SBA opposition to motion for reconsideration — Williams v. U.S. Small Business Administration (C.D. Cal.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Central District of California · No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK · Doc. 29 · 2025-01-17 · Docket on CourtListener

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E. MARTIN ESTRADA 
United States Attorney 
DAVID M. HARRIS  
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Civil Division 
JOANNE S. OSINOFF   
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation Section 
ALEXANDER L. FARRELL (Cal. Bar No. 335008) 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Federal Building, Suite 7516 
300 North Los Angeles Street 
Los Angeles, California 90012 
Telephone: (213) 894-5557 
Facsimile: (213) 894-7819 
E-mail: Alexander.Farrell@usdoj.gov  
 
Attorneys for Defendant 
United States Small Business Administration 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNITED STATES SMALL 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, 
Defendant. 
No. 2:24-cv-09553-RGK-SK 
UNITED STATES SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION’S OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFF’S “MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION” [DKT. 27]  
[Proposed Order filed concurrently 
herewith] 
Hearing Date: 
February 10, 2025 
Hearing Time: 
9:00 a.m. 
Ctrm: 
850 
Honorable R. Gary Klausner 
United States District Judge
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DEFENDANT’S OPPOSITION TO “MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION” 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
After this Court issued an order [Dkt. 23], granting the United States Small 
Business Administration’s (“SBA”) motion to dismiss and denying Plaintiff Brandon Joe 
Williams’ Motion to Remand, Plaintiff filed a motion titled as “NOTICE OF MOTION 
AND MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
TO DISMISS 11/8/24 (DCKT #8) AND TO VACATE VOID ORDER FROM 12/30/24 
(DCKT #23).” Dkt. 27 (“Motion for Reconsideration”).1 
The Motion for Reconsideration seeks relief from this Court’s December 30, 
2024, order and requests leave of Court to 1) file an amended complaint pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2); and seeks to overturn the Court’s order 
dismissing this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Plaintiff also seeks 
an immediate order from this Court remanding this action to the Superior Court of the 
State of California for the County of Los Angeles, prior to any hearing because he claims 
“[e]ven the hearing itself is a bit pointless because no Federal court can gain jurisdiction 
over this case so we might as well just skip to remanding the case back to State court.” 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is procedurally and substantively meritless. 
Procedurally, Plaintiff failed to meet and confer with counsel for the SBA within the 
meaning and purpose of Local Rule 7-3. Plaintiff attempts to avoid this requirement by 
referencing to a separate conference of the parties that occurred on November 20, 2024, 
over a month prior to the entry of the Court’s December 30, 2024, order that Plaintiff 
seeks to reconsider. See Motion for Reconsideration at 3. Plaintiff did not actually meet 
and confer about his Motion for Reconsideration. 
Substantively, the Court correctly granted the SBA’s motion to dismiss and 
dismissed this action. This Court also correctly determined that Plaintiff’s failure to 
 
1 Plaintiff also filed a pleading titled as “OBJECTIONS REGARDING ORDER 
FROM 12/30/24 (DOCKET #23).” See Dkt. 24 (“Plaintiff’s Objections”); see also Dkt. 
24-1 (“Affidavit” in support). Plaintiff’s Objections are equivalent to a motion for 
reconsideration and is duplicative. 
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oppose the SBA’s motion is deemed consent to the granting of the SBA’s motion. See 
C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12. Plaintiff admits he did not file an opposition to the Motion to 
Dismiss because he did not believe a responsive pleading was necessary. Plaintiff’s 
Objections ¶ 3. Plaintiff fails to meet his burden to demonstrate this Court clearly erred 
in dismissing this action. Plaintiff fails to state any circumstance that allows for the 
Court to grant the Motion for Reconsideration, pursuant to Local Rule 7-18. Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Reconsideration simply repeats many of the arguments stated in his Motion 
for Remand and attempts to include an incoherent “Affidavit of Facts” attempting to 
explain his own citizenship a person and or as BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS ®. Dkt. 27-
1. This alleged “affidavit” does not include any new material facts or a change of law 
occurring after the December 30th Order was entered.  
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration should be 
denied.2 
II. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed a civil action against the SBA in the 
Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles. See Dkt. 1-1 
(“Compl.”). Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to assert claims against the SBA for breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, “currency” cause of action, contract fraud, conversion, 
unjust enrichment, violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et 
seq., violation of California Penal Code §§ 496, 236.1, 487, and criminal violation of 
California Corporations Code § 25541. Id. ¶¶ 20-64. Most of the allegations in Plaintiff’s 
Complaint derive from sections of the Model Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Id. ¶¶ 
13-14, 23-24 28-29, 31. 
On November 5, 2024, the SBA removed this action to District Court pursuant to 
 
2 To the extent that Plaintiff brings his Motion for Reconsideration and Objections 
as a non-human entity, as “BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS ®” – a “public corporation” 
[Dkt. 27 at 1; Dkt. 24 ¶ 1], the Court should deny the motion because a non-human entity 
cannot appear pro se in this Court and must be represented by a member of this Court’s 
bar. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 83-2.1.1.1; 83-2.2; 83-2.2.2. 
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28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Dkt. 1. On November 12, 2024, the SBA moved to dismiss the 
Complaint’s claims against it pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 
(6). Dkt. 8. Plaintiff did not file any opposition to the SBA’s motion to dismiss and as 
thus such consented to the granting of the motion. See Dkt. 23 at 3; see also C.D. Cal. 
L.R. 7-12. 
On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case back to the 
Superior Court. Dkt. 12. The SBA filed an opposition to the motion to remand. Dkt. 13. 
Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of the motion for remand. Dkt. 17.  
On December 18, 2024, the Court took the SBA’s motion to dismiss and the 
Plaintiff’s motion for remand under submission. Dkt. 21. 
 
On December 20, 2024, the Court issued an order, ruled the SBA’s removal of the 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) was proper, denied the Plaintiff’s motion for 
remand, ruled that the Plaintiff’s claims against the SBA were barred by sovereign 
immunity and were inadequately pled and were legal frivolous, and granted the SBA’s 
motion to dismiss, and dismissed the action in its entirety. Dkt. 23. The Court also found 
that because Plaintiff failed to oppose the SBA’s motion to dismiss, he consented to the 
granting of the motion. See id. at 3. 
 
On January 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Motion for Reconsideration. Dkt. 27. 
III. 
RECONSIDERATION LEGAL STANDARDS 
Although not mentioned in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, motions for 
reconsideration may be brought under Rule 60(b), as well as under Local Rule 7-18. A 
motion for reconsideration “should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, 
unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear 
error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 
Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation 
omitted). The movant bears the burden of proving that reconsideration is proper. 389 
Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999). 
Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order or 
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proceeding only in the following circumstances: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) the judgment is void; (5) 
the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the 
judgment. See Stewart v. Dupnik, 243 F.3d 549, 549 (9th Cir. 2000) (declining to grant 
Rule 60(b) motion where movant failed to establish entitlement to relief). Rulings on 
motions for relief from judgment brought pursuant to Rule 60(b) are committed to the 
sound discretion of the trial court. Thompson v. Housing Authority of Los Angeles, 782 
F.2d 829, 832 (9th Cir. 1986). 
“Courts in this district have interpreted Local Rule 7-18 to be coextensive with 
Rules 59(e) and 60(b).” Gish v. Newsom, 2020 WL 6054912, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 
2020) (citation omitted)). Under Local Rule 7-18, a motion for reconsideration may be 
made only on the grounds of: (a) a material difference in fact or law from that presented 
to the Court that, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to 
the party moving for reconsideration at the time the Order was entered; (b) the 
emergence of new material facts or a change of law occurring after the Order was 
entered; or (c) a manifest showing of a failure to consider material facts presented to the 
Court before the Order was entered. L.R. 7-18. “No motion for reconsideration shall in 
any manner repeat any oral or written argument made in support of or in opposition to 
the original motion.” Id. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECONSIDERATION 
Plaintiff does not attempt to establish a highly unusual circumstance warranting 
reconsideration, newly discovered evidence, or a change in the controlling law under 
Rule 60(b) or Local Rule 7-18. Plaintiff also does not assert that mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect, or fraud led to the decision, or that a judgment is void or 
has been satisfied under Rule 60(b). Plaintiff simply raises the same arguments that he 
raised in his Complaint and in his motion for remand—arguments this Court has already 
rejected. 
The Motion for Reconsideration and the “Affidavit of Facts” [Dkt. 27-1] do not 
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explain any fact or law that was not previously known to Plaintiff when he filed his 
Motion for Remand; the pleadings do not show new material facts or a change of law 
that occurred after the December 30th Order was entered; and the pleadings do not show 
the Court failed to consider material facts presented to the Court before the December 
30th Order was entered. See C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-18. 
Also, the Court correctly rejected Plaintiff’s arguments in its prior Order. For 
example, Plaintiff’s attempt to repeat that his claims rely on various strange and legally 
unsound arguments based on citizenship or the purported lack thereof. Cf. Affidavit of 
Facts [Dkt. 27-1]; with Plaintiff’s Reply Brief in support of Motion for Remand [Dkt. 17] 
at 4-6 (“Plaintiff’s position is firmly grounded in established legal principles 
distinguishing between incorporated entities subject to suit and unincorporated sovereign 
entities…[t]he differentiation between Plaintiff Brandon Joe Williams (unincorporated 
‘freeman’ of the ‘Union’… and BRANDON JOE WILLIAMS ® (incorporated juristic 
person [known as a ‘sole proprietorship’] – described as a ‘person,’ ‘individual,’ or 
‘natural person’) is based on statutory interpretation—not fringe theories…By focusing 
on these distinctions, Plaintiff demonstrates that Defendant’s invocation of sovereign 
immunity is wholly inapplicable here.”)). The Court correctly stated “[t]hese arguments 
are highly similar to those made by sovereign citizens, which courts have uniformly 
rejected… [t]he Court sees no reason why Plaintiff's arguments in this case should fare 
better.” Dkt. 23 at 2-3. 
Plaintiff still does not meaningfully dispute that proper removal under 28 U.S.C. § 
1442(a)(1), occurred and this has been thoroughly explained by the SBA. In conclusory 
fashion, Plaintiff claims “[e]ven the hearing itself [his own noticed motion hearing] is a 
bit pointless because no Federal court can gain jurisdiction over this case so we might as 
well just skip to remanding the case back to State court. Motion for Reconsideration at 3. 
As the Court explained, to establish that removal is proper under Section 1442(a)(1), the 
removing defendant must “demonstrate that (a) it is a person within the meaning of the 
statute; (b) there is a causal nexus between its actions, taken pursuant to a federal officer’s 
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directions, and plaintiff’s claims; and (c) it can assert a colorable federal defense.” Dkt. 23 
at 2; see Stirling v. Minasian, 955 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2020). Each of these elements 
were soundly and throughout explained that the SBA is a “person” within the meaning of 
the statute, as it is a United States agency. See State of Neb. ex rel. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. 
Bentson, 146 F.3d 676, 678 (9th Cir. 1998). Second, there is a causal nexus between the 
SBA’s actions and Plaintiff's claims, as Plaintiffs claims relate to the SBA’s issuance and 
administration of an Economic Injury Disaster Loan. And finally, the SBA has a colorable 
federal defense that Plaintiff's contract claims are barred by sovereign immunity, and that 
his tort claims fail to meet the various jurisdictional requirements set forth by the Federal 
Tort Claims Act. 
Finally, the Court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s action in its entirety and without 
leave to amend. Leave to amend may be denied if amendment would be futile. Foman v. 
Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Wheeler v. City of Santa Clara, 894 F.3d 1046, 1059 
(9th Cir. 2018). Plaintiff admits he did not file any opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 
because he did not believe a responsive pleading was necessary: 
The reason that there was no response in opposition done with the motion to 
dismiss is because there are no causes of action of which this Federal court 
could possibly gain jurisdiction over. They are all explicitly and specifically 
State causes of action, of which this Federal court would not be able to 
dismiss, nor rule in the plaintiff’s favor for. 
 Plaintiff’s Objections ¶ 3. This confirms his express consent to the Court granting the 
SBA’s motion to dismiss in its entirety. See Dkt. 23 at 3; see also C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-12. 
Plaintiff should not be afforded any opportunity to file an amended complaint to retain 
the Court’s jurisdiction while also claiming this Court should have never presided over 
this action.  
As previously explained, Plaintiff’s entire Complaint is derived from various 
sovereign citizen theories, held by numerous courts to be patently frivolous. “So-called 
sovereign citizens argue that, though they are born and reside in the United States, they 
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are their own sovereigns and are not United States citizens.” Mack v. Sweet, 2017 WL 
6756667, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4, 2017) (citing Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 
279, 282 (2011)). “They claim as grounds for this belief: the Uniform Commercial Code, 
maritime and admiralty law, the idea of strawman trusts, and Bible verses.” Mack, 2017 
WL 6756667, at *3 (citing Mason v. Anderson, 2016 WL 4398680, at *2 (S.D. Tex. 
Aug. 18, 2016)). Simply put, Plaintiff cannot use his sovereign citizen beliefs to 
extinguish his debts. See Westfall v. Davis, 2018 WL 2422059, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 
2018) (discussing sovereign citizen theories). 
These theories are not valid in United States courts and have been overwhelmingly 
rejected for years as frivolous and indisputably meritless as this Court already noted. See 
e.g., Snead v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 2007 WL 1851674, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 
2007). Because the failings of Plaintiff’s Complaint could not be cured by amendment, 
the Court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s case with prejudice. See Cato v. United States, 
70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff failed to satisfy the high bar to warrant reconsidering the Court’s order 
dated December 30, 2024, and his request for relief from dismissal should be denied. 
Dated: January 17, 2025 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
E. MARTIN ESTRADA 
United States Attorney 
DAVID M. HARRIS  
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Civil Division 
JOANNE S. OSINOFF   
Assistant United States Attorney 
Chief, Complex and Defensive Litigation Section 
 
 
 
      /s/ Alexander L. Farrell 
 
ALEXANDER L. FARRELL 
Assistant United States Attorney 
 
Attorneys for Defendant United States Small 
Business Administration
 
 
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Local Rule 11-6.2 Certificate of Compliance 
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that this Opposition memorandum 
contains 2,361 words and is 7 pages which complies with the word limit set by L.R. 11-
6.1 and the page limit set by the Court’s Standing Order [Dkt. 6]. 
 
Dated: January 17, 2025 
 
 
      /s/ Alexander L. Farrell 
 
ALEXANDER L. FARRELL 
Assistant United States Attorney 
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