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Government's Sentencing Submission — United States v. Adedayo Ilori
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The government's sentencing submission, a letter dated October 6, 2021 to United States District Judge Lewis J. Liman in United States v. Adedayo Ilori, No. 20 Cr. 378 (LJL), in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed October 7, 2021 as Document 98. It states that the defendant pled guilty on April 8, 2021 to Count One, conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and admitted Count Five, conspiracy to commit money laundering, with sentencing set for October 13, 2021. The letter describes a scheme, as set out in the Presentence Report, to submit fraudulent business loan applications totaling $1,020,000 to an undercover FBI agent, and answers arguments in the defense sentencing submission about the defendant's role. The government asks for a sentence within the stipulated Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months' imprisonment.
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No. 1:20-cr-00378-LJL · Doc. 98 · Docket on CourtListener
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Case 1:20-cr-00378-LJL Document 98 Filed 10/07/21 Page 1 of 7
U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney
Southern District of New York
The Silvio J. Mollo Building
One Saint Andrew’s Plaza
New York, New York 10007
October 6, 2021
BY ECF
Honorable Lewis J. Liman
United States District Judge
Southern District of New York
500 Pearl Street
New York, New York 10007
Re: United States v. Adedayo Ilori, No. 20 Cr. 378 (LJL)
Dear Judge Liman:
The defendant, Adedayo Ilori, is scheduled to be sentenced on October 13, 2021, at
2:00 p.m. The Government makes this submission in advance of sentencing. For the reasons set
forth below, the Government submits that a sentence within the Guidelines range stipulated in the
parties’ plea agreement, namely 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment, is appropriate in this case.
I. Offense Conduct
Between approximately March 2019 and 2020, Adedayo Ilori and Herode Chancy, a bank
manager, conspired to submit fraudulent applications for business loans, and they submitted
fabricated bank statements and stolen identities to apply for a total of $1,020,000 in loans that they
intended not to repay (the “Loan Scheme”). (PSR ¶¶ 18-19). Toward the end of the scheme,
Chancy coordinated with Ilori to obtain another stolen identity to open a bank account with the
assistance of co-defendant Michael Albarella, another bank manager, in order to launder $200,000
of the fraudulent loan proceeds. Unbeknownst to Chancy and Ilori, the purportedly corrupt
underwriter to whom they were submitting the loan applications was an undercover FBI agent, and
the person they believed to be a third co-conspirator who worked in the financial industry was a
confidential source (the “CS”). (PSR ¶¶ 17-18). Because the Court is familiar with the facts of
the case, the Government refers the Court to the Presentence Report and the argument section
below for a fulsome description of Ilori’s role in the Loan Scheme.
II. Procedural History
On March 4, 2020, pursuant to a complaint in connection with the above offense, law
enforcement arrested Ilori and his co-defendants. The Complaint charged Ilori with: one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; wire fraud, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1343; aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) and (b); and
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conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h. On July 23, 2020, a
grand jury returned an indictment charging Ilori with the same offenses as in the Complaint, as
well as conspiracy to commit mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and mail fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
On April 8, 2021, Ilori pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Count One of the
Indictment, which charged Ilori with conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and Ilori admitted
to Count Five, which charged Ilori with conspiracy to commit money laundering. (PSR ¶ 11).
Pursuant to the plea agreement dated January 25, 2021, the parties stipulated that the applicable
Guidelines range is 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment. On July 8, 2021, Probation issued the final
Presentence Report. Probation calculated the defendant’s Guidelines range to be 51 to 63 months’
imprisonment. (PSR ¶ 104). Probation recommends a sentence of 51 months’ imprisonment.
(PSR at 32).
III. A Guidelines Sentence is Appropriate in This Case
A. Applicable Law
Although United States v. Booker held that the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, it also
held that they remain in place and that district courts must “consult” the Guidelines and “take them
into account” when sentencing. 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). As the Supreme Court stated, “a district
court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines
range,” which “should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.” Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
After that calculation, a sentencing judge must consider seven factors outlined in Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3553(a): (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant;” (2) the four legitimate purposes of sentencing, as set
forth below; (3) “the kinds of sentences available;” (4) the Guidelines range itself; (5) any relevant
policy statement by the Sentencing Commission; (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities among defendants;” and (7) “the need to provide restitution to any victims.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1)-(7); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 & n.6.
In determining the appropriate sentence, the statute directs judges to “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing, which are:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
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B. Discussion
In this case, the Government believes a sentence within the stipulated Guidelines range of
51 to 63 months’ imprisonment would achieve the goals of sentencing and appropriately balance
the factors considered pursuant to Section 3553(a).
First, a sentence within the stipulated Guidelines range is appropriate to reflect the
seriousness of Ilori’s conduct and to provide just punishment. Ilori engaged in a long-running
conspiracy with Chancy to submit fraudulent business loan applications totaling over one million
dollars. Ultimately, Chancy and Ilori intended not to repay the loans—i.e., to bust them out.
Although Chancy took the lead in the conspiracy and was the central point of contact with the CS
and the UC, Ilori had a lengthy and substantial role in the scheme. Ilori was responsible for
preparing two of the $5,000 loan applications and one of the $250,000 loan applications. (PSR
¶ 42). Ilori was present for the first in person meeting with Chancy and the CS in April 2019, as
well as two in person meetings in November 2019, and he had multiple recorded calls and text
messages with the CS in January and February 2020 regarding the scheme. 1 (PSR ¶¶ 21, 29, 30,
32, 35).
Throughout the scheme, Ilori did not hesitate and instead pressed forward to bring the
scheme to fruition. At the first meeting in April 2019, Ilori offered to make fake documents and
obtain identification information of other persons to use in the loan scheme, and he claimed he
could obtain the necessary documentation to submit the loans by the following week. (PSR ¶¶ 21,
22). Ilori resumed meeting with Chancy and the CS to move ahead with the scheme within less
than two weeks of his release on bail in his pending state case. (PSR ¶¶ 29, 30). At the November
12, 2019 meeting, Ilori stated he was bringing in another co-conspirator, a “white guy”, whom
Ilori had met in jail who was going to open bank accounts for them. (PSR ¶ 30). Ilori sourced,
created, and provided two fraudulent driver’s licenses with stolen identities and doctored bank
statements in support of his fraudulent loan applications. (PSR ¶ 32). After the first round of
loans, on a recorded call on February 8, 2020 with Chancy and the CS, Ilori stated he wanted to
do another round of loans, (PSR ¶ 35), and he claimed he had bank statements ready for the new
loans. On February 26, 2020, after the second round of loan applications were submitted, Ilori
agreed on a call with Chancy to provide an identification to open a bank account that the CS would
use to launder his portion of the fraud proceeds. (PSR ¶ 39).
In his sentencing submission, Ilori seeks to downplay the seriousness of his conduct and
minimize his culpability, reflecting a minimal acceptance of responsibility. First, Ilori claims he
was not directly involved in all eight loan applications, he was not actively involved in the second
round of loan applications, and he did not provide Chancy with the Missouri identification card
that was used to open a bank account with Michael Albarella and the CS to launder the CS’s
portion of the fraud proceeds. As explained above, the Government holds Ilori directly responsible
for—i.e., considers Ilori to be the author of—three fraudulent loan applications, two in the first
round, and one in the second round. Nevertheless, the fact that eight applications were submitted
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In addition, when there was a problem with one of the $5,000 loan transfers in the first round of
loans and the bank would not release the funds, it was Ilori who repeatedly contacted the bank to
resolve the issue, as documented by recorded text messages and calls between Ilori and the CS.
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was foreseeable to Ilori because he participated in multiple conversations where it was discussed
that they would apply for multiple loans and multiple rounds of loans. (See, e.g., PSR ¶¶ 29, 35).
The evidence also specifically shows that Ilori participated in the second round of loans and
suggested doing more loans. During the November 12, 2019 meeting, Ilori claimed that he could
do ten loan applications instead of the two loan applications the CS was proposing to do initially.
On a recorded call with the CS on February 8, 2020, Ilori said he wanted to do another round of
loans, (PSR ¶ 35), and he wanted to propose another scheme. Ultimately, in connection with the
second round of loans, Ilori’s fingerprints were recovered from doctored bank statements
submitted in support of the loan application made using the Pennsylvania stolen identity that had
also been used in the first round of loan applications. (PSR ¶ 37). The second-round application
included a signed application with a different date and bank statements with a different date than
in the first-round application, indicating Ilori had submitted these hardcopy documents afresh to
Chancy for the second round of loans. Thus, contrary to his claim in his letter to the Court that he
sought to “sabotage” the scheme, Ilori encouraged Chancy and the CS to do more loans. Indeed,
Ilori’s claim that he sought to sabotage the scheme is nonsensical, for if Ilori intended to sabotage
the scheme, he would have reported it to law enforcement. As to the Missouri identification card,
the context of Chancy’s conversation with Ilori on February 26, 2020, indicates that Ilori provided
Chancy the Missouri identification via WhatsApp. Chancy called Ilori in the presence of the CS
and asked Ilori if he had an identity they could use and whether they could open a bank account
using the stolen identifications that Ilori had previously given Chancy. (PSR ¶ 39). During the
call, while discussing the ID, Chancy asked Ilori, “When are you going to send it?” and seconds
later “[UI] the ID, right? On WhatsApp on my other phone.” Later during the meeting, Chancy
showed the CS and Albarella a photo of the ID on his phone, and the CS took a photo of the ID on
Chancy’s phone. (PSR ¶ 39). Regardless, Ilori admitted to conspiring to launder proceeds form
the scheme as part of his guilty plea, and this factual issue is not material to sentencing in light of
all the other facts in the case.
Second, Ilori argues that much of the description of Ilori’s offense conduct is based on
Chancy’s account of Ilori’s conduct, and that Chancy’s account is unreliable. Ilori, however,
provides no reason as to why Chancy’s account is unreliable, nor is the description of Ilori’s
offense conduct based primarily on Chancy’s description of it but also on numerous recordings of
Ilori, among other evidence. At the time Chancy made the statements to the CS regarding Ilori’s
conduct, he was making them in furtherance of the conspiracy, and he did not know the CS was
an informant. Chancy and Ilori were working toward a common objective—executing the loan
scheme—and Chancy had no reason to lie regarding Ilori’s role in the scheme while the scheme
was ongoing. Moreover, Chancy’s statements are corroborated by other evidence, such as Ilori’s
own statements on the recordings and Ilori’s fingerprints on the loan applications. To take the
example provided by Ilori in his submission, Chancy told the CS that Ilori had opened bank
accounts using the identities of other people and that Ilori used driver’s licenses with real
identifying information that had been altered with different photographs. (PSR ¶ 23). The two
loan applications in the first round of loans that used stolen identities—in contrast with the other
two applications that used the identities of Chancy’s known associates—included driver’s licenses
with the names and dates of birth of the identity theft victims but the photograph of a different
individual, just as Chancy had described. (PSR ¶ 32). Ilori’s fingerprints were recovered from
those hardcopy applications. (Id.). Ilori himself stated during the November 19, 2019 recorded
meeting that the driver’s licenses to be used in the scheme used stolen identities. (PSR ¶ 29).
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Moreover, during the recorded November 12 meeting, while discussing the scheme, Ilori stated
that he had statements from different banks, including Bank of America, Chase, and TD Bank, and
that in two weeks he wanted to have thirty accounts. This evidence corroborates Chancy’s
description of Ilori’s role in the Loan Scheme.
Third, Ilori disputes that his June 28, 2019 arrest by the NYPD was connected to the instant
scheme, and he maintains his innocence with respect to those pending state charges. Ilori himself,
however, in discussing his arrest with Chancy and the CS on November 12, 2019, in a recorded
meeting, stated in the context of discussing the arrest, “I pulled that faked ID. Shit but, the thing
is [UI] how do you know what a fake ID? She can’t [UI] even the cops they didn’t know, [UI] so
how can you know?” The CS then asked Ilori, “what kind of fake, what state was it?” and Ilori
responded “Florida.” One of the items seized from Ilori by the NYPD was a Florida driver’s
license in the name of Christopher Halstead. During that same meeting, the CS asked Ilori whether
any of the bank accounts he had opened were still open, and Ilori responded he wanted “to start
fresh” and use new bank accounts for the scheme. (PSR ¶ 30). This statement by Ilori indicates
that Ilori had been opening bank accounts use false identities in connection with the Loan Scheme
at the time he was arrested by NYPD. Regardless, because Ilori has yet to be convicted of the state
charges, the primary relevance of the arrest for the purpose of Ilori’s sentencing is that Ilori was
not deterred from engaging in the Loan Scheme despite the arrest.
Fourth, Ilori asks the Court to take into account its finding from the Fatico hearing that it
was the CS who initiated the scheme with Chancy. But this has no bearing on Ilori, who was not
present for the initial conversation between Chancy and the CS regarding the scheme. The
Government acknowledges that Chancy introduced Ilori to the scheme, but for all the reasons
described above, Ilori had a substantial, prolonged, and proactive role in the scheme once invited
to join it. Ilori further claims in his letter to the Court that Ilori would not be convicted of the
instant crime but “for this manipulation and pressure directed from the C[S]” and that Ilori was
told the CS was a “high ranking Russian gangster.” There is no evidence to suggest that Ilori was
manipulated or pressured by the CS—and Ilori points to none. Nor is there any evidence that Ilori
was aware of or intimidated by the CS’s criminal past during the scheme or threatened to engage
in the scheme; indeed, Chancy conceded in his sentencing submission that he had no knowledge
of the CS’s criminal history at the time of the scheme. The evidence only shows that Ilori was a
willing and persistent participant in the scheme over the course of almost one year.
Second, a sentence within the stipulated Guidelines range is necessary to provide specific
deterrence and promote respect for the law. As outlined in the Presentence Report, Ilori has five
prior convictions for fraud and forgery spanning from 1997 to 2006, as well as four other arrests
related to fraud. All of the arrests and convictions involve conduct similar to the case at hand—
namely, opening financial accounts using false identities to make fraudulent charges. In 1998,
Ilori was sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment by the Honorable Deborah Ann Bates in this
District after he pled guilty to bank fraud for opening multiple bank accounts using aliases and
attempting to deposit over $100,000 in counterfeit checks. (PSR ¶ 62). When Ilori violated
supervised release by using a fraudulent credit card, he was sentenced to another 24 months’
imprisonment. (Id.). In May 2007, Ilori was sentenced in New York County Supreme Court to
42 months to seven years’ imprisonment for using a fraudulently obtained credit card to purchase
$2,000 worth of goods and for possession the victim’s personal information and a fraudulent
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driver’s license. (PSR ¶ 66). That same month, Ilori was also sentenced to 30 months to five
years’ imprisonment for attempting to open bank accounts using a forged driver’s license and
utility bill. (PSR ¶ 67). Ilori committed the instant offense despite previously receiving multiple
serious sentences for comparable conduct, indicating a need for a substantial sentence to deter Ilori
from committing future crimes. Moreover, Ilori’s involvement in the instant offense was more
than a momentary lapse of judgment. Ilori’s participation in the conspiracy lasted almost one year,
providing the defendant with ample time to reflect on his involvement in this crime and to choose
to desist from engaging in the crime. In addition, Ilori was not deterred from continuing the
scheme with Chancy despite his arrest by the NYPD in the midst of the scheme in June 2019. The
combination of Ilori’s lengthy involvement in the instant offense, Ilori’s persistence to continue
the scheme after his arrest in June 2019, and Ilori’s lengthy criminal history involving fraud for
which he served substantial sentences, together demonstrate an acute need for specific deterrence
and to protect the public from further crimes by the defendant. Thus, although Ilori had less of a
leading role in the scheme compared with Chancy, Ilori’s substantial role in the scheme combined
with his criminal history indicates that a sentence at least as serious as Chancy’s sentence is
warranted.
Third, a sentence within the stipulated Guidelines range is warranted to further the interests
of general deterrence, and to send the message to others engaged in financial crime and identity
theft that crimes of this nature will be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. General deterrence
is an important sentencing interest in cases such as this to protect financial institutions, which are
frequent targets of fraudulent actors because financial institutions cannot investigate every
fraudulent transaction due to the frequency with which they are targeted by fraudsters. In other
words, the risks of getting caught are substantially lower than many other theft offenses because
this kind of impersonal fraud does not involve theft from a victim’s person. Moreover, because
identity theft victims are generally unaware of the fact that their identities have been stolen—as
was the case here—identity theft victims do not know that they are victimized and cannot report
the fraud. Accordingly, it is appropriate that the Court impose a sentence that meaningfully deters
others who may be tempted to engage in similar conduct.
Like Chancy, Ilori argues in his sentencing submission that the Guidelines range deserves
little deference because the intended loss amount was contrived by law enforcement actors as part
of the sting operation. Although the loan amounts were proposed by the UC, Ilori agreed to those
amounts without hesitation. Moreover, the intended loss amount is meaningful because there were
two rounds of loans, and Ilori did not stop engaging in the Loan Scheme after the first round of
loans totaling $20,000 was funded but instead continued to pursue the second round totaling $1
million. In addition, a sentence within the Guidelines range is appropriate not solely on account
of the intended loss amount but due to aggravating factors described above that are part of the
offense conduct and the defendant’s criminal history. Ilori also argues that the CS influenced Ilori
to use the identities of actual victims. Nevertheless, as early as the first meeting in April 2019,
Ilori offered to procure the identification information of other persons to be used in the scheme,
and to this day the Government does not know how or from where Ilori obtained the identifications,
showing Ilori was not coached by the CS to obtain stolen identities.
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C. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Government respectfully submits that a sentence within
the stipulated Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment would be appropriate in this
case.
Respectfully submitted,
AUDREY STRAUSS
United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York
By:
Cecilia Vogel
Tara M. La Morte
Assistant United States Attorneys
(212) 637-1084/1041
cc: Brooke Cucinella, Esq. (by ECF)
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