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Home Court filings WP Company LLC v. U.S. Small Business Administration Plaintiffs' reply in support of cross-motion for summary judgment — WP Co. v. SBA

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Plaintiffs' reply in support of cross-motion for summary judgment — WP Co. v. SBA

Filed September 29, 2020 in Wp Co v. SBA; one of 21 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Filed2020-09-29

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · No. 1:20-cv-01240-JEB · Doc. 21 · 2020-09-29 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
WP COMPANY LLC  
d/b/a THE WASHINGTON POST, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 
                                                          
Defendant. 
  
Case No. 1:20-cv-1240-JEB 
Oral Argument Requested 
   
 
 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN FURTHER SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dated:  September 29, 2020 
 
Charles D. Tobin (#455593) 
Maxwell S. Mishkin (#1031356) 
Kristel Tupja (#888324914) 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
1909 K Street, NW, 12th Floor 
Washington, DC 20006 
Telephone: (202) 661-2200 
Fax: (202) 661-2299 
tobinc@ballardspahr.com 
mishkinm@ballardspahr.com 
tupjak@ballardspahr.com 
 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
 
 
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i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... ii 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT .....................................................................................................1 
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................................3 
I. 
THE SBA CANNOT WITHHOLD LOAN DATA UNDER EXEMPTION 4 ...................3 
A. 
The Loan Data Does Not Reveal Any Information That Is 
Customarily And Actually Treated As Private ........................................................3 
1. 
Non-profit groups already disclose the data the SBA  
seeks to protect .............................................................................................3 
2. 
The Loan Data would not actually reveal borrowers’  
average payrolls ...........................................................................................5 
B. 
The Loan Data Was Not Provided Under An Assurance Of Privacy ......................7 
II. 
THE SBA CANNOT WITHHOLD LOAN DATA UNDER EXEMPTION 6 .................10 
III. 
THE SBA HAS NOT SATISFIED THE FORESEEABLE HARM 
STANDARD ......................................................................................................................14 
CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................................................14 
 
 
 
 
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ii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
 
Page(s) 
Cases 
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Department of the Interior,  
53 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 1999) .............................................................................................11 
American Immigration Lawyers Association v. Executive Office  
for Immigration Review, 
830 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2016) .................................................................................................10 
Flightsafety Services Corporation v. Department of Labor, 
326 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................5 
*Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 
139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019) ...............................................................................................................3 
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Commerce, 
375 F. Supp. 3d 93 (D.D.C. 2019) ...........................................................................................14 
Maydak v. Department of Justice, 
218 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ...................................................................................................7 
*Multi AG Media LLC v. Department of Agriculture, 
515 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................13 
Prechtel v. FCC,  
330 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D.D.C. 2018) .........................................................................................11 
Public Citizen, Inc. v. OMB, 
598 F.3d 865 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ...................................................................................................3 
RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 
566 U.S. 639 (2012) ...................................................................................................................9 
Statutes 
31 U.S.C. § 6101 ............................................................................................................................10 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
In its Opposition (“Opp.”), the SBA concedes the falsity of the factual premises it relies 
on to withhold the identities of and amounts borrowed by the recipients of more than half a 
trillion taxpayer dollars through the PPP and EIDL programs.  The forms, regulations, statutes, 
and precedent that the SBA cites, and the public interest that has only grown since this litigation 
began, all favor the release of this “Loan Data” to Plaintiffs and the public. 
First, the SBA now acknowledges that “[b]usinesses that pay salaries of greater than 
$100,000 received PPP loans” and that “PPP borrowers did not all receive the maximum loan 
amount available to them,” see SBA’s Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 
(“SBA’s Resp. SUMF”) at ¶¶ 18-19, Dkt. 20-1.  The SBA’s admissions thus undercut its entire 
Exemption 4 rationale that the Loan Data would reveal “average payroll” information, because in 
making that claim the agency assumes precisely the opposite, that borrowers paid salaries of no 
more than $100,000 and took out the maximum loans.  See Opp. at 7-8.   
Second, the SBA asks the Court to overlook its own PPP application and instead look to 
its Standard Operating Procedure (“SOP”), even though that document also lists “names . . . of 
recipients of approved loans” and “amounts of loans” as information generally disclosed under 
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), see Ex. Q to the Decl. of William Manger (“Manger 
Decl.”), Dkt. 15-2 at 55.  Moreover, the SBA’s claim that it errantly included the transparency 
language in the PPP application form (i.e., that “[i]nformation about approved loans will be 
automatically released,” including “the names of the borrowers” and “the amount of the loan”), 
because it hastily copied “boilerplate” from another program’s application form, supports more 
scrutiny – not less – in the administration of this $525 billion aid program.  See Opp. at 2, 10.  
The SBA therefore cannot justify its claim that the Loan Data is confidential under Exemption 4 
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or that the public interest is outweighed by the borrowers’ private interests under Exemption 6.   
Third, the government’s own enhanced concerns about the administration of the SBA 
loan program demonstrate the public interest in the Loan Data.  The Justice Department has 
already opened dozens of cases for alleged PPP-related crimes, and the SBA’s own Inspector 
General calls these prosecutions “the smallest, tiniest piece of the tip of the iceberg.”  See Stacy 
Cowley, Spotting $62 Million in Alleged P.P.P. Fraud Was the Easy Part, The New York Times, 
Aug. 28, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/28/business/ppp-small-business-fraud-
coronavirus.html at 1-2.  Indeed, just days after Plaintiffs filed their opening brief (“Br.”), the 
Department’s Criminal Division held a press conference on “PPP Criminal Fraud.”  Prosecutors 
announced charges against PPP borrowers for spending taxpayer dollars “on things like luxury 
cars, homes, renovations, jewelry – and even adult entertainment and gambling in Las Vegas,” 
and acknowledged that “any time the federal government makes a large amount of money 
available to the public on an expedited basis, the opportunities for fraud are clear.”1  In light of 
these official allegations that the program has been abused, the SBA’s argument that the public 
interest is “satisfied” because the SBA plans “to review all PPP loans greater than $2 million” 
and “other PPP loans, as appropriate,” is simply inadequate.  See Opp. at 16.  The SBA’s vague 
promise of oversight rings especially hollow as loans of greater than $2 million, the threshold for 
scrutiny that the SBA selected, represent only 0.6% of all loans made under the PPP.  Thus, even 
under the SBA’s assurances, the vast majority of PPP loans would receive no government 
scrutiny.  Again, the public’s need to monitor waste, fraud, and abuse, in a program that 
                                                 
1 See Acting Assistant Attorney General Brian Rabbitt Delivers Remarks at the PPP Criminal 
Fraud Enforcement Action Press Conference: Remarks as Prepared for Delivery, Dep’t of 
Justice, Sept. 10, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-assistant-attorney-general-
brian-rabbitt-delivers-remarks-ppp-criminal-fraud.   
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prosecutors already have identified as vulnerable to rampant criminal conduct, outweighs any 
private interests under Exemption 6. 
In light of the SBA’s groundless confidentiality and privacy objections, and the 
compelling public interest in disclosure of these records, the Court should order the SBA to 
promptly release the Loan Data in full and award Plaintiffs their costs and reasonable attorneys’ 
fees. 
ARGUMENT 
The SBA fails to rebut FOIA’s “presumption in favor of disclosure” that underlies 
FOIA’s objective “‘to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to open agency action to the 
light of public scrutiny.’” Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. OMB, 598 F.3d 865, 869 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976)).  The SBA also fails to carry 
the burden, under the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, to show that any harm from releasing the 
Loan Data is not simply possible, but is reasonably foreseeable.   
I. 
THE SBA CANNOT WITHHOLD LOAN DATA UNDER EXEMPTION 4. 
The SBA’s Opposition undermines its Exemption 4 claim and fails to rebut Plaintiffs’ 
argument that the Loan Data does not satisfy either part of the Exemption 4 test – i.e., that for 
“commercial or financial information” to indisputably be “confidential” under that exemption, it 
must have been “both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to 
the government under an assurance of privacy.”  Food Mktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. 
Ct. 2356, 2366 (2019).   
A. 
The Loan Data Does Not Reveal Any Information That Is Customarily  
And Actually Treated As Private. 
 
1. 
Non-profit groups already disclose the data the SBA seeks to protect. 
 
As Plaintiffs have pointed out, the SBA maintains that if it “release[d] the borrowers’ 
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identities and PPP loan amounts, the public and competitors could attribute average payroll 
information to particular borrowers,” Opp. at 6, yet the tens of thousands of non-profit groups 
that borrowed PPP funds generally make that information public on their IRS Form 990s.  Br. at 
15.  While the SBA informs the Court that “Form 990 does not make an organization’s average 
payroll public,” Opp. at 11-12 (citing Second Manger Decl. ¶ 21, in turn citing 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6033(b)(7)), the form’s first page requires a non-profit to furnish its total “[s]alaries, other 
compensation, [and] employee benefits.”  See Form 990, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f990.pdf, at 1 line 15.  That information is drawn from Form 990 Part IX, which requires an 
organization to report its total payroll, the very information the SBA says is not public.  The 
smaller subset of compensation disclosures to which the SBA’s declarant refers – the non-
profit’s officers, key employees, highest paid staff, etc. – is found in Form 990 Part VII. 
For example, Carnegie Hall, a non-profit, received a PPP loan of between $5 and $10 
million.  See Christian Berthelsen, Carnegie Hall Is Among Cultural Sites That Got PPP Aid, 
Bloomberg, July 6, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-07-06/carnegie-hall-
whitney-museum-and-s-f-symphony-got-ppp-loans.  On its latest public Form 990, Carnegie 
Hall lists total “[s]alaries, other compensation, [and] employee benefits” for the current year as 
$48,276,831.  See Form 990, Carnegie Hall Corp., Feb. 25, 2019, at 1 line 15, available at 
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/131923626/05_2019_prefixes_06-
13%2F131923626_201806_990_2019051316293975.  That figure encompasses the more than 
$5 million in compensation Carnegie Hall paid to current officers, directors, trustees, and key 
employees, as well as the more than $30 million in compensation paid in “[o]ther salaries and 
wages.”  See id. at 10 (Part IX) lines 5-10.   
Because the public already knows the amount of Carnegie Hall’s and tens of thousands of 
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other non-profits’ total payroll from the Form 990, which requires that public disclosure, the 
SBA cannot justify withholding the size of PPP loans for non-profits on the faulty premise that it 
needs to safeguard that data from disclosure under FOIA. 
2. 
The Loan Data would not actually reveal borrowers’ average payrolls. 
The SBA has demonstrated that any connection between payroll information and loan 
size is fallacious even for businesses that do treat their average payroll as private.2  The SBA 
merely “assumes that a borrower took out a loan for the maximum amount allowed” and also 
“assum[es] . . . that a PPP borrower would pay few if any of its employees more than $100,000.”  
Opp. at 6-7 (emphasis added).  It is now beyond dispute, however, that PPP borrowers in fact 
took less than the maximum and in fact paid more than $100,000 in salary.  See SBA’s Resp. 
SUMF at ¶¶ 18-19 (admitting that “PPP borrowers did not all receive the maximum loan amount 
available to them” and that “[b]usinesses that pay salaries of greater than $100,000 received PPP 
loans”).  The SBA’s assumptions are therefore concededly false. 
The SBA supports its supposition by arguing that the PPP application “steered borrowers 
to calculate the maximum loan amount available to them and thus to request that amount.”  Opp. 
at 7.  But the SBA does not say how many borrowers took less than the amount to which they 
were “steered.”  And while some businesses may have “had an obvious reason” to borrow 
greatly at a time of economic distress, see id., others also had an obvious reason not to take too 
much.  The SBA will forgive loans only to a business that expends sufficient funds on designated 
                                                 
2 The SBA criticizes Plaintiffs for “declin[ing] to address” Flightsafety Services Corporation v. 
Department of Labor, 326 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2003), which the SBA cites for the proposition that 
“Exemption 4 protects ‘information regarding salaries and wages,’” Opp. at 6, but that point is 
not in question here.  Plaintiffs do not contest that an individual for-profit business’s payroll 
information can be confidential under Exemption 4; Plaintiffs dispute that the Loan Data reveals 
payroll information in the first place. 
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budget items.  Businesses that over-borrowed and were unable to hit those spending thresholds 
risk losing out on loan forgiveness.  See Br. at 16.  The SBA provides no sound basis for its 
argument that enough borrowers maxed-out their loans such that disclosing the entire program’s 
Loan Data reasonably risks disclosure of an individual business’s confidential information.   
As to the salary thresholds, the SBA similarly tries to shore up its assumption by mis-
citing its own evidence to assert that “the vast majority of PPP borrowers have no employees 
who earn more than $100,000 per year.”  Opp. at 8 (citing Second Manger Decl. ¶¶ 11-12).    
What that declaration actually says, however, is that “[b]ased on available W-2 data, the 
Department of Treasury estimates that 77% of all small businesses do not have any employees 
whose salary exceeds $100,000,” and that “by implication” this figure applies for PPP borrowers.  
Second Manger Decl. ¶ 10 (emphasis added).  The SBA thus assumes it can treat PPP borrowers 
as representative of all small businesses, even though businesses with existing ties to banks 
likely had easier access to PPP loans.  See, e.g., Haoyang Liu and Desi Volker, Where Have the 
Paycheck Protection Loans Gone So Far?, Fed. Reserve Bank of New York: Liberty Street 
Economics, May 6, 2020, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2020/05/where-have-
the-paycheck-protection-loans-gone-so-far.html (“Our interpretation is that banks’ preference for 
their own customers causes the PPP to favor firms with existing lending relationships.”); Ruth 
Simon & Peter Rudegeair, In Race for Small-Business Loans, Winning Hinged on Where Firms 
Bank, The Wall Street Journal, Apr. 20, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-race-for-small-
business-loans-winning-hinged-on-where-firms-bank-11587410421 (“Whether a firm made the 
cut often came down to how and where it banked.”).  To the extent that businesses with ties to 
banks may tend to pay higher salaries than those without such connections, the SBA offers no 
reason to presume that “the vast majority” of PPP borrowers pay salaries of under $100,000. 
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Resting on these faulty premises, SBA’s argument is unsustainable.  The SBA itself 
demonstrates this through its appeal to speculation.  No member of the public looking at the 
Loan Data would be able to ascertain a specific business’s confidential payroll data, as they 
would have no way to know whether a specific borrower took less than the maximum amount for 
its loan, paid salaries of over $100,000, or both.  The Court therefore should overrule SBA’s 
argument under FOIA Exemption 4.3 
B. 
The Loan Data Was Not Provided Under An Assurance Of Privacy.   
 
In addition to the SBA’s failure to satisfy the Exemption 4 requirement that the 
information must be “customarily and actually treated as private by its owner,” the SBA also 
fails to demonstrate that the information was “provided to the government under an assurance of 
privacy” under the Argus Leader test.  Despite the SBA’s efforts to avoid the concession, the 
record is clear that the Loan Data was not provided to the SBA under an “assurance of privacy.”  
Instead, it was provided with a guarantee of disclosure. 
 
The PPP application told borrowers that “[i]nformation about approved loans will be 
automatically released,” including “the names of the borrowers” and “the amount of the loan.”  
See SBA, Paycheck Protection Program Borrower Application Form, 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-07/PPP-Borrower-Application-Form-508.pdf at 4 
(emphasis added).  The relevant portion of the form, near the top of page 4, appears as follows: 
                                                 
3 The SBA mis-cites precedent in arguing that the agency “satisfied its burden of protecting the 
PPP loan amounts under Exemption 4 by articulating a ‘generic,’ and ‘categorical’ justification 
that applied to the loan data in its entirety.”  Opp. at 8 (citing Maydak v. Dep’t of Justice, 218 
F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).  Maydak does not support an Exemption 4 claim based on a generic 
showing; rather, it recognizes that the government “satisfies its burden of proof under Exemption 
7(A) by grouping documents in categories and offering generic reasons for withholding the 
documents in each category” and observes that “other exemptions” not including Exemption 4 
can be satisfied “through generic, categorical showings” as well.  Maydak, 218 F.3d at 765-66 
(emphasis added) (identifying cases addressing Exemptions 3, 5, 7(C), and 7(D)). 
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The EIDL application likewise stated that FOIA generally requires the SBA to release 
“information such as names of borrowers” and “loan amounts at maturity.”  See SBA, COVID-19 
Economic Injury Disaster Loan Application, 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/articles/SBA_Form_3501_Economic_Injury_Disaster_Lo
an_Application.pdf at 12.  The SBA could not have told borrowers more clearly that the Loan 
Data would be made public, not kept private. 
 
The SBA nonetheless maintains – again, contrary to its own proofs – that “‘an implied 
assurance of confidentiality fairly can be inferred’” from its actions.  Opp. at 9 (quoting Dep’t of 
Justice v. Landano, 508 U.S. 165, 179 (1993)).  The SBA principally argues that “[t]he 
application form did not purport to override the [SBA’s] Standard Operating Procedure,” which 
“for many years has committed SBA to preserving the confidentiality of payroll information.”  
Opp. at 10.  In particular, Mr. Manger cites Appendix C of the current SOP as “includ[ing] 
among information generally exempt from disclosure the payroll information of businesses.”  
Second Manger Decl. ¶ 13; Manger Decl., Ex. Q at 54.  The SBA therefore argues that a 
borrower unsure whether its name and loan amount might be disclosed would look past the four-
page PPP application itself and rely on a statement made in a separate document, the SOP. 
 
The SBA fails to mention, however, that on the very next page of the SOP, it lists 
“[n]ames and commercial street and email addresses of recipients of approved loans” and 
“[k]inds and amounts of loans” under the heading, in all capital letters, “INFORMATION 
GENERALLY DISCLOSED.”  See id. at 55.  The SOP further states that “[a]pproved loan 
recipients, amounts and dates” are “information [that] usually is not granted Exemption 4 
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protection.”  See id. at 24-25 (emphasis in original).  Even if the Court would expect borrowers 
to consult the SOP in reviewing the PPP application form, and calibrate their expectations about 
public disclosure of the Loan Data, the SOP supports Plaintiffs’ position that the information was 
presumptively public. 
 
The SBA also illogically insists that “the most natural reading” of the explicit disclaimer 
– stating that “the names of the borrowers” and “the amount of the loan” will be “automatically 
released” – instead tells borrowers that their names and loan amounts will be kept secret.  Opp. at 
10.  According to the SBA, because the disclaimer text also states that “collateral pledged to 
secure the loan” will be made public, and “PPP loans do not require collateral,” potential 
borrowers will assume the disclaimer “applies only to Section 7(a) loans, not PPP loans.”  Id. 
(emphasis omitted).  The SBA therefore assumes that PPP borrowers would recognize the PPP 
form’s reference to “collateral” as inapt, would be aware of the 7(a) loan program, and would 
cross reference the plain language of the PPP form they are instructed to complete with a 7(a) 
loan application form that they do not need to complete.4  Rather than a “natural” reading, the 
SBA urges that the Court, and borrowers, traverse through its various programs and applications 
to arrive at an unnatural reading of the PPP form itself.   
 
As Plaintiffs additionally argued in their opening brief (Br. at 19), the idea that the SBA 
“implicitly” assured borrowers the Loan Data would be kept confidential is further weakened by 
                                                 
4 Likewise, because the application notes that the SBA will not disclose undefined “[p]roprietary 
data,” the SBA claims that applicants will view borrower names and loan amounts as proprietary 
data to be kept confidential.  Id.  That argument continues to ignore the commonsense 
interpretative principle that the specific controls the general.  Br. at 18-19.  The disclaimer states 
that names and loans amounts specifically will be disclosed and that proprietary data generally 
will be kept private.  The most natural reading of the disclaimer is that names and loan amounts 
will, in fact, be disclosed.  See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 
U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (“To eliminate the contradiction, the specific provision [must be] construed 
as an exception to the general one.”). 
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the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act of 2006.  The statute provides that the 
Office of Management and Budget “shall” disclose the “name of the entity receiving the award” 
and “the amount of the award” for “[f]ederal award[s]” of $25,000.00 or more, where “[f]ederal 
award” is defined specifically to include “loans . . . and other forms of financial assistance.”  
31 U.S.C. § 6101 note § 2(a)(4) & (b)(1).  The SBA responds that the law does not require the 
disclosure of information exempt under FOIA, see Opp. at 12, but that simply begs the question.  
The relevant point is that this statute on its face weighs against any “implicit” message from the 
SBA that borrowers’ names and loan amounts would be kept private.   
 
The SBA did not receive the Loan Data under an assurance of privacy, whether explicit 
or implicit.  Rather, the SBA received the Loan Data under an assurance of disclosure: the 
application forms themselves and the agency’s SOP state outright that borrowers’ names and 
loan amounts will be public record.  The SBA thus cannot satisfy either element of the Argus 
Leader test, and it cannot justify withholding the Loan Data under Exemption 4.5 
II. 
THE SBA CANNOT WITHHOLD LOAN DATA UNDER EXEMPTION 6. 
 
The SBA likewise fails to carry its burden under Exemption 6 to show that releasing the 
Loan Data “would rise to the level of a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” when 
balanced against “the public interest in disclosure.”  Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Exec. 
Office for Immigration Review, 830 F.3d 667, 673-74 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (internal marks and 
citations omitted).  The privacy interest, if any, is minimal, and the public interest is mammoth.   
 
On the privacy issue, the SBA emphasizes that the D.C. Circuit recognizes a privacy 
interest “in connection with financial information” as a general matter, Opp. at 13, but Plaintiffs 
                                                 
5 To be sure, even if the SBA had made an assurance of confidentiality to borrowers, the first 
Argus Leader element still would require disclosure of the Loan Data. 
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have shown that in these particular circumstances PPP and EIDL borrowers have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the Loan Data.  Br. at 20-21.  As discussed above, the SBA expressly 
notified borrowers that their names and loan amounts would be disclosed.  See supra at 7-9.  In 
analogous circumstances courts have concluded that such a notification diminishes (or 
eliminates) any reasonable expectation of privacy under Exemption 6.  See Br. at 21-22 (citing 
Prechtel v. FCC, 330 F. Supp. 3d 320, 329 (D.D.C. 2018) and All. for the Wild Rockies v. Dep’t 
of the Interior, 53 F. Supp. 2d 32, 37 (D.D.C. 1999)).  The SBA attempts to distinguish these 
decisions by asserting that “to release the identities of individuals who comment on agency 
rulemakings is not to reveal anything especially private about them.”  Opp. at 14.6  But the SBA 
dodges the point: whatever the individual’s privacy interest in the abstract, the precedent teaches 
that the interest diminishes or disappears entirely when information is provided to the 
government despite notice that the agency will disclose it to the public.  See Br. at 21-22 (citing 
Prechtel, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 329; All. for the Wild Rockies, 53 F. Supp. 2d at 37).  Borrowers 
took out these loans being told, in no uncertain terms, that their names and loan amounts would 
be made public. 
The SBA errs on the public interest side of the scale as well.  According to the SBA, the 
public already has ample information about these unprecedented financial assistance programs, 
see Opp. at 15-17, but the SBA’s arguments on this point are baseless.  The SBA states that it has 
“released the identities of PPP borrowers with loans above $150,000, who account for almost 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, while the government distinguishes the Prechtel precedent on this basis, in 
actually litigating that case, it took the opposite position, arguing there that the individuals 
submitting comments on the rulemaking “have a substantial privacy interest” in the requested 
information.  See Def.’s Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J. at 4, Prechtel v. FCC, No. 1:17-cv-
1835-CRC (D.D.C. June 18, 2018), Dkt. 25.   
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75% of all PPP funds loaned,” id. at 16, but loans of less than $150,000 make up 87% of all PPP 
loans, see SBA, Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) Report: Approvals through Aug. 8, 2020, 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-08/PPP_Report%20-%202020-08-10-508.pdf at 6.  
Moreover, the SBA has pledged to review only PPP loans for more than $2 million (and others 
“as appropriate”), Opp. at 16, leaving the overwhelming majority of PPP loans, and thus the 
lion’s share of all borrowers, subject to neither agency nor public oversight. 
The SBA also disputes that Loan Data would enable the press and the public to monitor 
whether taxpayer funds have been distributed fairly and equitably, stating that “the SBA has 
already released demographic data for PPP loans.”  Opp. at 16 (citing Manger Decl. ¶¶ 88-89).  
But as the Government Accountability Office noted in a report published just one day before the 
SBA filed its Opposition in this case: 
The loan-level data that SBA provided include limited demographic data on 
borrowers, as SBA did not ask for demographic information on the PPP loan 
application.  According to SBA officials, SBA does not have the legal authority to 
require a borrower to submit demographic data on a loan application.  In a May 
2020 report, the SBA Office of Inspector General noted that SBA did not request 
optional demographic information on the PPP loan application and suggested that 
the agency (1) revise the borrower application to request these optional data and 
(2) include optional demographic information on the loan forgiveness form.  SBA 
did not revise the borrower application to collect such information in an effort to 
streamline the application process, according to agency officials.  Consequently, 
information was not reported for business owners’ race for 90 percent of 
approved loans, gender for 79 percent of approved loans, and veteran status 
for 85 percent of approved loans. 
 
See COVID-19: Federal Efforts Could Be Strengthened by Timely and Concerted Actions, GAO, 
Sept. 21, 2020, https://www.gao.gov/reports/GAO-20-701/ (emphasis added).  The SBA has thus 
failed to make this information available, and by withholding the Loan Data it has prevented the 
press and public from finding out the information for itself.  Nor can the SBA plausibly argue 
that “release of borrower identities for the smallest loans would not enable the public to 
Case 1:20-cv-01240-JEB   Document 21   Filed 09/29/20   Page 15 of 17

 
 
13 
 
 
determine which businesses receiving PPP loans were minority-owned.” See Opp. at 16.  Of 
course, journalists regularly cross-reference publicly available data to supplement and augment 
the government’s self-reporting, all for the public benefit.7 
 
Even more remarkable than what the SBA says, however, is what the agency ignores.  
The words “waste” and “fraud” and “abuse” are found nowhere in the SBA’s Opposition, and 
they receive just a single passing mention in SBA’s proofs.  See Second Manger Decl. ¶ 29.  As 
noted, however, the Justice Department has begun dozens of prosecutions for alleged PPP-
related crimes, and the SBA’s Inspector General calls these cases “the smallest, tiniest piece of 
the tip of the iceberg.”  See supra at 2.  As the Department stated, “The money these defendants 
stole was taxpayer money.  Every dollar received was a dollar drawn from the American 
people’s account.  Even worse, every dollar they took was a dollar set aside to help our fellow 
Americans weather one of the worst national crises in recent history.”  See supra note 1.  It is for 
this reason that the D.C. Circuit recognizes “a special need for public scrutiny of agency action 
that distributes extensive amounts of public funds in the form of subsidies and other financial 
benefits.”  Multi AG Media LLC v. Dep’t of Ag., 515 F.3d 1224, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2008).   
 
The SBA cannot justify withholding the Loan Data under Exemption 6.  The public 
interest in this information is enormous and the privacy risk from its release is minimal at most. 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, At War With The Truth, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2019, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-
war-confidential-documents/ (reporting based on interviews and data gathered to supplement 
FOIA disclosures by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction); Katelyn 
Polantz et al., Highlights from the new Mueller FBI investigation documents, CNN, Feb. 11, 
2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/02/politics/mueller-investigation-documents/index.html 
(reporting based on interviews and observations to supplement FOIA disclosures by the 
Department of Justice). 
Case 1:20-cv-01240-JEB   Document 21   Filed 09/29/20   Page 16 of 17

 
 
14 
 
 
III. 
THE SBA HAS NOT SATISFIED THE FORESEEABLE HARM STANDARD. 
 
In the wake of the FOIA Improvement Act of 2016, withholding public records now 
requires “more than speculation” that their release will harm some interest protected by a FOIA 
exemption.  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 375 F. Supp. 3d 93, 100-01 (D.D.C. 
2019).  Instead, an agency must show that the harm “is reasonably foreseeable” and must 
articulate “the link between this harm and the specific information contained in the material 
withheld.”  Id.  The SBA has failed this test.  The agency’s speculative arguments discussed 
above cannot even pass the baseline for withholding records under FOIA, let alone satisfy the 
enhanced “foreseeable harm” standard that now governs this action. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in their opening brief, Plaintiffs respectfully 
request that their cross-motion for summary judgment be granted, that the SBA’s motion for 
summary judgment be denied, that the SBA be ordered to promptly disclose the Loan Data in 
full, and that Plaintiffs be awarded their costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in this 
action. 
Dated:  September 29, 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Respectfully submitted,  
 
BALLARD SPAHR LLP 
 
/s/ Charles D. Tobin  
 
 
 
Charles D. Tobin (#455593) 
Maxwell S. Mishkin (#1031356) 
Kristel Tupja (#888324914) 
1909 K Street, NW, 12th Floor 
Washington, DC 20006 
Telephone: (202) 661-2200 
Fax: (202) 661-2299 
tobinc@ballardspahr.com 
mishkinm@ballardspahr.com 
tupjak@ballardspahr.com 
 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
 
Case 1:20-cv-01240-JEB   Document 21   Filed 09/29/20   Page 17 of 17

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