Court filing
Government Restitution Letter — United States v. Hashim Campbell
Filed February 15, 2023 in U.S. v. Campbell; one of 12 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2023-02-15 |
U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York · No. 1:21-cr-00478-FB · Doc. 24 · 2023-02-15 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
U.S. Department of Justice
United States Attorney
Eastern District of New York
CWE
271 Cadman Plaza East
F. #2020R00955
Brooklyn, New York 11201
February 15, 2023
By Email and ECF
The Honorable Frederic Block
United States District Judge
Eastern District of New York
225 Cadman Plaza East
Brooklyn, New York 11201
Re:
United States v. Hashim Campbell
Criminal Docket No. 21-478 (FB)
Dear Judge Block:
The government respectfully submits this letter regarding the restitution amount
that should be ordered as part of the sentencing of Hashim Campbell (the “defendant”), which
occurred on November 17, 2022. Because the full amount of the victim’s loss was within the
scope of the criminal activity the defendant agreed to undertake and was reasonably foreseeable
to Campbell, the defendant is jointly and severally liable for the full amount of the victim’s loss.
Therefore, the Court should order restitution in the amount of $3,500,000 plus interest.
I.
Background1
The Paycheck Protection Program
In March 2020, the President of the United States signed the Coronavirus Aid,
Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act into law. It was designed to provide emergency
financial assistance to the millions of Americans who were suffering the economic effects of the
COVID-19 pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of
up to $349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other
expenses through a program referred to as the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”).
To obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business was required to submit a PPP loan
application signed by an authorized representative of the business. The PPP loan application
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this section come from the Information and Pre-
Sentencing Report (“PSR”) for the defendant, which was adopted by the Court without objection
from the parties at sentencing on November 17, 2022.
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB Document 24 Filed 02/15/23 Page 1 of 7 PageID #: 199
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required the business, through its authorized representative, to acknowledge the program rules
and to make certain affirmative certifications to be eligible to obtain a PPP loan. In the PPP loan
application, the small business was required to state, among other things, its: (a) average monthly
payroll expenses and (b) number of employees. These figures were used to calculate the amount
of money the small business was eligible to receive under the PPP. In addition, businesses
applying for a PPP loan were required to provide documentation showing their payroll expenses.
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program was a Small Business
Administration (“SBA”) program that provided lowinterest financing to small businesses,
renters and homeowners in regions affected by declared disasters. Another source of relief
provided by the CARES Act was the authorization for the SBA to provide EIDLs of up to $2
million to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruption due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. Under the program, the SBA was authorized to issue advances of up to
$10,000 to small businesses within three days of applying for an EIDL Advance. The amount of
an EIDL Advance was determined based on the number of employees working for the applicant.
The advance did not have to be repaid.
To obtain an EIDL or EIDL Advance, a qualifying business was required to
submit an application to the SBA and provide information about its operations, such as the
number of employees, gross revenues for the 12-month period preceding the disaster, and cost of
goods sold in the 12-month period preceding the disaster. In the case of EIDLs for COVID-19
relief, the 12-month period was the period preceding January 31, 2020. The applicant also was
required to certify that all the information in the application was true and correct to the best of
the applicant's knowledge.
EIDL applications were submitted directly to the SBA and processed by the SBA
with support from a government contractor. The amount of the loan, if the application was
approved, was determined based, in part, on the information provided in the application about
number of employees, revenue, and cost of goods, as described above. Any funds issued under
an EIDL were issued directly by the SBA. EIDL funds could be used for payroll expenses, sick
leave, production costs, and business obligations, such as debts, rent and mortgage payments. If
the applicant also obtained a loan under the PPP, the EIDL funds could not be used for the same
purpose as the PPP funds.
The Fraudulent Scheme
The defendant was the owner and operator of two New York-based tax
businesses. Taking advantage of that position, the defendant along with others engaged in a
scheme to fraudulently obtain approximately $3.5 million in COVID-19 pandemic relief loans.
The defendant, using his tax businesses, directly contributed to over approximately $1 million in
fraudulently PPP loans as part of the scheme
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB Document 24 Filed 02/15/23 Page 2 of 7 PageID #: 200
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Separately charged defendant Charlene Wint, co-conspirator #1, co-conspirator
#2, and co-conspirator #3 (the “Bank Employees”),2 were employed at a retail branch of a bank
located at 125th Street in New York, New York (“Bank 1”). Bank 1 is a national bank with
locations around the country.
Following the enactment of the CARES Act, the defendant and Bank Employees,
together with others, effectuated a scheme to submit fraudulent PPP loan applications on behalf
of Bank 1 customers who did not legitimately qualify for loans under the PPP program in
exchange for “commissions” taken from loan proceeds. The Bank Employees worked with a
network of recruiters to identify borrowers who were either existing Bank 1 customers or became
Bank 1 customers after they were recruited. In exchange for their assistance, the Bank
Employees gave the recruiters “commissions” from the PPP loan proceeds.
After borrowers were recruited to join the scheme, the Bank Employees assisted
customers with all aspects of the PPP loan application process and helped borrowers fill out
fraudulent PPP loan application documents that contained fraudulent information. As part of the
scheme, the Bank Employees enlisted tax preparers, including the defendant, to obtain false tax
documents, which were provided as support for the fraudulent PPP applications to maximize the
loan amount for each borrower’s business. In addition, the defendant and Bank Employees
obtained fraudulent PPP loans for the defendant’s family members and friends.
As part of the scheme, the defendant prepared false tax documents to support PPP
loan applications and then sent the documents, often via email, back to the Bank Employees. In
some cases, rather than sending the applicants to the defendant, the Bank Employees only sent an
applicant’s personal information to the defendant (e.g. name, business name, SSN, etc.) and the
defendant used the information to prepare false tax documents, without ever meeting the loan
applicant. For applicants with legitimate businesses, the defendant inflated financial figures on
tax documents so that the applicants would qualify for larger PPP loans. For applicants with no
businesses, the defendant created false tax returns.
Additionally, the defendant assisted several family members and friends in
submitting fraudulent applications for PPP loans. Specifically, the defendant created fraudulent
income tax returns for his family members and friends, which were submitted with their PPP
applications to obtain fraudulent loans. With the defendant’s assistance, his family and friends
obtained approximately $200,000 in fraudulent PPP loans to which the applicants were not
entitled.
The defendant demanded 10% of each PPP loan that was processed using the
false documents that he prepared and applicants paid the defendant directly. Ultimately, the
defendant accepted approximately $100,000 in commission of PPP loan proceeds to which he
was not entitled. The false tax documents that the defendant prepared were used to support
approximately $1,000,000 in fraudulent PPP loans to which the applicants were not entitled.
2 These co-conspirators have been charged in other cases pending in this district before
Your Honor.
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On September 23, 2021, the defendant pled guilty before the Honorable Roanne
L. Mann, United States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York, to a single-count
Information charging her with participating in a conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, and
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349. Subsequently, on November 17, 2022
the defendant was sentenced to one month in prison and restitution to be ordered within 90 days.
II.
Applicable Law
The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, provides
for mandatory restitution in all sentencing proceedings where (a) the offense was committed by
fraud or deceit and (b) an identifiable victim has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss. 18
U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii), (c) (1)(B). The amount of restitution to be ordered is the
“amount of loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis for the offense of conviction.”
United States v. Gushlak, 728 F.3d 184, 195 n. 7 (2d Cir.2013) (quoting United States v.
Silkowski, 32 F.3d 682, 688 (2d Cir.1994)). The Government bears the burden of establishing
loss amount, and “[a]ny dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution shall be resolved
by the court by the preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Bahel, 662 F.3d 610, 647
(2d Cir.2011) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e)). “The district court need not establish the loss with
precision but rather ‘need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available
information.’” United States v. Carboni, 204 F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir.2000) (quoting United States v.
Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir.1997)). There is no dispute that defendant’s offense is one to
which mandatory restitution applies or that the victim identified by the Government is entitled to
restitution.
The MVRA authorizes district courts to hold co-conspirators jointly and severally
liable for restitution owed to the victims of a conspiracy. See United States v. Nucci, 364 F.3d
419, 423 (2d Cir.2004) (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 3664(h)). Rejecting the argument that “the MVRA
provides for restitution based only on the conduct of the defendant, and not on the conduct of
others,” the Second Circuit has held that a defendant is “liable for the reasonably foreseeable acts
of all co-conspirators.” United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3d 47, 50–51 (2d Cir.2000). It does not
matter that a defendant may “not have agreed on the details of the conspiracy” or may be
“unaware” of his co-conspirator’s acts. United States v. Gushlak, No. 03 CR 833, 2011 WL
782295, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.24, 2011) (quoting United States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682, 689 (2d
Cir.2004)). Where a defendant “was a member of the conspiracy,” his “offense was committed
pursuant to the common plan of the conspiracy,” and he “could reasonably have foreseen that a
co-conspirator would commit the substantive offense,” he is liable for restitution arising out of
those offenses. Boyd, 222 F.3d at 51.
III.
Restitution in the Amount of $3,500,000 is Appropriate
Here, the defendant, his co-defendants, and others devised a scheme to defraud by
submitting and causing to be submitted false and fraudulent loan applications and the losses
reflected in the proposed restitution order were readily foreseeable by the defendant. Indeed,
Campbell pleaded guilty and thereby admitted that he conspired with his co-defendants and
others to commit bank and wire fraud to carry out the scheme to defraud COVID-19 relief
programs. He undertook numerous acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, such as creating false
tax documents for fictitious companies and taking kickbacks after individuals were fraudulently
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB Document 24 Filed 02/15/23 Page 4 of 7 PageID #: 202
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awarded loan money. Even assuming that Campbell did not have knowledge of all false loans
that were given out, it was reasonably foreseeable to him, that his co-conspirators would be
preparing false loan applications, submitting them, and obtaining PPP loan money fraudulently.
The loss amount that the defendant was individually accountable for purposes of
the plea agreement was included within the PSR that was adopted by the Court, and not objected
to by the parties. See PSR ¶ 18 (“The defendant is accountable for a total of $1,200,000 in
fraudulently obtained loans.”). The defendant had two companies that worked with the Bank
Employees and other co-conspirators to apply for and obtain PPP false loans. The amount of
loss that the defendant was directly responsible for through his tax companies was $1,706,426.02
and total loss that the defendant is jointly and severally liable for is $3,500,000.
Further, “the purpose of restitution is essentially compensatory: to restore a
victim, to the extent money can do so, to the position he occupied before sustaining injury.”
United States v. Boccagna, 450 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir.2006). Consistent with that purpose, the
MVRA provides that a “court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each
victim's losses.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(A). Restitution should not be limited to the defendant’s
ill-gotten gains. The Second Circuit has conclusively rejected substitution of ill-gotten gains for
a victim’s actual loss in awarding restitution. See United States v. Zangari, 677 F.3d 86, 92–93
(2d Cir.2012) (“We ... hold that a sentencing court ordering restitution under the MVRA may not
substitute a defendant's ill-gotten gains for the victim's actual loss.”). As the proper measure is
the full amount the victim’s losses, the restitution order must reflect that sum.
The Court retains jurisdiction to modify the terms of payment if there is a material
change in defendant’s economic circumstance that may affect his ability to pay restitution, see
United States v. Kyles, 601 F.3d 78, 83-84 (2d Cir. 2010), including adjusting the payment
schedule or even requiring immediate payment in full, as the interests of justice may require.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k). The Court may adjust the payment schedule on its own motion, and
section 3664 even permits a court to accelerate defendant’s schedule of restitution payments so
his victims are promptly and justly compensated. See United States v. Gilmartin, 12-cr-287,
2018 WL 2059650, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2018). Although the MVRA provides the Court with
continuing jurisdiction to modify the timing of payment, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(k), that section makes
no mention of altering the amount of payment. See United States v. Hamburger, 414 F. Supp.
2d. 219, 227 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). The Second Circuit in Kyles, 601 F.3d at 83, made it abundantly
clear that, although a district court has equitable authority to modify a payment schedule, this
authority does not extend to decreasing the amount of restitution.
Lastly, no hearing is required. “Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), so long as the
victim’s losses are ascertainable at least ten days before [ruling on restitution], and the
documents supporting the victim’s losses are provided to the defendant within this time-frame,
the district court may decide restitution ... without holding a separate evidentiary hearing.”
United States v. Hagerman, 506 F. App’x 14, 19 (2d Cir.2012); see also United States v.
Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 258 (2d Cir.2010) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining
“to hold a full-blown evidentiary hearing” on restitution). Under the circumstances, the
requirements for issuing a restitution order without holding a hearing have been satisfied. The
victim’s losses were ascertainable to defendant and copies of the documents supporting the
victim’s losses were provided to defendants within a relevant time frame. Campbell cannot rebut
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB Document 24 Filed 02/15/23 Page 5 of 7 PageID #: 203
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these findings. Additionally, there is sufficient evidence to conclude, based on the record, that
Campbell is liable for restitution payable to the victim identified by the Government, and no
hearing is required.
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Conclusion
Accordingly, it is appropriate for the full amount of restitution, totaling
$3,500,000 plus interest, to be imposed jointly and severally as to Campbell, and his co-
defendants. The proposed Order of restitution is attached.
***
Because the proposed Order includes the name and address of the victim and it is
an ongoing investigation regarding other members of the conspiracy, the government
respectfully requests that Exhibit A to the restitution Order remain under seal except for the
limited purpose of providing access to the clerk of the court.
Additionally, the government requests that the Court exclude time under the 90-
day clock during the pendency of the motions until Your Honor’s decision. Defense counsel
does not object to the request.
Respectfully submitted,
BREON PEACE
United States Attorney
By:
Chand W. Edwards-Balfour
Assistant U.S. Attorney
(718) 254-6238
Jennifer Bilinkas
Department of Justice
Trial Attorney
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB Document 24 Filed 02/15/23 Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 205File and source
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