Sentencing Memorandum — United States v. Daragjati (M.D. Fla.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida (Jacksonville Division) · No. 3:23-cr-00048-TJC-LLL · Doc. 44 · 2024-03-13 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
JACKSONVILLE DIVISION 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
Case No. 3:23-cr-48-TJC-LLL 
 
CHRISTOPHIM LEO DARAGJATI 
 
__________________________________/ 
DEFENDANT’S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM 
 
 
Defendant, Christophim Daragjati, by and through undersigned 
counsel, submits this Sentencing Memorandum in anticipation of the 
hearing scheduled for Monday, March 18, 2024, at 10:30 AM.   
For the reasons articulated in this Memorandum, Mr. Daragjati 
respectfully requests this Court to sentence him to a total of 39 months 
in the Bureau of Prisons, followed by 36 months of supervised release, 
with conditions requiring restitution, mental health treatment, and 
substance abuse treatment.     
I. 
Objections to Guideline Calculations 
Mr. Daragjati submitted two main objections to the Final 
Presentence Report (“PSR”) submitted by the U.S. Probation Office.  
(Doc. 35).  One objection was about the inclusion of losses that were 
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intended, but not actually sustained, by the victims when it comes to 
calculating the “loss” amount for the purpose of the Specific Offense 
Characteristic enhancement under USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1).  See PSR Add. 
29-31.  The other objection was about the two-level enhancement under 
USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12), which only applies when “the offense involved 
conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 1040.”  See PSR Add. 27-28.   
As to the first objection – the calculation of “loss” – undersigned 
counsel would refer this Court to the arguments stated in the letter 
submitted to the probation officer.  See PSR Add. 29-31.  While he 
maintains his objection under United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 
(11th Cir. 2023), Mr. Daragjati understands how courts in this district 
have been ruling regarding its application to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
However, given the unprecedented nature of United States 
Probation’s policy that the enhancement under subsection (b)(12) applies 
in cases involving PPP Loan Fraud – and the flawed reasoning offered in 
defense of its position – this Memorandum will dive deeper into the issue.   
A. Probation’s Position 
In the section of the PSR detailing the Offense Level Computation, 
the Probation Office states the following: 
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According to USSG §2B1.1(b)(12), if the offense involved 
conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 1040, increase by two levels. 
In this case, the defendant made fraudulent statements and 
representations in a matter involving a benefit in connection 
with an emergency declaration (Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic 
Security 
(CARES) 
Act/Covid-19 
pandemic); 
therefore, two levels are added. 
 
PSR ¶ 36.  As a threshold matter, this is incorrect because the CARES 
Act was a piece of legislation passed by Congress, not a disaster 
declaration by the President under the Stafford Act (which is what § 1040 
requires).  Mr. Daragjati objected to this in response to the Initial 
PSR.  The United States Probation Office reviewed the objection and 
maintained its position that the special offense characteristics applies to 
this case.  PSR Add. 3-5.  Probation concludes that the creation of PPP 
Loans “pursuant to the CARES Act was a response to the pandemic’s 
widespread adverse economic impact . . . and [therefore] falls under the 
COVID-19 pandemic emergency determination under the [Stafford 
Act].”  Id. at 5.   
 
Probation claims that because there is “no dispute that COVID-19 
was declared a national emergency pursuant to the Stafford Act” and no 
“dispute that the PPP money the defendant obtained was provided in 
connection with the COVID-19 disaster,” that “the analysis should end 
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there.”  Id. at 4.  They conclude: “All that is necessary, as exists here, is 
that the benefits were provided in connection with the disaster.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  But as explained below, this type of daisy-chain isn’t 
what the statute means when it says a “benefit . . . paid in connection 
with . . . an emergency declaration.”  18 U.S.C. § 1040(a) (emphasis 
added).  Section 1040 requires that the stolen benefit must have been 
paid in connection with a “major disaster declaration” or “emergency 
declaration” under the Stafford Act, referring to declarations that trigger 
the release of certain forms of aid to state and local governments and are 
typically administered by FEMA.  The statute does not apply, as 
Probation would have it, whenever a benefit is paid in connection with 
the same disaster or emergency underlying the President’s declaration—
a standard that would vastly expand the statute’s reach and conflict with 
its text. 
Probation claims that applying this enhancement must be correct 
because sentencing judges across the country have been doing so.  They 
write: 
The probation office is not aware of any caselaw related to this 
enhancement, but the district courts have repeatedly and 
consistently 
applied 
this 
two-level 
enhancement 
at 
sentencing.  
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PSR Add. 4.  Probation offers no additional details or sources to support 
this claim.  Probation insists that this allegedly common practice is 
supported by the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of “in connection 
with” in a case with no relation to sentencing guidelines. 
District courts’ repeated application of the enhancement in 
COVID-19 fraud cases (involving EIDL and PPP loans) is 
consistent with the “broad interpretation” the Supreme Court 
has given to the phrase in “connection with.” 
 
PSR Add. 4 (citing Mont v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019)). 
 
Finally, Probation concludes that Mr. Daragjati’s “narrow reading 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1040 to only apply to benefits provided directly under the 
Stafford Act is inconsistent with the rest of the statute.”  Id. Add. 4.  To 
support this claim, they make two arguments.  First, they argue that 
because Stafford Act benefits are often administered through “a State or 
local government, or other entity,” that benefits provided through a law 
passed by Congress is basically a Stafford Act benefit because Congress 
is a separate branch from the President, just like a state or local 
government is.  Id.  Second, they argue that the jurisdictional provision 
in 18 U.S.C. § 1040(b) is proof that benefits can be considered connected 
to Stafford Act declaration without being authorized pursuant to the 
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Stafford Act.  Id. at 4-5. 
These arguments are flawed and fail to support Probation’s 
position.  The remainder of this section of this Memorandum will provide 
a review of the Stafford Act, executive actions pursuant to the Stafford 
Act, the CARES Act and the Paycheck Protection Program loans, the 
Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 
2007, 18 U.S.C. § 1040, the amendments of two other section, and USSG 
§ 2B1.1(b)(12).  It concludes with a discussion about how Probation’s 
position is not based on the law and the enhancement contained in USSG 
§ 2B1.1(b)(12) should not apply in this case. 
B. The Law 
1. Stafford Act & Executive Actions 
The enhancement at issue reads: 
If the offense involved conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 1040, 
increase by 2 levels.  If the resulting offense level is less than 
level 12, increase to level 12.   
 
USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12) (emphasis added).  The referenced statute prohibits 
fraud “involving any benefit authorized, transported, transmitted, 
disbursed, or paid in connection with a major disaster declaration ... or 
an emergency declaration under ... the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 
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and Emergency Assistance Act.”  18 U.S.C. § 1040(a).  The Stafford Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5208, governs federal assistance to state and local 
governments in the event of an officially declared “emergency” or “major 
disaster.”  Id. § 5122(1).  It authorizes a wide array of federal aid, 
including coordination services, “technical and advisory assistance,” and 
help with distributing “medicine, food, and other consumable 
supplies.”  Id. § 5170a(2)-(4).  The Act allows various government 
agencies to automatically provide this assistance once the president 
issues an executive order, without Congress having to pass a new law.   
On March 13, 2020, the former president declared the COVID-19 
pandemic a national emergency, pursuant to Section 501(b) of the 
Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. § 5191(b)).  See Pres. Proc. No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 
15337 (Mar. 13, 2020).  The Small Business Administration followed by 
issuing disaster declarations for each State. See Notice, Administrative 
Declarations of Economic Injury Disasters for the Entire United States 
and U.S. Territories, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,052 (Apr. 3, 2020). These 
declarations enabled the Small Business Administration to exercise its 
preexisting authority (under the Stafford Act) to make or guarantee loans 
to small businesses that suffer a “substantial economic injury” caused by 
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a disaster where the business is located.  15 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2)(A), 
(C).  These loans were called “economic injury disaster loans,” or 
EIDLs.  See 13 C.F.R. §§ 123.300-123.304.   
2. The CARES Act & PPP Loans 
On March 27, 2020, Congress passed, and the former president 
signed, the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) 
Act, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  See CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 
116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020).  Among many other things, the CARES 
Act created the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), which authorized 
potentially forgivable loans to small businesses to help cover certain 
expenses, such as payroll, mortgage and rent payments, utilities, and 
other operating costs.  Id. § 1102 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 636(a)(36)-(37) 
(2020)).  PPP Loans did not exist before the enactment of the CARES Act, 
the legislation that created them.  They were not created nor authorized 
by the executive emergency/disaster declarations referred to in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1040 or the Stafford Act.  A presidential declaration has no effect on 
their existence.  The period of availability of PPP Loans was set by 
legislation.  See CARES Act, § 1102(a)(2). 
 
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3. USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12) & 18 U.S.C. § 1040 
Twelve years before the COVID-19 pandemic and passage of the 
CARES Act, a different piece of legislation was enacted in the wake of 
Hurricane Katrina.  On January 7, 2008, the Emergency and Disaster 
Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 2007 was signed into 
law.  See Pub. L. No. 110-179, 121 Stat. 2556 (2008).  This legislation 
created 18 U.S.C. § 1040 and added to two other sections (1341 and 1343) 
language that increased the maximum penalties for fraud involving 
benefits connected to disaster/emergency declarations under the Stafford 
Act.  Id. at §§ 2-4.  The amendments to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 
provide for a 30-year maximum prison sentence if the wire fraud involved 
benefits connected to disaster/emergency declarations under the Stafford 
Act.  Id. at § 3; 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  Most other violations of section 1343 
carry a 20-year maximum.  18 U.S.C. § 1343.   
 This legislation is also how the adjustment in USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12) 
came into existence.  To complement the above statutory changes, the 
Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 
2007 also directed the Sentencing Commission to: 
[P]romulgate sentencing guidelines or amend existing 
sentencing guidelines to provide for increased penalties for 
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persons convicted of fraud or theft offenses in connection with 
a major disaster declaration under section 401 of the Robert 
T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 
U.S.C. 5170) or an emergency declaration under section 501 
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 5191). 
 
Pub. L. No. 110-179, 121 Stat. 2556 (2008) at § 5(a)(1) (emphasis 
added).  The Commission was to do this “not later than the 30 days after 
the date of enactment.”  Id. at 5(c).  On January 8, 2008, the Sentencing 
Commission adopted an emergency amendment to USSG § 2B1.1 
containing the two-level enhancement.  See USSG Supp. to App. C, 
Amend. 714 (February 6, 2008).  A final version was adopted nine months 
later.  See id. Amend. 719 (November 1, 2008).   
C. Argument: The Enhancement in USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12) 
Does Not Apply to PPP Loan Fraud Cases 
 
1. The enhancement is meant to apply to those charged with 
or convicted of fraud in connection with a presidentially 
declared emergency. 
 
As explained above, the Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud 
Penalty Enhancement Act of 2007 is responsible for the creation of the 
guideline enhancement and three changes to criminal statutes (the 
introduction of 18 U.S.C. § 1040 and amendment of § 1341 and § 1343).  
The Act’s directive to the Sentencing Commission stated that the 
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guidelines should be amended to provide for increased penalties for 
defendants “convicted of” offenses in connection with an emergency or 
disaster declaration under the Stafford Act.  Therefore, it appears that 
Congress intended for the guidelines enhancement to apply in cases 
involving the new crimes that they created.1   
 Mr. Daragjati was not charged with or convicted of violations of the 
Emergency and Disaster Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 
2007.   While he was charged in this case with multiple counts under 18 
U.S.C. § 1343 and, pursuant to the Plea Agreement, pled guilty to two of 
these counts (Counts I and XIII), he was not charged under the enhanced 
(30-year) maximum penalty provision in section 1343.  Both parties 
agreed since the beginning of this case that the maximum penalty for Mr. 
Daragjati on each of these counts is 20 years in prison.  (Doc. 26 at (A)(2)).  
Further, the Indictment does not charge Mr. Daragjati with violations of 
section 1343 in relation to declarations under the Stafford Act, nor does 
it charge him with violating § 1040.  (Doc. 1).  The Plea Agreement 
confirms this when listing the “Elements of the Offense(s).”  (Doc. 26 at 
 
1 “The bill also directs the Sentencing Commission to revise its sentencing guidelines for fraud or 
theft in connection with a major disaster emergency declaration in light of the new statutory 
changes.”  153 CONG. REC. H16864-03 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 2007) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
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(A)(4)).   
2. Congress’s motivation in passing the CARES Act does not 
render the benefits it created “in connection with” 
presidential declarations under the Stafford Act 
 
While Congress may have been motivated to pass the CARES Act 
for the same reasons that led the former president to declare a national 
emergency under the Stafford Act, that does not make the CARES Act an 
executive action falling under the Stafford Act.  It does not matter that 
both the legislation and executive action were “a response to the 
pandemic’s widespread adverse economic impact.”  This is an 
uncomplicated separation of powers issue.  Congress could have passed 
(and the president could have signed into law) the CARES Act regardless 
of whether a national emergency was declared.  Likewise, the former 
president could have declared a national emergency regardless of what 
legislation was pending in Congress.  Conversely, and most importantly, 
PPP loans were not authorized and paid because the President issued an 
emergency declaration under the Stafford Act; PPP loans existed only 
because Congress passed separate legislation authorizing them.   
If Congress intended for enhanced penalties to apply to PPP Loan 
fraud, it could have directed the Sentencing Commission to do so in the 
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CARES Act.  As demonstrated by the Emergency and Disaster 
Assistance Fraud Penalty Enhancement Act of 2007, Congress is clearly 
capable of amending criminal statutes and directing the Sentencing 
Commission to create new enhancements.  Further, if the Congress in 
2007/2008 intended for the adjustment in section 2B1.1(b)(12) to apply to 
fraud related to benefits created by “future” legislation “inspired by” a 
national emergency that “also happens to be” the subject of an executive 
declaration under the Stafford Act, it could have done so.   
Reading the enhancement as it is written is not, as suggested by 
Probation, the imposition of a “heightened requirement.”  It applies to 
the conduct described in section 1040, and that conduct is clearly about 
benefits that are provided because of an executive action under the 
Stafford Act.  Granted, it is arguably within the spirit of the statute and 
the enhancement for the enhancement to apply to fraud in connection 
with PPP Loans.  But as tempting as that may be, the plain text of the 
law must be looked at when deciding to apply an enhancement. 
 
Probation’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Mont v. 
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019), is misplaced.  That case involved a 
different issue entirely and, most importantly, the opinion specifically 
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denies providing a full definition for the phrase “in connection with.”  In 
pertinent part, the Court wrote: 
We hold that pretrial detention later credited as time 
served for a new conviction is “imprison[ment] in 
connection with a conviction” and thus tolls the 
supervised-release term under § 3624(e). . . .  
The Court has often recognized that “in connection with” 
can bear a “broad interpretation.” . . . . Here, however, 
we need not consider the outer bounds of the term “in 
connection with,” as pretrial incarceration is directly tied 
to the conviction when it is credited toward the new 
sentence.  
 
Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1832 (emphases added).  Thus, the Court made it clear 
that its ruling was based on the direct relationship between a sentence of 
imprisonment and the awarded credit time served.  
3. The alleged practice of other courts and the other 
provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1040 have nothing to do with the 
applicability of the enhancement. 
 
No information is provided by Probation about which courts are 
“repeatedly” applying the enhancement and whether the defense 
attorneys in those cases objected.  There is also no evidence provided 
showing that the enhancement has been applied “consistently” across the 
judiciary in PPP loan cases.  The question is whether applying the 
enhancement is appropriate, and not whether other courts applied the 
enhancement. 
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Undersigned counsel was able to find one appellate case addressing 
this issue.  In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals noted its approval of the sentencing court’s decision to apply the 
enhancement in USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12) to the defendants’ fraud in relation 
to EIDLs and to not apply the enhancement to the defendant’s fraud in 
relation to PPP Loans.  See United States v. Redfern, No. 22-4196, 2023 
WL 2823064 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2023) (unpublished).  The court wrote the 
following: 
As many will recall, in March of 2020, the [former president] 
issued a Stafford Act emergency declaration in response to 
COVID-19. So the question, as the district court explained, 
was whether loans under the PPP and EIDL program were 
“authorized” or “paid” “in connection with” that declaration. 
After undertaking a detailed canvass of the legislative origins 
and regulatory features of the two programs, the district court 
concluded that EIDL benefits (though not PPP benefits) were 
authorized “in connection with” a Stafford Act declaration, 
and accordingly applied the enhancement. 
 
Although we have no reason to doubt the district court's 
analysis, we also have no need to pass on it here. 
 
Id. at 3–4 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).  The lower 
court’s reasoning in the Redfern case was sound and correct.2 
 
2 See also the United States Sentencing Memorandum in United States v. Sanchez, W.D. Oklahoma 
Case No. 2022-CR-232-HE, 2023 WL 9378191 (May 18, 2023) (“The United States agrees this 
enhancement does not apply when calculating Sanchez's advisory guideline range because, 
although the COVID-19 pandemic was declared a major disaster, the funding for the [Economic 
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Probation’s additional arguments based on the other language in 
18 U.S.C. § 1040 are not legally sound.  The section defines “benefit” as 
“any record, voucher, payment, money or thing of value, good, service, 
right, or privilege provided by the United States, a State or local 
government, or other entity.”  § 1040(c).  However, it prohibits fraud in 
relation 
to 
“any 
benefit 
authorized, 
transported, 
transmitted, 
transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with . . . an emergency 
declaration [under the Stafford Act].”  § 1040(a)(2).  So, any benefits must 
follow from executive actions under the Stafford Act.  As it turns out, the 
Stafford Act “was enacted to provide federal assistance to victims of 
disasters by giving money to the states which then distribute it.”  14 
A.L.R. Fed. 2d 173 (2006).  Local governments also distribute funds and 
private entities are often contracted to deliver relief services. 
 
Finally, the jurisdictional provisions in the statute are exactly that; 
the subsection describes situations where fraudulent benefits received 
pursuant to the Stafford Act are subject to federal jurisdiction.  The first 
is where the benefit is “in or affects interstate or foreign commerce.”  18 
U.S.C. § 1040(b)(1).  The second is where the benefit is “transported in 
 
Impact Payments] came from legislation other than the Stafford Act.”) 
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the mail at any point.”  § 1040(b)(2).  The third is where the benefit is 
directly from the federal government.  § 1040(b)(3).  These provisions do 
not take away the requirement that benefits are connected to Stafford 
Act declarations.   
 
 
II. 
Determination of an Appropriate Sentence 
If this Court were to find that USSG § 2B1.1(b)(12) is inapplicable 
to Mr. Daragjati’s case, that would place him at a Total Offense Level of 
14 for the counts computed under the guidelines.  At CHC I, his guideline 
range would be 15 to 21 months.  For the counts carrying a consecutive 
mandatory minimum, this Court must sentence Mr. Daragjati to at least 
24 months.  Mr. Daragjati is requesting a within-the-guidelines sentence 
of 39 months in prison (15 + 24 = 39), to be followed by 36 months of 
supervised release.  This sentence would be sufficient to meet the 
statutory goals of sentencing.  It punishes Mr. Daragjati for his criminal 
acts, while also providing him a decent chance to work on improving 
himself and return to being a good father to his children.  It reflects the 
nature and circumstances of the offense, while also considering the 
history and characteristics of Mr. Daragjati. 
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A. History and Characteristics of Mr. Daragjati 
Christopher Leo Daragjati was born in Jacksonville.  His father, an 
old-school Albanian immigrant, ruled the family with an iron fist.  He 
grew up witnessing domestic violence and suffered frequent physical and 
verbal abuse from his father.  He also reports being abused by his 
grandfather at 8 years old.3   Reaching out for help or protection was 
unthinkable in their culture.  Mr. Daragjati also grew up witnessing his 
father and uncles commit insurance fraud via arson and staged motor 
vehicle accidents. 
When Mr. Daragjati was ten, his mother divorced his father and 
moved with her son to the Canton, Ohio, area.  Unfortunately, there she 
married a man who was an abusive alcoholic.  Mr. Daragjati suffered 
more physical abuse at the hands of his stepfather and witnessed 
domestic violence against his mother.  The family lived in poverty and 
was frequently homeless.  Mr. Daragjati reports that it was during this 
period he first used alcohol by stealing his stepfather’s whiskey.  During 
this time, he stopped going to school. 
 
3  Details of this and other incidents appear in the Sealed Exhibit filed along with this 
Memorandum. 
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His mother eventually was able to escape the relationship and she 
and Mr. Daragjati, then 14, moved to Virginia Beach, where several of 
his adult siblings lived.  Mr. Daragjati recalls that his sister, Tammy 
Mayhew, essentially raised him in Virginia.  She is ten years older than 
him and remains his closest relative.4  Nevertheless, he struggled in 
Virginia, only sporadically attending school.5  Around this time, he began 
a daily alcohol and marijuana habit.  
Mr. Daragjati was adrift in Virginia until, at the age of 17, he met 
the love of his life, Suesan.  She was six years older and already had a 
two-year-old son, but they quickly fell in love and married three years 
later.  For the first time in his life, Mr. Daragjati felt he had someone 
who cared for and loved him unconditionally.  Suesan Daragjati was a 
nuclear technician in the United States Navy.  She provided Mr. 
Daragjati a stability he had never known.  He raised her son as his own.  
They later had two children of their own, a son and a daughter.  He 
primarily raised them while his wife worked as the main breadwinner for 
the family.  He would work odd jobs to contribute financially. 
 
4 Letters from Ms. Mayhew, as well as Mr. Daragjati’s brother and stepson are attached as Exhibits. 
5 Records were requested from Virginia Beach City Schools, but the district no longer had his 
records. 
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Unfortunately, after her third pregnancy, Suesan Daragjati 
developed kidney issues and ultimately suffered from renal failure.  The 
family relocated back to the Jacksonville area so Mr. Daragjati’s sister 
could help him care for Suesan.  As neither of them came from money, 
without her Navy income, they really struggled financially.  Mr. 
Daragjati continued to work whatever jobs he could find in the 
construction industry that would afford him the flexibility of caring for 
his wife and children.   
Tragically, after nine years together and six years of marriage, 
Suesan Daragjati succumbed to renal failure on March 27, 2015.  She was 
just 33 years old.  Mr. Daragjati, at the time only 26 years old, found 
himself a widower and single father of three children.  To say that Mr. 
Daragjati was devastated by his wife’s death would be a gross 
understatement.  His North Star gone, he was crushed and continues to 
deal with overwhelming grief to this day.  He was recently diagnosed by 
Dr. Williams with complicated grief, also known as persistent complex 
bereavement disorder.  Complicated grief extends well beyond ordinary 
grief, can disrupt daily life, impair decision making and impulse control, 
and render sufferers often irrational and unable to move past the initial 
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state of intense mourning.  It helps explain, but not excuse, why someone 
could embark on such an ambitious fraud. 
At one point after his wife’s death, Mr. Daragjati texted his family 
to “say goodbye” and set out to drive his car into a lake in order to drown 
himself.  His sister was able to intercept him, and he was Baker Acted.  
He was diagnosed with major depressive disorder, was initially found 
incompetent to consent to treatment, and eventually prescribed Celexa 
and daily psychotherapy sessions.6  A few years later, Mr. Daragjati’s 
children were returned to him, and he moved to Middleburg to be closer 
to his sister and her family.   
Since his arrest in this case in November 2022, his children have 
been staying with his sister, Ms. Mayhew, and her husband.  They have 
regular calls and video visits with Mr. Daragjati.  As his stepson Fabian 
Vauthrin, now 19, describes in his letter, despite Mr. Daragjati’s mental 
health and financial issues, “my dad has always been there for my 
brother, my sister, and myself.”  He comments that, even though Mr. 
Daragjati “is technically my stepdad, to me he is much more than that, 
to me he is like a real father, a best friend, and much more.” 
 
6 Mental health records from Orange Park Medical Center were filed as a Sealed Exhibit. 
Case 3:23-cr-00048-TJC-LLL     Document 44     Filed 03/13/24     Page 21 of 24 PageID 263

22 
 
B. Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 
There is no denying the fact that Mr. Daragjati committed a variety 
of fraudulent acts over a period of several years.  He fraudulently 
obtained PPP Loans, filed fraudulent tax returns, pawned stolen goods, 
committed identity theft, and passed fraudulent checks.  His victims 
include not only the government, but also various businesses and 
individuals.  He understands that it is this Court’s prerogative to punish 
him and that he will be sent to prison for some time.  He only asks that 
his sentence not deprive his children of their father for longer than is 
necessary and that it includes opportunities for rehabilitation and 
redemption. 
Mr. Daragjati has been incarcerated now for about 16 months.7    
While this time away from his family has not been easy, Mr. Daragjati 
comments that his arrest and subsequent detention have been a blessing 
in disguise.  He has had ample time to reflect on his actions and examine 
how and why he ended up here.  To be certain, he does not offer any 
excuses for his behavior.  But he now recognizes how his failure to 
 
7 Mr. Daragjati was in the Clay County Jail from November 16, 2022 until his arrest on the federal 
charges on March 28, 2023.  Since March 2023, he has been housed at the Nassau County Jail. 
Case 3:23-cr-00048-TJC-LLL     Document 44     Filed 03/13/24     Page 22 of 24 PageID 264

23 
 
properly address his grief following his wife’s death led to a cycle of self-
medicating behaviors that only worsened his mental health issues.  It 
was not until a few days after his arrest that he understood the reliance 
he had on alcohol and cannabis, and the clouded judgment that resulted. 
Mr. Daragjati quickly accepted responsibility for his behavior in 
this case.  There was never any plan to contest the charges or take the 
case to trial.  He entered his pleas of guilty less than four months after 
this case opened.  He is deeply remorseful for his actions and wants to 
become a better person.  Within a few weeks of arriving at the Nassau 
County Jail, he enrolled in GED prep courses to better himself.   
Additionally, the Nassau County Jail reports that he has no disciplinary 
reports during his eleven months there. He is eager to participate in 
mental health counseling.  Mr. Daragjati is hoping to complete his GED 
and enroll in a vocational welding program while at the Bureau of 
Prisons.   
He respectfully requests that this Court to sentence him to 15 
months in the BOP on Counts I, XI, and XIII, followed by 24 months in 
the BOP on Counts IV and XII, followed by 36 months of supervised 
Case 3:23-cr-00048-TJC-LLL     Document 44     Filed 03/13/24     Page 23 of 24 PageID 265

24 
 
release, with conditions requiring restitution, mental health treatment, 
and substance abuse treatment.   
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
  
 
 
A. FITZGERALD HALL, ESQ. 
Federal Defender, MDFL  
 
______________________________ 
Scott T. Schmidt, Esq.  
Assistant Federal Defender 
Florida Bar No. 92534  
200 West Forsyth Street, Suite 1240 
Jacksonville, FL 32202 
Telephone: (904) 232-3039 
Fax: (904) 232-1937 
Email: scott_schmidt@fd.org 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE  
I hereby certify that on this 13thth day of March 2024, a true copy 
of the foregoing was served by electronic notification to the United States 
Attorney’s Office, Assistant United States Attorney Kevin Frein, Esq. 
 
/s/ Scott Schmidt 
 
 
 
Scott T. Schmidt, Esq.  
Assistant Federal Defender  
Case 3:23-cr-00048-TJC-LLL     Document 44     Filed 03/13/24     Page 24 of 24 PageID 266

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