PRAC's Semiannual Report to Congress October 1, 2022 - March 31, 2023

Summary

The Pandemic Response Accountability Committee Semiannual Report to Congress for October 1, 2022 through March 31, 2023, with a message from Chair Michael E. Horowitz. The message states that during the reporting period the PRAC issued a Fraud Alert in which its Pandemic Analytics Center of Excellence identified more than 69,000 questionable Social Security Numbers used to obtain $5.4 billion in potentially fraudulent pandemic loans. It also states that the PRAC hosted over 1,500 oversight professionals at its Agile Oversight Forum in January 2023, and that the Senate passed S. 659 in March 2023, a bill that would increase the maximum fraud claim pursued administratively from $150,000 to $1 million. The report is organized around the PRAC's four goals and includes appendices on pandemic-related OIG reports and hotline data.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

P A N D E M I C  R E S P O N S E  A C C O U N TA B I L I T Y  C O M M I T T E E
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023

ii
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Message from the Chair
It is my privilege to present the Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee’s (PRAC) spring 2023
Semiannual Report to Congress. This report covers
the PRAC’s accomplishments during the October 1,
2022–March 31, 2023 reporting period. In the
more than 3 years since the onset of the pandemic
and the PRAC’s creation in the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, our
mission to promote transparency and coordinate
oversight of the federal government’s COVID-19
pandemic response remains more critical than ever.
In this semiannual report, you will find updates on
our major initiatives, including:
• Investigations, reports, and alerts that focus
on fraud, waste, and abuse in the use of the
federal pandemic funds;
• Major projects and initiatives that promote our
oversight and collaboration goals and advance
the entire federal oversight community; and
• Key metrics and indicators that highlight our
operational efficiency and effectiveness.
Congress, the public, and other stakeholders
continue to use the oversight work of the PRAC and
its Office of Inspectors General (OIG) partners to
understand and address the various challenges
caused by the pandemic. In February 2023, I
testified along with other federal oversight leaders
before the House Committee on Oversight and
Accountability and the House Committee on
Ways and Means and shared the benefits of
using advanced data analytics to identify fraud
in pandemic relief programs. I also encouraged
Congress to make our Pandemic Analytics Center
of Excellence (PACE) permanent as a tool to help
watchdogs oversee all federal spending, including
future emergency relief and recovery programs.
The PACE is demonstrating a significant return on
investment. During the reporting period, we issued
a Fraud Alert in which the PACE and its team of data
scientists identified more than 69,000 questionable
Social Security Numbers (SSNs) that were used
to obtain $5.4 billion in potentially fraudulent
pandemic loans.
Transparency into pandemic spending remains a
cornerstone of our efforts. To this end, the PRAC has
developed over 130 interactive data visualizations,
including web pages detailing pandemic funding
provided to state governments and U.S. territories.
Moreover, an agile approach to oversight is critical
given the speed with which relief money was
distributed during the throes of the pandemic.
In January 2023, the PRAC hosted over 1,500
oversight professionals at our Agile Oversight
Forum where we discussed agile strategies that
watchdogs can use to quickly share concerns with
policymakers, Congress, and the public.
Our collaboration with our oversight partners
extends to the production of high-impact, cross-
agency insight reports. In December 2022, we

iii
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
released our report on the impact of expanded
telehealth and its use across health benefit
programs administered by six federal agencies.
We also continue to promote coordination with
our investigative partners to support a whole-of-
government response to fighting pandemic fraud,
including our participation in the Department of
Justice’s COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force.
Separately, the PRAC’s Fraud Task Force benefits
from the efforts of 53 criminal investigators from
across the federal government on a variety of
criminal cases to track down hundreds of millions
of dollars in stolen federal pandemic funds. In
November 2022, the Task Force’s first case to go
to trial resulted in a conviction of an individual
for attempting to obtain more than $10 million in
pandemic relief, resulting in more than $1 million
in fraudulent disbursements. With the statute of
limitations to pursue fraud in certain pandemic
small business loan programs extended by Congress
during the last reporting period, our investigators
and partners are empowered to continue pursuing
similar cases.
We continue to advocate for legislative proposals
that support similar statute of limitation extensions
for other pandemic programs, like the new
pandemic-related unemployment insurance
(UI) programs. Currently, the five-year statute of
limitations for many pandemic-related UI fraud
investigations will expire in 2025.
Additionally, we support recent efforts from
Congress to help OIGs administratively recover
fraudulently diverted tax dollars by amending the
Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act to raise the
jurisdictional limit for administrative recoveries of
“smaller” false or fraudulent claims. In March 2023,
the Senate passed S. 659, a bill co-sponsored by
Senators Grassley and Durbin, that would increase
the maximum amount of a fraud claim that can
be pursued administratively from $150,000 to $1
million.
During this reporting period, the PRAC continued to
provide critical insights on high-impact areas while
strengthening our partnerships and collaboration
across the oversight community. These efforts help
identify fraud, waste, and abuse that has already
occurred while creating a blueprint for helping
prevent it in the future.
I hope you find this Semiannual Report insightful.
The Honorable Michael E. Horowitz
Chair, PRAC
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice

iv
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Contents
Message from the Chair
ii
Highlights
1
Background
2
PRAC Accomplishments
4
Goal One–Promote Transparency
5
Goal Two–Promote Coordinated, Comprehensive Oversight
7
Goal Three–Prevent and Detect Fraud, Waste,
Abuse, and Mismanagement
9
Goal Four–Ensure Effective and Efficient PRAC Operations
11
Holding Wrongdoers Accountable Through Investigations
12
Key Insights Through Oversight Reports
19
Key Insight 1: Agencies have opportunities to improve data information
sharing to enhance decision making across pandemic programs.
21
Key Insight 2: CARES Act recipients struggled to understand reporting
requirements and guidance which can impact oversight and
transparency of the use of federal funds.
22
Key Insight 3: Lack of documentation hindered opportunities to
determine if pandemic money helped people respond and recover
from the pandemic.
24
Key Insight 4: Providing critical data, information, and guidance to
the American public can allow them to better protect themselves from
the effects of the pandemic.
25
Appendix A: Acronyms
27
Appendix B: Pandemic-Related Reports by Offices of Inspector General
28
Appendix C: Hotline Data
32

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
1
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Highlights
Highlights

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
2
Highlights
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Background
Background
Established in March 2020 by the CARES Act,
the PRAC is a Committee of the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
(CIGIE). CIGIE is an independent entity established
within the executive branch by the Inspector General
Act of 1978, as amended, whose membership
includes the 75 statutorily created federal
Inspectors General (IGs).
The CARES Act identifies IGs from nine agencies
as statutory members of the PRAC. The Chair can
designate additional IGs to serve on the Committee
from any agency that receives pandemic funds or
is involved in the federal government’s response
to the COVID-19 pandemic. The IGs serving on the
Committee continue to perform their IG duties.
The PRAC is comprised of 20 IGs (see PRAC
membership below). We are staffed by a full-
time Executive Director and 68 employees
distributed across seven directorates: Oversight
& Accountability, Outreach & Engagement,
Transparency, Chief Information Officer, Chief
Counsel, Chief Data Officer, and Chief Management
Officer.
The PRAC promotes transparency and provides
Congress and the public with objective, reliable
information about the $5 trillion in pandemic relief
dollars at PandemicOversight.gov. We also work
with IGs to recommend program improvements,
refer matters for criminal investigations, and identify
misspent funds for recovery.
PRAC Membership
Name
Michael E. Horowitz, Chair
Paul K. Martin, Vice Chair
Phyllis K. Fong
Robert P. Storch
Sandra D. Bruce
Christi A. Grimm
Joseph Cuffari
Rae Oliver Davis
Mark Lee Greenblatt
Larry D. Turner
Eric J. Soskin
Richard Delmar
Michael J. Missal
Tyler Smith
Mark Bialek
Allison C. Lerner
Hannibal “Mike” Ware
Brian D. Miller
J. Russell George
Tammy Whitcomb Hull
Department or Agency OIG
Department of Justice
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Department of Agriculture
Department of Defense
Department of Education
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Homeland Security
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department of Labor
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Veterans Affairs
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Reserve Board / Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
National Science Foundation
Small Business Administration
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
U.S. Postal Service

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
3
Highlights
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
The PRAC released its Strategic Plan for 2020 through 2025 in July 2020. The plan identified four goals
to carry out the PRAC’s mission and vision (see Figure 1). These goals are not mutually exclusive – audits,
investigations, reviews, and other activities may meet more than one goal.
Promote Transparency
Promote Coordinated,
Comprehensive
Oversight
Prevent and Detect Fraud, Waste,
Abuse, and Mismanagement
Ensure Effective
and Efficient
PRAC Operations
MISSION
To serve the American public by promoting transparency and the coordinated
oversight of the federal government’s coronavirus response to prevent and detect
fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and mitigate major risks that cross
program and agency boundaries.
VISION
Sound stewardship of taxpayer funds and an effective and efficient coronavirus
response across the federal government, the oversight of which will be data-driven,
risk-focused, and technology-enabled.
GOALS
Background
Figure 1. PRAC Mission, Vision, and Goals.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
4
Highlights
Background
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
PRAC Accomplishments
The PRAC was established to serve the American public by promoting transparency and facilitating
coordinated oversight of the federal government’s COVID-19 pandemic response and associated spending.
Our goals are to detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement and to identify and mitigate major risks
that cross program and agency boundaries. We aim to serve as the eyes and ears of the American public,
monitoring the government’s pandemic response spending and reporting accessible, timely, accurate, and
comprehensive data that can be translated into actionable insights. The following figure depicts the goals
set out in our Strategic Plan for 2020 through 2025 and key accomplishments we have achieved during this
reporting period, as aligned with the PRAC’s mission and vision.
Figure 2. PRAC Goals.
Added state and
territory funding data
to our website.
Testimony before the
House Committee on
Oversight & Accountability
and House Committee on
Ways & Means.
Hosted and
participated in
four public events
with over 1,700
attendees.
Coordinated
with OIGs to
issue a report
 on telehealth.
Fraud Alert—
Identified $5.4B
in potentially
fraudulent loans.
Investigation by PRAC
Fraud Task Force
resulting in conviction.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
5
Highlights
Background
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
Accountability
Goal One–Promote Transparency
Provide the Public with Timely Data and Information on
Covered Funds and the Coronavirus Response
Transparency is central to the PRAC’s mission, and we remain committed to delivering timely spending
information and easily accessible resources to the public. Our website, PandemicOversight.gov, has used
approximately 34 million rows of data to produce tools and accessible dashboards that allow the public to
explore how much federal pandemic funding has been allocated and spent by different states and programs.
Since October 2022, we have added 130 new
interactive data visualizations and published 12
new data and feature stories that provide insight
into a variety of topics including demographic data
on the Homeowner Assistance Fund, the amounts
received and spent by recipients in each state for
veteran programs, and potential fraud found within
the Employee Retention Credit.
Our 58 state and territory web pages break down
how much each state and U.S. territory received
in funding for pandemic-related programs,
investigative results by state, and oversight reports
issued by state and local auditors. These web pages
allow users to quickly search and understand total
funding obligated and spent by state and the top five
pandemic programs within each state and territory.
Relatedly, during this reporting period, 32 new
reports issued by state and local oversight agencies
also became available on our website. We will
continue to add more as they are published so the
public and policymakers can see the full inventory of
what federal, state, and local oversight agencies are
finding in their oversight of the pandemic response.
We recognize the importance of engaging directly
with the public through panels and educational
events that facilitate discussions on transparency
and sound stewardship of funds.
State and territory funding data added
to our website.
Figure 3. State and territory funding data website page.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
6
Highlights
Background
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
Accountability
• In October 2022, we participated in a policy hackathon sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology that gave 250 students from 46 different countries the opportunity to develop creative policy
solutions to complex issues, such as delivering rent relief during a national crisis.
• In December 2022, we co-hosted a virtual roundtable discussion with the National League of Cities
that explored community engagement strategies used by local governments to determine how to spend
pandemic relief funds. This panel included city and state government officials and discussed options to
continue pandemic-funded programs and services in the future.
• In January 2023, we participated in a panel co-sponsored by the U.S. Conference of Mayors and
Bloomberg Philanthropies to share best practices for managing federal grants, programs, and resources
with officials from local governments. Our coordination and collaboration with local officials can help
identify and address unique and emerging issues.
Figure 4. Media mentions across all platforms.
During this reporting period, we shared updates on the PRAC’s work with the news media. PRAC Chair
Horowitz was interviewed by print, television, and radio reporters on the important oversight work and
challenges in pandemic spending. For example, he was featured on ABC News Live Prime discussing fraud
in small business loan programs and the ongoing fight against identity theft. Our impactful and insightful
content, along with our reputation as a credible source of data, enables us to continue to engage and reach
a broader audience. During the reporting period, the PRAC received nearly 4,800 mentions across print,
broadcast, and social media. As we continue to produce resources and share timely updates, we recognize
that public engagement is important to our ongoing mission of providing transparency and investigating
pandemic fraud.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
7
Highlights
Background
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
Accountability
Goal Two–Promote Coordinated,
Comprehensive Oversight
Facilitate Exceptional
Coordination and
Collaboration to Ensure
High-Impact Results
During this reporting period, we demonstrated
how the oversight community can work together
to produce impactful results. The PRAC hosted a
first-of-its-kind virtual event focused on executing
agile oversight. With pandemic relief distributed
at a fast pace, we realized watchdogs needed
to be just as fast communicating risks and
problems. Agile oversight products, like alert
memorandums, highlight issues that require
immediate consideration by agency officials and/or
Congressional stakeholders. Over 1,500 oversight
professionals attended our event, which leveraged
the insights of 12 federal, state, and local oversight
offices, to hear about successful strategies for
getting out critical information quickly. The PRAC
will continue to find opportunities to employ these
strategies and encourage others to do the same.
The PRAC also continues to find opportunities to
bring oversight agencies together to work on cross-
cutting projects that provide an understanding of
broader pandemic-related challenges. We used the
knowledge and expertise of the PRAC’s Health Care
Subgroup members, to coordinate the development
of an Insights Report on the use of telehealth across
key federal health care programs. The collective
insights from these agencies can provide decision
makers with valuable information regarding program
integrity risks and the benefits of extending these
types of programs beyond the pandemic.
Agile Oversight Forum Partners
Leveraging the insights of 12 federal, state, and local
oversight offices, the PRAC hosted over 1,500 oversight
professionals to discuss strategies for oversight offices
to start moving to a more agile posture for the timely
release of critical information.
California State Auditor’s Office
Department of Health and Human
Services OIG
Department of Housing and Urban
Development OIG
Department of the Interior OIG
Department of Justice OIG
Department of Labor OIG
Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation OIG
Government Accountability Office
King County, WA Auditor’s Office
New York State Comptroller’s Office
Small Business Administration OIG
United States Agency for International
Development OIG

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
8
Highlights
Background
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
Accountability
Foster Sound Stewardship
of Covered Funds and
Programs
Congress has been particularly interested in the
expertise and insight of the PRAC and our partners
to better understand if pandemic funds were
used for their intended purposes and the extent
of fraud, waste, and abuse. PRAC Chair Horowitz
testified before the House Committee on Oversight
and Accountability and the House Committee on
Ways and Means earlier this year to discuss these
issues. Beyond highlighting our extensive work,
Chair Horowitz outlined legislative proposals for
Congress to consider that would help watchdogs
pursue smaller dollar cases of fraud and give them
more time to pursue fraud in the new pandemic UI
programs.
Additionally, Chair Horowitz encouraged Congress
to make our PACE permanent to help watchdogs
oversee all federal spending, including future
emergency relief and recovery programs. Its
sustainment will ensure that our federal government
and the oversight community is equipped with the
data and tools necessary to proactively assess risk
and oversee all federal spending.
Ensure Efficient Sharing of
Data, Analytics, and Other
Information
The PACE has continued to deliver analytic,
audit, and investigative support to the oversight
community. Understanding the critical need for data
literacy across the federal oversight community, the
PACE Data Science Fellowship program has placed
26 data scientists at 14 OIGs to date.
(Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images)
PRAC Chair Michael Horowitz testifies before the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability on Wednesday, February 1, 2023.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
9
Highlights
Background
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
Accountability
We also analyzed the data we have
acquired, such as non-public Paycheck
Protection Program (PPP) and COVID-19
Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) data,
to identify potential fraud. In January 2023,
we identified 69,000 questionable SSNs
that were used to obtain $5.4 billion in
potentially fraudulent COVID-19 EIDL and
PPP loans. A critical step in this analysis was
using our legal authorities to have the Social
Security Administration verify SSNs we had
considered to be potentially invalid or never
issued. This collaborative effort shows the
value that government information-sharing
and preventive controls can have to improve
program integrity and better protect the public.
Figure 5. Graphic featured in PRAC Fraud Alert.
Goal Three–Prevent and Detect Fraud,
Waste, Abuse, and Mismanagement
Hold Wrongdoers
Accountable
The PRAC’s Fraud Task Force continues to serve
a vital role in uncovering pandemic fraud and
providing investigative support to partner law
enforcement agencies. To date, the work of the
Task Force and our partners has resulted in lengthy
jail sentences for wrongdoers and the recovery of
more than $1 billion in pandemic fraud. We have
53 agents across 15 OIGs detailed throughout the
nation investigating fraud, working to protect historic
amounts of emergency relief money, and bring
pandemic fraud wrongdoers to justice. The mission
behind our Task Force is to use the expertise of the
oversight community and tackle pandemic fraud
Figure 6. PRAC partners with 15 agencies and
53 Task Force Agents.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
10
Highlights
Background
Accountability
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
PRAC - Investigative Results
In November 2022, a Fraud Task Force investigation led to a major conviction in an attempted $10 million
pandemic fraud scheme that resulted in $1 million disbursed. Stolen funds were used for, among other
things, cryptocurrency investments, the purchase of stocks, and the leasing of luxury apartments and cars.
with every tool we have—criminal, civil, forfeitures
of money and property, and suspensions and
debarments.
We understand that confronting this ongoing
issue requires partnership across the federal law
enforcement community, and we work closely with
the DOJ COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force.
One of their recent cases involved a Texas man
that conspired with others to submit fraudulent
PPP loan applications by falsifying the number of
employees and average monthly payroll expenses.
In total, the conspirators sought over $35 million
through more than 80 fraudulent PPP loans. The
defendant distributed over $500,000 in fraudulent
loan proceeds to conspirators and himself using
false payroll checks and laundered a portion of
the proceeds by transferring the funds from one
of his bank accounts to another bank account he
controlled.
Mitigate Major Risks
That Cut Across Program
Boundaries
Fraud often cuts across multiple programs and
requires a comprehensive approach to mitigate
risks effectively. The PACE has access to a variety
of government public and non-public data sources
as well as commercial sources. The integration
of these data sources provides law enforcement
with insights that they would not be able to obtain
otherwise. Its investigative support applies the latest
advances in analytic and forensic technologies
to identify hidden networks and connections
among individuals exploiting pandemic fraud
using artificial intelligence. The PACE also uses
exploratory analytics to identify trends and patterns
that suggest potential fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement in pandemic spending. The PACE
plays an instrumental role in housing common
data and reducing efforts associated with data
preparation and management. This role has saved
time, money, and improved the quality of the data
that supports investigations.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
11
Highlights
Background
Reports
Appendices
Accomplishments
Accountability
Goal Four–Ensure Effective and
Efficient PRAC Operations
Fulfill Statutory Responsibilities
We remain committed to providing Congress and other key stakeholders with our expertise and insights
on how the oversight community and the federal government at large can improve our response to the
pandemic as well as future crises.
As previously described, Chair Horowitz testified before both the House Committee on Oversight and
Accountability and the House Committee on Ways and Means earlier this year. Chair Horowitz shared
the value of extending the statute of limitations for new pandemic UI programs to provide more time to
investigate the billons of estimated dollars defrauded from these programs. The current statute of limitations
for many pandemic-related UI fraud investigations will expire in 2025. Chair Horowitz also urged Congress to
consider amending the Program Fraud Civil Remedies Act to raise the jurisdictional limit for administrative
recoveries of “smaller” false or fraudulent claims from $150,000 to $1 million.
Build a Diverse Team of Innovative Thought Leaders
The PRAC was established just over three years ago in March of 2020. Since then, we have grown rapidly to
a nationally distributed workforce of 68 staff members spread across five time zones. With our direct hiring
authority capabilities outlined in the CARES Act, we have been empowered to recruit from a deep pool of
candidates across the private sector, academia, and government. Alongside our partners, the PRAC is well
positioned to effectively oversee $5 trillion in pandemic relief funds.
Supporting the Independent Oversight of Inspectors
General
Given the scale and complexity of the pandemic recovery, effective oversight requires programmatic
expertise to ensure efficient and effective auditing and review. Our partner IGs have highly specialized
expertise and essential knowledge about the programs their respective agency administers. The PRAC
offers support where needed and finds opportunities to coordinate and perform work across agencies to
deliver cross-cutting insights, but we rely on the expertise and credibility of these offices to help perform
our work. We respect their autonomy to conduct their own audits or investigations and are mindful of not
duplicating efforts.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
12
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Accountability
Holding Wrongdoers Accountable
Through Investigations
A key role of OIGs is to support law enforcement in pursuing fraud investigations and criminal enforcement.
A total of 17 OIGs publicly reported 661 indictments and arrests, and 481 convictions from October 1, 2022,
through March 31, 2023, related to the federal government’s COVID-19 pandemic response. The following
section provides the total number of accountability actions organized by agency and highlights cases
categorized by criminal activity.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
13
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Accountability
Percentage of Cases by Program
(October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023)
Program Area
Percentage of Cases by Program
Paycheck Protection Program
63%
Pandemic Unemployment
28%
COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program
23%
Health and Safety (fake Personal Protective Equipment,
false Medicare billing, false medical advertising)
5%
Other (Coronavirus Relief Fund, price gouging, Economic
Impact Payments, Restaurant Revitalization Fund)
5%
Source: Assembled by the PRAC from DOJ RSS feed.
Note: The percentages above credit all programs included in one case, and therefore, the total percentages exceeds
100 percent.
Table 1. Percentage of Cases by Program.
Investigative Results by Agency
(October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023)
Office of Inspector General
Arrests/Indictments
Convictions
Amtrak
-
1
Defense Criminal Investigative Service
22
18
Department of Health Human Services
36
26
Department of Homeland Security
65
11
Department of Housing and Urban Development
14
2
Department of Justice
5
5
Department of Labor
184
193
Department of the Treasury
2
4
Department of Veteran Affairs
4
4
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
52
36
Federal Housing Finance Agency
9
9
Federal Reserve Board
9
20
Small Business Administration
129
112
Social Security Administration
10
7
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
1
1
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
99
24
United States Postal Service
20
12
Source: Information provided to PRAC from each investigative office.
Note: Investigative work often involves several law enforcement agencies working on the same case. OIGs may conduct
cases with other OIGs, other federal law enforcement agencies, and state and local law enforcement entities. The counts
above credit all OIGs involved in the case and do not necessarily represent unique cases.
Table 2. Investigative Results by Agency.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
14
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
14
Accountability
Paycheck Protection
Program (PPP) and
COVID-19 Economic Injury
Disaster Loan (EIDL)
Case Highlights
Former Louisiana Woman Pled Guilty to
Preparing Over 110 Fraudulent PPP Loans
Totaling Over $1.1 Million Dollars
Investigative Partners: PRAC Fraud Task Force,
Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) OIG, Department of
Labor (DOL) OIG, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI),
United States Secret Service (USSS), with assistance
from state and local partners or agencies
The defendant pleaded guilty to a scheme to submit
110 PPP sole proprietorship loan applications using
the same false and fraudulent invoices and federal
tax forms. Nearly all the applications used a
fictitious business the defendant created. The
defendant falsely certified that the applications and
the information provided in the supporting
documents were true and accurate when submitted.
The defendant also advertised under various
aliases on Facebook to recruit individuals to help
them obtain money from the program.
Texas Man Convicted in Multimillion-Dollar
COVID Relief Fraud Scheme
Investigative Partners: Federal Housing Finance Agency
OIG, Small Business Administration (SBA) OIG, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG, Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration, HSI
The defendant was convicted for conspiring with
others to submit fraudulent PPP loan applications
by falsifying the number of employees and the
average monthly payroll expenses of the applicant
businesses. In total, the defendant, along with
others who participated in the scheme, sought over
$35 million through more than 80 fraudulent PPP
loans. The defendant distributed over $500,000
in fraudulent loan proceeds to conspirators and
himself using false payroll checks and laundered
a portion of the proceeds by transferring the funds
from one of his bank accounts to another bank
account he controlled. Fifteen other individuals have
pleaded guilty for their involvement in this case.
CEO Of Paycheck Protection Program Lender
MBE Capital Pleads Guilty In Connection With
Fraudulent Loan And Lender Applications
Investigative Partners: Federal Reserve Board OIG, SBA
OIG, Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigations
(IRS CI)
The CEO of MBE Capital Partners, LLC, pleaded
guilty in connection with both fraudulent loan and
lender applications submitted through the PPP.
Shortly after PPP began, the defendant fraudulently
obtained a $238,764 PPP loan for his company.
Then the defendant used false representations and
documents to fraudulently obtain SBA approval for
his company to be a non-bank lender through the
PPP. The defendant fraudulently secured hundreds
of millions of dollars in capital for PPP loans and
collected more than $71 million in lender fees.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
15
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
15
Accountability
Seattle Man Who Used Stolen Identities to
Seek Nearly $2 Million in COVID-19 Benefits
Pleads Guilty to Wire Fraud and Aggravated
Identity Theft
Investigative Partners: Social Security Administration
OIG, SBA OIG, DOL OIG, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS)
Amtrak Police Department, with assistance from state
and local partners or agencies
The defendant pleaded guilty for submitting more
than 29 COVID-19 EIDL applications using stolen
identities, and in some cases real small businesses,
seeking almost $1.5 million in aid, along with a
co-conspirator. They also used more than 50 stolen
identities to claim over $500,000 in UI benefits.
Across both programs, the two individuals were able
to receive over $1 million in fraudulent benefits.
New York Woman Sentenced for $9.2 Million
COVID-19 Relief Fraud
Investigative Partners: SBA OIG, IRS CI
The defendant was sentenced to 45 months in
prison and ordered to pay more than $1.6 million in
restitution and an additional $55,000 in forfeiture
for her role in the submission of fraudulent PPP loan
applications seeking more than $9.2 million. The
defendant recruited multiple individuals to apply
for fraudulent PPP loans in exchange for kickbacks
from their proceeds.
Baton Rouge Man Sentenced to 132 Months
in Federal Prison for Fraud Scheme and Money
Laundering Relating to Financial Aid and
COVID Fraud
Investigative Partners: Department of Education OIG,
FBI, with assistance from state and local partners or
agencies
The defendant was sentenced to 132 months in
federal prison and ordered to pay more than $2.7
million in restitution for defrauding the Department
of Education federal student aid program and
exploiting SBA’s COVID-19 EIDL program. The
defendant falsified business revenues and costs
for his business and concealed his prior guilty
plea to felony theft. As a result of the fraudulent
application, SBA ultimately distributed $90,000 to
the defendant.
Former Oregon Dentist Sentenced to Federal
Prison for Stealing Millions in Covid-Relief
Funds and Illegally Distributing Controlled
Substances
Investigative Partners: Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration, SBA OIG, FBI, USSS
A former Oregon dentist was sentenced to 70
months in federal prison and ordered to pay more
than $10.5 million in restitution for attempting to
steal $170 million in COVID-19 relief funds. From
September 2020 through May 2021, the defendant
submitted dozens of fraudulent COVID-19 EIDL
and PPP loan applications. The defendant applied
for these loans through fictitious businesses
and provided false information regarding the
business start dates, number of employees, and
locations, and the identities of the purported
applicants and business owners. Most of the
fraudulent applications were submitted in other
peoples’ names. The defendant later targeted
SBA’s Restaurant Revitalization Fund. In total, the
defendant submitted more than 100 fraudulent
PPP, COVID-19 EIDL, and Restaurant Revitalization

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
16
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
16
Accountability
Fund applications, stole the identities of more
than 40 victims, and caused SBA to pay out more
than $11.5 million in loans, grants, and associated
lender fees.
Four Defendants Charged in Multi-Million Dollar
COVID-19 Fraud Ring
Investigative Partners: Defense Criminal Investigative
Service, SBA OIG, Air Force Office of Special
Investigations, USSS
The four defendants were charged for their
alleged roles in a national fraud scheme where
they attempted to acquire $2 million in fraudulent
PPP loans by creating false tax documentation
to support the non-existent businesses. They
successfully acquired nearly $1 million in fraudulent
PPP loans. One of the defendants created false
PPP loan applications for nearly 100 people across
the country and helped those individuals submit
this false information to SBA-approved lenders.
Additionally, one of the defendants was an Active-
Duty Airman in the Air Force.
Recidivist Fraudster Convicted at Trial Of Over
$10 Million COVID-19 Loan Fraud Scheme
Investigative Partners: PRAC Fraud Task Force, DOJ OIG,
USSS, Drug Enforcement Administration, FBI, Federal
Aviation Administration, with assistance from state and
local partners or agencies
The defendant, along with another individual who
previously pleaded guilty and was sentenced
to nine years in prison, was convicted of using
false identities, fake tax records, and corporate
documents to obtain $1 million in COVID-19 EIDL
and PPP loans over the course of a year. In total
the individuals attempted to obtain more than $10
million through these relief programs through 14
different PPP and COVID-19 EIDL loans. Specifically,
the defendants used stolen identities and falsely
claimed full control of several companies that they
stated employed more than 200 people and paid
monthly salaries of more than $3.2 million.
North-Central Florida Blimp Company Executive
Sentenced to Over Five Years In Federal Prison
for COVID-19 Relief Fraud
Investigative Partners: Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation OIG, SBA OIG, FBI, IRS CI
The defendant was sentenced to 66 months in
federal prison and ordered to pay over $7.8 million
in restitution for submitting 16 fraudulent PPP
loans in the name of multiple businesses to several
lenders. The loan applications had no record of
employees that the defendant has listed in the
application and some of the companies listed in
applications were not established before February
15, 2020 (a requirement for the program). In total,
the defendant’s fraudulent PPP loan applications
sought a total of roughly $12 million in PPP loan
funds, of which he received roughly $5 million.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
17
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
17
Accountability
Pandemic Unemployment
Case Highlights
Waterbury Man Charged with Theft of
Pandemic Unemployment Benefits
Investigative Partners: Department of Homeland
Security OIG, DOL OIG, USPIS, Social Security
Administration OIG, with assistance from state and local
partners or agencies
The defendant was arrested on a federal criminal
complaint charging him with fraud and identity
theft. It is alleged that, using the identities of others
without their knowledge, the defendant submitted
numerous fraudulent applications for Pandemic
Unemployment Assistance and received assistance
in the form of debit cards in the names of the
victims. The defendant then obtained the debit
cards issued in victims’ names and unlawfully used
the cards for his own benefit.
Hyattsville Man Pleads Guilty to Scheme to
Fraudulently Obtain at Least $1.3 Million in
COVID-19 CARES Act Benefits
Investigative Partners: DOL OIG, USPIS, HSI, Treasury
OIG, with assistance from state and local partners or
agencies
The defendant pleaded guilty in connection with
a scheme to fraudulently obtain more than $1.3
million in Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. The
defendant used the identities of over 183 victims,
but used common internet protocol addresses,
mailing addresses, and email addresses used in the
applications. The applications were submitted to
multiple states including Maryland, Arizona, District
of Columbia, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Tennessee,
and Virginia.
Former Amtrak Employee and Husband Plead
Guilty After Bilking Pandemic Relief Program
of Nearly $1 Million
Investigative Partners: Amtrak OIG, Railroad Retirement
Board OIG, DOL OIG, DOL, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, HSI, USPIS, with assistance
from state and local partners or agencies
A former Amtrak employee pleaded guilty for
working with her husband to apply for UI benefits.
Over the course of roughly a year, beginning in the
spring of 2020 while she was still employed at
Amtrak, the defendant and her husband caused
at least 44 fraudulent UI claims to be filed with
California’s state workforce agency. In some
instances, the defendant submitted applications
using names, SSNs, and dates of birth she had
obtained from former clients of her tax preparation
businesses. She received roughly $1 million in
benefits through debit cards mailed to addresses
she and her husband controlled.
Former Mail Carrier and Co-Schemer
Sentenced to Prison for COVID Fraud
Investigative Partners: United States Postal Service OIG,
DOL OIG, with assistance from state and local partners or
agencies
A former United States Postal Service mail carrier
was sentenced to 41 months in federal prison
and ordered him to pay more than $150,000
in restitution for scheming to steal more than
$250,000 in UI benefits. While employed at the
United States Post Office, the defendant, and co-
conspirators, applied for UI benefits using false
statements and sometimes stolen identities.
Additionally, the individual stole legitimate debit
cards intended for UI recipients on his mail route
and withdrew the funds from ATMs.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
18
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Reports
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
18
Accountability
Health and Safety Case
Highlights
Suburban Chicago Man Indicted for COVID-19
Testing Fraud Scheme
Investigative Partners: Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) OIG, FBI
The defendant was indicted for purportedly
submitting fraudulent claims for reimbursement
on COVID-19 tests which were never performed,
were performed improperly, or were already paid for
by the client through his laboratory he co-owned.
The indictment also alleges that the defendant
caused the release of negative tests, despite no
testing being performed, to individuals who had
submitted specimen to the laboratory for testing. In
total, the laboratory obtained over $83 million from
the Health Resources and Services Administration
Uninsured Program as payment for fraudulent
claims for COVID-19 tests purportedly performed
by the laboratory. The defendant is alleged to have
transferred some of the fraudulently obtained funds
to a personal account, and to have used the funds
for personal expenditures.
Other Case Highlights
Former West Haven Employee and State
Representative Admits Stealing COVID Relief
and Other City Funds
Investigative Partners: Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) OIG, FBI
The defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges
stemming from his involvement in schemes that
resulted in the theft of more than $1.2 million
dollars in Coronavirus Relief Fund (CRF) and other
funds from the City of West Haven, Connecticut. The
defendant was a Connecticut State Representative
and employed by the City. From July 2020 through
September 2021, the City received approximately
$1,150,257 in financial assistance from CRF. The
defendant, who was authorized to approve the
designated relief funds for the reimbursement of
COVID-related expenditures, conspired with others
to steal these funds through the submission of
fraudulent invoices, and subsequent payment, for
goods and services that were never provided. His
schemes included forming businesses to bill the City
for consulting services that were not performed.
Naples Felon Sentenced to More Than Seven
Years for $2.6 Million COVID Relief Fraud
Scheme
Investigative Partners: Special Inspector General for
Pandemic Recovery, Federal Reserve Board OIG, FBI,
IRS CI
The defendant was sentenced to seven years and
three months in federal prison and ordered to pay
$2.6 million in restitution for a scheme to submit
false and fraudulent COVID-19 EIDL, PPP, and Main
Street Lending Program applications to SBA. These
applications included payroll, tax documents, and a
commercial lease with false documents. The
defendant in some cases also used the personal
identifying information of other individuals in his
applications. Across his applications, the individual
was able to obtain one Main Street Lending
Program, four COVID-19 EIDL, and five PPP loans
totaling roughly $2.6 million. He then used the
funds for purchase of a home, boat, and
ammunition among other items.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
19
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
19
Reports
Accountability
Key Insights Through Oversight
Reports
From October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023,
19 OIGs issued 50 oversight reports related to the
federal government’s COVID-19 pandemic response,
which identified $2.3 million in monetary findings
(e.g., questioned costs or funds put to better use).1
OIGs also made 101 recommendations to improve
the government’s response to the pandemic, such
as improving internal controls and providing more
oversight of recipients. In addition, OIGs have been
looking across their own work for trends or common
challenges and are issuing summary, or capstone,
reports that make recommendations to address
broader programmatic issues.
State oversight entities have continued to play a key
role in conducting oversight of federal pandemic
funding provided to state governments. For example,
state oversight entities have been issuing their
statewide single audits for the July 2021 to June
2022 time period, which identify control deficiencies
and other findings in major pandemic programs like
the Emergency Rental Assistance (ERA) Program.
As we will discuss in the following pages, these
federal oversight reports provide key insights on:
1. The importance of improving data information-
sharing to enhance decision making;
2. The impacts on spending transparency due
to reporting difficulties of CARES Act funding
recipients;
3. How a lack of documentation has hindered
opportunities to determine if pandemic funding
has helped the people it was intended to; and
4. The need to provide critical data, information,
and guidance to allow the American public to
better protect themselves from the effects of
the pandemic.
Notably, all four insights converge on a broader
theme centered around the value and critical need
for federal, state, and local government agencies to
produce, maintain, and share relevant information
and data. Without doing so, the American public
may not have critical information to best protect
their livelihoods, and policymakers may not have the
information they need to make informed decisions
to strengthen program integrity and better protect
the public during future emergencies.
See the following table for more information about
the reports issued by our federal OIG partners. For a
complete list of all federal oversight reports issued,
see Appendix B.
1
These oversight reports include all reports, memorandums, advisories, and other products issued by the OIGs related to the COVID-19 response
funding and programs.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
20
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
20
Reports
Accountability
Federal Oversight Reports from October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023
Office of Inspector General
Total Reports
Total
Recommendations
Total Monetary
Findingsa
Department of Agriculture
1
-
-
Department of Education
1
10
-
Department of Health and Human Services
12
24
$9,832
Department of Homeland Security
1
2
-
Department of Housing and Urban Development
2
5
-
Department of the Interior
3
13
$292,662
Department of Justice
1
10
-
Department of Labor
3
8
-
Department of Transportation
2
2
-
Department of the Treasury
7
2
-
Department of Veterans Affairs
2
2
-
Election Assistance Commission
2
13
$2,000,043
General Services Administration
1
2
-
Federal Reserve Board & Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau
1
-
-
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
2
-
-
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
1
8
-
Small Business Administration
1
-
-
Special Inspector General for Pandemic Recovery
6
-
-
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration
1
-
-
Totals
50
101
$2,302,537
a Monetary findings include all questioned costs and funds put to better use identified by each OIG.
Table 3. Oversight Reports from October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2023.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
21
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
21
Reports
Accountability
Key Insight 1: Agencies have opportunities to improve
data information-sharing to enhance decision making
across pandemic programs.
The PRAC has previously highlighted the need for
performance data to help drive decision making and
assess program effectiveness as a top challenge
in the government’s COVID-19 pandemic response.
This challenge still remains. Several federal
and state oversight offices this reporting period
emphasized that agencies, or specific programs,
should better leverage the data available to them
to improve their effectiveness and employ it in their
decision making. This data may be already available
to agencies internally or can be accessed through
their partners, but it is not being shared effectively
or being considered as programs progress.
For example, VA OIG found that the Veterans
Health Administration’s (VHA) data that tracks
canceled appointments could be better leveraged.
Based on a related 2020 recommendation, VHA
updated its Post-Cancelled Appointments and
Consult Management Initiative to track follow-
ups for all canceled appointments after July 21,
2020 from patients with COVID-19 or pandemic
remarks.2 While VA OIG found that VHA completed
follow-ups for around 87 percent of their canceled
appointments, the OIG identified that VHA could
better leverage their Post-Cancelled Appointments
and Consult Management Initiative report to
analyze types of care and monthly metrics. They
emphasized that monitoring the type of care
could help ensure that patients receive essential
diagnostic and preventative care and understand
certain health trends.
Relatedly, HHS OIG found that officials in state and
local COVID-19 vaccination programs expressed
challenges in obtaining data from immunization
databases needed to properly manage vaccination
campaigns.3 Many programs reported having
incomplete data on 250 million COVID-19 vaccine
doses administered by federal agencies and retail
pharmacies that receive vaccines from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention. Nearly all state
and local vaccination officials expressed this issue.
HHS OIG noted that complete and timely vaccination
data is critical for successful national vaccination
campaigns, monitoring vaccination coverage, and
planning strategies to increase vaccination uptake
in communities with low vaccination rates. In a
similar report, HHS OIG cited problems with Indian
Health Service’s internal data information-sharing
which contributed to inconsistent reporting on
the number of vaccination doses administered by
Tribal programs.4 Specifically, the issues associated
with the reporting of vaccine administration data
primarily resulted from the lack of compatibility
between Indian Health Services and Tribal
programs’ data management systems. HHS OIG
found that these reporting deficiencies made it
difficult for the Indian Health Services to accurately
assess vaccination progress.

2
VA OIG, VHA Progressed in the Follow-Up of Canceled Appointments during the Pandemic but Could Use Additional Overisght Metrics, Report
#21-03777-218, November 3, 2022.
3
HHS OIG, Challenges with Vaccination Data Hinder State and Local Immunization Program Efforts to Combat COVID 19, OEI—05-22-00010,
January 31, 2023.
4
HHS OIG, IHS Did Not Always Provide the Necessary Resources And Assistance To Help Ensure That Tribal Program Complied With All The
Requirements During Early COVID-19 Vaccination Program Implementation, A-07-21-04125, October 17, 2022.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
22
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
22
Reports
Better use of data to enhance decision making
extends beyond health care and vaccination
challenges. For example, the Office of the New
York State Comptroller found that the New York
Department of Labor failed to properly capture and
evaluate relevant data from their UI system related
to fraud, such as tracking and monitoring fraudulent
claims on an aggregate basis.5 The Comptroller
reported that doing so is necessary to support the
Department’s operational decisions as well as what
they report publicly.
Key Insight 2: CARES
Act recipients struggled
to understand reporting
requirements and
guidance which can impact
oversight and transparency
of the use of federal funds.
Complete and timely reporting of recipient spending
of federal pandemic funds enables effective
program oversight, monitoring, and can be used
to help populate public transparency websites.
During this reporting period, oversight offices at
the federal and state level highlighted that there
was often confusion, or other issues, related to
reporting requirements from recipients of federal
funds. Reporting issues often stemmed from a
lack of training and written policies and incorrect
information passing through multiple sources
without verification. These issues impacted the
timeliness or completeness of recipient reporting
related to pandemic funds and may have limited the
transparency of these funds to the general public.
5
Office of the New York State Comptroller, Department of Labor:
Controls and Management of the Unemployment Insurance System,
2021-S-3, November 15, 2022.
Understanding Issues Across
Programs and Agencies
In this reporting period, oversight agencies reviewed
findings across their bodies of work in capstone
style reports to identify broad, cross-cutting issues
within programs and agencies that may not have
otherwise been identified. Understanding key issues
across programs and agencies is critical to providing
effective oversight. Oversight entities continue to
show the value in using capstone-style reports
to identify these broader issues to both inform
the public and improve programs, systems, and
processes.
Following the release of three reports on the
reporting of CARES Act Funds across several
different Tribes, DOI OIG released a capstone
management advisory to synthesize findings
highlighted across the reports. As a result, they found
broader issues related to the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA), and its inability to hold Tribes accountable for
submitting the appropriate CARES Act reports.
DOJ OIG released a capstone review of its work
across 16 Bureau of Prison facilities which
identified broader issues across the BOP’s
response to the pandemic. This allowed DOJ OIG to
provide the agency with recommendations to improve
similar issues in the future, such as ensuring that
they are retaining effective practices to protect staff
and inmate health.
Similarly, the Special Inspector General for
Pandemic Recovery performed 16 independent
attestation reviews to evaluate whether
Treasury’s Validation Memo for loan recipients,
the initial step to move an applicant forward in
the process to receive funds, was completed
using Treasury guidance for underwriting and
documentation. This capping-style product assessed
16 reviews and found possible systemic issues with
this part of Treasury’s lending process.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
23
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
23
Reports
For example, the DOI OIG’s management advisory
reviewed three separate Tribes that received
CARES Act funding through BIA in the Great Plains
region.6 DOI OIG found that despite BIA providing
instructions and FAQ guidance, the Tribes did not
submit the required Federal Financial Reports or
their required Annual Narrative Reports in time.
In their report, DOI OIG reviewed $1.5 million
in CARES Act expenditures and questioned
nearly half of that amount. The lack of reporting
stemmed from BIA officials being unaware of
agreement responsibilities which outline reporting
requirements from the Tribes, not having formal
training, and not having written policies or
procedures for reviewing these reports. The OIG
emphasized that the submission and review of the
Federal Financial Reports and Annual Narrative
Reports from the Tribes could have provided BIA a
greater opportunity to identify deficiencies, provide
effective oversight, and respond accordingly.
Similarly, Treasury OIG issued a desk review of the
Fort McDermitt Paiute-Shoshone Tribe’s use of CRF
proceeds.7 The OIG found that the Tribe was late
in filing or failed to file quarterly Financial Progress
Reports. Additionally, supporting documentation
had not been entered into Treasury’s grant reporting
portal. Specifically, while the Tribe had adequately
supported their expenditures and had complied
with CARES Act and Treasury guidance on allowable
uses, their Treasury grant portal showed the Tribe
had spent $0 despite having documentation to
support over $3.5 million in expenses, based on
a sample of 21 transactions. This discrepancy
shows that while entities may have been aware of
allowable uses, failure to report spending made
it appear as though the Tribe had not spent any
money when in reality, they had spent a substantial
amount of their funds.
State, local, and Tribal governments received over
$150 billion in funding from the CARES Act. State
oversight entities have focused heavily on reporting
challenges from funding recipients. For example,
the Arizona Auditor General reported that the state
had inaccurate program information in quarterly
reports when compared to the state’s records for
CRF.8 The errors were the result of inadequate
training being provided to former staff members and
procedures not requiring reports to be reconciled
with accounting records. These errors resulted in
expenditures that were understated by over $21
million, more than $78 million that were incorrectly
classified as contract expenditures instead of
loans, and approximately $20.3 million that were
incorrectly classified as loans instead of as contract
expenditures. The report emphasized that the
inaccurate reporting impacts the ability for federal
agencies to rely on the information for monitoring
purposes.
In another example, the North Dakota Office
of the State Auditor highlighted the need for
stronger procedures to ensure federal reports are
complete and accurate.9 The North Dakota Office of
Management and Budget relied upon state agencies
to complete and submit their CRF report template.
However, the report found that reporting errors
were caused by state agencies not understanding
CRF reporting requirements, material errors and
omissions from state agencies not being identified,
and timeframes (10 days after the end of the
quarter) for reporting deadlines were short. The
errors resulted in approximately $61.1 million of
CRF expenditures not being reported in the correct
quarter. The State Auditor emphasized that these
issues impacted both transparency and federal
oversight of the program.
6
DOI OIG, The Bureau of Indian Affairs Great Plains Region Did Not Oversee CARES Act Funds Appropriately, 2021-FIN-032, February 10, 2023.
7
Treasury OIG, Desk Review of Fort McDermitt Paiute-Shoshone Tribe’s Use of Coronavirus Relief Fund Proceeds, OIG-CA-23-011, March 28, 2023.
8
Arizona Auditor General, Single Audit Report Year Ended June 30, 2021, October 31, 2022.
9
North Dakota Office of the State Auditor, State of North Dakota Single Audit Report, March 29, 2023.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
24
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
24
Reports
Key Insight 3: Lack of
documentation hindered
opportunities to determine
if pandemic money helped
people respond and
recover from the pandemic.
Beyond reporting expenses, properly justifying
expenses is just as critical. Doing so provides
agencies and oversight offices information about
how funds were used and how they supported
the American public during the pandemic. This
reporting period, oversight offices identified several
federal and state agencies that did not maintain
documentation justifying how they used pandemic
funds to help people respond or recover from the
pandemic. In some cases, agencies did not obtain
documentation supporting individuals’ eligibility
to receive benefits from pandemic programs,
while in other cases, agencies did not maintain
documentation to either support the legitimacy of
the spending or justify how the spending helped
the public respond and recover from the pandemic.
Regardless of the reason, without maintaining
supporting documentation, the ability for agencies
to make pandemic spending decisions based on
accurate information decreases.
For example, the Department of Education OIG
audit of the University of Cincinnati’s use of Higher
Education Emergency Relief Funds (HEERF) found
that the university did not fully document eligibility
criteria and determinations for its emergency
financial aid grants to students.10 The HEERF
program provided direct grants to institutions
of higher education to prevent, prepare for, and
respond to COVID-19 and included a portion for
institutions to defray expenses associated with
COVID-19 and to carry out student support activities
and a portion for emergency financial aid grants to
students. The university used student enrollment
and financial data that was in the university’s
information system to make determinations about
which students would receive emergency financial
aid grants under HEERF; however, the information
system did not keep a historic record of this
information. Without this supporting documentation,
management is limited in its ability to ensure that
emergency financial aid grants went to students
who needed it the most because of COVID-19.
In another example, the Election Assistance
Commission OIG audit of funds awarded to the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(CNMI) under the Help America Vote Act of
2002 (HAVA) found that CNMI could not provide
documentation supporting that the grant was used
for authorized and intended purposes.11 A portion
of CNMI’s HAVA funding came from the CARES Act
as the Act provided additional funding to prevent,
prepare for, and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic
for the 2020 federal election cycle. Because of
this limitation, the Election Assistance Commission
OIG questioned $687,000 of the total $1.2 million
awarded to CNMI under this grant. Although CNMI
charged expenses such as employees’ salaries,
cleaning services, and repair and maintenance to
this grant, they could not provide documentation
supporting these costs and, in some cases,
justification about how these costs helped prepare
or respond to COVID-19.
State findings also reflected this issue. The
Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau assessed how
the Wisconsin’s Department of Administration
made decisions about the use of supplemental
discretionary federal pandemic funds from the
10 Department of Education OIG, University of Cincinnati’s Use of Higher Education Emergency Relief Fund Student Aid and Institutional Grants,
ED-OIG/A20US0045, January 17, 2023.
11 Election Assistance Commission OIG, Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
G22MP0005-23-04, February 24, 2023.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
25
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
25
Reports
Appendices
CARES Act, American Rescue Plan Act, and the
Insights through Single Audits
Under federal regulations, any recipient (or sub-
recipient) that received more than $750,000 in
federal funding during its fiscal year is subject to
a single audit. Single audits assess compliance
controls on federal assistance and identify possible
areas of improvements and questioned costs. As
of March 31, 2023, 30 fiscal year 2022 (July 2021
through June 2022) statewide single audits had
been issued.
Notably, all 30 states who issued single audits
during this reporting had their ERA program audited
because it was identified as a major program.
Overall, the 30 reports contained 44 findings
pertaining to the ERA program. These findings
include:
Twenty-one state oversight entities did not
identify material noncompliance with the
program, but these programs still could
have had internal control or reporting issues. For
example, Vermont’s Office of the State Auditor
found that the Department of Finance and
Management procedures understated the amount
paid by the state to sub-recipients on the Schedule
of Expenditures of Federal awards by $118.8
million (or 99 percent), making it appear as those
the state did not pass through ERA funding to sub-
recipients.
Eight states had finding(s) containing
material noncompliance which resulted in a
qualified opinion being issued. For example,
Maine’s Office of the State Auditor found that
the Department of Economic and Community
Development was unable to provide documentation
to support amounts on the 2022 ERA program
performance reports and was unable to ensure
that the sub-award was used in compliance with
federal regulations due to improper design and
documentation.
Consolidated Appropriations Act.12 They found that
the Wisconsin Department of Administration did not
document how decisions were made to use these
discretionary funds for state programs. Among other
things, the Wisconsin Department of Administration
did not document the amount of funds to be used
for programs, anticipated benefits, or relevant
information that supported funding decisions and
amounts.
Similarly, the State of Mississippi FY 2021 single
audit noted that the Mississippi Department
of Employment Security could not provide
documentation supporting that it used CRF on
allowable activities.13 Specifically, the Department
used CRF monies to pay for vouchers provided to
students. However, the Mississippi Department
of Employment Security could not provide
documentation that the courses benefited students
in the workforce or were necessary due to the
pandemic.
Key Insight 4: Providing
critical data, information,
and guidance to the
American public can allow
them to better protect
themselves from the
effects of the pandemic.
New or expanded programs and other services
across federal, state, and local agencies require
effective education and outreach to achieve
their outcomes. Whether it is informing the
public of health safety concerns, newly available
12 Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau, State of Wisconsin FY 2021-22
Financial Statements, 22-26, December 2022.
13 Mississippi Office of the State Auditor, Single Audit for Year Ending
June 30, 2021, November 11, 2022.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
26
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Appendices
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
26
Reports
economic relief, or helping victims of identity theft,
government entities must have an established and
accessible way to communicate with the public.
For example, HHS OIG identified more than 1,300
nursing homes that had extremely high infection
rates during COVID-19 surges in 2020.14 HHS
OIG noted that significant changes were needed
to protect residents and better prepare nursing
homes for future health emergencies. Reports like
this show that publicizing COVID-19 infection and
mortality rates may help people make appropriate
decisions about their family’s well-being. Informing
the public extends beyond health-related issues.
Other oversight entities have emphasized that
government agencies and offices must properly
provide beneficiaries with guidance. For example,
HUD OIG issued a report that reviewed HUD’s
communication to homeowners with Federal
Housing Administration-insured mortgages about
protections, repayment options, loss mitigation
options, and responsibilities related to COVID-19.15
HUD OIG found that improvements such as clearly
presenting the deadline for requesting forbearance
and detailing loss mitigation options available after
forbearance, among other improvements, could
better serve homeowners during the COVID-19
pandemic and future national emergencies.
Local oversight entities are also finding valuable
opportunities where agencies can better share
critical information with the public. The Ulster
County New York Office of the Comptroller found
that unemployment claims were being fraudulently
filed using the identities of active local government
employees, a common theme previously identified
across several state auditor’s offices.16 The
Comptroller found that the County’s Personnel
Department properly identified the fraudulent
unemployment claims, but some employees were
not notified that they were victims of identity theft.
The Comptroller recommended that affected
individuals be notified of fraudulent unemployment
claims and provided with timely resources regarding
identity theft and credit protection as soon as
possible.
14 HHS OIG, More Than a Thousand Nursing Homes Reached Infection Rates of 75 Percent or More in the First Year of the COVID-19 Pandemic;
Better Protections Are Needed for Future Emergencies, OEI-02-20-00491, January 19, 2023.
15 HUD OIG, HUD’s Communication to Homeowners About COVID-19 Policies, 2023-NY-0001, January 30, 2023.
16 Office of the Ulster County Comptroller, 2021 Audit on Unemployment Fraud, November 3, 2023.

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
27
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
27
Appendices
Appendix A: Acronyms
BIA
Bureau of Indian Affairs
CARES Act
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act
CIGIE
Council of the Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency
CNMI
Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands
COVID-19
Novel coronavirus disease
CRF
Coronavirus Relief Fund
HHS
Department of Health and Human
Services
HUD
Department of Housing and Urban
Development
DOI
Department of the Interior
DOJ
Department of Justice
DOL
Department of Labor
Treasury
Department of the Treasury
EIDL
Economic Injury Disaster Loan
ERA
Emergency Rental Assistance
FBI
Federal Bureau of Investigation
HAVA
Help America Vote Act
HEERF
Higher Education Emergency Relief
Fund
HSI
Homeland Security Investigations
IG
Inspector General
IRS CI
Internal Revenue Service Criminal
Investigations
OIG
Office of Inspector General
PACE
Pandemic Analytics Center of
Excellence
PRAC
Pandemic Response Accountability
Committee
PPP
Paycheck Protection Program
SBA
Small Business Administration
SSN
Social Security Number
UI
Unemployment Insurance
USPIS
United States Postal Inspection
Service
USSS
United States Secret Service
VA
Department of Veterans Affairs
VHA
Veterans Health Administration

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
28
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
28
Appendices
Appendix B: Pandemic-Related
Reports by Office of Inspector General
OIGs issued a total of 50 reports between October
1, 2022, and March 31, 2023, related to the
COVID-19 pandemic response. The following
information provides a list of those reports.
Board of Governors for the Federal Reserve
System & Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau OIG
Observations on Cybersecurity Risk Management
Processes for Vendors Supporting the Main Street
Lending Program and the Secondary Market
Corporate Credit Facility, 2022-IT-B-015,
November 9, 2022
U.S. Department of Agriculture OIG
USDA Coronavirus Food Assistance Program Data
Story, 22-033-01, December 1, 2022
U.S. Department of Education OIG
University of Cincinnati’s Use of Higher Education
Emergency Relief Fund Student Aid and Institutional
Grants Funds, EDOIG/A20US0045, January 27,
2023
U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services OIG
IHS Did Not Always Provide the Necessary
Resources and Assistance To Help Ensure That
Tribal Programs Complied With All Requirements
During Early COVID-19 Vaccination Program
Administration, A-07-21-04125, October 18, 2022
Home Health Agencies Used Multiple Strategies To
Respond to the COVID-19 Pandemic, Although Some
Challenges Persist, OEI-01-21-00110, October 18,
2022
Payments Made to Providers Under the COVID-19
Accelerated and Advance Payments Program Were
Generally in Compliance with the CARES Act and
Other Federal Requirements, A-05-20-00053,
October 25, 2022
During the Initial COVID-19 Response, HHS
Personnel Who Interacted With Potentially Infected
Passengers Had Limited Protections, OEI-04-20-
00360, November 3, 2022
The Number of Beneficiaries Who Received
Medicare Part B Clinical Laboratory Tests
Decreased During the First 10 Months of the
COVID-19 Pandemic, A-09-21-03004, November 14,
2022
Insights on Telehealth Use and Program Integrity
Risks Across Selected Health Care Programs During
the Pandemic, OEI-02-22-00150, December 1,
2022
Labs With Questionably High Billing for Additional
Tests Alongside COVID-19 Tests Warrant Further
Scrutiny, OEI-09-20-00510, December 6, 2022
Illinois Generally Complied With Requirements for
Claiming Medicaid Reimbursement for Telehealth
Payments During COVID-19, A-05-21-00035,
January 6, 2023

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
29
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
29
Appendices
ASPR Could Improve Its Oversight of the Hospital
Preparedness Program to Ensure Crisis Standards
of Care Comply With Federal Nondiscrimination
Laws, A-01-21-01502, January 19, 2023
More Than a Thousand Nursing Homes Reached
Infection Rates of 75 Percent or More in the First
Year of the COVID-19 Pandemic; Better Protections
Are Needed for Future Emergencies,
OEI-02-20-00491, January 19, 2023
Challenges With Vaccination Data Hinder State and
Local Immunization Program Efforts to Combat
COVID-19, OEI-05-22-00010, January 31, 2023
Early Challenges Highlight Areas for Improvement in
COVID-19 Vaccination Programs, OEI-04-21-00190,
January 31, 2023
U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG
FEMA Did Not Provide Sufficient Oversight of Project
Airbridge, OIG-22-14, February 7, 2023
U.S Department of Housing and Urban
Development OIG
Review of Drawdown Levels and Publicly Available
Information on the Office of Native American
Programs’ CARES Act and ARP Act Block Grants,
2023-LA-0003, January 20, 2023
HUD’s Communication to Homeowners About
COVID-19 Policies, 2023-NY-0001, January 30,
2023
U.S. Department of the Interior OIG
The Bureaus of Indian Affairs and Indian Education
Have the Opportunity To Implement Additional
Controls To Prevent or Detect Multi-dipping of
Pandemic Response Funds, 2021–ER–015,
November 29, 2022
The Omaha Tribe Did Not Account for CARES Act
Funds Appropriately, 2021–FIN–032–B, December
29, 2022
The Bureau of Indian Affairs Great Plains Region
Did Not Oversee CARES Act Funds Appropriately,
2021–FIN–032, February 10, 2023
U.S. Department of the Justice OIG
Capstone Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’
Response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019
Pandemic, 23-054, March 21, 2023
U.S. Department of Labor OIG
COVID-19: OSHA’s Enforcement Activities Did Not
Sufficiently Protect Workers from Pandemic Health
Hazards, 19-23-001-10-105, October 31, 2022
FY 2022 Independent Auditors’ on DOL’s
Consolidated Financial Statements Report,
22-23-002-13-001, December 13, 2022
Insights on Telehealth Use and Program Integrity
Risks in DOL Workers’ Compensation Programs
During the Pandemic, 19-23-002-04-001,
December 13, 2022
U.S. Department of Transportation OIG
FTA Can Enhance Its Controls To Mitigate COVID-19
Relief Funding Risks, ST2023001, October 12,
2022
DOT’s Tracking of Aviation Imports and Potential
Impacts of Disruptions, AV2023009, December 19,
2022

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
30
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
30
Appendices
U.S. Department of the Treasury OIG
Town of Hempstead Uses of Coronavirus Relief Fund
Payment, OIG-CA-23-006, January 9, 2023
Desk Review of Broward County, FL Use of
Coronavirus Relief Fund Proceeds, OIG-CA-23-010,
January 31, 2023
Desk Review of the State of New York’s Use of
Coronavirus Relief Fund Proceeds, OIG-CA-23-013,
February 14, 2023
Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic Relief
Programs: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support
Certifications - Corvus Airlines, Inc. (Redacted),
OIG-23-021, March 27, 2023
Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic Relief
Programs: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support
Certifications - Empire Airlines, Inc. (Redacted),
OIG-23-022, March 27, 2023
Desk Review of Fort McDermitt Paiute-Shoshone
Tribe’s Use of Coronavirus Relief Fund Proceeds,
OIG-CA-23-011, March 28, 2023
Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic Relief
Programs: Audit of Air Carrier Worker Support
Certifications - Wings Air Helicopters, LLC
(Redacted), OIG-23-023, March 31, 2023
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs OIG
VHA Progressed in the Follow-Up of Canceled
Appointments during the Pandemic but Could
Use Additional Oversight Metrics, 21-03777-218,
November 3, 2022
Insights on Telehealth Use and Program Integrity
Risks Across Selected Health Care Programs During
the Pandemic, 21-03579-27, December 1, 2022
U.S. Election Assistance Commission OIG
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded
to the State of California, G22CA0009-23-01,
October 4, 2022
Audit of the Help America Vote Act Grants Awarded
to the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands, G22MP0005-23-04, February 24, 2023
U.S. General Services Administration OIG
Ventilation Issues Persist in Unrenovated Wings of
GSA Headquarters Building, JE23-001, November
28, 2022
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Insights on Telehealth Use and Program Integrity
Risks Across Selected Health Care Programs During
the Pandemic, PRAC-2023-01, December 1, 2022
FRAUD ALERT: PRAC Identifies $5.4 Billion in
Potentially Fraudulent Pandemic Loans Obtained
Using Over 69,000 Questionable Social Security
Numbers, PRAC-2023-02, January 30, 2023
U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation OIG
PBGC Should Improve Its Special Financial
Assistance Review Procedures, EVAL-2023-08,
February 24, 2023
U.S. Small Business Administration OIG
White Paper: 7(A) Loan Program During SBA’s
Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 23-05,
March 21, 2023

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
31
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
31
Appendices
U.S. Special Inspector General for Pandemic
Recovery
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Caribbean Sun Airlines, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-13, October 26, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Ovation Travel Group, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-14, December 2, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Timco Engine Center, Inc.,
SIGPR-A-22-003-15, December 6, 2022
Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan Recipient’s
Validation Memo – Eastern Airlines, LLC,
SIGPR-A-22-003-16, January 19, 2023
Roll-up of the Independent Review of 4003(b) Loan
Recipients’ Validation Memos, SIGPR-A-22-003-1,
March 8, 2023
Interim Report: Audit of the Effects the Main Street
Lending Program’s loan losses have on Treasury’s
Investment in the Program, SIGPR-A-23-002-2,
March 31, 2023
U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax
Administration
Backlogs of Tax Returns and Other Account Work
Will Continue Into the 2023 Filing Season,
2023-46-007, December 20, 2022

Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
Semiannual Report to Congress
OCTOBER 1, 2022 - MARCH 31, 2023
32
Highlights
Background
Accomplishments
Accountability
Reports
Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
32
Appendices
Appendix C: Hotline Data
During the reporting period, we received 1,305 hotline communications, of which 325 were filed for
information or not actionable. The remaining 980 were deemed potentially actionable for fraud, waste,
abuse, or mismanagement. From these, the PRAC forwarded 987 allegations to 16 different Offices of
Inspectors General for review and appropriate action. Referrals might be sent to more than one OIG based
on the allegation(s) referenced, resulting in the slightly higher number reported here.

For more information:
Lisa Reijula
Associate Director of Outreach and Engagement, PRAC
Lisa.Reijula@cigie.gov
Visit us at:
PandemicOversight.gov
Follow us at:
Report Fraud, Waste, Abuse, or Misconduct:
To report allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or
misconduct regarding pandemic relief funds or programs
please go to the PRAC website at
PandemicOversight.gov.
A Committee of the
Council of the Inspectors General
on Integrity and Efficiency

File and source

File

2023-h1-semiannual-oct2022-mar2023.pdf

Size

5,306,771 bytes

SHA-256

dab6784de0357ede6459717a616fea5f5d70729d77fe93de2a9fe659de14b35f

Our copy

2023-h1-semiannual-oct2022-mar2023.pdf

Original

www.oversight.gov