Pandemic Darlings The pandemic economy, in original documents
Home Court filings United States v. Campbell Government Restitution Letter — United States v. Hashim Campbell

Court filing

Government Restitution Letter — United States v. Hashim Campbell

Filed February 15, 2023 in U.S. v. Campbell; one of 12 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York
Filed2023-02-15

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York · No. 1:21-cr-00478-FB · Doc. 24 · 2023-02-15 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 
United States Attorney 
Eastern District of New York 
 
CWE 
271 Cadman Plaza East 
F. #2020R00955 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
 
 
February 15, 2023 
 
By Email and ECF 
 
The Honorable Frederic Block  
United States District Judge 
Eastern District of New York 
225 Cadman Plaza East 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
 
Re: 
United States v. Hashim Campbell 
 
Criminal Docket No. 21-478 (FB) 
 
Dear Judge Block: 
 
The government respectfully submits this letter regarding the restitution amount 
that should be ordered as part of the sentencing of Hashim Campbell (the “defendant”), which 
occurred on November 17, 2022.  Because the full amount of the victim’s loss was within the 
scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake and was reasonably foreseeable 
to Campbell, the defendant is jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the victim’s loss.  
Therefore, the Court should order restitution in the amount of $3,500,000 plus interest.  
I. 
Background1 
The Paycheck Protection Program 
In March 2020, the President of the United States signed the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act into law.  It was designed to provide emergency 
financial assistance to the millions of Americans who were suffering the economic effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of 
up to $349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other 
expenses through a program referred to as the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). 
To obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business was required to submit a PPP loan 
application signed by an authorized representative of the business.  The PPP loan application 
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this section come from the Information and Pre-
Sentencing Report (“PSR”) for the defendant, which was adopted by the Court without objection 
from the parties at sentencing on November 17, 2022. 
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 24     Filed 02/15/23     Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 199

2 
required the business, through its authorized representative, to acknowledge the program rules 
and to make certain affirmative certifications to be eligible to obtain a PPP loan.  In the PPP loan 
application, the small business was required to state, among other things, its: (a) average monthly 
payroll expenses and (b) number of employees.  These figures were used to calculate the amount 
of money the small business was eligible to receive under the PPP.  In addition, businesses 
applying for a PPP loan were required to provide documentation showing their payroll expenses. 
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program 
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program was a Small Business 
Administration (“SBA”) program that provided low­interest financing to small businesses, 
renters and homeowners in regions affected by declared disasters.  Another source of relief 
provided by the CARES Act was the authorization for the SBA to provide EIDLs of up to $2 
million to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruption due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Under the program, the SBA was authorized to issue advances of up to 
$10,000 to small businesses within three days of applying for an EIDL Advance.  The amount of 
an EIDL Advance was determined based on the number of employees working for the applicant.  
The advance did not have to be repaid. 
To obtain an EIDL or EIDL Advance, a qualifying business was required to 
submit an application to the SBA and provide information about its operations, such as the 
number of employees, gross revenues for the 12-month period preceding the disaster, and cost of 
goods sold in the 12-month period preceding the disaster.  In the case of EIDLs for COVID-19 
relief, the 12-month period was the period preceding January 31, 2020.  The applicant also was 
required to certify that all the information in the application was true and correct to the best of 
the applicant's knowledge. 
EIDL applications were submitted directly to the SBA and processed by the SBA 
with support from a government contractor.  The amount of the loan, if the application was 
approved, was determined based, in part, on the information provided in the application about 
number of employees, revenue, and cost of goods, as described above.  Any funds issued under 
an EIDL were issued directly by the SBA.  EIDL funds could be used for payroll expenses, sick 
leave, production costs, and business obligations, such as debts, rent and mortgage payments.  If 
the applicant also obtained a loan under the PPP, the EIDL funds could not be used for the same 
purpose as the PPP funds. 
The Fraudulent Scheme 
The defendant was the owner and operator of two New York-based tax 
businesses.  Taking advantage of that position, the defendant along with others engaged in a 
scheme to fraudulently obtain approximately $3.5 million in COVID-19 pandemic relief loans.  
The defendant, using his tax businesses, directly contributed to over approximately $1 million in 
fraudulently PPP loans as part of the scheme 
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 24     Filed 02/15/23     Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 200

3 
Separately charged defendant Charlene Wint, co-conspirator #1, co-conspirator 
#2, and co-conspirator #3 (the “Bank Employees”),2 were employed at a retail branch of a bank 
located at 125th Street in New York, New York (“Bank 1”).  Bank 1 is a national bank with 
locations around the country.   
Following the enactment of the CARES Act, the defendant and Bank Employees, 
together with others, effectuated a scheme to submit fraudulent PPP loan applications on behalf 
of Bank 1 customers who did not legitimately qualify for loans under the PPP program in 
exchange for “commissions” taken from loan proceeds.  The Bank Employees worked with a 
network of recruiters to identify borrowers who were either existing Bank 1 customers or became 
Bank 1 customers after they were recruited.  In exchange for their assistance, the Bank 
Employees gave the recruiters “commissions” from the PPP loan proceeds. 
After borrowers were recruited to join the scheme, the Bank Employees assisted 
customers with all aspects of the PPP loan application process and helped borrowers fill out 
fraudulent PPP loan application documents that contained fraudulent information.  As part of the 
scheme, the Bank Employees enlisted tax preparers, including the defendant, to obtain false tax 
documents, which were provided as support for the fraudulent PPP applications to maximize the 
loan amount for each borrower’s business.  In addition, the defendant and Bank Employees 
obtained fraudulent PPP loans for the defendant’s family members and friends.   
As part of the scheme, the defendant prepared false tax documents to support PPP 
loan applications and then sent the documents, often via email, back to the Bank Employees.  In 
some cases, rather than sending the applicants to the defendant, the Bank Employees only sent an 
applicant’s personal information to the defendant (e.g. name, business name, SSN, etc.) and the 
defendant used the information to prepare false tax documents, without ever meeting the loan 
applicant.  For applicants with legitimate businesses, the defendant inflated financial figures on 
tax documents so that the applicants would qualify for larger PPP loans.  For applicants with no 
businesses, the defendant created false tax returns. 
Additionally, the defendant assisted several family members and friends in 
submitting fraudulent applications for PPP loans.  Specifically, the defendant created fraudulent 
income tax returns for his family members and friends, which were submitted with their PPP 
applications to obtain fraudulent loans.  With the defendant’s assistance, his family and friends 
obtained approximately $200,000 in fraudulent PPP loans to which the applicants were not 
entitled. 
The defendant demanded 10% of each PPP loan that was processed using the 
false documents that he prepared and applicants paid the defendant directly.  Ultimately, the 
defendant accepted approximately $100,000 in commission of PPP loan proceeds to which he 
was not entitled.  The false tax documents that the defendant prepared were used to support 
approximately $1,000,000 in fraudulent PPP loans to which the applicants were not entitled. 
 
2 These co-conspirators have been charged in other cases pending in this district before 
Your Honor.   
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 24     Filed 02/15/23     Page 3 of 7 PageID #: 201

4 
On September 23, 2021, the defendant pled guilty before the Honorable Roanne 
L. Mann, United States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York, to a single-count 
Information charging her with participating in a conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, and 
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.  Subsequently, on November 17, 2022 
the defendant was sentenced to one month in prison and restitution to be ordered within 90 days. 
II. 
  Applicable Law 
The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, provides 
for mandatory restitution in all sentencing proceedings where (a) the offense was committed by 
fraud or deceit and (b) an identifiable victim has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss. 18 
U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii), (c) (1)(B).  The amount of restitution to be ordered is the 
“amount of loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis for the offense of conviction.” 
United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195 n. 7 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting United States v. 
Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir.1994)).  The Government bears the burden of establishing 
loss amount, and “[a]ny dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved 
by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.”  United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d 610, 647 
(2d Cir.2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)).  “The district court need not establish the loss with 
precision but rather ‘need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available 
information.’”  United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting United States v.  
Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir.1997)).  There is no dispute that defendant’s offense is one to 
which mandatory restitution applies or that the victim identified by the Government is entitled to 
restitution. 
The MVRA authorizes district courts to hold co-conspirators jointly and severally 
liable for restitution owed to the victims of a conspiracy.  See United States v. Nucci, 364 F.3d 
419, 423 (2d Cir.2004) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(h)).  Rejecting the argument that “the MVRA 
provides for restitution based only on the conduct of the defendant, and not on the conduct of 
others,” the Second Circuit has held that a defendant is “liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts 
of all co-conspirators.”  United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3d 47, 50–51 (2d Cir.2000).  It does not 
matter that a defendant may “not have agreed on the details of the conspiracy” or may be 
“unaware” of his co-conspirator’s acts.  United States v. Gushlak, No. 03 CR 833, 2011 WL 
782295, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.24, 2011) (quoting United States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682, 689 (2d 
Cir.2004)).  Where a defendant “was a member of the conspiracy,” his “offense was committed 
pursuant to the common plan of the conspiracy,” and he “could reasonably have foreseen that a 
co-conspirator would commit the substantive offense,” he is liable for restitution arising out of 
those offenses.  Boyd, 222 F.3d at 51. 
III. 
Restitution in the Amount of $3,500,000 is Appropriate 
Here, the defendant, his co-defendants, and others devised a scheme to defraud by 
submitting and causing to be submitted false and fraudulent loan applications and the losses 
reflected in the proposed restitution order were readily foreseeable by the defendant.  Indeed, 
Campbell pleaded guilty and thereby admitted that he conspired with his co-defendants and 
others to commit bank and wire fraud to carry out the scheme to defraud COVID-19 relief 
programs.  He undertook numerous acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, such as creating false 
tax documents for fictitious companies and taking kickbacks after individuals were fraudulently 
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 24     Filed 02/15/23     Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 202

5 
awarded loan money.  Even assuming that Campbell did not have knowledge of all false loans 
that were given out, it was reasonably foreseeable to him, that his co-conspirators would be 
preparing false loan applications, submitting them, and obtaining PPP loan money fraudulently. 
The loss amount that the defendant was individually accountable for purposes of 
the plea agreement was included within the PSR that was adopted by the Court, and not objected 
to by the parties.  See PSR ¶ 18 (“The defendant is accountable for a total of $1,200,000 in 
fraudulently obtained loans.”).  The defendant had two companies that worked with the Bank 
Employees and other co-conspirators to apply for and obtain PPP false loans.  The amount of 
loss that the defendant was directly responsible for through his tax companies was $1,706,426.02 
and total loss that the defendant is jointly and severally liable for is $3,500,000.     
Further, “the purpose of restitution is essentially compensatory: to restore a 
victim, to the extent money can do so, to the position he occupied before sustaining injury.” 
United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir.2006).  Consistent with that purpose, the 
MVRA provides that a “court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each 
victim's losses.”  18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A).  Restitution should not be limited to the defendant’s 
ill-gotten gains.  The Second Circuit has conclusively rejected substitution of ill-gotten gains for 
a victim’s actual loss in awarding restitution.  See United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3d 86, 92–93 
(2d Cir.2012) (“We ... hold that a sentencing court ordering restitution under the MVRA may not 
substitute a defendant's ill-gotten gains for the victim's actual loss.”).  As the proper measure is 
the full amount the victim’s losses, the restitution order must reflect that sum. 
The Court retains jurisdiction to modify the terms of payment if there is a material 
change in defendant’s economic circumstance that may affect his ability to pay restitution, see 
United States v. Kyles, 601 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2010), including adjusting the payment 
schedule or even requiring immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice may require.  
See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k).  The Court may adjust the payment schedule on its own motion, and 
section 3664 even permits a court to accelerate defendant’s schedule of restitution payments so 
his victims are promptly and justly compensated.  See United States v. Gilmartin, 12-cr-287, 
2018 WL 2059650, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018).  Although the MVRA provides the Court with 
continuing jurisdiction to modify the timing of payment, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), that section makes 
no mention of altering the amount of payment.  See United States v. Hamburger, 414 F. Supp. 
2d. 219, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  The Second Circuit in Kyles, 601 F.3d at 83, made it abundantly 
clear that, although a district court has equitable authority to modify a payment schedule, this 
authority does not extend to decreasing the amount of restitution.   
Lastly, no hearing is required.  “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), so long as the 
victim’s losses are ascertainable at least ten days before [ruling on restitution], and the 
documents supporting the victim’s losses are provided to the defendant within this time-frame, 
the district court may decide restitution ... without holding a separate evidentiary hearing.” 
United States v. Hagerman, 506 F. App’x 14, 19 (2d Cir.2012); see also United States v. 
Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 258 (2d Cir.2010) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining 
“to hold a full-blown evidentiary hearing” on restitution).  Under the circumstances, the 
requirements for issuing a restitution order without holding a hearing have been satisfied.  The 
victim’s losses were ascertainable to defendant and copies of the documents supporting the 
victim’s losses were provided to defendants within a relevant time frame.  Campbell cannot rebut 
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 24     Filed 02/15/23     Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 203

6 
these findings.  Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to conclude, based on the record, that 
Campbell is liable for restitution payable to the victim identified by the Government, and no 
hearing is required. 
 
 
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 24     Filed 02/15/23     Page 6 of 7 PageID #: 204

7 
Conclusion 
Accordingly, it is appropriate for the full amount of restitution, totaling 
$3,500,000 plus interest, to be imposed jointly and severally as to Campbell, and his co-
defendants.  The proposed Order of restitution is attached. 
*** 
Because the proposed Order includes the name and address of the victim and it is 
an ongoing investigation regarding other members of the conspiracy, the government 
respectfully requests that Exhibit A to the restitution Order remain under seal except for the 
limited purpose of providing access to the clerk of the court. 
Additionally, the government requests that the Court exclude time under the 90-
day clock during the pendency of the motions until Your Honor’s decision.  Defense counsel 
does not object to the request. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
BREON PEACE 
United States Attorney 
 
By: 
                                                      
Chand W. Edwards-Balfour 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
(718) 254-6238 
 
Jennifer Bilinkas 
Department of Justice 
Trial Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 24     Filed 02/15/23     Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 205

File and source

File
gov.uscourts.nyed.469462.24.0.pdf
Size
237,176 bytes
SHA-256
c09e7da190cb8346ef6370d0bd275d07ffe04f52f433856199c13567351cc018
Our copy
gov.uscourts.nyed.469462.24.0.pdf
Original
PACER (login required)
Back to top