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Home Court filings United States v. Campbell Government Sentencing Letter — United States v. Hashim Campbell

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Government Sentencing Letter — United States v. Hashim Campbell

Filed November 14, 2022 in U.S. v. Campbell; one of 12 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York
Filed2022-11-14

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York · No. 1:21-cr-00478-FB · Doc. 20 · 2022-11-14 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 
United States Attorney 
Eastern District of New York 
 
CWE/JLB 
271 Cadman Plaza East 
F. #2020R00955 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
 
November 14, 2022 
By ECF 
 
The Honorable Frederic Block  
United States District Judge 
Eastern District of New York 
225 Cadman Plaza East 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
 
Re: 
United States v. Hashim Campbell 
 
Criminal Docket No. 21- 478 (FB) 
 
Dear Judge Block: 
 
  The government respectfully submits this letter in advance of the sentencing of 
Hashim Campbell (the “defendant”), which is currently scheduled for November 17, 2022.  On 
September 23, 2021, the defendant pled guilty before the Honorable Roanne L. Mann, United 
States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York, to a single-count Information charging 
him with participating in a conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1349.  For the reasons set forth herein, a sentence within the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “USSG”) range 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment is 
appropriate in this case.   
I. 
Background1 
The Paycheck Protection Program 
In March 2020, the President of the United States signed the Coronavirus Aid, 
Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act into law.  It was designed to provide emergency 
financial assistance to the millions of Americans who were suffering the economic effects of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the authorization of 
up to $349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other 
expenses through a program referred to as the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). 
  To obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business was required to submit a PPP loan 
application signed by an authorized representative of the business.  The PPP loan application 
required the business, through its authorized representative, to acknowledge the program rules 
 
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this section come from the Information and the Pre-
Sentencing Report (“PSR”) for the defendant.  
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and to make certain affirmative certifications in order to be eligible to obtain the PPP loan.  In 
the PPP loan application, the small business was required to state, among other things, its: (a) 
average monthly payroll expenses and (b) number of employees.  These figures were used to 
calculate the amount of money the small business was eligible to receive under the PPP.  In 
addition, businesses applying for a PPP loan were required to provide documentation showing 
their payroll expenses. 
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program 
The Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) program was a Small Business 
Administration (“SBA”) program that provided low­interest financing to small businesses, 
renters and homeowners in regions affected by declared disasters.  Another source of relief 
provided by the CARES Act was the authorization for the SBA to provide EIDLs of up to $2 
million to eligible small businesses experiencing substantial financial disruption due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  Under the program, the SBA was authorized to issue advances of up to 
$10,000 to small businesses within three days of applying for an EIDL Advance.  The amount of 
an EIDL Advance was determined based on the number of employees working for the applicant. 
The advance did not have to be repaid. 
To obtain an EIDL or EIDL Advance, a qualifying business was required to 
submit an application to the SBA and provide information about its operations, such as the 
number of employees, gross revenues for the 12-month period preceding the disaster, and cost of 
goods sold in the 12-month period preceding the disaster.  In the case of EIDLs for COVID-19 
relief, the 12-month period was the period preceding January 31, 2020.  The applicant also was 
required to certify that all the information in the application was true and correct to the best of 
the applicant’s knowledge. 
EIDL applications were submitted directly to the SBA and processed by the SBA 
with support from a government contractor.  The amount of the loan, if the application was 
approved, was determined based, in part, on the information provided in the application about 
number of employees, revenue, and cost of goods, as described above.  Any funds issued under 
an EIDL were issued directly by the SBA.  EIDL funds could be used for payroll expenses, sick 
leave, production costs, and business obligations, such as debts, rent and mortgage payments.  If 
the applicant also obtained a loan under the PPP, the EIDL funds could not be used for the same 
purpose as the PPP funds. 
The Fraudulent Scheme 
The defendant is a 41-year-old man who resided in the Bronx, New York.  He 
was the owner and operator of two New York-based tax businesses.  Taking advantage of that 
position, the defendant engaged in a scheme where he and his co-conspirators fraudulently 
obtained over approximately $1 million in PPP loans. 
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Separately charged defendant Charlene Wint, co-conspirator #1, co-conspirator 
#2, and co-conspirator #3 (the “Bank Employees”),2 were employed at a retail branch of a bank 
located at 125th Street in New York, New York (“Bank 1”).  Bank 1 is a national bank with 
locations around the country.   
Following the enactment of the CARES Act, the defendant and Bank Employees, 
together with others, effectuated a scheme to submit fraudulent PPP loan applications on behalf 
of Bank 1 customers who did not legitimately qualify for loans under the PPP program in 
exchange for “commissions” taken from loan proceeds.  The Bank Employees worked with a 
network of recruiters to identify borrowers who were either existing Bank 1 customers or became 
Bank 1 customers after they were recruited.  In exchange for their assistance, the Bank 
Employees gave the recruiters “commissions” from the PPP loan proceeds. 
After borrowers were recruited to join the scheme, the Bank Employees assisted 
customers with all aspects of the PPP loan application process and helped borrowers fill out 
fraudulent PPP loan application documents that contained fraudulent information.  As part of the 
scheme, the Bank Employees enlisted tax preparers, including the defendant, to obtain false tax 
documents, which were provided as support for the fraudulent PPP applications to maximize the 
loan amount for each borrower’s business.  In addition, the defendant and Bank Employees 
obtained fraudulent PPP loans for the defendant’s family members and friends.   
As part of the scheme, the defendant prepared false tax documents to support PPP 
loan applications and then sent the documents, often via email, back to the Bank Employees.  In 
some cases, rather than sending the applicants to the defendant, the Bank Employees only sent an 
applicant’s personal information to the defendant (e.g. name, business name, SSN, etc.) and the 
defendant used the information to prepare false tax documents, without ever meeting the loan 
applicant.  For applicants with legitimate businesses, the defendant inflated financial figures on 
tax documents so that the applicants would qualify for larger PPP loans.  For applicants with no 
businesses, the defendant created false tax returns. 
Additionally, the defendant assisted several family members and friends in 
submitting fraudulent applications for PPP loans.  Specifically, the defendant created fraudulent 
income tax returns for his family members and friends, which were submitted with their PPP 
applications to obtain fraudulent loans.  With the defendant’s assistance, his family and friends 
obtained approximately $200,000 in fraudulent PPP loans to which the applicants were not 
entitled. 
The defendant demanded 10% of each PPP loan that was processed using the 
false documents that he prepared and applicants paid the defendant directly.  Ultimately, the 
defendant accepted approximately $100,000 in commission of PPP loan proceeds to which he 
was not entitled.  The false tax documents that the defendant prepared were used to support 
approximately $1,000,000 in fraudulent PPP loans to which the applicants were not entitled. 
 
2 These co-conspirators have been charged in other cases pending in this district before 
Your Honor.   
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II. 
Applicable Law 
The Supreme Court has explained that the Court “should begin all sentencing 
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable [Guidelines] range.  As a matter of 
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point 
and the initial benchmark.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (citation omitted).   
Next, a sentencing court should “consider all of the § 3553(a) factors to determine 
whether they support the sentence requested by a party.  In so doing, [it] may not presume that 
the Guidelines range is reasonable.  [It] must make an individualized assessment based on the 
facts presented.”  Id. at 50 (citation and footnote omitted).  Title 18, United States Code, Section 
3553(a) provides, in part, that in imposing sentence, the Court shall consider: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant; [and] 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-- 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; [and] 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
At sentencing, “the court is virtually unfettered with respect to the information it 
may consider.”  United States v. Alexander, 860 F.2d 508, 513 (2d Cir. 1988).  Indeed, “[n]o 
limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct 
of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider 
for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661.  Thus, the Court should 
first calculate the applicable Guidelines range, and then apply the Section 3553(a) factors to 
arrive at an appropriate sentence, considering all relevant facts. 
III. 
Guidelines Calculation 
The United States Probation Department’s (“Probation”) calculated the 
defendant’s offense level in the PSR as follows: 
Base Offense Level (§§ 2X1.1(a) and 2B1.1(a)(1))  
              7 
More: Loss Amount Greater than $550,000 (2B1.1(b)(1)(H))   +14 
More: Abuse of Position of Public Trust (§§ 3E1.1(a))  
+2 
Less: Acceptance (§§ 3E1.1(a))  
 
              
 -2 
Less: Early Acceptance (§§ 3E1.1(b)) 
 
  
 
 -1 
Adjusted Total: 
 
 
 
                         
 20 
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(PSR ¶¶ 23–34).  Probation calculated the adjusted total offense level as 20, which, based on a 
criminal history category of I, carries an advisory Guidelines range of 33 to 41 months’ 
incarceration.  (Id. ¶ 72).   
The government disagrees with this calculation because Probation did not apply a two-level 
adjustment for sophisticated means pursuant to USSG § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C).  The government 
believes the enhancement for sophisticated means applies because of the nature of the conduct 
involved in the conspiracy during which fictitious client names and companies were used to 
defraud Bank 1 and the SBA into paying out PPP loans.  U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10) provides: “If . . 
. the offense otherwise involved sophisticated means and the defendant intentionally engaged in 
or caused the conduct constituting sophisticated means, increase by 2 levels.” U.S.S.G. § 
2B1.1(b)(10)(C).  Application Note 9 further explains: 
For purposes of subsection (b)(10)(C), “sophisticated means” means 
especially complex or especially intricate offense conduct 
pertaining to the execution or concealment of an offense.  For 
example, in a telemarketing scheme, locating the main office of the 
scheme in one jurisdiction but locating soliciting operations in 
another jurisdiction ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.  
Conduct such as hiding assets or transactions, or both, through the 
use of fictitious entities, corporate shells, or offshore financial 
accounts also ordinarily indicates sophisticated means.  
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.9. 
The scheme in its totality is sophisticated when all relevant conduct is considered.  
The scheme involved the defendant and numerous co-conspirators, who created the documents 
necessary to fraudulently apply for and receive PPP loans for various entities in this case.  A 
certain level of sophistication is required to determine how to apply for such a loan in a manner 
likely to succeed, especially involving insider bank employees and, in the defendant’s case, 
being a licensed accountant.  During the course of the scheme, the defendant and his co-
conspirators also knew how to recruit participants to assist in preparing the fraudulent loans and 
worked out kickbacks as payment for their roles in securing fraudulent loans.  See United States 
v. Regensberg, 381 F. App’x 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that “repetitive conduct ... [that] 
demonstrates that more than routine planning was involved” constituted sophisticated means); 
See United States v. Jackson, 346 F.3d 22, 25 (2d Cir.2003) (“[E]ven if each step in the scheme 
was not elaborate, the total scheme was sophisticated in the way all the steps were linked 
together....”); United States v. Lewis, 93 F.3d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir.1996) (holding, in tax case, that 
the sophisticated means enhancement applied even when “each step in the planned tax evasion 
was simple, [because] when viewed together, the steps comprised a plan more complex than 
merely filling out a false tax return.”).  Additionally, the documents necessary to support the PPP 
applications are sophisticated.  As part of the conspiracy, fraudulent tax documents were 
prepared and provided to the loan applicants in the name of their respective corporate entity.  
Generating false documents sufficient to survive minimal scrutiny reflects a level of 
sophistication in the execution of the scheme and that the defendant was aware of how his 
conduct could potentially avoid detection with these tax documents in place.   
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Evaluating the entire scheme, all of which includes defrauding a complex disaster 
loan plan by the federal government, the recruitment of employees at a bank and outside 
accountants, the recruitment of individuals willing and eligible to submit a fraudulent loan 
application with a legitimate nominee business, and the creation of different supporting 
documents including IRS forms, all underscores that the defendant’s fraudulent scheme involved 
sophisticated means.  Lewis, 93 F.3d at 1083.  Further, the defendant does not contest the 
application of the sophisticated means enhancement and stipulated to it as part of the Guidelines 
calculations included in the plea agreement. 
Taking into account the additional 2 points for sophisticated means, the 
government respectfully submits that the total offense level is 20, and the applicable Guidelines 
range is 33 to 41 months’ incarceration.  
IV. 
A Sentence of 33 to 41 Months’ Imprisonment is Appropriate 
The government respectfully submits that a sentence between 33 to 41 months’ 
incarceration, as set forth in the plea agreement, is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 
achieve the goals of sentencing.   
First, the defendant’s criminal conduct in this matter is serious, as he fraudulently 
sought to obtain approximately a million dollars in pandemic-related loans offered to address 
emergency and disaster relief to those businesses affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.  His 
actions warrant commensurately significant consequences, both due to the seriousness of the 
offense and as a general deterrent to send a message to the broader public that taking advantage 
of a national emergency to enrich oneself at public expense is not tolerated.  The COVID-19 
pandemic was among the most serious of public health crises in American history and it had 
profound economic ramifications.  The defendant’s exploitation of the crisis not only cost the 
government and the Bank 1 time and money, but also diverted funds that could have been used 
the way PPP loans were intended: to assist struggling businesses and to keep people employed.  
Instead, the defendant took money that was earmarked for small businesses struggling and 
dissipated it on his own personal enrichment.  Moreover, this was not a victimless crime.  The 
PPP and EIDL programs were not a limitless pot of money.  By taking money that he was not 
entitled to, the defendant defrauded taxpayers who helped fund the program and the SBA which 
guarantees these loans.  As such, this selfish and destructive conduct, which through the 
diversion of relief money caused direct harms to a vulnerable public, demands serious 
punishment.   
Second, a Guidelines sentence as reflected in the plea agreement is necessary to 
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law and provide general deterrence. 
Given that criminal conduct like the defendant’s is typically difficult to detect and prosecute, 
there is a greater need for general deterrence. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 
988-89 (1991) (noting that “since deterrent effect depends not only upon the amount of the 
penalty but upon its certainty, crimes that are less grave but significantly more difficult to detect 
may warrant substantially higher penalties”).  Moreover, because economic and fraud-based 
crimes are more rational, cool and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these 
crimes are prime candidates for general deterrence.” See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 
1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Heffernan, 43 
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F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Considerations of (general) deterrence argue for punishing 
more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and punish, since 
both attributes go to increase the expected benefits of a crime and hence the punishment required 
to deter it.”).  Here, a Guidelines sentence will help to deter other fraudsters, like the defendant, 
who believe that they can generate income through fraudulent schemes against government 
agencies during a time of crisis.  Such persons should know that the decision to deceive 
government agencies into handing over funds allocated to assist the most vulnerable populations 
will result in stern consequences.  This is particularly true for a person who is placed in a 
position of trust, as was the defendant, who was to assist people in submitting legitimate tax 
documents necessary to maintain their businesses. 
V. 
Conclusion 
The government respectfully requests that the Court impose a sentence between 
33 to 41 months’ incarceration, as set forth in the plea agreement.   
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
BREON PEACE 
United States Attorney 
 
By: 
/s/ Chand E. Edwards-Balfour                      
Chand W. Edwards-Balfour 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
(718) 254-6238 
 
Jennifer Bilinkas 
Trial Attorney, Department of Justice 
 
cc: 
Clerk of Court (FB) (via Email and ECF) 
 
Counsel of record (via Email and ECF) 
 
U.S. Probation (via Email) 
Case 1:21-cr-00478-FB     Document 20     Filed 11/14/22     Page 7 of 7 PageID #: 179

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