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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
CENTRAL DIVISION
*
THE ARC OF IOWA; CHARMAINE
*
ALEXANDER, Individually and on Behalf of *
C.B.; JOHNATHAN CRAIG, Individually and *
on Behalf of E.C. and J.C.; MICHELLE
*
4:21-cv-00264
CROFT, Individually and on Behalf of J.J.B.;
*
AMANDA DEVEREAUX, Individually and on *
Behalf of P.D.; CARISSA FROYUM ROISE, *
Individually and on Behalf of H.J.F.R.; LIDIJA *
GEEST, Individually and on Behalf of K.G.;
*
MELISSA HADDEN, Individually and on
*
Behalf of V.M.H.; HEATHER LYNN
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PRESTON, Individually and on Behalf of M.P. *
and S.P.; LISA HARDISTY
*
SITHONNORATH, Individually and on Behalf *
of A.S.; REBEKAH STEWART, Individually *
on Behalf of E.M.S.; ERIN VERCANDE,
*
Individually and on Behalf of S.V.;
*
*
Plaintiffs,
*
*
v.
*
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KIM REYNOLDS, In her Official Capacity as *
Governor of Iowa; ANN LEBO, In her Official *
Capacity as Director of the Iowa Department
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of Education; ANKENY COMMUNITY
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SCHOOL DISTRICT; COUNCIL BLUFFS
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COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
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DAVENPORT COMMUNITY SCHOOL
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DISTRICT; DECORAH COMMUNITY
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SCHOOL DISTRICT; DENVER
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COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; DES
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MOINES PUBLIC SCHOOLS; IOWA CITY
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ORDER GRANTING IN PART
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
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AND DENYING IN PART
JOHNSTON COMMUNITY SCHOOL
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DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO
DISTRICT; LINN MAR COMMUNITY
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DISMISS AND GRANTING
SCHOOL DISTRICT; WATERLOO
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PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
*
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
*
Defendants.
*
*
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Before the Court is Defendants Governor Kim Reynolds and Director of the Iowa
Department of Education Ann Lebo’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 86; Defendants Ankeny
Community School District, Davenport Community School District, Decorah Community
School District, Denver Community School District, Des Moines Public Schools, Johnston
Community School District, Linn Mar Community School District, Waterloo Community School
District’s, Council Bluffs Community School District’s, and Iowa City Community School
District’s respective Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 96, 97, 98; and Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, ECF No. 88. The parties filed responses and replies to the respective
Motions.1 ECF Nos. 99, 100, 101, 104, 105, 106. The Court heard oral argument on the
Motions on September 28, 2022. See ECF No. 113. The matter is fully submitted.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of this case have been exhaustively recounted by this Court as well as the court
of appeals. In early spring 2020, schools across Iowa and the country transitioned to remote
learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. When schools eventually resumed in-person learning,
many adopted masking policies requiring staff, students, and visitors to wear face masks. On
May 20, 2021, Governor Reynolds signed into law an act banning local school districts from
imposing mask mandates on school property unless otherwise required by law. Act of May 20,
2021 (H.F. 847), ch. 139, 2021 Iowa Act § 28 (codified at Iowa Code § 280.31). Specifically,
the law provides:
The board of directors of a school district, the superintendent or chief
administering officer of a school or school district, and the authorities in charge of
each accredited nonpublic school shall not adopt, enforce, or implement a policy
that requires its employees, students, or members of the public to wear a facial
covering for any purpose while on the school district’s or accredited nonpublic
school’s property unless the facial covering is necessary for a specific
1 None of the Defendant school districts responded to Plaintiffs’ summary-judgment motion.
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extracurricular or instructional purpose, or is required by section 280.10 or 280.11
or any other provision of law.
Iowa Code § 280.31. As a result, Iowa schools with masking policies dropped them.
That fall, Plaintiffs filed this action on behalf of disabled or immunocompromised
children in Iowa alleging Iowa’s mask mandate ban violates their civil rights under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132; section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 794(a); and the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (ARPA), Pub.
L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (2021). On September 13, 2021, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Defendants from enforcing Iowa Code section 281.30 in
Iowa public schools. ECF No. 32. Two weeks later, the Court granted a fourteen-day extension
of the TRO. ECF No. 49. Then, on October 8, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction after concluding Plaintiffs have standing to bring the case, Plaintiffs had
demonstrated a need for preliminary injunctive relief, Plaintiffs have properly brought their
claims under Title II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and there was no
reason for them to administratively exhaust their claims under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. ECF No. 60. The Court further concluded
Plaintiffs had demonstrated irreparable harm; Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of
their ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims; and it was in the public’s interest to allow local public
school districts to exercise their discretion to adopt masking policies in an effort to inhibit the
spread of COVID-19 and protect the children in their schools. Id.
Defendants Reynolds and Lebo filed an interlocutory appeal and successfully asked the
appellate court for an expedited briefing schedule and oral argument. Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds,
No. 21-3268 (8th Cir. Oct. 15, 2021) (order granting motion for expedited appeal). Following
oral argument, the Eighth Circuit entered a decision “hold[ing] that Plaintiffs are entitled to a
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preliminary injunction because mask requirements are reasonable accommodations required by
federal disability law to protect the rights of Plaintiffs’ children.” Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds (Arc
of Iowa I), 24 F.4th 1162, 1167–68 (8th Cir. 2022), vacated, 33 F.4th 1042 (2022). Specifically,
two members of the three-person panel concluded Plaintiffs have standing to sue because
(1) they have “demonstrated an adequate injury in fact,” id. at 1169, (2) their children’s “injuries
are fairly traceable to [s]ection 280.31,” id. at 1171, and (3) their children’s “injuries are likely to
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision,” id. at 1172. Next, the majority held the
exhaustion requirement of the IDEA did not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims “[b]ecause the gravamen
of Plaintiffs’ complaint does not seek relief from a denial of a [free appropriate public
education].” Id. at 1177. Finally, with respect to whether Plaintiffs were entitled to a
preliminary injunction, the majority held “Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits because
mask requirements constitute a reasonable modification and schools’ failure to provide this
accommodation likely violates the [Rehabilitation Act],” id., Plaintiffs had demonstrated an
irreparable harm, id. at 1180, the balance-of-the-equities factor weighs in Plaintiffs’ favor, id.,
and “the public interest[] also favors Plaintiffs,” id. at 1181.
Nevertheless, the panel concluded that, because “the injunction imposed by the district
court sweeps more broadly than necessary to remedy Plaintiffs’ injuries,” the preliminary
injunction should be “vacate[d], in part, and remand[ed] to allow the district court to enter a
tailored injunction that prohibits Defendants from preventing or delaying reasonable
accommodations and ensures that Plaintiffs’ schools may provide such reasonable
accommodations.” Id. at 1168. In other words, because “Plaintiffs are not harmed by the
absence of mask requirements at schools their children do not attend,” the preliminary injunction
needed to be narrowed to only those school districts that Plaintiffs’ children attend to remedy
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their injuries. Id. at 1181. Before the court issued its mandate, however, Defendants Reynolds
and Lebo’s petition for rehearing by the panel was granted. Arc of Iowa, No. 21-3268 (8th Cir.
Mar. 28, 2022).
On May 16, 2022, the panel filed a per curiam, yet not unanimous, decision vacating the
preliminary injunction as moot. Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds (Arc of Iowa II), 33 F.4th 1042, 1044
(8th Cir. 2022). In a nutshell, two members of the panel concluded, “[t]he issues surrounding the
preliminary injunction are moot because the current conditions [of the COVID-19 pandemic]
differ vastly from those prevailing when the district court addressed it.” Id. They noted that
vaccines are now available for school-aged children, “greatly decreasing Plaintiffs’ children’s
risk of serious bodily injury or death,” and that there were “markedly lower transmission rates
and case loads throughout Iowa and the country.” Id. The panel took “no position on the merits
of Plaintiffs’ claims, which [it said] are left for future decision.” Id. at 1045. However, it
emphasized that this Court and the parties “should pay particular attention to [s]ection 280.31’s
exception for ‘any other provision of law’” on remand. Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 280.31). That
is, “[if] another state or federal law requires masks, [s]ection 280.31 does not conflict with that
law—and thus should not be completely enjoined.” Id. Judge Kelly’s dissent centered on the
lack of “evidence in the record about Plaintiffs’ children’s current risk” in disagreeing with the
majority’s decision to sua sponte vacate this Court’s preliminary injunction for mootness. Id. at
1046 (Kelly, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge also wrote that based on the record before the
court at that time, “Plaintiffs are entitled to a preliminary injunction that prohibits Defendants
from preventing or delaying reasonable accommodations under the ADA and [the Rehabilitation
Act] and ensures that Plaintiffs’ schools could enforce mask requirements as reasonable
accommodations if needed.” Id. at 1047. Judge Kelly made a final parting point:
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Irrespective of the outcome of this litigation, parents of children with disabilities
may still seek accommodations to ensure their children may safely access their
schools as the COVID-19 pandemic wears on. Section 280.31 explicitly includes
an exception when “any other provision of law” requires face coverings. Schools
are equipped to determine on an individualized, case-by-case basis—just as schools
do for any other type of reasonable accommodation request—whether a mask
requirement for certain people or places in the school building is a reasonable
accommodation under the ADA and [the Rehabilitation Act]. This is what federal
law requires, and what [s]ection 280.31—and Defendants who are charged with
enforcing it—must allow.
Id. at 1050.
Defendants now move to dismiss this action, and Plaintiffs have filed a motion for
summary judgment on their claims for declaratory relief.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a court must
first “distinguish between a ‘facial attack’ and a ‘factual attack.’” Branson Label, Inc. v. City of
Branson, Mo., 793 F.3d 910, 914 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724,
729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)). Defendants Reynolds and Lebo appear to assume the truth of Plaintiffs’
factual allegations, thus, the Court will regard the challenges as facial attacks. “In a facial attack,
‘the court merely [needs] to look and see if plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject
matter jurisdiction.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp.,
613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980)). Therefore, “the court restricts itself to the face of the
pleadings and the non-moving party receives the same protections as it would defending against
a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6).” Osborn, 918 F.2d at 729 n.6 (citations omitted). “The
burden of establishing that a cause of action lies within the limited jurisdiction of the federal
courts is on the party asserting jurisdiction . . . .” Ark. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Little Rock
Cardiology Clinic, P.A., 551 F.3d 812, 816 (8th Cir. 2009).
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“Under [Rule] 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and
viewed most favorably to the plaintiff.” Hager v. Ark. Dep’t of Health, 735 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th
Cir. 2013). In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “Determining whether a claim is plausible is a ‘context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’” Hamilton v. Palm, 621
F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679).
Rule 56(a) provides, “A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim
or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is proper when the record, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences,
shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is therefore entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See id.; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Defendants Reynolds and Lebo’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendants Reynolds and Lebo continue to argue Plaintiffs do not have standing to
challenge Iowa Code section 280.31 because Plaintiffs have not suffered injuries and their
requested declaratory relief will not redress their alleged injuries. They further argue Plaintiffs’
claims are moot because of changed circumstances, including a lower risk of contracting
COVID-19 at school and a lower risk of severe illness or death if infected. Defendants also
argue Plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed because they have not exhausted their administrative
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remedies. Next, Defendants argue federal law does not require that masks be worn in schools or
that school districts have discretion to make masking decisions at the local level. They contend
section 280.31 is a neutral, nondiscriminatory statute that does not target disabled children. They
further contend universal mask mandates are not a reasonable modification but rather an undue
burden that fundamentally alters the nature of Iowa’s education program and infringes on the
rights of others. Finally, Defendants argue Plaintiffs’ have abandoned their claim based on the
ARPA and their claims for injunctive relief.
1. Standing
Defendants Reynolds and Lebo continue to argue Plaintiffs do not have standing because
(1) Plaintiffs are not injured by section 280.31 because it permits schools to require masks when
required by federal law and (2) the requested relief does not redress Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries.
Plaintiffs admit there are some marked changes that have occurred in the COVID-19
landscape since this litigation began over a year ago but contend they continue to have standing
because their children still face elevated risks of death or serious illness from COVID-19 and
barriers to critical educational opportunities.
In both its prior Orders, this Court determined Plaintiffs have standing. ECF Nos. 32 at
17, 60 at 11. The Eighth Circuit initially agreed, Arc of Iowa I, 24 F.4th at 1173, before later
vacating the preliminary injunction as moot, Arc of Iowa II, 33 F.4th at 1045. It has been more
than a year since this action commenced, and although circumstances have undoubtedly changed
in that time, standing is determined at the time an action commences. Friends of the Earth, Inc.
v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170 (2000). Thus, Plaintiffs continue to have
standing to bring this action regardless of how much change has occurred. However, even if
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standing was like mootness in that it depended on the state of the record at the time of review,
Plaintiffs would still have standing to bring suit for the reasons expressed below.
Plaintiffs have submitted Declarations from the medical doctors for three of Plaintiffs’
children that detail these children’s continued severe risks and continued need for their schools to
require masks for those around and interacting with these children. Without masking
requirements at these children’s schools, the children are forced to choose between their safety
and their education. One six-year-old child, E.C., has several serious diagnoses that put her “at
high risk for severe complications if she were to become infected with COVID-19, even though
E.C. has been fully vaccinated and boosted.” ECF No. 95-1 at 2 ¶ 5. It is difficult for E.C.
herself to wear a mask because of her intellectual challenges. Id. at 2 ¶ 6. For these reasons,
E.C. participates in “home-bound schooling” instead of in-person schooling because it is the
safest option. Id. at 2 ¶ 7. However, E.C. does not receive the same level of special education
services as a home-bound student that she would receive if she attended school in person. Id. at
2 ¶ 8. Thus, it is essential that E.C. be able to return to in-person learning safely, which may
include masking by E.C.’s teachers, aides, and other students in the classroom who are able to
wear masks. Id. at 3 ¶¶ 10, 12. Another child, M.P., has several medical complications resulting
from his rare condition including that his heart, lungs, and liver are under chronic stress. Id. at
7–8 ¶¶ 4–7. He is also at increased risk of blood clots that put him at high risk for severe
complications from COVID-19 despite being fully vaccinated and previously having had the
disease. Id. at 8–9 ¶¶ 7, 8, 13. For M.P. to safely attend in-person learning, M.P.’s doctor
recommends that all other students and staff around M.P. wear a mask to protect him. Id. at 8
¶ 11. A third child, H.J.F.R., has multiple serious medical diagnoses, one of which puts him at a
higher risk of requiring additional ventilatory support if he becomes infected with the virus that
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causes COVID-19. Id. at 14. H.J.F.R.’s doctor recommends that all people should wear masks
when indoors to reduce H.J.F.R.’s risk of exposure when county transmission is high. Id. This
evidence is sufficient to conclude Plaintiffs have demonstrated a concrete and particularized
injury in fact if schools are not permitted to require masks under certain circumstances. See Kai
v. Ross, 336 F.3d 650, 656 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting “the danger to plaintiffs’ health, and perhaps
even their lives, gives them a strong argument of irreparable injury”); Liddell v. Special Admin.
Bd. of Transitional Sch. Dist. of City of St. Louis, 894 F.3d 959, 965–66 (8th Cir. 2018)
(concluding the plaintiffs had alleged an “injury to their children’s educational interests and
opportunities” sufficient for Article III standing).
Next, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are fairly traceable to the enactment
and enforcement of Iowa Code section 280.31. Indeed, without section 280.31, there would be
no question that schools could require masks to be worn and these students be protected.2
Plaintiffs have therefore shown traceability because their children’s injuries are caused by “the
predictable effect of Government action on the decisions of third parties.” Dep’t of Com. v. New
York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2566 (2019).
Defendants Reynolds and Lebo instead contend that the declaratory relief sought by
Plaintiffs will not redress their alleged injuries and will not require Plaintiffs’ schools to impose
universal mask mandates. It is true that what Plaintiffs seek is a return of discretion to the local
schools to determine what requirements are necessary to protect the health and safety of their
students, staff, and visitors to the school. As shown in this case, many schools across Iowa had
mask requirements prior to the enactment of section 280.31 but dropped them once the statute
2 In fact, Defendants Reynolds and Lebo write in their Motion to Dismiss that “Plaintiffs’
. . . alleged denial of education . . . [i]f it’s caused at all, [it is caused by section 280.31].” ECF
No. 90 at 19.
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became effective. And after the Court ordered the preliminary injunction, several schools once
again imposed some form of mask requirements. These facts demonstrate that redressability is
not too “speculative,” but rather, “likely.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).
Indeed, it is likely that granting the relief requested by Plaintiffs will lead their schools to require
masks of those working with or nearby Plaintiffs’ children to comply with federal disability law
and accommodate the children’s disabilities.
Because at least one of Plaintiffs’ children remains at high risk for severe illness and
faces a loss of educational opportunities by having to participate in home-bound schooling as
compared to in-person learning, see Dep’t of Com., 139 S. Ct. at 2565 (“For a legal dispute to
qualify as a genuine case or controversy, at least one plaintiff must have standing to sue.”),
Plaintiffs have clearly shown a concrete and particularized injury in fact sufficient for standing,
that is fairly traceable to Defendants’ enforcement of section 280.31, and that Plaintiffs’
requested relief will likely redress their alleged injuries.
2. Mootness
Defendants Reynolds and Lebo next argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are moot because the
circumstances of the pandemic have changed such that children now have a lower risk of
contracting COVID-19 at school and have a lower risk of death or serious illness if the virus is
contracted. They rely on the Eighth Circuit’s Opinion from May 2022, which held that the
preliminary injunction in this case was prudentially moot due to the availability of children’s
COVID-19 vaccines and lower transmission rates. Defendants insist the Circuit’s Opinion is
binding on this Court as the law of the case. Arc of Iowa II, 33 F.4th at 1045 (vacating the
preliminary injunction as moot).
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“The doctrine of mootness, which is embedded in Article III’s case or controversy
requirement, requires that an actual, ongoing controversy exist at all stages of federal court
proceedings.” Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 F.3d 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted). “[P]rudential mootness, ‘[t]he cousin of the mootness doctrine, in its strict Article III
sense, is a melange of doctrines relating to the court’s discretion in matters of remedy and
judicial administration.” Ali v. Cangemi, 419 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted). “Even if a court has jurisdiction under Article III to
decide a case, prudential concerns may militate against the use of judicial power, i.e., the court
‘should treat [the case] as moot for prudential reasons.’” Id. (alteration in original) (citation
omitted); see also Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps. Eng’rs, 277 F. App’x 170, 172 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“Under the prudential mootness doctrine, . . . [a court] may decline to exercise [its] discretion to
grant declaratory and injunctive relief if the controversy is ‘so attenuated that considerations of
prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand,
and to withhold relief it has the power to grant.” (citation omitted)). Defendants “bear[] the
burden of establishing that changed circumstances warrant relief.” Ahmad v. City of St. Louis,
995 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiffs correctly assert their claims for declaratory relief have not been adjudicated and
therefore are not foreclosed by the Eighth Circuit’s decision from May. Indeed, the appellate
panel explicitly wrote that it “[took] no position on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims, which are left
for future decision.” Arc of Iowa II, 33 F.4th at 1045. In other words, the Circuit recognized that
Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief remained and were not mooted by its decision to vacate
the preliminary injunction. “It is important to remember that, as with other justiciability
doctrines, mootness should not be confused with the merits. An argument that an action is moot
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because the plaintiff is not entitled to the requested relief, for example, is no more than an
argument on the merits that should be decided on the merits.” 13B Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3533.1 (3d ed. Apr. 2022 update).
Additionally, even though circumstances have changed since this case was filed, Plaintiffs have
shown that at least some of their children are still at high risk for severe illness if they contract
COVID-19, despite being vaccinated. And for these high-risk children, having others around
them at school wear masks is essential for their protection. “The central question in a prudential
mootness analysis is ‘whether changes in circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of the
litigation have forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.’” Sierra Club, 277 F. App’x at
172–73 (quoting Int’l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Kelly, 815 F.2d 912, 915 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Defendants Reynolds and Lebo have not retracted their statements that they will enforce section
280.31 against school districts and administrators, instead they continue to contend that federal
disability law does not require mask mandates and that mask mandates are not a reasonable
modification. Thus, Plaintiffs have demonstrated meaningful declaratory relief can still be
granted, and Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving that Plaintiffs’ claims for
declaratory relief are moot.
3. Exhaustion
Defendants once again argue that Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust their administrative
remedies under the IDEA. And once again, the Court concludes the “gravamen” of Plaintiffs’
Complaint does not seek redress for Defendant Schools’ failures to provide Plaintiffs’ children
with a free and appropriate public education. See Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 580 U.S. 154,
___, 137 S. Ct. 743, 749 (2017). Rather, Plaintiffs challenge their children’s schools’ failure to
require any masks, forcing the families to choose between their children attending school in
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person at risk to their health or attend remotely or even not at all. Plaintiffs seek the ability to
request the reasonable accommodation of requiring persons around their children to wear masks
in order for their disabled children to safely access their public school and to have that request
granted. Their goal is not to achieve an equally appropriate free education for their special needs
children but to physically access their schools without the risk of severe illness or death.
4. Federal Disability Law
Defendants Reynolds and Lebo argue that federal disability law does not require schools
to impose universal mask mandates, thus Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Defendants contend that section 280.31 does not violate either Title II of the
ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because the state statute is a “neutral
nondiscriminatory policy,” ECF No. 90 at 18, and Plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims
are without merit because their children are not being denied the benefit of a public education
because of their disabilities.
In their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that Defendant Districts must
comply with federal disability law by providing reasonable accommodations, when requested,
that may include imposing mask mandates. Further, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that
Defendants’ implementation of section 280.31—to the extent that it prohibits local school
districts from requiring masks to be worn in fulfillment of a student’s request for a reasonable
accommodation—violates federal law.
This Court has held that mask mandates are a reasonable modification such that school
districts may require students, staff, and visitors to wear masks to protect disabled children in
their schools. Under the ADA, “public entit[ies] shall make reasonable modifications in policies,
practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the
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basis of disability, unless [they] can demonstrate that making the modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i).
The Rehabilitation Act’s regulations similarly require public entities to make reasonable
accommodations to ensure meaningful access to the benefit that public entity provides.
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985); DeBord v. Bd. of Educ. of Ferguson-Florissant
Sch. Dist., 126 F.3d 1102, 1104–05 (8th Cir. 1997). In other words, the Acts require public
schools to make reasonable accommodations for students with disabilities in order to provide
them with meaningful access to education. A modification “is not reasonable if it either imposes
‘undue financial and administrative burdens’ . . . or requires ‘a fundamental alteration in the
nature of [the] program.’” Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987)
(citations omitted).
Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, school districts are required “to ‘start by
considering how [their educational programs] are used by non-disabled [students] and then take
reasonable steps to provide disabled [students] with a like experience.” Argenyi v. Creighton
Univ., 703 F.3d 441, 451 (8th Cir. 2013) (quoting Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co., 685
F.3d 1131, 1135 (9th Cir. 2012)). Plaintiffs have demonstrated that school programs, services,
and activities are not meaningfully accessible to their disabled children because their children
cannot attend in-person learning without threat severe illness or death due to their medical
vulnerabilities. Permitting schools to impose mask mandates would allow disabled children who
are at an increased risk of severe illness or death from COVID-19 to participate in their school’s
programs, services, and activities “with a like experience” to their nondisabled peers and would
not fundamentally alter the nature of the services that a school provides. Id. Defendants even
admit that, depending on the circumstances, “limited masking of teachers or students while
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interacting closely with the individual” may be a reasonable modification that is not prohibited
by section 280.31. ECF No. 90 at 23.
For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes Plaintiffs have standing, the case is not
moot, Plaintiffs need not exhaust their administrative remedies, and Plaintiffs have pled
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim to relief under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. At
oral argument, Plaintiffs agreed they have abandoned their claim under the ARPA and are no
longer seeking injunctive relief. The Court therefore grants Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’
claim under the ARPA and Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and these claims are dismissed.
Accordingly, Defendants Reynolds and Lebo’s Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied
in part.
B. Defendant Districts’ Motions to Dismiss3
Defendant Districts argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is moot because it is based on
circumstances that no longer exist as COVID-19 vaccines are now available for children and
thus, Plaintiffs’ children’s health circumstances and educational experiences are vastly different
than they were a year ago. Further, Defendant Districts contend that Plaintiffs have failed to
show how Defendant Districts are indispensable parties and Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim
against them upon which relief can be granted. Defendant Districts assert “that Plaintiffs’ real
dispute lies with Defendants Kim Reynolds and Ann Lebo regarding the enforcement of Iowa
3 The Motion to Dismiss was filed by Defendants Ankeny Community School District, Davenport
Community School District, Decorah Community School District, Denver Community School District,
Des Moines Public Schools, Johnston Community School District, Linn Mar Community School District,
and Waterloo Community School District. ECF No. 96. Defendant Council Bluffs Community School
District joins in the Motion and adopts the attached brief but also files a separate Motion to Dismiss
presenting the same arguments. ECF No. 97. Similarly, Defendant Iowa City Community School
District partially joins in the Motion, presenting the same necessary-party argument as the other school
districts but declines to present the mootness argument. ECF No. 98. The Court will refer to all school
districts named in Plaintiffs’ Complaint collectively as “Defendant Districts” for purposes of this Order.
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Code [s]ection 280.31” and that “[Defendant] Districts are not necessary parties because
complete relief can be obtained absent their participation in the action.” ECF No. 96-1 at 5.
As determined above, Plaintiffs’ claims for declaratory relief are live and were not
mooted by the Eighth Circuit’s decision to vacate the preliminary injunction or the changes in
circumstances underlying its decision.
With regard to Defendant Districts’ second argument, Plaintiffs respond Defendant
Districts are indispensable parties because the statute prohibits school boards and administrators
from adopting mask requirements and because the declaratory relief sought by Plaintiffs impacts
the school districts’ responses to Plaintiffs’ future requests for reasonable modifications.
A party is necessary and indispensable if, “in that [party]’s absence, the court cannot
accord complete relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(1)(A). Further, “joinder of all materially
interested parties to a single lawsuit . . . protect[s] interested parties and avoid[s] waste of
judicial resources.” Sykes v. Hengel, 220 F.R.D. 593, 596 (S.D. Iowa 2004) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the Court that is focused on Defendant Districts’ compliance
with the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiffs assert that Title II of the ADA and section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act require school districts to impose masking requirements when
requested as a reasonable accommodation and that failing to do so, on the sole basis that section
280.31 prohibits any and all masking requirements in Iowa’s schools, violates the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. Because it is Defendant Districts’ responses to a reasonable-accommodation
request and how section 280.31 is implemented that is ultimately at the heart of Plaintiffs’
Complaint, Defendant Districts are necessary parties to this action. Accordingly, Defendant
Districts’ Motion to Dismiss is denied.
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C. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs seek a declaration from this Court as to their legal rights under the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act following the enactment of Iowa Code section 280.31. Plaintiffs contend that
granting declaratory judgment as they request would make clear to Defendants Reynolds and
Lebo the scope of their authority to enforce the statute, to school administrators their obligations
under federal and state law, and to families with disabled schoolchildren their legal rights.
Plaintiffs assert Defendants Reynolds and Lebo have caused confusion and uncertainty over
whether schools are permitted to require masks to be worn if federal law so requires by
threatening to remove a school district’s accreditation if it imposes a mask mandate. This
confusion and uncertainty has impacted the decisions local school districts have made regarding
masking requirements and also the decisions made by families of students with disabilities.
Thus, Plaintiffs have filed their Motion asking this Court to enter judgment declaring that Iowa
Code section 280.31’s phrase “‘other provision[s] of law’ . . . include[s] Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (‘ADA’) and [s]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” ECF No. 88 at 2.
Plaintiffs further ask this Court to enter judgment declaring “[t]hat [s]ection 280.31 cannot be
cited as a basis to deny a student’s request for a reasonable modification or accommodation
under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act that includes requiring others to wear masks.” Id. Prior to
filing their Motion, Plaintiffs sought stipulation from Defendants with regard to the above-
quoted language. Id. Defendants Reynolds and Lebo opposed the proposed stipulation,
Defendant Iowa City Community School District so stipulated, and the remaining Defendants
did not respond. Id. at 2–3.
Declaratory relief is authorized by the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and
2202(a). Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, “[i]n a case of actual controversy . . . any court of
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the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other
legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or
could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201. “There are two principal situations when it is proper to
grant declaratory relief: (1) when the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and
settling the legal relations in issue; and (2) when it will terminate and afford relief from the
uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings.” Meredith Corp. v.
Riegel Consumer Prods., No. 4:04-cv-90273, 2005 WL 290013, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 31, 2005)
(quoting Alsager v. Dist. Ct. of Polk Cnty., 518 F.2d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 1975)).
In their response, Defendants Reynolds and Lebo argue that the relief requested in
Plaintiffs’ Motion is different from that requested in their Complaint. They further contend
Plaintiffs’ Motion should be denied because it does not resolve a dispute between the parties as
they have consistently asserted that section 280.31 allows schools to comply with federal law.
Defendant Districts have not filed a resistance to Plaintiffs’ Motion. At the hearing on the
Motion, Defendant Council Bluffs Community School District stated it was not opposed to the
first declaration proposed by Plaintiffs but it requested that the second proposed declaration be
narrowed such that section 280.31 cannot be the “only” basis to deny a student’s request for a
reasonable modification or accommodation that includes requiring others to wear masks.
“The function of an affirmative federal pleading, under [Rule] 8(a)(2), is to give the
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication
of the type of litigation involved.” Oglala Sioux Tribe of Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 714
(8th Cir. 1979). Under Rule 54(c), the “final judgment should grant the relief to which each
party is entitled, even if the party has not demanded that relief in its pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(c). “[T]he federal rules—and the decisions construing them—evince a belief that when a
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party has a valid claim, he should recover on it regardless of his counsel’s failure to perceive the
true basis of the claim at the pleading stage, provided always that a late shift in the thrust of the
case will not prejudice the other party in maintaining a defense upon the merits.” 5 Charles Alan
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1219 (4th ed. Apr. 2022 update). In
their Complaint, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that section 280.31 “and the Defendants’
implementation thereof, violates the ADA” and “subject[s] the Plaintiffs to discrimination in
violation of [s]ection 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” ECF No. 1 at 37. Specifically, Plaintiffs
complain that it is Defendants Reynolds and Lebo’s “implementation” of section 280.31 by
threatening the loss of accreditation to school districts and their administrators and Defendant
Districts’ failure to comply with federal law and provide reasonable accommodations that
violates the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. And it is these methods of implementation that
Plaintiffs seek to have declared wrongful in their Motion. In both, Plaintiffs argue school
districts must have the discretion—without fear of loss of accreditation—to consider a disabled
student’s request for a reasonable modification or accommodation that will allow them to safely
access their school’s services, programs, and activities. Thus, Defendants had adequate notice of
Plaintiffs’ claims and the declaratory relief they seek and are not prejudiced in their defense.
Next, although it is true Defendants Reynolds and Lebo have always asserted that a
preliminary injunction was unnecessary because section 280.31 contains a savings clause that
allows schools to comply with “any other provision of law,” including federal law, Iowa Code
§ 280.31, they have also vigorously argued that federal law does not require mask mandates and
that requiring masks is not a reasonable modification under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act,
such that section 280.31 does not permit school districts to impose any mask requirements. This
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contradiction demonstrates an actual controversy remains between the parties. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(1).
In its May decision, the Eighth Circuit directed the parties and this Court to “pay
particular attention to [s]ection 280.31’s exception for ‘any other provision of law.’” Arc of
Iowa II, 33 F.4th at 1045 (quoting Iowa Code § 280.31). The panel continued: “This exception
unambiguously states that [s]ection 280.31 does not apply where ‘any other provision of law’
requires masks . . . [and] does not distinguish between state or federal law.” Id. (citations
omitted). The panel implied that the phrase “other provision[s] of law” in section 280.31
includes federal disability laws, such as the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, such that school
districts could impose mask requirements as a reasonable accommodation upon request.4
However, without an explicit holding from the appellate court, uncertainty among families and
school districts remains.
In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs submit the declarations of three doctors who opine
that the particular children they treat remain at high risk for severe complications or medical
interventions should they contract COVID-19, despite being vaccinated and boosted. ECF
No. 88-3 at 4, 10, 18. The doctors expressly state that for the safety of these children, other
students and staff around them at school should wear masks to protect their health. Id. at 5 ¶ 12
(“In terms of recommendations for a safe return to in-person learning, I recommend, among
other precautions, that masking may be necessary, depending on conditions in the fall or if
conditions are like they are now, by E.C.’s teachers and aides and by all others in the classroom
4 This implication is bolstered by the Eighth Circuit’s earlier decision, which noted that, “the
plain meaning of [s]ection 280.31 is that where federal law requires masks in school, [s]ection 280.31
allows them. . . . Because [s]ection 280.31 allows mask requirements to comply with the ADA or [the
Rehabilitation Act], it does not conflict with and is not preempted by these laws.” Arc of Iowa I, 24 F.4th
at 1179–80.
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who can wear masks.”), 11, 12 ¶ 18 (“It is my medical opinion that M.P. still requires masking
by those around him in school in order to best protect him from further COVID-19 infections.”);
see also id. at 18 (“When his county is in the high transmission category, we recommend that all
people should wear a mask when indoors with other people to reduce [his] exposure to COVID-
19 spread by others.”). Defendants Reynolds and Lebo do not dispute or contradict this
evidence. They simply argue there is no need for the declaratory relief that Plaintiffs seek
because the savings clause in section 280.31 allows for compliance with the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act.
In this case, it is proper to grant a declaratory judgment because it “will serve a useful
purpose in clarifying and settling the legal relations in issue” and “will terminate and afford
relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings.” Meredith
Corp., 2005 WL 290013, at *3. Accordingly, under Iowa Code section 280.31, a disabled
student may request a reasonable accommodation that requires masks to be worn by teachers,
aides, other students, and anyone else near or interacting with the disabled student to allow the
disabled student making the request to safely and readily access their school and in-person
learning. Any school district receiving such an accommodation request must consider it just as
they would any other request for a reasonable modification made under the ADA or the
Rehabilitation Act. The Court agrees with Defendants Reynolds and Lebo that section 280.31’s
general prohibition against mask mandates in schools should be considered when determining
whether a particular student’s request for a mask mandate as an accommodation is a reasonable
one. But if, after considering section 280.31’s general ban on mask mandates, the school district
concludes that requiring masks is a reasonable modification to protect the safety of the student
making the accommodation request under federal disability law, then Defendants Reynolds and
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Lebo must permit the imposition of a mask mandate. To be clear, a school district need not
determine a mask mandate is the only accommodation available, only that it is a reasonable one,5
which is what federal law requires and therefore section 280.31 permits.
Accordingly, the Court exercises its discretion to grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary
Judgment and Complaint for Declaratory Relief. The Court modifies Plaintiffs’ second proposed
declaration to clarify that Iowa Code section 280.31 can be cited as one reason to deny a
student’s request for accommodation if the school district determines a request for a mask
mandate is unreasonable in light of section 280.31’s general ban on mask mandates in Iowa’s
schools, but it cannot be cited as the only reason to summarily deny such a request.
IV. CONCLUSION
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ Reynolds and Lebo’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 86) is
GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court grants Defendants’ Motion
as to Plaintiffs’ claims for injunctive relief and their claim for declaratory relief under the
ARPA. The Court denies Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiffs’ other claims.
2. Defendant Districts’ Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 96, 97, 98) are DENIED.
3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 88) is GRANTED.
4. The Court hereby DECLARES that the phrase ‘other provision[s] of law’ as it
is used in Iowa Code section 280.31 includes Title II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
5 The Court notes that federal law may not, in fact, require universal masks mandates as the only
accommodation available to a school when a disabled student presents an accommodation request, but it
is a reasonable modification that a school district may impose if it determines such a mandate is necessary
to provide the student with safe access to in-person learning.
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5. The Court hereby DECLARES that Iowa Code section 280.31 cannot be cited
as the only basis to deny a student’s request for reasonable modification or
accommodation made under Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
that includes requiring others to wear masks.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 1st day of November, 2022.
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