Government Opposition to Early Termination — U.S. v. Blotnick

Record facts

U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey · No. 2:21-cr-00796-BRM · Doc. 34 · 2026-04-22 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

U.S. Department of Justice 
 
 
United States Attorney’s Office 
 
District of New Jersey 
 
 
 __________________________________________________________________________________________________________________  
 
Fatime Meka Cano 
970 Broad Street, 7th floor 
973-645-2700 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 
April 22, 2026 
 
Via ECF & EMAIL 
 
The Honorable Brian R. Martinotti 
United States District Judge 
Martin Luther King Jr. Federal Building & Courthouse 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 
 
 
 
Re: 
United States v. Gregory Blotnick 
 
 
 
Crim. No. 21-796 
 
Dear Judge Martinotti: 
 
The Government submits this letter in lieu of a more formal submission in 
opposition to Gregory Blotnick’s (“Blotnick” or the “Defendant”) request for early 
termination of supervised release. 
Background 
 
On October 13, 2021, Blotnick appeared before Your Honor and pleaded guilty 
to a Two-Count Information.  Count One charged wire fraud in violation of Title 18, 
United States Code, Section 1343, and Count Two charged money laundering, in 
violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957. Presentence Investigation 
Report dated May 3, 2022. (“PSR”) ¶¶ 2-3.   
 
 
Blotnick’s plea agreement included an appellate waiver that read, in relevant 
part:  
Blotnick knows that he has and, except as noted below in 
this paragraph, voluntarily waives, the right to file any 
appeal, any collateral attack, or any other writ or motion, 
including but not limited to an appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 
3742 or a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which challenges 
the sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that 
sentence falls within or below the Guidelines range that 
results from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 27. 
 
Dkt. No. 19. 
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At the time of his sentencing, this Court assigned Blotnick a criminal history 
category I and a total offense level of 27, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range 
70 to 87 months’ imprisonment, consistent with PSR and the parties’ plea agreement.  
PSR ¶¶ 123-124.  
 
On June 7, 2022, this Court varied downward three levels and Your Honor 
sentenced Blotnick to 51 months imprisonment on each count to run concurrently, 
followed by two years of supervised release.  Dkt. No. 27.  The Bureau of Prisons 
(“BOP”) released Blotnick from custody on March 12, 2025, and his supervised release 
commenced.  His term of supervision is set to expire on March 12, 2027—he has 
served approximately 13 months of his two-year term of supervised release.  
 
In his motion for request for early termination of supervised release, Dkt. 32 
(“Mot.”), Blotnick argues that early termination is appropriate because, in sum, he 
has made significant progress, complied with the conditions of his supervision, 
maintained stable housing and employment, reintegrated into the community, 
maintained sobriety, and continues to make restitution payments—including recent 
payments exceeding the required minimum.  Id. at 3. 
 
The U.S. Probation Office (“Probation”) has advised the Government that 
Blotnick remains compliant with the terms of his supervision and that he meets the 
minimum requirements set forth in the Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 8, Ch. 3, 
Section 360.20(c).  Probation does not oppose Blotnick’s request for early termination 
of supervision.   
Analysis 
While the Government appreciates that Blotnick has remained compliant with 
the terms of his supervision, as is expected of those on supervised release, the 
Government disagrees that early discharge from supervised release is warranted on 
two grounds.  First, in his plea agreement (the “Plea Agreement”), Blotnick waived 
his right to bring this motion.  Second, Blotnick cannot show that early termination—
13 months into a 24-month term—is justified.  It is not only the expectation, but a 
requirement of supervised release that Blotnick remain law abiding.  As outlined 
below, consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and the interest of justice 
counsel against an early discharge from supervised release.  Accordingly, the 
Government respectfully requests that the Court deny Blotnick’s motion. 
A. Blotnick Waived His Right to Bring the Motion 
As an initial matter, Blotnick waived his right to bring this motion.  That alone 
dooms his request.  As the Third Circuit made clear in United States v. Damon, 933 
F.3d 269, 275 (3d Cir. 2019), where—as here—the defendant agrees in his plea 
agreement to waive the right to file an appeal or collateral attack challenging the 
sentence imposed, that waiver includes motions to terminate supervised release.  The 
Third Circuit reasoned that, because the plea agreement at issue in Damon 
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specifically listed the term of supervised release as a component of the defendant’s 
sentence, the appellate waiver extended to the defendant’s motion to terminate his 
term of supervised release, which was nothing more than a “challenge” to the 
sentence imposed.  Id. at 274. 
 
Here, like in Damon, Blotnick expressly waived the right to “challenge” his 
sentence, including but not limited to appeals under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and in collateral 
attacks under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, where the sentence imposed was within or below the 
agreed-upon sentence.  Blotnick received a sentence significantly below the agreed-
upon sentence.  Therefore, Blotnick’s waiver was triggered, barring him from seeking 
early termination of supervised release.  Damon, 933 F.3d at 274.  Damon, therefore, 
binds this Court to deny Blotnick’s motion pursuant to his waiver.      
 
B. Early Termination of Supervised Release is Not Warranted 
Even assuming that Blotnick did not waive his right to move for early 
termination, such relief is not warranted here.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), this Court 
may terminate a term of supervised release prior to its expiration in certain 
circumstances:  
The court may, after considering the factors set forth in [18 
U.S.C. §] 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), 
(a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7)[,] terminate a term of supervised 
release and discharge the defendant released at any time 
after the expiration of one year of supervised release, 
pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure relating to the modification of probation, if it is 
satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct of 
the defendant released and the interest of justice.  
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).  
It is Blotnick’s burden, “as the party receiving the benefit of early termination, 
to demonstrate that such a course of action is justified.”  United States v. Weber, 451 
F.3d 552, 559 n.9 (9th Cir. 2006).  After all, it “logically follows that the burden of 
ultimate persuasion should rest upon the party attempting to adjust the sentence.”  
United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 291 (3d Cir. 1989).  In assessing whether 
Blotnick has met that burden, this Court must consider:  
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the 
defendant’s 
history 
and 
characteristics, 
18 
U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1);  
(2) the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct, protect the public from further crimes of the 
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defendant, and provide him with needed educational or 
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment in the most effective manner, § 3553(a)(2)(B)-
(D);  
(3) the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established 
for the defendant’s crimes, § 3553(a)(4)(A);  
(4) pertinent policy statements issued by the United States 
Sentencing Commission, § 3553(a)(5); 
(5) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been 
found guilty of similar conduct, § 3553(a)(6); and  
(6) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the 
offense, § 3553(a)(7). 
“After considering these factors, this Court may provide relief only if it is 
satisfied that early termination is warranted by the defendant’s conduct and is in the 
interest of justice.”  United States v. Melvin, 978 F.3d 49, 52 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1)).  “The expansive phrases ‘conduct of the defendant’ and ‘interest 
of justice’ make clear that a district court enjoys discretion to consider a wide range 
of circumstances when determining whether to grant early termination.”  Id. 
(quotation marks omitted).  Furthermore, “[d]istrict courts are not required to make 
specific findings of fact with respect to each of these” specified § 3553(a) “factors; 
rather, a statement that [the district court] has considered the statutory factors is 
sufficient.”  Id. at 52-53. 
 
Repudiating contrary language in earlier non-precedential opinions, however, 
Melvin held that “a district court need not find that an exceptional, extraordinary, 
new, or unforeseen circumstance warrants early termination of a term of supervised 
release before granting a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1).”  Id. at 53.  Although 
“extraordinary circumstances may be sufficient to justify early termination of a term 
of supervised release,” they are not “necessary for such termination.”  Id.  
Nonetheless, “[g]enerally, early termination of supervised release under § 3583(e)(1) 
will be proper” as a discretionary matter “only when the sentencing judge is satisfied 
that new or unforeseen circumstances warrant it.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
“That is because, if a sentence was ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ when 
first pronounced,” as § 3553(a) requires, a reviewing court “would expect that 
something will have changed in the interim that would justify an early end to a term 
of supervised release.”  Id. (quotation omitted).  
Taking into consideration the Section 3553(a) factors and the interest of 
justice, early termination of supervised release is not warranted here.  As the Circuit 
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recently explained in Melvin, early termination of supervised release is generally 
proper only where new or unforeseen circumstances warrant it, “because, if a 
sentence was ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ when first pronounced, 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a), we would expect that something will have changed in the interim 
that would justify an early end to a term of supervised release.” Id.  Here, Blotnick 
has not identified any changed circumstances warranting departure from the Court’s 
initial determination that the two-year term was a “sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary” period of supervised release for the crime of conviction.   
Likewise, consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors does not justify early 
termination of Blotnick’s supervision.  First, the nature and circumstances of 
Blotnick’s offense are serious.  Blotnick defrauded 12 separate Victim Lenders from 
the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”), created to help distressed small businesses 
stay afloat during a global pandemic.  PSR ¶ 1.  Over the course of the investigation, 
Blotnick submitted at least 21 fraudulent PPP applications seeking more than $6.8 
million; he received over $4.6 million as a result. PSR ¶ 21.   
Second, although this is Blotnick’s first conviction, his scheme spanned almost 
an entire year, during which time Blotnick repeatedly submitted almost two dozen 
false and fraudulent PPP applications for his own personal greed.  Considering 
Blotnick’s brazen conduct, early termination of his supervised release would not 
reflect his history and characteristics or promote respect for the law.  18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(1)-(2). 
 
Here, Blotnick states that since the start of his term of supervised release, he 
has been “incident free and in full compliance with all conditions of supervision” and 
is “a non-violent, first time offender” with “stable employment, housing consistent 
community involvement, and restitution payments exceeding the required 
minimum,” and that his current career is unrelated to the underlying offense conduct, 
and “poses no risk to public safety.”  Mot. at 1 and 3.  Importantly, compliance alone 
does not justify early termination.  See, e.g., United States v. Dziesiuta, No. CR 20-
339 (MAS), 2022 WL 876758, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2022); United States v. Stiso, No. 
2:14-CR-484 (WJM), 2021 WL 1291648, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 6, 2021) (defendant’s 
“compliance with the conditions of his supervision . . . is precisely what is expected of 
him”); United States v. Caruso, 241 F. Supp. 2d 466, 469 (D.N.J. 2003); United States 
v. Paterno, No. 99-CR-037 (WGB), 2002 WL 1065682, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2002).   
 
While the Government commends Blotnick’s efforts to become a productive 
member of society and remain law abiding, Blotnick does not articulate any new or 
unforeseen circumstances that weigh in favor of the early termination of supervised 
release.  Rather, successful reentry into society while on supervised release is one of 
the goals of federal supervision, and ceasing supervision simply because Blotnick has, 
to date, adjusted well to supervision would not, and should not, in and of itself justify 
early termination of supervised release.  Moreover, Blotnick does not explain with 
any particularity how completing his term of supervised release will prevent him 
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from continuing this productive path.  Blotnick has demonstrated that he can be a 
productive member of society while under supervision.  The Government is hopeful 
that this will continue once his period of supervision expires in March 2027.  However, 
in light of his offense conduct and criminal history and the absence of changed 
circumstances, Blotnick has not shown that cutting his term short is “warranted by 
the conduct of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583(e)(1).  
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the United States submits that early 
termination of Blotnick’s term of supervised release is not “warranted by the conduct 
of the defendant released and the interest of justice.”  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). 
 
Respectfully submitted,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROBERT FRAZER 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
By: Fatime Meka Cano  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
 
 
cc: 
Chief U.S. Probation Officer Joseph A. DaGrossa (via ECF) 
 
 
 
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