Court filing
SBA opposition to second motion for reconsideration — Williams v. U.S. Small Business Administration (C.D. Cal.)
Filed February 10, 2025 in Williams v. SBA; one of 15 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Central District of California |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2025-02-10 |
U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK · Doc. 34 · 2025-02-10 · Docket on CourtListener
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JOSEPH T. MCNALLY
Acting United States Attorney
DAVID M. HARRIS
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
JOANNE S. OSINOFF
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation Section
ALEXANDER L. FARRELL (Cal. Bar No. 335008)
Assistant United States Attorney
Federal Building, Suite 7516
300 North Los Angeles Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Telephone: (213) 894-5557
Facsimile: (213) 894-7819
E-mail: Alexander.Farrell@usdoj.gov
Attorneys for Defendant
The United States Small Business Administration
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES SMALL
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK
UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS
ADMINISTRATION’S OPPOSITION
TO PLAINTIFF’S SECOND “MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION” [DKT. 32]
[Proposed Order filed concurrently
herewith]
Hearing Date:
March 3, 2025
Hearing Time:
9:00 a.m.
Ctrm:
850
Honorable R. Gary Klausner
United States District Judge
Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK Document 34 Filed 02/10/25 Page 1 of 8 Page ID
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OPPOSITION TO THE SECOND “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION”
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff filed a second post-dismissal motion titled as “NOTICE OF MOTION
AND MOTION FOR VOID ORDER FOR THE ORIGINAL REMANDING FROM
STATE TO FEDERAL COURT AS WELL AS THE JUDGEMENT FROM 12/30/24
[DCKT #1 AND #23].” Dkt. 32 (“Second Motion for Reconsideration”). Plaintiff has
filed two other motions for reconsideration seeking to reverse the Court’s prior order that
dismissed this action. See Dkt. 24; 24-1; 27; 27-1. All of Plaintiff’s post-dismissal
motions are duplicative, defective, and do not meet the threshold for reversing the
dismissal in this case.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration seeks relief from this Court’s December
30, 2024, order and requests the Court overturn the order denying his motion for remand
and seeks an immediate order from this Court remanding this action to the Superior
Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. Plaintiff argues that the
Los Angeles Superior Court is not a state court within a “state” of the United States, as
interpreted under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 that was the based for removal to this Court.
Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Reconsideration is meritless and is procedurally and
substantively defective. Procedurally, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is
untimely because it was filed more than 14 days after the entry of the Court’s December
30, 2024, Order. See Dkt. 23. Substantively, the Second Motion for Reconsideration
does not meet the threshold for a reversal of a prior order. Plaintiff fails to state any
circumstance that allows for the Court to grant the Second Motion for Reconsideration,
pursuant to Local Rule 7-18. Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Reconsideration does not
include any new material facts or a change of law occurring after the December 30th
Order was entered. And the plain textual reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1442 shows Plaintiff is
wrong because the Los Angeles Superior Court is a state court. For the reasons stated
below, Plaintiff’s Second Motion for Reconsideration should be denied.
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II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a civil action against the SBA in the
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. See Dkt. 1-1
(“Compl.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to assert claims against the SBA for breach of
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, “currency” cause of action, contract fraud, conversion,
unjust enrichment, violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et
seq., violation of California Penal Code §§ 496, 236.1, 487, and criminal violation of
California Corporations Code § 25541. Id. ¶¶ 20-64. Most of the allegations in Plaintiff’s
Complaint derive from sections of the Model Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Id. ¶¶
13-14, 23-24 28-29, 31.
On November 5, 2024, the SBA removed this action to District Court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Dkt. 1. On November 12, 2024, the SBA moved to dismiss the
Complaint’s claims against it pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and
(6). Dkt. 8. Plaintiff did not file any opposition to the SBA’s motion to dismiss and as
thus such consented to the granting of the motion. See Dkt. 23 at 3; see also C.D. Cal.
L.R. 7-12.
On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case back to the
Superior Court. Dkt. 12. The SBA filed an opposition to the motion to remand. Dkt. 13.
Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of the motion for remand. Dkt. 17.
On December 18, 2024, the Court took the SBA’s motion to dismiss and the
Plaintiff’s motion for remand under submission. Dkt. 21.
On December 20, 2024, the Court issued an order, ruled the SBA’s removal of the
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) was proper, denied the Plaintiff’s motion for
remand, ruled that the Plaintiff’s claims against the SBA were barred by sovereign
immunity and were inadequately pled and were legal frivolous, and granted the SBA’s
motion to dismiss, and dismissed the action in its entirety. Dkt. 23. The Court also found
that because Plaintiff failed to oppose the SBA’s motion to dismiss, he consented to the
granting of the motion. See id. at 3.
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On January 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed “objections” which is are equivalent to a
motion for reconsideration. Dkt. 24; 24-1. On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed another
motion for reconsideration. Dkt. 27. The SBA filed an opposition to the motion for
reconsideration and filed a response to the “objections.” Dkt. 28-29. On February 6,
2025, the Court took the Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration [Dk. 27] under
submission. See Dkt. 33.
Separately, on January 31, 2025, Plaintiff filed this Second Motion for
Reconsideration.
III.
RECONSIDERATION LEGAL STANDARDS
Although not mentioned in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motions for
reconsideration may be brought under Rule 60(b), as well as under Local Rule 7-18. A
motion for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances,
unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear
error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals,
Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted). The movant bears the burden of proving that reconsideration is proper. 389
Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999).
Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or
proceeding only in the following circumstances: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the
judgment. See Stewart v. Dupnik, 243 F.3d 549, 549 (9th Cir. 2000) (declining to grant
Rule 60(b) motion where movant failed to establish entitlement to relief). Rulings on
motions for relief from judgment brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) are committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Thompson v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles, 782
F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1986).
“Courts in this district have interpreted Local Rule 7-18 to be coextensive with
Rules 59(e) and 60(b).” Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 6054912, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
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2020) (citation omitted)). Under Local Rule 7-18, a motion for reconsideration may be
made only on the grounds of: (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented
to the Court that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to
the party moving for reconsideration at the time the Order was entered; (b) the
emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the Order was
entered; or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the
Court before the Order was entered. L.R. 7-18. “No motion for reconsideration shall in
any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to
the original motion.” Id.
IV.
THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS UNTIMELY
Summarily, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is untimely and should be
denied. The Central District of California’s Local Rules state “[a]bsent good cause
shown, any motion for reconsideration must be filed no later than 14 days after entry of
the Order that is the subject of the motion or application.” CD. Cal. L.R. 7-18. The Order
that Plaintiff seeks to overturn was entered on December 30, 2024. Dkt. 23. The Second
Motion for Reconsideration however was filed on January 31, 2025, more than 14 days
after the entry of the Order. See Motion at 1. Plaintiff cannot show good cause of why
this Court should consider this untimely motion. Plaintiff has already filed two separate
motions for reconsideration within the applicable timeline. Regardless of the substance
of the Second Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff’s “state court” arguments could have
been included in his prior filings, but they were not. As such, the Court should deny the
Second Motion for Reconsideration for this initial reason.
V.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECONSIDERATION
Plaintiff does not attempt to establish a highly unusual circumstance warranting
reconsideration, newly discovered evidence, or a change in the controlling law under
Rule 60(b) or Local Rule 7-18. Plaintiff also does not assert that mistake, inadvertence,
surprise or excusable neglect, or fraud led to the decision, or that a judgment is void or
has been satisfied under Rule 60(b). Plaintiff simply raises arguments that he could have
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raised in his motion for remand or his previously filed motions for reconsideration—
arguments this Court can readily reject.
The Second Motion for Reconsideration does not explain any fact or law that was
not previously known to Plaintiff when he filed his Motion for Remand; the pleadings do
not show new material facts or a change of law that occurred after the December 30th
Order was entered; and the pleadings do not show the Court failed to consider material
facts presented to the Court before the December 30th Order was entered. See C.D. Cal.
L.R. 7-18.
Plaintiff still does not meaningfully dispute that proper removal under 28 U.S.C. §
1442(a)(1), occurred and this has been thoroughly explained by the SBA. Plaintiff’s
argument is that the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles is not a “state court”
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1442. Motion at 2. He then claims that “[i]n the law of
the United States, an insular area is a U.S.-associated jurisdiction that is not part of a U.S.
state or the District of Columbia.” Motion at 3.
As the Court already explained, to establish that removal is proper under Section
1442(a)(1), the removing defendant must “demonstrate that (a) it is a person within the
meaning of the statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a
federal officer’s directions, and plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a colorable federal
defense.” Dkt. 23 at 2; see Stirling v. Minasian, 955 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2020). The
Court fully and correctly explained why the SBA’s removal under § 1442 was proper. See
Dkt. 23 at 2. The Court does not need to conduct a further analysis to define a “state” or
whether the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles is a “state court” because the
Court already determined Plaintiff’s arguments in the underlying motion for remand were
meritless, irrelevant, and did not even address the substance of a § 1442 removal. Id. The
Second Motion for Reconsideration is no different.
Lastly, the plain text of § 1442 demonstrates that the removal from Los Angeles
Superior Court was proper. When a “statute's language is plain, ‘the sole function of the
courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,
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Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). First, to interpret a statute “…is to determine whether the
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular
dispute in the case. The Court’s inquiry ceases if the statutory language is unambiguous
and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent.” Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.
337, 340 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the plain language of Section 1442(a) limits removals to “civil action[s]”
and “criminal prosecution[s]” brought in “a State court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a). The
Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles is a state court within the
State of California's court system. See Judicial Branch of California - Superior Courts,
https://courts.ca.gov/courts/superior-courts (last visited Feb. 10, 2025); see also website
of the Los Angeles Superior Court, https://www.lacourt.org/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2025).
The plain meaning inquiry ends with the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles
is a state court within the meaning of federal agency removal statute. The Court does not
need to go further entertain Plaintiff’s frivolous argument.
Accordingly, removal to this Court was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1442, and the
Second Motion for Reconsideration should be denied for this additional reason.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff failed to satisfy the high bar to warrant reconsidering the Court’s order
dated December 30, 2024, and his request for relief from dismissal should be denied.
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Dated: February 10, 2025
Respectfully submitted,
JOSEPH T. MCNALLY
Acting United States Attorney
DAVID M. HARRIS
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Civil Division
JOANNE S. OSINOFF
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation Section
/s/ Alexander L. Farrell
ALEXANDER L. FARRELL
Assistant United States Attorney
Attorneys for Defendant the United States Small
Business Administration
Local Rule 11-6.2 Certificate of Compliance
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that this Opposition memorandum
contains 2,014 words and is 6 pages which complies with the word limit set by L.R. 11-
6.1 and the page limit set by the Court’s Standing Order [Dkt. 6].
Dated: February 10, 2025
/s/ Alexander L. Farrell
ALEXANDER L. FARRELL
Assistant United States Attorney
Case 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK Document 34 Filed 02/10/25 Page 8 of 8 Page ID
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