are Made from One Prison,” InSight Crime, December
30, 2019, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/extortion-calls-guatemala-prison/.
77. “Sistema Integrado De Justicia” (CICIG), accessed June 4, 2020, https://www.cicig.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Pre-
sentacion_GIZ_SIJ_2019.pdf.
78. Tristan Clavel, “Copycat Extortionists: Guatemala’s Criminal Chancers,” Insight Crime, April 30, 2019, https://www.insight-
crime.org/investigations/copycat-extortionists-guatemalas-criminal-chancers/
79. Clavel, “Copycat Extortionists.”
80. Clavel, Copycat Extortionists.”
81. “World Factbook: Guatemala,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed June 5, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/geos/print_gt.html.
82. “WFP Guatemala Country Brief, December 2019—Guatemala,” ReliefWeb, World Food Programme, February 6, 2020,
https://reliefweb.int/report/guatemala/wfp-guatemala-country-brief-december-2019.
rate for all crimes.77 In 2017, Guatemalans
filed nearly 8,400 extortion complaints, but
the courts handed down fewer than 700
convictions.78
Most Guatemalans cite corruption as the
major challenge confronting the governance
of their country. For years, CICIG, a unique
joint UN-Guatemalan mechanism, made
significant headway in battling government
corruption. In 2019, however, then-President
Jimmy Morales dissolved the CICIG with help
from the Trump administration, which with-
drew support for the initiative. The ousting
of CICIG marked a downward turn in govern-
ment accountability and any confidence the
Guatemalan people may have had that things
would get better.
Discrimination and
Mistreatment of Women and
Indigenous Groups
Most Guatemalans who migrate to the United
States and Mexico are from the western high-
lands area of the country79 where the largest
populations of indigenous people live.80 The
Guatemalan government and mainstream
society systematically exclude indigenous
people in Guatemala. 79 percent of indige-
nous people live in poverty and 40 percent
of them are in extreme poverty.81 One-third of
the rural population faces food insecurity.82
Guatemalans who have left farming commu-
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nities say that they “barely eat” at home.83
Returned indigenous migrants cite additional
barriers to reintegration in their communities,
such as loss of cultural practices, restruc-
turing of community dynamics,84 and loss of
language.85
Although Mayan languages are a corner-
stone of their culture, they are also a basis
for exclusion from public and social services.
For example, at the unaccompanied minors’
shelter in Quetzaltenango, counselors pro-
vide psychological services in Spanish, but
many children who return and desperately
need counseling speak Mam, Ki’ché, or other
Mayan languages. Organizations like Asoci-
ación IDEI86 provide volunteers who speak
Mayan languages to facilitate counseling, but
they are not a solution for a lack of indige-
nous psychologists, social workers, doctors,
and other professionals.
Indigenous communities are dispropor-
tionately excluded from social services and
access to the rule of law, and also are dispro-
portionately victims of human rights viola-
tions.87 Because of this discrimination, de-
ported and returned indigenous people are
83. Nomaan Merchant and Sonia Perez D., “Trump Ramps Up Expulsions of Migrant Youth, Citing Virus,” Associated Press,
May 13, 2020, https://apnews.com/b64523bed9c1ed15c6185b37896bd586.
84. According to interviews conducted with Asociación Pop No’j.
85. According to interviews conducted with Colectivo Vida Digna and Asociación IDEI.
86. Asociación IDEI (website), accessed June 8, 2020, https://www.asociacionidei.org/.
87. Maria Martin, “Killings Of Guatemala’s Indigenous Activists Raise Specter Of Human Rights Crisis,” National Public Radio,
January 22, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/01/22/685505116/killings-of-guatemalas-indigenous-activists-raise-specter-of-hu-
man-rights-crisis.
88. “2018 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala,” U.S. Department of State, Section 6., Discrimination,
Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons, April 29, 2019, https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-hu-
man-rights-practices/guatemala/.
89. “Misión,” Asociación Pop No’j (website), accessed June 8, 2020, https://www.asociacionpopnoj.org/mision/.
90. “A Dignified Life in Guatemala,” Vida Digna ,2017, https://www.vidadignaguatemala.org/.
91. Lizbeth Gramajo Bauer, “’Otra Vez a Lo Mismo’”: Migración De Retorno y Procesos De Reintegración En El Altiplano Occi-
dental De Guatemala (Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landívar, Editorial Cara Parens, 2019), p. 51; states that between 2008
and 2018, nearly 300,00 Guatemalans were deported to the western highlands of Guatemala.
92. Gramajo Bauer, “’Otra Vez a Lo Mismo.’”
93. Priscila Molina, “WFP Guatemala Country Brief,” World Food Programme, December 2019, https://docs.wfp.org/api/docu-
ments/WFP-0000112440/download/?_ga=2.61276972.1660492243.1587577490-1861731502.1587577490.
94. “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala,” U.S. Department of State, accessed June 5, 2020, https://
www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/guatemala/.
95. “2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Guatemala.”
96. Ana Landa Ugarte, Elizabeth Salazar, Magali Quintana, and Raul Molina Herrera, “USAID/Guatemala Gender Analysis Final
Report September 2018,” USAID, September 14, 2018, https://banyanglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/USAID-Guate-
mala-Gender-Analysis-Final-Report.pdf.
less likely to receive social support from the
government or help from the state if they are
victims of crime.88 Asociación Pop No’j89 and
Colectivo Vida Digna90 are returnee organi-
zations that provide reintegration services for
returned indigenous Guatemalans while con-
sidering their cultural heritage, language, and
community roles. These support services are
critical for returned indigenous migrants but
have limited reach compared to the number
of indigenous deportees and returnees who
arrive each day.91
Women and girls also face discrimination and
violence in Guatemala. Although Guatemalan
law establishes the principle of gender equal-
ity and criminalizes discrimination,92 Guate-
mala has the highest gender inequality index
in the region.93 Women experience soaring
rates of sexual violence,94 exclusion from po-
litical and economic participation,95 and rigid
gender norms96 that can prevent them from
engaging in certain types of work or attend-
ing school. In 2017, gender-based violence
(GBV) was the most reported crime, which
overwhelmed the Guatemalan courts’ ability
to provide justice to women who experience
GBV as there were not enough prosecutors
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to handle the high caseload.97 Indigenous
women experience intersectional discrimi-
nation for their ethnicity and gender. Women
and girls who left Guatemala because of
violence and gender discrimination find it
difficult to reintegrate safely into Guatemalan
society because of these pervasive structural
barriers.
In Quetzaltenango, Refugees International
spoke with Maria, an indigenous woman
with little formal education who was a victim
of domestic violence perpetrated by her
partner. After her sister migrated to the
United States, Maria started a small business
weaving traditional Mayan clothing. Like
many of those with relatives in the United
States and successful small businesses,
Maria was targeted repeatedly for extortion.
The extortion escalated to kidnapping
when her adolescent daughter was held for
ransom. After her release, the extortion calls
continued, the police were of no help, and
two women in her town were abducted and
never returned. For these reasons, Maria
and her children left Guatemala to seek
asylum in the United States in early 2019.
Maria’s eldest daughter was allowed into the
United States to make an asylum claim, but
the U.S. government placed Maria and her
two younger children in the MPP program
in Tijuana. After a man threatened Maria
and her children, they felt too unsafe to wait
there, and so abandoned their asylum claim
and returned to Guatemala. Although Maria’s
return appeared voluntary, she left Tijuana
because of insecurity and a sense of fear
for her and her children’s safety. Back in
Guatemala, she still feels unsafe and has had
to change her phone number and address
to avoid threats. She is a target for crime
because of her gender and being a returnee
with a successful weaving business. She
worries daily that her estranged and abusive
97. “Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala,” Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, December 31, 2017, https://www.
oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Guatemala2017-en.pdf.
98. Introduction, Lauren Heidbrink, Migranthood: Youth in a New Era of Deportation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
2020).
ex-husband will find out where she lives,
and that she will have nowhere to turn if he
finds her. She cannot reunite with her older
daughter in the United States and lives in fear
that something will happen to her and her
younger children in Guatemala, or that her
ex-husband will find and hurt her.
Increased Vulnerability for
Children
Over the last decade, the number of
Guatemalan children deported from the
United States and Mexico has increased
nine-fold. The vast majority are indigenous
youth from communities in the highlands
and along the Mexican-Guatemalan border.
Their average age is 14.5 years old. Most
left Guatemala for survival (fleeing extortion,
poverty, and violence), and a significant
percentage traveled north to reunite with
family in the United States. 98
Children returned to Guatemala from the
United States and Mexico by plane are bused
by the Guatemalan Secretariat of Social
Welfare from the airport in Guatemala City
to a nearby government-run shelter, where
they are screened by social workers and
picked up by guardians. Those not picked
up become wards of the state. Refugio de
La Ninez, a shelter, helps in cases involving
children who cannot be returned to abusive
homes and those involving returned pregnant
teens or young mothers. Asociación Pop
No’j conducts follow-up visits with families of
returned children, providing them with funds
for necessities and counseling. This follow-up
is crucial because of a rise in suicide among
this population of returnees.
Children deported from southern Mexico
are bused to Casa Raices, a shelter in
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Maria and her younger daughter walking
through the main square in Salcajá. Photo by
Refugees International.
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Quazteltnango, where their parents pick
them up. In February 2020, Casa Raices
received about 100 children, mostly 15- and
16-year-olds, on two buses each week. Many
of the children are traumatized or sick from
having spent a month or more in detention
in Mexico, deprived of sufficient showers
and food. The director of social work at
the shelter told Refugees International that
about 30 percent of returnees had parents in
the United States and 10 percent had been
neglected, abandoned, or abused.
Some children also are unable to return to
school. The Guatemalan Education Ministry
has passed a regulation allowing returned
children to reenter school at any time. How-
99. Karen Musalo and Pablo Ceriani Cernadas, Childhood and Migration in Central and North America: Causes, Policies,
Practices and Challenges (San Francisco, CA: University of California Hastings College of the Law, Center for Gender & Ref-
ugee Studies, 2015). P. 155-6 https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Childhood_Migration_HumanRights_FullBook_En-
glish.pdf
100. Alejandra Argueta et al., “The Realities of Returning Home: Youth Repatriation in Guatemala” (Wilson Center Latin Amer-
ica Program, June 2015), p. 23-25, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/Guatema-
la%20Repatriation_June%202015-%20FINAL.pdf.
101. ibid, Lizbeth Gramajo Bauer, p. 86
ever, under-resourced local schools often do
not have enough spaces to accommodate
all children, especially in the western high-
lands.99 Few teenagers see the benefit of
finishing high school, given the lack of at-
tainable jobs and higher education in Guate-
mala.100 Some returned Guatemalan children
received public high school education for
free in the United States and face the disap-
pointment that school may no longer be an
option in Guatemala.101
Many children with parents in the United
States return to live with their extended fam-
ilies. Although returnees who receive remit-
tances from parents in the United States may
have a higher standard of living compared to
Casa Nuestras Raices is one of only two government run shelters operated by the Secretariat of Social
Welfare for returned unaccompanied minors in Guatemala. This shelter in Quetzaltenango receives chil-
dren deported from Mexico by land. Photo by: Refugees International.
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those not receiving them, returnee children
may re-migrate because they want more than
financial help—they want to be with their
parents.
Socioeconomic
Barriers to
Integration
Protection concerns are typically accompa-
nied by socioeconomic constraints that all
Guatemalan returnees face. Government
services aimed at assisting returned Guate-
malans focus heavily on reception, not rein-
tegration services.102 Returned Guatemalans
face a myriad of challenges upon return, and
each experience is unique. Yet before the
COVID-19 pandemic, returned Guatemalans
typically faced barriers to economic integra-
tion and health services, and lacked family
support. These challenges have been com-
pounded during the pandemic.
Barriers to Economic
Integration
Migrants often take out loans for paying
smugglers to take them through Mexico
to the United States.103 Many turn to high-
interest loans from unregulated actors, such
102. The Guatemalan Migration Institute (IGM for its acronym in Spanish) registers deportees arriving by air from Mexico and
the United States in Guatemala City and Tecun Uman for returnees arriving via land from Mexico. In Guatemala City, the IGM
transports families and children to shelters operated by the Secretary of Social Welfare (SBS), which provides psychological
support, shelter, humanitarian care, and medical screenings. The SBS also receives unaccompanied minors from Mexico in
Quetzaltenango and provides similar services to those in Guatemala City. Single adults who arrive in Guatemala City can
access limited government services, such as a cursory medical screening at the airport, an arrival orientation, and transport to
bus terminals for migrants not from Guatemala City.
103. Kevin Sieff, “The Migrant Debt Cycle,” The Washington Post, November 4, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/2019/11/04/migrant-debt-cycle/?arc404=true.
104. Lauren Heidbrink, “The Coercive Power of Debt: Migration and Deportation of Guatemalan Indigenous Youth,” The Jour-
nal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology 24, no. 1 (March 2019): pp. 263–281, https://doi.org/10.1111/jlca.12385.
105. Heidbrink, “Coercive Power of Debt.”
106. Corroborated in Lizbeth Gramajo Bauer, “Otra Vez lo Mismo.”
107. Gramajo Bauer, “’Otra Vez a Lo Mismo.’”
as moneylenders and cooperatives, and use
land, homes, vehicles, or goods as collateral.
104 If they return, they may come back with
significant debt and limited options to pay
it off.105 Organizations that work to provide
services to returned indigenous Guatemalans
in the western highlands told Refugees
International that debt increases the chances
of re-migrating because deportees in debt
can pay it off through a higher-paying job in
the United States.106
Finding a job can be very difficult upon
return.107 Several organizations facilitate labor
market integration for returnees in Guatemala
City and the highlands. Multistakeholder
initiatives such as Guate te Incluye provide
skills trainings and certifications to migrants
who gained technical skills abroad, such
as culinary services or construction. They
also link returned Guatemalans to jobs in
the private sector. In addition, Guate te
Incluye works to provide loans to returned
migrants because it is difficult for them to
get a formal loan to start a business. Such
loans are especially important because
there are no legal services available to help
returnees recover property left in the United
States. Many returnees quickly sell off their
property at low prices before leaving and
have little capital upon arrival in Guatemala.
Other organizations like Te Conecta connect
returned Guatemalans to meaningful job
opportunities, which can take anywhere
from a few weeks to months, depending on
the skills and language level of the returned
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migrant. Employers are sometimes hesitant to
hire returned migrants because they fear the
latter will migrate again;108 this perception can
negatively affect migrants’ job search.
Organizations providing support can
increase returned Guatemalans’ chances
of overcoming barriers to work. These
organizations are few, however, and suffer
from resource constraints that limit their
scope and effectiveness. There is no shelter
where returned Guatemalans can stay
while looking for work in Guatemala City.
Though Te Connecta works with government
partners, it does very little to help returnees
find work. “I don’t know what CONAMIGUA
(Consejo National de Atencion al Migrante
de Guatemala) does and I never heard of any
returnee getting a job at the Labor Ministry,” a
Te Conecta representative said.
USAID has set up “stay here” centers in
Guatemala City and elsewhere to promote
reintegration of returned Guatemalan teens,109
but a large number of young returnees
fall through the cracks. At the airport in
Guatemala City, Refugees International met
Jaime, a young man in his early twenties
who had lived in Oklahoma with his family for
more than a decade, although they arrived in
the United States too late for him to qualify
for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA). He had been arrested for unpaid
parking tickets, transferred to ICE custody,
and granted voluntary departure. He did not
know anyone in Guatemala City.
108. According to an interview with Te Conecta, February 2020.
109. Kevin Sieff, “The Stay Here Center,” The Washington Post, April 19, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/
wp/2019/04/19/feature/this-school-aims-to-keep-young-guatemalans-from-migrating-they-dont-know-its-funded-by-the-u-s-
government/.
110. “Guatemala: Health and Nutrition,” USAID, USAID, August 30, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov/guatemala/health-nutrition.
111. Benemérito Comité Prociegos y Sordos, “Prevención de la Ceguera,” accessed June 9, 2020, https://www.prociegosysor-
dos.org.gt/.
112. Salil Shetty, “Most Dangerous Journey: What Central American Migrants Face When They Try to Cross the Border,”
Amnesty International USA, February 20, 2014, https://www.amnestyusa.org/most-dangerous-journey-what-central-american-
migrants-face-when-they-try-to-cross-the-border/.
113. “Mental Health: Central American Refugee Health Profile,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department
Health Care
Poor-quality health care is a less common
but nevertheless significant reason some
Guatemalans migrate and, according to
Asociación Pop No’j, is a determining factor
in preventing re-migration. The health care
of poor and indigenous Guatemalans is
the worst in the hemisphere because of
limited resources, infrastructure, personnel,
and inadequate supplies of medicines and
materials.110
Refugees International spoke with Martin,
a returned Guatemalan, whose reasons for
migrating included worries about the health
of his son Juan, who had lost vision in one
eye following a head injury. Juan went to a
reputable hospital111 in Guatemala City and
underwent two operations, but his injury
required specialized care not available in
Guatemala. Martin and Juan left to go to
the United States and, like Maria who fled
because of crime, were also placed in the
MPP program. They returned to Guatemala
because of the dire shelter conditions in
Mexico but went back to Juarez to attend
their court date.
Furthermore, migration introduces health
issues that persist upon return. Sexual
assault, robbery, kidnapping, and abuse
sadly are all too commonplace for many
migrants who travel through Mexico.112 The
need for mental health care upon return
is essential, but the psychological support
services nongovernmental organizations
provide are not a replacement for long-term
care.113 Asociación IDEI reported a case of a
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boy who was trafficked and sexually abused
during his travel to the United States. He
contracted HIV because of the abuse he
endured. He now lives with intense stigma
because of the nature of his abuse and the
virus he contracted. He needs HIV treatment
and counseling to process the prior trauma
and current stigma, but access to treatment
in Guatemala is low—only 43 percent114 of
HIV-positive people in Guatemala are on
antiretroviral treatment.
Compounded
Challenges during
the COVID-19
Pandemic
The COVID-19 pandemic poses unprecedent-
ed and urgent concerns for returning Guate-
malans, and exacerbates the existing vulnera-
bilities laid out in the previous section.
Guatemala has confirmed 10,272 cases of
COVID-19, 115 186 of which are Guatemalans
deported by the United States.116 The country
is ill equipped to handle a rise in COVID-19
cases, and many gaps can be seen in the
government response to date.
For all Guatemalans, and especially those
returning, a major vulnerability during the
of Health and Human Services, January 25, 2017, https://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/profiles/central-american/
health-information/mental-health/index.html.
114. “Guatemala,” UNAIDS, December 8, 2016, https://www.unaids.org/en/regionscountries/countries/guatemala.
115. Coronavirus Resource Center, John Hopkins University. Accessed June 16, 2020. https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html
116. “U.S. Resumes Deportation Flights to Guatemala,” Time, June 10, 2020, https://time.com/5851118/guatemala-deporta-
tions-u-s-immigration/
117. Asociación Pop No’j, “El Grupo Articulador de la Sociedad Civil en Materia Migratoria de Guatemala, Organizaciones
Sociales y Personas Individuales ante la Deportación de Estados Unidos de Migrantes durante la Propagación del COVID-19,”
March 26, 2020, https://www.asociacionpopnoj.org/el-grupo-articulador-de-la-sociedad-civil-en-materia-migratoria-de-guate-
mala-organizaciones-sociales-y-personas-individuales-ante-la-deportacion-desde-estados-unidos-y-mexico-de-personas-mi-
grantes-du/.
118. Abbott, “White Flags.”
119. Abbott, “White Flags.”
120. Abbott, “White Flags.”
121. Abbott, “White Flags.”
lockdown is an inability to cope with the fi-
nancial burden.117 As social distancing contin-
ues, Guatemalans who work in the informal
economy and in agriculture and temporary
work, will be affected negatively, like many
returning to the country. Although the Gua-
temalan Congress approved an emergency
stimulus of 1,000 quetzals (roughly $130) and
food boxes to roughly 2 million people, as of
May 22, many poor Guatemalans say they
still have not received any support.118
The World Bank predicts that even more
Guatemalans will fall into poverty.119 Returned
Guatemalans already encounter difficulties in
finding work, and the pandemic will extend
this job insecurity for a longer period. Re-
porting from Guatemala shows the suffering
already underway. Guatemalans across the
country hang flags outside their windows
in different colors to signal they need help.
White flags mean hunger; red is for medicine;
black, yellow, or blue means that a woman,
child, or elderly person is in danger of vio-
lence.120
For rural and indigenous communities, the
impact could be much worse. Although the
Guatemalan government is promoting hand
washing campaigns, the message falls flat for
rural and indigenous Guatemalans who do
not have necessities like potable water.121 It is
encouraging that the government has trans-
lated these campaigns into Mayan languages
so indigenous communities have access to
information, but deep inequalities in access
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to necessities still prevail. Throughout Gua-
temala, the availability of hospital beds and
equipment,122 and the number of physicians,
is low.123 Some indigenous people worry that
their understaffed health centers will not be
prepared for the virus.124 Food insecurity is
also a challenge in rural areas; the World
Food Program predicts the number of food
insecure people in the world will double
under COVID-19.125 This staggering increase
could be true for Guatemala as well.
Women who live in a situation of domestic
violence are in more danger during this time.
Rates of violence against women are on the
rise in Latin America,126 and economic stress-
ors and limited freedom of movement will
affect levels of violence.
For deported Guatemalans who have arrived
on flights carrying a person tested positive
for COVID-19, the Guatemalan government
has failed to provide suitable places for them
to quarantine. The government has isolated
Guatemalans exposed to the virus in places
without adequate support for social distanc-
ing or humanitarian care. In April 2020, the
government placed roughly 234 Guatemalan
deportees in quarantine in the Ramiro de
122. Arturo Wallace, “Coronavirus: Qué Capacidad Tienen Realmente Los Países De América Latina Para Hacer Frente a La
Epidemia De Covid-19,” BBC News Mundo, March 23, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-51916767.
123. “Healthcare Access and Conditions in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador,” Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion, U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, January 25, 2017, https://www.cdc.gov/immigrantrefugeehealth/profiles/
central-american/healthcare-diet/index.html;
Jeff Abbott, “Fears Grip Guatemala’s Indigenous Groups as Coronavirus Sets In,” Al Jazeera, April 16, 2020, https://www.alja-
zeera.com/news/2020/04/fears-grip-guatemala-indigenous-groups-coronavirus-sets-200416165256449.html.
124. Abbott, “Fears.”
125. “COVID-19 Will Double Number of People Facing Food Crises Unless Swift Action Is Taken,” World Food Programme,
April 21, 2020, https://www.wfp.org/news/covid-19-will-double-number-people-facing-food-crises-unless-swift-action-taken.
126. Megan Janetsky, “Violence against Women Up Amid Latin America COVID-19 Lockdowns,” Al Jazeera, April 20, 2020,
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/violence-women-surges-latam-coronavirus-quarantines-200420020748668.html.
127. Sofia Menchu, “Deported from U.S., Guatemalans Fear Infection in Mass Quarantine,” Reuters, April 18, 2020, https://
uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-guatemala-idUKKBN2200WW.
128. David Toro Escobar, “3 guatemaltecos deportados de Texas el pasado lunes dieron positivo por #Covid_19 según
datos de Eduardo Woltke defensor de la PDH,” Twitter, April 15, 2020, 9:51 a.m., https://twitter.com/DavidToroEscob1/sta-
tus/1250421607048155139.
129. Coronado, “Zulma Calderon.”
130. Coronado, “Zulma Calderon.”
131. Telemundo, “Terrible: Amenazan Con Quemar a Decenas De Deportados En Guatemala,” Telemundo 52, April 16,
2020, https://www.telemundo52.com/fotosyvideos/terrible-amenazan-con-quemar-a-decenas-de-deportados-en-guatema-
la/2072196/.
132. Jeff Abbott, “Unwelcomed in US—and at Home: Deported Guatemalans Face Threats,” Al Jazeera, April 27, 2020, https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/04/unwelcomed-home-deported-guatemalans-face-threats-200427143917256.html.
Leon Carpio sports complex, a few blocks
from the Guatemala City airport.127 Other
returned Guatemalans have been isolated in
the Guatemalan airport.128 The Guatemalan
government is hospitalizing patients who are
sick with the virus, even if they do not have
serious symptoms.129 The Guatemalan Human
Rights Ombudsman’s office states that this
policy is contributing to a near collapse of
hospital systems in the country.130
The stigma associated with deportation has
intensified and worsened now that many
returned Guatemalans have tested positive
for COVID-19. In Quetzaltenango, community
members have threatened to burn deport-
ees131 who they believed were infected with
COVID-19. Returned Guatemalans cited fear
of discrimination or violence following quar-
antine.132
Conclusion
During the COVID -19 crisis, the United States
and Mexico should institute a temporary
moratorium on deportations and returns,
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eliminate barriers Guatemalans face in
seeking asylum, and ensure that children and
adults are not unnecessarily detained. The
Guatemalan government should seek to ease
the vulnerabilities of deportees by providing
them with more comprehensive reintegration
services and access to proper safeguards
during the pandemic.
But Mexican and U.S. policies jeopardizing
the safety of Guatemalans long precede the
COVID-19 crisis. And, on June 15, 2020 the
Trump administration proposed a regulation
that would make it all but impossible for
Guatemalan fleeing domestic violence or
attempted recruitment or extortion by gangs
to gain refuge in the United States long after
pandemic recedes. The rule explicitly denies
eligibility for asylum to those who pass
through a third country or claim they fear
being specifically targeted for persecution in
Guatemala because they are returnees from
the United States.133
Policies that address protection needs rather
than exacerbate them require humanity,
political will, and flexibility to achieve. Now
more than ever, policymakers must ensure
that Guatemalans fleeing harm have access
to refuge in the United States and Mexico and
that Guatemalan returnees have access to
safety, healthcare, and economic opportunity.
133. “Procedures for Asylum and Witholding of Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review,” Federal Register, 85.115,
June 15, 2020, 36279, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/06/15/2020-12575/procedures-for-asylum-and-with-
holding-of-removal-credible-fear-and-reasonable-fear-review.
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About
the
Authors
Yael SchacheR is the senior U.S. advocate at Refugees
International, where she focuses on U.S. asylum, U.S. refugee
admissions, temporary protected status, and humanitarian visas.
Follow her on Twitter: @YaelSchacher.
Rachel Schmidtke is the advocate for Latin America at
Refugees International. Follow her on Twitter: @r_schmidtke.
About
Refugees
international
Refugees International advocates for lifesaving assistance and
protection for displaced people and promotes solutions to
displacement crises around the world. We do not accept any
government or UN funding, ensuring the independence and
credibility of our work.
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1800 M Street NW
Suite 405N
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 828 0110
Fax: (202) 828 0819
Email: ri@refintl.org
Twitter: @RefugeesIntl
Instagram: @RefugeesIntl
Facebook: Refugees International
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Justsecurity.org
Biden’s Embrace of Trump’s Transit Ban
Violates US Legal and Moral Refugee
Obligations
by Karen Musalo
February 8, 2023
The Biden administration is poised to resurrect a Trump-era policy, the transit ban,
which in its most recent form was repeatedly struck down by the courts as unlawful. The
new transit ban, the subject of a notice of proposed rulemaking, would create a
“rebuttable presumption of asylum ineligibility” for individuals arriving at the southern
border who have not sought “protection in a country through which they traveled” on
their journey, “unless they meet exceptions that will be specièed.” The announcement of
the imminent policy change drew quick condemnation in a letter from members of
Congress, as well as in separate letters from faith-based and civil rights and human
rights organizations.
The new transit ban would violate the United States’ protection obligations to refugees,
which are long-standing and solidly based in both international and domestic law. The
United States acceded in 1968 to the Refugee Protocol, which incorporates the
substantive provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention. With congressional passage of
the Refugee Act in 1980, the United States aligned its federal immigration statute with
the provisions of the Refugee Convention and Protocol. The cornerstone of both
international and domestic law is the principle of non-refoulement, the prohibition
against returning refugees to any country where their lives or freedom would be
threatened.
Although the U.S. refugee statute does permit the denial of asylum to those who pass
through a “safe third country” en route to the United States and do not apply for
protection there, the law sets forth two non-negotiable requirements – the country of
transit must not be one where the asylum seeker’s life or freedom would be threatened
on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
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political opinion, and the asylum seeker must have access to a “full and fair” procedure
for determining claims to protection. (The United States must also have a formal
agreement with the third country.)b These conditions are not met in the countries most
asylum seekers travel through on their way to the United States.
The Biden administration will undoubtedly argue that because the proposed rule
imposes only a rebuttable presumption instead of an outright prohibition, it is
distinguishable from Trump’s legal ban and will pass legal muster. But the facts on the
ground do not support even a presumption of safety and access to a full and fair
procedure.
Furthermore, if the presumption of ineligibility is applied during credible fear screening
interviews at the border, as part of the deeply éawed expedited removal process, it will be
very difècult for asylum seekers to clear the hurdle it presents. The majority of asylum
seekers navigate expedited removal without an attorney, and do not possess detailed
knowledge of human rights conditions and asylum procedures in each of the countries
they transited in order to make the case that they qualify for an exception. The United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has speciècally recommended that
“exclusion” decisions, which would include decisions such as those made on the
applicability of the transit ban, not be made in accelerated procedures such as expedited
removal.
All migrants arriving at the southern border have transited Mexico, and depending on
their country of origin and route, they may have traveled through Guatemala, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, or Panama before arriving to Mexico. With
the possible exception of Costa Rica, none of these countries of transit offer the safety or
access to a refugee protection system which would justify imposition of the ban.
Pervasive violence against migrants in Mexico, carried out by state as well as non-state
actors, has been well-documented. The most recent U.S. State Department country
conditions report noted the “targeting and victimization” of migrants, and in striking
down the Trump transit ban in July 2020, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the
high levels of violence, including sexual violence, against asylum seekers in Mexico.
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Even if Mexico were safe, which it is not, U.S. policies, such as Title 42, have
overwhelmed its refugee system, preventing meaningful access to a “full and fair”
procedure. A little over a decade ago – in 2011 – a btotal of 752 claims for refugee
protection were lodged; in 2021 the number had soared to over 130,000. Funding has not
kept pace, and the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) lacks resources
for its core operations.
The four Central American countries south of Mexico – Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, and Nicaragua – are even less able to pass the safe third country test.
Signiècant human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and
disappearances, prevail at high levels in each country. Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala have the highest rates of femicides (gender-motivated killings) in the world,
as well as extreme violence against LGBTQ+ individuals, while the brutal suppression of
political opponents to the authoritarian regime in Nicaragua is well-documented.
Furthermore, not one of the four countries has anything approaching an adequate
refugee protection system. Guatemala’s system has been described as “inadequate” and
cumbersome, and El Salvador’s as having “major regulatory and operational gaps.” The
system in Honduras is “nascent,” and those individuals who try to access it, especially
women, children, and LGBTQ+ individuals, are especially vulnerable to abuse and sexual
exploitation. Nicaragua is even more of an outlier, having ceased any cooperation with
the UNHCR; in 2015 it suspended meetings of its refugee determination body, the
National Commission for Refugees.
This leaves Costa Rica, a country with a population of ève million, and Panama, a
country of four million, as remaining countries of transit for the majority of asylum
seekers arriving to the United States. Although they have human rights records far
superior to any of the countries discussed above, access to protection is complicated by
the unique circumstances in each.
Costa Rica, with its admirable human rights record, well-established asylum framework,
and history of welcoming refugees, has long been viewed as a destination country for
those seeking protection. In recent years, however, it has been swamped by claims for
protection; in 2021 and 2022, it was among the top four countries globally for asylum
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claims registered. In the beginning of 2022, the UNHCR reported just under 1.44 million
asylum seekers in the United States — a country of 332 million — and 204,730
applications in Costa Rica, a country of 5 million; in other words, Costa Rica is already
taking approximately 10 times as many refugees per capita as the United States. The
rising numbers have overwhelmed Costa Rica’s systems, resulting in delays, difèculty
accessing protection, and a rise in “xenophobic, racist, and discriminatory” attitudes.
This has also led to the adoption of restrictive asylum policies, including its own “safe
third country” ban, and rules that limit the right to work and freedom of movement.
In contrast to Costa Rica, a country of destination, Panama has been seen as a country of
transit. Migrants enter via the Isthmus of Darién, which straddles the border of Panama
and Colombia. They then travel north on the infamously dangerous route known as the
Darién Gap. Panama has also experienced a dramatic rise in numbers. In the seven years
from 2013 to 2020, just over 100,000 migrants entered Panama through the Darién, while
in 2021 alone, the number rose to 140,000.
Panama has a refugee protection system, but the process is difècult to access. The
country applies its refugee laws in an extremely narrow manner, leading Panama to have
an asylum approval rate of only 1 percent, and a record of having only granted asylum to
2,500 refugees since it began hearing claims. In-country experts consider refugee status
to be “the single most difècult pathway” to obtain legal status in Panama. Even those
who are recognized as refugees ènd it difècult to integrate due to laws which prohibit
non-citizens from a broad range of professions. Human rights groups have proposed and
advocated for migration reform so that ultimately Panama can become a “safe harbor for
. . . refugees.” However, that day has yet to arrive.
The Biden administration could be forgiven if it were totally unaware of the conditions in
the countries of transit – which are either patently unsafe, or beyond capacity. bBut lack
of knowledge is not the case, making the administration’s actions all the more
deplorable. With the planned implementation of his own version of a transit ban, Biden
stands willing to outsource U.S. protection obligations to countries such as Costa Rica,
which are already overwhelmed by a disproportionately high rate of asylum applications
per capita, or in the alternative, to return those éeeing persecution to situations as
violent as those they have éed.
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But beyond the legal folly of resurrecting the ban is the shame that this administration
should feel when it repudiates its international and domestic obligations, tries to oféoad
its responsibilities to smaller countries with far less resources, and abandons not only
refugees seeking protection, but its own moral high ground. One can only hope that the
Biden administration will heed the call of lawmakers, faith leaders, and community
groups to reconsider its plan to impose a transit ban. If it does not, it can anticipate a
sustained critique throughout the notice and comment period, and beyond.
IMAGE: US President Joe Biden speaks with El Paso Mayor Oscar Leeser as he visits the US-Mexico border in El Paso,
Texas, on January 8, 2023. (Photo by JIM WATSON/AFP via Getty Images)
About the Author(s)
Karen Musalo
Karen Musalo (@KarenMusalo) is a law professor and founding director of the Center for Gender &
Refugee Studies at the University of California, Law, San Francisco. She is the principal author of “Refugee
Law and Policy: A Comparative and International Approach,” and has litigated major landmark cases in
gender asylum over the past 25 years, including as lead counsel in Matter of Kasinga and Matter of R-A-
and co-counsel in Matter of A-B- and Matter of A-C-A-A-.
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Guatemala: Treatment of Non-Guatemalan
Migrants
November 15, 2019
Do you have any information on the treatment of non-Guatemalan migrants in Guatemala?
This query originated from Asylum Headquarters, RAIO, USCIS.
For this response, per the request of Asylum Headquarters, relevant text from Spanish-language
sources has been translated into English.
The following sources discuss the treatment of non-Guatemalan migrants in Guatemala:
Trump wants border-bound asylum seekers to find refuge in Guatemala instead. Guatemala
isn’t ready., The Washington Post, Aug. 16, 2019.
Paradoxes of Protection: Compassionate Repression at the Mexico–Guatemala Border,
Journal on Migration and Human Security, 2019, Vol. 7(3), p. 62-78 (in particular, see p. 69-
70, 74).
Informe Anual Circunstanciado de Actividades y de la Situación de los Derechos Humanos
2018 [Annual Report of Actions and Situation of Human Rights 2018], Procurador de los
Derechos Humanos [Guatemala’s Human Rights Ombudsman], Jan. 2019. (see “Migrants in
Transit through Guatemala,” p. 292-294; “Migrants in Guatemala as a Destination Country,”
p.294-297; “Refugees” p.297-299).
Migrants in Transit through Guatemala
The Guatemalan State has visualized the migrant population from another region
as a problem that threatens national security. They have also faced communication
barriers for speaking languages other than Spanish or English; the application of
arbitrary criteria to allow them to enter Guatemalan territory by representatives of
the Guatemalan Institute of Migration applied especially to people of extra-
continental origin (Congo, Cameroon, India, among others); institutional
abandonment to find themselves stranded in the international area of Aurora
International Airport; in some cases, there are not even consulates of their countries
in Guatemala; actions to prevent them from accessing shelter, among others.
Among the situations that have afflicted Central American migrants are abuses and
mistreatment by the PNC [National Civil Police]; extortion, theft, and assault by
migratory authorities; lack of information on the possibility of accessing the
processes of international protection according to their needs; discrimination and
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stigmatization due to origin and belonging to the LGBTI community; kidnapping;
extortion, as well as victims of trafficking. […]
During the institutional intervention, several risk factors during the route and in the
shelters, especially for children and adolescents, were identified; lack of capacity
of the State to attend to the migration population in transit; the absence of the work
that the migration authorities must carry out under the Code of Migration was
notorious, as well as that of other state actors related to the issue; repressive actions
by security forces were observed. On the other hand, the assistance from civil
organizations, particularly individuals and even companies, was essential for the
humanitarian assistance. (p.292-294)
Situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR), Dec. 31, 2017 (see p.123, paragraph 235).
Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Guatemala, UN Committee on
Migrant Workers, May 2, 2019.
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018 – Guatemala, U.S. Department of
State, Mar. 2019.
Concluding observations on the seventh periodic report of Guatemala, UN Committee
against Torture, Dec. 26, 2018 (see p. 11, paragraph 34).
Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the activities
of the Office of the High Commissioner in Guatemala, OHCHR, Feb. 9, 2018 (see p.8,
paragraph 36).
Migrantes hondureños baleados en el Periférico: no sabemos por qué nos atacaron [Honduran
migrants shot on the Periférico: we don’t know why they attacked us], Prensa Libre (Guat.),
Apr. 20, 2019.
The Honduran migrants who were attacked while traveling as a group on April 11
on the Peripheral Ring try to recover, not only from their physical injuries, but also
emotionally. They agree on one thing: they have no idea why they were shot. […]
The migrant even denies the version given by some neighbors and merchants in the
area that they would have been confused with criminals since, at the time of the
attack, he says, none of the group talked or tried to approach someone, they simply
walked along the Peripheral. […]
The migrants were part of a group of approximately one thousands Hondurans who
had left by caravan from San Pedro Sula on April 9. […]
Of the group of 10 who were attacked on the Peripheral Ring, the four who were
wounded were taken to the San Juan de Dios General Hospital, of which, last
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Saturday, Evin Javier Maradiaga Cartagena, 19, who was shot twice in the head
and had already been declared brain dead, died.
Selvin Alexis Carranza Erazo and José Andrés De la O Padilla have already left,
while Rony Saul Padilla is conscious, out of danger, and recovering.
Se Enfrentan Migrantes Contra Civiles los Corren del Centro de Tecún Umán [Migrants Face
Off Against Civilians in the Center of Tecún Umán], El Orbe (Mex.), Jan. 29, 2019.
In the last hours, Guatemalan citizens faced off with blows, sticks, and stones
against migrants from the caravan that were in the central park of Tecún Umán, in
Guatemalan territory, human rights organizations even confirmed that there were
gunshots, but no victims. […]
However, the productive sectors, chambers, schools, civil organizations and
representatives of society, from both Guatemala and Chiapas, had denounced for
just over a month that the arrival of the migrants at the border with Mexico was
causing severe damage to the economy and ungovernability.
Given this, dozens of established businesses reinforced their premises with bars and
metal doors, in addition to forming watch groups made up of merchants. Citizen
claims and warnings of an impending civil confrontation were heard. Even the
major of Tecún Umán, Erick Zúñiga, had asked the migrants to take refuge in the
soccer stadium that qualified as a temporary shelter, but they ignored him.
Desperate because they assure that the economic damage from the presence of
migrants is several million dollars a day, Guatemalan society decided to act on its
own.
The formed a large contingent, east of the city, and marched to the center of the
city. On their way, they expressed slogans in which they demanded that the
migrants leave.
The confrontation was inevitable. Dozens of young migrants covered their faces
with rags and shirts, took stones, sticks, and other objects and threw them at the at
the citizen march, which responded in the same manner, with the authorities unable
to do anything.
However, the society group was advancing and won the pitched battle. Migrants
fled
towards the “Rodolfo Robles” International Bridge to try to enter the
national territory by force. […]
Derived from all this, the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman reported at night
that the Delegates of that body verify the situation in the central park of Tecún
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Umán, “where residents evicted migrants from the location and told them that they
can only stay in the shelter in the stadium.”
Meanwhile, 15 human rights and civil defense organizations in Mexico, Central
America, and other regions issued a document on Monday night expressing their
repudiation of the violence that occurred in this community.
Headed by the Collective of Observation and Monitoring of Human Rights in
southeastern Mexico, they explained that the protest (in the confrontation) was led
by a group called Ayutlecos Unidos, which from social media had summoned the
population to remove the migrants from that municipality.
In addition, they call them “shits” and used slogans like “No more Hondurans in
Ayutla”; “Hondurans out of Ayutla”; or “For an Ayutla healthy and clean from
shits.”
They confirmed that “firearms were shot, although we do not report any victims of
gunshot wounds. The Mexican authority has let all people through and the agents
have quickly installed fences to block the passage of the aggressor group.”
The document is signed by the Office in Latin America and the Caribbean of the
American Friends Service; the Digna Ochoa Human Rights Center; the Minverva
Bello Center for the Rights of Victims of Violence; Initiatives for Human
Development; Doctors of the World; Jesuit Networks with Migrants;
Mesoamerican Voices, among others.
Vecinos de Ayutla, San Marcos expulsan a migrantes hondureños y salvadoreños y se lían a
golpes [Residents of Ayutla, San Marcos, expel Honduran and Salvadoran migrants and hit
them], Prensa Libre (Guat.), Jan. 27, 2019.
Residents of the border town of Ayutla, San Marcos, expelled from the central park
Honduran and Salvadoran migrants that were affecting the order and beauty of that
town, they [the residents] reported.
Following this action, which occurred at about 14.45 [2:45 p.m.], on Sunday, Jan.
27, 2019, there was a confrontation between neighbors and migrants on the Rodolfo
Robles international border bridge, toward which some migrants who were
resisting leaving ran. […]
Today, some migrants crossed into Mexican territory through the Suchiate River,
others by the Rodolfo Robles border bridge, while others went to a shelter enabled
to provide them aid. […]
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The Human Rights Ombudsman, Jordán Rojas, reiterated his call to the Guatemalan
immigration authority to address this situation, since during the mass exodus of
migrants they [the Government] have not provided humanitarian assistance.
“By not providing any kind of humanitarian assistance and attention to immigrants,
the authorities risk creating a humanitarian rights crisis for both the migrants and
the population of Ayutla”, said the Ombudsman.
Thousands of migrants, mostly Hondurans and Salvadorans, have passed through
Ayutla in recent months, where the population initially gave assistance and food to
the travelers.
Fuerte rechazo de guatemaltecos a acuerdo para recibir migrantes [Guatemalans Strongly
Reject Agreement to Receive Migrants], Prensa Libre (Guat.), Aug. 8, 2019.
The Encuesta Libre [The Free Survey], prepared by ProDatos company for Prensa
Libre, confirmed what multiple voices of Guatemalan civil society have stated: that
there’s a rejection to the immigration agreement signed between the U.S. and
Guatemala on July 26, which states that Honduran and Salvadoran migrants fleeing
violence would be received in the country and given refuge.
82% of the respondents – eight out of 10 – said they do not agree that the
government should accept migrants from other countries to await authorization to
enter the U.S., which shows a strong rejection of the agreement signed between the
Minister of the Interior of Guatemala Enrique Degenhart, and the Homeland
Security Secretary Kevin McAleenan, in the White House. […]
Among the factors that critics oppose of this agreement are that Guatemala did not
receive much benefit from the negotiation.
Although the government calls the signing of an agreement an achievement that
would grant more work visas in the agricultural sector, those who oppose [the
agreement] say that this program already existed and demand to see a specific
number of those who would benefit from this, because the agreement does not
specify a number.
Another criticism is that little information has been disclosed and that currently
there is no certainty of who would finance the agreement; [and] it also points out
that Guatemala does not have the conditions to offer security to those fleeing
violence in their countries of origin nor does it have an economy robust enough to
offer employment and welfare to migrants from other countries.
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In fact, Guatemala as well as El Salvador and Honduras share very similar
economic and security indicators, and some of those indicators related to poverty
and extreme poverty are actually better in the southern neighboring countries. […]
Father Juan Luis Carbajal, executive secretary of the Pastoral [Catholic Church’s
Pastoral on Human Mobility], is confident that the result of the survey is due to the
people’s lack of knowledge on what a safe third country means and it is not due to
feelings
of
rejection
against
migrants.
Carbajal added that the lack of information about the agreement and the secrecy in
which it was negotiated could contribute to Guatemalans rejecting the possibility
of having the country receive Honduran and Salvadoran migrants, and said that
citizens reject it because they know that [the country has] does not have the
conditions to assist their own people, nor the political will to resolve the asylum
cases pending at the Institute for National Migration.
“We are concerned that there are negative behaviors – against migrants – if we are
not going to replicate the same attitudes of some Americans and Mexicans against
Central Americans, that we are going to replicate those feelings of xenophobia,”
said the priest.
Danilo Rivera, an analyst at the Central American Institute for Social Studies and
Development, agreed that the rejection is due to the lack of knowledge about the
agreement and because people think that the thousands of migrants who crossed the
country in caravans who would settle in Guatemala.
Accordingly, the expert explains that if Guatemalans are aware that there are not
sufficient conditions for development and life for themselves, they adopt a
defensive stance against the possibility of having taken away the little they have.
“Guatemalan people are supportive; but there is a big difference between
supporting the caravans so they can continue their journey and the idea that they
are staying in Guatemala,” says Rivera, who believes that Guatemalans take into
account what their future conditions will be like.
Rechazo a los migrantes: “pizcas de xenofobia recorren nuestro ADN” [Rejection of
migrants: “bits of xenophobia run through our DNA”], Con Criterio (Guat.), Jul. 17, 2019.
Herika Velazquez, a Venezuelan who has been living with her husband and three
children for 10 years in Guatemala, comments on her experience in the country:
“I have been well received by the Guatemalan people: they have been very kind.
But it really hurts to know that there is a lot of xenophobia; there are countries
where some sectors of the society do not approve of our presence there, but this is
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not the case of Guatemala. We have not felt discrimination here and I say that most
Venezuelans agree with me. There may be cases [of discrimination], but they are
very isolated.”
A Jewish community that used to dress in their tunics, spoke another language and
had different customs than those of the local community were less fortunate. They
were expelled from San Juan La Laguna, Sololá, in 2014. That year, the community
council held an assembly to demand Mayor Rodolfo Pérez suspend basic services
[utilities] to the Jewish community and he accepted. One of the foreigners narrated
this bad experience.
“We were in a very dangerous situation. They cut off our water and electricity, and
said that the next phase was to kill us. We only want to live in peace and make this
city of benefit for us and for the whole country.”
For that decision, the mayor was sentence to a one-year commutable sentence. […]
[Father José Luis Carvajal] expresses that the recent movement of Central
American migrants exposed the tolerance level the Guatemalans have:
“These caravans brought out the best, but also the worst of many. [They exposed]
things from harsh discourses full of xenophobia to great displays of solidarity and
compassion.”
[Father] Carvajal believes that many –even the political systems – are taking
advantage of the need for opportunities these groups have:
“Surely, sowing fear has been a tool for immigration control and containment. It is
a strategy intended to eliminate migration.”
Last Monday, the Totonicapán department hospital issued a document in which
they pointed out that the mass migration crossing the country has generated a rise
in extortions, robberies, and [criminal] acts that make the population of that
department vulnerable.
In the document, the hospital leadership expressed that they were focusing their
priorities on the population. In addition, they reported that security systems would
be strengthened [and] that everyone must present their DPIs to get access into the
hospital.
José Luis Arrola, an advisor to the hospital, recognized it was an error and clarified
[that]:
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“Everyone who comes in here will have the right to health care [protected];
everyone will be treated.”
The hospital’s letter prompted delegates from the Office of the Human Rights
Ombudsman to request a report on the circumstances from the authorities.
El ombudsman de Guatemala lamenta la "indiferencia" de Morales ante la crisis migrante
[Guatemala’s ombudsman regrets Morales’ “indifference” to the migrant crisis], Agencia
EFE, Dec. 19, 2018.
The Guatemalan Human Rights Ombudsman, Jordán Rodas, lamented the
“indifference” and “little solidarity” shown by President Jimmy Morales towards
Honduran and Salvadoran migrant caravans who crossed Guatemalan territory in
October and November. During the presentation of the Report on the Actions of the
Office of the Human Rights Prosecutor on the Transit of Honduran and Salvadoran
Migrants, October and November 2018, Rodas said that both Morales and
Chancellor Sandra Jovel “closed their eyes to the reality the migrants are facing.”
He attested that in Guatemala, “sometimes people have an outdated mentality over
security set back into the 1970s and 1980s, which contrasts with the “reality”
because “migration is not a security issue.”
[Rodas] criticized the lack of “humanitarian approach” to migrant caravans, which
is a “pending issue” because “it seems that the appropriate government agencies
have no empathy.” Those responsible for overseeing Guatemala’s migration
[system] “were totally insensitive to this human drama” which is the result – he
insisted – of “the forgetting of history, corruption, poverty, exclusion, that forced
our Central American brothers to migrate.” […]
On the other hand, Deputy Attorney General Miriam Roquel highlighted that the
findings of the report “demonstrated” that the General Directorate of Migration
lacks the “processes to formulate immigration regulations” and that there is “no
education strategy in place for this area.”
She also warned that Guatemala does not have the “adequate conditions” for a
“contingency plan,” beyond those in place for those affected by natural disasters.
The following sources discuss the treatment of migrants in Guatemala, Guatemala’s asylum
system, and/or assessments of Guatemala’s capacity to handle an influx of migrants:
Guatemala Is No Safe Third Country: Why the Asylum Deal Is a Mistake, Foreign Affairs,
Sep. 25, 2019.
Guatemala must strengthen asylum system to be safe third country, UNHCR says, Devex,
Aug. 21, 2019.
‘Safe third country’? Guatemalans are not convinced, America Magazine, Aug. 1, 2019.
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A 'Safe' Third-Country Agreement With Guatemala Could Be Dangerous, Forbes, Jul. 15,
2019.
Guatemala seen as ill-prepared to absorb US-bound refugees, Associated Press, Jul. 12, 2019.
US-Guatemala Asylum Deal Advances Without UN Refugee Agency, VOA News, Jul. 12,
2019.
Is Guatemala Safe for Refugees and Asylum Seekers?, Human Rights First, Jul. 1, 2019.
Migration, violence, and safety among migrant sex workers: A qualitative study in two
Guatemalan communities, Culture, Health & Sexuality, Vol. 18, 2016.
Finally, one source mentioned gang members moving among the Northern Triangle
countries. Here are a few more sources that discuss that issue:
Pandilleros de El Salvador son capturados en Guatemala [Gang Members from El Salvador
are Captured in Guatemala], VOA Noticias, Aug. 26, 2019.
Since mid-July, according to the National Civil Police’s data, there has been a rise in
apprehensions of suspected Salvadoran gang members in Guatemala. In a month, they
have apprehended 10 alleged members of cliques (gangs) of Barrio 18 and the Mara
Salvatrucha. […]
The three departments where the apprehensions have been reported are Jutiapa,
Chimaltenango and Chiquimula.
The Ministry of Defense has deployed army soldiers to the border zones to neutralize
and combat drug and illegal arms trafficking, as well as the entry of criminal groups.
[..]
According to security expert Lizando Acuña, the migration of gang members is a result
of the Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele’s Anti-Gang Plan. To counteract this action,
he says that the government should know how these groups operate, because they are
based on a hierarchy; the gangs’ leadership will not migrate because they will not leave
the territorial control they have in their countries.
In his words: “They exchange communication and have to, in some way, also enter into
the countries to coordinate their work. They don’t improvise; on the contrary, they have
an organization of some sort.”[…]
Guatemalan police arrest powerful Salvadoran gang leader, Reuters, Apr. 11, 2017.
CentAm Officials Raise Alert Over Cross-border Gang Movements, InSight Crime, May 5,
2016.
‘El Salvador Gang Members Flee to Honduras, Guatemala’, InSight Crime, Apr. 28, 2015.
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This response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available
to the RAIO Research Unit within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to
be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.
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From:
Salcedo, Viviana
To:
Mazzochi, Sarah
Subject:
Fwd: Asylum staffing in NCA countries
Date:
Friday, October 4, 2019 2:21:11 PM
+HUH\RXJR
*HW2XWORRNIRUL26
From: Katie Tobin
Sent: Tuesday, October 1, 2019 11:01 AM
To: Salcedo, Viviana
Subject: Asylum staffing in NCA countries
Hi Viviana,
I thought this info may be of interest to you too, especially with your meeting with USCIS today…
Cheers,
Katie
From: Giovanni Bassu
Sent: Monday, September 30, 2019 3:38 PM
To: Coine, Glenn
Cc: Samuelson, Andrea L
; Chiara Cardoletti-Carroll
;
Katie Tobin
Subject: RE: URGENT PRM request for information
Dear Glenn
This is what we know, although the question of budget is not easy for us to check.
Guatemala:
Currently, the Office of International Migration Relations has a team of 7 full-time
employees. Before the month of February there were only 4, the 3 additional
people have been integrated in the last few months. The CONARE has 4 officials
(one of them from the National Migration Institute (IGM)). The Migration Authority
is composed of 9 institutions in total, 4 of which are attending the CONARE
meetings .
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We do not have information on the National Migration Authority or the National
Refugee Commission annual budgets
El Salvador:
CODER does not have its own budget, nor does it have staff dedicated exclusively to
tasks of the organization. They are employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
whose duties include those related to the CODER
Honduras:
The National Migration Institute, Human Rights Management has a team of 12
employees (amongst which 3 people are eligibility officers, and 1 staff is dedicated
to collecting COI).
The Commission for the Analysis, Revision, and Dictum on the Status of Refugees is
composed of 3 members of the Ministry of Justice, Governance and
Decentralization and 3 members of the INM. Additionally, 2 eligibility officers assist
the human rights manager in the presentation of cases during the commission.
We do not have information on their annual budgets
Best
Giovani
DHSFF1254
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UNPROTECTED
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST VENEZUELAN REFUGEE
WOMEN IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
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© Amnesty International 2020
Except where otherwise noted, content in this document is licensed
under a Crea-tive Commons (attribution, non-commercial, no
derivatives, international 4.0) licence.
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode
For more information please visit the permissions page on our website:
www.amnesty.org
Where material is attributed to a copyright owner other than Amnesty
International this
material is not subject to the Creative Commons licence.
First published in 2020
by Amnesty International Ltd
Peter Benenson House, 1 Easton Street
London WC1X 0DW, UK
Index: AMR 01/5675/2022
Original language: Spanish
amnesty.org
Cover photo:
© Fernanda Pineda
Cover design:
© Sergio Ortiz
Amnesty International is a movement of 10 million
people which mobilizes the humanity in everyone
and campaigns for change so we can all enjoy our
human rights.
Our vision is of a world where those in power keep
their promises, respect international law and are
held to account.
We are independent of any government, political
ideology, economic interest or religion and are
funded mainly by our membership and individual
donations.
We believe that acting in solidarity and compassion
with people everywhere can change our societies
for the better.
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
5
2. METHODOLOGY
9
3. BACKGROUND
11
4. VIOLENCE: MULTIPLE AND OMNIPRESENT
14
4.1 IN PUBLIC SPACES
17
4.2 INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
20
4.3 AT WORK
22
5. DIFFICULTIES IN ACCESSING INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION AND REGULARIZING
MIGRATION STATUS
29
5.1 ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
29
5.2 OBSTACLES LINKED TO MIGRATION REGULARIZATION PROCESSES
30
5.2.1 IN COLOMBIA
30
5.2.2 IN PERU
31
5.3 LACK OF INFORMATION
34
6. AUTHORITIES’ RESPONSES: FAILURES, LACK OF PROTECTION AND MORE VIOLENCE
36
6.1 BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE.
38
6.1.1 LACK OF INFORMATION ABOUT CARE PATHWAYS
38
6.1.2 IRREGULAR MIGRATION STATUS
40
6.1.3 AAUTHORITIES’ LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
41
6.1.4 DISCRIMINATION AND COMPOUND STEREOTYPING
42
6.1.5 INSUFFICIENT EFFECTIVE PROTECTION MEASURES
43
6.1.6 INADEQUATE DATA COLLECTION
46
6.2 OBSTACLES TO REPORTING VIOLENCE AT WORK
48
6.3 OBSTACLES TO ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES
50
6.4 OTHER STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES
52
7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
54
CONTENTS
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DEFINITION
Centros de Emergencia Mujer (Women’s Emergency Centres, Peru) are special-
ized and free public services that provide comprehensive and multidisciplinary
care for victims of violence against women and members of their family.
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women is a body
composed of independent experts which monitors the implementation of the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.
Cisgender people are individuals whose gender expression and/or gender identity
accords with conventional expectations based on the physical sex they were as-
signed at birth. In broad terms, cisgender is the opposite of transgender.
Carné de Permiso Temporal de Permanencia (Temporary residence pe mits, Peru)
Intersectional discrimination is when discrimination on different grounds oper-
ates together to produce a compounded or distinct disadvantage.
These are stereotypes that discriminate against women on multiple grounds, not
only because of gender, but also because of age, nationality and/or sexual orien-
tation, among other factors.
Gender stereotypes are generalized views or preconceptions about attributes or
characteristics, or the roles that are or ought to be possessed by, or performed
by, people of different genders (for example, women and men).
Gender identity refers to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual expe-
rience of gender. This may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth.
Ministerio de la Mujer (Ministry for Women’s Affairs, Peru)
In this report, the term “woman” is used as a general category to refer to both
cisgender and transgender women, unless there are reasons to disaggregate the
information. In such cases, the term “trans woman” is used.
GLOSSARY
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GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST VENEZUELAN REFUGEE WOMEN IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
A refugee is someone outside their country of nationality or habitual res-
idence who is unable or unwilling to return to that country owing to a
YGNNHQWPFGFHGCTQHRGTUGEWVKQP
CUFGƂPGFKPVJG)GPGXC%QP-
XGPVKQP CPF UQOGQPG YJQ JCU ƃGF VJGKT EQWPVT[ DGECWUG VJGKT NKXGU
safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign
CIITGUUKQPKPVGTPCNEQPƃKEVUOCUUKXGXKQNCVKQPUQHJWOCPTKIJVUQTQVJGT
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order (as extended
by the Cartagena Declaration
Permiso de Protección Temporal (Temporary Protection Status, Colombia)
National Programme for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence
against Women and Members of their Family (Peru)
Sistema Integrado de Información sobre Violencias de Género (Compre-
hensive Information System on Gender-Based Violence, Colombia)
Sistema Nacional de Vigilancia en Salud Pública (National Public Health
Monitoring System, Colombia)
Transgender refers to individuals whose gender identity does not corre-
spond to the biological sex assigned to them at birth. A transgender wom-
an is a woman who was assigned “male” at birth but has a female gender
identity; a transgender man is a man who was assigned “female” at birth
but has a male gender identity. Not all transgender individuals identify
as male or female; transgender can include members of third genders, as
well as individuals who identify as more than one gender or no gender at
all. Transgender individuals may, or may not, have had sex reassignment.
*WOCPVTCHƂEMKPIQTVTCHƂEMKPIKPRGTUQPUKUFGƂPGFKPVJG702TQVQEQN
VQ2TGXGPV5WRRTGUUCPF2WPKUJ6TCHƂEMKPIKP2GTUQPU'URGEKCNN[9QO-
GPCPF%JKNFTGP
CNUQMPQYPCUVJG6TCHƂEMKPIKP2GTUQPU2TQVQEQN YJKEJ
UGVUQWVVJGKPVGTPCVKQPCNN[CEEGRVGFFGƂPKVKQPQHVTCHƂEMKPI pVJGTGETWKV-
ment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability
QTQHVJGIKXKPIQTTGEGKXKPIQHRC[OGPVUQTDGPGƂVUVQCEJKGXGVJGEQP-
sent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation.”
6TCHƂEMKPIKPJWOCPDGKPIUHQTUGZWCNGZRNQKVCVKQPKUPQVVJGUCOGCUUGZ
YQTM
Gender-based violence is violence directed against a person or which
affects them disproportionately because of their gender or sex. Gen-
FGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGECPVCMGOWNVKRNGHQTOUCPFKUHQWPFKPCNNEQPVGZVU
where people interact.
REFUGEE
PPT
AURORA PROGRAMME
SIVIGE
SIVIGILA
TRANSGENDER
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
GENDER BASED VIOLENCE
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GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST VENEZUELAN REFUGEE WOMEN IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
/CTKGNCYCUHQTEGFVQNGCXG8GPG\WGNCKPDGECWUGQHVJGNCEMQHCEEGUUVQHQQFGFWECVKQPCPF
JGCNVJECTGHQTJGTUGNHCPFJGTEJKNFTGPCPFVJGJKIJNGXGNUQHKPƃCVKQPKPVJGEQWPVT[(QTJGTCUHQT
many refugee and migrant women, the decision to leave was not an easy one and when she arrived
in Colombia and later Peru, the two main host countries for Venezuelan refugees, she faced various
forms of gender-based violence. Mariela told Amnesty International about the different abuses she has
experienced in Colombia as a Venezuelan woman.
UN Women has described gender-based violence in Latin America as “the shadow pandemic”.1 For
TGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVYQOGPVJGKTOKITCVKQPUVCVWUKPETGCUGUVJGTKUMUVJG[HCEGGZRQUKPIVJGOVQ
gender-based violence on the migration route and in the cities in which they decide to settle. Despite
high levels of under-reporting, existing data show that gender-based violence against refugee women
has increased in recent years in Colombia and Peru, the two countries that are the focus of Amnesty
International’s research in this report. The number of reported cases has risen in Colombia from 2,430
to 4,165 between 2018 and 20202, and in Peru from 1,384 in 2019 to 1,818 in 2021.3
Xenophobia and myths about the security issues caused by migration in cities; prejudices related to
VJGRGTEGKXGFUGZWCNKV[QHYQOGP
DTCPFGFCURGQRNGYJQpUVGCNJWUDCPFUqQTCUUGZYQTMGTU EJCPI-
es in gender roles in partner or family relationships during the migration process; and the challenge
to pre-established gender roles in society, are some of the underlying causes of violence against Ven-
ezuelan women.
Violence in all spaces
As Amnesty International has documented, violence occurs in all contexts. Women are repeatedly
UWDLGEVGFVQCVVCEMUCPFUGZWCNXKQNGPEGKPRWDNKEURCEGUDQVJKPVJGJQUVEKVKGUYJGTGVJG[NKXGCPF
along the migration route. Irregular border crossings are spaces where Venezuelan refugee women
experience violence by organized armed groups, while some are recruited in Venezuela for the purpose
of labour or sexual exploitation.
#UTGICTFUVJGYQTMRNCEGKVKURGTUGCXKQNGPVURCEGHQT8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPKPDQVJEQWPVTKGU
8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPHCEGEQORQWPFUVGTGQV[RGUKPVJGKTUGCTEJHQTFGEGPVYQTMFGPKGFVJGQRRQTVW-
PKV[VQCEEGUUYQTMDGECWUGVJG[CTG8GPG\WGNCPCUYGNNCUFKUETKOKPCVQT[HCEVQTUUWEJCUCIG+P
VJGCDUGPEGQHUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUEJKNFECTGURCEGUHQTVJGKT[QWPIEJKNFTGPCPFTGCNQRRQTVWPKVKGUHQT
KPENWUKQPKPVJGYQTMHQTEGKPFGEGPVEQPFKVKQPUOCP[8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPCTGHQTEGFVQTGUQTVVQYQTM
in the informal sector, as street vendors, often with their children in tow, where they are exposed to
XCTKQWUHQTOUQHXKQNGPEGCPFNCDQWTGZRNQKVCVKQPKPENWFKPIDGKPIEQQRVGFHQTYQTMHQTVJGRWTRQUG
QHUGZWCNGZRNQKVCVKQP)KXGPVJKURTGECTKQWUYQTMEQPVGZVUQOGYQOGPJCXGEJQUGPVQGPICIGKPUGZ
YQTM%QORQWPFUVGTGQV[RGUCNUQETGCVGCPGPXKTQPOGPVKPYJKEJ8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPGZRGTKGPEGIGP-
FGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGKPVJGYQTMRNCEGYJGPVJG[FQOCPCIGVQCEEGUUQPG
1 UN Women, The Shadow Pandemic: Violence against women during COVID-19, https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/in-focus-
gender-equality-in-covid-19-response/violence-against-women-during-covid-19
2 Colombian Ministry of Health, National Observatory on Gender-Based Violence, https://www.sispro.gov.co/observatorios/onviolencias-
IGPGTQ2CIKPCUJQOGCURZ
ƂNVGT )GPGTCNKPFKECVQTUCPF8GPG\WGNCPYQOGP
5RCPKUJQPN[
(KIWTGUHTQOVJG9QOGPoU'OGTIGPE[%GPVTG
%GPVTQ'OGTIGPEKC/WLGT%'/ TGEQTFUQPUGZWCNXKQNGPEGHQTVJG[GCTU
CPF%CUGUQHUGZWCNXKQNGPEGs4CRGKPFGEGPVCUUCWNVUGZWCNJCTCUUOGPVCPFUGZWCNCUUCWNVKPRWDNKERNCEGUJVVRU RQTVCNGUVC-
FKUVKEQCWTQTCIQDRGHQTOCUFGNCXKQNGPEKCCPF%'/TGEQTFU
5RCPKUJQPN[
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“We are a population at risk, we did not come here for pleasure or on a
whim, we came here to escape from a regime that does not allow us to live
a decent life… because if you work it’s in order to be able to have a decent
livelihood. We came here looking for a better future. To be respected as
women... But it seems that... you don’t want us here.” Mariela, a Venezuelan woman in
Colombia
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GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST VENEZUELAN REFUGEE WOMEN IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
Absence of state protection
#NVJQWIJDQVJEQWPVTKGUJCXGNGICNHTCOGYQTMUFGUKIPGFVQCFFTGUUCPFRWPKUJIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG
Amnesty International believes that the Colombian and Peruvian states are major absences when it comes
to guaranteeing, protecting and respecting in practice the rights to a life free of violence for Venezuelan
refugee women and access to justice for women survivors of gender-based violence. The organization’s
research reveals that Venezuelan women refugees do not have effective access to international protection
and migration regularization processes because many do not receive information on this from the states.
6JKUETGCVGUCƂTUVCPFUKIPKƂECPVQDUVCENGVQVJGRTQVGEVKQPQHVJGKTTKIJVU
Furthermore, Venezuelan women face multiple obstacles in accessing justice and health services without
FKUETKOKPCVKQP6JGIGPGTCNRGTEGRVKQPQHYKFGURTGCFKORWPKV[CPFCNCEMQHGHHGEVKXGPGUUKPVJGYC[
the justice systems function in general – both for their nationals and foreign nationals – are factors that
discourage many women from reporting gender-based violence in both countries. But Venezuelan refugee
YQOGPCNUQHCEGURGEKƂEEJCNNGPIGU VJGHCEVVJCVVJGKTOKITCVKQPUVCVWUKUPQVTGIWNCTK\GFNGCFUVJGOVQ
believe that they do not have the same rights as the rest of the population and that, therefore, they cannot
VWTPVQKPUVKVWVKQPUVQFGOCPFVJGUGTKIJVUQTVJCVKHVJG[FQUQVJG[YQWNFTKUMDGKPIFGRQTVGFVQ8GP-
ezuela. Added to this is the gap in access to information on care pathways for survivors of gender-based
XKQNGPEG 8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPTGRQTVVJCVVJG[FQPQVMPQYYJCVVJGUGCTGYJKEJKPUVKVWVKQPVQIQVQQT
what mechanisms exist.
1HƂEKCNUTGURQPUKDNGHQTRTQXKFKPIUGTXKEGUHQTUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCTGPQVCYCTGQHVJG
rights and needs of refugee and migrant women in terms of access to existing pathways and protection
measures. In addition, on many occasions they have internalized compound stereotypes, in which male
violence is combined with xenophobic prejudices against Venezuelans. This results not only in a denial of
access to justice for these women, but also in new forms of violence and discrimination against them by
those who have a duty to support and protect them.
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNKFGPVKƂGFQVJGTUJQTVEQOKPIUKPUVCVGTGURQPUGUKPDQVJEQWPVTKGUUWEJCUVJGNCEM
of availability of and access to temporary shelters for survivors of gender-based violence, which particular-
N[CHHGEVU8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPYJQFQPQVJCXGUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUCPFVJGHCKNWTGVQEQNNGEVCFGSWCVGUVC-
tistical information that would facilitate the development of public policies that address the differentiated
impact of these forms of violence on Venezuelan women.
In addition, the absence of effective campaigns to challenge the compound stereotypes that foster this
violence, and so prevent it, contributes to and exacerbates the continuing violence against Venezuelan
women in these countries.
As regards healthcare services, in Colombia and Peru the law establishes that, in the case of survivors
of gender-based violence, these services fall under the category of emergency services, so no one can be
FGPKGFVJGO*QYGXGT#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNHQWPFVJCVKPRTCEVKEGVJGCDUGPEGQHCENGCTFGƂPKVKQPD[
healthcare systems of what is considered an emergency in cases of gender-based violence, including sex-
WCNXKQNGPEGTGUWNVUKPHTQPVNKPGRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUKPVGTRTGVKPIKVKPFKHHGTGPVYC[UYJKEJTGUVTKEVU8GPG\WGNCP
refugee women’s access to health services.
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNECNNUQPVJG%QNQODKCPCPF2GTWXKCPCWVJQTKVKGUVQVCMGOGCUWTGUVQGPUWTGVJCVCNN
women can enjoy a life free from violence and free from discrimination on the basis of gender, nationality,
OKITCVKQPUVCVWUQTCP[QVJGTITQWPFU+PVJGECUGQH8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPVJKUTGSWKTGUKOOGFKCVG
measures to challenge the entrenched compound stereotypes that foster and perpetuate violations of their
human rights.
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KEY RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATES
ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
•
Ensure effective access to asylum procedures without discrimination for all those in need of
international protection.
•
Strengthen and expand the dissemination of information to Venezuelan women on access to
international protection and other forms of migration regularization. This information should be
accompanied by strategies and messages aimed at addressing and avoiding the fear that those
CRRTQCEJKPIVJGCWVJQTKVKGUVQKPKVKCVGRTQEGGFKPIUEQWNFTKUMFGVGPVKQPCPFFGRQTVCVKQPVQ8GP-
ezuela.
•
+ORNGOGPVQTUVTGPIVJGPVTCKPKPIRTQITCOOGUYKVJCJWOCPTKIJVURGTURGEVKXGHQTRWDNKEQHƂ-
EKCNUKPRCTVKEWNCTVJQUGYQTMKPIKPVJGRQNKEGRWDNKERTQUGEWVKQPOKITCVKQPCPFJGCNVJUGTXKEGU
on access to international protection and other forms of migratory regularization and the rights
of refugees and migrants.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
•
Implement mass information campaigns on care pathways to address cases of gender-based
violence, that include dissemination strategies that have previously been consulted with women,
KPENWFKPITGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVYQOGPKPQTFGTVQGPCDNGYQOGPKPUKVWCVKQPUQHITGCVGTTKUMKP
particular to be reached.
•
Ensure that all institutions that care for survivors of gender-based violence, including the police,
public prosecution service and migration and health institutions, have robust protocols for provid-
ing support, incorporating an intersectionality perspective and the obligation of non-discrimina-
tion, in cases of gender-based violence that address the particular care needs of refugee women
and migrant survivors of gender-based violence.
•
2TQXKFGCRRTQRTKCVGU[UVGOCVKEOCPFCVQT[KPKVKCNCPFQPIQKPIVTCKPKPIVQCNNRWDNKEQHƂEKCNU
providing services for survivors of gender-based violence, such as staff from the police, public
prosecution, migration and health services, on the prevention and detection of gender-based vio-
NGPEGIGPFGTGSWCNKV[CPFKPVGTUGEVKQPCNFKUETKOKPCVKQP+PCFFKVKQPVQTCKUKPICYCTGPGUUQHYQO-
GPoUTKIJVUKPENWFKPIVJGTKIJVUQHVTCPURGQRNGCPFVJQUGYJQGPICIGKPUGZYQTMCPFGZKUVKPI
care pathways, these programmes should aim to actively challenge prejudices regarding gender
UVGTGQV[RGUCPFO[VJUCTQWPFIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCOQPIRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUCPFOWUVCFFTGUU
from the perspective of intersectionality and the obligation of non-discrimination, the particular
care needs of refugee and migrant women survivors of gender-based violence.
•
Conduct thorough, impartial and independent investigations into all acts of violence against
women, including rape and other forms of sexual violence, and ensure that investigations incor-
porate a gender perspective.
•
Ensure that institutions responsible for providing services in cases of gender-based violence,
DQVJCVVJGPCVKQPCNCPFNQECNNGXGNUJCXGUWHƂEKGPVTGUQWTEGUVQKORNGOGPVGHHGEVKXGRTQVGEVKQP
measures for women survivors of gender-based violence that are accessible to women regardless
QHVJGKTOKITCVKQPUVCVWU+PRCTVKEWNCTGPUWTGVJCVVJGTGCTGVGORQTCT[UJGNVGTUYKVJUWHƂEKGPV
capacity.
•
%QPUKFGTGUVCDNKUJKPIECTGCPFUGNHECTGRQNKEKGUHQTHTQPVNKPGQHƂEKCNUKPVJGLWUVKEGCPFJGCNVJ
services, implemented and coordinated by the state institutions involved in addressing the needs
of survivors of gender-based violence.
ADDRESSING AND PREVENTING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
•
Improve inter-agency coordination in responses to gender-based violence, in particular focusing
on addressing the needs of refugee and migrant women.
•
Improve data collection on gender-based violence by recording statistical data on victims, disag-
gregated by sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, disability, relationship between
the abuser and the victim, and the victim’s migration status and ethnic minority heritage, and en-
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GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST VENEZUELAN REFUGEE WOMEN IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
sure that the data are regularly reviewed and used to inform policy development, resource alloca-
tion and other measures to prevent and address sexual and other types of gender-based violence.
•
Improve inter-institutional coordination in responding to gender-based violence, especially re-
garding refugee and migrant women.
•
#FFTGUUVJGWPFGTN[KPIECWUGUUVTWEVWTCNKPGSWCNKVKGUCPFEQORQWPFIGPFGTUVGTGQV[RGUPC-
tionality and migration status that perpetuate violence against Venezuelan women, ensuring that
measures to prevent gender-based violence include policies for the care of children and the elder-
N[ CEEGUUVQFGEGPVGORNQ[OGPVVCMKPIKPVQCEEQWPVCHQEWUQPVJGUQEKQGEQPQOKEKPVGITCVKQP
of refugee and migrant women; and social and community integration programmes at the local
NGXGNVJCVUVKOWNCVGCPFUVTGPIVJGPUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUHQTTGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVYQOGPYQOGP
heads of families and caregivers.
ACCESS TO HEALTH
•
6CMGOGCUWTGUVQGPUWTGEQORTGJGPUKXGJGCNVJECTGHQTYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG
TGICTFNGUUQHVJGKTOKITCVKQPUVCVWUKPRCTVKEWNCTGPUWTKPIVJCV
•
%CTGKUPQVEQPFKVKQPCNQPVJGƂNKPIQHCEQORNCKPVKPNCYQTKPRTCEVKEG
•
All health needs resulting from gender-based violence are categorized as emergency healthcare
and that there are clear protocols for medium- and long-term physical and emotional care; and
•
6JCVECTGKPEQTRQTCVGURU[EJQNQIKECNƂTUVCKFCPFRU[EJQUQEKCNUWRRQTVRTQITCOOGUHQTUWTXKXQTU
of gender-based violence (women and close family that may be affected, children and other de-
pendents).
COMBATING STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION
•
Ensure that all authorities, including those at the highest level, refrain from using language that
UVKIOCVK\GUCDWUGUXKNKƂGUQTFKUETKOKPCVGUCICKPUV8GPG\WGNCPU
•
Design and implement awareness-raising campaigns for the general public aimed at combating
stereotypes and xenophobia regarding Venezuelans, including composite gender stereotypes in-
cluding those that foster the hypersexualization of Venezuelan women.
•
In particular, adopt without delay effective measures to combat the different forms of gender-based
XKQNGPEGCVYQTMDQVJKPVJGHQTOCNCPFKPHQTOCNUGEVQTUQHVJGGEQPQO[YKVJRCTVKEWNCTGORJC-
sis on discrimination on the basis of gender, gender identity, nationality and migration status.
•
Ensure that everyone, including Venezuelan women and trans people, have access to education
and decent employment options in order to prevent anyone from having to rely on the sale of sex-
WCNUGTXKEGUKPUGZYQTMCUCOGCPUQHUWTXKXCNDGECWUGQHRQXGTV[QTFKUETKOKPCVKQP
TO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
•
#FGSWCVGN[ƂPCPEGVJGJWOCPKVCTKCPTGURQPUGVQVJGOCUUGZQFWUQH8GPG\WGNCPUHTQOVJGKT
country, ensuring the sustainability of the responses implemented for women survivors of gen-
der-based violence.
•
Promote the strengthening of state responses to gender-based violence, ensuring that technical
assistance or other cooperation programmes include eliciting commitments from authorities and
CNNQECVKPI ƂPCPEKCN TGUQWTEGU VQ HWNƂN VJGKT QDNKICVKQPU VQ RTGXGPV RWPKUJ CPF GTCFKECVG IGP-
der-based violence.
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6JKUTGRQTVKUDCUGFQPGZVGPUKXGTGUGCTEJECTTKGFQWVFWTKPIVJGƂTUVJCNHQHYKVJƂGNFYQTM
carried out virtually and in person in both countries. In Peru, researchers visited the cities of Lima and
6WODGUFWTKPIVJGNCUVYGGMQH/CTEJ+P%QNQODKCTGUGCTEJGTUXKUKVGFVJGEKVKGUQH$QIQV½%ÖEWVC
CPFVJGOWPKEKRCNKV[QH5QCEJCFWTKPIVJGNCUVYGGMQH/CTEJCPFVJGƂTUVYGGMQH#RTKN
Amnesty International conducted 45 research interviews and coordinated seven focus groups with
Venezuelan refugee women. The research team heard the experiences of 63 Venezuelan refugee wom-
GP KP%QNQODKCCPFKP2GTW+PQTFGTVQRTQVGEVCPFUCHGIWCTFVJGEQPƂFGPVKCNKV[QHVJGTGHWIGG
women interviewed during the research, their names have been changed. The research team also held
meetings with Venezuelan women’s organizations, civil society organizations in Colombia and Peru
and international agencies, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),
VJG+PVGTPCVKQPCN1HƂEGHQT/KITCVKQP
+1/ 709QOGPCPFVJG7PKVGF0CVKQPU2QRWNCVKQP(WPF
(UNFPA). Fifteen meetings were also held with state institutions.
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNTGXKGYGFCUKIPKƂECPVPWODGTQHFQEWOGPVUCPFUVCVKUVKECNTGRQTVUHTQOJW-
manitarian agencies, academic research, research conducted by non-governmental organizations,
press articles and institutional statistical sources in Colombia and Peru. In addition, it made 17
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KPUVKVWVKQPU#VVJGVKOGQHYTKVKPIUKZTGRNKGUJCFDGGPTGEGKXGFHTQO2GTWCPFƂXGHTQO%QNQODKC
6JGTGUGCTEJVGCOTGXKGYGFPCVKQPCNNGIKUNCVKQPCPFQVJGTQHƂEKCNFQEWOGPVU+PCFFKVKQPKVECTTKGF
out an extensive review of international human rights standards and reports produced by the interna-
tional and the inter-American systems for the protection of human rights related to women’s rights,
gender-based violence and the situation of migrants.
The results of this research were shared on 29 April 2022 with all the national and international or-
ganizations who participated in the research process.
Amnesty International wishes to express its deep gratitude to each of the Venezuelan refugee women
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8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGQTICPK\CVKQPUKPVJGJQUVEKVKGU VQVJGEQOOWPKVKGUQH5QCEJCCPF'PICVKX½HQT
VJGQRGPURCEGUKPYJKEJVQECTT[QWVVJGƂGNFYQTMHQTVJKUTGUGCTEJ VQVJGJWOCPKVCTKCPCIGPEKGUKP
Colombia and Peru; and to the authorities in both countries whom it met.
2. METHODOLOGY
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By May 2022, according to the Interagency Coordination Platform for Venezuelan Refugees and Mi-
grants (Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, R4V),
more than 6 million Venezuelans had left their country because of massive human rights violations.4
1HVJGUGOQTGVJCPOKNNKQPCTGEWTTGPVN[KPC.CVKP#OGTKECPEQWPVT[+PNKPGYKVJVJGDTQCFFGƂ-
nition of who is a refugee set out in the Cartagena Declaration, Amnesty International considers that
Venezuelans who have left their country because of such massive human rights violations are in need
of international protection and have the right to apply for recognition of their refugee status. The
countries hosting the largest number of Venezuelan refugees are Colombia (1.84 million people), Peru
(1.29 million people) and Ecuador (513,900 people).5 According to the statistics consulted, women
account for 50% of refugees in Colombia and 58% of those in Peru.6
9JKNGKVKUVTWGVJCVVJGNCTIGUVGZQFWUQHRGQRNGHTQO8GPG\WGNCVQQMRNCEGDGVYGGPCPFVJG
beginning of 2020 (about 4,110,079 people)7, refugees are continuing to leave Venezuela every day.
Many enter at irregular crossing points along the extensive borders with Colombia and the other neigh-
bouring countries.
4 #OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCN7TIGPVOGCUWTGU 8GPG\WGNCPUPGGFKPVGTPCVKQPCNRTQVGEVKQP
#/4 JVVRU YYYCOPGUV[QTI
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5 482NCVHQTO4GHWIGGUCPF/KITCPVUHTQO8GPG\WGNCWRFCVGF/C[JVVRU YYYTXKPHQGPTGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVUCEEGUUGF
QP/C[
6 IPQH8GPG\WGNCPUKP%QNQODKCYGTGYQOGP
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G\QNCPC GP %QNQODKC WP RCPQTCOC EQP GPHQSWG FG IÅPGTQ JVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQƂNGUKPXGUVKICEKQPGUPQVCUGUVCFKUVKECU
LWNPQVCGUVCFKUVKECRQDNCEKQPOKITCPVGXGPG\QNCPCRCPQTCOCEQPGPHQSWGFGIGPGTQRFH+PVJGUCOG[GCT%#4'TGRQTVGFVJCV
QH8GPG\WGNCPUKP2GTWYGTGYQOGPCPF%#4'7PCGOGTIGPEKCFGUKIWCN #P½NKUKU4½RKFQFG)ÅPGTQUQDTGNC%TKUKUFG4GHWIKCFQU
[/KITCPVGUGP%QNQODKC'EWCFQT2GTÖ[8GPG\WGNC,WPG
https://www.r4v.info/es/document/una-emergencia-desigual-analisis-rapido-de-genero-sobre-la-crisis-de-refugiados-y
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3. BACKGROUND
Figure 1
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Colombia has been characterized both as a country of transit and a country of residence for many
people from Venezuela. In response, the Colombian authorities have made some efforts to identify and
regularize the status of Venezuelans, establishing different programmes and regularization mecha-
nisms – the Special Residence Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia) in 2018 and the Temporary
Protection Statute (Estatuto Temporal de Protección) in 2021 – aimed at facilitating the regularization
of the situation of Venezuelans in Colombian territory.
6JGCTOGFEQPƃKEVUKP%QNQODKCVJCVCTGEQPVKPWKPIFGURKVGVJGUKIPKPIQHVJG2GCEG#ITGGOGPVKP
DGVYGGPVJGUVCVGCPFVJG(#4%'2IWGTTKNNCUKPETGCUGVJGTKUMUHCEGFD[8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGU
especially women, who arrive in the country after experiencing violence and human rights violations,
either at irregular border crossings or in different areas of the country.
Peru is the country with the second largest number of Venezuelans. To respond to this situation, in
addition to the existing asylum procedure, the government has created a regularization programme
MPQYPCU6GORQTCT[4GUKFGPEG2GTOKVU
%CTPÅFG2GTOKUQ6GORQTCNFG2GTOCPGPEKC *QYGXGTVJG
mass arrival of Venezuelans triggered a change in migration policy and national and international
organizations have highlighted the tendency of the Peruvian authorities, starting in 2018, to create
QDUVCENGUVQRGQRNGUGGMKPIVQGPVGTVJGEQWPVT[CVTGIWNCTOKITCVKQPRQKPVUD[FGOCPFKPICJWOCP-
KVCTKCPXKUCQTUVCVKPIVJCVVJG[OWUVTGSWGUVCPFYCKVHQTTGHWIGGUVCVWUQWVUKFG2GTWXKCPVGTTKVQT[9
The mass arrival of Venezuelans in Colombia and Peru has been accompanied by high levels of stig-
OCVK\CVKQPCPFZGPQRJQDKCVQYCTFU8GPG\WGNCPUHTGSWGPVN[CEEWUGFQHCPFYKVJQWVGXKFGPEGJGNF
to be responsible for crime, as part of political strategies to exploit fear and insecurity. This narrative
JCUGXGPDGGPFGRNQ[GFD[UGPKQTQHƂEKCNU+P2GTWVJGRTGUKFGPVKCNGNGEVKQPECORCKIPYCU
OCTMGFD[KPVGPUGUVKIOCVK\CVKQPQH8GPG\WGNCPUKPVJGEQWPVT[ In Colombia, in the same year, in
$QIQV½VJGETGCVKQPQHCURGEKCNUGEWTKV[HQTEGWPKVYCURTQRQUGFVQEQODCVETKOGUEQOOKVVGFD[
foreign migrants.11
6JGƂTUVOCUUƃQYUQHRGQRNGHTQO8GPG\WGNCYGTGEQORQUGFOQUVN[QHOGP
HQTGZCORNGQH
those in Peru), many of them professionals or with some economic options that enabled them to settle
in the host countries. However, according to various sources consulted, the proportion of Venezuelan
refugee women has increased from 47% to 50% since 201712 and in cases such as Peru it has gone
from 47% to 58%.135GXGTCNHCEVQTUEQPVTKDWVGVQVJGHGOKPK\CVKQPQHVJGOKITCVQT[ƃQYKPENWFKPI
HCOKN[TGWPKƂECVKQPQTVJGUGCTEJHQTQRRQTVWPKVKGUVQCEEGUUJGCNVJECTG14 education and food for
their children or elderly people in their care, not available in Venezuela.15 In these cases, women do
not travel alone, but as caregivers for other people who accompany them along the migration routes
and once settled in the host cities. For example, family connections were the reasons why some 55%
of Venezuelan refugee women who arrived in Colombia in 2020 left Venezuela. A gender analysis
KPFKECVGUVJCVVJKUKUNKPMGFVQVJGECTGTGURQPUKDKNKVKGUCUUQEKCVGFYKVJVJGTQNGUCUUKIPGFVQYQOGP
(QTOQTGQP6GORQTCT[2TQVGEVKQP5VCVWUUGGJVVRU YYYOKITCEKQPEQNQODKCIQXEQXKUKDNGU
5RCPKUJQPN[
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCN2GTW +PUGCTEJQHUCHGV[ 2GTWVWTPUKVUDCEMQPRGQRNGƃGGKPI8GPG\WGNC
#/4
JVVRU YYYCOPGUV[QTIGPFQEWOGPVUCOTGP
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCN2GTÖ %QOWPKECEKÏPCN%QOKVÅFG2TQVGEEKÏPFGNQU>GEJQUFG6QFQUNQU6TCDCLCFQTGU/KITCVQTKQUFGNCU
0CEKQPGU7PKFCURTGXKCCUWCUGUKÏP
#/4 JVVRU YYYCOPGUV[QTIGUFQEWOGPVUCOTGU
'N2CÉUn.CCNECNFGUCFG$QIQV½CIKVCNCZGPQHQDKCCNRTQRQPGTWPEQOCPFQGURGEKCNEQPVTCOKITCPVGUETKOKPCNGUo#WIWUVJVVRU GNRCKU
EQOKPVGTPCEKQPCNNCCNECNFGUCFGDQIQVCCIKVCNCZGPQHQDKCCNRTQRQPGTWPEQOCPFQGURGEKCNEQPVTCOKITCPVGUETKOKPCNGUJVON
0CVKQPCN#FOKPKUVTCVKXG&GRCTVOGPVQH5VCVKUVKEU
�' 0QVC'UVCFÉUVKEC/KITCEKÏPGP%QNQODKCWPRCPQTCOCEQPGPHQSWGFG
IÅPGTQJVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQƂNGUKPXGUVKICEKQPGUPQVCUGUVCFKUVKECULWNPQVCGUVCFKUVKECRQDNCEKQPOKITCPVGXGPG\QNC-
PCRCPQTCOCEQPGPHQSWGFGIGPGTQRFH $CTÏOGVTQ FG :GPQHQDKC /WLGTGU OKITCPVGU JKRGTUGZWCNK\CEKÏP [ OCEJKUOQ QPNKPG CV
JVVR DCTQOGVTQFGZGPQHQDKCQTIRWDNKECEKQPGUCEEGUUGF/C[ CPF%#4'7PCGOGTIGPEKCFGUKIWCN #P½NKUKU4½RKFQFG)ÅPGTQ
UQDTGNC%TKUKUFG4GHWIKCFQU[/KITCPVGUGP%QNQODKC'EWCFQT2GTÖ[8GPG\WGNC,WPG
%#4'7PCGOGTIGPEKCFGUKIWCN #P½NKUKU4½RKFQFG)ÅPGTQUQDTGNC%TKUKUFG4GHWIKCFQU[/KITCPVGUGP%QNQODKC'EWCFQT2GTÖ
[8GPG\WGNC,WPG
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNn8GPG\WGNC 7PCVVGPFGFJGCNVJTKIJVUETKUKUKUHQTEKPIVJQWUCPFUVQƃGGoRTGUUTGNGCUG/CTEJJVVRU
YYYCOPGUV[QTIGPNCVGUVPGYUXGPG\WGNCWPCVVGPFGFJGCNVJTKIJVUETKUKUKUHQTEKPIVJQWUCPFUVQƃGG
5VCVGOGPVUD[8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGP(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC#RTKN5GGCNUQ 4GF%NCOQT2KGURCTCSWGVGVGPIQ0Q-
XGODGTJVVRU YYYTXKPHQGUFQEWOGPVKPHQTOGTGFENCOQTRKGURCTCSWGVGVGPIQPQXKGODTGGUCEEGUUGF/C[
p#NVJQWIJVJGDQTFGTUYGTGENQUGFVJKUJCUPQVOGCPVVJCVVJGƃQYJCUCEVWCNN[
decreased. What we have are people who are unregistered and have no possibility
of regularizing their situation, and we do not know where they are or what
violations they may have experienced. It’s quite complex.” 2GTWXKCPQHƂEKCN
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On the other hand, refugee women who still have family in Venezuela are not only the main bread-
winners for their family during the migration process, but also for those who have remained in their
country of origin.16
It is important to note that there are high rates of gender-based violence against women in both transit
and host countries. In Colombia, the Comprehensive System on Gender-Based Violence (Sistema In-
tegrado de Violencias de Género, SIVIGE)17 reported a total of 122,758 cases throughout the country
in 2020. Of these, 58,904 involved physical violence; 31,635 sexual violence; 18,967 neglect and
desertion; and 9,782 psychological violence. Of this total number of cases, 78% of the survivors were
women.
In Peru, the Aurora Programme,19 via the Women’s Emergency Centres (Centros de Emergencia Mujer,
CEM), recorded 114,495 cases of gender-based violence in 2020. Of these cases, 97,926, or 85.5%,
QHUWTXKXQTUYGTGYQOGP6JGECUGUFKUCIITGICVGFCEEQTFKPIVQVJGV[RGQHXKQNGPEGYGTG
cases of psychological violence; 44,125 cases of physical violence; 13,843 cases of sexual violence;
and 532 cases of economic violence.
As this report shows, refugee women in Venezuela experience sexual violence and gender-based vi-
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cruitment by armed groups and enforced disappearance. There have also been incidents where their
companions or the people they care for, including their children,21 have been targeted, both during the
migratory journey and in the places where they settle.
16 D#0'0QVC'UVCFÉUVKEC/KITCEKÏPGP%QNQODKCWPRCPQTCOCEQPGPHQSWGFGIÅPGTQJVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQHKNGU
KPXGUVKICEKQPGUPQVCUGUVCFKUVKECULWNPQVCGUVCFKUVKECRQDNCEKQPOKITCPVGXGPG\QNCPCRCPQTCOCEQPGPHQSWGFGIGPGTQRFH
CPF*+#5709QOGP/WLGTGUGPOQXKNKFCFJWOCPC[XKQNGPEKCDCUCFCGPIÅPGTQ'EWCFQTJVVRU YYYTXKPHQUKVGUFGHCWNV
ƂNGU107A/WLGTGUA*+#5A&KCIPÏUVKEQA8$)A/WLGTGUA/QXKNKFCFA*WOCPCRFHCEEGUUGF/C[
#OQPIVJGV[RGUQHXKQNGPEGVJCV5+8+)'ENCUUKƂGUCUIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCTG RJ[UKECNXKQNGPEGRU[EJQNQIKECNXKQNGPEGUGZWCNXKQNGPEG
and neglect and desertion. For more information, see Colombian Ministry of Health National Observatory on Gender-Based Violence at https://
YYYUKURTQIQXEQQDUGTXCVQTKQUQPXKQNGPEKCUIGPGTQ2CIKPCUJQOGCURZ
ƂNVGT)GPGTCN+PFKECVQTU CEEGUUGF#RTKN
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IGPGTQ2CIKPCUJQOGCURZ
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19 The purpose of the National Programme for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Members of the Family
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by family and sexual violence, thus contributing to improving the quality of life of the population.
#WTQTC2TQITCOOGJVVRU RQTVCNGUVCFKUVKEQCWTQTCIQDRGEQORGPFKQU UGGEQORGPFKWO
5RCPKUJQPN[
70&24GKPXGPVCTUGUQDTGNCOCTEJC /WLGTGUTGHWIKCFCU[OKITCPVGUFG8GPG\WGNC
7PGUVWFKQFGUWUEQPFKEKQPGU[CEEGUQUCOGFKQUFGXKFCGP%QNQODKC'EWCFQT[2GTÖYKVJVJGUWRRQTVQHVJG482TQVGEVKQP5GEVKQP
RWDNKUJGFKP#RTKNYKVJƂIWTGUHQT
Figure 2
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4. VIOLENCE: MULTIPLE
AND OMNIPRESENT
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In countries with already high rates of gender-based violence, violence against Venezuelan refugee
YQOGPOCPKHGUVUKVUGNHKPXCTKQWUURCEGUCPFKPOWNVKRNGHQTOU RJ[UKECNXKQNGPEGUGZWCNJCTCUUOGPV
sexual violence and psychological violence; all violence that occurs in the public space, in the family
CPFKPVJGYQTMRNCEG
Despite the fact that Colombia has SIVIGE, an inter-institutional effort aimed at managing information
about gender-based violence22, consolidated public data is only available up to 2020. The available
ƂIWTGUUJQYVJCVXKQNGPEGCICKPUV8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPKP%QNQODKCJCUITQYPGZRQPGPVKCNN[
since 2017, when 166 cases were registered, reaching 4,165 cases reported in 2020 (see Figure 3).
According to SIVIGE, 80.89% of cases of violence against Venezuelan women occurred in the home,
11.5% in the street and 7.6% in other spaces.23 Figure 4 indicates the types of violence reported.
(QTOQTGKPHQTOCVKQPUGGJVVRU YYYUKURTQIQXEQQDUGTXCVQTKQUQPXKQNGPEKCUIGPGTQ2CIKPCUJQOGCURZCEEGUUGFDGVYGGP,CPW-
CT[CPF/C[
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23 Colombian Ministry of Health National Observatory on Gender-Based Violence https://www.sispro.gov.co/observatorios/onviolencias-
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Figure 3
Figure 4
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In Peru, the National Programme for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and
Members of the Family (Programa Nacional para la Prevención y Erradicación de la Violencia contra
las Mujeres e Integrantes del Grupo Familiar, AURORA)24 provides disaggregated information on for-
GKIPPCVKQPCNUYJQCEEGUU%'/UGTXKEGU#EEQTFKPIVQVJGUGƂIWTGUDGVYGGPCPFCDQWV
70% of foreign nationals who accessed CEM services were Venezuelan women, and the number of
cases has tripled, going from 250 in 2017, to 759 in 2018, to 2,022 in 2019.25
Between 2019 and 2021, the dynamics changed (see Figure 5). The fall in the number of cases in
KUNKPMGFVQVJGTGUVTKEVKQPUQPVTCPUKVCPFOQXGOGPVCFQRVGFD[IQXGTPOGPVUKPTGURQPUGVQ
the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the number of cases reported by phone through the helpline Línea
100, which provides information and advice on gender-based violence, went from 119,786 in 2019
to 235,791 in 2020, an increase of 98%.267PHQTVWPCVGN[VJGUGƂIWTGUCTGPQVFKUCIITGICVGFD[VJG
nationality of the women complainants.
The CEM reported that it provided services to foreign women 681 times between January and March
2022, which suggests that the demand for support services from Venezuelan refugee women con-
tinues to increase.277PHQTVWPCVGN[CNVJQWIJVJG[GCTD[[GCTƂIWTGUCTGFKUCIITGICVGFD[V[RGQH
violence, they also do not contain data corresponding to the nationality of the survivor.
The increase in the number of cases reported in both countries coincides with the growth of the Ven-
ezuelan refugee population in both Colombia and Peru since 2018.*QYGXGTVJGƂIWTGUTGEQTFGF
are very low in relation to the percentage of Venezuelan women in each country. For Colombia, the
4,165 cases represent just 0.45% of Venezuelan women who are estimated to live in the country.
(QT2GTWVJGƂIWTGKUGXGPNQYGTCPFVJGECUGUTGIKUVGTGFD[VJG%'/TGRTGUGPVQHVJG
Venezuelan female population in the country.
6JGUGEQPUKFGTCVKQPUCPFƂIWTGUYQWNFUGGOVQKPFKECVGUKIPKƂECPVWPFGTTGRQTVKPIQHECUGUQHTGH-
ugee women users of prevention and support programmes in Colombia and Peru. This is also indic-
ative of the challenges faced by Venezuelan women in accessing existing state care pathways. As an
illustration, below is a comparison of the cases of sexual violence recorded by the Aurora Programme
between 2019 and 2021.
24 The purpose of the National Programme for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Members of the Family
#7414#KUVQFGUKIPCPFKORNGOGPVCVVJGPCVKQPCNNGXGNCEVKQPUCPFRQNKEKGUHQTVJGECTGRTGXGPVKQPCPFUWRRQTVQHRGQRNGCHHGEVGF
by family and sexual violence, thus contributing to improving the quality of life of the population.
#WTQTC2TQITCOOGUGGJVVRU RQTVCNGUVCFKUVKEQCWTQTCIQDRGVKRQUFGRQDNCEKQPCPFJVVRU RQTVCNGUVCFKUVKEQCWTQTCIQD
RGVKRQUFGRQDNCEKQP
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%QNQODKCP 1DUGTXCVQT[ HQT 9QOGP $QNGVÉP 'URGEKCN .C XKQNGPEKC EQPVTC NCU OWLGTGU OKITCPVGU WPC HTQPVGTC RQT UWRGTCT
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Figure 5
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4.1 IN PUBLIC SPACES
In host cities
Sources consulted by Amnesty International agree that violence against women in public spaces is
widespread and manifests itself both against nationals, Peruvian and Colombian women, and against
refugee women, including Venezuelan women.291PGQHVJGYQOGPKPVGTXKGYGFUCKF p6JGTGKUCNQV
of violence here in Peru, there is a lot of violence. Against Venezuelan as well as Peruvian women,
it’s not only us Venezuelan women who experience violence. Peruvian women also experience a lot of
violence, a lot of abuse.”
However, the same sources agree that violence against Venezuelan women manifests itself in a differ-
ent way because of stereotypes related to their bodies and sexuality, exposing them to harassment,
XKQNGPEGCPFGXGPVQDGKPIVJGXKEVKOUQHJWOCPVTCHƂEMKPICPFJKPFGTKPIVJGKTUQEKCNKPVGITCVKQPKP
host cities.31 Amnesty International found that refugee women face multiple forms of gender-based
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Colombia, women also reported violence along the different migration routes. The data available for
Colombia show that 24.1% of women have experienced discrimination or have been unfairly treated
because they are Venezuelan refugees. Of these, 58.8% said that they had experienced such violence
in the streets.32
This violence combines stereotypes associated not only with their nationality, but also with the fact
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perceived sexuality of Venezuelan women. These stereotypes, by undermining their worth and dignity,
KPETGCUGVJGTKUMQHXKQNGPEGCPFECPNGCFVQXGTDCNCUUCWNVRU[EJQNQIKECNXKQNGPEGJCTCUUOGPVCPF
sexual violence.
+PVGTXKGYUYKVJXCTKQWUKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNUKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTWDGVYGGP/CTEJCPF#RTKN KPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP
.KOC/CTEJ (QEWU)TQWR.KOC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP/CTEJ
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31 %QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCT $CTÏOGV-
TQFG:GPQHQDKC$QNGVÉP*KRGTUGZWCNK\CEKÏP[OCEJKUOQQPNKPGJVVR DCTQOGVTQFGZGPQHQDKCQTIRWDNKECEKQPGUCEEGUUGF/C[
7PKXGTUKV[QHVJG2CEKƂE70*%4CPCN[UKUQHOGFKCEQXGTCIGQHTGHWIGGUCPFOKITCPVUCVJVVRU YYYCEPWTQTIDHG
RFH
5RCPKUJQPN[
32 0CVKQPCN#FOKPKUVTCVKXG&GRCTVOGPVQH5VCVKUVKEU
�' 2WNUG/KITCVKQP5WTXG[CVJVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQKPFGZRJR
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5RCPKUJQPN[
Figure 6
“They said that we came here to be homewreckers, that we were all prostitutes.
So even though that’s far from the case, they blame all of us, saying that we’re
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go back to our own country, that there’s nothing for us here. Colombians have
done a long list of things to me so my experience here has not been a very good
one.” Estefanía, a Venezuelan woman in Colombia
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The image of Venezuelan women, associated with stereotypes of hypersexualization, and in some cases
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YQTMCPFKPUQEKCNTGNCVKQPUJKRU33 The information and statements gathered also reveal prejudices in
VJGJQUVEQOOWPKVKGUVJCVUGGTGHWIGGYQOGPCUpUVGCNKPIJWUDCPFUqCPFJQOGYTGEMGTUYJKEJJCU
at times resulted in violence against them by women in the host countries.
These images that objectify and hypersexualize refugee women encourage discrimination and xeno-
phobia both on the migration routes and in the host cities, exacerbating their situation of vulnerability
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#OQPIVJGV[RGUQHXKQNGPEGKFGPVKƂGFKPRWDNKEURCEGUKUsexual violence. Although this affects all
Venezuelan refugee women, Venezuelan trans women are in a particularly vulnerable situation because
of their gender identity, since they transgress entrenched patriarchal and male gender roles in socie-
ties such as Colombia and Peru.35
It should be borne in mind that the discrimination and exclusion to which some transgender women in
RCTVKEWNCTCTGUWDLGEVGFTGUWNVUKPVJGKTJCXKPITGFWEGFLQDQRRQTVWPKVKGUFTKXKPIVJGONQQMHQTPKIJV
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#PQVJGTUVCVGOGPVJKIJNKIJVUJQYUGZWCNXKQNGPEGKUCPGXGT[FC[HCEVKPVJGNKXGUQHTGHWIGGYQOGP
• On migration routes
8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPHCEGUKIPKƂECPVTKUMUVQVJGKTNKXGUCPFRJ[UKECNKPVGITKV[CNQPIVJGGPVKTG
migration route. Amnesty International received information about cases of physical and sexual vio-
lence against women all along the route as they headed to the host cities.36
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482TQVGEVKQP5GEVKQP
35 %CTKDG#ƂTOCVKXQ2GTƂNGUOKITCVQTKQUFGNCEQOWPKFCF.)$6+3
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+PVGTXKGYUYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNUKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTWDGVYGGP/CTEJCPF#RTKN5GGCNUQ 4GF%NCOQT2KGURCTCSWGVG
VGPIQJVVRU YYYCEPWTQTIRWDNKECVKQPURWDARTQVHCFGRKGURCTCSWGVGPIQVGUVKOQPKQUFGRGTUQPCUXGPG\QNCPCUTGHW-
IKCFCU[OKITCPVGUJVONCEEGUUGF#RTKN
“More than anything, it’s women, these comments are directed from one woman
to another, it’s like ‘they come here, they hate me, they prostitute themselves’.
Let’s not deny it, there are women who do, but it is out of necessity, because they
can’t get work.” Daniela, a Venezuelan woman in Colombia
“I have been exposed to attempted rape twice here in Lima… and the attempted rapes were
in the street, also the police wouldn’t accept my complaint because ‘what was I doing running
in the streets at 6.30 in the morning’... The second attempt was January 2020, I remember, I
was running again, I run a lot. I am a very active person, I really like to do sports and I run in
the morning before I go to work. It happened near my home too, where I’ve always lived…
I still live in the same place and I constantly have the same fear of coming across the same
person. The second time… this time it was a little more in your face because that gentleman
chased me with his penis out of his pants. I was running, he was running after me and nobody
was doing anything and I didn’t understand why nobody was doing anything. I went again to the
police station, the same station, and said that there was a person with his private parts exposed
chasing the women in the park. Honestly, I saved myself because I jumped over a fence and
when he jumped I turned around. It really was because of that, like he didn’t expect me to turn
and face him.” Mariana, a Venezuelan woman in Peru
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According to the statements received, Venezuelan women travel in fear and with the constant threat
of being targeted for different forms of gender-based violence by men in transit countries, for example
being forced to have sex in order to access transport or experiencing harassment and/or sexual violence
CVWPQHƂEKCNDQTFGTETQUUKPIU37 According to information received by international organizations, Ven-
ezuelan women also experience violence, including sexual violence, from those in the group they are
YCNMKPICNQPIYKVJYJGPVJG[LQKPITQWRUQHOGPKPUGCTEJQHUCHGV[QPVJGLQWTPG[
The evidence gathered shows that gender-based violence also occurs at irregular border crossings.
At some irregular crossings, also called “trochas” (shortcuts), refugees may be exposed to multiple
forms of violence39KPENWFKPICUUCWNVCPFUGZWCNXKQNGPEGCPFVJGTKUMQHDGKPIVTCHƂEMGFHQTUGZWCN
exploitation.
VIOLENCE BY NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS IN COLOMBIA: “DOUBLE JEOPARDY”
(“DOBLES AFECTACIONES”)
The concept of “double jeopardy” refers to the situation of an individual or a
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their status as people on the move and because of a context of violence, such
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statements about Venezulan women in “double jeopardy” in Colombia. The presence in Colombia
of various non-state armed groups, many of them installed in areas along the borders with Venezuela,
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them because they are women on the move. Venezuelan refugee women are victims of gender-based
violence by organized armed groups. 41
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+PVGTXKGYUYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNU%QNQODKC/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP%ÖEWVC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYUYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNU%QNQODKC/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP%ÖEWVC/CTEJ5GG
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8$) GPNCU/WLGTGU/KITCPVGU&GURNC\CFCU[UW#EEGUQCN
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CEEGUUGF/C[
Border Perú - Ecuador. Copyright Fernanda Pineda/Amnesty International.
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Representatives of international organizations and civil society stated that there are cases of gen-
der-based violence in border areas such as Norte de Santander, Santander, Nariño, Cauca, areas
QH%QNQODKCYJGTGEQECETQRUCPFFTWIVTCHƂEMKPICPFOKETQVTCHƂEMKPIEQTTKFQTUCTGRTGXCNGPV42
6JGNCEMQHGEQPQOKEQRRQTVWPKVKGUHQT8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGUOGCPUVJCVUQOGRGQRNGQRVHQTEQEC
RNCPVKPICPFJCTXGUVKPIYQTM9QOGPHCEGJKIJTKUMUQHDGKPITGETWKVGFKPVQVTCHƂEMKPIHQTUGZWCN
GZRNQKVCVKQPp6JG[VCMGYQOGPnTGETWKVGFoHQTWPRCKFFQOGUVKEYQTM+PDQTFGTCTGCUYJCVJCR-
RGPUKUVJCVVJGTGCTGEKUCPFVTCPU=8GPG\WGNCP?YQOGPNQQMKPIHQTYQTMCPFVJG[TGETWKVVJGO
VQYQTMQPnTCPEJGUo43CPFVJG[ƂPFVJCVVJGUGCTGVTCHƂEMKPIPGVYQTMUHQTVJGRWTRQUGQHUGZWCN
exploitation”, said one of the people interviewed. 44
This is what happened to Stella, a Venezuelan refugee woman who was persuaded by a Venezuelan
HTKGPFVQETQUUVJGDQTFGTCPFIQVQYQTMQPEQECpHCTOUq
4.2 INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
Violence in the family, where the alleged perpetrator is the victim’s partner or former partner, is
the most prevalent form of violence in the lives of Colombian and Peruvian women, as well as of
8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGP+VECPVCMGVJGHQTOQHRU[EJQNQIKECNRJ[UKECNGEQPQOKECPFUGZWCN
violence.
#NVJQWIJKP2GTWKVKUQPN[RQUUKDNGVQCEEGUUƂIWTGUQPXKQNGPEGRGTRGVTCVGFD[VJGKPVKOCVG
partner or ex-partner of foreign women in general, the information available and the statements
gathered indicate that intimate partner violence against Venezuelan refugee women has increased
in both Colombia and Peru.45 In Colombia, during 2020, 80.89% of cases of gender-based violence
against Venezuelan refugee women reported by SIVIGE occurred in the home.466JGƂIWTGUUJQYCP
increase in violence in this area, from 75% in 2018.
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8$) GPNCU/WLGTGU/KITCPVGU&GURNC\CFCU[UW
#EEGUQCN5KUVGOCFG2TQVGEEKÏP,WUVKEKC[4GRCTCEKÏPGP%QNQODKC0QXGODGT
43 Places where people live and work in rural areas.
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+PVGTXKGYUYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNUKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTWDGVYGGP/CTEJCPF#RTKNCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[
QTICPK\CVKQPKP2GTW/CTEJ
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UGTXCVQT[QP)GPFGT$CUGF8KQNGPEGJVVRU YYYUKURTQIQXEQQDUGTXCVQTKQUQPXKQNGPEKCUIGPGTQ2CIKPCUJQOGCURZ
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“I left everything there, my son, my mother and my whole family in Venezuela and I emigrated
here, I didn’t know where to go, I knew nothing about these places and I arrived in a guerrilla
zone. When I arrived in that area there were lots of Venezuelan and Colombian people... I
didn’t really know anything, not even what the types of plants were…
... When night fell I rode on an animal, a donkey, for four hours to reach the farm. When I
arrived at that farm it was terrible, I didn’t even know who was there, whether it was the
army or the guerrillas. I was worried because I didn’t know what the score was. They came
every day: giving me panela, and I don’t know what else.
... In Cúcuta, I didn’t experience what happened there. Here thank God they didn’t say, ‘no,
sell your body’. Here, I was never told that. If I did it, it was of my own free will, they never
told me to or pointed a gun at me. But, there [on the farm] there were much worse things.”
Stella, a Venezuelan woman in Colombia
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T
The cases documented during the research for this report indicate that violence in the domestic sphere
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URCEGUVQECTGHQTEJKNFTGPWPFGTƂXGCPFUWDUGSWGPVFKHƂEWNVKGUGPTQNNKPIVJGOKPUEJQQNEQWRNGF
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their children in the home and to become economically dependent, which in some cases escalates
from control to violence.
In both countries, the statements gathered show that intimate partner violence can come from part-
ners or former partners, from nationals of the host countries as well as Venezuelans. According to the
YQOGP#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNKPVGTXKGYGF p0QYXKQNGPEGD[8GPG\WGNCPOGPKUPQTOCNK\KPIUQOG-
thing that was not always the case in Venezuela.”47
Among the factors that help explain the increase in intimate partner violence by Venezuelan men are
the prevalence of macho cultures and the normalization of violence in society, as well as the “new
HCOKN[TGEQPƂIWTCVKQPUq during the migration process that in some cases result in changes in rela-
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QWVUKFGVJGJQOG QTYQOGPYJQKP8GPG\WGNCJCFRCKFYQTMDWVKPVJGJQUVEKVKGUJCXGVQYQTMCU
ECTGTUKPVJGJQOGYJKNGVJGKTRCTVPGTYQTMUQWVUKFGVJGJQOG49
Several interviewees reported cases of gender-based violence by Venezuelan men to Amnesty Interna-
tional.
Researchers also documented cases where male partners who are nationals of the host country abused
their relationship of power and made refugee women feel that they do not have rights in the host coun-
trypVJG[OCMGVJGODGNKGXGVJCVVJG[FQPQVJCXGTKIJVUDGECWUGVJG[CTGOKITCPVUVJG[VCMGCYC[
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5VCVGOGPVU(QEWU)TQWRUCPF.KOC2GTWCPF/CTEJ
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/KITCPVGUGP%QNQODKC'EWCFQT2GTÖ[8GPG\WGNC,WPG
+PVGTXKGYUYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPUKP%QNQODKC/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYUYKVJPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPUKP2GTW/CTEJ
CPF(QEWU)TQWR2GTW/CTEJ
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+PVGTXKGYUYKVJPCVKQPCNCPFKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPUKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTW/CTEJ
Figure 7
“In the case of Venezuelans, they are men who feel more ‘empowered’ here in Colombia
because they are the ones who are working and the woman, if she came with children and
has two or more, cannot leave the home, this triggers Venezuelan men’s machismo... There
are even many women who say: ‘How long does the activity last? I have to leave quickly
because my husband is waiting for me’ or ‘lend me the phone because I have to tell my
husband’, or ‘lend me the phone to send a photo so my husband knows that I am here’, that’s
the level they are reduced to”. Micaela, a Venezuelan woman in Colombia
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• Leaving the aggressor: almost impossible for Venezuelan women without resources or support
According to the information gathered, the majority of refugees from Venezuela face precarious eco-
nomic circumstances in the host cities.52 For women, this comes on top of other pre-existing situations
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care for. In these contexts, in addition to physical and psychological violence, many suffer patrimonial
and economic violence from their partner who is the “sole” breadwinner for the family. For example,
5CPFTCYJQEWTTGPVN[NKXGUYKVJJGTJWUDCPFKP$QIQV½VQNF#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCN p*GIKXGUOG
dollars a day and I have to try to manage on that, sometimes he doesn’t give any money, for example,
when he gets angry and leaves.”53
6JGFKHƂEWNVKGUYQOGPHCEGDTGCMKPIVJGE[ENGQHXKQNGPEGCPFOQXKPICYC[HTQOVJGKTCDWUGTUJCXG
DGGPYKFGN[FQEWOGPVGF(QT#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNGEQPQOKEXKQNGPEGEQWRNGFYKVJYQOGPoUNCEM
QHGORNQ[OGPVQTLQDKPUGEWTKV[VJGCDUGPEGQHEJKNFECTGCPFKPUWHƂEKGPVVGORQTCT[UJGNVGTU
UGG
%JCRVGT OCMGKVGXGPOQTGFKHƂEWNVHQT8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTWVQNGCXGVJGKT
RCTVPGTUVQRTQVGEVVJGKTNKXGU1PGJWOCPKVCTKCPYQTMGTRQKPVGFQWVHQTGZCORNGVJCVC8GPG\WGNCP
YQOCPYJGPCUMGFYJ[UJGFKFPQVTGRQTVVJGXKQNGPEGTGRNKGF p+JCXGPQYJGTGVQIQ6JG[VQNFOG
that there are not enough shelters.”54
4.3 AT WORK
6JGYQTMGPXKTQPOGPVKUQPGQHVJGURCEGUYJGTGVJG8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKPVGTXKGYGFGZRTGUUGFHCEKPI
UKIPKƂECPVNGXGNUQHKPHQTOCNKV[CPFXKQNGPEG5QWTEGUEQPUWNVGFCPFEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQPUKPDQVJ
EQWPVTKGUDGNKGXGVJCVVJGUKVWCVKQPQHGEQPQOKERTGECTKQWUPGUUVJGNCEMQHTGIWNCTK\CVKQPQHVJGKTOK-
ITCVKQPUVCVWUCPFVJGNCEMQHCEEGUUVQVTCKPKPIRTQITCOOGUCPFGEQPQOKEGORQYGTOGPVOGCUWTGU
because they cannot regularize their migration status, force Venezuelan women in Colombia and Peru
VQYQTMKPVJGKPHQTOCNUGEVQTYJGTGVJG[FQPQVJCXGCP[RTQVGEVKQPCICKPUVVJGXKQNGPEGVCTIGVGF
against them.55
+PDQVJ%QNQODKCCPF2GTWCNCTIGPWODGTQHRGQRNGYQTMKPVJGKPHQTOCNUGEVQT+P%QNQODKCDG-
VYGGP&GEGODGTCPF(GDTWCT[QHYQTMKPICIGRGQRNGYGTGGORNQ[GFKPVJGKPHQTOCN
sector, 42.7% of this total were women.56+P2GTWKPVJGRGTEGPVCIGQHRGQRNGYQTMKPIKPVJG
informal sector reached 76%57, but this information does not disaggregate the percentage of women.
In Colombia, a Pulse Migration Survey by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Depar-
tamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE) indicates that 82% of Venezuelan women in
VJGCEVKXGYQTMHQTEGUCKFVJG[JCFFKHƂEWNVKGUKPQDVCKPKPIRCKFYQTM1HVJGUGQPN[JCFCYTKVVGP
contract, compared to 84% who said they have a verbal contract.
+P2GTWVJG1HƂEGQHVJG)GPGTCN5WRGTKPVGPFGPVHQT/KITCVKQP
5WRGTKPVGPFGPEKC)GPGTCNFG/K-
graciones) has registered 566,707 adult women foreign nationals in the country. Of these, 74% are
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+P%QNQODKCQHTGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVYQOGPCTGNKXKPIKPUQEKQGEQPQOKEUVTCVCCPF %QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP
$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCT
+PVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOCP%QNQODKC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJCPKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQP%QNQODKC/CTEJ
%QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCT
56 �'0GCTN[OKNNKQP2GTWXKCPULQKPGFVJGKPHQTOCNYQTMUGEVQTKP
JVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQKPFGZRJRGUVCFKUVKECURQTVGOCOGTECFQNCDQTCNGORNGQKPHQTOCN[UGIWTKFCFUQEKCN ` VGZV .CRTQRQT-
EK%$PFGQEWRCFQUKPHQTOCNGUOGVTQRQNKVCPCUHWG%CEEGUUGF
5RCPKUJQPN[
)GUVKQPn%GTECFGOKNNQPGUFGRGTWCPQUGPVTCTQPCNCKPHQTOCNKFCFNCDQTCNGNo/CTEJJVVRU IGUVKQPRGGEQPQ-
OKCOCPCIGOGPVGORNGQEGTECFGOKNNQPGUFGRGTWCPQUGPVTCTQPCNCKPHQTOCNKFCFNCDQTCNGNKPHQTOCNKFCFNCDQTCNKPGKVTC-
bajo-sin-derechos-sociales-noticia/
�' 2WNUG /KITCVKQP 5WTXG[ JVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQKPFGZRJRGUVCFKUVKECURQTVGOCFGOQITCƂC[RQDNCEKQPGPEWGUVCRWN-
UQFGNCOKITCEKQPGROCEEGUUGF#RTKN
5RCPKUJQPN[
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YQTMQPCPWPRCKFDCUKUCPFKPQHECUGUVJGKTGORNQ[OGPVUVCVWUEQWNFPQVDGFGVGTOKPGF
It should be noted that 22% of the women completed secondary education and 18% completed tech-
nical or higher education.59
+PDQVJEQWPVTKGUTGHWIGGUHCEGDCTTKGTUVQCEEGUUKPIQRRQTVWPKVKGUHQTFGEGPVYQTMKPIEQPFKVKQPU+P
%QNQODKCHQTGZCORNG8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKFGPVKƂGFNCEMQHYQTMRGTOKVUCUVJGOCKPDCTTKGTHQN-
NQYGFD[NCEMQHGZRGTKGPEGFKUETKOKPCVKQPCPFNCEMQHCEEGUUVQKPHQTOCVKQPQPLQDQHHGTU Several
YQOGPEQOOGPVGFVJCVVJGKTƂTUVLQDQRVKQPYCUCUCUVTGGVXGPFQTUGNNKPIEQHHGGCTGRCUQTECPF[QT
recycling.61(CEGFYKVJLQDKPUGEWTKV[UQOGYQOGPCNUQEJQQUGVQGPICIGKPUGZYQTM+PHQTOCNYQTM
KPETGCUGUVJGTKUMUQHDGKPIGZRQUGFVQXCTKQWUHQTOUQHXKQNGPEGCPFNCDQWTGZRNQKVCVKQPKPENWFKPIDG-
KPIEQQRVGFHQTYQTMKPTGUVCWTCPVUCPFDCTUHQTVJGRWTRQUGQHUGZWCNGZRNQKVCVKQP62 The information
CPFVGUVKOQPKGUICVJGTGFUWIIGUVVJCVKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTWVJGYQTMGPXKTQPOGPVHQT8GPG\WGNCP
women is per se violent.
:GPQRJQDKCKUCPQVJGTQDUVCENGRTGXGPVKPI8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPHTQOCEEGUUKPIFGEGPVYQTMCPFQPGQH
VJGOCKPTGCUQPUYJ[VJG[HCEGXKQNGPEGKPVJGYQTMRNCEG63 Some Venezuelan refugee women said
VJCVFGURKVGJCXKPITGIWNCTOKITCVKQPUVCVWUKVKUUVKNNXGT[FKHƂEWNVVQIGVCFGEGPVLQDVJCVCNNQYU
VJGOVQGUECRGGEQPQOKERTGECTKQWUPGUUFWGVQZGPQRJQDKCCPFVJGNCEMQHLQDQRRQTVWPKVKGU pUJG
is 37 years old and has gotten into companies and everything, and right now she is in one, but she is
employed by the day” said one of the mothers of a Venezuelan woman based in Colombia.64
8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPQHVGPHCEGZGPQRJQDKCQTEQORQWPFUVGTGQV[RGUYJGPVJG[NQQMHQTYQTM$QVJVJG
sources consulted and the statements gathered indicate that they are denied the opportunity to access
YQTMDGECWUGVJG[CTG8GPG\WGNCP65 This is compounded by discrimination on other grounds, such as
CIG6JKUYCUVJGECUGHQT.K\YJQKU[GCTUQNF
1HƂEGQHVJG0CVKQPCN5WRGTKPVGPFGPVHQT/KITCVKQP%QPVGZVQFGNGHGOKPK\CEKÏPFGNCOKITCEKÏPGPGN2GTÖTGURWGUVC[GUVTCVGIKCUGU-
VCVCNGURCTCCNECP\CTNCKPVGITCEKÏP/CTEJ&QEWOGPVRTQXKFGFKPCPKPVGTXKGYYKVJVJG5WRGTKPVGPFGPVo1HƂEGQP/CTEJ
�'2WNUG/KITCVKQP5WTXG[
JVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQKPFGZRJRGUVCFKUVKECURQTVGOCFGOQITCƂC[RQDNCEKQPGPEWGUVCRWNUQFGNCOKITCEKQPGROCEEGUUGF#RTKN
+PVGTXKGYYKVJ8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOCP.KOC/CTEJCPF(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC#RTKN
+PVGTXKGY YKVJ KPVGTPCVKQPCN QHƂEKCNU %QNQODKC /CTEJ 5GG CNUQ 1ODWFURGTUQPoU 1HƂEG 'CTN[ 9CTPKPI 0QTVG FG
5CPVCPFGT0QXGODGTCPF%QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU
una frontera por superar.
%QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCTCPFKPVGT-
XKGYYKVJ&G,WUVKEKC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
64 Casual employment on a day-to-day basis.
%QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCT KPVGTXKGY
YKVJ&G,WUVKEKC%QNQODKC/CTEJ UVCVGOGPVU(QEWU)TQWR.KOC/CTEJ CPFUVCVGOGPVU(QEWU)TQWR'PICVKX½
Colombia.
Commercial Establishments in Tumbes, Perú. Coypright: Fernanda Pineda/Amnesty International.
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Potential employers stigmatize, discriminate or even assault Venezuelan women, based on gender
stereotypes and their hypersexualization, which are widespread in Colombian and Peruvian societies.
8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPQHVGPTGEGKXGEQOOGPVUVJCVTGFWEGVJGKTLQDQRRQTVWPKVKGUVQUGZYQTM p9J[NQQM
HQTYQTMKH[QWECPIQVQVJGUVTGGVVQYQTMqQPGQHVJGYQOGPKPVGTXKGYGFTGRQTVGFJCXKPIJGCTF
#PQVJGTYQOCPKPVGTXKGYGFTGURQPFGFVQCSWGUVKQPQHYJCVQDUVCENGUVJG[HCEGYJGPNQQMKPIHQT
GORNQ[OGPVD[UC[KPI p*GTGVJGKUUWGKUYQTMGORNQ[OGPVHQTOKITCPVUDGECWUGVJCVKUYJCV8GPG-
\WGNCPUCTGVJG[CUM[QWHQTUGZWCNUGTXKEGUKPQTFGTVQIKXG[QWCLQD+VoUUJQEMKPIq
+P VJKU EQPVGZV 8GPG\WGNCP TGHWIGG YQOGP HCEG WPTGNGPVKPI UGZWCN JCTCUUOGPV KP VJG YQTMRNCEG
Camila shared her experience, when she arrived in Lima, of a boss who constantly harassed her during
VJGVJTGGOQPVJUUJGYQTMGFYKVJJKOGXGPHGCTKPIHQTJGTNKHGYJGPUJGTGCNK\GFVJCVVJGOCPMGRV
CIWPKPQPGQHJKUFGUMFTCYGTU
4GHWIGGYQOGPYJQOCPCIGVQƂPFYQTMKPVJGHQTOCNUGEVQTCTGPQVKOOWPGVQXKQNCVKQPUQHVJGKT
NCDQWTTKIJVUCPFFKHƂEWNVYQTMKPIEQPFKVKQPU6JGNCEMQHCYTKVVGPGORNQ[OGPVEQPVTCEVUQEKCNDGP-
GƂVURC[PQVKPNKPGYKVJVJGNCYNQPIYQTMKPIJQWTUCPFPQTGUVFC[UYGTGUQOGQHVJGRGTUKUVGPV
VTGPFUKFGPVKƂGFKPDQVJEQWPVTKGUFWTKPIVJKUTGUGCTEJ66
Obstacles to access to decent work: “That’s what they told us: ‘I have no one to look after
the children’”67
#PQVJGTDCTTKGTVQCEEGUUKPIYQTMKFGPVKƂGFD[YQOGPKUVJCVVJG[EQPVKPWGVQUJQWNFGTCFKURTQRQT-
tionate amount of the responsibility for childcare because of the prevailing gender roles both in their
EQWPVT[QHQTKIKPCPFKPVJGJQUVEQWPVT[6JKUKPVGPUKƂGUYJGPVJG[NGCXGVJGKTEQWPVTKGU The study
66 DANE, Pulse Migration Survey,
JVVRU YYYFCPGIQXEQKPFGZRJRGUVCFKUVKECURQTVGOCFGOQITCƂC[RQDNCEKQPGPEWGUVCRWNUQFGNCOKITCEKQPGROCEEGUUGF#RTKN
&G,WUVKEKCKPVGTXKGY%QNQODKC/CTEJ
%QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCT
“It happened to me, when I arrived, I said, I’m going to look for work, I’m going to work, even
if it’s selling coffee, I saw that they were looking for staff in bakeries, I went to several places.
6JGƂTUVVJKPIVJG[CUMGFCDQWVYCUO[PCVKQPCNKV[QHEQWTUGDGECWUGQHO[CEEGPV n0QPQ
we don’t hire Venezuelans here’ I was told outright. At another place, ‘how old are you?’, ‘no,
go home and look after the youngsters’. I went out several times and said, ‘wow, it’s going to
DGJCTFHQTOGVQƂPFCLQDo6JCVYCUQPGQHVJGJWTFNGUHQTOGCDKIQPG9JGP+ECOG+
YCUYQTMKPICPFJGTG+ECPPQVIGVCLQDVJCVoUKORQUUKDNG6JQUGCTGVJGƂTUVVJKPIUCIGCPF
nationality, they already label you with that and then what do you do. I’d like to be independent,
to have a space for me, my privacy but I have no way of being able to afford that.”
Liz, a Venezuelan woman in Colombia
“I arrived with a job offer that ended in threats and harassment and when I realized I was at
risk, I didn’t care that I wasn’t being paid, but I wanted to, sort of melt away. And so… that
was how I started out. I went on, I took a job in the informal sector so as not to be stuck there.
But I arrived in what appeared to be a good position. I arrived with a job offer, with a wonderful
dream salary, but by the third month, it started: ‘look, I don’t need staff, I want you, I want
to be with you...’ and I kept saying, no, no, until he got a bit aggressive and I said I can’t do
this anymore. My head was telling me that the gun was in the drawer [of the boss, who was
harassing her].” Jenny, a Venezuelan woman in Peru
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.CDQWT&[PCOKEUQH8GPG\WGNCP/KITCPV9QOGPKP%QNQODKC
&KP½OKECUNCDQTCNGUFGNCUOWLGTGU
migrantes venezolanas en Colombia) found that Venezuelan refugee women have a higher (unpaid)
YQTMNQCFKPVJGJQOGVJCP%QNQODKCPYQOGP#EEQTFKPIVQVJKUUVWF[QH8GPG\WGNCPOKITCPV
YQOGPKPYQTMCPFQHVJQUGPQVKPYQTM69 stated that they spent at least 20 hoursCYGGMQP
childcare compared to 35.3% and 30.6% of employed and unemployed Colombian women.71
$GECWUGQHVJGNCEMQHUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUCPFUVCVGEJKNFECTGRQNKEKGU8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPJCXG
PQQPGVQVCMGECTGQHVJGKTEJKNFTGP1HVGPIKXGPVJGKTGEQPQOKEKPUGEWTKV[VJGEQPFKVKQPUQHRQXGTV[
VJG[HCEGKPVJGJQUVEKVKGUCPFVJGNCEMQHHCOKN[UWRRQTVPGVYQTMUKVKUYQOGPYJQCTGNGHVVQNQQM
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VQOGGVVJGPGGFUQHVJGHCOKN[CUVJG[JCXGPQTGNKCDNGEJKNFECTGPGVYQTMU
(CEGFYKVJVJKUEQORNGZUKVWCVKQPOCP[YQOGPEJQQUGVQVCMGVJGKTEJKNFTGPYKVJVJGOYJGPVJG[
IQQWVVQYQTMCUUVTGGVXGPFQTUYJGTGVJG[HCEGDGKPIQHHGTGFOQPG[HQTUGZTCRGFCUUCWNVGFCPF
discriminated against. Other women “decide” (having no alternative) to leave their children alone at
JQOGQTVCMGVJGOCNQPIYJGPQPVJGUVTGGVUDGIIKPIGZRQUKPIVJGOVQCITGCVGTTKUMQHFKUETKOK-
nation, abuse and violence. Particularly in Colombia, there is a widespread fear among Venezuelan
refugee women that, in either of the above two scenarios the Colombian authorities will intervene to
VCMGCYC[VJGEJKNFTGP73 and put them in the Administrative Process for the Restoration of Rights
(Proceso Administrativo de Restitución de Derechos).74
In addition, according to the information received, the majority of Venezuelan refugee women face
greater barriers in accessing government training programmes and economic empowerment measures
because of the obstacles to regularizing their migration status75EQWRNGFYKVJVJGNCEMQHUWRRQTVPGV-
YQTMUHQTEJKNFECTG
6JGUQWTEGUEQPUWNVGFCNUQKPFKECVGFVJCVQPGQHVJGFKHƂEWNVKGUHCEGFD[YQOGPKPCEEGUUKPICPF
CVVGPFKPICNNUVCIGUQHVTCKPKPIRTQITCOOGUQTEGTVKƂECVKQPQHEQORGVGPEKGUKUCICKPTGNCVGFVQECTG
responsibilities.76
69 Inactive and unemployed
JQWTUHQTVJQUGKPYQTMCPFJQWTUHQTVJQUGPQVKPYQTM
%751+PVGTPCEKQPCN&KP½OKECUNCDQTCNGUFGNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGUXGPG\QNCPCUGP%QNQODKC&GEGODGTCEEGUUGF/C[
5GGCNUQ%QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCT
&G,WUVKEKCKPVGTXKGY%QNQODKC/CTEJ
2#4&ƂIWTGUKPFKECVGVJCVVJGTGCTGOQTGVJCP8GPG\WGNCPEJKNFTGPKP%QNQODKC6JKUƂIWTGJCUDGGPKPETGCUKPIUKPEG
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&G,WUVKEKCKPVGTXKGY%QNQODKC/CTEJ (QEWU)TQWR5QCEJC%QNQODKC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJ%QNQODKCPQHƂEKCNU#RTKN
75 &G,WUVKEKCKPVGTXKGY%QNQODKC/CTEJCPF�'2WNUG/KITCVKQP5WTXG[
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&G,WUVKEKCKPVGTXKGY%QNQODKC/CTEJ
”They are also very fearful of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute [Instituto
Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, ICBF]. The ICBF is an institution that migrant
families are very afraid of, afraid they’ll have their children taken away from
them. So then they... decide not to go out looking for formal work, but rather to
work in the informal sector, so they sell food, they sell coffee, so that they can
take the children to the work with them.” Interview with DeJusticia
“Some programmes have included nurseries, spaces that ensure women can attend.
However, when they do manage to access employment, after a month or two women
resign because they have no one to take responsibility for childcare, and their wages
are not enough to enable them to pay a childminder. So... well, that has a big impact on
the effectiveness of these programmes. This obviously restricts women’s participation
in the labour market.” Interview with DeJusticia
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LOOKING FOR WORK – THE EXPERIENCE OF VENEZUELAN TRANS WOMEN
For LGBTI people the migration process is usually characterized by systematic and
UVTWEVWTCNXKQNGPEGHTQOVJGOQOGPVVJG[OCMGVJGFGEKUKQPVQNGCXGVJGKTEQWPVTKGUQH
origin to the process of social integration in the cities in which they settle.77 In addition
VQVJGFKUETKOKPCVKQPVJG[CNTGCF[GZRGTKGPEGDGECWUGQHVJGNCEMQHCEEGRVCPEGQH
their sexual orientation and gender identity, they also face xenophobia from people in
JQUVEQWPVTKGUQHVGPKPENWFKPIRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUCPFOGODGTUQHVJGRQNKEGHQTEGUTGURQPUKDNGHQTVJGKT
security.
This was the case for Alicia, a trans woman and with a career as a communications professional in
8GPG\WGNC#NKEKCNGHV8GPG\WGNCCPFUGVVNGFKP.KOCYJGTGUJGVTKGFVQNQQMHQTYQTMKPJGTRTQHGUUKQPCN
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VJGJQUVEQWPVT[CPFJGCNVJCPFUCHGV[EQPFKVKQPUVJCVEQWNFRWVJGTCVTKUMQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG
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%CTKDG#ƂTOCVKXQ2GTƂNGUOKITCVQTKQUFGNCEQOWPKFCF.)$6+3
%QPGEVCPFQECOKPQURQTNQUFGTGEJQU
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1#5CPF482NCVHQTOTGRQTVUJQYUVJGKORCEVQH%18+&QPURGEKƂEITQWRUQH8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGUCPFOKITCPVUR'P
JVVRU YYYTXKPHQGPPGYUQCUCPFTXRNCVHQTOTGRQTVUJQYUKORCEVEQXKFURGEKƂEITQWRUXGPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGUCPF ` VGZ-
V #EEGUUVQJGCNVJECTG#4GHWIGGUCUCUQWTEGQHKPHGEVKQP
“The worst discrimination I have experienced in particular, and my colleagues and
VTCPUEQNNGCIWGUJCXGVCNMGFCDQWVVJKUKUVJGFKHƂEWNV[KPCEEGUUKPICFGEGPVLQD
The fact that your external physical appearance suggests to them that you do not
have cognitive abilities to be able to do the job and they simply refuse to hire you. I
mean, I’ve gone where it says they’re looking for a woman and my CV is way above
YJCVVJG[CTGCUMKPIHQTCPFVJG[UC[n9GoXGCNTGCF[ƂNNGFVJGRQUVoDWV+oXGVQNF
cisgender friends, ‘ask them’, and they say, ‘bring your CV’ and I’ve gone in and
UCKFn9GNNFKFPoV[QWLWUVVGNNOGVJGLQDYCUƂNNGF!o+OGCPVJCVoUJQYQDXKQWUKV
is. I have had cases where, if they pay someone from here 30 soles for a 12-hour
job, they give me 14 soles for 15 hours or they want to pay me 10 or 12 soles and
I have taken the work because I had to. And many times I have done everything
that I have been told, cleaning this, cleaning the roof, collecting cardboard boxes;
I have worked in markets cleaning the roofs, collecting merchandise, cleaning
some horrible places that smell of cat urine, in conditions that you cannot imagine
and many times they have not even paid me in full, because they know that nobody
will protect me, ‘I will not pay you’, period. Or else they say, ‘sales were down
today, I won’t pay you’. And sometimes I have worked just for bread and coffee,
what they call here the ‘lunch’, that is a snack in the afternoon, just for that,
sometimes I have worked for food. It has been very, very, very hard to be here all
these years and feel that you’ve lost your life and left it behind after you worked,
went to university, that you have two careers, that you put so much so much of
your heart into this life.” Laura, a Venezuelan woman in Peru
Copyright: Fernanda Pineda/Amnesty International
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Amnesty International is concerned about the shortcomings of state responses to gender-based vio-
NGPEGKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTWYJKNGVJGNCEMQHUVCVGKPVGTXGPVKQPECPCNUQNGCXGYQOGPƃGGKPI8GPG-
\WGNCCVITGCVGTTKUMQHGZRNQKVCVKQPCPFJWOCPVTCHƂEMKPI
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNHQWPFVJCVVJGRTGECTKQWUEQPFKVKQPUKPYJKEJVJG[CTGNKXKPIVJGNCEMQHCUWR-
RQTVPGVYQTMUKPVJGJQUVEQWPVT[NKPMGFVQVJGPGGFVQYQTMCPFVJGRTGUUKPIPGGFHQTHCOKN[KPEQOG
not only for those in the country where they are living but also for their families in Venezuela, push
many Venezuelan women to accept “the promise of high salaries with the income they need”79 or “the
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#EEQTFKPIVQVJGKPHQTOCVKQPTGEGKXGFYQOGPHTQO8GPG\WGNCJCXGDGGPEQPVCEVGFVQYQTMKPXCTKQWU
cities in Colombia and Peru. In some cases, it was Venezuelan people who contacted the women and
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HGNNQYPCVKQPCNUDGEQOG[QWTUWRRQTVPGVYQTMCPF[QWVTWUVVJGO8GPG\WGNCPPGVYQTMUJCXGDGGP
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#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNTGEGKXGFKPHQTOCVKQPTGICTFKPIECUGUQHGZRNQKVCVKQPCPFVTCHƂEMKPIYJGTGYQO-
GPYGTGTGETWKVGFYKVJVJGKTEJKNFTGPYJQYGTGCNUQFKTGEVXKEVKOUQHVTCHƂEMKPIHQTDGIIKPIRWTRQUGU
“forced labour” on the street and even sexual exploitation. An example of this is the case of 30-year-
QNF#PFTGCYJQYCUDTQWIJVHTQO8GPG\WGNCVQ2GTWVQYQTMKPCHCOKN[JQOG#PFTGCoUHCOKN[YCU
EQPVCEVGFD[CEQWRNGYJQECOGVQJGTJQWUGVQEQPXKPEG#PFTGCoUOQVJGTVJCVVJG[UJQWNFVCMGJGT
UGXGP[GCTQNFUQPVQ2GTWCPFVJG[YQWNFVCMGECTGQHJKO
Andrea described how she and her mother refused, but instead they convinced Andrea to travel to Peru
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her leg problems (related to diabetes, which at the time was undiagnosed). Andrea spent two years
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YGGMUVQpYQTMqQWVUKFGVJGJQOGUC[KPIVJG[YGTGUGNNKPIUYGGVUQPVJGUVTGGV
79 +PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQPKP2GTW/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNU(GDTWCT[CPF/CTEJ
p.CRTQOGUCFGCNVCTGPVCDKNKFCFEQPWPKPITGUQUCNCTKCNSWGPGEGUKVCPqQpEWCNSWKGTVKRQFGQHGTVCNCDQTCNq %QNQODKCP/KPKUVT[QH
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+PVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNU/CTEJ.
+PVGTXKGY.KOC2GTW/CTEJCPF(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQPKP2GTW/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJYQOCPUWTXKXQT/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJUWTXKXQTKP.KOCCPF/CTEJ
Copyright: Fernanda Pineda/ Amnesty International
HUMAN TRAFFICKING
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+PGCTN[VJG1HƂEGQHVJG2WDNKE2TQUGEWVQToU8KEVKOCPF9KVPGUU#UUKUVCPEG7PKV
7PKFCFFG
#UKUVGPEKCC8ÉEVKOCU[6GUVKIQU7+6 TGUEWGF#PFTGCCPFVQQMJGTVQCUJGNVGTWPFGTRTQVGEVKQP
Andrea said during the interview that despite having a Peruvian foreigners permit (carné de extran-
jería peruano) and telling the authorities she felt safer in Peru, they informed her that she would
be deported to Venezuela. According to the information received months later by the organization,
#PFTGCƂPCNN[EQPUGPVGFVQDGTGVWTPGFVQJGTEQWPVT[
+P%QNQODKCKP1EVQDGTHQTVJGƂTUVVKOGVJG%QPUVKVWVKQPCN%QWTVKUUWGFCHWPFCOGPVCN
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VJGTKIJVUQH;QNCPFCC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPXKEVKOQHVTCHƂEMKPIYJQJCFPQVDGGPRTQRGTN[KFGPVKƂGF
CUCXKEVKOQHVTCHƂEMKPIQTRTQVGEVGFD[VJG%QNQODKCPCWVJQTKVKGUCPFJGTHCOKN[CPFQTFGTGFVJG
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The Court emphasized the importance of adopting an intersectional approach in these cases, and
TGEQIPK\GFVJCV8GPG\WGNCPRGQRNGKPVJGEQPVGZVQHOCUUOKITCVQT[ƃQYUCTGCVITGCVGTTKUMQHDGKPI
XKEVKOUQHVTCHƂEMKPI
The Venezuelan migrant population is exposed to a greater risk of becoming victims
QHVJGETKOGQHVTCHƂEMKPIDGECWUGVJG[GZRGTKGPEGEQPFKVKQPUQHGZVTGOGRQXGTV[
are abandoned by the state; and have an irregular migration status, which exposes
them to situations of exploitation; this cannot be assess on the basis of the level
QHTGRQTVGFECUGUFWGVQVJGDCTTKGTUVJCVRTGXGPVVJKUHTQODGKPIKFGPVKƂGFCPF
brought to the attention of the authorities.” Constitutional Court of Colombia
The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, to which Colombia
and Peru are state parties, are the main legal instruments for the protection of refugees throughout
+PVGTXKGYYKVJUWTXKXQTKP.KOCCPF/CTEJ
+PVJKUECUG;QNCPFCTGEGKXGFUWRRQTVHTQOVJGQTICPK\CVKQP9QOGPoU.KPM9QTNFYKFGKPPCXKICVKPIVJGLWUVKEGU[UVGO5GG9QOGPoU
.KPM9QTNFYKFGn+PCJKUVQTKEFGEKUKQPVJG%QPUVKVWVKQPCN%QWTVQH%QNQODKCQTFGTUKORTQXGOGPVUVQVJGEQWPVT[oUU[UVGOQHRTQVGEVKQPUHQT
XKEVKOUQHVTCHƂEMKPIKPJWOCPDGKPIUo1EVQDGTJVVRU YYYYQOGPUNKPMYQTNFYKFGQTIGPPGYUCPFRWDNKECVKQPURTGUUTQQO
in-a-historic-decision-the-constitutional-court-of-colombia-orders-improvements-to-the-country-s-system-of-protections-for-victims-
QHVTCHƂEMKPIKPJWOCPDGKPIU
pNCRQDNCEKÏPOKITCPVGFG8GPG\WGNCGUV½GZRWGUVCCWPTKGUIQOC[QTFGUGTXÉEVKOCFGNFGNKVQFGVTCVCRWGURCFGEGWPCUEQPFKEKQPGU
FGRQDTG\CGZVTGOCCDCPFQPQGUVCVCN[EQPFKEKQPGUOKITCVQTKCUKTTGIWNCTGUSWGNCGZRQPGCRCFGEGTUKVWCEKQPGUFGGZRNQVCEKÏPNQSWG
PQRWGFGFGVGTOKPCTUGRQTGNÉPFKEGFGECUQUFGPWPEKCFQUFGDKFQCNCUDCTTGTCUSWGKORKFGPKFGPVKƂECTNQ[RQPGTNQGPEQPQEKOKGPVQ
FGNCUCWVQTKFCFGUq %QPUVKVWVKQPCN%QWTVQH%QNQODKC,WFIOGPV6QH
“I came from Venezuela practically backpacking, with my daughters and a couple,
the man was Colombian and the woman was Venezuelan [from my neighbourhood].
They made promises that they never kept. They promised me that they would help
me. I arrived from Venezuela with my feet already swollen, I could hardly walk and
they said that they were going to help me here with medicines and medical care
and that when I got better, I could become independent, but it was a lie. They knew
what they were bringing me here for.
They knew that with my daughters they were going to make money here. And the
month after I got here, they started to take the girls, they told me that they were
artisans, that they made bracelets, but it was a lie, I never saw them making
anything. Actually, then I knew what they were taking them for. They took them
begging, selling candy. They took them to the provinces, then to some villages, they
took them to sell, to beg and with that they made a lot of money...
6TCHƂEMKPIKPRGQRNGKUYJGPVJG[FQPoVNGV[QWIQQWVUKFGVJG[DGCV[QWVJG[
make you work, they don’t pay you, they exploit you, they take your children, they
put them to work, to beg, they exploit them just like they do you. I never received a
peso from them, not a single one, nothing.” Andrea, a Venezuelan woman in Peru.
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VJGYQTNF6JG%CTVCIGPC&GENCTCVKQPCTGIKQPCNRTQVGEVKQPKPUVTWOGPVDTQCFGPUVJGFGƂPKVKQPQHC
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rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” Colombia and Peru have
KPEQTRQTCVGFVJKUFGƂPKVKQPKPVQVJGKTNGIKUNCVKQP
The Venezuelan women interviewed expressed a pressing need to regularize their migratory situation, in-
cluding access to refugee status. Amnesty International found, however, that Venezuelan people continue
VQHCEGUKIPKƂECPVQDUVCENGUVQTGIWNCTK\KPIVJGKTUVCVWUGKVJGTVJTQWIJTGEQIPKVKQPQHVJGKTTGHWIGGUVCVWU
or through other migration regularization channels or programmes.
5.1 ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
In Colombia, international protection is regulated by the Single Regulatory Decree of the Foreign Rela-
tions Administrative Sector (Decreto Único Reglamentario del Sector Administrativo de Relaciones Exte-
riores, Decree 1067 of 2015). This states that the Advisory Commission for the Determination of Refugee
Status (Comisión asesora para la determinación de la condición de refugiado, CONARE) is responsible
for receiving, processing and examining applications for recognition of refugee status. Individuals may
apply to the migration authorities for refugee status at the time of entry into the country at migration
points, or, once inside the country, within two months of their entry into the country, via the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
In Peru, Law 27.891 on Refugees (2002) and its regulations govern international protection. The Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs Permanent Ad Hoc Commission on Refugees (Comisión Permanente Ad Hoc para los
Refugiados del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores) is the body responsible for receiving, investigating,
processing and deciding on applications for refugee recognition. An application for recognition of refugee
status may be submitted before the expiry of a person’s temporary stay in Peru, or, if they do not have
legal authorization to enter or stay, within a period not exceeding 30 days from the date of entry into
Peruvian territory, unless there are, in the opinion of the Special Commission for Refugees, reasons to
justify an exception to this.
The number of applications for international protection submitted by Venezuelans in Colombia is low. As
of 30 June 2021, the authorities had received 31,400 applications for asylum and recognized 1,300.91
According to information received by Amnesty International, the low number of asylum applications may
be related to the limited access to existing information about this procedure. The absence of a time limit
%CTVCIGPC&GENCTCVKQPQP4GHWIGGU0QXGODGT
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D
2GTWKPEQTRQTCVGFVJKUFGƂPKVKQPKP.CY0QQH&GEGODGT4GHWIGG.CY#TVKENG
D
482NCVHQTO6QVCN2GPFKPI#U[NWO%NCKOURGT%QWPVT[CEEGUUGF#RTKN
48RNCVHQTO4GEQIPK\GFTGHWIGGUHTQO8GPG\WGNCCEEGUUGF#RTKN
5. DIFFICULTIES IN
ACCESSING INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION AND
REGULARIZING MIGRATION
STATUS
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by which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must issue its response;92VJGHCEVVJCVRGQRNGECPPQVYQTMFWTKPI
VJKUVKOGYJGPVJG[CTGKUUWGFCUCHGEQPFWEVRGTOKV CPFVJGKPJGTGPVTKUMQHNQUKPITGHWIGGUVCVWUKP
the event of returning to Venezuela, are other factors indicated in the interviews as discouraging people
from submitting an asylum application.
This last factor seems to be common in both countries. In Peru, of the 531,000 refugee applications
submitted93 only 4,100 have been approved by the authorities.94 Amnesty International has expressed
concern about failings in the handling and reception of asylum applications since 2020.95 Despite the
HCEVVJCVVJGPWODGTQHRGQRNGTGEQIPK\GFCUTGHWIGGUKUJKIJGTVJCPKP%QNQODKCVJGCWVJQTKVKGUCHƂTO
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return to your country of origin? Do you consent to this, in the hypothetical event that you are granted
refugee status?”, most people say no, that they want to return.96
Faced with this, the Peruvian authorities have stated that they opt for other alternatives to allow Venezue-
NCPRGQRNGVQTGOCKPKPVJGEQWPVT[ *WOCPKVCTKCP/KITCVKQP5VCVWU
%CNKFCF/KITCVQTKC*WOCPKVCTKC97).
This status is granted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to people who are in the process of applying for
refugee status, “based on humanitarian criteria, for the time being for Venezuelan individuals who have
CRRNKGFHQTTGHWIGGUVCVWUq6JKUUVCVWUCNNQYUCU[NWOUGGMGTUVQTGIWNCTK\GVJGKTUVC[KP2GTWCPFQDVCKP
CHQTGKIPGToURGTOKVYQTMHQTOCNN[QTUVCTVCDWUKPGUUCPFCEEGUUJGCNVJUGTXKEGU*WOCPKVCTKCP/KITCVKQP
Status authorizes a person the right to remain in the country for 183 days and is renewable, as long as the
conditions of vulnerability for which it was granted persist.99 As of March 2022, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs reported having granted only 61,000 instances of humanitarian migration status.
5.2 OBSTACLES LINKED TO MIGRATION REGULARIZA-
TION PROCESSES
5.2.1 IN COLOMBIA
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#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCN2GTÖ %QOWPKECEKÏPCN%QOKVÅFG2TQVGEEKÏPFGNQU>GEJQUFG6QFQUNQU6TCDCLCFQTGU/KITCVQTKQUFGNCU0C-
EKQPGU7PKFCURTGXKCCUWCUGUKÏP(GDTWCT[
+PFGZ #/4
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+PVGTXKGYYKVJCRWDNKEQHƂEKCNKP2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJCRWDNKEQHƂEKCNKP2GTW/CTEJ CPFTGURQPUGVQVJG
4GSWGUVHQT+PHQTOCVKQP/KPKUVT[QH(QTGKIP#HHCKTU2GTW
copyright: Engativá, Bogotá. Transport Terminal. Copyright: Fernanda Pineda/Amnesty International
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In 2018, faced with mass arrivals of people from Venezuela, the Colombian government created the Special
Permit to Remain (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, PEP) with the aim of establishing an initial register
of Venezuelan refugees that would enable identity documents to be issued and give people access to basic
services and job opportunities. At that time, in order to obtain a PEP, Venezuelan refugees needed to have
entered through one of the authorized border points; that is, to have their passport stamped.
In 2021, Temporary Protection Status (PPT) was introduced for Venezuelans as an alternative to regulariza-
tion for the 1,840,000 or so Venezuelan refugees in Colombia, replacing the PEP. The PPT and PEP differ
KPCPWODGTQHYC[UCPFRGTJCRUVJGOQUVKORQTVCPVFKHHGTGPEGKUVJCVWPNKMGVJG2'2VJG226KUCXCKNCDNG
to all Venezuelans who entered Colombian territory up to 31 January 2021, whether on a regular or irregular
basis.
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GPVT[VQQMRNCEGDGHQTGVJKUFCVG*QYGXGTKVKURQUUKDNGVQRTGUGPVUWRRQTVKPIGXKFGPEGUWEJCUVJGGPTQN-
ment of children in school, a receipt, a medical examination or some document or record showing that the
person entered the country before the set date. People who arrived in Colombia after 31 January 2021 must
have entered through formal border posts and have stamped a passport to access the PPT. According to the
available information, as of 26 May 2022, 1,207,403 PPTs had been approved.
8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPHCEGCPWODGTQHEJCNNGPIGUKPQDVCKPKPIC2266JGƂTUVKUCUUQEKCVGFYKVJVJGRTGUGPVKPI
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conditions, are unable to enrol their children in the education system, and only approach health services for
emergencies, it is not possible for them to present a document proving that they entered the country before
31 January 2021.
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNCNUQHQWPFVJCVVJGFKHƂEWNVKGU8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPHCEGKPCEEGUUKPIGNGEVTQPKEOGFKC
and the internet are also an obstacle to their engaging in the PPT process. Liz, a 60-year-old Venezuelan wom-
an, said Amnesty International was also able to document that, while the PPT allows trans people to obtain
FQEWOGPVUVJCVTGƃGEVVJGKTIGPFGTKFGPVKV[KPRTCEVKEGVQFQUQVJG[OWUVECTT[QWVCFFKVKQPCNRTQEGFWTGU
that increase costs and therefore limit effective access to this document.
5.2.2 IN PERÚ
It is estimated that there are approximately 1,290,000 Venezuelans in Peru.6JG2GTWXKCPNGICNHTCOGYQTM
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2GTOKUQ6GORQTCN
de Permanencia, PTP), between 2017 and 2019, and since 2020 the Temporary Residence Permit Card
%CTPÅFG2GTOKUQ6GORQTCNFG2GTOCPGPEKC%22 YJKEJKPRTCEVKEGYQTMKPVJGUCOGYC[CPFRTQXKFGHQT
the same rights.
It should be noted that both exclude the right to access to healthcare,URGEKƂECNN[KORCEVKPIVJGJGCNVJ
and sexual and reproductive health of Venezuelan refugee women and limiting their access to primary health
services for those who are survivors of gender-based violence. The CPP is in identity document issued by the
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which Venezuelans – regardless of whether or not they have regularized their status – can obtain a permit to
UVC[HQTQPG[GCTp6JKUVGORQTCT[RGTOKVECPPQVDGTGPGYGFPQTTGSWGUVGFCUGEQPFVKOGqUQDGHQTGVJG
expiry date, the person must go through another process regarding migration status. According to informa-
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CPPs were granted to Venezuelans.
In addition to these two programmes, there is also special migration residence status, migration status due to
vulnerability and, as already mentioned, humanitarian migration status. These three types of migration status
enable refugees to obtain a Foreigners’ Card (Carné de Extranjería), which is the only document that allows
them to access social insurance.
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#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCN$GVYGGPKPXKUKDKNKV[CPFFKUETKOKPCVKQP 8GPG\WGNCP.)$6+3
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+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQPKP2GTW/CTEJ +PVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCNKP2GTW/CTEJ
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VJG1HƂEGQHVJG5WRGTKPVGPFGPVQH/KITCVKQP2GTW/CTEJ(QTOQTGKPHQTOCVKQPUGGJVVRU JGNRWPJETQTIRGTWERRCEEGUUGF
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With regard to humanitarian migration status, although Amnesty International welcomes this measure, the
KPVGTXKGYUUJQYGFVJCVVJGTGKUCNCEMQHCENGCTCPFKPUVKVWVKQPCNK\GFRTQVQEQNQTIWKFGNKPGUQPKVUKORNGOGP-
tation to enable women survivors of gender-based violence to access this migration status through formal
channels.
Special migration residence status is the process by which most people who obtain PTPs regularized their
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accounts, accessing health services and accessing social programmes and services.
Special migration status due to vulnerability is granted to foreigners in Peru “when they are in a situation in
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Being a survivor of gender-based violence112 is one of the circumstances recognized when foreign women can
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who are in a situation of high vulnerability and who have not been involved in the commission of crimes. It allows employment or self-em-
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the conditions of vulnerability for which this residence was granted persist.
&QEWOGPVURTQXKFGFD[CRWDNKEQHƂEKCNKPVGTXKGYQP/CTEJ
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226 states that foreign nationals in vulnerable situations are those in a situation in which they lack protection or risk not being able to
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as those who are:
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E +PCPKTTGIWNCTOKITCVKQPUVCVWU
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YREQPVGPVWRNQCFU+PHQTOG8KQNGPEKCEQPVTCOWLGTGUOKITCPVGURFH
5RCPKUJQPN[
#TVKENGQHVJG4GIWNCVKQPGUVCDNKUJGUUGXGTCNQDNKICVKQPUTGICTFKPIFQEWOGPVUCPFQTVGORQTCT[RGTOKVUVQTGOCKPKPVJGEQWPVT[
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of special migration status, among other aspects:
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CVKQPHQNNQYKPICPGZRGTVTGRQTVHTQOCURGEKCNKUVQTICPK\CVKQPCNWPKV OGCUWTGUVJCVKPENWFGVJGITCPVKPIQHGZVGPUKQPUCPFGZGORVKQP
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URGEKƂEECUGVQDGVCMGPKPVQEQPUKFGTCVKQP
+PECUGUQHUKVWCVKQPUQHXWNPGTCDKNKV[/+)4#6+105OC[ITCPVGZGORVKQPUTGICTFKPIRTGUGPVKPIVJGTGSWKTGOGPVUUGVQWVKPRTQ-
cedures set out in the current migration regulations or others, subject to a report from a relevant specialist unit.
/+)4#6+105OC[ITCPVURGEKCNOKITCVKQPUVCVWUGZEGRVKQPCNN[VQHQTGKIPPCVKQPCNUKPCUKVWCVKQPQHGZVTGOGXWNPGTCDKNKV[CNNQYKPI
them to remain in circumstances not covered by other forms of migration status, a status that will be granted after a report from the
relevant specialist body.
National Centre for Attention at the Border, Tumbes, Peru. Copyright: Fernanda Pineda/Amnesty International
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CEEGUUVJKUOKITCVKQPRTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTG6JGOKITCVKQPNCYUVCVGUVJCVRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUDQVJKPVJG9QO-
en’s Emergency Centres and in police stations, have the duty to inform women about this option, regardless
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vulnerability, of which 897 were to Venezuelan refugee women and 963 to Venezuelan men.113 However, this
institution indicated that it did not have information on how many were granted for gender-based violence.
+PTGURQPUGVQCTGSWGUVHQTKPHQTOCVKQPFKUCIITGICVGFD[GCEJQHVJGITQWPFUUGVQWVHQTITCPVKPIURGEKCN
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formation.114 For this reason, it was not possible to determine how many of the 2,070 were awarded for
gender-based violence. Although this measure represents the possibility of comprehensive protection
HQTTGHWIGGYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNJCUKFGPVKƂGFUGXGTCN
challenges to accessing it.
Amnesty International welcomes the recent creation of the Protocol for the Care and Referral of Mi-
grants in Vulnerable Situations (Protocolo de Atención y Derivación de personas migrantes en situación
de vulnerabilidad),115YJKEJRTQXKFGUCRCVJYC[VJCVOKITCVKQPQHƂEKCNUECPCRRN[KPECUGUYJGTGYQO-
en are victims of violence. This pathway can start when they are directly approached about a case,
which they must refer to the Aurora Programme focal point or to the CEM covering their jurisdiction.
A case can also be referred by the CEM or the police. As will be explained later (Chapter 6), among
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appropriate referral and advice to refugee women survivors, as provided for in the Protocol. Another
factor is the economic precariousness experienced by most women, which means they have to go out
each day to earn the means of subsistence, which means they do not have the time or energy necessary
to deal with the justice services.
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNJCUCNUQKFGPVKƂGFVJCVVJGOWNVKRNKEKV[QHOKITCVKQPFQEWOGPVUKP2GTWYJKEJ
CNTGCF[EQORNKECVGUCEEGUUVQTGIWNCTK\CVKQPKUGZCEGTDCVGFD[VJGNCEMQHMPQYNGFIGCOQPIQHƂEKCNU
regarding the institutions involved in the care pathway for women survivors of violence. In both family
RQNKEGUVCVKQPUCPFVJG%'/QHƂEKCNUCTGPQVCYCTGVJCVHQTGKIPYQOGPJCXGVJGTKIJVVQCEEGUUVJKU
migration status if they are victims of violence, regardless of their documentation.
+PCFFKVKQPQHƂEKCNUTGURQPUKDNGHQTRTQXKFKPIRTKOCT[ECTGVQYQOGPUWTXKXQTUCTGWPCYCTGQHVJG
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the statements of the Venezuelan women interviewed who stated that they were not informed at any
time about this possibility of regularizing their status.116
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by women survivors of gender-based violence who opt for special migration status is the length and de-
NC[UQHVJG1HƂEGQHVJG5WRGTKPVGPFGPVHQT/KITCVKQPRTQEGUUGU#EEQTFKPIVQVJGUQWTEGUEQPUWNVGF
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CPFQTJQURKVCN#VRTGUGPVVJKURTQEGUUECPVCMGOQTGVJCPUKZOQPVJU119
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“I asked the question because I understand that because I am in this situation
of vulnerability and because I am an asylum seeker, I should have gone for a
foreigner’s card for vulnerability, but they didn’t tell me about this. I asked the
two lawyers at the CEM [Women’s Emergency Centre] and they didn’t tell me
this.”Ana, a Venezuelan woman in Peru
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Finally, according to the information received, the limited duration of special migration status, for
one year, also represents an obstacle to the protection of the rights of foreign women survivors of
gender-based violence. According to the law, at the end of this period, the authorities must reassess
whether the vulnerability remains in order to decide on whether to renew their document and this can
lead to instances of revictimization. Once the state of vulnerability has ended or the issue has been re-
solved – with or without a complaint – migration status will cease to be extended, leaving women again
KPCUKVWCVKQPYJGTGVJG[NCEMRTQVGEVKQPKHVJG[FQPQVMPQYCDQWVQVJGTTGIWNCTK\CVKQPOGEJCPKUOU
5.3 LACK OF INFORMATION
Amnesty International found that, in both countries, Venezuelan women in general do not have infor-
mation about the processes for applying for international protection and regularizing their migration
status.
+P%QNQODKC8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPYJQJCXGDGGPKPVJGEQWPVT[HQTOQTGVJCPƂXG[GCTUUCKFVJG[FKF
PQVMPQYCDQWVVJGRCVJYC[UHQTTGIWNCTK\KPIVJGKTUVCVWUCPFJCFPQVJCFCEEGUUVQVJG2'29QOGP
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or social media, which is where information is commonly shared.121 With regard to the PPT, many said
VJCVVJG[JCFTGEGKXGFKPHQTOCVKQPCPFJCFDGGPCDNGVQTGIKUVGTVJCPMUVQVJGCFXKEGQTCUUKUVCPEGQH
national civil society organizations or international organizations.122#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNTGSWGUVGF
a meeting with Migration Unit of the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but did not receive a re-
sponse.
5KOKNCTN[#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNYCUCDNGVQQDUGTXGVJGKORQTVCPVYQTMECTTKGFQWVD[EKXKNUQEKGV[
organizations in Peru, in particular organizations run by Venezuelan women, to ensure access to in-
formation for refugee women survivors of violence. The assistance and support, including legal and
psychological support, provided by these organizations123CTGƂNNKPIICRUCPFNCEMQHKPHQTOCVKQPQP
support pathways offered by the Peruvian state.
+PVGTXKGYYKVJ#WTQTC2TQITCOOG2GTW/CTEJ
(QEWU)TQWR'PICVKX½%QNQODKC/CTEJ
(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVCCPF(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC#RTKN
(QEWU)TQWRUJGNFKP.KOCCPF/CTEJ
San Miguel, Lima. Children and youth registration day with RENIEC and AAPREH, March 2022.
Copyright: Fernanda Pineda/ Amnesty International
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Amnesty International’s research highlighted the role of national and international organizations in provid-
ing information, awareness, support and advice to women survivors of gender-based violence in Colombia
and Peru. This should not, however, obscure the fact that the Colombian and Peruvian authorities have
CTGURQPUKDKNKV[VQKPHQTOTGHWIGGUCFGSWCVGN[QHVJGKTTKIJVVQCEEGUUCPFTGEGKXGKPHQTOCVKQPQPVJGRTQ-
cesses for obtaining recognition of their refugee status and regularization.124
#UYKNNDGGZRNCKPGFDGNQYVJKUTKIJVKUENQUGN[NKPMGFVQVJGRQUUKDKNKV[QHJCXKPIXCNKFOKITCVKQPUVCVWU
which, in turn, is essential today for Venezuelan women to be able to fully enjoy all their rights, in particu-
lar when accessing justice and healthcare pathways.
+#%*4&WG2TQEGUUKP2TQEGFWTGUHQTVJG&GVGTOKPCVKQPQH4GHWIGG5VCVWUCPF5VCVGNGUUPGUUCPFVJG)TCPVKPIQH%QORNGOGPVCT[
2TQVGEVKQP1'#5GT.8++&QE#WIWUVRCTCUVQ +#%*44GUQNWVKQP+PVGT#OGTKECP2TKPEKRNGUQPVJG*WOCP
4KIJVUQH#NN/KITCPVU4GHWIGGU5VCVGNGUU2GTUQPUCPF8KEVKOUQH*WOCP6TCHƂEMKPI5CP5CNXCFQT&GEGODGT5GEVKQP:++2TKPEKRNG
CPF$TC\KN&GENCTCVKQPCPF2NCPQH#EVKQP
p#(TCOGYQTMHQT%QQRGTCVKQPCPF4GIKQPCN5QNKFCTKV[VQ5VTGPIVJGPVJG+PVGTPCVKQPCN
2TQVGEVKQPQH4GHWIGGU&KURNCEGFCPF5VCVGNGUU2GTUQPUKP.CVKP#OGTKECCPFVJG%CTKDDGCPq $TCUKNKC&GEGODGT%JCRVGT6YQ
p. 11.
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6. AUTHORITIES’ RESPONSES:
FAILURES, LACK OF
PROTECTION AND MORE
VIOLENCE
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Under the international treaties and instruments for the protection of human rights to which they are
party, Colombia and Peru have an obligation to TGURGEVRTQVGEVCPFHWNƂN125 the human rights of all
VJQUGRTGUGPVKPVJGKTVGTTKVQT[YKVJQWVFKUETKOKPCVKQPQHCP[MKPFKPENWFKPIQPITQWPFUUWEJCUIGPFGT
economic status, nationality or migration status.126
With regard to women’s right to a life free from violence, the obligation to respect means that state
authorities must refrain from performing, sponsoring or condoning any practice, policy or measure that
violates this right.1276JGQDNKICVKQPVQRTQVGEVVJKUTKIJVTGSWKTGUUVCVGUVQRTGXGPVKVHTQODGKPIXKQNCVGF
D[QVJGTKPFKXKFWCNU6JGCWVJQTKVKGUJCXGCFWV[VQRTQVGEVRGQRNGHTQOXKQNGPEGCPFVQVCMGCNNPGEGU-
sary measures to prevent violence and to ensure that effective investigations are conducted into acts
of gender-based violence, that those responsible are duly prosecuted and punished, and that victims
receive reparation.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has incorporated this into the duty of states to act with
due diligence and has established that there is an enhanced due diligence obligation in cases of gen-
FGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG#EEQTFKPIVQVJG%QWTVUVCVGUOWUVpJCXGCPCRRTQRTKCVGNGICNHTCOGYQTMQHRTQ-
tection that is enforced effectively, and prevention policies and practices that allow effective measures
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effective response. In addition, the Inter-American Court has determined that when there is a situation
or context of widespread violence against women, states have a strict obligation to prevent, investigate,
prosecute, punish and ensure reparation.129
Under international human rights law, all authorities of a state have an obligation to respect and ob-
serve the international standards by which the state has agreed to be bound, in particular the human
rights of women.
*WOCP4KIJVU%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN%QOOGPV6JG0CVWTGQHVJG)GPGTCN.GICN1DNKICVKQP+ORQUGFQP5VCVGU2CTVKGUVQVJG
%QXGPCPV'KIJVKGVJUGUUKQP70&QE*4+)'04GXCV
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core obligations of States parties under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
%'	%)%
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#TVKENGQHVJG+PVGTPCVKQPCN%QXGPCPVQP%KXKNCPF2QNKVKECN4KIJVUCPF#TVKENGQHVJG#OGTKECP%QPXGPVKQPQP*WOCP4KIJVU
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPVJGEQTGQDNKICVKQPUQH5VCVGURCTVKGUWPFGTCTVKENGQHVJG%QPXGPVKQPQPVJG
'NKOKPCVKQPQH#NN(QTOUQH&KUETKOKPCVKQPCICKPUV9QOGP%'	%)%
RCTC
+PVGT#OGTKECP%QWTV%CUGQH8ÅNK\(TCPEQGVCNX)WCVGOCNC2TGNKOKPCT[1DLGEVKQPU/GTKVU4GRCTCVKQPUCPF%QUVU,WFIOGPVQH
/C[CPF%CUGQH8KEM[*GTP½PFG\GVCNX*QPFWTCU/GTKVU4GRCTCVKQPUCPF%QUVU,WFIOGPVQH/CTEJJVVRU YYY
EQTVGKFJQTETFQEUECUQUCTVKEWNQUUGTKGEAAKPIRFHCPFJVVRU YYYEQTVGKFJQTETFQEUECUQUCTVKEWNQUUGTKGEAAKPIRFH
6JG+PVGT#OGTKECP%QWTVQH*WOCP4KIJVUJCUCHƂTOGFVJCVUVCVGUCNUQJCXGCIGPGTCNQDNKICVKQPGUVCDNKUJGFKPVJG#OGTKECP%QP-
XGPVKQPCPQDNKICVKQPTGKPHQTEGFUKPEGVJG%QPXGPVKQPQH$GNÅOFQ2CT½ECOGKPVQHQTEG5GG+PVGT#OGTKECP%QWTV%CUGQH)QP\½NG\GV
CN
p%QVVQP(KGNFq X/GZKEQ2TGNKOKPCT[1DLGEVKQPU/GTKVU4GRCTCVKQPUCPF%QUVU,WFIOGPVQH0QXGODGT5GTKGU%0Q
JVVRU YYYEQTVGKFJQTETFQEUECUQUCTVKEWNQUUGTKGEAAKPIRFHCPF%CUGQH8GN½USWG\2CK\GVCNX)WCVGOCNC2TGNKOKPCT[1DLGE-
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pdf
*WOCP4KIJVU%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN%QOOGPV6JG0CVWTGQHVJG)GPGTCN.GICN1DNKICVKQP+ORQUGFQP5VCVGU2CTVKGUVQVJG%QX-
GPCPV'KIJVKGVJUGUUKQP70&QE*4+)'04GXCV
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&QYPNQCFCURZ!U[ODQNPQ %%24H%HH4GXH#FF.C
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The right to access to justice has been developed by the Inter-American human rights system in its
interpretation of access to an effective recourse and judicial protection provided for in article 25 of the
American Convention on Human Rights. Access to justice includes both the availability of information
on victims’ rights and available remedies and access to effective formal remedies; and to processes
and support pathways.131
70$CUKE2TKPEKRNGUCPF)WKFGNKPGUQPVJG4KIJVVQC4GOGF[CPF4GRCTCVKQPHQT8KEVKOUQH)TQUU8KQNCVKQPUQH+PVGTPCVKQPCN*W-
OCP4KIJVU.CYCPF5GTKQWU8KQNCVKQPUQH+PVGTPCVKQPCN*WOCPKVCTKCP.CY4GUQNWVKQPCFQRVGFD[VJG)GPGTCN#UUGODN[QP
&GEGODGT 6KVNGU8++CPF8++++P
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/basic-principles-and-guidelines-right-remedy-and-reparation
6.1 BARRIERS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE
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Colombia and Peru have made progress in implementing some mechanisms for the prevention and
RWPKUJOGPVQHXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPCPFJCXGURGEKCNK\GFTGIWNCVQT[HTCOGYQTMUVQRTGXGPVCPF
punish it, as well as specialized care pathways and protocols for women victims of various forms of vio-
lence.132*QYGXGTCEEQTFKPIVQKPHQTOCVKQPICVJGTGFD[#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNKPRTCEVKEGUKIPKƂECPV
challenges remain in both countries in addressing, investigating, prosecuting and punishing cases of
gender-based violence. These include limited presence of the judiciary in rural areas and geographic,
NKPIWKUVKECPFGEQPQOKEDCTTKGTUVQYQOGPoUGSWCNCEEGUUVQLWUVKEG+PCFFKVKQP8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPCTG
not aware of their rights and of the legal remedies available to them; the persistence of gender stereo-
types that are deeply rooted in Colombian and Peruvian society and are replicated in the justice system;
and the low level of criminal prosecutions for gender-based violence. These obstacles have also been
noted by the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee),
which has highlighted the greater impact of these obstacles on women living in rural areas, as well as
QPYQOGPKPUKVWCVKQPUQHXWNPGTCDKNKV[UWEJCUCU[NWOUGGMGTUCPFOKITCPVU133
In both Colombia and Peru, the widespread perception of impunity and the ineffectiveness of the jus-
tice systems discourage many women from reporting gender-based violence.
FIGURES
According to the Report on Violence against Women by Corporación Sisma Mujer
in Colombia, in 2021, 82.92% of complaints of domestic violence were under
investigation stage, which indicates a high level of impunity as only 16.09% of
these cases reached trial and only 0.8% resulted someone receiving a sentence.
In relation to sex crimes, during the same period, the report found that 88.19% of cases of sex crimes
against women were under investigation. Only 6.85% of cases reached trial and in only 0.13% sen-
tencing.
6JG2GTWXKCP1ODWFURGTUQPoU1HƂEGKPCUVCVGOGPVQPVJGRTGUUKPIPGGFHQTGHHGEVKXGCEVKQPD[VJG
justice system to address an increase in cases of feminicide, noted that in 2020 only 6 out of 138
cases of feminicide (that is, 4%) resulted in convictions for the crime of feminicide. 134
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNTGSWGUVGFKPHQTOCVKQPHTQOVJG%QNQODKCPCPF2GTWXKCPIQXGTPOGPVUQPVJG
PWODGTQHEQPXKEVKQPUCPFCESWKVVCNUHQTETKOGUTGNCVGFVQXCTKQWUHQTOUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG#V
the time of writing, no such information had been received.
These same perceptions are shared by Venezuelan women, who consider that in most cases it is not
YQTVJOCMKPICEQORNCKPVDGECWUGVJG[YKNNPQVIGVCPGHHGEVKXGTGURQPUGHTQOVJGUVCVGQTQDVCKPCP[
form of reparation, since women who are nationals of the host countries do not obtain this either.135
+P%QNQODKC.CYQH
&GEGODGT UGVUQWVOGCUWTGUVQRTGXGPVCPFRWPKUJHQTOUQHXKQNGPEGCPFFKUETKOKPCVKQP
CICKPUVYQOGP .CYQH
,WN[ GUVCDNKUJGUHGOKPKEKFGCUCURGEKƂEQHHGPEG .CYQHGUVCDNKUJGUOGCUWTGUVQ
RTGXGPVCPFGTCFKECVGFQOGUVKEXKQNGPEG .CYQHUGVUQWVOGCUWTGUVQRTGXGPVCPFRWPKUJJCTCUUOGPVCVYQTMCPFVJGECTG
RCVJYC[HQTXKEVKOUQHFQOGUVKEXKQNGPEGCPFIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCPFIWKFGNKPGUQPJQYVJG#VVQTPG[)GPGTCNoU1HƂEGUJQWNFTGURQPF
VQRGQRNGYKVJFKXGTUGUGZWCNQTKGPVCVKQPCPFIGPFGT+P2GTWVJGTGCTG .CYVJG.CYVQ2TGXGPV'TCFKECVGCPF2WPKUJ#NN(QTOU
QH8KQNGPEGCICKPUV9QOGPCPF/GODGTUQHVJG)TQWR.CY CPFQPVJGRTGXGPVKQPCPFRWPKUJOGPVQHUGZWCNJCTCUUOGPVYKVJ
CEQTG2TQVQEQNQPLQKPVCEVKQPKPVJGƂGNFQHEQORTGJGPUKXGECTGCPFRTQVGEVKQPCICKPUVXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPCPFOGODGTUQHVJG
family aimed at strengthening inter-institutional action and coordination in providing comprehensive care services, and a Protocol for the
Investigation of Crimes of Feminicide, incorporating a gender perspective, among other instruments.
%'	%QOOKVVGG%QPENWFKPIQDUGTXCVKQPUQPVJGPKPVJRGTKQFKETGRQTVQH2GTW
JVVRU VDKPVGTPGVQJEJTQTIANC[QWVUVTGCV[DQF[GZVGTPCN&QYPNQCFCURZ!U[ODQNPQ %'	H%H2'4H%1H.CPI GPCPFQH%QNQODKC
*VVRU VDKPVGTPGVQJEJTQTIANC[QWVUVTGCV[DQF[GZVGTPCN&QYPNQCFCURZ!U[ODQNPQ %'	H%H%1.H%1H.CPI GP
%QTRQTCEKÏP 5KUOC /WLGT /CTEJ JVVRU YYYUKUOCOWLGTQTIYREQPVGPVWRNQCFU8($QNGVKP/RFH
5RCPKUJQPN[ 2GTWXKCP1ODWFURGTUQPoUQHƂEGn&GHGPUQTÉCFGN2WGDNQFG2GTÖWTIGWPCCEVWCEKÏPGHGEVKXCFGNUKUVGOCFGLWUVKEKC
HTGPVGCCWOGPVQFGECUQUFGHGOKPKEKFKQo/CTEJ
https://www.defensoria.gob.pe/defensoria-del-pueblo-urge-una-actuacion-efectiva-del-sistema-de-justicia-frente-a-aumento-de-casos-de-feminicidio/
+PVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP2GTW/CTEJ (QEWU)TQWR.KOC/CTEJ (QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC
/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP%ÖEWVC/CTEJ
“There is a very high level of impunity regarding the law and I doubt that anyone
will resort to wasting their time there because we have seen that even for TV stars,
very famous women here, who have gone through a lot of serious violence, the guy
still remains at liberty, he is free, walking around, and they don’t dare seek justice.”
Laura, a Venezuelan woman in Peru
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However, in Colombia and Peru, Venezuelan survivors of gender-based violence face additional and
URGEKƂEQDUVCENGUKPIGVVKPIGHHGEVKXGCEEGUUVQLWUVKEG
6.1.2 LACK OF INFORMATION ABOUT CARE PATHWAYS
There have been institutional efforts in Colombia and Peru136 to disseminate and provide guidance to
survivors of gender-based violence on existing care pathways, such as setting up hotlines. However,
QPGQHVJGƂTUVQDUVCENGUVJCVYQOGPKFGPVKH[KPCEEGUUKPIECTGRCVJYC[UKUVJCVVJG[FQPQVMPQY
CDQWVVJGO VJG[FQPQVMPQYYJKEJKPUVKVWVKQPVQIQVQQTYJCVOGEJCPKUOUCTGCXCKNCDNG137
Civil society organizations reported that, despite some isolated efforts by institutions in Colombia and
Peru to disseminate and provide advice on care pathways for survivors of gender-based violence, a
strategic plan has not yet been developed to ensure that existing regulations and care pathways reach
Venezuelan refugee survivors of gender-based violence.
In Colombia, the refugee women interviewed stressed that, although in recent times they have man-
CIGFVQJCXGITGCVGTCEEGUUVQKPHQTOCVKQPVJKUYCUVJCPMUVQVJGYQTMQHKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\C-
tions, international cooperation agencies and civil society organizations, not to an effort by the state
authorities.139
+PCFFKVKQPVQVJGNCEMQHKPHQTOCVKQPTGHWIGGYQOGPUCKFVJCVYJCVUQOGVKOGURTGXGPVUVJGOHTQO
approaching institutions is the idea that they do not have the same rights as people in the host coun-
tries and therefore cannot claim their rights from institutions. In this context, women perceive the
public security and justice system as remote from their situation.
According to sources interviewed, this perception among Venezuelan people is reinforced by the
treatment they have received by some public authorities, who describe Venezuelans as “illegals with
no rights”.141 This type of statement is part of a context of xenophobic attitudes against Venezuelan
people fed by political discourses, both in Colombia and Peru, which are discussed later in this
report.142
%QNQODKCJCUCKPHQTOCVKQPCPFCFXKEGJQVNKPGHQTXKEVKOUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGVJCVEQXGTUVJGYJQNGEQWPVT[
.KPG
CPFVJGRWTRNGNKPGHQTRU[EJQUQEKCNECTGCPFCFXKEGEQXGTKPI$QIQV½ 2GTWJCUCHTGGVGNGRJQPGNKPGRTQXKFKPIKPHQTOCVKQP
advice, counselling and emotional support and referral for victims of family or sexual violence.
(QEWU)TQWR2GTW/CTEJ (QEWU)TQWR2GTW/CTEJ (QEWU)TQWR2GTW/CTEJ CPF(QEWU
)TQWRKP%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP%QNQODKC/CTEJ TGURQPUGHTQOVJG%QNQODKCP/KPKUVT[QH,WUVKEGVQ#OPGUV[
+PVGTPCVKQPCNoUTKIJVQHRGVKVKQPQH#RTKNHTQOVJG#VVQTPG[)GPGTCNoU1HƂEG#RTKN
(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ (QECN)TQWR5QCEJC%QNQODKC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG-
\WGNCPYQOCP5QCEJC/CTEJ
(QEWU)TQWRUCPFCPF/CTEJCPF(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC#RTKN
+PVGTXKGYYKVJCPKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJ
$CTÏOGVTQFGZGPQHQDKC$QNGVÉPOGPUWCN%QNQODKC$QNGVÉPOGPUWCNs2GTÖ
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6.1.3 IRREGULAR MIGRATION STATUS
&KHƂEWNVKGUKPCEEGUUKPIKPVGTPCVKQPCNRTQVGEVKQPCPFQVJGTTGIWNCTK\CVKQPRTQEGUUGUJCXGCPKOOGFKCVG
impact on access to justice for Venezuelan women survivors of gender-based violence. Many women
YJQFQPQVJCXGTGIWNCTK\GFOKITCVKQPUVCVWUCTGCHTCKFVQIQVQVJGTGNGXCPVKPUVKVWVKQPUVQOCMGC
complaint, because they fear being deported to Venezuela.143
0QVJCXKPITGIWNCTK\GFOKITCVKQPUVCVWUGZCEGTDCVGUVJGRQYGTKPGSWCNKV[DGVYGGP8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGG
women and their abusers if the latter have Colombian or Peruvian nationality and can constitute a
means of putting pressure on them to prevent them from reporting gender-based violence. Claudia, a
[GCTQNF8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPYJQECOGVQ2GTWVQYQTMHQTC68RTQITCOOGTCPFYCUUGZWCNN[JCT-
CUUGFD[JGTDQUUGZRNCKPGFYJ[UJGFKFPQVTGRQTVKV
+PVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJ
p+FKFPoVVT[VQIGVRCKF+YCUPoVYCKVKPIHQTCP[VJKPIHTQOVJCVQHƂEG'XGT[VJKPI
was left there and I didn’t dare to report it because he is a fairly powerful person,
a public person... he has power. And I was... I was undocumented.” Claudia, a Venezuelan
woman in Peru
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#OPGUV[ +PVGTPCVKQPCN FQEWOGPVGF JQY VJG GEQPQOKE RTGECTKQWUPGUU KP YJKEJ YQOGP ƂPF VJGO-
UGNXGUNKPMGFVQVJGNCEMQHOKITCVKQPFQEWOGPVCVKQPKUCPQVJGTGNGOGPVVJCVKPJKDKVU8GPG\WGNCP
women from accessing care pathways because they have to focus their efforts and energies on the
RTKQTKV[QHOGGVKPIVJGDCUKEPGGFUQHGXGT[FC[NKHGTCVJGTVJCPVJKPMKPICDQWVTGEGKXKPIECTGQTƂNKPI
a complaint. The women interviewed commented that they often do not have the resources or time
to go to the authorities and follow long and draining processes. Amnesty International is particularly
EQPEGTPGFVJCVKPDQVJEQWPVTKGUKPHQTOCNGORNQ[OGPVRQQTYQTMKPIEQPFKVKQPUCPFNQYYCIGUQH
refugee and migrant women do not allow them to allocate resources and time to approach institutions
and demand protection of their right to a life free from violence.
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNDGNKGXGUVJCVVJGNCEMQHKPHQTOCVKQPCDQWVECTGRCVJYC[UCPFGZKUVKPIOGEJC-
PKUOUVJGNCEMQHMPQYNGFIGCDQWVVJGKTTKIJVUHGCTCPFVJGYKFGURTGCFRGTEGRVKQPQHKORWPKV[CPF
VJGRTGECTKQWUUKVWCVKQPKPYJKEJ8GPG\WGNCPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGƂPFVJGOUGNXGUEQP-
stitute very real barriers preventing Venezuelan refugee women in Colombia and Peru from accessing
ECTGRCVJYC[U6JGFKHƂEWNVKGUCTGGZCEGTDCVGFHQTYQOGPKPCPKTTGIWNCTOKITCVKQPUKVWCVKQP
These factors have an impact on the under-reporting of cases to the respective authorities. In turn,
under-reporting prevents Colombia and Peru from assessing the true scale of the phenomenon of gen-
der-based violence towards refugee women and, therefore, adopting appropriate policies and allocating
UWHƂEKGPVTGUQWTEGUVQCFGSWCVGN[CFFTGUUVJKURTQDNGO
6JGUGDCTTKGTUCNUQKPETGCUGVJGTKUMQHVJKUXKQNGPEGEQPVKPWKPIQTGXGPGUECNCVKPI7PCDNGVQIQVQVJG
CWVJQTKVKGUVQOCMGCEQORNCKPVCPFQDVCKPRTQVGEVKXGOGCUWTGUYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQ-
lence can become victims of feminicide. In 2021, the Colombian Femicides Observatory (Observatorio
de Feminicidios en Colombia) reported that of 622 feminicides recorded in 2021, 45 were of Venezue-
lan refugee women.1446JG2GTWXKCP1ODWFURGTUQPoU1HƂEGTGRQTVGFVJCVCVQVCNQHHGOKPKEKFGU
were recorded in 2019 and 2020, of which eight were of Venezuelan women.145
6.1.4 AUTHORITIES’ LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPLICABLE REGULATIONS
1PQVJGTQEECUKQPUKVKUQHƂEKCNUoNCEMQHMPQYNGFIGCDQWVGZKUVKPIRCVJYC[UCPFRTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTGU
that is a barrier to foreign women survivors of violence accessing protection measures.
The regulations in force in Colombia and Peru state that there is no restriction on nationals or foreign
PCVKQPCNUƂNKPICEQORNCKPVKPECUGUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG146 In other words, according to the laws
CRRNKECDNGKPVJGUGEQWPVTKGU8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGECPƂNGCEQO-
plaint without the need to present a foreigners’ identity card.
*QYGXGT#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNHQWPFVJCVKPRTCEVKEGNCEMQHFQEWOGPVCVKQPKUQPGQHVJGDCTTKGTU
EKVGFD[VJGCWVJQTKVKGUYJQFQPQVMPQYVJGNCY#EEQTFKPIVQUGXGTCNUVCVGOGPVUTGEGKXGFKPDQVJ
EQWPVTKGUVJGCWVJQTKVKGUTGSWKTGYQOGPVQRTQXKFGFQEWOGPVCVKQPQHVJGKTOKITCVKQPUVCVWUKPQTFGTVQ
receive their complaints.147
%QNQODKCP(GOKEKFGU1DUGTXCVQT[$QNGVÉPOGPUWCNFGHGOKPKEKFKQU/CTEJ
JVVRU QDUGTXCVQTKQHGOKPKEKFKQUEQNQODKCQTICVVCEJOGPVUCTVKENG$QNGV%#&P8KXCUPQUSWGTGOQU%QNQODKCOCT\QARFH
2GTWXKCP1ODWFUOCPoU1HƂEG+PHQTOG8KQNGPEKCDCUCFCGPIÅPGTQEQPVTCOWLGTGUOKITCPVGUGPGN2GTÖ&QEWOGPVQFGVTCDCLQ
JVVRU RGTWWPHRCQTIUKVGUFGHCWNVƂNGURWDRFHKPHQTOGAAXKQNGPEKCAEQPVTCAOWLGTGUAOKITCPVGURFH
+P2GTWUGG.CYVJG.CYVQ2TGXGPV2WPKUJCPF'TCFKECVG8KQNGPEGCICKPUV9QOGPCPF/GODGTUQHVJG(COKN[CPFVJG
%QTG2TQVQEQNHQT,QKPV#EVKQPQPEQORTGJGPUKXGECTGCPFRTQVGEVKQPHTQOXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPCPFOGODGTUQHVJGHCOKN[ITQWR
JVVRU QDUGTXCVQTKQXKQNGPEKCRGYREQPVGPVWRNQCFU2TQVQEQNQFGDCUGEQPLWPVCEQPVTCNCXKQNGPEKCCPGZQATRFH
5RCPKUJ
QPN[ CPFKP%QNQODKC.CY
UGVVKPIQWVUVCPFCTFUQPTCKUKPICYCTGPGUURTGXGPVKPICPFRWPKUJKPIHQTOUQHXKQNGPEGCPF
FKUETKOKPCVKQPCICKPUVYQOGP.CYCRRNKGUVQPCVKQPCNUCPFHQTGKIPGTUKPCEEQTFCPEGYKVJVJGEQPUKFGTCVKQPUQH&GETGGQH
UKZVJTGEKVCNYJKEJUVCVGU pKVURWTRQUGKUVJGCFQRVKQPQHPQTOUVJCVIWCTCPVGGCNKHGHTGGQHXKQNGPEGHQTCNNYQOGPq#TVKENG
QHVJG%QPUVKVWVKQPCNUQUVCVGUVJCVp(QTGKIPGTUUJCNNGPLQ[KP%QNQODKCVJGUCOGEKXKNTKIJVUITCPVGFVQ%QNQODKCPUq
+PVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN6WODGU2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGY
YKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPU%QNQODKC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPC-
VKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPU%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
“There are too many requirements and apart from that they make you waste a
lot of time and for us time is work, we depend on time, if we don’t work one day,
we don’t eat the next day. They don’t treat us well.” Ángeles, a Venezuelan woman in Colombia
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9QOGPKPFKECVGFVJCVRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUFQPQVMPQYQTCTGPQVHCOKNKCTYKVJVJGV[RGQHVGORQTCT[FQEW-
OGPVCVKQPITCPVGFVQVJGOFWTKPIVJGTGIWNCTK\CVKQPRTQEGUUCPFCUCTGUWNVQHƂEKCNUUQOGVKOGUTGHWUG
VQCEEGRVVJGEQORNCKPVDGECWUGUWTXKXQTUECPPQVRTQXKFGVJGFQEWOGPVUVJCVVJGQHƂEKCNUMPQYCDQWV
QTTGSWKTGKPRTCEVKEG
+PVJGECUGQHVTCPUIGPFGTYQOGPVJGUGFKHƂEWNVKGUCTGEQORQWPFGFD[VJGHCEVVJCVVJGCWVJQTKVKGU
TGHWUGVQTGEGKXGCEQORNCKPVYJGPVJGKTFQEWOGPVCVKQPTGƃGEVUCIGPFGTKFGPVKV[FKHHGTGPVHTQOVJCV
YJKEJVJGRGTUQPGZRTGUUGUQTKFGPVKƂGUYKVJ149
6.1.5 DISCRIMINATION AND COMPOUND STEREOTYPING
Human rights protection mechanisms, both of the international system and the inter-American sys-
tem, have established that one of the central factors limiting access to justice for women survivors of
gender-based violence, in general, is the persistence of views based on gender stereotypes held by of-
ƂEKCNUTGURQPUKDNGHQTCFOKPKUVGTKPIUWRRQTVCPFRTQVGEVKQPRTQEGUUGU According to various sources
interviewed in Colombia and Peru, views based on gender stereotypes are widespread among public
QHƂEKCNUKPXQNXGFKPVJGRTQEGUUGUQHRTQXKFKPIECTGCPFRTQVGEVKQPVQVJGUGYQOGP
#EQOOQPFGPQOKPCVQTKPVJGUJQTVEQOKPIUQHUVCVGTGURQPUGUYJGPYQOGPEQOGHQTYCTFVQUGGM
RTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTGUKUVJCVQHƂEKCNUUGGMVQOKPKOK\GVJGTGRQTVGFXKQNGPEGYJKEJNGCFUVQTGHWUCNVQ
adopt effective measures that can really protect women from gender-based violence. For example, a
8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPKP2GTWTGEGKXGFVJGHQNNQYKPITGURQPUGHTQOVJGRQNKEG pDWV[QWoTGIQKPIVQIQ
DCEMVQJKOCTGPoV[QW!qQTp[QWoTGIQKPIVQIQDCEMVQJKOTKIJV!qpNQQMVJKUKUFKHƂEWNVDWVVJGTGoU
a solution to everything, with help or psychological therapy you will be alright, you have your family,
[QWJCXG[QWTHTKGPFUCTG[QWUWTG[QWoTGPQVRNCPPKPIVQIQDCEMVQJKO!q6JGYQOCPKPVGTXKGYGG
VQNF#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNVJCVYKVJVJKUV[RGQHTGURQPUG p6JG[FQPoVJGNR[QWVJG[FQPoVJGNR[QW
be safe.”151
Another Venezuelan woman, who was the victim of attempted sexual assault while she was exercising
by an individual who chased her with his pants down and his penis exposed, reported that, at the time
UJGƂNGFVJGEQORNCKPVVJGRQNKEGCUMGFJGTYJCVUJGYCUFQKPITWPPKPICNQPGCVUKZKPVJGOQTP-
KPI+PCFFKVKQPVJGRQNKEGOCPVQNFJGTVJCVYJCVUJGYCUTGRQTVKPIYCUPQVCTGCUQPVQƂNGCHQTOCN
EQORNCKPV pDGECWUGCRGTUQPEJCUGF[QWNKMGVJCVKVFQGUPoVOGCPVJGTGYCUCP[MKPFQHCIITGUUKQP
because he was not doing anything to you, he was not touching you or causing an impact.” These
V[RGUQHTGURQPUGUTGƃGEVCRTQHQWPFNCEMQHWPFGTUVCPFKPIQHVJGRTQDNGOQHUGZWCNXKQNGPEG VJG
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has established that sexual violence does not always involve
physical contact.152 In this particular case, the policeman ended up telling the woman survivor that
he would not accept the complaint because she was a foreigner, “but if she were Peruvian, maybe he
would have.”153
+PVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPU%QNQODKC/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJ+PVGTPCVKQPCN1TICPK\CVKQPU%ÖEWVC %QNQODKC
/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPU2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN6WODGU2GTW/CTEJ
CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN%QNQODKC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKN
UQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP%QNQODKC/CTEJ
%'	 %QOOKVVGG )GPGTCN 4GEQOOGPFCVKQP )GPGTCN TGEQOOGPFCVKQP QP YQOGPoU CEEGUU VQ LWUVKEG %'	%)%
#WIWUVJVVRU VDKPVGTPGVQJEJTQTIANC[QWVUVTGCV[DQF[GZVGTPCN&QYPNQCFCURZ!U[ODQNPQ %'	%)%.CPI GPCPF
+PVGT#OGTKECP%QWTV)QP\½NG\GVCN
p%QVVQP(KGNFq X/GZKEQ2TGNKOKPCT[1DLGEVKQP/GTKVU4GRCTCVKQPUCPF%QUVU,WFIOGPVQH
0QXGODGTCPF%CUGQH8GN½USWG\
5VCVGOGPVD[C8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPKPVGTXKGYGFKP(QEWU)TQWR85:.KOC2GTW/CTEJ
+PVGT#OGTKECP%QWTV%CUGQHVJG/KIWGN%CUVTQ%CUVTQ2TKUQPX2GTW/GTKVU4GRCTCVKQPUCPF%QUVU,WFIOGPVQH0QXGODGT
5VCVGOGPVD[C8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPKPVGTXKGYGFKP(QEWU)TQWR85:.KOC2GTW/CTEJ
“I approached the police; I live near to a police station. I was in the process of
moving from a PTP to a Foreigners’ Card. I only had the decision about the change
in my migration status, I didn’t have the physical card as yet, but I was waiting for
Migrations to approve the regularization. And the police told me that they couldn’t
accept my complaint because my PTP seemed to have expired in the system. I
GZRNCKPGFVJCVKVJCFEGTVCKPN[GZRKTGFDWVVJCV+JCFCFQEWOGPVVJCVEQPƂTOGF
that I was applying to Migrations for a change in migration status, which I could
do, and in addition, my passport was valid. Even so, they didn’t want to take the
complaint.” Mariana, a Venezuelan woman in Peru
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Other practices that leave women survivors of gender-based violence totally unprotected were also
KFGPVKƂGFKP%QNQODKC#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNYCUVQNFD[CTGHWIGGYQOCPYJQYCUCUUCWNVGFD[JGT
RCTVPGTVJCVVJGHCOKN[RQNKEGUVCVKQPKPKVKCVGFCEQPEKNKCVKQPRTQEGUUYKVJJGTCVVCEMGT6JG%'	
Committee recommends that alternative procedures such as conciliation and mediation should not
be used in cases of gender-based violence against women.154 This is because these procedures run
VJGTKUMQHKIPQTKPIWPGSWCNRQYGTTGNCVKQPUDGVYGGPOGPCPFYQOGPKPVJGUGUKVWCVKQPUCPFNGCXKPI
women survivors without protection, in addition to perpetuating the idea that violence against women
is a private matter, not very serious and open to reconciliation.
The statements gathered show that, in the particular case of Venezuelan women in Colombia and Peru,
the complaints processes and the search for protection measures were intersected by the existence of
EQORQWPFIGPFGTUVGTGQV[RGUCOQPIVJGRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUKPEJCTIGQHUWRRQTVKPIVJGOVJCVKUVQUC[
stereotypes based not only on issues of gender, which affect women in general, but also in particular
on the fact that they are Venezuelan women.
The statements gathered by Amnesty International also highlighted stereotypes that blame Venezuelan
TGHWIGGYQOGPHQTDGKPITGURQPUKDNGHQTRTQXQMKPIVJGCIITGUUQToUXKQNGPVTGCEVKQPCPFVJGTGHQTGVJCV
they should deal with it on their own, without state protection. A Venezuelan woman who tried to report
JGTJWUDCPFVQVJGRQNKEGKP%QNQODKCYCUVQNFVJCVpVJG[EQWNFPoVNQQMHQTJKOn[QWoTG8GPG\WGNCP
UQ[QWOWUVJCXGNKMGFYJCVJGYCUCDQWVDGECWUG[QWECOGCPFJCFCPQVJGTEJKNFoq155 The police
response was that if her assailant arrived at the house, she should call them. Faced with this, the
YQOCPVQNF#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCN pƂTUV+JCXGPQEGNNRJQPGCPFUGEQPFECNNVJGRQNKEGYJGPVJGTG
KUQPN[QPGWPKVKPVJGXKNNCIGD[VJGVKOGVJGƂTUVQPGCTTKXGFJGYQWNFJCXGMKNNGFCPFDWTKGFOG
CPFVCMGPO[FCWIJVGTq#PQVJGT8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPYJQJCFƂNGFCEQORNCKPVCICKPUVJGTCVVCEMGT
CPFYJQECNNGFVJGRQNKEGDGECWUGVJGCVVCEMGTYCUPGCTD[CPFCTOGFTGEGKXGFVJGHQNNQYKPITGURQPUG
pCJ[QWCTGVJG8GPG\WGNCP+oOUWTG[QWOWUVDGTGCNN[JQVDGECWUGJGKUJGTGNQQMKPIHQT[QWq156
6JKUV[RGQHTGURQPUGCNUQTGƃGEVUVJGJ[RGTUGZWCNK\CVKQPQH8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPYJKEJRQTVTC[UVJGO
as desirable and always available sexually,157 but not worthy of protection.
VENEZUELAN TRANS WOMEN
The IACHR, in its report, Violence against Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and In-
tersex Persons in the Americas, noted that LGBTI people who are victims of gen-
FGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGHCEGCFFKVKQPCNQDUVCENGUKPCEEGUUKPILWUVKEGHQTURGEKƂETGC-
sons related to their gender identity or sexual orientation. Sources interviewed
by Amnesty International noted that Venezuelan trans women as well as LGBTI
people face obstacles and discrimination related to their gender identity when
trying to report gender-based violence committed against them.159 For example,
VJGKTEQORNCKPVUCTGQHVGPFKUOKUUGFQWVTKIJVCPFVJG[ECPGXGPGZRGTKGPEGOKUVTGCVOGPVQTOQEMGT[
of their gender identity by state agents. This situation was corroborated by Venezuelan trans refugee
women interviewed in the context of this research in both countries.161
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPTGEQOOGPFUVJCVUVCVGUGPUWTGVJCVECUGUQHXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPKPENWFKPI
domestic violence, are under no circumstances referred to any alternative dispute resolution procedure; CEDAW Committee; General
4GEQOOGPFCVKQP#EEGUUVQLWUVKEG%'	%)%RCTCE )GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQHVJG%'	%QOOKVVGGRTQXKFGU
that states parties must ensure that gender-based violence against women is not mandatorily referred to alternative dispute resolution
RTQEGFWTGUKPENWFKPIOGFKCVKQPCPFEQPEKNKCVKQP+VCNUQUVCVGUVJCV p6JGWUGQHVJGUGRTQEGFWTGUUJQWNFDGUVTKEVN[TGIWNCVGFCPFCN-
lowed only when a previous evaluation by a specialised team ensures the free and informed consent by the affected victim/survivor and
VJCVVJGTGCTGPQKPFKECVQTUQHHWTVJGTTKUMUHQTVJGXKEVKOUWTXKXQTQTVJGKTHCOKN[OGODGTUq%'	%QOOKVVGG )GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFC-
VKQPQPIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPWRFCVKPIIGPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQP%'	%)%,WN[RCTC
D
JVVRU VDKPVGTPGVQJEJTQTIANC[QWVUVTGCV[DQF[GZVGTPCN&QYPNQCFCURZ!U[ODQNPQ %'	%)%.CPI G
5VCVGOGPVQHC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC
5VCVGOGPVQHC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP(QEWU)TQWR%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
5VCVGOGPVD[C8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP(QEWU)TQWRFKHHGTGPVHQTOUQHXKQNGPEG.KOC2GTW/CTEJ
+#%*48KQNGPEGCICKPUV.GUDKCP)C[$KUGZWCN6TCPUCPF+PVGTUGZ2GTUQPUKPVJG#OGTKECU
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/violencelgbtipersons.pdf
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJCPFPVGTXKGYYKVJ&G,WUVKEKC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP2GTW/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
p;QWIQVQTGRQTVCU+FKF+YGPVVQVJGRQNKEGUVCVKQPVJGƂTUVVKOGCPF+oNNPGXGT
forget the policeman’s expression. He looked me up and down and said, ‘Veneca’
[a derogatory term for a Venezuelan woman].” Carmen, a Venezuelan woman in Peru.
VEN
The
terse
FGTD
sons
by A
peop
tryin
VJGKT EQORNCKPVU CTG QHVG
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9JGPVJG[UGGMRTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTGUVJG[CNUQHCEGFKUETKOKPCVKQP#VTCPUIGPFGTYQOCPUGZYQTMGT
CUUCWNVGFKPVJGUVTGGVVQNF#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNVJCVVJGUVCHHQHVJG%ÖEWVC#VVQTPG[)GPGTCNoU1HƂEG
KP%QNQODKCUWIIGUVGFCUCRTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTGVJCVUJGEWVJGTJCKTCPFpFTGUUNKMGCOCPq162 Am-
PGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNƂPFUVJGUGHQTOUQHFKTGEVFKUETKOKPCVKQPD[VJGCWVJQTKVKGUXGT[YQTT[KPIDGECWUG
they not only violate the right of trans women to access justice and perpetuate impunity, but they
NGCXGYQOGPWPRTQVGEVGFCPFVJGTGHQTGOQTGGZRQUGFVQHWTVJGTCVVCEMUQTTGRTKUCNUHQTJCXKPIVTKGF
to lodge a complaint.
6JGGZCORNGUEKVGFUJQYVJCVIGPFGTCPFPCVKQPCNKV[UVGTGQV[RGUPGICVKXGN[KPƃWGPEGFVJGTGURQPUGU
QHQHƂEKCNUVQ8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGTGUWNVKPIKPVJGKTDGKPI
denied their right of access to justice. The human rights protection mechanisms of the international
and regional systems have pointed out that gender and compound stereotypes in the justice sys-
tem constitute a form of discrimination, and that their application in the area of criminal law has
HCTTGCEJKPIEQPUGSWGPEGU163 such as compromising the fairness of judicial proceedings, shifting re-
URQPUKDKNKV[QPVQXKEVKOUCPFFKUEJCTIKPIVJGCEEWUGFSWGUVKQPKPIVJGETGFKDKNKV[QHXKEVKOUoVGUVKOQP[
and preventing women from having access to real and effective protection measures.164 In Peru and
Colombia discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, sex and nationality is a breach of the law.
9JGPEQOOKVVGFD[RWDNKEQHƂEKCNUKPDQVJEQWPVTKGUVJKUETKOGECPDGEQPUKFGTGFCPCIITCXCVKPI
factor carrying heavier punishment.165 However, a recent study by Plan International revealed that the
OCLQTKV[QH8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKP2GTWFQPQVMPQYVJCVVJG[ECPOCMGCEQORNCKPVCICKPUVVJQUG
CFOKPKUVGTKPILWUVKEGKHVJG[FQPQVHWNƂNVJGKTHWPEVKQPU166
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNDGNKGXGUVJCVVJGCWVJQTKVKGUoNCEMQHMPQYNGFIGKPENWFKPIVJGRTCEVKEGQHTG-
SWKTKPIXGT[URGEKƂEKOOKITCVKQPFQEWOGPVCVKQPDGHQTGCEEGRVKPIEQORNCKPVUCUYGNNCUVJGRTGUGPEG
of compound gender stereotypes (gender, nationality and gender identity), highlight the urgent need
VQUVTGPIVJGPVJGRTQEGUUGUHQTTCKUKPICYCTGPGUUCPFCRRTQRTKCVGCPFEQPVKPWQWUVTCKPKPIHQTQHƂEKCNU
responsible for receiving and dealing with complaints and to guarantee the protection of survivors of
gender-based violence in Colombia and Peru. This challenge has been pointed out by the CEDAW
Committee in its concluding observations on Colombia and Peru167CPFYCUGXGPCEMPQYNGFIGFD[
VJGCWVJQTKVKGUKPVGTXKGYGFD[#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNYJQCEEGRVGFVJCVOWEJYQTMUVKNNPGGFUVQDG
done on issues of training and awareness raising on how to support foreign survivors of gender-based
violence.
+PVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC#RTKN
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPYQOGPoUCEEGUUVQLWUVKEG%'	%)%#WIWUV +PVGT#OGTKECP
%QWTV%CUGQH)QP\½NG\GVCN
p%QVVQP(KGNF X/GZKEQ,WFIOGPVQH0QXGODGT '5%4%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN%QOOGPVQP
The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights (art. 3 of the International Covenant on
'EQPQOKE5QEKCNCPF%WNVWTCN4KIJVU '%#WIWUV
5GG%'	%QOOKVVGG%QOOWPKECVKQP0Q-CTGP6C[CI8GTVKFQX2JKNKRRKPGU%'	%&,WN[
JVVRU LWTKUQJEJTQTI5GCTEJ&GVCKNUCPF%'	%QOOKVVGG%QOOWPKECVKQP0Q#PIGNC)QP\½NG\%CTTGÍQX5RCKP
%'	%&,WN[JVVRU LWTKUQJEJTQTI5GCTEJ&GVCKNU
.CYQH
%QNQODKC JVVRU YYYHWPEKQPRWDNKECIQXEQGXCIGUVQTPQTOCVKXQPQTOCARFHRJR!K CPF.CY
2GTW COGPFKPICTVKENGQHVJG%TKOKPCN%QFGJVVRU YYYOKORIQDRGCFWNVQOC[QTCTEJKXQU.G[RFH
5RCPKUJQPN[
2NCP+PVGTPCVKQPCN'UVWFKQUQDTGXKQNGPEKCDCUCFCGPIÅPGTQJCEKCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU[QTGHWIKCFCUGPNQURCÉUGUTGEGRVQTGU
FG2GTÖ['EWCFQTRJVVRU RNCPKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTIWRNQCFUUKVGU'UVWFKQA8$)A2GTWAA'EWCFQTRFH
5GG%'	%QOOKVVGG%QPENWFKPIQDUGTXCVKQPUQPVJGPKPVJRGTKQFKETGRQTVQH2GTW
JVVRU VDKPVGTPGVQJEJTQTIANC[QWVUVTGCV[DQF[GZVGTPCN&QYPNQCFCURZ!U[ODQNPQ %'	H%H2'4H%1H.CPI GCPFQH
%QNQODKC
JVVRU VDKPVGTPGVQJEJTQTIANC[QWVUVTGCV[DQF[GZVGTPCN&QYPNQCFCURZ!U[ODQNPQ %'	H%H%1.H%1H.CPI GP
+PVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN6WODGU2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJ
RWDNKEQHƂEKCN%QNQODKC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC#RTKN
“I lived with my cousin in Chosica... in the Chosica police station I was in practice
abused again making the complaint because the authorities didn’t take me
seriously, because I am trans. Rather they made fun of me; they took a long time;
I left there feeling really despondent and it was quite a painful experience. They
began to make fun of me, saying things like ‘yours is coming’ as if I was looking for
someone or I was someone’s wife or someone’s husband or whatever gender they
wanted to use. ‘Someone will be along soon, it’s not your turn, no it’s not yours’ as
if they were passing around a hot potato, but no one wanted to deal with me. My
complaint was not considered, so they didn’t even take the time to write it down. I
felt like it was my fault.” Laura, a Venezuelan woman in Peru.
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According to sources interviewed, another issue of concern in Peru regarding the training and aware-
PGUUQHRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUKUVJGJKIJVWTPQXGTQHRGTUQPPGNCPFVJGTGHQTGVJGHCEVVJCVPGYQHƂEKCNU
enter the service who do not have the necessary training.169 Sources consulted in both countries also
highlighted the need to provide psychological support and self-care measures for frontline staff who
provide assistance to women survivors of gender-based violence.
5QWTEGUEQPUWNVGFJCXGRQKPVGFQWVQVJGTHCEVQTURTGXGPVKPIKPUVKVWVKQPUHTQORTQXKFKPICPCFGSWCVG
TGURQPUGVQIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCHHGEVKPI8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKPRCTVKEWNCTUWEJCUVJGNCEMQHEQQT-
dination between the different institutions involved in their protection in both countries171CPFVJGNCEM
QHTGUQWTEGUCPFUWRRNKGURTQXKFGFVQRQNKEGQHƂEGTUHQTGZCORNGKP2GTW172
6.1.6 INSUFFICIENT EFFECTIVE PROTECTION MEASURES
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has established that States must ensure
that judicial, administrative, political or other remedies for women and girls who have been subjected
to gender-based violence, such as restraining orders and shelters, are women-centered, available, ac-
EGUUKDNGCEEGRVCDNGVCMGCIGCPFIGPFGTKPVQCEEQWPVCPFCFGSWCVGN[CFFTGUUVJGTKIJVUCPFPGGFU
of the victims/survivors. 173
Amnesty International found that another gap in protection for survivors of gender-based violence in
%QNQODKCCPF2GTWKUYQOGPoUNCEMQHCEEGUUVQVGORQTCT[UJGNVGTU
Although in both Colombia and Peru, the law states that all women victims of gender-based violence
OWUVJCXGCEEGUUVQCUJGNVGTYJGPVJG[CTGKPCUKVWCVKQPQHOQFGTCVGQTUGXGTGTKUM174(Peru) or a spe-
EKCNUKVWCVKQPQHTKUM
%QNQODKC CEEQTFKPIVQVJGUQWTEGUKPVGTXKGYGFUJGNVGTUFQPQVJCXGUWHƂEKGPV
ECRCEKV[VQIWCTCPVGGVJGIGQITCRJKECNEQXGTCIGCPFSWCNKV[QHVJGHCEKNKVKGUPGGFGFVQOGGVVJGJKIJ
demand for places from victims of gender-based violence. According to international standards, there
should be at least one shelter/refuge place for every 10,000 inhabitants, providing safe emergency ac-
EQOOQFCVKQPSWCNKƂGFEQWPUGNNKPICPFCUUKUVCPEGKPƂPFKPINQPIVGTOCEEQOOQFCVKQP175 These fa-
EKNKVKGUOWUVDGCEEGUUKDNGCPFCFGSWCVGN[UVCHHGFCPFHWPFGFKPQTFGTVQTGCEJXKEVKOURTQCEVKXGN[176
+PVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJCRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJCRWDNKEQHƂEKCN%QNQODKC/CTEJCPF2NCP+PVGTPCVKQPCN'UVWFKQUQDTGXKQNGPEKCDCUCFCGPIÅPGTQJCEKC
NCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU[QTGHWIKCFCUGPNQURCÉUGUTGEGRVQTGUFG2GTÖ['EWCFQT
70(2#CPF2GTWXKCP1ODWFURGTUQPoU1HƂEG8KQNGPEKCDCUCFCGPIÅPGTQEQPVTCOWLGTGUOKITCPVGUGPGN2GTÖ1EVQDGT
JVVRU YYYFGHGPUQTKCIQDRGYREQPVGPVWRNQCFU+PHQTOG8KQNGPEKCEQPVTCOWLGTGUOKITCPVGURFHCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJCPKP-
VGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPKP%QNQODKC/C[
2NCP+PVGTPCVKQPCN'UVWFKQUQDTGXKQNGPEKCDCUCFCGPIÅPGTQJCEKCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU[QTGHWIKCFCUGPNQURCÉUGUTGEGRVQTGU
de Perú y Ecuador
+#%*48KQNGPEGCPF&KUETKOKPCVKQPCICKPUV9QOGPCPF)KTNU $GUV2TCEVKEGUCPF%JCNNGPIGUKP.CVKP#OGTKECCPFVJG%CTKDDGCP
1'#5GT.8++&QERCTC0QXGODGTRCTCJVVR YYYQCUQTIGPKCEJTTGRQTVURFHU8KQNGPEG9QOGP)KTNURFH
5GG%QNQODKC&GETGGQH
&GEGODGT RCTVKCNN[TGIWNCVKPICTVKENGUCPFQH.CYQH
*VVRU YYYHWPEKQPRWDNKECIQXEQGXCIGUVQTPQTOCVKXQPQTOCARFHRJR!K CPF2GTW%QTG2TQVQEQNHQT,QKPV#EVKQPKPVJGƂGNFQH
EQORTGJGPUKXGECTGCPFRTQVGEVKQPHTQOXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPCPFOGODGTUQHVJGHCOKN[
2GTW
JVVRU QDUGTXCVQTKQXKQNGPEKCRGYREQPVGPVWRNQCFU2TQVQEQNQFGDCUGEQPLWPVCEQPVTCNCXKQNGPEKCCPGZQATRFH
5RCPKUJQPN[
709QOGP*CPFDQQMHQT.GIKUNCVKQPQP8KQNGPEGCICKPUV9QOGPR
JVVRU YYYWPYQOGPQTIGPFKIKVCNNKDTCT[RWDNKECVKQPUJCPFDQQMHQTNGIKUNCVKQPQPXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGP
%QWPEKNQH'WTQRG%QPXGPVKQPQPRTGXGPVKPICPFEQODCVKPIXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPCPFFQOGUVKEXKQNGPEG
+UVCPDWN%QPXGPVKQP #TVKENG
“We actually believe that, in all reports, and also other relevant initiatives, what we
always try to emphasize and highlight is the need for each institution to periodically
CPFCFGSWCVGN[VTCKPKVUQHƂEKCNUCDQWVVJGKUUWGQHRTQXKFKPICUUKUVCPEGVQYQOGP
victims of violence, not only intimate partner violence but all manifestations of
violence”. 2WDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW
p+PVJGRQNKEGUVCVKQPUVJGQHƂEKCNUCTGFGCNKPIYKVJECUGUQHXKQNGPEGHQTCYGGM
VJG[CTGVTCKPGFCPFPGZVYGGM[QWVJG[CTGTGRNCEGFD[PGYQHƂEKCNU6JG[CTGPQV
permanent staff, doing the same work. New staff arrive knowing little or nothing
about the issue of violence” 2WDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW
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According to information received by Amnesty International, in Lima, Peru, there are two shelters
run by the Metropolitan Municipality of Lima and seven run by the Ministry for Women’s Affairs,
(MIMP)177 for a population of more than 10,004,000 inhabitants. In the border department of Norte
de Santander, Colombia, there are only two shelters at present, funded through international cooper-
ation, although the departmental government plans to create more.
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNHQWPFVJCVNCEMQHUWHƂEKGPVUJGNVGTUOGCPUOCP[YQOGPCPF.)$6+TGHWIGGU
are denied their right to be protected through access to temporary safe refuge as survivors of gen-
der-based violence.179 This situation would seem to be even more critical for Venezuelan women and
RGQRNGNKXKPIKPRQXGTV[CPFYKVJQWVHCOKN[CPFUQEKCNUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUCPFYKVJQWVQRRQTVWPKVKGU
VQCEEGUUFGEGPVCPFCFGSWCVGJQWUKPIHQTYJQOUJGNVGTUCTGVJGQPN[QRVKQPHQTƂPFKPICRNCEGQH
safety.
Additionally, according to sources interviewed, in Peru, protection measures can only be accessed by
OCMKPICEQORNCKPVVQVJGTGNGXCPVCWVJQTKVKGU This situation is worrying because, as noted above,
there are many obstacles that prevent Venezuelan women survivors of gender-based violence from
ƂNKPIEQORNCKPVU
On the other hand, the authorities in Colombia and Peru indicated to Amnesty International that the
NCEMQHCTGURGEVHWNCRRTQCEJTGICTFKPIVJGTKIJVUQHVJG.)$6+RGQRNGKPUVCVGURGEKCNK\GFUJGNVGTUHQT
women, either through specialized shelters for this group or by providing safe spaces for trans women,
KUCPQVJGTQHVJGICRUKFGPVKƂGFKPTGNCVKQPVQRTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTGU
6.1.7 INADEQUATE DATA COLLECTION
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNPQVGFVJGFKHƂEWNV[DQVJKP2GTWCPFKP%QNQODKCQHQDVCKPKPISWCNKV[KPHQT-
OCVKQPQPEQORNCKPVUHQTCEVUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGƂNGFYKVJVJGTGNGXCPVCWVJQTKVKGU %'/ VJG
5+8+)+.#U[UVGO5+8+)'VJGRQNKEGVJG2WDNKE2TQUGEWVQToU1HƂEGCPFVJG#VVQTPG[)GPGTCNoU1HƂEG
2GTWXKCP1ODWFURGTUQPoU1HƂEG
JVVRU YYYFGHGPUQTKCIQDRGFGWPCXG\RQTVQFCUYREQPVGPVWRNQCFU5WRGTXKUKEDP*QICTGUFG4GHWIKQ6GORQTCN&GHGPUQTECFCFGN2WGDNQRFH
5RCPKUJQPN[
+PVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYUYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQHƂEKCNU2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJ KPVGTXKGY
YKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQPU%QNQODKC/CTEJ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN%ÖEWVC#RTKN
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJRWDNKEQHƂEKCN%ÖEWVC#RTKN
Women’s shelter, Colombia. Copyright: Fernanda Pineda/ Amnesty International
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&GURKVGJCXKPIKPHQTOCVKQPRTQXKFGFD[VJG2GTWXKCP2WDNKE2TQUGEWVQToU1HƂEGCPFVJG%QNQODKCP
#VVQTPG[)GPGTCNoU1HƂEGKPUQOGECUGUVJKUYCUPQVFKUCIITGICVGFD[VJGPCVKQPCNKV[QHVJGYQOGP
victims/survivors.
In both countries, there are records of primary care for women survivors. However, in Colombia, the
Comprehensive Information System on Gender-Based Violence uses data from SIVIGE, which was last
updated in 2020. The National Public Health Monitoring System (SIVIGILA) does contain indicators
developed solely for gender-based violence against Venezuelans, but these are not consistent with
VJGƂIWTGUHQTVJGIGPGTCNKPFKECVQTUKPVJGUCOGU[UVGOYJKEJFKUCIITGICVGVJGFCVCCEEQTFKPIVQ
%QNQODKCPCPF8GPG\WGNCPPCVKQPCNUCUVJGHQNNQYKPIVCDNGKNNWUVTCVGU
In Peru, the Aurora Programme has a register of cases dealt with by the Women’s Emergency Centres.
Although this contains data updated to March 2022, information submitted by foreign nationals and
UJQYURGTEGPVCIGUD[PCVKQPCNKV[VJGƂIWTGUCTGPQVFKUCIITGICVGFD[XKQNGPEGCPFPCVKQPCNKV[UQKV
is not possible to identify the number of Venezuelan women who have been victims of sexual, physical
or psychological violence.
6JGNCEMQHWRVQFCVGKPHQTOCVKQPFKUCIITGICVGFD[PCVKQPCNKV[CUYGNNCUD[VJGIGPFGTKFGPVKV[QT
sexual orientation of the victims is worrying, since the failure to record this information contributes to
the invisibility and under-reporting of the problem of gender-based violence against women and ref-
ugees. This in turn prevents public authorities at all levels in both countries from designing effective
CPFCFGSWCVGTGURQPUGUVQVJGRTQDNGO
6.2 OBSTACLES TO REPORTING VIOLENCE AT WORK
5VCVGUJCXGCPQDNKICVKQPVQOQPKVQTVJGHWNƂNOGPVQHYQTMGTUoTKIJVUDQVJKPHQTOCNCPFKPHQTOCN
UGVVKPIU6JKUQDNKICVKQPTGSWKTGUVJCVVJG[KFGPVKH[YJGTGVJGITGCVGUVPWODGTQHRQUUKDNGXKQNCVKQPUQH
NCDQWTTKIJVUVCMGRNCEGKPQTFGTVQOCMGOQTGUVTCVGIKEKPURGEVKQPU+PVJGECUGQH8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGG
women, the countries’ inspectorates should carry out enhanced monitoring to verify compliance with
their labour rights.
+PDQVJ2GTWCPF%QNQODKCVJGTGCTGVYQTQWVGUHQTTGRQTVKPIDWNN[KPICPFUGZWCNJCTCUUOGPVCVYQTM#
ETKOKPCNRTQEGFWTGYJQUGNGICNHTCOGYQTMKUVJG%TKOKPCN.CYVQ2TGXGPVCPF2WPKUJ5GZWCN*CTCUU-
OGPVCV9QTMKP2GTWCPF.CYQHCPF.CYQH
%TKOKPCN%QFG KP%QNQODKC
%QNQODKCP/KPKUVT[QH*GCNVJ0CVKQPCN1DUGTXCVQT[QP)GPFGT$CUGF8KQNGPEGJVVRU YYYUKURTQIQXEQQDUGTXCVQTKQUQPXKQNGP-
EKCUIGPGTQ2CIKPCUJQOGCURZ
ƂNVGTD[)GPFGT8KQNGPEG+PFKECVQTU8GPG\WGNCPRQRWNCVKQP
5RCPKUJQPN[
+PVGTPCVKQPCN.CDQWT1TICPK\CVKQP
+.1 %QPXGPVKQPQP8KQNGPEGCPF*CTCUUOGPV
0Q
JVVRU YYYKNQQTIF[PPQTONGZGPH!R 014/.':27$ 01 2A+.1A%1&' % CPF %QPXGPVKQP QP .CDQWT +PURGE-
VKQP
0Q JVVRU YYYKNQQTIF[PPQTONGZGPH!R 014/.':27$ 01 2A+.1A%1&' % CPF %'	
%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPYQOGPOKITCPVYQTMGTURCTCUCPF
JVVRU YYYQJEJTQTIGPINKUJDQFKGUEGFCYFQEUITAAQPAYQOGPAOKITCPVAYQTMGTUAGPRFH
%TKOKPCN.CYVQ2TGXGPVCPF2WPKUJ5GZWCN*CTCUUOGPVCV9QTM
2GTW CPF.CYQHCPF.CYQH
%QNQODKC
Figure 8
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7PFGTVJGNCVVGTVYQNCYUYQOGPXKEVKOUQHDWNN[KPICPFUGZWCNJCTCUUOGPVYQTMKPIKPVJGHQTOCNCPF
informal sector can lodge a complaint with the competent criminal authorities.
Additionally, in both countries under the labour laws, there are mechanisms to promote, oversee and
OQPKVQTEQORNKCPEGYKVJNCDQWTCPFQEEWRCVKQPCNUCHGV[RTQXKUKQPU+P2GTWKVKUVJG1HƂEGQHVJG0C-
VKQPCN5WRGTKPVGPFGPVHQT9QTMRNCEG/QPKVQTKPI
5WRGTKPVGPFGPEKC0CEKQPCNFG(KUECNK\CEKÏP.CDQTCN
and in Colombia, it is the Employee Relations Committees (Comités de Convivencia Laboral), which
CTGTGURQPUKDNGHQTTGEGKXKPICPFRTQEGUUKPIEQORNCKPVUƂNGFTGICTFKPIUKVWCVKQPUVJCVEQWNFEQPUVKVWVG
YQTMRNCEGJCTCUUOGPV#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNKFGPVKƂGFHQTGZCORNGVJCVGZKUVKPIOGEJCPKUOUWPFGT
NCDQWTNCYUKPDQVJEQWPVTKGUVQTGRQTVDWNN[KPICPFUGZWCNJCTCUUOGPVCVYQTMCTGCEEGUUKDNGQPN[VQ
VJQUGYQTMKPIKPVJGHQTOCNGEQPQO[FGHCEVQGZENWFKPIVJQWUCPFUQHKPHQTOCNYQTMGTUOCP[QHVJGO
HQTGKIPYQOGPKPENWFKPI8GPG\WGNCPUGZRQUGFVQIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGKPVJGYQTMRNCEG
The evidence gathered shows that Venezuelan women do not approach the authorities to report gen-
FGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGKPVJGYQTMRNCEG#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNKFGPVKƂGFUGXGTCNQDUVCENGUVJCVRTGXGPV
refugee women from reporting this violence, which are closely associated with the precariousness of
VJGKTGEQPQOKECPFGORNQ[OGPVUKVWCVKQP6JGOCLQTKV[QHVJGYQOGPKPVGTXKGYGFYQTMKPVJGKPHQTOCN
sector of the economy, because, among other things, they do not have regularized migration status and
HCEGFKUETKOKPCVKQPYJGPUGGMKPIVQCEEGUUFGEGPVYQTM6JKUKPVWTPRWVUVJGOKPCUKVWCVKQPYJGTG
VJGTGKUCITGCVGTTKUMQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEG
According to the statements obtained, another of the elements that inhibit Venezuelan refugee women
HTQOTGRQTVKPIYQTMRNCEGXKQNGPEGKUVJGHGCTQHUWHHGTKPITGRTKUCNUCPFKPRCTVKEWNCTNQUKPIVJGKTUQWTEG
of income should they initiate a legal case, given that dismissal is the most common reaction in these
types of cases.
1PGYQOCPVQNF#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNVJCVUJGGZRGTKGPEGFYQTMRNCEGJCTCUUOGPVCPFFKUETKOKPCVKQP
DGECWUGUJGKU8GPG\WGNCPDWVFGEKFGFPQVVQTGRQTVKVHQTHGCTQHNQUKPIJGTLQD p+VJKPM+CNUQFKFPoV
report itbecause I was too afraid of losing my job, and I held out until the end so I wouldn’t lose my
job.”
#UYKVJXKQNGPEGKPVJGHCOKN[VJGNCEMQHTGUQWTEGUQHVJGKTQYPCPFNKOKVGFLQDQRRQTVWPKVKGURTGXGPV
YQOGPHTQOTGRQTVKPIIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGKPVJGYQTMRNCEG#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNPQVGUYKVJEQP-
cern that, in practice, challenges remain to ensuring that existing complaints mechanisms are acces-
sible and effective in protecting the rights of Venezuelan women survivors of gender-based violence in
VJGYQTMRNCEGCPFVJCVVJG[VCMGKPVQCEEQWPVVJGCFFKVKQPCNEJCNNGPIGUVJG[HCEGFWGVQVJGKTIGPFGT
migration status and nationality.
The plans and strategies of the Colombian and Peruvian labour authorities must be strengthened to
GPUWTGVJCV8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPCTGDGVVGTCDNGVQTGRQTVIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGKPVJGYQTMRNCEGCPF
RTGXGPVTGRTKUCNUHQTƂNKPIEQORNCKPVU6JKUKUCEJCNNGPIGKFGPVKƂGFD[VJGCWVJQTKVKGUKPVGTXKGYGFKP
Peru.
+PVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPKP%QNQODKC/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPKP5QCEJC%QNQODKC
/CTEJ CPFUVCVGOGPVUD[8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKP(QEWU)TQWR.KOC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPKP%QNQODKC/CTEJ KPVGTXKGYYKVJC8GPG\WGNCPYQOCPKP5QCEJC%QNQODKC
/CTEJ CPFUVCVGOGPVUD[8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKP(QEWU)TQWR.KOC/CTEJ
5VCVGOGPVD[C8GPG\WGNCPYQOCP(QEWU)TQWR2GTW/CTEJ
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPYQOGPOKITCPVYQTMGTUUGVUQWVUVCVGUoQDNKICVKQPVQGUVCDNKUJCFGSWCVGNGICN
remedies and complaints mechanisms and put in place easily accessible dispute resolution mechanisms, protecting both documented
and undocumented women migrant workers from discrimination or sexual exploitation and abuse.
+PVGTXKGYYKVJCRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJ
“My granddaughter got together with a partner who is Colombian... It has been
FKHƂEWNVDGECWUGUJGJCUCPKPVKOCVGTGNCVKQPUJKRYKVJVJGQYPGTQHVJGRNCEG
where she works. So a lot of the time, the workplace is not separate from the
RGTUQPCNCPFYJGPVJG[JCXGJCFRGTUQPCNRTQDNGOUVJGƂTUVVJKPIJGFQGUKUUCEM
her, he has done that about three times. She’s been working for him since 2018,
no holiday, no bonus, nothing and every time he gets annoyed, he kicks her out.”
Carolina, a Venezuelan woman in Colombia.
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The above is based on states’ obligation, established in the CEDAW Convention, to react active-
ly against any form of discriminatory violenceCPFVQCFQRVEQORTGJGPUKXGTGURQPUGUVCMKPIKPVQ
account that gender-based violence impacts women in a different way because it is related to other
factors, in this case their migratory situation.191 In particular, the CEDAW Committee noted that states
UJQWNFKORNGOGPVCFGSWCVGNGICNEQORNCKPVUOGEJCPKUOUCPFGCUKN[CEEGUUKDNGFKURWVGTGUQNWVKQP
OGEJCPKUOUVQRTQVGEVCNNYQOGPOKITCPVYQTMGTUKPENWFKPIWPFQEWOGPVGFYQOGPOKITCPVYQTMGTU
from discrimination and sexual exploitation and abuse.192
6.3 OBSTACLES TO ACCESS TO HEALTH SERVICES
In Colombia and Peru, laws recognize the right of survivors of gender-based violence to comprehensive
healthcare193 and the care pathways established by the authorities include care for survivors of gen-
der-based violence (physical, psychological and sexual and reproductive healthcare) regardless of their
migration status.194 In both countries, the policy considers healthcare services for women and survivors
of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, to fall under the category of emergency services,
and therefore they cannot be denied to anyone.195
Healthcare services for victims of gender-based violence are essential to meet their physical, emo-
tional and security needs during initial interventions, as well as to ensure that the necessary evidence
is gathered for the investigation. The information provided by various health professionals in both
medicine and psychology, in the context of state responses to gender-based violence, is essential to
identify the impact of various inter-related forms of discrimination and survivors’ respective needs,
as well as the measures that need to be established to ensure access to justice. In both countries,
the care pathways for survivors of sexual violence state that providing care within 72 hours is crucial
to prevent sexually transmitted infections and/or forced pregnancies as a result of sexual violence.196
However, Amnesty International found that, in practice, one of the main obstacles faced by Venezuelan
TGHWIGGYQOGPKPCEEGUUKPIJGCNVJECTGUGTXKEGUKUVJGNCEMQHCENGCTFGƂPKVKQPHQTHTQPVNKPGRWDNKE
QHƂEKCNUQHYJCVKUEQPUKFGTGFCPGOGTIGPE[KPECUGUQHXKEVKOUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGKPENWFKPI
sexual violence.197According to civil society organizations interviewed, there are no common or clear
criteria that set out that certain services related to gender-based violence should be considered as
an emergency. In Peru, although initial emergency care should be given to any woman victim of gen-
FGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGHQNNQYWRCPFUWDUGSWGPVECTGKUEQPFKVKQPCNQPYQOGPJCXKPITGIWNCTK\GFVJGKT
status and having access to the Comprehensive Health System. In Colombia, the problem is that
people who do not have regular migration status cannot join the health system and that means that
the only care to which they are entitled is care that is considered emergency care.199 For example,
information was received that psychological care services and non-emergency contraception are not
considered to be emergency services.
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPCTVKENGQHVJG%'	%QPXGPVKQPUVCVGUVJCV p5VCVGURCTVKGUJCXGCPQDNKIC-
tion not to cause discrimination against women through acts or omissions; they are further obliged to react actively against discrimination
against women, regardless of whether such acts or omissions are perpetrated by the State or by private actors. Discrimination can occur
VJTQWIJVJGHCKNWTGQH5VCVGUVQVCMGPGEGUUCT[NGIKUNCVKXGOGCUWTGUVQGPUWTGVJGHWNNTGCNK\CVKQPQHYQOGPoUTKIJVUVJGHCKNWTGVQCFQRV
PCVKQPCNRQNKEKGUCKOGFCVCEJKGXKPIGSWCNKV[DGVYGGPYQOGPCPFOGPCPFVJGHCKNWTGVQGPHQTEGTGNGXCPVNCYU.KMGYKUG5VCVGURCTVKGU
have an international responsibility to create and continuously improve statistical databases and the analysis of all forms of discrimina-
VKQPCICKPUVYQOGPKPIGPGTCNCPFCICKPUVYQOGPDGNQPIKPIVQURGEKƂEXWNPGTCDNGITQWRUKPRCTVKEWNCTq
RCTC
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d467ea72.html
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPWRFCVKPIIGPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQP
%'	%)%,WN[RCTC
JVVRU VDKPVGTPGVQJEJTQTI6TGCVKGU%'_JCTGF&QEWOGPVUA)NQDCN%'	A%A)%AAA'RFH
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPYQOGPOKITCPVYQTMGTURCTC
JVVRU YYYQJEJTQTIGPINKUJDQFKGUEGFCYFQEUITAAQPAYQOGPAOKITCPVAYQTMGTUAGPRFH
#TVKENGQH.CY
QPVJGTKIJVUQHXKEVKOUQHXKQNGPEGKP%QNQODKCCPF.CY0QKP2GTWYJKEJTGEQIPK\GUVJG
rights to comprehensive care and recovery regarding the physical and mental health of victims of violence against women and members
of the family
5GG4WVCFG#VGPEKÏPRCTCXÉEVKOCUFG8KQNGPEKC+PVTCHCOKNKCT[8KQNGPEKC$CUCFCGP)ÅPGTQ%QNQODKCJVVR EGPVTQFGFQEWOGPV-
CEKQPRTQURGTKFCFUQEKCNIQXEQ/KETQUKVKQ2TGXGPEKQPFGNC8KQNGPEKC+PHQITCƂCU4WVCAFGA#VGPEKQPRFHCPFQWVNKPGQHRTQEGFWTG
HQT.CY0QVQ2TGXGPV2WPKUJCPF'TCFKECVG8KQNGPEGCICKPUV9QOGPCPF/GODGTUQHVJG(COKN[q2GTW
JVVRU YYYOKORIQDRGYGDUOKORNG[RFHGUSWGOCNG[AARFH
5RCPKUJQPN[
+P%QNQODKC.CY
CPFVJG2TQVQEQNCPF)WKFCPEGQP%QORTGJGPUKXG*GCNVJECTGHQT8KEVKOUQH5GZWCN8KQNGPEGCPF
4GUQNWVKQPYJKEJWRFCVGUVJG2TQVQEQNQP*GCNVJECTGHQT8KEVKOUQH5GZWCN8KQNGPEGKP%QNQODKCCPF.CY0QKP2GTW
%QTG2TQVQEQNQP,QKPV#EVKQPQPEQORTGJGPUKXGECTGCPFRTQVGEVKQPHTQOXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPCPFOGODGTUQHVJGHCOKN[CPF
5RGEKCNKUV*GCNVJ5VCPFCTF0Q/+05#&)+'52
2TQVQEQNCPF)WKFCPEGQP%QORTGJGPUKXG*GCNVJECTGHQT8KEVKOUQH5GZWCN8KQNGPEGCPF4GUQNWVKQPYJKEJWRFCVGUVJG2TQ-
VQEQNQP*GCNVJECTGHQT8KEVKOUQH5GZWCN8KQNGPEGKP%QNQODKCCPF5RGEKCNKUV*GCNVJ5VCPFCTF0Q/+05#&)+'52KP2GTW
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJOGODGTUQHEKXKNUQEKGV[%QNQODKC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJCRWDNKEQHƂEKCN2GTW/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP%QNQODKC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP%QNQODKC/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJOGODGTUQHEKXKNUQEKGV[%QNQODKC/CTEJ
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According to the information received, Venezuelan refugee women survivors of gender-based violence
CTG PQV TGEGKXKPI CFGSWCVG CPF QPIQKPI RU[EJQNQIKECN ECTG HTQO KPUVKVWVKQPU KP GKVJGT EQWPVT[ +P
best case scenarios, this group of women survivors of gender-based violence receive this type of care
through civil society organizations.
#PQVJGTQDUVCENGKFGPVKƂGFKP2GTWKUVJCVJGCNVJECTGUGTXKEGUHQTYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXK-
olence are, in practice, conditional on the woman having previously lodged a complaint. This means
that a woman who is unable or unwilling to report violence out of fear or other factors would not have
access to healthcare services.
The CEDAW Committee has established that states must ensure that all protection and support meas-
ures and services to women’s victims/survivors of gender-based violence respect and strengthen their
autonomy” and are “provided irrespective of women’s residence status and their ability or willingness
to cooperate in proceedings against the alleged perpetrator.” Additionally, the Inter-American Court
QH*WOCP4KIJVUJCUGUVCDNKUJGFVJCVRJ[UKECNKPVGITKV[KUFKTGEVN[CPFKOOGFKCVGN[NKPMGFVQJGCNVJ-
ECTGCPFVJCVVJGNCEMQHCFGSWCVGOGFKECNECTGOC[NGCFVQCXKQNCVKQPQH#TVKENGQHVJG#OGTKECP
%QPXGPVKQP6JGTGHQTGOCMKPIJGCNVJECTGHQTYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGEQPFKVKQPCN
on the existence of a prior complaint can lead to a violation of their rights to physical integrity, to
health and to live a life free from violence. The current situation has a different negative impact on
Venezuelan women given the fear they have of reporting violence because of the factors mentioned
earlier in this report.
+P%QNQODKCƂNKPICEQORNCKPVKUPQVCTGSWKTGOGPVHQTCEEGUUKPIJGCNVJECTGUGTXKEGU However,
according to the information received, in practice, health professionals often inform the relevant au-
thorities when women report having been victims of sexual violence, without necessarily obtaining the
woman’s consent. Amnesty International believes that survivors should receive all the information and
support they need to report gender-based violence, but that it is their decision whether or not a report
(QEWU)TQWRKP%ÖEWVC%QNQODKC/CTEJ
+PVGTXKGYYKVJKPVGTPCVKQPCNQTICPK\CVKQP2GTW/CTEJ
%'	%QOOKVVGG)GPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQPQPIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGPWRFCVKPIIGPGTCN4GEQOOGPFCVKQP
%'	%)%,WN[
+PVGT#OGTKECP%QWTV%CUGQH5W½TG\2GTCNVCX'EWCFQT2TGNKOKPCT[1DLGEVKQPU/GTKVU4GRCTCVKQPUCPF%QUVU,WFIOGPVQH
/C[RCTC
%QNQODKCP/KPKUVT[QH*GCNVJCPF5QEKCN2TQVGEVKQPTGUQNWVKQPPWODGTQHWRFCVKPIVJG2TQVQEQNQP*GCNVJECTGHQT8KEVKOUQH5GZWCN8KQ-
NGPEGJVVRU EQPUWNVQTUCNWFEQOYREQPVGPVWRNQCFU#EVWCNK\CEKQP2TQVQEQNQFG#VGPEKQPGPUCNWFRCTC8KEVKOCUFG8KQNGPEKC5GZWCNRFH
5RCPKUJQPN[ CPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP%QNQODKC/CTEJ
Copyright: Fernanda Pineda/ Amnesty International
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KUOCFGCPFPQVCNGICNTGSWKTGOGPVQTCRTCEVKEGD[JGCNVJRTQHGUUKQPCNUQTQVJGTUYJQEQOGKPVQ
contact with survivors.
Finally, another challenge in accessing healthcare faced by women survivors of gender-based violence
is that healthcare services in both countries are conditional on the resources having been allocated
and being available. Therefore, in certain rural regions or municipalities such services are extremely
limited and this constitutes another barrier for Venezuelan survivors of gender-based violence in these
areas, who are generally living in an economically precarious situation and do not have the resources
themselves to access health services.
6.4 OTHER STRUCTURAL OBSTACLES
States have an obligation to combat the compound gender stereotypes that underpin violence and
discrimination against womenCPFVQWPFGTVCMGCEVKQPUVQVTCPUHQTOFKUETKOKPCVQT[UQEKQEWNVWTCN
attitudes, structures and patterns, through social and civic campaigns that promote “changing socio-
cultural patterns” and “transforming social perceptions and gender-based stereotypes”.
Although Colombia and Peru have made some efforts to combat xenophobia against Venezuelans
through widespread awareness-raising initiatives and campaigns, the information gathered, for ex-
ample the Report Balance and proposed initiatives to combat xenophobia in Colombia, show that
these campaigns have had very little impact and have not effectively contributed to the dismantling of
stereotypes, nor have they translated into the prevention of violence against refugee women.
Throughout this research, Amnesty International found that compound gender and nationality ste-
reotypes about Venezuelans remain deeply entrenched. As discussed above, they are one of the root
causes giving rise to violence and discrimination against Venezuelan women in all areas, as well as one
of the main obstacles that prevent refugee women survivors of gender-based violence from accessing
protection measures and justice.211
Amnesty International was particularly concerned about the persistence of such stereotypes, despite
VJGTGEQOOGPFCVKQPUQHVTGCV[DQFKGU6JG%QOOKVVGGQPVJG4KIJVUQH/KITCPV9QTMGTUTGEQOOGPFGF
KPVJCV%QNQODKCGPJCPEGKVURQNKEKGUVQGNKOKPCVGFKUETKOKPCVQT[UVGTGQV[RGUCPFOCMGRTQITGUU
in education for the prevention of xenophobia at all educational levels.212
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNYQWNFCNUQJKIJNKIJVVJCVVJGNCEMQHCEEGUUVQFGEGPVYQTM VJGFKHƂEWNVKGUKP
CEEGUUKPIGEQPQOKECPFUQEKCNDGPGƂVUCUKPHQTOCNYQTMGTUCPFGEQPQOKEGORQYGTOGPVOGCUWTGU
ƂPCPEKPICPFVTCKPKPIRTQITCOOGU CPFDGCTKPIFKURTQRQTVKQPCVGTGURQPUKDKNKV[HQTEJKNFECTGKPVJG
CDUGPEGQHUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUCPFFKHƂEWNVKGUKPCEEGUUKPIECTGRQNKEKGUCTGQVJGTDCTTKGTUVJCVRTGXGPV
Venezuelan refugee women from reporting and obtaining protection from gender-based violence.
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) sets out
states’ obligation to prevent discrimination against women on the grounds of maternity and to ensure
VJGTGCNK\CVKQPQHVJGKTTKIJVVQYQTMGPEQWTCIKPIVJGRTQXKUKQPQHVJGPGEGUUCT[UWRRQTVKXGUQEKCNUGT-
XKEGUVQGPCDNGRCTGPVUVQEQODKPGHCOKN[QDNKICVKQPUYKVJYQTMTGURQPUKDKNKVKGUD[GPEQWTCIKPIVJG
ETGCVKQPCPFFGXGNQROGPVQHCPGVYQTMQHEJKNFECTGUGTXKEGU6JG%QOOKVVGGQP'EQPQOKE5QEKCNCPF
%WNVWTCN4KIJVU
'5%4%QOOKVVGG JCUUVCVGFVJCV p+PVGTUGEVKQPCNFKUETKOKPCVKQPCPFVJGNCEMQHCP
CRRTQCEJVJCVVCMGUKPVQCEEQWPVVJGPGGFUQHYQOGPVJTQWIJQWVVJGKTNKHGE[ENGNGCFUVQCPCEEWOW-
NCVKQPQHFKUCFXCPVCIGUVJCVCFXGTUGN[CHHGEVVJGTKIJVVQHCKTCPFUCVKUHCEVQT[YQTMKPIEQPFKVKQPUCPF
other rights”.213+PTGURQPUGVQVJKUVJG%QOOKVVGGJCUUGVQWVVJGQDNKICVKQPQHUVCVGUVQVCMGURGEKƂE
measures to address traditional gender roles, as well as other structural obstacles that perpetuate tra-
9QTNF*GCNVJ1TICPK\CVKQP4GURQPFKPIVQKPVKOCVGRCTVPGTXKQNGPEGCPFUGZWCNXKQNGPEGCICKPUVYQOGP9*1ENKPKECNCPFRQNKE[
IWKFGNKPGJVVRU CRRUYJQKPVKTKUDKVUVTGCOJCPFNGAGPIRFH
+PVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP%QNQODKC/CTEJCPFKPVGTXKGYYKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQP/CTEJ
#TVKENG%'	CPF#TVKENG%QPXGPVKQPQPVJG4KIJVUQH2GTUQPUYKVJ&KUCDKNKVKGU
#TVKENGQHVJG+PVGT#OGTKECP%QPXGPVKQPQPVJG2TGXGPVKQP2WPKUJOGPVCPF'TCFKECVKQPQH8KQNGPEGCICKPUV9QOGPp%QPXGPVKQP
QH$GNÅO&Q2CT½q
(TKGFTKEJ'DGTV5VKHVWPI$CNCPEG[RTQRWGUVCUGPVQTPQCKPKEKCVKXCURCTCEQODCVKTNCZGPQHQDKCGP%QNQODKCGP
JVVR NKDTCT[HGUFGRFHƂNGUDWGTQUMQNWODKGPRFH
%QNQODKCP1DUGTXCVQT[HQT9QOGP$QNGVÉP'URGEKCN.CXKQNGPEKCEQPVTCNCUOWLGTGUOKITCPVGU WPCHTQPVGTCRQTUWRGTCT KPVGTXKGY
YKVJEKXKNUQEKGV[QTICPK\CVKQPU%QNQODKC/CTEJ UVCVGOGPVU(QEWU)TQWR.KOC/CTEJ CPFUVCVGOGPVU(QEWU
)TQWR'PICVKX½%QNQODKC
%QOOKVVGGQPVJG2TQVGEVKQPQHVJG4KIJVUQH#NN/KITCPV9QTMGTUCPF/GODGTUQH6JGKT(COKNKGU%QPENWFKPIQDUGTXCVKQPUQPVJG
VJKTFRGTKQFKETGRQTVQH%QNQODKC%/9%%1.%1,CPWCT[RCTC
%QOOKVVGGQP'5%4)GPGTCNEQOOGPV0Q
QPVJGTKIJVVQLWUVCPFHCXQWTCDNGEQPFKVKQPUQHYQTM
CTVKENGQHVJG+PVGTPCVKQPCN
%QXGPCPVQP'EQPQOKE5QEKCNCPF%WNVWTCN4KIJVU RCTCCKPJVVRU FKIKVCNNKDTCT[WPQTITGEQTFTGEQTFƂNGUEQNNCRUGJGCFGT
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FKVKQPCNIGPFGTTQNGUUWEJCUEJKNFECTGKPVJGYQTMRNCEGCPFƃGZKDNGYQTMKPICTTCPIGOGPVUVQRTQOQVG
GSWCNYQTMKPIEQPFKVKQPUKPRTCEVKEG
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNDGNKGXGUVJCVVJGUGOGCUWTGUCTGGUUGPVKCNVQCFFTGUUVJGUVTWEVWTCNKPGSWCNKV[
VJCVRTGXGPVUYQOGPGURGEKCNN[8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPHTQODTGCMKPIFQYPVJGF[PCOKEUQHXKQNGPEG
VJG[HCEGCVJQOGCPFCVYQTM
In addition, according to the information received, in the few cases where they do have access to
training and job guidance from other agencies, women continue to be encouraged to enter sex-segre-
ICVGFUGEVQTUQHYQTMYKVJNQYGTUQEKCNXCNWGCPFGEQPQOKETGEQIPKVKQPFGURKVGVJGHCEVVJCVVJG'5%4
Committee noted the duty of states to pay special attention to and address the issue of occupational
UGITGICVKQPDCUGFQPUGZCUCPKPFKURGPUCDNGRCTVQHIWCTCPVGGKPIVJGTKIJVVQHCKTCPFFGEGPVYQTMKPI
EQPFKVKQPUHQTYQOGPYQTMGTU
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Women in Latin America and the Caribbean are victims of multiple and systematic forms of violence. In
the case of Venezuelan women, who have had to leave their country because of the grave human rights
crisis or persecution to protect their lives in other countries of the region, such as Colombia or Peru,
their nationality and often irregular migration status are additional sources of discrimination and vio-
lence. For trans women, their sexual orientation or diverse gender identity are other additional factors.
Throughout whole process of departure and travel as well as in these host countries, Venezuelan women
HCEGOWNVKRNGHQTOUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGKPVJGFKHHGTGPVURCEGUYJGTGVJG[NKXGCPFRCUUVJTQWIJ
KPVJGRWDNKEFQOGUVKECPFYQTMURJGTGU
#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNDGNKGXGUVJCVVJGNCEMQHCEEGUUVQKPVGTPCVKQPCNRTQVGEVKQPCPFQVJGTOKITCVKQP
TGIWNCTK\CVKQPRTQEGUUGUKUQPGQHVJGƂTUVQDUVCENGUVQVJGHWNNGPLQ[OGPVQHJWOCPTKIJVUHCEGFD[
Venezuelan refugee women survivors of gender-based violence. Among the main barriers to accessing
TGIWNCTOKITCVKQPUVCVWUCTGVJGNCEMQHCEEGUUVQKPHQTOCVKQPCDQWVVJGTGIWNCTK\CVKQPCPFKPVGTPCVKQPCN
protection processes, the complexity of these processes, and the barriers set up by countries to limit
VJGOCUUGPVT[QHRGQRNGCUYGNNCU8GPG\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPoUNCEMQHGEQPQOKECPFVGEJPQNQIKECN
resources to access these processes, in particular to access justice and health services, among others.
Although Colombia and Peru have laws to prevent and punish gender-based violence against women
and protocols and/or specialized care pathways for survivors of gender-based violence, Amnesty Inter-
national found that there are serious challenges to achieving effective implementation. In addition to
the obstacles that women in general face when reporting gender-based violence in Colombia and Peru,
COQPIVJGOCKPDCTTKGTUKFGPVKƂGFHQTCEEGUUVQLWUVKEGHQT8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPKUVJGNCEMQHCEEGUUVQ
KPHQTOCVKQPQPECTGRCVJYC[UCPFGZKUVKPIOGEJCPKUOU CNCEMQHMPQYNGFIGCDQWVVJGKTTKIJVUCPF
QTVJGRGTEGRVKQPVJCVVJG[FQPQVJCXGVJGUCOGTKIJVUVQƂNGCEQORNCKPVCPFVQRTQVGEVKQPOGEJC-
nisms as nationals of the host countries; the fear of being detained or deported; and their precarious
GEQPQOKEUKVWCVKQPYJKEJRTGXGPVUVJGOHTQOFGXQVKPIVJGVKOGCPFGPGTI[TGSWKTGFVQCEEGUUVJG
justice system.
Amnesty International also noted with concern that gender and nationality stereotypes regarding Ven-
G\WGNCPTGHWIGGYQOGPCTGDGKPIWUGFD[QHƂEKCNUVQLWUVKH[FGP[KPIVJGOCEEGUUVQLWUVKEGYJGPVJG[
CVVGORVVQƂNGCEQORNCKPVQTUGGMRTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTGURGTRGVWCVKPIXKQNGPEGCPFFKUETKOKPCVKQP
CICKPUVVJGO+PCFFKVKQPKVHQWPFVJCVQHƂEKCNUFQPQVMPQYVJGCRRNKECDNGTGIWNCVKQPUCPFTGSWKTG
for example, that women submit certain identity documents before accepting their complaint, despite
VJGHCEVVJCVVJGTGIWNCVKQPUFQPQVTGSWKTGVJKU6JGTGCTGPQVGPQWIJVGORQTCT[RTQVGEVKQPUJGNVGTU
for survivors of gender-based violence, despite the fact that these protection measures are crucial for
8GPG\WGNCPYQOGPYJQFQPQVJCXGUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTW+PCFFKVKQP#OPGUV[
International considers that there are serious gaps in the collection of information on gender-based vi-
QNGPEGCICKPUVTGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVYQOGPKPDQVJEQWPVTKGUYJKEJRTGXGPVUVJGCFQRVKQPQHCFGSWCVG
measures to address it.
In relation to access to health, while health services for women and survivors of gender-based violence,
KPENWFKPIUGZWCNXKQNGPEGHCNNWPFGTVJGECVGIQT[QHGOGTIGPE[UGTXKEGUKP%QNQODKCCPF2GTWVJGNCEM
QHCENGCTFGƂPKVKQPQHYJCVKUEQPUKFGTGFCPGOGTIGPE[KPECUGUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCEVUCUCP
QDUVCENGVQCFGSWCVGCPFEQORTGJGPUKXGECTGHQTTGHWIGGYQOGPUWEJCU8GPG\WGNCPYQOGP6JKUKU
KPCFFKVKQPVQVJGTGSWKTGOGPVHQTYQOGPVQƂNGCETKOKPCNEQORNCKPVVQCEEGUUJGCNVJUGTXKEGUFGURKVG
VJGHCEVVJCVVJGNGIKUNCVKQPFQGUPQVTGSWKTGVJKUVQCEEGUUECTGKPCFFKVKQPVQVJGUGTKGUQHRTGXKQWUN[
NKUVGFDCTTKGTUVQCEEGUUVQLWUVKEGUGTXKEGU#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNCNUQKFGPVKƂGFQVJGTFKHƂEWNVKGUKP
accessing health services beyond emergency services, particularly psychological care.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
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The multiple forms of gender-based violence faced by Venezuelan women survivors of such violence in
%QNQODKCCPF2GTWQWVNKPGFKPVJKUTGRQTVEQWRNGFYKVJVJGNCEMQHCEEGUUVQOKITCVKQPTGIWNCTK\CVKQP
processes and the obstacles they face in accessing health and justice services, are extremely grave and
in breach of the obligations of both states to prevent gender-based violence against women without
discrimination, including Venezuelan women, and to respect, protect and guarantee their right to live
CNKHGHTGGQHXKQNGPEG+PTGURQPUG#OPGUV[+PVGTPCVKQPCNOCMGUVJGHQNNQYKPITGEQOOGPFCVKQPUVQVJG
Colombian and Peruvian authorities and regarding international cooperation.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATES
ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
• Ensure effective access to asylum procedures without discrimination for all those in need of inter-
national protection.
• Strengthen and expand the dissemination of information to Venezuelan women on access to interna-
tional protection and other forms of migration regularization. This information should be accompanied
by strategies and messages aimed at addressing and avoiding the fear that those approaching the
CWVJQTKVKGUVQKPKVKCVGRTQEGGFKPIUEQWNFTKUMFGVGPVKQPCPFFGRQTVCVKQPVQ8GPG\WGNC
r+ORNGOGPVQTUVTGPIVJGPVTCKPKPIRTQITCOOGUYKVJCJWOCPTKIJVURGTURGEVKXGHQTRWDNKEQHƂEKCNU
KPRCTVKEWNCTVJQUGYQTMKPIKPVJGRQNKEGRWDNKERTQUGEWVKQPOKITCVKQPCPFJGCNVJUGTXKEGUQPCEEGUU
to international protection and other forms of migratory regularization and the rights of refugees and
migrants.
ACCESS TO JUSTICE
• Implement mass information campaigns on care pathways to address cases of gender-based vio-
lence, that include dissemination strategies that have previously been consulted with women, includ-
KPITGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVYQOGPKPQTFGTVQGPCDNGYQOGPKPUKVWCVKQPUQHITGCVGTTKUMKPRCTVKEWNCTVQ
be reached.
• Ensure that all institutions that care for survivors of gender-based violence, including the police,
public prosecution service and migration and health institutions, have robust protocols for providing
support, incorporating an intersectionality perspective and the obligation of non-discrimination, in
cases of gender-based violence that address the particular care needs of refugee women and migrant
survivors of gender-based violence.
r2TQXKFGCRRTQRTKCVGU[UVGOCVKEOCPFCVQT[KPKVKCNCPFQPIQKPIVTCKPKPIVQCNNRWDNKEQHƂEKCNURTQ-
viding services for survivors of gender-based violence, such as staff from the police, public prose-
cution, migration and health services, on the prevention and detection of gender-based violence,
IGPFGTGSWCNKV[CPFKPVGTUGEVKQPCNFKUETKOKPCVKQP+PCFFKVKQPVQTCKUKPICYCTGPGUUQHYQOGPoUTKIJVU
KPENWFKPIVJGTKIJVUQHVTCPURGQRNGCPFVJQUGYJQGPICIGKPUGZYQTMCPFGZKUVKPIECTGRCVJYC[U
these programmes should aim to actively challenge prejudices regarding gender stereotypes and myths
CTQWPFIGPFGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCOQPIRWDNKEQHƂEKCNUCPFOWUVCFFTGUUHTQOVJGRGTURGEVKXGQHKPVGT-
sectionality and the obligation of non-discrimination, the particular care needs of refugee and migrant
women survivors of gender-based violence.
• Conduct thorough, impartial and independent investigations into all acts of violence against women,
including rape and other forms of sexual violence, and ensure that investigations incorporate a gender
perspective.
• Ensure that institutions responsible for providing services in cases of gender-based violence, both at
VJGPCVKQPCNCPFNQECNNGXGNUJCXGUWHƂEKGPVTGUQWTEGUVQKORNGOGPVGHHGEVKXGRTQVGEVKQPOGCUWTGUHQT
women survivors of gender-based violence that are accessible to women regardless of their migration
UVCVWU+PRCTVKEWNCTGPUWTGVJCVVJGTGCTGVGORQTCT[UJGNVGTUYKVJUWHƂEKGPVECRCEKV[
r%QPUKFGTGUVCDNKUJKPIECTGCPFUGNHECTGRQNKEKGUHQTHTQPVNKPGQHƂEKCNUKPVJGLWUVKEGCPFJGCNVJ
services, implemented and coordinated by the state institutions involved in addressing the needs of
survivors of gender-based violence.
ADDRESSING AND PREVENTING GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
• Improve inter-agency coordination in responses to gender-based violence, in particular focusing on
addressing the needs of refugee and migrant women.
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• Improve data collection on gender-based violence by recording statistical data on victims, disag-
gregated by sex, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, age, disability, relationship between
the abuser and the victim, and the victim’s migration status and ethnic minority heritage, and
ensure that the data are regularly reviewed and used to inform policy development, resource allo-
cation and other measures to prevent and address sexual and other types of gender-based violence.
• Improve inter-institutional coordination in responding to gender-based violence, especially re-
garding refugee and migrant women.
r#FFTGUUVJGWPFGTN[KPIECWUGUUVTWEVWTCNKPGSWCNKVKGUCPFEQORQWPFIGPFGTUVGTGQV[RGUPC-
tionality and migration status that perpetuate violence against Venezuelan women, ensuring that
measures to prevent gender-based violence include policies for the care of children and the elder-
N[ CEEGUUVQFGEGPVGORNQ[OGPVVCMKPIKPVQCEEQWPVCHQEWUQPVJGUQEKQGEQPQOKEKPVGITCVKQPQH
refugee and migrant women; and social and community integration programmes at the local level,
VJCVUVKOWNCVGCPFUVTGPIVJGPUWRRQTVPGVYQTMUHQTTGHWIGGCPFOKITCPVYQOGPYQOGPJGCFUQH
families and caregivers.
ACCESS TO HEALTH
r6CMGOGCUWTGUVQGPUWTGEQORTGJGPUKXGJGCNVJECTGHQTYQOGPUWTXKXQTUQHIGPFGTDCUGFXKQ-
NGPEGTGICTFNGUUQHVJGKTOKITCVKQPUVCVWUKPRCTVKEWNCTGPUWTKPIVJCV
r%CTGKUPQVEQPFKVKQPCNQPVJGƂNKPIQHCEQORNCKPVKPNCYQTKPRTCEVKEG
• All health needs resulting from gender-based violence are categorized as emergency healthcare
and that there are clear protocols for medium- and long-term physical and emotional care; and
r6JCVECTGKPEQTRQTCVGURU[EJQNQIKECNƂTUVCKFCPFRU[EJQUQEKCNUWRRQTVRTQITCOOGUHQTUWTXK-
vors of gender-based violence (women and close family that may be affected, children and other
dependents).
COMBATING STIGMA AND DISCRIMINATION
• Ensure that all authorities, including those at the highest level, refrain from using language that
UVKIOCVK\GUCDWUGUXKNKƂGUQTFKUETKOKPCVGUCICKPUV8GPG\WGNCPU
• Design and implement awareness-raising campaigns for the general public aimed at combating
stereotypes and xenophobia regarding Venezuelans, including composite gender stereotypes in-
cluding those that foster the hypersexualization of Venezuelan women.
• In particular, adopt without delay effective measures to combat the different forms of gen-
FGTDCUGFXKQNGPEGCVYQTMDQVJKPVJGHQTOCNCPFKPHQTOCNUGEVQTUQHVJGGEQPQO[YKVJRCTVKEWNCT
emphasis on discrimination on the basis of gender, gender identity, nationality and migration
status.
• Ensure that everyone, including Venezuelan women and trans people, have access to education
and decent employment options in order to prevent anyone from having to rely on the sale of sexual
UGTXKEGUKPUGZYQTMCUCOGCPUQHUWTXKXCNDGECWUGQHRQXGTV[QTFKUETKOKPCVKQP
TRAFFICKING
r+ORNGOGPVOGCUWTGUVQRTGXGPVUWRRTGUUCPFRWPKUJJWOCPVTCHƂEMKPIHQTVJGRWTRQUGQHUGZWCN
exploitation.
REGARDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
r#FGSWCVGN[ƂPCPEGVJGJWOCPKVCTKCPTGURQPUGVQVJGOCUUGZQFWUQH8GPG\WGNCPUHTQOVJGKT
country, ensuring the sustainability of the responses implemented for women survivors of gen-
der-based violence.
• Promote the strengthening of state responses to gender-based violence, ensuring that techni-
cal assistance or other cooperation programmes include eliciting commitments from authorities
CPFCNNQECVKPIƂPCPEKCNTGUQWTEGUVQHWNƂNVJGKTQDNKICVKQPUVQRTGXGPVRWPKUJCPFGTCFKECVGIGP-
der-based violence.
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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
IS A GLOBAL MOVEMENT
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS.
WHEN INJUSTICE HAPPENS
TO ONE PERSON, IT
MATTERS TO US ALL.
CONTACT US
JOIN THE CONVERSATION
info@amnesty.org
+44 (0)20 7413 5500
www.facebook.com/AmnistiaAmericas
@AmnistiaOnline
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UNPROTECTED
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE AGAINST VENEZUELAN
REFUGEE WOMEN IN COLOMBIA AND PERU
In Colombia and Peru, the two main receiving countries for Venezuelan
refugees in the Americas region, Venezuelan women face multiple forms
of violence in public spaces, at home and at work. Despite this, they are
denied access to justice and health services because of stereotypes rela-
ted to their gender, nationality and gender identity, among other factors,
which also mean they experience new forms of violence and discrimina-
VKQPYJGPVJG[VT[VQƂNGCEQORNCKPV(QTOCP[VJGNCEMQHTGIWNCTOKITC-
VKQPUVCVWUCPFKPHQTOCVKQPCDQWVVJGKTTKIJVUGZCEGTDCVGUVJGUGFKHƂEWNVKGU
This report outlines how the Colombian and Peruvian authorities are failing
to guarantee Venezuelan women’s rights to a life free from violence and
discrimination.
ÍINDEX: AMR 01/5675/2022
JULY 2022
ORIGINAL LANGUAGE: SPANISH
amnesty.org
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US: LGBT Asylum Seekers in Danger at the Border
https://www.hrw.org/node/382098/printable/print
1/9
At a rally in Tijuana, Mexico, people hold placards reading
"Stand for Asylum" and "Stop Title 42 Now." The US
policy often called “Title 42” allows border agents to expel
people summarily to Mexico or their countries of origin
with no opportunity to apply for asylum.
© 2022 Aimee Melo/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images
MAY 31, 2022
US: LGBT Asylum Seekers in Danger at the Border
Biden Should Immediately Safeguard At-Risk Groups, Restore Asylum Access
Published in
Ari Sawyer
US Border Researcher, US Program
AriMSawyer
(Ciudad Juárez) – Lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) people and other
asylum seekers fleeing persecution in their
home countries experience abusive and
dangerous conditions in Mexico when not
allowed to cross the border to seek asylum,
Human Rights Watch said today. ¬
Two policies implemented by the
administration of former President Donald J.
Trump – the Migrant Protection Protocols,
commonly known as “Remain in Mexico,”
and the Title 42 summary expulsion policy –
continue to be used under the Biden
administration to block access to the asylum
system for most people who try to cross into
the US to seek safety. This includes people at a greater risk of harm in Mexico because of their particular
conditions or identities, including gender identity or expression, disability, and age who should be entitled to
an exception from expulsion. US authorities should stop sending asylum seekers to Mexico or expelling them
to their countries of origin and should quickly process people waiting at the border to seek asylum who are at
particular risk of abuse.
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US: LGBT Asylum Seekers in Danger at the Border
https://www.hrw.org/node/382098/printable/print
2/9
“The United States should restore access to asylum for all, but so long as Biden is blocked from doing so, he
should at the very least immediately use existing exceptions for at-risk asylum seekers, including LGBT
people,” said Ari Sawyer, US border researcher at Human Rights Watch. “Continuing to summarily expel
LGBT and HIV-positive asylum seekers to Mexico or their country of origin places their lives at serious risk.”
US government protocols include exceptions for asylum seekers at a greater risk, and President Joe Biden has
promised US agents will apply them. But border agents have broad discretion to grant or deny exceptions, and
there are no clear consequences for agents who fail to do so or checks to ensure that exceptions are being
handled properly, Human Rights Watch found.
Despite a recognition by the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that LGBT people may face
“increased risk of harm in Mexico due to their sexual orientation or gender identity,” Human Rights Watch
documented cases in which border officials returned LGBT asylum seekers, including those with HIV, to
Mexico under both abusive anti-asylum policies.
Human Rights Watch conducted 29 interviews with asylum seekers, migrants’ rights groups, and United
Nations agency officials in April and May 2022, in person and by phone, in Ciudad Juárez and Mexico City,
and in El Paso, Texas. Human Rights Watch undertook research in coordination with Casa de Colores, a US-
Mexican organization working to provide shelter and legal services to LGBT asylum seekers.
LGBT asylum seekers told Human Rights Watch they had been expelled even after expressing their fear of
returning and telling border agents they identified as LGBT, had HIV, or had experienced abuse related to their
gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation. They also described serious abuse during their
journeys to the border, including by Mexican officials.
One woman interviewed fled to the United States from Honduras, where she previously faced targeted
violence for living openly as a lesbian woman, including one incident when someone cut her face, leaving a
large scar. Near the US border, people she believed to be members of a Mexican cartel kidnapped her and
forcibly took nude photos of her.
She said that when she explained to US border officials that she was a lesbian seeking asylum from Honduras
and that she had also experienced abuse in Mexico, agents laughed at her. She said one agent told her, “I don’t
care what’s happening to you.” She was expelled to Honduras, and immediately fled again to the US border,
this time afraid to seek asylum for fear of being returned to Honduras again.
Previous Human Rights Watch research has highlighted the risk of illegal and arbitrary arrest, torture,
extrajudicial execution, sexual assault, and enforced disappearance for LGBT people in Central America.
Although the Biden administration has moved to terminate both Title 42 and Remain in Mexico, several US
state officials have filed suits in federal court, resulting in orders to keep the programs in place during the
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litigation.
A federal district court judge has temporarily blocked the Biden administration from ending the expulsion
policy, which was first issued at the start of the Covid-19 pandemic against the recommendation of top public
health experts. There is no evidence that people seeking asylum pose a public health threat to the United
States, and the expulsion policy cannot be justified on public health grounds. ¬
Though the initial Title 42 was issued without “notice and comment” procedures, allowing a period for the
public to comment, the judge found that the Biden administration should have gone through these
administrative consultation processes to end Title 42. Some US lawmakers have proposed legislation that
would keep summary expulsions in place until pandemic public health measures are terminated.
Asylum seekers and other migrants sent to Mexico are often unable to support themselves or access basic
services such as shelter, food, water, safe transportation, or health care, and have no meaningful recourse for
abuses from criminal cartels or Mexican authorities. In the Mexican state of Tamaulipas, Human Rights Watch
found that asylum seekers and other migrants are systematically targeted for kidnapping, extortion, rape, and
other violence, by both government officials and criminals.
LGBT people constitute one particularly at-risk group of asylum seekers, among others, including people with
disabilities and chronic health conditions, Black and Indigenous asylum seekers, asylum seekers who do not
speak Spanish as a first language, and families traveling with children.
LGBT asylum seekers and asylum seekers with HIV described additional discrimination and abuse as well as
barriers to accessing essential services, including life-saving antiretroviral therapy and gender-affirming health
care, services that include medical and mental health services, continuation of hormonal treatment, and other
services for transgender and nonbinary people that are crucial to their health and well-being.
National Institute of Migration Response to HRW 5.31.22
Human Rights Watch asked Mexico’s National Migration Institute for more information on allegations made
against immigration agents. The agency responded on May 31 and said they were unaware of any reports of
such abuses, were not able to investigate them, and that the Mexican constitution prohibits such behavior.
The United States has an obligation to protect refugees from returning to a threat of persecution, ill-treatment,
and threats to life and safety, Human Rights Watch said. President Biden should ensure that the United States
complies with its domestic and international legal obligations to respect the right to seek asylum.¬¬
“LGBTQ+ and HIV-positive asylum seekers face grave risks to their health and safety from the time they flee
their countries, often after years of targeted abuse, to when they arrive at the US border,” said Susana Coreas,
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director of Casa de Colores. “Biden has rightly committed to protecting LGBTQ+ refugees. He should follow
through on that promise and ensure all asylum seekers are welcomed with dignity at the border.”
Abuse at the US Border
Human Rights Watch spoke with 20 LGBT asylum seekers in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico, who hoped to cross into
the United States and be allowed to seek protection. Nearly all reported they were not approaching the border
or trying to ask US officials for asylum because they feared they would be expelled to Mexico or their country
of origin. They said they preferred to wait for the Biden administration to restore access to asylum or for legal
aid to make a request for exemption from the expulsion policy. Four asylum seekers reported that they had
previously been expelled to Mexico or their country of origin without an asylum screening.
When Adolfo H. and Gerardo C., a gay couple fleeing Cuba and El Salvador, respectively, who like others
interviewed are not identified by their real names for their protection, tried to seek asylum at the US border in
February 2022, they were expelled by US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agents to Mexico. They had
previously experienced extortion several times by Mexican immigration agents, who stopped them at various
points along their journey and demanded payment to continue. At the time, they were not yet married. US
officials told the couple that Adolfo could stay and seek asylum in the United States because he is from Cuba
but that his partner would be expelled, even though border officials had the authority to allow both men in.
Instead, they gave them the option of being separated or of being expelled together. They said that while they
were in custody, US officials told them to stop holding hands or touching one another. Faced with the prospect
of being separated again, they got married in Mexico, hoping that given another chance, they would be
allowed to seek asylum together.
José M., a gay man who fled death threats in Honduras based on his sexual orientation, said he had tried
to cross the border in March 2021. He was afraid to stay in Mexico, where he said he has experienced
extortion and violence at the hands of Mexican police and discrimination at shelters. On his way to the
border, Mexican immigration agents stopped the bus he was on and made everyone get off, he said,
forcing each migrant to pay a bribe of about US$25 each or be expelled from the country. He also said
that because of his gender expression and sexual orientation, some shelters did not allow him to stay
there, leaving him to sleep on the streets. In Ciudad Juarez, the shelter operators told him it was a sin to
be gay and said that if he and other LGBT asylum seekers didn't go to religious service, they would be
forced to leave. He said he had told US border officials that he is gay and that he was afraid to be sent to
Mexico, but hours later CBP agents sent him to Mexico. Before expelling him, US officials made him
throw away everything he had, including the few clothes he had. US border agents typically throw away
migrants’ possessions, including items such as medicine, baby blankets, important identity documents,
documents needed to prove an asylum claim, and memorabilia that hold sentimental value, claiming the
practice is for health and safety reasons.
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The Biden administration has also recently placed some LGBT people in the Remain in Mexico program,
officials with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) told Human Rights Watch, sending them to
Ciudad Juárez despite the exemption for LGBT people and others at particular risk of abuse. IOM operates a
shelter for newly expelled or returned asylum seekers to test them for Covid-19 and provide quarantine before
they move on to other shelters. IOM officials said LGBT asylum seekers had been sent to Mexico even after
they explicitly told US border agents about their gender identity or sexual orientation.¬¬
Abuses in Country of Origin
LGBT asylum seekers interviewed reported serious abuses in their countries of origin, including rape, assault,
death threats, extortion, and forced disappearances or killings of romantic partners and friends.
Juan C., a transgender man, fled Honduras after he received death threats related to his gender identity
and activism in an LGBT rights organization. He said that several LGBT people he has known have
been killed or disappeared there. He said that the police detained him without charges on several
occasions. In 2021, two men raped him and his girlfriend after saying, “Who is the man and who is the
woman in the relationship?” and saying that the couple were transgender and lesbian only because they
had not had sex with a man. “They said, ‘We are going to make you women,’” Juan said.
Eduardo O., a gay man from Honduras, said he fled the country shortly after gang members beat his
romantic partner to death. Gang members had previously threatened to kill Eduardo. Then in June 2021,
the same gang members attacked him and his partner while they were together. While Eduardo was able
to escape, he said, his partner could not. He said he reported his partner’s murder to the police, who did
not investigate.
Kayla R., a transgender woman from Guatemala, said she had to flee and seek asylum after the gangs
who were extorting the business where she worked beat her when she and the store owner couldn’t pay,
leaving prominent scars on her face. On another occasion, gang members beat her in the street while
using anti-LGBT slurs. They left a large gash and scar on her head.
Discrimination and Abuse in Mexico
Human Rights Watch also documented serious abuse and discrimination against LGBT asylum seekers in
Mexico. Several LGBT asylum seekers said that Mexican immigration agents, police, and National Guard
soldiers targeted them for extortion. Other asylum seekers experienced kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery,
and other physical violence by both Mexican government officials and criminals.
Brenda F., a transgender woman, fled El Salvador in 2017 after gang members who wanted her to sell
drugs beat and threatened to kill her. After applying for protection and living for a few years in Mexico,
she said she was riding a bus from Monterrey to Matamoros in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas in May
2020 when, at a checkpoint, immigration agents pulled her off the bus and took her into an office about
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25 meters away. While another immigration agent stood watch outside the office, the agent questioned
her about her destination and reason for traveling, she showed him an order from a doctor for laboratory
tests. He accused her of lying and of wanting to cross into the United States and grabbed his genitalia,
saying if she wouldn’t “give me what I want,” he could have two police officers expel her to Guatemala.
Afterward, he told her that if she reported him, he had already taken a photo of her identification and
would come after her. She said she knows other trans women who have experienced sexual assault at
the hands of Mexican immigration agents.
Mariana L., a lesbian woman who fled Honduras in 2021, said she was kidnapped for ransom in January
2021 and held for over a week near the US-Mexico border by people she believed to be cartel members.
They took her to a house in Reynosa, Tamaulipas, where she saw several other kidnapped migrants. She
said they stole her passport and forcibly photographed her naked until her sister managed to pay a
ransom of US$3,000. Her kidnappers would hit her to make her cry when they called her sister for the
ransom money.
When Erika L., a lesbian woman, and Samuel B. and Martin G., gay brothers from El Salvador, arrived
at the Mexico-Guatemala border in January 2022, a group of men kidnapped them. On the Mexican side
of the border, the men raped Erika while beating her friends and forcing them to watch. They went to
the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR), Mexico’s refugee authority, in Tapachula,
Chiapas, where they applied for asylum in Mexico. COMAR gave them a document confirming that
they were in the process of seeking asylum in Mexico, giving them legal status in Mexico. An
immigration agent apprehended them outside the COMAR office as they left. When he saw their
application documents, he tore them up, saying they were meaningless and sent them to a detention
center. They were released and then took a bus to the US-Mexico border. They said Mexican
immigration agents periodically stopped the bus and boarded it to extort them and other migrants,
saying they had to pay if they wanted to continue their journey to the US border.
Kayla R., the transgender woman who fled Guatemala, said that in July 2021 Mexican state police in
Piedras Negras robbed her and beat her with batons so badly that she was ultimately hospitalized and
vomited blood. The police detained her and another transgender woman she was traveling with for two
days without food and water and then turned them over to immigration agents, who sent them to an
immigration detention facility. There, she said, a Mexican immigration agent told her she should report
the crime, which would make her eligible for a one-year humanitarian visa, giving her legal status in
Mexico. She said she would like to do so, and that the agent took down her information but never gave
her any paperwork or began any immigration process. Instead, after she reported the crime, Mexican
immigration agents returned her to Guatemala, where she had experienced brutal violence. She
immediately fled again. While she was making her way back to the US border in March 2022, criminals
threatened her with a machete and robbed her.
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Six asylum seekers and migrant rights workers reported that some of the shelters in Ciudad Juárez that
accepted LGBT asylum seekers subjected them to discriminatory treatment, including the shelter where LGBT
asylum seekers were forced to go to Christian religious services. Shelters in Ciudad Juárez are at capacity,
meaning they would be homeless if they did not agree to go to the service.¬Some migrant shelters in Ciudad
Juárez would not accept LGBT asylum seekers at all, migrant rights workers there said.
Accessing lifesaving health care for asylum seekers with HIV or other chronic illnesses was also difficult,
asylum seekers said. All five HIV-positive asylum seekers interviewed, and one asylum seeker with diabetes
and hypertension, said they had gone periods ranging from a few weeks to four months, without their
necessary medication because they did not have any money or support. ¬
Mari R., a transgender woman who is HIV positive and who fled Honduras after she refused to sell
drugs for a gang whose members had raped and threatened to kill her, went without her antiretroviral
medication in Mexico for four months. In April, with the support of Derechos Humanos Integrales en
Acción (DHIA), a local migrant rights organization, she was finally able to see a doctor, who told her
that her condition had significantly worsened. The day after Human Rights Watch spoke to her, she was
hospitalized.
Four transgender asylum seekers, as well as IOM officials and a local trans rights organization called Red
Solidaria Trans, said that transgender asylum seekers have not had access to gender-affirming health care in
Ciudad Juárez.
Brenda F., a transgender woman who fled after facing an attempted gang recruitment and death threats
in El Salvador, said she had previously been taking hormones but that in Ciudad Juárez, she has not
been able to access to gender-affirming hormone care, though she has repeatedly tried. “They always
say they don’t offer that care, they can’t, or they don’t know how,” she said. Transgender people who
take hormones to develop secondary sex characteristics consistent with their gender identity and
expression experience a reversal of these physical traits when hormone therapy is stopped, which can
cause distress among other symptoms.¬Brenda said she hasn’t had access to hormone care since October
2021 and that she is suffering from depression as a result. “I have asked for help getting my hormones
and they have said they don’t offer that kind of support here [in Ciudad Juárez],” she said. “We are
suffering marginalization in that way – hormone treatment is necessary, and they are denying us.”
Recommendations
To the Biden Administration
Continue and redouble efforts to end the Remain in Mexico program and Title 42 summary expulsions,
including by initiating a “notice and comment” rulemaking process to end Title 42.
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While these abusive policies remain in place, ensure that border agents do not to return at-risk asylum
seekers under the Remain in Mexico program or expel them under the Title 42 summary expulsion
policy. People at particular risk of harm include LGBT asylum seekers; those with HIV, disabilities, and
chronic health conditions; Black and Indigenous asylum seekers; those who do not speak Spanish as a
first language; and families traveling with children.
Take immediate steps to parole into the United States all LGBT asylum seekers and other asylum
seekers at particular risk of harm who have previously been subjected to the Remain in Mexico program
or the Title 42 summary expulsion policy.
Review regulations, Board of Immigration Appeals and Attorney General decisions, and policies and
other guidance, rescinding or amending as appropriate to ensure consistency with the right to seek
asylum and the right to protection from return to harm or threat of harm as defined in the Refugee
Convention, the Convention against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.
Continue to increase the number of appropriately trained personnel – asylum officers, doctors, child-
care specialists, mental health services professionals and other first responders – at the border using
funds currently allocated toward immigration enforcement and detention.
Beyond initial screening of migrants, transfer humanitarian reception, including migrant processing and
asylum functions, from CBP to a separate government agency, such as the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), or groups with trauma-informed training and whose mission is to
perform humanitarian services.
Take steps to ensure that LGBT asylum seekers and asylum seekers with HIV feel safe enough to self-
identify while in the custody of CBP, including by ensuring that US officials affirmatively explain a
policy of nondiscrimination and ask each migrant if they would like to share their gender identity and
sexual orientation.
Investigate and discipline US border agents who wrongfully send LGBT asylum seekers and other
particularly at-risk asylum seekers to Mexico or their countries of origin.
Work with Mexico and other governments to implement a holistic regional plan for access to protection
and safe and dignified migration.
To the US Congress
Reject proposed legislation¬introduced by Sens. James Lankford (R-Oklahoma) and Kyrsten Sinema (D-
Arizona) to keep Title 42 in place until after the government’s Covid-19 emergency declaration is
terminated.
Enact legislation to end the Title 42 summary expulsion and Remain in Mexico policies.
To the Mexican Government
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End the practice of accepting non-Mexican nationals sent to Mexico by US authorities under the
Remain in Mexico and Title 42 summary expulsion policies.
Investigate abuses by Mexican immigration agents, including reports of extortion at immigration
checkpoints, and take disciplinary action against any found to have been involved in such conduct.
Ensure that Mexican immigration agents do not expel people who may need international protection
without due process and screening for fear of return to potential harm.
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Safeguard Asylum Access in the US US Will Protect Cameroonians from Dangerous Deportations
Asylum Seekers Face Real Harm from US Border Policy
“They Treat You Like You Are Worthless”
“Like I’m Drowning”
Region / Country
Mexico
United States
Immigration
Topic
LGBT Rights
Refugees and Migrants
Asylum Seekers
Source URL: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/05/31/us-lgbt-asylum-seekers-danger-border
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Stuck in Uncertainty and Exposed to Violence:
The Impact of US and Mexican Migration Policies
on Women Seeking Protection in 2021
Introduction
In 2021, policies on both sides of the US-Mexico border negatively affected women seeking protection.
As we head into 2022, marking the first year of the Biden administration, Trump-era restrictive policies
remain in place at the US-Mexico border, exacerbating the situation for women forced to wait at Mexico’s
northern border for the opportunity to seek asylum in the US. In addition, under pressure from the Biden
administration, the Mexican government continues to intensify enforcement to deter migrants and
individuals seeking protection at Mexico’s southern border, worsening the situation for women stuck there.
In the fall of 2021, the Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración (IMUMI) and the Women’s Refugee
Commission (WRC) monitored events and carried out interviews with women seeking protection to
understand the challenges and the dangers they face in Mexico.1 This report outlines those challenges and
provides recommendations for the US and Mexican governments.
US Policies in 2021
Early on, the Biden administration committed to building a fair, orderly, and humane immigration system
and reversing illegal Trump-era policies that endangered the lives of people seeking protection at the
US-Mexico border. In its first few months in office, it made positive strides on several promises, including
creating initiatives to provide reparative justice for those harmed by Trump-era policies. In February 2021,
President Biden created the Interagency Task Force on the Reunification of Families to reunify the nearly
4,000 children who were separated from their parents under Trump’s “zero tolerance” policy, which
aimed to criminally prosecute all migrants crossing into the US between ports of entry. That month, the
administration also announced the creation of a process—in collaboration with international organizations,
regional task forces, and local NGOs—that would allow individuals returned to Mexico under the Trump-
era “Remain in Mexico” (RMX) policy to return to the US and continue their immigration cases in the US
rather than continuing to wait in Mexico. It also reversed the Trump-era legal decisions that made it nearly
impossible for survivors of domestic and gang violence to qualify for asylum.
In addition, the administration’s strategies included a focus on protection and a gender lens. In summer
2021, the administration launched a whole-of-government blueprint of strategies to reform the US
immigration system. One of the strategies that aimed to address the root causes of migration in Central
1 This report draws on interviews from IMUMI and WRC, cases from IMUMI’s legal clinic, as well as media reports and research
publications. IMUMI interviewed women in shelters in Mexico City between September and December 2021. On November 2,
2021, WRC staff visited two shelters in Mexico City and interviewed individuals from Haiti, Venezuela, El Salvador, Guatemala,
and other countries. On December 3, 2021, WRC staff visited two migrant shelters in Tijuana and interviewed individuals from
Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Cameroon, and other countries. IMUMI and WRC obtained informed consent from all
individuals interviewed.
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America included a pillar “to combat sexual, gender-based, and domestic violence.”2 Another strategy laid
out a comprehensive approach to regional migration management. Yet, in practice, the Biden administration
has largely focused on enforcement and deterrence in its engagement with countries in the region. Notably,
it reportedly has requested that the Mexican government sign a “safe third country” agreement, requiring
most non-Mexican individuals to first seek protection in Mexico before requesting asylum in the US.
The Biden administration’s positive actions and strategies have been profoundly overshadowed by its failure
to restore access to asylum at the border, including at ports of entry, for most arriving migrants and people
seeking asylum. In December 2021, the Biden administration announced the reinstatement (pursuant to
a court order) and expansion of RMX3 and extended the Trump-era Title 42 CDC public health order that
summarily blocks and expels people from the US-Mexico border, often repeatedly, to danger in Mexico
and countries of origin. Since President Biden took office, people have been expelled more than 1.1 million
times, including more than 187,000 expulsions of parents and children,4 who were denied the opportunity
to seek protection. In August 2021, the administration began expulsion flights to southern Mexico, where
Mexican authorities forcibly returned people across the border to Guatemala or sent them on buses to
Honduras, in an act of chain refoulement.5 In clear violation of non-refoulement, the Biden administration
also sent individuals on Title 42 expulsion flights directly to back to Haiti, Guatemala, Honduras, and other
countries of origin, without screening them for risk of harm upon return or otherwise providing them an
opportunity to seek protection.
Mexican Policies in 2021
Over the course of 2021, under pressure from the White House, the Mexican government took a number
of measures to step up its immigration enforcement to deter migrants and asylum seekers from accessing
protection at the US-Mexico border. In 2021, authorities from Mexico’s National Migration Institute (INM)
worked with the Mexican National Guard and security forces to carry out a record number of migrant
apprehensions; approximately 30 percent of those apprehended were women, and 27 percent were
children. These figures include families and unaccompanied children who were initially apprehended by
INM or the National Guard and then referred to state or civil-society shelters, a requirement of Mexico’s
new children protection reform implemented in 2021. The reform requires that after referral, the protection
offices determine the child’s best interests, whether that means deportation, remaining in Mexico with
humanitarian legal status, or being reunited with family in another country. While this reform is a big step
2 In addition to its immigration blueprint, in November 2021, the administration launched the first National Strategy on Gender
Equity and Equality. Through this whole-of-government approach, the administration committed to work to build “a fair and
humane immigration system that welcomes immigrants [and] keeps families together” and create improved protection pathways
for those fleeing persecution, including victims of gender-based violence.
3 The restart of Remain in Mexico was pursuant to a court order; however, prior to the ruling in early August 2021, the Biden
administration reportedly was already considering implementing a supposedly more “humane” version of RMX. In August 2021,
a Texas judge ordered the administration to restore RMX “in good faith.” The administration appealed that order and issued a
new memo terminating RMX in October 2021. The Biden administration has committed to ending RMX eventually, but said that
it planned to comply with the court’s order to restart RMX. In the new iteration, the administration expanded the program to all
non-Mexicans from the Western Hemisphere.
4 This includes Customs and Border Protection Title 42 expulsion statistics from February to December 2021.
5 The principle of non-refoulement in international law prohibits countries that are receiving asylum seekers from removing them
or returning them to a country where there is reason to believe that they would be at risk of irreparable harm or human rights
violations. Chain refoulement occurs when individuals are sent back to a country that will not protect people from the onward
transfer in violation of non-refoulement. In this case, the US expelled asylum seekers back to southern Mexico by plane and the
Mexican government bussed them to Guatemala. This occurred with Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Honduran nationals in 2021.
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forward for the rights of families and children, implementation across Mexico has been uneven6 and
many challenges remain, including the need for better funding and training to ensure the best interests of
children are consistently upheld.
The Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador administration also took greater measures to restrict travel by migrants
and individuals seeking protection, pushing many people to hire smugglers and risk dangerous travel routes.
It also created new travel regulations requiring proof of immigration status to purchase a bus ticket, leading
to discrimination and racial profiling of both migrants in transit and Mexicans, especially Indigenous and Afro-
descendent Mexicans. In addition, the US requested that the Mexican government put into place new travel
requirements to make it more difficult for the citizens of countries who have been arriving at the US southern
border in high numbers to transit through Mexico. Since August 2021, the Mexican government announced
new requirements that Ecuadorians, Brazilians, and Venezuelans, some of whom are fleeing danger, acquire
a visa to travel to Mexico as tourists. Mexican immigration authorities also stepped up restrictive tactics at
Mexican airports, where they denied entry to a record 72,895 foreigners in 2021, more than double the
number of denials in 2019 (31,008). Officials at airports turned around individuals aiming to seek protection
in Mexico, who were unlawfully denied the opportunity to present their claim to COMAR (Mexico’s agency
responsible for asylum processing and adjudications) and instead detained in isolation for weeks. Furthermore,
Mexico continued to coordinate with the US on the Biden administration’s expulsions under Title 42, agreeing
to receive expelled individuals from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, and worked with the Biden
administration to re-implement and expand RMX.
Meanwhile, as Mexican authorities increased enforcement and US restrictive policies persisted, last year
Mexico became one of the top destinations worldwide for individuals seeking protection. In 2021, COMAR
received a historic high of 131,448 applications, with women representing 41 percent of applicants7 and
children representing 24 percent. This record number of applicants is an 87 percent increase from the prior
high of 70,351 applications in 2019. Underfunded despite the critical need, COMAR has been unable to keep
up with the increase in claims, leaving many people in southern Mexico—where the vast majority submit their
applications8—to wait for decisions on their protection claims in precarious conditions for months or even up
to two years in some cases. Mexican refugee law requires that applicants remain in the jurisdiction where they
applied throughout the adjudication process, which prevents individuals applying for protection from reuniting
with family and community networks in safer regions of the country with better employment opportunities.
**Note that the following section of the report contains graphic descriptions of sexual violence.**
The Impact of US and Mexican Policies on Women
Taken together, the US and Mexican governments’ policies and practices forced women seeking protection
to wait for extended periods, often in precarious and dangerous circumstances, at Mexico’s northern and
southern borders. Throughout 2021, IMUMI and WRC carried out interviews with women and monitored
events to understand the challenges and dangers they were facing.
6 There has been less progress in some Mexican states on the reform implementation than others due to a lack of training,
funding, and political will of local authorities. As a result, despite the reform, some children may continue to be detained by
immigration authorities or deported without a proper best interest determination. In fall 2021, a panel featuring IMUMI and other
civil society organizations discussed some of the challenges with implementation.
7 Since 2016, women have represented approximately 40 percent of applicants to COMAR.
8 Approximately 68 percent of applications were filed in the state of Chiapas and 5 percent in Tabasco.
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1.
Women seeking protection experience violence in Mexico that exacerbates prior traumas that forced
them to flee their countries of origin in the first place. A 2015 UN report found that approximately 60
percent of surveyed women seeking asylum from Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador were fleeing
gender-based violence, which includes any form of sexual, physical, mental, and economic harm
directed at an individual due to their gender. A recent 2021 report by Kids in Need of Defense (KIND)
found that violence against women in Central America drastically increased during the COVID-19
pandemic due to lockdowns that confined women with their perpetrators and to gangs gaining greater
control over local communities.
The violence that women seeking protection experience in transit in Mexico and while waiting
at Mexico’s northern border cities—including kidnapping, rape, trafficking, and other forms of
harassment—compounds their previous traumatic experiences. For example, a Guatemalan woman,
Liliana,9 shared with IMUMI that after fleeing from a violent relationship with her husband who served
in the military, she was kidnapped by a group of men in Tijuana. While she was being held by her
kidnappers, she heard the men making arrangements on the phone to sexually exploit her. This
experience was so traumatizing that after Liliana was released, she decided to travel to Mexico City to
seek asylum while staying in a safe shelter instead of waiting to request asylum at the US-Mexico border.
2. Women seeking protection do not feel safe in Mexico’s southern and northern border cities and
worry that they can be tracked down by their persecutors. IMUMI documented various cases of
Central American women who have been tracked down by their perpetrators in Mexico. A Guatemalan
woman, Cristina, traveling with her husband and three children, described to WRC staff the “terror of
being forced to wait in Tijuana where our persecutors can find us.” In southern Mexico, a Honduran
woman, Sara, described to IMUMI that she and her family were kidnapped by members of the Mara
Salvatrucha gang. After Sara fled Honduras, one of the perpetrators found her in Tapachula, Chiapas,
forcing her and her family to flee to another city and give up their asylum claim in Mexico.
3.
Women seeking protection are subjected to violent gender-based crimes in Mexico, including rape
and sexual assault, and face heightened barriers to report these crimes and receive support services.
Women who are returned to Mexico alone or with their families experience many types of violent
attacks. A 2017 Doctors Without Borders survey found that 31.4 percent of women seeking protection
had been abused during their transit through Mexico. Some women are kidnapped and raped by their
captors, often in front of their children. Many assaults involve Mexican authorities. A Honduran woman,
Jessica, in the Mexico City detention center described to IMUMI how she and a friend were detained by
the National Guard in Ciudad Juarez after being expelled from the US. The agents sexually abused both
women, who remained in detention in Ciudad Juarez for two months before being transferred to the
Mexico City detention center. The women were deported from Mexico before they had the chance to
file a complaint against the agents.
In another case documented by IMUMI, a Honduran woman was offered a job in Chiapas, Mexico, that
turned out to be a ploy to traffic her. After six months of being routinely sexually abused, she escaped,
but despite her reporting the crime, authorities did not protect her or investigate the crime, forcing her
to leave the state and look for protection on her own.
Many sexual violence crimes are not reported or investigated in Mexico. According to the National
Survey for Urban Public Security, between July and December 2020, 98.6 percent of sexual crimes were
9 All names have been changed to protect the privacy of the women interviewed.
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not reported or not investigated. Women who lack migration status and those detained face additional
risks of being the victim of a sexual crime and heightened barriers to accessing justice and support
services, including psychological support and medical care.
4. Women seeking protection are separated from their children as a result of restrictive policies. In
some cases, parents are victims of crimes, such as kidnapping, and their children are left alone to cross
to safety into the US. Several months after being returned to Mexico, Sandra, a Black woman from
Honduras, went to look for a job in downtown Piedras Negras, where she was kidnapped and held for
three days. Her four children crossed the border on their own because they did not know what had
happened to their mother and were frightened. In other cases, due to the danger in Mexican border
cities, coupled with US policies preventing many families and adults from seeking asylum, parents are
forced to make the heartbreaking decision to send their children alone to safety in the US.
5.
Women continue to wait in squalid conditions in Mexican northern and southern border cities.
Limited shelter capacity in Mexico’s northern border cities has left many women sleeping on the streets
and in precarious conditions, including at the informal tent encampments in Tijuana and Reynosa. WRC
staff spoke with a Honduran woman, Eleana, in Tijuana who tried to secure accommodations in Tijuana
shelters after being expelled from the US, but was turned away due to limited capacity. She was forced
to stay in squalid conditions in a house far away from the city center. A mere 15 days after Eleana and
her family attempted to seek protection after crossing into the US and were expelled by Border Patrol to
the streets of Tijuana, a rabid dog attacked and killed her 20-month-old toddler. In Tapachula, Chiapas,
women asylum seekers and their families waited months for their Mexican asylum cases to be resolved
while living in shelters, rented rooms on the outskirts of the city, or camped in the city’s central plaza,
with limited access to bathrooms or showers.
6. Women seeking protection struggle to find child care and enroll their children in school in Mexico.
According to Mexican law, all children—regardless of their immigration status—should be able to enroll
in public school. However, many barriers to enrollment in schools remain, such as discrimination and
misinformation from local school administrators. One woman, Karina, recounted to WRC how she
had not been able to enroll her two young children in local public schools because administrators
(falsely) told her she would have to pay a sizable enrollment fee for each child. Women asylum seekers
in Tapachula, Chiapas, told IMUMI that some schools require certified translations of birth certificates
and vaccination records, making it impossible to enroll their children as they either do not have the
documents, or cannot afford to have them translated.
Child care responsibilities and barriers enrolling children in school made it difficult for women to find
part- or full-time work, while they wait to access asylum in the US or in Mexico. A number of women
expressed to WRC fear of leaving their children alone due to the dangers in border cities, and worries
over being unable to support themselves and their families since they could not work.
7.
Women seeking protection struggle to access vital health services, including reproductive health
services. Mexico’s 2011 Migration Law guarantees access to health services to people regardless of
their immigration status in Mexico. Despite this, pregnant people expelled to Mexico by US authorities
under Title 42 have been turned away by local hospitals and denied medical care. A Salvadoran woman,
Brenda, told WRC she was denied prenatal care in Tijuana, where local hospital workers told her, “We
can’t help you because you aren’t Mexican.” A Honduran woman, Marina, represented by IMUMI, was
turned away from a public hospital because she did not have the required documents to prove financial
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need. A lawyer resolved the situation, but shared with IMUMI that almost all of her clients require legal
assistance to access basic reproductive health services in Mexico.
8. LGBTQI+, Black, Indigenous, and non-Spanish speaking women seeking protection face additional
dangers in Mexico. In particular, Black asylum seekers face anti-Black racism, discrimination, and
targeting from Mexican authorities. Several Haitian asylum seekers in Mexico City told WRC that they did
not even try to look for employment opportunities because of the discrimination they were certain they
would face by employers. Restrictive US border policies force individuals to wait in Mexico where they
often are vulnerable to the same risks, discrimination, and dangers that they fled in their countries of
origin. For example, Laura, a trans woman who fled Honduras due to death threats and her house being
burned down, told WRC she was threatened at gunpoint by Mexican authorities during her journey
to Tijuana. She did not feel safe in Mexico and struggled to secure housing due to discrimination. A
Guatemalan asylum seeker in Mexico City, Karen, described to IMUMI staff that a teacher discriminated
against her daughter for being “darker” and wearing Indigenous clothing.
9. Due to Mexico’s increased enforcement and travel restrictions, women seeking protection are
forced to look for ways to evade immigration and military checkpoints by traveling in caravans for
safety or relying on smugglers. In 2021, the situation was particularly harrowing in Tapachula, Chiapas,
where 89,668 asylum seekers (approximately 68 percent of all applicants) awaited adjudication of
their protection claims. Many families attempted to move from Tapachula to other cities with better
job opportunities and safer conditions. However, INM and National Guard checkpoints and increased
enforcement in southern Mexico made transit difficult.
One Honduran woman, Veronica, told IMUMI that she and her family decided to join a migrant caravan
in August 2021. INM officials stopped them, told them that the letter proving their pending asylum
application was not valid, and tore up the documents. When she tried to film the incident with her
telephone, agents took it away from her. During a press conference in September 2021, a Haitian
woman in Tapachula described how Haitians are racially profiled by Mexican authorities and removed
from buses. “We can barely get around Tapachula even though we are asylum seekers with a letter from
COMAR. It is practically impossible to get on a bus to go to another city without paying smugglers a fee
to get through the checkpoints.”
In the bus terminals in Tapachula and throughout Mexico, private bus companies began checking
immigration status as a prerequisite for buying a bus ticket. Two women in the Mexico City detention
center told IMUMI in September 2021 that they had been detained in a Mexico City bus station even
though they had letters proving their immigration status.10
10. Women seeking protection are subjected to use of force and violence by Mexican and US authorities.
In August 2021, Mexican immigration authorities and the Mexican National Guard were filmed kicking
migrants, violently pushing women and children into vehicles, and threatening family separation
as tactics to break up large groups. In one video, a woman who had been detained could be seen
screaming that she had been separated from her two-year-old son during the raid. While she screamed
and tried to get out of the INM van, an agent could be seen pushing her on the breasts back into the
van. In October 2021, a Haitian woman was found dead along a highway in Chiapas. Her clothes had
10 Since bus ticket agents have neither the authority nor the training to verify immigration status, they have begun sending anyone
they deem suspicious to talk to INM officials stationed in the bus stations, who would then detain the individual.
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been removed and she had been raped and strangled. Four municipal police officers were detained
in relation to the crime. In September 2021, armed US Border Patrol agents in Del Rio, Texas were
photographed abusing Black migrant families and driving them back across the border to Mexico.
Many women seeking protection who transit through Mexico are subjected to more than one of the
above risks during their stay, which often lasts months or even years due to restrictive policies. A
Honduran woman, Mariana, recounted to IMUMI her misfortunes over the past two years waiting in Mexico,
and how the Biden administration’s policies—following on the Trump administration’s attacks on the asylum
system—have resulted in her ongoing inability to seek asylum in the US:
“I fled Honduras with my two children in 2019 because my husband beat us and he was involved in a
criminal gang that protected him. After several months in Mexico, we arrived at the US-Mexico border
to request protection and we were sent back under [Remain in Mexico] through Nuevo Laredo. Since I
had my two small children, we made our way to Monterrey, Mexico [a city several hours to the south],
where we were living on the street. I was raped and became pregnant.
“A kind Mexican woman took us in and allowed us to live with her until the baby was born in October
2020. My kids didn’t go to school in all of 2020. I still had a dream to live with my sister in the US and
be safe, but things were really difficult. Then in April 2021, I learned that I could sign up for the [RMX
wind-down process] even though I had never had my hearing, so I signed up for Conecta.11 I got help
to register my baby so he would have a birth certificate. Then I got an email stating that Conecta had
closed and that I would have to wait again.
“I don’t understand what I am supposed to do, where I am supposed to go. I have been trying for two
years to follow the rules, but my kids are two years older now, I have a baby, and I don’t know what to
do. I can’t go back to Honduras, I am afraid to be in Mexico, and I’m not allowed to request protection
at the border. I feel lost.”
Conclusion and Recommendations
Both President Biden and President Andrés Manuel López Obrador recognize that many women are
fleeing gender-based violence and persecution in their countries of origin and need access to protection
in both countries. IMUMI and WRC are deeply concerned about practices by both governments that
normalize human rights violations, including the violation of the right to request asylum. Instead of
restrictive policies and enforcement actions that put women and children seeking protection in harm’s
way, the US and Mexican governments should strengthen asylum systems in both countries and broaden
complementary pathways for protection. We urge the Biden and López Obrador administrations to
implement the following recommendations to ensure that the rights of women—including the right to
access protection—are upheld.
11 Conecta was a web platform run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) where individuals who
were subjected to the first iteration of RMX could enroll to access the RMX wind-down process and continue their immigration
cases within the US. This platform was operational between February and August 2021. It was suspended due to the court order
regarding the reinstatement of RMX.
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Recommendations for the Biden administration
»
End the use of Title 42 to expel adults and families to Mexico and their countries of origin via land
expulsions and expulsion flights.
»
Restore access to asylum at ports of entry, so that individuals can approach a port of entry and request
protection and other relief from inside the United States.
»
Refrain from pressuring Mexico to increase enforcement by immigration and security forces or
implementing new visa restrictions for nationalities arriving in large numbers. Focus the Collaborative
Migration Management Strategy (CMMS) on expanding access to protection in the region and
complementary pathways to protection, without sacrificing access to asylum at the US southern border.
»
Reverse the expansion and stop further implementation of RMX.
»
Release monthly Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data that is disaggregated by gender on
encounters, expulsions, returns under RMX, and other statistics relating to US asylum processing.
Recommendations for the Mexican government
»
Allocate adequate funding to COMAR to decrease wait times, open more offices, and hire additional
protection officers.
»
Reform the Mexican Refugee Law to allow people to continue their asylum procedures from
different parts of the country where they have family and community networks, better employment
opportunities, and safer conditions.
»
Ensure that women who have suffered or who remain in danger of violence in Mexico have access to
relocation programs and services where they can safely wait for their asylum process.
»
Expedite humanitarian visitor cards for asylum seekers, victims and witnesses of crimes, migrant
children, and other vulnerable populations.
»
Refuse to collaborate with the US government on the implementation of policies such as Title 42 and
RMX that violate US, Mexican, and international law..12
»
Eliminate the use of the National Guard and all armed forces in migration enforcement in compliance
with the Mexican Constitution and international law.
»
Eliminate unconstitutional internal enforcement revisions and checkpoints that result in illegal racial
profiling.
»
Rescind the provision that requires foreigners to show proof of migration status to purchase a bus
ticket in Mexico.
»
Ensure access to public education for all migrant and refugee children.
»
Ensure access to health services for migrant and refugee women and girls, especially reproductive
health services.
12 Mexican organizations have pending litigation and complaints with the National Human Rights Commission against the bus
travel restrictions, Mexico’s participation in Remain in Mexico 1.0 and Remain in Mexico 2.0, Mexico´s implementation of internal
Title 42 expulsion flights, discriminatory enforcement practices at internal checkpoints, and the participation of the National
Guard in migration enforcement. For additional information about the lawsuits: 1. RMX 1.0 (Instituto para las Mujeres en la
Migración (IMUMI), A.C. vs. SEGOB, SRE, INM, INMUJERES) - Mexican Supreme Court - 302/2020. 2. RMX2 - Mexico City District
Court - exp. 1887/2021 3. Tit. 42 Expulsions - Mexico City Circuit Court - 153/2021. 4. Bus Travel Migration Status Restriction -
Mexico City District Court - 1647/21 5. Discriminatory Migration Enforcement Practices - Mexican Supreme Court (E, A y J VM vs.
INM, Cámara de Diputados y otros) -- 275/2019 6. National Guard Participation in Migration Enforcement -- (Gretchen Louise
Kuhner Vs. Congreso de la Unión y Presidente de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos), Mexican Supreme Court, 73/2020.
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»
Increase access to housing for asylum seekers through ongoing support to civil society shelters,
including safe spaces for vulnerable groups such as women, families, and LGTBQI+ individuals.
Additional resources
»
Analysis of Gender Violence: Women Seeking International Protection in Mexico, IMUMI, 2021.
»
Asylum Denied: Remain in Mexico 2.0, Women’s Refugee Commission, 2021.
»
Dual Crises: Gender-Based Violence and Inequality Facing Children and Women During the COVID-19
Pandemic in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, KIND, 2021.
»
Pathways to Justice: Gender-Based Violence and the Rule of Law, Wilson Center, 2021.
»
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies (CGRS) Publications.
_____________________
This report was written by Gretchen Kuhner of the Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración (IMUMI) and
Savitri Arvey of the Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC). It was reviewed by Katharina Obser, Ursela
Ojeda, and Dale Busher from WRC. Patricia Arroyo reviewed statistics, Sara Velasco helped with fact
checking, and Miriam Gonzalez reviewed the Spanish translation on behalf of IMUMI. It was edited by
Joanna Kuebler and Diana Quick from WRC, and designed by Diana Quick.
IMUMI and WRC extend deep thanks to the women who generously shared their time and experiences, as
well as the migrant shelters and organizations that provided information and facilitated the interviews with
women.
This report was made possible by the generous support of the Open Society Foundations.
For additional information, please contact Gretchen Kuhner, director, IMUMI (gretchenk@imumi.org) or
Savitri Arvey, policy advisor, WRC (SavitriA@wrcommission.org).
Women’s Refugee Commission
The Women’s Refugee Commission (WRC) improves the lives and protects the rights of women, children,
and youth who have been displaced by conflict and crisis. We research their needs, identify solutions, and
advocate for programs and policies to strengthen their resilience and drive change in humanitarian practice.
Since our founding in 1989, we have been a leading expert on the needs of refugee women, children, and
youth and the policies that can protect and empower them. womensrefugeecommission.org.
IMUMI
The Institute for Women in Migration, AC (IMUMI) is a civil society organization based in Mexico City that
promotes the rights of women and their families in migration. IMUMI provides legal support to women and
their families, collaborates with civil society organizations, academic institutions, and government bodies to
ensure issues relevant to women are included in regional migration policy. imumi.org.
February 2022
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3/16/23, 11:38 AM
Fleeing Nicaraguans strain Costa Rica's asylum system | AP News
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1/21
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Fleeing Nicaraguans strain Costa Rica's asylum system | AP News
https://apnews.com/article/covid-health-elections-presidential-caribbean-52044748d15dbbb6ca706c66cc7459a5
2/21
By MOISES CASTILLO and CHRISTOPHER SHERMAN
September 2, 2022
SAN JOSE, Costa Rica (AP) — After four years of trying to continue his studies in
Nicaragua, Elton Rivera finally reached the same conclusion as thousands of his
countrymen. The government shuttered his university, its director told him he was going
into exile and warned that the police were coming for Rivera too.
Rivera surveyed the various safe houses he had used after his arrest in 2018 and realized
that no one who had sheltered him was left. “The only option is to go to Costa Rica,
which is what I have closest and where I have the most contacts,” he said. He snuck out
of Nicaragua along a trail over a mountain in February and was soon on a bus to San Jose.
Rivera immediately sought asylum. The Costa Rican government gave him an
appointment to formalize his request — in 2030.
Since the summer of 2021, when Nicaragua President Daniel Ortega locked up dozens of
political opponents ahead of November’s presidential elections, Nicaraguans have been
seeking asylum in Costa Rica at the highest levels since Nicaragua’s political crisis
exploded in April 2018.
The exodus of Nicaraguans fleeing political repression has neighboring Costa Rica’s
asylum system teetering under the weight of applications that exceed even the 1980s
when civil wars ravaged Central America.
Asylum seekers now account for 4% of Costa Rica’s population. Despite having only 5
million citizens, Costa Rica trailed only the United States, Germany and Mexico in the
number of asylum applications it received last year, according to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees.
Fleeing Nicaraguans strain Costa Rica's asylum system
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lli
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Fleeing Nicaraguans strain Costa Rica's asylum system | AP News
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3/21
Costa Rican officials now confirm more than 200,000 pending applications and another
50,000 people waiting for their appointment to make a formal application. Nicaraguans
account for nearly nine out of 10 applicants.
The asylum seekers are added pressure for the new administration of President Rodrigo
Chaves who is trying to jump-start an economy hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic.
“That has been an incredible increase,” said Allan Rodríguez, deputy director of Costa
Rica’s immigration agency, which also oversees the asylum system. “It has put the
capacities of the administration to the test. It has made us reinvent ourselves not only in
the reception process, but also in how to resolve this issue.”
Rodríguez said that the system has been bolstered in terms of its ability to take asylum
applications -- the U.N. refugee agency contracted 50 people to help -- but that remaining
challenges include resolving the cases quickly and integrating asylees into Costa Rican
society.
Rivera, 28, was in the final year of studying medicine at Nicaragua’s largest public
university and not particularly interested in politics when protests broke out in April 2018
in response to changes to the social security system. Senior citizens who took to the
streets were roughed up by police, so university students came out in support of the
pensioners.
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4/21
Rivera went to do his rounds at a hospital the next day and saw wounded students
flooding in. On the second day of protests, police beat him and tossed him in a filthy cell
for six hours before releasing him. The arrest made him a leader among other medical
students, which eventually got him expelled.
He later enrolled in a private university as a political science major because it did not
have a medical school and was a few classes short of finishing his degree when Ortega’s
government shut down the school, and a number of other private universities in
February.
Rivera is now trying to continue his studies outside Nicaragua. Even with his asylum
appointment eight years off, he said: “I’ve been calm about it because I know the quantity
of Nicaraguans there are here and Costa Rica is a very small country.”
Nicaraguans wait for their ʭrst interviews in their application for asylum outside the Refugee Service Center in San Jose, Costa
Rica, Monday, Aug. 29, 2022. (AP Photo/Moises Castillo)
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5/21
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Xaviera Molina, 27, has already been granted asylum because she left Nicaragua in one of
the early waves in July 2018.
Molina, a marketing major, was a single mother at the time in the second year of her
degree track. She had never been involved in activism, but when students expanded the
protest against Ortega’s government she got involved, first distributing food and then
helping provide medical care to wounded students.
Nicaraguan Xaviera Molina, center, who was granted asylum in Costa Rica, listens to Ruth Blass Lopez who is applying for
asylum, at a diner that serves traditional Nicaraguan food ownd by a Nicaraguan asylum-seeker in San Jose, Costa Rica, Friday,
Aug. 26, 2022. (AP Photo/Moises Castillo)
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Fleeing Nicaraguans strain Costa Rica's asylum system | AP News
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6/21
“I was basically a nurse by accident,” Molina said.
The government increased its repression of protests, mounting an operation in July 2018
to clear the barricades protesters had erected around neighborhoods of resistance
throughout Nicaragua. Molina went into hiding and then decided she had to leave the
country.
Molina fled across the border to Costa Rica in July 2018, requested asylum and received it
last October. She went 1 ½ years without seeing her daughter who remained with her
parents in Nicaragua.
She said the process was slow, but she was able to work, opened her own catering
business and brought her daughter to Costa Rica.
“I know people who have been here four years like me and they still haven’t accepted that
they have to stay,” Molina said. “They still haven’t bought a bed because they feel like at
any moment they’re going to go back.”
This March, U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas met with officials in
Costa Rica. The Biden administration was interested in seeing Costa Rica and Mexico,
two countries with relatively robust asylum systems, continue taking as many asylum
seekers as possible.
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In his State of the Union Address that month, Biden said, “We’re securing commitments
and supporting partners in South and Central America to host more refugees and secure
their own borders.”
Diego Pérez, a spokesman for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Costa Rica,
said that with the COVID-19 pandemic, Costa Rica’s asylum system no longer “has the
same capacity to absorb or integrate (asylum seekers), including in the labor market.”
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said
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Fleeing Nicaraguans strain Costa Rica's asylum system | AP News
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7/21
Gabriela Nuñez, the Costa Rica director for the U.S.-based refugee-support organization
HIAS, notes that before the Nicaragua crisis Costa Rica was accustomed to receiving
about 5,000 asylum requests annually. Now the country receives more than that in a
month.
“There is an emergency in terms of how people are seeking access to the territory, to the
process and finally how many are ultimately recognized,” Nuñez said.
Now some worry that the years-long wait for an appointment is leading more
Nicaraguans to look north -- to Mexico or the United States -- than at any point in their
country’s four-plus year political crisis.
Through July of this year, 5,335 Nicaraguans have sought asylum in Mexico, four times as
many as all of 2021. In many cases, applying for asylum in Mexico is just a way for asylum
seekers to reach the U.S. border.
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Last year, U.S. border agents encountered Nicaraguans more than 50,000 times at the
southwest border. Through the first 10 months of the 2022 fiscal year, they have
encountered Nicaraguans 134,000 times.
For most however, Costa Rica remains the top choice for Nicaraguans seeking safety, due
to its proximity, familiarity and possible existing family ties.
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For m
For m
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8/21
Nicaraguan Wilmer Ramos, sitting, shares corn tortillas with a teammate before they play in a preparation tournament before
the start of the local baseball league at Sabana Park in San Jose, Costa Rica, Sunday, Aug. 28, 2022. The number of players for
the local league in Costa Rica has increased since Nicaraguans began seeking asylum at the highest levels since their country's
political crisis exploded in April 2018. (AP Photo/Moises Castillo)
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9/21
Nicaraguan baseball player for the local Mets team waits to bat in a preparation game against La Carpio ahead of
baseball season at Sabana Park in San Jose, Costa Rica, Sunday, Aug. 28, 2022. (AP Photo/Moises Castillo)
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10/21
Still, it can be a difficult transition. Costa Rica is more expensive. Nicaraguans forced to
flee quickly are not able to take much with them; professional certifications do not
transfer; it takes time to determine what grade children should enter in a different
education system.
Three months after applying for asylum, applicants can begin working legally. But many
said that some employers do not recognize the government-issued card identifying them
as asylum seekers. Others have managed to open small businesses, but say they are not
eligible for loans.
Nicaraguan asylum-seeker Cristopher Mendoza does a Facebook live broadcast for a Nicaraguan audience of a
local baseball game between the Mets and La Carpio during a preparation tournament before the start of the
regular season at Sabana Park in San Jose, Costa Rica, Sunday, Aug. 28, 2022.(AP Photo/Moises Castillo)
Nicaraguans hold a baseball tournament ahead of the regular season at Sabana Park in San Jose, Costa Rica, Sunday, Aug. 28,
2022. (AP Photo/Moises Castillo)
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as as
igi
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11/21
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Rivera is trying to make the best of it. He founded an organization called Bridges for
Nicaraguan Students, which aims to help exiled students find ways to continue their
studies.
Soon Rivera will travel to Romania to resume his medical studies, but he doesn’t plan to
stop his political activism.
When he had decided to leave Nicaragua, Rivera remembers thinking: “I’m going to
bother them more there, continue talking there, keep raising my voice there.”
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12/21
__
Sherman reported from Mexico City. AP videojournalist Berny Araya in San Jose
contributed to this report.
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A Nicaraguan family arrives to a Catholic church where the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has set up
a ʭeld oʪce to assist people applying for asylum in San Jose, Costa Rica, Monday, Aug. 29, 2022. (AP Photo/Moises Castillo)
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CLP_PC_030112
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March 27, 2023
Submitted via: https://www.regulations.gov.
Daniel Delgado
Acting Director, Border and Immigration Policy
Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans, U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Lauren Alder Reid
Assistant Director, Office of Policy,
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice
Re: Comment on the Proposed Rule by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) on Circumvention of Lawful Pathways, CIS
No. 2736-22; Docket No: USCIS 2022-0016; A.G. Order No. 5605-2023
I submit this comment as an historian of United States asylum law and procedures and as
Director for the Americas and Europe at Refugees International, an independent
non-governmental organization that advocates for lifesaving assistance, human rights, and
protection for displaced people. Over the past five years, I have published several academic
articles and research reports on the history of U.S. asylum law and policy, their relationship to
international law, and approaches to effectively sharing the responsibility to protect refugees. I
have witnessed and monitored access to asylum and protection pathways at the U.S.-Mexico
border and, with my colleagues at Refugees International and partner organizations, in other
countries in the region, including Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico.
In light of the tremendous numbers of forcibly displaced people in the hemisphere and around
the world, Refugees International supports the creation of additional legal pathways to the United
States as a supplement to—rather than as a substitute for—access to asylum at the U.S.-Mexico
border. U.S. and international refugee law require universal access to asylum and uniform
procedures for the consideration of asylum claims regardless of nationality and mode of transit or
entry, which also do not serve as proxies for the merits of claims. Denying eligibility for asylum
to those who transit other countries or enter between ports of entry not only will lead to
refoulement but also undermines the ability of other countries to handle the many asylum claims
they already have. Indeed, many of the features of the proposed rule undermine the rule’s own
stated goals, and reveal that it will do more to undermine overall access to protection in the
Americas than bolster it. For these reasons, further elaborated below, Refugees International
urges the agencies to withdraw the proposed rule (hereafter referred to as NPRM).
1) The Proposed Rule violates U.S. law.
The United States acceded to the UN Protocol to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees in 1968 but, for the next dozen years, U.S. law did not comply with the Convention.
1
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The United States lacked a clear procedure whereby people could seek asylum during exclusion
proceedings and, if a person in deportation proceedings proved they would be persecuted for
their political opinions if returned to their home country, the Attorney General could still deport
the person as a matter of discretion. The Refugee Act of 1980 changed this.The law was intended
not only to ensure that the United States abided by the Convention’s prohibition on
non-refoulement. As I have argued elsewhere and as has been recently affirmed in federal court,
the Refugee Act of 1980 was also a Congressional mandate to create uniform procedures for the
handling of asylum claims whether a person arrived at a land border or airport, whether a person
did or did not have documentation, whether a person asked for asylum after crossing a land
border without authorization or at a port or entry.1 Congress did this because lack of uniformity
in the handling of claims led, in the 1970s, to discrimination based on nationality and race. This
will likewise be the effect of the proposed rule’s barring of access to asylum to those who do not
make use of a parole process or the CBP One app to make an appointment at a port of entry.
Parole programs are only available to people from certain nationalities who have passports and
sponsors in the United States and who have not recently entered unauthorized into Mexico or
Panama. CBP One is not universally accessible—it is only available in a few languages to people
with certain types of phones and wifi—and it is unclear how an asylum seeker would prove to an
officer that they could not get an appointment using it so as to be eligible for asylum at the
border. (It is also unclear how asylum seekers would prove to CBP officers that that they were
facing an imminent threat of rape or were a victim of a severe form of trafficking to be excepted
from ineligibility). This NPRM creates different rules for people at the southern border without
documents and for people who arrive in airports with visas, reverting back to the lack of
uniformity that existed before 1980. The NPRM insists that, despite establishing a broad
presumption of ineligibility that will preclude access to the asylum system for many asylum
seekers, it is compliant with the UN Refugee Convention because these asylum seekers would
continue to be eligible for withholding of removal. But withholding of removal offers less robust
protection and has a more onerous standard of proof than the “well founded fear” standard in the
Convention. To comply with the Convention, the United States must have a uniform and fair
procedure to determine eligibility for refugee status as defined in Article 1 of the Refugee
Convention and incorporated in the 1980 Refugee Act.
When Congress amended the asylum statute in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), it reaffirmed its prior explicit authorization of access to
asylum for anyone “who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States,” “whether or not” they arrive “at a designated port of arrival.” In 1995, the year before
passing IIRIRA, Congress considered and rejected an amendment which would have barred
asylum to those who, “before arriving at the United States, passed through another
country”—and even then, only if “the Secretary of State ha[d] identified [the transit country] as
providing asylum or safe haven to refugees.”2 Instead, in IIRIRA Congress mandated that a
person was barred from asylum eligibility when coming from a country with which the United
States had a safe third country agreement or when the asylum seeker had been firmly resettled in
a third country. 8 U.S.C. §1158(d)(5)(B) provides that the administration may not issue
2 H.R. 2182, 104th Cong. § 1(a) (1995).
1 Brief of Amicus Curiae Refugees International and Yael Schacher, Immigration Defenders Law Center et. al. v. Chad
Wolf et. al. (District Court for the Central District of California, 2020); Decision by Judge Bernal, Immigration
Defenders Law Center et. al. v. Mayorkas et. al., (District Court for the Central District of California, 2023).
2
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regulations that are inconsistent with these provisions. When the agencies promulgated
regulations in 1997 to implement IIRIRA, they included the provision that an individual “asylum
application may be denied in the discretion of the Attorney General if the alien can be removed
to a third country which has offered resettlement and in which the alien would not face harm or
persecution.”3
The NPRM, at 88 Fed. Reg. 11735-11741, nonetheless argues that Congress gave the agencies
the authority to presume ineligible for asylum all people who come to the southwest border after
transiting through other countries where they have not been rejected for asylum and who ask for
asylum after crossing between ports of entry or at a port of entry without a CBP One
appointment. The NPRM does this by making a few unconvincing arguments. First it claims that
the “text and the structure” of IIRIRA—namely that section 1158 splits asylum applications and
eligibility into two subsections—indicate that Congress meant to have whole categories of
asylum seekers apply for asylum for no purpose since they could never be granted asylum, i.e,
Congress called for the creation of an application process to nowhere and wanted the agencies to
spend their time rejecting applications by people ineligible for asylum. This argument not only,
in the words of Judge Richard Paez, “borders on absurdity.”4 It also does not seem to be made in
good faith given the emphasis throughout the NPRM on the need to improve the efficiency of the
asylum system.
Indeed, the agencies also argue that, because they have the discretionary authority to consider
transit through third countries and manner of entry in adjudicating individual asylum cases,
Congress meant to give them the authority to do this “across a category of similarly situated”
asylum seekers in the name of the “overall efficiency of the system” and to “encourage other
countries in the region to share in the protection of migrants” (88 FR 11737). In administering
the bars on asylum eligibility detailed in the NPRM, the agencies will not assess whether the
individual asylum seeker could safely stay in a transit country and effectively secure protection
there. They will not assess the merits of an individual asylum claim, but instead assume the claim
is less meritorious because the claimant did not seek asylum in a transit country. (Even if, for
example, the asylum seeker had a close relative in the United States.) This approach to asylum
fundamentally clashes with the case-by-case asylum adjudication system delineated by Congress
in the Refugee Act of 1980, IIRIRA, and the Real ID Act of 2005. Departure from this approach
and authority to handle categories of asylum seekers in a certain way must be explicitly
articulated by Congress, as it did in 1996 not only in establishing the one year asylum application
filing deadline but also when it mandated that all people forced to abort a pregnancy or to
undergo involuntary sterilization, or persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
procedure, would be considered to have been persecuted on account of political opinion.
4 “Explicitly authorizing a refugee to file an asylum application because he arrived between ports of entry and then
summarily denying the application for the same reason borders on absurdity. The consequences of denial at the
application or eligibility stage are, to a refugee, the same. Had Congress intended to allow DOJ and DHS to override
this provision, it could have said so in…the statutory provisions governing asylum applications. And Congress
signaled its desire that any eligibility limitations be consistent with application requirements; limitations
promulgated under the eligibility subsection of the statute must be consistent with this section—meaning the
entirety of section 1158—not just consistent with this subsection.” (East Bay Sanctuary Covenant et. al. v. Biden
et.al., 993 F.3d 640 (9th Circuit, 2021) 43-44.)
3 62 Fed. Reg. 10342.
3
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As discussed below, it is truly questionable whether the NPRM’s utilitarian and foreign policy
(rather than human rights) approach to asylum will lead, as is assumed in the NPRM, to
increased overall access to protection in the hemisphere, to “increasing the percentage of
meritorious claims that are considered” by the agencies, and (in some way not specified) to
advancement of the “broader public interest” (88 Fed Reg 11737).
2) The Proposed Rule does not accurately portray conditions for migrants and access
to asylum in other countries in the region.
Refugees International has done extensive recent reporting on the experiences of migrants in the
Americas, especially in Peru, moving from Colombia to Panama through the Darien Gap, in
Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Mexico. Though these countries have made commitments to
humanely manage migration by signing the L.A. Declaration, migrants traveling through them
over the past few months have experienced rising insecurity, xenophobia, and human-rights
violating migration enforcement measures. Further, as former leaders of Costa Rica and
Colombia have written, access to protection in other countries will only be undermined by the
proposed rule’s cutting off access to protection in the United States and sending asylum seekers
into orbit throughout the hemisphere.5 This proposed rule is shifting responsibility for protection
to other countries that may just follow the United States’ lead, leading to chain refoulement
rather than increased protection.
The NPRM notes that every country in the hemisphere has seen large increases in migration and
that countries like Colombia and Peru are hosts to millions of Venezuelans. It also asserts that
imposition of Title 42 upon, and the creation of parole programs for, Venezuelans, Cubans,
Haitians, and Nicaraguans, effectively reduced encounters at the U.S. border and “changed
migratory patterns” (88 Fed. Reg. 11711). But, 50,000 migrants crossed the Darien Gap in
January and February of 2023, five times the number in the first two months of 2022, and an
increasing percentage of them were Haitians and Ecuadorans.6 The NPRM lauds Ecuador and
Peru for providing temporary permits to asylum seekers. But a lack of long-term integration and
increasing political instability and insecurity there have made it harder for displaced people to
access work and services there and has driven them to migrate, along with Peruvians and
Ecuadorans as well.7 None of these individuals, currently traveling through the Darien Gap and
northward without visas, will be eligible to apply for parole programs.
The NPRM’s assertion that Mexico “is the third highest recipient of asylum claims in the world”
says nothing about how Mexico is handling these claims and whether it is a safe country to
which to return asylum seekers (88 Fed. Reg. 11720). As the Refugees International report on the
7https://efectococuyo.com/venezuela-migrante/la-incertidumbre-nunca-se-va-asi-viven-los-venezolanos-la-crisis-q
ue-sacude-el-peru/
6 Evan Dyer, “Migrant numbers at jungle crossing point to a record-breaking year for irregular migration in North
America,” CBC, March 19, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/migrants-panama-darien-gap-haiti-1.6783199
5Juan Manuel Santos, “Time for the Americas tp step up (afain) on migration” El Pais, March 6, 2023,
https://english.elpais.com/opinion/2023-03-06/time-for-the-americas-to-step-up-again-on-migration.html
Carlos Alvarado Quesada, “What Biden’s deeply troubling asylum limit means for the economy,” The Hill, March 8,
2023,https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/3889578-what-bidens-deeply-troubling-asylum-limit-means-for-the-
economy/
4
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Mexican asylum system cited in the NPRM (footnote 147) points out, Mexico applies the
Cartagena standard to some nationalities and not others, particularly Haitians who spent 2021
and 2022 in precarious limbo.8 On several trips to Mexico over the last year, I have spoken to
dozens of migrants (from El Salvador, Honduras, Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela) who have
fallen prey to gang violence in Ciudad Juarez and Reynosa and to dozens of others who have
been terribly mistreated by Mexican police and immigration authorities in many different parts of
the country – from Tapachula to Coahuila. Xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment has only
worsened in Mexico since U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas recognized
the “extreme violence and insecurity” experienced by migrants and asylum seekers during the
Remain in Mexico program.9 Underfunded and already overwhelmed by asylum applications, the
Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) is worried about the impact of the new
rule on the Mexican asylum system. Once the new regulation goes into effect, will thousands of
asylum seekers put forward weak claims in Mexico in order to be rejected and so eligible for
asylum in the United States?10 What kind of documentation will Mexico immigration authorities
give all the asylum seekers the United States will deport to Mexico via expedited removal? Will
it be possible for them to formally work in Mexico, almost impossible for them to do now? Will
Mexico bus these asylum seekers to the south or send them to their home countries as it has done
with those expelled under Title 42? The United States making secret agreements with Mexico to
accept deported Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, and Venezuelans with no concern about what
happens to them after deportation does not comply with the non-refoulement obligation of the
UN Refugee Convention.
The NPRM lauds progress that Guatemala has made to improve its asylum system over the last
two years. Having visited Guatemala with Refugees International colleagues and spoken to
representatives of the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and to migrants there in early 2020 and
late 2022, I question the extent of this progress.11 Salvadorans sent from the U.S. border under
the previous administration’s “asylum cooperative agreement” and Venezuelan families
migrating northward in October 2022 could not find safety in Guatemala and were at risk of
refoulement. Indeed, the rule of law situation in Guatemala has deteriorated over the last year,
during which Guatemalan migration authorities barred 15,593 Venezuelans from entering from
11 Ariana Sawyer, Yael Schacher, and Rachel Schmidtke, “Deportation with a Layover: Failure of Protection under the
U.S.-Guatemala Asylum Cooperative Agreement,” May 19, 2020,
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/5/8/deportation-with-a-layover-failure-of-protection-under-t
he-us-guatemala-asylum-cooperative-agreement
Rachel Schmitdke, “ Pushbacks of Venezuelans on the Guatemalan Border,” October 31, 2022, Refugees
International,
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2022/10/31/refugees-international-eyewitness-pushbacks-of-vene
zuelans-on-the-guatemalan-border
10 Rosa Flores, “Mexico Rethinks asylum initiative after controversial U.S. announcement,” CNN, Feb. 24, 2023,
https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/24/americas/mexico-asylum-policy-intl-latam/index.html; see also:
https://twitter.com/giolepri/status/1629874741204127745?s=48&t=bnPnoVLl6sJblKyIuK3Pgg
https://twitter.com/andresrsilva_/status/1629903734225481729?s=48&t=LCanSKQ_XTQAov0OGKsFeg
9Termination of the Migrant Protection Protocols, October 29, 2021,
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-01/21_1029_mpp-termination-memo.pdf
8Yael Schacher and Rachel Schmidtke, “Pushed into the Shadows: Mexico’s Reception of Haitian Migrants,”
Refugees International, April 28, 2022,
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2022/4/25/pushed-into-the-shadows-mexicos-reception-of-haitian
-migrants
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Honduras.12 Meanwhile, there are only 708 refugees and 1,472 asylum claims in Guatemala,
where high level officials, including the Vice President, still need to approve every claim.13
The NPRM presents a very partial picture of the situation in Costa Rica, which, since November
2022, has been adopting stricter asylum and migration deterrence policies, pointing to U.S.
policies as the reason for doing so.14 The Costa Rican government issued a decree stipulating
that, if an asylum seeker transited another country, their claim would be deemed inadmissible
unless the asylum seeker had evidence of inability to apply.15 Costa Rica also no longer
automatically provides work permits to asylum seekers and requires that people apply for asylum
within one month of arriving. These measures limit asylum seekers’ right to work and push them
into precarious working situations. According to Refugees International partner organization the
Institute on LGBTQI Migration and Refuge for Central America, the decree ignores the different
needs and socioeconomic realities of LGBTQI+ refugee applicants and has been accompanied
with a resurgence of xenophobic and discriminatory discourse about migrants and asylum
seekers.16
3) The Proposed Rule is premised on assumptions and minimal proof.
The NPRM argues it must make migrants arriving at the border ineligible for asylum because
most of those who pass credible fear screenings and who cross between ports of entry mostly do
not have meritorious claims. No data is provided by the NPRM to prove the latter. The statistics
cited in the NPRM (https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1062976/download) only show that
there is a backlog of claims; that of adjudicated claims, the asylum grant rate is higher than the
denial rate; and that the rate of people who have failed to apply for asylum after passing credible
fear has halved since 2013. There is no system in place to ensure that those who arrive in the
United States through the parole programs or through CBP One have credible asylum claims, let
alone that they are more likely to be granted asylum on the merits. Simply making people who
cross between ports of entry ineligible for asylum will not raise asylum grant rates or even
necessarily lessen the work of the immigration courts and asylum office, which, as the NPRM
concedes, will still need to spend “significant additional time” assessing whether claimants meet
the three exceptions to presumed ineligibility and, if not, the reasonable fear standard (88 Fed.
Reg. 11744). A surer way to close the gap between those who pass credible fear and those
granted asylum would be to provide asylum seekers access to counsel and to clarify the standard
16Statement From IRCA CASABIERTA and Refugees International Regarding the Recent Executive Decrees
43809-Mgp/43810-Mgp, December 28, 2022,
https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2022/12/28/statement-from-irca-casabierta-and-refugees-internati
onal-regarding-the-recent-executive-decrees-43809-mgp43810-mgp
15http://www.pgrweb.go.cr/scij/Busqueda/Normativa/Normas/nrm_texto_completo.aspx?param1=NRTC¶m2=1
&nValor1=1&nValor2=98356&nValor3=133735&strTipM=TC&lResultado=2&nValor4=1&strSelect=sel
14 Alonso Martinez, “Rodrigo Chaves: Costa Rica cambiará reglas para pedir asilo político por falta de ayuda
internacional” [Rodrigo Chaves: Costa Rica to change rules for requesting political asylum due to lack of
international aid], Delfino, November 16, 2022,
https://delfino.cr/2022/11/rodrigo-chaves-costa-rica-cambiara-reglas-para-pedir-asilo-politico-por-falta-de-ayuda-
internacional.
13 https://data.unhcr.org/fr/documents/details/96323
12 Roman Gressier, “Guatemala, Crossroads of the Venezuelan Exodus, El Faro, Feb. 27, 2023,
https://elfaro.net/en/202302/centroamerica/26709/Guatemala-Crossroads-of-the-Venezuelan-Exodus.htm
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that should be used to adjudicate claims of persecution based upon membership in a particular
social group. The best way to reduce the fiscal strain on states and localities receiving asylum
seekers is to more promptly authorize asylum seekers to work so that they can support
themselves and pay taxes. It is also worth pointing out that the average time it takes to adjudicate
asylum claims—4 years—is identical to the average time it takes for the United States to process
refugees through the United States Refugee Admissions Program. To make refugee adjudication
fairer and faster, the United States must clarify and make uniform the standards it uses to
adjudicate claims and invest in increased staffing and other resources for adjudication.
The proposed rule’s primary goal is to address a predicted surge in migrants at the border in the
spring of 2023 and to combat reliance on smuggling. The rule assumes that, in the spring of
2023, the existence of legal pathways will keep encounters low. But, as mentioned above, legal
pathways are not available to all asylum seekers. The demand for CBP One appointments vastly
outstrips supply and, as of February 2023, Refugees International’s discussions with port officers
and migrants in El Paso indicated that sending advance information to CBP through the app did
not increase processing speed through ports of entry. If the legal pathways could sufficiently and
less expensively serve all those who need to seek asylum, there would be no need to bar asylum
seeking between ports of entry as no asylum seeker would pay a smuggler for what was so
readily accessible and less dangerous. The “stick” of the bar not only penalizes asylum seekers in
a way that is contrary to U.S. and international law but also betrays the reality that the legal
pathways are not, in fact, true substitutes for access to asylum at the border. For Ukrainians, the
United States offered only carrots, but for the mostly Black and brown asylum seekers at the
border, carrots and sticks.
Last, the proposed rule claims it will not separate families. But the NPRM exempts
unaccompanied minors and not their families from presumed ineligibility for asylum if they
cross between ports of entry. Limiting those fleeing harm to withholding of removal or
Convention Against Torture (CAT) protection will result in family separation because neither of
these forms of protection provide derivative status. If only one member of a family is granted
withholding or CAT, the rest of the family will be ordered removed or will be unable to come to
the United States.
Overall, the NPRM re-orients the processing of asylum claims at the southwest border
away from a uniform approach geared to providing refuge to individuals that meet the asylum
standard. The regulation will have a disparate impact on certain nationalities and minorities and
does the opposite of leading by humanitarian example in the hemisphere. Refugees International,
like many Americans, believes the public interest is best served when the United States adheres
to its own and international refugee law and champions human rights. For these reasons,
Refugees International recommends that the rule be withdrawn.
Yael Schacher
Director for the Americas and Europe
Refugees International
yael@refugeesinternational.org
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PUBLIC SUBMISSION
As of: May 08, 2023
Received: March 27, 2023
Status: Posted
Posted: March 29, 2023
Tracking No. lfr-d1te-2rku
Comments Due: March 27, 2023
Submission Type: Web
Docket: USCIS-2022-0016
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways
Comment On: USCIS-2022-0016-0001
Circumvention of Lawful Pathways
Document: USCIS-2022-0016-12310
Comment Submitted by FWD.us
Submitter Information
Email: andrew@fwd.us
Organization: FWD.us
General Comment
FWD.us respectfully submits the attached public comment. In summary, FWD.us believes this proposed policy,
which would effectively deny the vast majority of people seeking safety at our borders from applying for asylum
—even though it is their legal right under U.S. and international law—is dangerous, inhumane, and antithetical to
U.S. immigration policy, and to our principles as a nation, and we urge the administration to withdraw the
proposal. Please refer to the PDF attachment for our full comment.
Attachments
FWD.us Public Comment re__Circumvention of Lawful Pathways_ NPRM - FINAL
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March 27, 2023
Submitted via www.regulations.gov
Daniel Delgado
Acting Director, Border and Immigration Policy, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
U.S. Department of Homeland Security
5900 Capital Gateway Drive
Camp Springs, MD 20746
Lauren Alder Reid
Assistant Director, Office of Policy
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Department of Justice
5107 Leesburg Pike
Falls Church, VA 22041
Re:
Docket No. USCIS 2022-0016 and A.G. Order No. 5605–2023, “Circumvention of
Lawful Pathways”
Dear Acting Director Delgado, Assistant Director Reid, and all relevant parties:
FWD.us submits this response to the request of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and Department of Justice (DOJ) for comments on the respective notices of proposed rulemaking
(NPRMs), “Circumvention of Lawful Pathways.”
FWD.us represents a community of business leaders, policy experts, and advocates, including
many individuals whose lives and futures are directly impacted by these policies, and we are
dedicated to improving immigration laws, policies, and processes in the United States. We are an
advocacy organization started by key leaders in the tech and business community who want to
strengthen the United States through meaningful bipartisan immigration reform. We believe our
country is stronger when all of us have the opportunity to live up to our full potential, which
means ensuring that our nation’s immigration laws and policies are administered effectively, and
that legal immigration options are accessible to everyone who qualifies, including the legal right
to apply for asylum.
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FWD.us has spent the last decade advocating for immigration reform, and we have had the
opportunity to work closely alongside many frontline organizers, service providers, allies, and
directly-impacted individuals. Our team includes numerous policy and operations experts with
invaluable experience working in government, advocacy and organizing, research, policy, and
direct service in support of immigrant communities. Organizationally, FWD.us has worked
closely on resourcing frontline organizations1 to direct funding and resources to support
organizations serving individuals and families impacted by the brutal “zero tolerance” and family
separation policies.
FWD.us has also published original research and storytelling about the impact of disastrous
asylum policies implemented by the previous administration. In 2020, we published a report
detailing the deep and long lasting harm of the Trump Administration’s anti-immigrant policies2,
and in 2021 we partnered with the National Immigrant Justice Center to document the
far-reaching harm of illegal externalization and offshoring practices among affluent nations
throughout the world, which prevented countless people from reaching their borders to seek
safety and asylum.3 Throughout, we have worked closely with fearless directly impacted
individuals who have bravely shared their stories, illustrating how human lives are
devastated—and too often lost—to these harmful policies.4
We have also done extensive research on the critical contributions immigrants, including
individuals seeking asylum, make to the United States, including to our economy and our
workforce. For example, FWD.us analysis shows5 that individuals in the asylum process who are
working with employment authorization contribute about $11 billion to the economy each year,
along with $2 billion in federal, state, and local taxes, and are helping fill open jobs in a
workforce struggling with persistent labor shortages, which helps reduce inflationary pressures.6
All of this work helps FWD.us understand the importance of robust legal pathways and
accessible humanitarian pathways for individuals and families to be able to seek safety, relief,
and protection in the United States. It also makes clear to us that this proposed policy, which
would effectively deny the vast majority of people seeking safety at our borders from applying
for asylum—even though it is their legal right under U.S. and international law—is dangerous,
inhumane, and antithetical to U.S. immigration policy, and to our principles as a nation.
6 “Improving Immigration to Reduce Inflation,” FWD.us, https://www.fwd.us/news/immigration-inflation.
5 “Pathways to Citizenship,” FWD.us, June 14, 2021, https://www.fwd.us/news/pathway-to-citizenship.
4 For example: “A Family Separated at the Border Fighting to Stay Together,” April 14, 2021, FWD.us;
https://www.fwd.us/news/family-separated-mpp.
3 “Pushing Back Protection: How Offshoring and Externalization Imperil the Right to Asylum,” August 3, 2021;
National Immigrant Justice Center and FWD.us; https://www.fwd.us/news/offshoring-asylum.
2 “Tearing Families Apart: The Impact of Trump’s Immigration Agenda,” September 29, 2020, FWD.us;
https://www.fwd.us/news/the-impact-of-trumps-immigration-agenda.
1 “FWD.us Education Fund Launches National Dignity for Families Fund,” May 18, 2021, FWD.us;
https://www.fwd.us/news/fwd-us-education-fund-launches-national-dignity-for-families-fund.
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We understand that the administration claims the rule is justified because “the number of
migrants expected to travel without authorization to the United States” following the lifting of
the Title 42 public health order “is expected to increase significantly, to a level that risks
undermining the Departments’’ continued ability to safely, effectively, and humanely enforce and
administer U.S. immigration law, including the asylum system…” However, we do not believe
this proposed solution will solve those challenges, and we believe it would in fact greatly
infringe on human rights and in fact drive up unauthorized entries, while causing more chaos and
human suffering.
Rather than this sort of large scale disqualification measure, the United States should
create a modern system of Western Hemisphere migration—built upon new, working, safe,
and legal immigration avenues. That means building a refugee and parole system for the
Western Hemisphere where people can apply while in their countries of origin, avenues so
that people can come temporarily to work or for longer term employment, and clearing
green card backlogs so that people can reunite with family who are citizens and residents.
We respectfully submit this comment in strong opposition to the proposed rule, and urge the
administration to abandon this proposal; or, if it is committed to forcing the policy onward, to
include additional exceptions and accommodations that will help shield the most vulnerable
populations from the chaos and suffering this proposal would all but certainly create.
1. The NPRM contradicts the letter and spirit of the United States’ longstanding
refugee policies and international agreements
Immigration law in the United States explicitly defines who qualifies as a refugee, including
individuals eligible to apply for asylum, and the process for doing so. These laws build on
international agreement about the rights and treatment of refugees, which have been in place for
more than 50 years. We believe the NPRM proposes a policy that directly contradicts a plain
reading of these foundational agreements and the U.S. laws that carry them out.
The United States’ commitment to accepting and welcoming refugees and people seeking asylum
is anchored by long-standing international agreements established in the aftermath of World War
II, when the international community came together to agree on the principle that safe countries
had a responsibility to offer refuge to—and should not turn away—people fleeing extreme
violence and oppression. Notably, this included Jewish refugees fleeing the atrocities of the
Holocaust, many of whom were turned away prior to the existence of these agreements, forcing
them back to territories where they faced near-certain death. In 1951, the United Nations adopted
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,7 which included a detailed set of agreements
describing the rights held by refugees and the responsibilities of how other countries must treat
7 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,” UNHCR; https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10.
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them. The only amendment to this agreement was the passage of the 1967 Protocol,8 which the
United States became party to and that clarified that there were no time or geographic restrictions
on who qualifies as a refugee. Today, almost 150 countries are party to the Convention or its
1967 Protocol.9
For the United States, this treaty constituted a deliberate departure from the exclusionary
immigration policies the U.S. had maintained through World War II. Specifically, the
Immigration Act of 192410 formalized entry bans on the basis of nationality and imposed new
quotas—and bans—on immigration from certain countries. Further, in the years that followed,
the United States closed its doors to hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing the horrors
of the Holocaust.11 Tragically, the U.S. even went so far as to turn away Jewish children,
families, and adults arriving at our borders because they were ostensibly perceived as a threat.12
The United States’ approval of the UN Convention was a commitment to move away from these
dangerous externalization policies that pushed refugees to their deaths; that commitment formed
the basis for Congress to pass multiple pieces of legislation related to the humane and proper
treatment of refugees13 in the years that followed, including the Refugee Act of 1980, which
clarified the process by which the U.S. accepted people seeking refuge, and increased the annual
number of refugee admissions. 14
The NPRM would violate the three core principles of long-standing international agreements on
refugee rights and processes
At minimum, the proposed asylum ban would infringe on the rights of refugees as detailed in the
1951 agreement, its 1967 Protocol, and the United States’ Refugee Act of 1980. Without
question, this proposal undermines the spirit of what the international community and the United
States itself affirmed in these historic agreements.
14 “Refugee Act of 1980,” 1980, Pub. L. 96-212,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-94/pdf/STATUTE-94-Pg102.pdf.
13 “Refugee Timeline,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services;
https://www.uscis.gov/about-us/our-history/history-office-and-library/featured-stories-from-the-uscis-history-office-
and-library/refugee-timeline.
12 “Voyage of the St. Louis,” United States Holocaust Museum,
https://encyclopedia.ushmm.org/content/en/article/voyage-of-the-st-louis; Daniel A. Gross, “The U.S. Government
Turned Away Thousands of Jewish Refugees, Fearing That They Were Nazi Spies,” November 18. 2015,
Smithsonian Magazine,
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/us-government-turned-away-thousands-jewish-refugees-fearing-they-were
-nazi-spies-180957324; Sarah Stillman, “When Deportation is a Death Sentence,” January 15, 2018, The New
Yorker, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/01/15/when-deportation-is-a-death-sentence.
11 “How Many Refugees Came to the United States from 1933-1945?,” United States Holocaust Museum;
https://exhibitions.ushmm.org/americans-and-the-holocaust/how-many-refugees-came-to-the-united-states-from-193
3-1945.
10 “Historical Highlights: The Immigration Act of 1924,” United States House of Representatives;
https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/The-Immigration-Act-of-1924.
9 “The 1951 Refugee Convention,” UNHCR; https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/1951-refugee-convention.html.
8 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
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In an introductory note to the Convention published in 2010, the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) explains that the Convention is “both a status and
rights-based instrument and is underpinned by a number of fundamental principles, most notably
non-discrimination, non-penalization and non-refoulement.”15 If implemented, the proposed
asylum ban would directly contradict these principles.
The principle of non-discrimination should ensure that access to the asylum process is uniform,
regardless of the applicant. However, the proposed asylum ban introduces a number of
discriminatory factors:
For one, the ban is only being applied to individuals arriving at the southern U.S. border, so it
would be applied disproportionately to certain individuals arriving from certain countries, which
is in itself inherently discriminatory. The policy applies a second layer of discrimination by
explicitly applying the ban if people seeking asylum have not “avail[ed] themselves of lawful,
safe, and orderly pathways into the United States,” when many of the existing avenues described
in the NPRM clearly restrict individuals coming from specific countries from utilizing them.
Further, requiring applicants to register for appointments through the CBP One mobile
application discriminatorily restricts access only to individuals who have a compatible computer
device and access to reliable internet within range of the U.S. southern border. It disadvantages
individuals who are not fluent in the few languages the app supports, family units who have
more information to fill out and are therefore much less likely to secure an appointment slot, and,
very notably, people whose skin color is too dark to be recognized by the app’s detection
technology, to name only a few.16
The policy described in the NPRM would also violate the 1951 Refugee Convention’s principle
of non-punishment. The Convention prescribes that:
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life or freedom
was threatened in the sense of article 1, enter or are present in their territory without
authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show
good cause for their illegal entry or presence.17
17 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”
16 See, for example, a letter sent from Senator Markey to the leadership of the Department of Homeland Security on
February 21, 2023, detailing the application’s discriminatory impacts and urging the agency to abandon or revise its
requirements for the app’s usage.
https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/senator_markey_letter_to_dhs_on_cbp_one_app_-_february_2023.p
df.
15 “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”.
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In fact, this proposed policy would explicitly contradict this provision in the Convention by
prohibiting individuals from applying for asylum based solely on account of how they arrived to
the U.S. (e.g., arriving at the southern border after traveling through another country, by not
availing themselves of the CBP One app, etc.), even before any consideration of the specifics of
their claim. And, if they are apprehended between ports of entry and do not qualify for an
exception, the new policy would actively impose penalties on people just for trying to apply for
asylum; individuals who are removed under expedited removal are generally prohibited from
reentering the United States, even through legal channels, for at least five years.18 So individuals
who are seeking asylum who present themselves to authorities and make claims of credible fear
will be denied and punished, solely on account of their “illegal entry or presence”—an obvious
violation of the Convention.
We are gravely concerned that this proposal would also violate the principle of
“non-refoulement” by forcing vulnerable people to return to places where their lives and freedom
would be endangered. The Convention states, “no Contracting State shall expel or return
(“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion.” However, the proposed asylum ban would directly
return individuals to unsafe conditions, and potentially the very country and similar if not the
same conditions from which they fled. And because the NPRM describes a process in which the
“presumption of ineligibility” is applied before an individual can make their claim of credible
fear, based solely on how they arrived and made their claim, their removal would be ordered
without full consideration of the conditions they are trying to escape or the danger they may face
if returned. In the very least, this expedited and restricted process greatly increases the chances
that vulnerable people will be returned to life-threatening danger.
United States immigration law is inarguably clear about the right and eligibility to apply for
asylum
U.S. immigration law includes an explicit definition of who is eligible to apply for asylum in the
United States. The first subsection of 8 USC 1158 is titled “Authority to Apply for Asylum,” and
states:
Any alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United
States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is
brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United
18 8 USC 1182(a)(9)(A),
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title8-section1182&num=0&edition=prelim.
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States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum in accordance
with this section or, where applicable, section 1225(b) of this title.19
There are some exceptions20, but none of these exceptions is related to the manner in which an
individual arrives to the United States, or where they make their claim. In fact, the very first
words of the statute affirm that “any individual who is physically present in the United States or
who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival)...” is eligible to
apply.
The proposed policy would significantly narrow and restrict the eligibility criteria beyond what
Congress established, a fact that is obscured by the “presumption” concept described in the
NPRM. The NPRM describes how the new policy would impose a “presumption of ineligibility”
on individuals seeking asylum if the individuals did not use certain procedures to apply for
asylum. This suggests that the manner in which an individual seeks asylum might indicate that
they are likely to be ineligible for asylum.
But of course the approved manners for applying that are detailed in this proposal are not related
in any way to existing eligibility criteria for asylum. Nothing in the existing immigration statute
requires individuals to make an appointment at a port of entry, or to apply and be denied in a
country on the way to the U.S. And in fact, those laws explicitly authorize individuals to apply
even if they are in the U.S. without authorization. So there is no reason a border officer should
“presume” that an individual is “ineligible” for asylum merely because they did not make that
appointment.
In this way, the proposal would create new, additional eligibility requirements for asylum,
beyond what Congress has defined, and then assign a presumption of ineligibility based on the
new requirements it has established.
The contradiction between U.S. and international law is obvious in a plain reading of the
agreements and the law, and for those reasons we urge the administration to abandon this
proposal.21
21 While the statute does say that “The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for the consideration of asylum
applications filed under subsection (a),” this is explicitly limited to asylum applications filed under the broad
description of individuals who have the “authority to apply for asylum” under subsection (a), which describes “Any
alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a
designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in
international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status.” However, the new policy does not follow
20 Including for individuals who can safely be removed to another country or has firmly resettled in another country,
who wait more than one year to file an application, or if they have had a previous asylum application denied, along
with specific prohibitions for individuals convicted of or suspected to have committed certain crimes, or who might
be a danger to the United States.
19 8 USC 1158,
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title8-section1158&num=0&edition=prelim.
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2. The NPRM directly undermines its own intended goal of establishing order and
lawful processes
The NPRM opens with a detailed explanation of shifting migration trends, with particular
emphasis on the increasing number of individuals arriving at the southern U.S. border who
subsequently file an application for asylum. DHS argues that this proposed rule is needed
because “such a high rate of migration risks overwhelming the Departments’ ability to
effectively process, detain, and remove, as appropriate, the migrants encountered.” The proposal
goes on to explain that the proposed rule would “account for the lawful, safe, and orderly means
for noncitizens to enter the United States to seek asylum and other forms of protection.”
However, it is clear that the outcome of the proposed rule will only be to reduce the number of
people who are actually able to apply for asylum in the first place. In the executive summary, the
NPRM laments that, “in the absence of policy changes included in the proposed rule, most
people processed for expedited removal under Title 8 will likely establish credible fear and
remain in the United States for the foreseeable future despite the fact that many of them will not
ultimately be granted asylum.”
The problem, as the NPRM states it, is that too many people will qualify to apply for asylum—so
the solution appears to be to simply disqualify them from applying in the first place.
This appears to be a badly misguided calculation that order will somehow emerge on its own if
fewer people are allowed to seek protection in the first place—there is no affirmative step to
establish process or promote order. History has not borne this out; the proposed asylum ban
represents the embodiment of a deterrence-only solution.
In fact, the proposed rule imposes new limitations on existing avenues that will likely create
more chaos and suffering at the border and beyond. For example, the NPRM requires the
presumption of ineligibility be applied to an individual if they traveled through other countries
without completing a full asylum process on their way to the U.S. border. Fulfilling this
requirement would be impossible in many cases, and in attempting to do so, vulnerable asylum
seekers would be forced to expose themselves and their families to dangerous conditions, abuse,
and harm. The truth is that there is often no realistic way for people to have even had the
opportunity to request safe and legal protections in countries along the migratory route. Many
nations through which asylum seekers are forced to travel have governments that are themselves
responsible for, or complicit in, widespread human rights violations against people seeking
asylum. Neighboring countries throughout the region often do not have anywhere near the
from subsection (a), but instead limits subsection (a), adding additional restrictions on who has the authority to apply
for asylum. 8 USC 1158(b)(1)(A).
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capacity, including the staff and resources,22 to provide adequate protections in line with what is
required under international law and pre-existing agreements. Discriminating against people
seeking asylum who could not do so in countries along their journey to the U.S. is a draconian
and cruel policy, and this terrible burden will fall disproportionately on Black, Brown, and
Indigenous people, exacerbating existing racial disparities and compounding a long history of
racist treatment baked into the U.S.’ immigration policies.
If they manage to make it to the U.S. border, the proposed rule would require individuals who
want to enter the U.S. to apply for asylum to secure an appointment at a port of entry using the
CBP One app. However, examples and analysis of CBP One’s current usage show its serious
limitations and the very real consequences that these limitations already have for individuals
trying to apply for relief. For one, the number of appointments available are extremely limited,
with some ports offering only a few dozen appointments each day, while thousands of
individuals wait in unsafe conditions for a chance to apply.23 Requiring all applicants to register
on CBP One, and forcing them to wait outside the U.S. until their appointment, is essentially
reinstating the “metering” policy24—which a district court deemed illegal in 2021—that had
required individuals seeking asylum to remain in Mexico until they had reached their turn on a
waiting list to enter and apply.25 The CBP One application process only changes the mode from
paper waiting lists to a mobile app, but it is still very clearly an attempt to institute metering.
The CBP One application also faces numerous limitations and challenges that raise serious
concerns about whether it is finished, functioning, and fully adequate to handle the magnitude of
the task assigned to it, and to capably manage the constant volume of thousands of requests from
people seeking asylum who must attempt to use it, likely while in desperate circumstances.
Journalists and advocates have documented a plethora of issues facing individuals who are
currently attempting to use CBP One to secure appointments at the border.26 Problems include
26 See, for example, Melissa Del Bosque, “Facial recognition bias frustrates Black asylum applicants to US,
advocates say,” February 8, 2023, The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/feb/08/us-immigration-cbp-one-app-facial-recognition-bias; Santiago
Caicedo, “Migrant families continue struggling with CBP One app registration,” February 16, 2023, KRGV,
https://www.krgv.com/news/migrant-families-continue-struggling-with-cbp-one-app-registration; Arelis R.
Hernández, “Desperate migrants seeking asylum face a new hurdle: Technology,” March 11, 2023, The Washington
Post, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/10/us/politics/migrants-asylum-biden-mexico.html; Miriam Jordan, “Biden
25 “The Department of Homeland Security’s ‘Metering’ Policy: Legal Issues,” Congressional Research Service,
March 8, 2022; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10295.
24 The Obama Administration first utilized metering to control the arrivals of Haitians requesting asylum at the
southern border; the scope and usage of the practice was significantly expanded under the Trump Administration.
See “Pushing Back Protection: How Offshoring and Externalization Imperil the Right to Asylum.”
23 Stephanie Leutert and Caitlyn Yates, “Asylum Processing at the U.S.-Mexico Border: February 2023,” Strauss
Center for International Security and Law, University of Texas at Austin;
https://www.strausscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Feb_2023_Asylum_Processing.pdf.
22 “Cruelty, Coercion, and Legal Conditions: The Trump Administration’s Unsafe Asylum Cooperative Agreements
with Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador,” January 18, 2021,
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Cruelty,%20Coercion,%20and%20Legal%20Contortions%20--%20
SFRC%20Democratic%20Staff%20Report.pdf.
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technical issues like freezing and glitches, as well as accessibility issues like limited language
availability and the app’s continued failures to properly identify children and people with darker
skin tones, resulting in a particularly harmful impact on Black asylum seekers.27
The CBP One app also has the capability to use geolocation to determine where an individual is
located when accessing the app. If this geolocation prevents individuals from making
appointments until they are within a certain distance from the U.S. border, they will have no
choice but to make the dangerous journey to the United States before they can even begin the
‘lawful’ process.28
All of these restrictions only address when and where individuals are able to file their
applications; they do nothing to ensure there is a safe, legal avenue that would allow them to
bypass the journey to the southern U.S. border, nor does it do anything to create humane and
orderly conditions for them while they wait to apply, nor does it address the logistical limitations
that prevent immigration officials from effectively processing asylum-seekers at ports of entry
today.29 While the policy might falsely allow the administration to claim there is “order” at ports
of entry by keeping large numbers of people beyond U.S. borders, the reality will certainly be
more chaos and human suffering among people who are pursuing their legal right to seek
asylum.
3. The NPRM will expose people seeking protection, including families, to separation,
abuse, and harm
The well-documented brutal and often deadly consequences of metering, as well as other
externalization programs30 (like the Migrant Protection Protocols), make evident the kind of
chaos and harm that replicating those policies would create.31
31 “U.S. Asylum and Border Policies Resulting in Human Rights Violations,” March 1, 2022, Human Rights First,
https://humanrightsfirst.org/library/u-s-asylum-and-border-policies-resulting-in-human-rights-violations. For a
30 For more, see “Pushing Back Protection: How Offshoring and Externalization Imperil the Right to Asylum,”
August 3, 2021, National Immigrant Justice Center and FWD.us, https://www.fwd.us/news/offshoring-asylum.
29 For more, see “What Does a Secure Border Look Like?”, December 27, 2022, the American Immigration Lawyers
Association, https://www.aila.org/advo-media/aila-policy-briefs/policy-brief-what-does-a-secure-border-look-like.
28 According to a CBP fact sheet, the app is currently only accessible for individuals “in Central and Northern
Mexico.” “Fact Sheet: Using CBP One™to Schedule an Appointment,” CBP,
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2023-Jan/CBP%20One%20Fact%20Sheet_English_0.pdf.
27 Melissa Del Bosque,“Facial recognition bias frustrates Black asylum applicants to US, advocates say.”
Administration Announces New Border Crackdown,” February 21, 2023, The New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/21/us/biden-asylum-rules.html; Jack Herrera, “Fleeing for Your Life? There’s An
App for That,” March 2, 2023, Texas Monthly,
https://www.texasmonthly.com/news-politics/cbp-app-asylum-biden-administration; Adam Shaw, “Biden
administration's 'CBP One' app to manage migration plagued by low store ratings, tech issues,” March 2, 2023, Fox
News,
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-administrations-cbp-one-app-to-manage-migration-plagued-low-store-ratin
gs-tech-issues;
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While the NPRM claims the new requirements would “reduc[e] reliance on human smuggling
networks that exploit migrants for financial gain,” the new limitations on access to asylum could
actually benefit smugglers by increasing demand for their services.
Immigration policy experts have long argued that expanding safe and legal immigration avenues
can reduce incentives for individuals to enter the U.S. without authorization, and that the inverse
is also true: restricting legal immigration avenues will almost certainly contribute to more
unauthorized migration.32 In fact, the proposed rule establishes itself on this same presumption,
arguing that providing “lawful, safe, and orderly pathways into the United States” would reduce
incentives to rely on smugglers to enter the U.S. without authorization. But this proposal posits a
harmful deterrence-only approach that merely restricts access to existing lawful pathways, and
which imposes harsh penalties on individuals who do not apply the way the government prefers.
If vulnerable people seeking protection are unable to access the existing legal avenue to apply at
a port of entry—because they did not previously apply for asylum, or they cannot secure an
appointment on the app—they are likely to turn to “coyotes” and smugglers to help them enter
the U.S. in between ports of entry. During the Trump Administration, as their new
deterrence-only policies were rolled out, the share of apprehensions made in between ports of
entry increased.33 On the other hand, as the proposed rule painstakingly details, the creation of
new, additional, expanded pathways for certain populations (e.g. Ukrainians, Venezuelans, etc.)
has led to decreases in the number of individuals from those countries who are encountered in
between ports of entry.
Alarmingly, these restrictive policies could also separate even more families if parents decide to
send their children alone in the hopes of enabling their children to have a better chance of
accessing the asylum process. Even though the NPRM states that DHS does not expect family
separation to occur, journalists and advocates have documented that it has been happening
already,34 and the NPRM offers no explanation why this would not continue or how this would
be alleviated if the process is expanded.
34 Sandra Sanchez, “Parents sending migrant children alone across border into South Texas,” February 16, 2023,
Border Report,
https://www.borderreport.com/immigration/parents-sending-migrant-children-alone-across-border-into-south-texas.
33 FWD.us analysis of CBP data on Southwest Land Border Encounters,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters.
32 See, for example, Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, “Why Border Enforcement Backfired,”
March 2016, AJS, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5049707/pdf/nihms787599.pdf; or David Bier,
“Legal Immigration Will Resolve America’s Real Border Problems,” August 20, 2019, Cato Institute,
https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/legal-immigration-will-resolve-americas-real-border-problems#int
roduction.
specific example, see “A family separated at the border fighting to stay together,” April 14, 2021, FWD.us,
https://www.fwd.us/news/family-separated-mpp.
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Individuals who attempt to navigate the proposed application process would likely be forced to
wait in dangerous conditions in certain regions of Mexico where local challenges are
compounded as they struggle to bear the burden created by U.S. policies. As noted above, there
are currently far fewer appointment spots available at each port of entry than there are people
waiting to enter. For example, local experts estimate that there are more than 10,000 individuals
seeking relief waiting in cities in the Mexican state of Tamaulipas—a state for which the U.S.
State Department has issued a “do not travel” warning, its highest advisory level, due to the risk
of kidnapping and crime35—yet fewer than 400 CBP One appointments are being made available
daily. This means that approximately 25 people are competing for every 1 appointment spot36 in
a region that the U.S. government formally notes has a “greater likelihood of life-threatening
risks,” and advises U.S. citizens to “leave as soon as it is safe to do so.”
Policies that force people to wait in dangerous regions for months or even years for their
opportunity to access protections drive widespread human rights abuses, including violence,
kidnapping, and discrimination, and particularly so against Black, Brown, and Indigenous
people. In a 2022 report, Human Rights First had tracked “1,544 publicly reported cases of
kidnappings, murder, torture, rape and other violent attacks against people returned to Mexico”
during the two years MPP was in use by the Trump Administration.37
Black migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers have faced uniquely and particularly dangerous
and deadly conditions when subjected to dangerous policies like metering, the Migrant
Protection Protocols, and Title 42. According to a shadow report38 to the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination focused on anti-Black discrimination against non-U.S.
citizens, Black asylum seekers trapped in Mexico because of policies just like those described in
the NPRM “faced particular risks [due to their] their race and nationality, and were particularly
targeted for violence, including kidnappings.”
In this NPRM, the administration is proposing forcing thousands of people fleeing extreme
violence and persecution, including children and families, to endure these conditions for months
or even years.
4. Despite the NPRM’s characterization, seeking asylum from within the United States
is lawful
38 “Shadow Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,” August 30, 2022, submitted by
the Black Alliance for Just Immigration, Haitian Bridge Alliance, Human Rights First, the Refugee and Immigrant
Center for Education and Legal Services, and Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights,
https://rfkhr.imgix.net/asset/US-Coalition_anti-Black-Discrimination-in-Immigration__CERD-Report_072222.pdf.
37 “U.S. Asylum and Border Policies Resulting in Human Rights Violations.”
36 “Asylum Processing at the U.S.-Mexico Border.”
35 “Mexico Travel Advisory,” October 5, 2022, U.S. Department of State,
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/traveladvisories/traveladvisories/mexico-travel-advisory.html.
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The title of the NPRM, “Circumvention of Lawful Pathways,” establishes the characterization
that individuals who are subject to the “presumption of ineligibility” have somehow ignored or
attempted to bypass an existing, available lawful pathway for the relief they seek.
Of course, this directly contradicts the fact that applying for asylum, even after entering between
ports of entry, is lawful. U.S. immigration law plainly states that individuals are eligible to apply
for asylum “whether or not at a designated port of arrival” and “irrespective of such
[individual’s] status.”39
The NPRM references the existence of numerous legal pathways, including the parole programs
for Ukrainians, Venezuelans, and the new program for Cubans, Haitians, and Nicaraguans, as
evidence that individuals have legal alternatives to seek relief. But these parole programs are
relatively narrow in scope, and they are not a substitute for a fair and functioning asylum process
open to all people seeking asylum. Only individuals from certain countries who have a sponsor
in the U.S. and who have documentation and approval to travel to the U.S. can qualify, and there
are numerical limits on the number of individuals admitted. Most asylum-seekers are not from
these countries, and they would not meet the other strict eligibility requirements. Additionally,
even for the asylum seekers from countries eligible for the parole pathways, the pathways do not
account for the people who cannot access them for a variety of reasons, and specifically not for
those whose lives are in immediate danger and who are forced to leave their home with a
moment's notice. Surely, the U.S. cannot and should not punish people fleeing war,
environmental disaster, political instability, persecution, and other extreme and life-threatening
violence merely because they didn’t have time to access this process.
The NPRM explains how the parole programs have paired dedicated pathways for those who
qualify with consequences at the border for those who do not avail themselves of the new
pathways. However, the obvious, critical distinction between these parole programs and the
NPRM is that the proposed asylum ban does not establish or provide a safe and orderly
alternative. Instead, the NPRM forces large numbers of people to arrive at the border before they
can even begin to access the limited legal pathway, inevitably restricting access to most people
for long periods of time.
The parole programs are also facing significant legal threats, and could be suspended by court
order or administrative action at any time.40 If that were to happen, it would further undermine
40 The recently announced CHNV parole programs have been challenged by 21 states who argue that the programs
were improperly implemented and go beyond parole authority. See “Texas v. DHS (TX Parole) - District Court,”
Justice Action Center, https://litigationtracker.justiceactioncenter.org/cases/texas-v-dhs-tx-parole-district-court.
Additionally, at the time we drafted our comment, a federal judge in Florida had ruled against the Biden
Administration’s use of parole and alternatives to detention for certain individuals arriving at the southern border.
39 8 USC 1158(a),
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title8-section1158&num=0&edition=prelim.
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the administration’s argument that there exist sufficient legal channels to justify these kinds of
limitations.
One inevitable and particularly shameful consequence of the proposed policy will be that more
individuals who seek asylum without following the new, complicated procedures may end up
barred from entering the U.S. for many years. That’s because individuals who cannot overcome
the “presumption of ineligibility” will have their credible fear claims denied, and they will be
subject to expedited removal. One harmful consequence of expedited removal is that the
individual is prohibited from entering the U.S.—even through legal channels—for at least five
years.41 This is a perverse punishment that will be imposed on vulnerable people whose only
“crime” was not being able to make an appointment on an app.
5. The NPRM contradicts President Biden’s promises and policies on asylum
The administration should abandon this proposal because it contradicts the President’s
long-standing promises to build a more humane and orderly immigration system, as well as the
Administration’s official policies on immigration.
As a candidate, President Biden directly criticized these exact policy approaches—many of
which were pursued by then-President Trump’s Administration—multiple times. For example,
during one presidential debate, President Biden criticized President Trump’s asylum policy,
saying:
This is the first President in the history of the United States of America that anybody
seeking asylum has to do it in another country. That's never happened before. That’s
never happened before in our country. You come to the United States and you make your
case. That’s how you seek asylum, based on the following premise, why I deserve it under
American law. They're sitting in squalor on the other side of the river.42
On his campaign website, President Biden sharply criticized the Trump Administration for
“drastically restrict[ing] access to asylum in the U.S., including imposing additional restrictions
on anyone traveling through Mexico or Guatemala,” and for its metering policy, stating::
Trump’s disastrous policy of “metering” — limiting the number of asylum applications
accepted each day — forces people seeking asylum to wait on the streets in often
42 “Debate transcript: Trump, Biden final presidential debate moderated by Kristen Welker,” October 23, 2020, USA
Today,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/10/23/debate-transcript-trump-biden-final-presidential
-debate-nashville/3740152001.
41 8 USC 1182(a)(9)(A).
Gary Fineout, “Federal judge, siding with Florida, blasts Biden administration on immigration,” March 8, 2023,
Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/03/08/florida-immigration-desantis-moody-biden-00086153.
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dangerous Mexican border towns for weeks before they are permitted to apply. It has
created a horrifying ecosystem of violence and exploitation, with cartels kidnapping,
violently assaulting, and extorting migrants.43
Within his first month in office, President Biden issued an executive order to lay out his
administration’s vision for handling migration and asylum issues at the U.S.’ southern border.44
In the first section, the order describes “a multi-pronged approach toward managing migration
throughout North and Central America that reflects the Nation’s highest values,” which would
include steps to “enhance lawful pathways for migration to this country and [to] restore and
strengthen our own asylum system, which has been badly damaged by policies enacted over the
last 4 years that contravened our values and caused needless human suffering.”
Unfortunately, the Biden Administration’s proposed asylum ban would replicate the exact same
policies that President Biden has previously so forcefully and accurately decried and promised
many times to end.
6. If the Biden Administration insists on pursuing this dangerous policy, it must work
to mitigate harm and expand lawful avenues that would effectively relieve pressure
on our asylum system
Today there are nearly 90 million people forcibly displaced throughout the world, fleeing
persecution and some of the most devastating wars and natural disasters of our time.45 Despite
new commitments and legislation established in the years following World War II, the United
States has been increasingly implementing policies that restrict access to asylum and turn
vulnerable people and families away from safety. Rather than continuing down this current path
of expelling adults and children, and potentially deporting people to life-threatening danger, the
United States should return to and uphold those laws and commitments, and lead other nations in
fiercely protecting these human rights.
For all of the reasons outlined above, the Biden Administration should rescind the NPRM and
lead by example to create a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system that can effectively
deal with forced migration. The implementation of this proposal would be a disastrous misstep,
causing great harm and infringing on human rights—including the U.S. and international right to
45 “Figures at a Glance,” June 16, 2022, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html.
44 “Executive Order on Creating a Comprehensive Regional Framework to Address the Causes of Migration, to
Manage Migration Throughout North and Central America, and to Provide Safe and Orderly Processing of Asylum
Seekers at the United States Border,” February 2, 2021, The White House,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/02/02/executive-order-creating-a-comprehensi
ve-regional-framework-to-address-the-causes-of-migration-to-manage-migration-throughout-north-and-central-amer
ica-and-to-provide-safe-and-orderly-processing/.
43 “The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants,” JoeBiden.com,
https://joebiden.com/immigration.
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seek asylum—with few, if any, benefits. We understand that the administration faces serious
challenges at the southern border, but we also understand there are rights and principles—legal
and moral—that cannot be compromised. The administration has obligations to Americans, to
the international community, and to those seeking relief that it must uphold. This proposal would
force the United States to violate those obligations, repeatedly and materially, and therefore it
should be abandoned.
The U.S. cannot hope to capably implement humane, orderly asylum and migration policy
through the lens of political crisis management. We should prioritize creating an orderly,
humane, and effective system in the U.S. that sets an example for the rest of the world.
Rather than restricting access to the right to seek asylum, the Biden Administration should strive
to deliver on the President’s promises to create a safe, orderly, and humane immigration system
that can effectively deal with the reality that thousands of people will be forced to flee violence
and natural disasters to save their own lives and the lives of their children and families, and that
many of them will inevitably arrive at the U.S.’ southern border to seek relief. In addition to
strengthening asylum processing at our borders, we need to build on, not undermine, successful
safe and legal pathways for people to come to the United States for refuge, such as the parole
pathways. Implementing smart migration policy also means utilizing executive authority, where
appropriate, to increase protections for migrants, to boost capacity for the overburdened asylum
and immigration court systems by ensuring adequate staff and resources, and to establish
additional safe legal pathways so individuals seeking relief have genuine and meaningful
alternatives to entering between ports of entry.
As the administration notes throughout this proposal, no single nation can provide a complete
solution to the migration trends emerging in the Western Hemisphere. But we must recognize,
too, that the United States of America has a unique legacy of welcoming and protecting people
seeking safety, and as such, we have a singularly important role to play in offering a strong
example to other countries. If America shuts its borders to vulnerable people, what should we
expect our neighbors to do? The U.S. must lead in creating pathways and establishing order by
creating real, accessible, legal processes.
If the Biden Administration chooses to ignore the strong public outcry and implement this
disastrous policy, we urge you to at least consider specific concerns submitted by experts,
practitioners, service providers, and a broad swath of the American people during this
comment process, and make significant changes to mitigate the harm of this rule and
ensure that the most vulnerable people seeking relief are not subjected to its harshest
penalties.
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We urge the administration to abandon the requirement that an individual have fully completed
an asylum process in another country to be exempt from the presumption of ineligibility, and
include additional exemptions for individuals who, in light of their circumstances and the
conditions of the countries in which they traveled, were not able to or chose not to seek asylum
in the countries through which they traveled (if, for example, they were not aware of their
options, they were ineligible or unable to apply, they were in a vulnerable or dangerous situation
while traveling through, no permanent humanitarian pathways exist in the country, etc).
We also strongly recommend making additional refinements to the language used to describe
grounds for exceptions and rebuttals to the presumption of ineligibility, to ensure that individuals
seeking asylum and asylum officers enforcing the proposed rule understand clearly exactly who
is subject to this presumption.
For example, the administration should expand and clarify descriptions of “exceptionally
compelling circumstances” and “imminent and extreme threats” that would allow applicants to
rebut the presumption of ineligibility. The current descriptions use vague terms that have varied
corollaries throughout immigration law. The administration should also establish a defined
process to determine if individuals are subject to the presumption, including requiring officers to
proactively ask and document answers to specific questions. The administration should also
provide additional details and examples of situations in which an individual might be exempt, so
applicants can better determine for themselves if they would be subject to the presumption.
The idea of having a functioning appointment system to promote efficient port-of-entry
processing is promising, and we urge the administration to consider ways to expand access to
this system. Primarily, the administration should abandon the geofencing requirement that limits
access to CBP One, and instead follow the model of the existing parole processes, which allow
individuals to schedule appointments and secure travel authorization and assistance before
heading to the border, and to ensure that ways of assigning appointment slots are fair and
protected against manipulation.46
We also urge the administration to explore how current successful programs can be replicated or
expanded, such as expanding the use of private sponsorship models and humanitarian parole
programs like the Ukrainian and CHNV processes to provide avenues for the diverse populations
arriving at the border to seek relief today. This could include establishing new pathways for
employment, particularly in shortage industries where admitting workers for a temporary period
could help close critical employment gaps, and expanding existing pathways for employment
like the H-2A and H-2B programs.
46 Stephania Corpi Arnaud, “Once a ticket scalpers’ tool, auto clickers now help migrants enter the U.S.,” February
23, 2023, Rest of World, https://restofworld.org/2023/auto-clicker-migrants-us-mexico.
17
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Finally, we believe that the application of the presumption of ineligibility should end when the
proposed rule is no longer in effect. The administration proposes applying the new policy to
individuals who are still in the asylum process even after the rule is terminated. As the NPRM
notes, however, the asylum process can take many years. It would be deeply unfair to hold
asylum applicants to this higher standard years after they began their process, or to hold them
accountable for being able to document the very specific and narrow reasons they should have
been exempted from the presumption—or should be found to have rebutted the presumption
based on hardships they were experiencing just prior to the date they crossed the border—many
years prior. Punishing asylum applicants many years into the future does nothing to promote an
orderly process today, and will inevitably compound the challenges and barriers that people
seeking asylum face as they work to establish a normal life in a new country.
In conclusion, FWD.us reiterates its strong opposition to the NPRM, because it is in clear
violation of international treaties and U.S. immigration law; because it would create
greater chaos at the border; because it would further expose vulnerable people and families
to separation, abuse, and extreme harm; and because it contradicts President Biden’s
promises and policies to create a more humane, orderly, and functioning immigration
system. We urge the Biden Administration to abandon this proposed asylum ban; if it will
not, we strongly urge you to consider ways to shield the most vulnerable people from the
proposal’s harshest consequences.
Respectfully submitted,
Todd Schulte
President
On behalf of FWD.us
18
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December 2022
HUMAN RIGHTS
STAIN, PUBLIC
HEALTH FARCE
Evasion of Asylum Law
and Title 42 Abuse Must End—
and Never Be Revived
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Introduction
For nearly two years, the Biden administration has wielded the Trump administration’s Title 42
policy to block people from seeking asylum at official ports of entry, expel to grave dangers
asylum seekers and migrants who cross the border, and evade the due process and refugee
protection provisions of U.S. immigration and asylum law. Though efforts to force continuation
of this cruel and counterproductive policy continue, after a federal district court in Washington
DC vacated it in November for violating U.S. law, it is scheduled to end on December 21, 2022.
The misuse of Title 42 has been a public health, border management and human rights fiasco.
Human Rights First has, as of the date this report was issued, tracked over 13,480 reports of
murder, torture, kidnapping, rape, and other violent attacks on migrants and asylum seekers
blocked in or expelled to Mexico under Title 42 since President Biden took office. It is a
staggering number that will continue to mount every day that Title 42 or similar policies that
evade refugee law are in place.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) attempted to end the Title 42 policy in
May 2022, but in the wake of a court order issued by a federal judge in Louisiana forcing the
policy’s continuation in a case brought by state attorneys general aligned with the former Trump
administration, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continued to use it. In October
2022, in a disturbing step backwards, the Biden administration announced it would expand use
of the policy to expel Venezuelans seeking refuge at the southern U.S. border without allowing
them to apply for asylum, attempting to justify this abrogation of asylum law by pairing it with a
limited parole program available to some Venezuelans. Since then, DHS has expelled thousands
of Venezuelans to dangerous conditions in Mexico where they are also at risk of refoulement, i.e.
illegal return, to persecution in Venezuela. In response to the October parole announcement, the
U.N. Refugee Agency (UNHCR), IOM and UNICEF immediately warned that such efforts “cannot
come at the expense of the fundamental human right to seek asylum.”
The targeted, expanded use of Title 42 against Venezuelans again confirms that this policy has no
basis in public health. As medical and public health experts have repeatedly affirmed and
recently-revealed Congressional testimony of a top CDC scientist confirms, the Title 42 policy has
no scientific basis. It was adopted at the behest of Stephen Miller and other Trump
administration officials as yet another discriminatory effort to restrict immigration and block
asylum. As leading epidemiologists and public health experts warned President Biden in
November, the continued and expanded use of Title 42 is “a travesty” that manipulates, misuses
and undermines trust in public health, and “feeds and propagates racially-based tropes that
falsely paint migrants as vectors of disease, fostering stigma and heightening the vulnerability of
already marginalized groups in a manner that is antithetical to the tenets of good public health
practice.”
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Some members of Congress have attempted to force continuation of Title 42 or a similar
suspension of asylum at the border – a codification of failed Trump policy that would eviscerate
U.S. refugee law and subvert international refugee law globally. At the same time, the Biden
administration is considering replacing Title 42 with other inhumane Trump policies or versions
of them, including an asylum transit ban – an illegal policy that, when in effect, turned refugees
away to danger and deprived other refugees of a path to family reunification, stability and
citizenship, as Human Rights First detailed in a 2020 report.
Senior Biden administration officials are reportedly planning to impose other harsh policies as
Title 42 ends, as well as use the notorious migrant detention center at Guantánamo Bay or other
third country detention facilities to hold Haitians interdicted at sea. The United States recently
returned 180 men, women and children – who had attempted to reach safety in the United
States by boat – to Haiti despite multiple U.N. authorities’ calls for states to halt returns to Haiti
given the life-threatening conditions there.
A ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that took effect in May 2022 prohibits
DHS from using Title 42 to return asylum-seeking families “to places where they will be
persecuted or tortured.” As the policy’s scheduled end date approaches, DHS retains clear
authority, consistent with the various court rulings, to except individuals from Title 42. It also
remains obligated under U.S. refugee law and binding treaty commitments, and a November D.C.
Circuit Court decision, not to return anyone—family, adult, or child—to persecution or torture,
consistent with the legal rationale of the D.C. Circuit Court. In his November ruling concluding
that the Title 42 policy violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the D.C. District Court judge
who vacated the Title 42 policy cited Human Rights First’s prior research documenting violent
attacks against people impacted by the policy and emphasized the “harms Plaintiffs face if
summarily expelled to countries [where] they may be persecuted or tortured” as well as the
earlier finding by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that “the record is replete with
stomach-churning evidence of death, torture, and rape.” The Trump-aligned state attorneys
general who initiated the Louisiana litigation are now seeking to intervene in the separate case
before the D.C. District Court and also seeking to stay that court's November ruling requiring the
Title 42 policy to end on December 21. Their stay request is now pending before the D.C. Circuit
Court after the District Court denied it.
It is far past time to end this illegal, inhumane, and ineffective policy and all attempts to force its
continuation. After nearly two years in office, the Biden administration should institute a more
effective and humanitarian response to the reception, identification, and processing of refugees
seeking protection in the United States – a response that upholds U.S. refugee and immigration
laws, as Human Rights First has outlined in its recommendation papers. The Biden administration
should not replace one failed and illegal Trump policy with another by embracing, supporting or
employing the ineffective, inhumane, xenophobic and racist immigration policies of the prior
administration.
This report is based on in-person interviews Human Rights First conducted with asylum seekers
in Tijuana in September 2022 and Ciudad Juárez in December 2022; and interviews by telephone
and in-person with attorneys, other humanitarian workers, and additional asylum seekers in
Mexico conducted from October to December 2022; reports of attacks drawn from an ongoing
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survey of asylum seekers in Mexico conducted by Al Otro Lado between mid-June and early
November 2022; open-source information identified by students from the University of California
Network for Human Rights and Digital Fact Finding (Berkeley, Santa Cruz, Los Angeles); review of
U.S. government data; and media and other human rights reporting.
Human Rights First published prior research on the Title 42 policy in June 2022, April 2022 (with
Al Otro Lado and Haitian Bridge Alliance), March 2022, February 2022, January 2022, December
2021, November 2021 (with Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project), October 2021,
August 2021, July 2021 (with Hope Border Institute), June 2021, May 2021 (with RAICES and
Interfaith Welcome Coalition), April 2021 (with Al Otro Lado and Haitian Bridge Alliance),
December 2020, and May 2020.
Key Findings
x The use of the Trump-initiated Title 42 policy over the nearly two years since President Biden
took office, its forced continuation through court order, and its recent expansion by the
administration have inflicted terrible human rights abuses. Human Rights First has tracked
13,480 reports of murder, kidnapping, rape, torture, and other violent attacks against people
blocked in or expelled to Mexico due to Title 42 since January 2021. These numbers are likely
just the tip of the iceberg as many victims have not spoken with investigators, journalists, or
attorneys. Some recent examples include: Mexican officers kidnapped a Guatemalan family
with two young children after DHS expelled them to Nuevo Laredo, and turned them over to a
cartel that held them hostage for three months and tortured them; a Honduran asylum seeker
and her four-year-old daughter were kidnapped, the daughter beaten and the mother raped in
front of her daughter as they waited in Tijuana due to Title 42; a 13-year-old girl was nearly
abducted at gunpoint in Juárez after her family fled political persecution in Venezuela but was
expelled under Title 42; and a Guatemalan lesbian trans woman was raped by Mexican police
in Piedras Negras after CBP turned her away from protection at the Eagle Pass port of entry.
Black and Indigenous asylum seekers continue to be targets of bias-motivated violence and
discrimination while stranded in Mexico.
x The Biden administration’s expansion of Title 42 to Venezuelans in October 2022 has denied
thousands access to the U.S. asylum process in flagrant violation of U.S. refugee law. The
expansion has stranded adults, families, and children in dangerous Mexican border cities
where they are targets of kidnapping, torture, and brutal attacks. It has subjected others to
onward refoulement to persecution and torture. It has also separated many families. In some
cases, this expansion has resulted in the separation of married couples and the delivery of
mothers, wives, teenage daughters, and other family members to grave dangers in Mexico.
CBP has subjected many Venezuelans to “lateral expulsions,” transporting them to areas far
from where they entered the United States and to locations where they have no knowledge of
the specific dangers or local refugee shelters. In many cases, asylum seekers appear to have
been transported to cities that lack shelter capacity.
x Mexican asylum seekers fleeing persecution and torture have been trapped in or expelled by
CBP to the very country they are trying to flee without access to the U.S. asylum process in
violation of U.S. law and non-refoulement legal obligations. They include: a woman who was
decapitated by the cartel that had threatened her after DHS, citing Title 42, would not let her
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seek asylum; a lesbian women who had suffered multiple attacks, rape, and threats due to her
sexual orientation and was refused the right to seek asylum at the San Ysidro port of entry; a
gay man who had suffered beatings, sexual assaults, and an attempted kidnapping due to his
sexual orientation and was turned away from asylum at the El Paso port of entry; and an
Indigenous woman who had been attacked by police, threatened, and her family members
murdered for her activism defending her Indigenous community was turned away from
seeking asylum with her three children at the San Ysidro port of entry in September 2022 and
subsequently suffered sexual abuse by Mexican police.
x Faith-based, humanitarian, and legal workers assisting asylum seekers stranded in Mexico by
the Title 42 policy face acute and mounting threats and attacks from violent cartels that
exercise widespread control over territory in Mexico. Recent threats and attacks include the
June 2022 kidnapping and November 2022 threats against a Baptist pastor in Nuevo Laredo,
the armed raiding of a shelter in Ciudad Juarez in late November 2022, the forced closure of a
Nuevo Laredo shelter after threats demanding that the shelter pay a “protection fee,” and the
robbery at gunpoint of a staff member of a legal organization in a Tijuana plaza near the San
Ysidro port of entry while the staff member accompanied asylum seekers instructed by CBP to
appear at 6 a.m. to be processed for a Title 42 exemption.
x CBP and Border Patrol officers continue to use Title 42 to expel migrants and asylum seekers
in ways that make them even more vulnerable to harm in Mexico and undermine their
ability to seek asylum in the United States – including by sometimes expelling asylum seekers
in the middle of the night, depriving them of necessary medical care, or taking their passports
or other identity documents, religious items, medical items, or other documents necessary for
their asylum cases. Many were expelled to deplorable conditions without secure housing,
leaving some sleeping on the streets. Mexican authorities transported some expelled
Venezuelans to other parts of Mexico, abandoning them in cities where migrant shelters are
full beyond capacity.
x The Title 42 policy has continued to inflict disorder at the border, triggering multiple border
crossings, artificially inflating CBP border statistics, pushing dangerous crossings away from
ports of entry, and facilitating exploitation. With Title 42 spurring dangerous attempts to cross
into the United States outside of ports of entry, at least 853 asylum seekers and migrants have
died in border crossings in FY 2022, making it the deadliest year since the U.S. government
began record keeping on border crossing deaths in 1998.
Recommendations
x
Congress: Reject any efforts to codify or legislatively extend the Title 42 policy or similar
policies that suspend refugee law or improperly block refugees from seeking asylum, direct
sufficient appropriations for asylum adjudications and to community-based, non-profit
organizations providing temporary housing, transportation, and other assistance to people
seeking refuge at the border, and continue to conduct oversight of the disorder and human
rights abuses caused by the Title 42 policy and any similar policies that deny access to asylum.
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x
Biden Administration: Take all steps to ensure a final end to the Title 42 policy, restore
compliance with U.S. refugee law and treaties, continue to request appropriations to conduct
timely asylum adjudications and address backlogs, oppose any efforts to force continuation or
resurrection of the Title 42 policy or similar policies, and reject any proposals to replace Title 42
with other policies that block, ban or prevent refugees from seeking asylum in the United
States and/or turn them away to danger. Never again use an actual or purported pathway to
the U.S. as an excuse to evade refugee law or abrogate the right to seek asylum.
x
Department of Homeland Security: As Title 42 ends, uphold U.S. refugee law at U.S. ports of
entry and along the border, ramp up asylum adjudication capacity and end attempts to replace
it with other illegal and inhumane Trump-era policies, and during the time Title 42 is still in
place, take all legally available actions to restore asylum access at and between ports of entry
and mitigate the harms of Title 42, including through the use of exceptions to Title 42 and by
affirmatively screening individuals subjected to Title 42 for fear of return to persecution and
torture, as U.S. law and international treaty obligations require.
x
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention: Publicly identify steps to ensure public health
authority is never again misused to evade refugee law and endanger the lives and safety of
people seeking protection, and if the Title 42 policy should be prolonged yet again, take any
additional steps necessary to help ensure its firm and final termination.
x The Government of Mexico: End cooperation with U.S. policies that violate international law
and/or result in human rights violations, and take steps to end Mexican police and other
officers’ perpetration of and complicity or acquiescence in attacks, extortions, kidnappings,
rape and other harms inflicted on migrants and asylum seekers.
Title 42 expansion returns Venezuelans fleeing persecution and humanitarian catastrophe to danger, deplorable conditions
On October 12, 2022, the Biden administration announced it would expand the use of Title 42 to
expel Venezuelans to Mexico, through a "New Migration Enforcement Process,” pairing the
expansion with a new limited humanitarian parole program that would enable some Venezuelans
to enter the United States. The parole program’s requirements actually preclude many refugees
from accessing it, including due to its identification, sponsorship, and airline ticket purchase
requirements, as well as its numerical limitations. The Hope Border Institute, which interviewed
expelled asylum seekers in October, concluded that the program “left no path for relief for the
people in the most vulnerable situations” and left thousands of Venezuelans in Mexico “in a cruel
state of limbo.”
While UNHCR and other U.N. agencies welcomed efforts to provide safe pathways for displaced
persons, they warned that such pathways “cannot come at the expense of the fundamental
human right to seek asylum.” In their statement, these U.N. authorities specifically reminded the
United States that: "Access to safe territory for asylum seekers is a cornerstone of the 1951
Refugee Convention and of international refugee law. We remain concerned by asylum
restrictions that are inconsistent with international law standards, including those imposed
through Title 42 public health action, and reiterate the call for their urgent termination.” Days
after the Biden administration’s decision to expand Title 42 to expel Venezuelans seeking U.S.
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asylum, CBP again acknowledged in an October 21, 2022 statement that recent arrivals at the
southern border included “an increased number of asylum seekers fleeing [the] authoritarian
regime[] in Venezuela.”
Venezuelans expelled to or blocked in Mexico due to Title 42’s expanded use are now stranded in
highly dangerous Mexican border cities as well as other locations in Mexico that lack capacity to
safely accommodate them. Many are also at risk of onward refoulement – illegal return - to
persecution and torture, with some Venezuelans pushed across the border into Guatemala and
others flown directly back to Venezuela by Mexican authorities. Title 42 expulsions of
Venezuelans by DHS are also separating families at the border.
The expanded use of Title 42 has already resulted in thousands of Venezuelans expelled to
Mexico without access to the U.S. asylum process. Between October 12 and mid-November
2022, more than 8,000 Venezuelans were expelled by DHS to Mexico. As of November 7, more
than 2,100 Venezuelans had been expelled to Ciudad Juárez alone since the policy was expanded
less than a month prior. Human Rights First researchers interviewed multiple sources who
indicated that around December 1, 2022, DHS in the El Paso region began conducting lateral
expulsions of Venezuelans to Matamoros and other cities and appeared to have halted direct
expulsions to Ciudad Juárez.
As it has wielded Title 42 to expel Venezuelans to Mexico, CBP has separated some families at
the border and turned away mothers, daughters, wives, partners, and other family members to
danger in Mexico. For example:
x In October 2022, DHS released Miguel Peñaranda, a Venezuelan man, and his 18-year-old
stepson into the United States but expelled to Mexico Peñaranda’s wife, Heyllyn Yepez, and
his 18-year-old stepdaughter. The family members, who had entered the United States in El
Paso, were separated and flown to other parts of the border within Texas: Peñaranda and his
stepson were flown to Brownsville, where they were released, while Yepez and her daughter
were flown to Laredo, where they were expelled at the border and then bused to Acapulco,
Mexico. Yepez told The New York Times, “I never, ever could have imagined this
happening…How can they do this to families? It’s so inhuman.”
x DHS separated a Venezuelan family of four in October 2022, releasing the father and son into
the United States to pursue their asylum claims while expelling the mother and daughter to
Mexico under Title 42, according to a migrant shelter director in Austin, Texas.
x A young Venezuelan woman was separated from her mother at the border in October 2022,
and while she was processed into the United States, her mother was expelled to Mexico,
according to a migrant shelter director in Austin, Texas.
x DHS has separated numerous Venezuelan married couples since October 2022. A woman
who was returned to Ciudad Juárez without her husband in October 2022 told Reuters, "I am
alone in a country where I have no one to help me. He was my only companion, my only help,
my only support.”
x In October 2022, DHS expelled a mother to Mexico while her 20-year-old son was permitted
to seek asylum in the United States.
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