Support Of Their Motion
- Date
- 2022-08-15
Summary
Plaintiffs' Reply in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment in The Arc of Iowa v. Kim Reynolds, Case No. 4:21-cv-264, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, filed August 15, 2022 as Document 104. The plaintiffs, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Iowa and other counsel, argue that the State Defendants' motion to dismiss lacks merit and that their requested declaratory relief falls within the complaint. The reply argues that Section 280.31 cannot be cited to deny a student's request for a reasonable modification under the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. It contends the relief would not automatically reinstate masking requirements in Iowa schools and asks the Court to grant summary judgment. The brief is dated August 12, 2022 and includes a certificate of service.
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Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 1 of 11
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA
THE ARC OF IOWA; CHARMAINE
ALEXANDER, individually and on behalf of
C.B., a minor; JONATHAN CRAIG,
individually and on behalf of E.C. and J.C.,
minors; MICHELLE CROFT, individually and
on behalf of J.J.B., a minor; AMANDA
DEVEREAUX, individually and on behalf of
P.D., a minor; CARISSA FROYUM ROISE, Case No. 4:21-cv-264
individually and on behalf of H.J.F.R., a minor;
LIDIJA GEEST, individually and on behalf of
K.G., a minor; MELISSA HADDEN,
individually and on behalf of V.M.H., a minor;
HEATHER LYNN PRESTON, individually
and on behalf of M.P. and S.P, minors; LISA
HARDISTY SITHONNORATH, individually
and on behalf of A.S., a minor; REBEKAH
STEWART, individually and on behalf of PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY IN
SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION
E.M.S., a minor; and ERIN VERCANDE,
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
individually and on behalf of S.V., a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v.
KIM REYNOLDS, in her official capacity as
Governor of Iowa; ANN LEBO, in her official
capacity as Director of the Iowa Department of
Education; ANKENY COMMUNITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT; COUNCIL BLUFFS
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
DAVENPORT COMMUNITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT; DECORAH COMMUNITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT; DENVER
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT; DES
MOINES PUBLIC SCHOOLS; IOWA CITY
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT;
JOHNSTON COMMUNITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT; LINN MAR COMMUNITY
SCHOOL DISTRICT; and WATERLOO
COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendants.
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 2 of 11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ iii
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................ 1
I. State Defendants’ motion to dismiss is without merit. ......................................................... 1
II. Plaintiffs’ requested relief falls squarely within the four corners of the complaint. ............ 2
III. This controversy presents a real dispute between adverse parties. ..................................... 4
IV. State Defendants, not Plaintiffs, misunderstand Section 280.31 and federal disability law.
............................................................................................................................................. 5
V. Plaintiffs’ requested relief would not automatically reinstate masking requirements in
Iowa schools and is modest in scope. ................................................................................. 6
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 8
ii
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 3 of 11
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Bloomer v. Caffey,
No. 3:14–cv–00078, 2015 WL 13307071 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 5, 2015). ........................................ 2
Capital Indemnity Corp. v. Miles,
978 F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1992) ....................................................................................................... 4
E.T. v. Paxton,
No. 21-51083, 2022 WL 2914732 (5th Cir. July 25, 2022) ........................................................ 6
Meredith Corp. v. Riegel Consumer Prods.,
4:04-CV-90273, 2005 WL 290013 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 31, 2005) (Pratt, J.) ................................... 4
Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank,
676 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 2012) ...................................................................................................... 4
Statutes
29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq................................................................................................................. 2, 3
42 U.S.C Code § 12131 et seq. ............................................................................................... 2, 3, 5
iii
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 4 of 11
INTRODUCTION
Because of this Court’s past orders, the federal civil rights of many students with
disabilities have been protected over most of the preceding school year. Its TRO and preliminary
injunction, issued early in the Delta wave at a particularly perilous moment in the pandemic’s
trajectory, allowed thousands of students with disabilities to attend school safely. Entering the
limited and tailored declaratory relief Plaintiffs have moved for is the appropriate next step to
protect these rights now and moving forward. State Defendants have told this Court that “it’s
time for this suit to end,” State’s Resp. to Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J./ECF 99, at 6, and declaratory
relief will do that.
State Defendants’ arguments in opposition do not stand in the Court’s way. They have
filed no statement of additional material facts, and have admitted all material facts asserted by
Plaintiffs, notwithstanding their disagreement about “splic[ing] together two accurate quotes
from the State’s appellate brief.” State’s Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts/
ECF 99-1, at 4. School District Defendants have not filed oppositions to the motion, and
Defendant Iowa City Community Schools do not resist the declaratory relief sought by
Plaintiffs.1 Pls.’ Mot. for Summ. J./ECF 88, at 2.
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment should be granted, and, as set forth fully in
Plaintiffs’ responding brief, ECF 95, State Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied.
ARGUMENT
I. State Defendants’ motion to dismiss is without merit.
State Defendants begin their opposition by restating points from their motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs’ response to State Defendants’ motion to dismiss, ECF 95, which is incorporated here,
1
School District Defendants are indispensable parties, and Plaintiffs incorporate herein their
arguments in Response to School District Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss. ECF 96-98.
1
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 5 of 11
rebuts the arguments in State Defendants’ Point I in full. In sum, Plaintiffs continue to have
standing, and State Defendants misinterpret the Eighth Circuit’s limited order holding that the
need for a preliminary injunction was moot to suggest that the entire case is moot. ECF 95, at 3-
8. This case presents an active and live controversy, as Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief is
not moot. Id. at 8-10. Defendants misunderstand and misapply the law of the case doctrine. Id. at
9. State Defendants provide no reason for this Court to revisit its prior ruling on administrative
exhaustion, which correctly rejected the very arguments State Defendants invoke (yet again) in
their opposition brief. Id. at 10-14. In their opposition and other filings, State Defendants do not
offer any evidence for their baldly asserted claim that limited and temporary masking
requirements are an unreasonable modification that impose an undue administrative burden on
schools or constitute a fundamental alteration. Id. at 16-17. And State Defendants’ invocation of
amorphous “constitutional concerns” is unavailing; the only “constitutional concerns” in this
case would arise if this Court let Iowa school districts ignore their responsibilities under federal
law. Id. at 18.
II. Plaintiffs’ requested relief falls squarely within the four corners of the
complaint.
State Defendants contend that Plaintiffs seek “a very different declaratory judgment” than
the one they sought in their complaint. ECF 99, at 7. The critical inquiry here is whether
Plaintiffs “now raise an entirely separate claim” in summary judgment briefing that was
“unmentioned within Plaintiffs' [ ] alleged causes of action.” Bloomer v. Caffey, No. 3:14–cv–
00078, 2015 WL 13307071 at *4 n.9 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 5, 2015) (unpublished). Plaintiffs do not.
In the prayer for relief, Plaintiffs asked this Court to “[d]eclare that HF 847, and the
Defendants’ implementation thereof, violates the ADA” and “[d]eclare that HF 847, and the
Defendants’ implementation thereof, subject the Plaintiffs to discrimination in violation of
2
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 6 of 11
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.” Compl./ECF 1, at 37 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs
specifically complained that State Defendants were implementing Section [280.31] by
threatening school districts and their personnel. Id. at ¶¶ 9, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58, 59, 61-72, 82-85,
91-94. At every stage of this litigation Plaintiffs have argued that school districts must have the
discretion needed to protect students with disabilities with the reasonable modifications
necessary to allow them to safely access education, and that State Defendants were impeding the
reasonable modification process in violation of federal disability rights law. See, e.g., Id. at ¶ 82
(“As a result of the Defendant State Official’s implementation and enforcement of HF 847,
which has denied these children the protection that they need to attend school in a safe
environment, the Defendants have violated the regulations and provisions of the ADA . . . The
Defendants are failing and/or causing other Defendants to fail to make a reasonable
modification…”); ¶¶ 92-94 (“As a result of the implementation and enforcement of HF 847,
Defendants have violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations
and/or caused Plaintiffs’ School Districts to violate the regulations and provisions…”).
These claims go to what the State Defendants call the “scope of section 280.31.” ECF 99,
at 7. Because of State Defendants’ threats (never renounced), the meaning of the law was (and
remains) unclear. Plaintiffs brought this suit to get a judicial declaration that Section 280.31
could not be used by Defendants to subvert their federal civil rights. The proposed declaratory
judgment stems from the Complaints’ declaratory request to preserve “the school’s ability to
comply with its obligations under federal disability laws.” ECF 1, at ¶ 9. The Complaint gave the
3
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 7 of 11
State Defendants fair notice of the claim and its supporting facts, meeting the Federal Rules’
requirements. Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, 676 F.3d 655, 664-65 (8th Cir. 2012).2
III. This controversy presents a real dispute between adverse parties.
Contrary to State Defendants’ assertions, declaratory relief is appropriate here as “[t]he
lines are drawn [and] the parties are at odds,” Capital Indem. Corp. v. Miles, 978 F.2d 437, 438
(8th Cir. 1992), and “the judgment will serve a useful purpose in clarifying and settling the legal
relations in issue” and “afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise
to the proceedings.” Meredith Corp. v. Riegel Consumer Prods., 4:04-CV-90273, 2005 WL
290013 at *3 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 31, 2005) (Pratt, J.) (unpublished).
This Court has already recognized that State Defendants “dispute federal law requires
that masks be worn in schools or that school districts have discretion to make masking decisions
at the local level.” Order Granting Prelim. Inj./ECF 60, at 9. And State Defendants in their
papers continue to argue otherwise. ECF 99, at 12 (indicating that consideration of a universal
mask mandate request would be wrong). Defendants resist even Plaintiffs’ call for clarity that
Section 230.18 “cannot be cited as a basis to deny a student’s request for reasonable modification
or accommodation.” Id. at 11-12. They have proven Plaintiffs’ case, making imperative the need
for this Court’s action: to clarify that Section 280.31 does not stand as a barrier to schools doing
the analysis necessary under federal law to determine if a masking requirement, however limited,
is needed as a reasonable modification to ensure equal access to education for students with
disabilities.
2 The caselaw State Defendants invoke, ECF 99, at 6-7, is inapt, because Plaintiffs have not
brought new claims at the summary judgment stage that were unalleged in their complaint.
4
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 8 of 11
The lines are drawn; the parties are at odds. This case, in the final analysis, comes down
to a relatively straightforward disagreement with enormous consequences for students with
disabilities.
IV. State Defendants, not Plaintiffs, misunderstand Section 280.31 and federal
disability law.
State Defendants concede that the first clause of Plaintiffs’ proposed declaratory
judgment, finding that the term “other provision[s] of law” as it is used in Section 280.31
includes Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504” or “Rehabilitation Act”), is “not wrong.” ECF 99, at 10. They
object to the second clause, which states “[t]hat Section 280.31 cannot be cited as a basis to deny
a student’s request for reasonable modification or accommodation that includes requiring others
to wear masks.” ECF 88 ¶ 2(2); ECF 99, at 11-12. They allege that this clause “assumes that a
mask would always be required.” ECF 99, at 11 (emphasis in original).
The proposed relief actually does the opposite. It makes no assumptions about any
reasonable modifications and their particular worth. Instead, it leaves individual school districts
to evaluate any request for masking consistent with the case-by-case analysis that is
characteristic of reasonable modification analysis. Under Plaintiffs’ proposed relief, school
districts can consider the strengths and demerits of a requested masking accommodation on its
own without the shadow of the Governor or Superintendents’ threats. As this Court has already
recognized, Defendants “dispute federal law requires that masks be worn in schools or that
school districts have discretion to make masking decisions at the local level.” ECF 60, at 9. And
based on the State’s threatened enforcement, “prior to the entry of a TRO, schools in Iowa did
not believe they were allowed to implement mask mandates under the savings clause.” Id. at 12.
If the State Defendants get their way, local school districts officials would have to evaluate any
5
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 9 of 11
request for a masking accommodation under the threat of loss of accreditation or funding, no
matter what the evidence says, or circumstances might demand.
State Defendants cite the observation of one judge in an analogous case that “[i]t’s well
settled that defendants—not plaintiffs—get to choose between reasonable accommodations(s),
and plaintiffs’ preferences between reasonable accommodation(s) are irrelevant.” ECF 99, at 12
(citing E.T. v. Paxton, No. 21-51083, 2022 WL 2914732, at *4 (5th Cir. July 25, 2022)).3 Of
course, that skirts the real issue. State Defendants continue to object even to the idea that
masking, or at least some forms of masking, could be a reasonable modification. Defendants’
continued objection to basic requirements of federal law makes this relief necessary. ECF 99, at
12.
V. Plaintiffs’ requested relief would not automatically reinstate masking
requirements in Iowa schools and is modest in scope.
State Defendants repeatedly suggest that Plaintiffs want sweeping mask mandates, which
could be reimplemented if the Court grants summary judgment. See, e.g., ECF 99, at 5 (“[A]ny
injury isn’t redressed by this suit because enjoining Section 280.31’s enforcement won’t provide
them a universal mask mandate.”); id. (“Universal mask mandates in schools are not a reasonable
modification . . . .”). To the contrary, entering the limited declaration that Plaintiffs seek would
not reinstate masking requirements automatically. Instead, declaratory relief would merely
preserve the possibility for students to seek masking as a reasonable modification under federal
disability law, and for the school properly to consider that request.
3 State Defendants suggest it is the observation of the circuit, but it is in fact only the observation
of Judge Oldham. Judge Willett did not join that part of the decision, and Judge Davis dissented.
Id.
6
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 10 of 11
CONCLUSION
The Court should deny State’s Defendants’ motions to dismiss this case. And the Court
should grant Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
Respectfully submitted:
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF IOWA
/s/ Rita Bettis Austen
Rita Bettis Austen, AT0011558
Shefali Aurora, AT0012874
Leah Patton, AT0006022
ACLU of Iowa Foundation Inc.
505 Fifth Avenue, Suite 901
Des Moines, IA 50309-2316
Telephone: 515-243-3988
Facsimile: 515-243-8506
rita.bettis@aclu-ia.org
shefali.aurora@aclu-ia.org
leah.patton@aclu-ia.org
DISABILITY RIGHTS IOWA
Cynthia A. Miller (AT0005382)
Catherine Johnson (AT0004006)
666 Walnut Street, Suite 1440
Des Moines, IA 50309
T: (515) 278-2502
E: cmiller@driowa.org
E: cjohnson@driowa.org
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION
Louise Melling*
125 Broad St.
New York, NY 10004
T: (212) 549-2637
E: lmelling@aclu.org
Susan Mizner*
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
T: (415) 343-0781
E: smizner@aclu.org
7
Case 4:21-cv-00264-RP-HCA Document 104 Filed 08/15/22 Page 11 of 11
ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER LLP
John A. Freedman*
601 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20001
T: 202.942.5316
E: john.freedman@arnoldporter.com
THE ARC
Shira Wakschlag*
The Arc of the United States
1825 K Street, NW, Suite 1200
Washington, DC 20006
Telephone: 202-534-3708
Facsimile: 202-534-3731
E: wakschlag@thearc.org
DUFF LAW FIRM, PLC
Thomas J. Duff
The Galleria
4090 Westown Pkwy, Suite 102
West Des Moines, Iowa 50266
Telephone: (515) 224-4999
Fax: (515) 327-5401
E : tom@tdufflaw.com
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs
*Admitted pro hac vice
Dated: August 12, 2022
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this date, I electronically filed the foregoing paper with the Clerk of Court by
using the CM/ECF system.
All participants in this case are registered CM/ECF users and will served by the CM/ECF system.
Date: August 12, 2022
/s/Rita Bettis Austen
Rita Bettis Austen
8
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