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Home Court filings United States v. Aaron Ashcraft Order Denying Compassionate Release — United States v. Aaron Ashcraft (E.D. Cal.)

Court filing

Order Denying Compassionate Release — United States v. Aaron Ashcraft (E.D. Cal.)

Filed February 9, 2024 in U.S. v. Ashcraft; one of 15 filings from this case.

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court, Eastern District of California
Filed2024-02-09

U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California · No. 2:22-cr-00087-KJM · Doc. 44 · 2024-02-09 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
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FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
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Proceeding pro se, defendant Aaron Ashcraft moves for compassionate release under 
18 U.S.C. § 3582.  For the reasons below, the court denies the motion.   
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I.
BACKGROUND
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Following the entry of his guilty plea to one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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§ 1343 and one count of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, Mins. Change of Plea Hr’g,
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ECF No. 6; Information, ECF No. 1, this court sentenced defendant Aaron Ashcraft to 41 months’
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imprisonment followed by 36 months’ supervised release, Mins. Sent’g, ECF No. 23.  Recently,
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on January 10, 2024, this court entered an order reducing defendant’s sentence to 33 months
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based on the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s retroactive zero-point offender amendment to the
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Sentencing Guidelines.  See Prior Order, ECF No. 40 (citing U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1).
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United States of America, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Aaron Ashcraft,  
Defendant. 
No. 2:22-cr-00087-KJM 
ORDER 
Case 2:22-cr-00087-KJM   Document 44   Filed 02/09/24   Page 1 of 4

 
 
 
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Defendant now moves for compassionate release based on the medical condition of his 
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son.  Mot., ECF No. 35.  He argues his son, D.A.,1 “was recently diagnosed with an aggressive 
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and advanced strain of Multiple Sclerosis and is unable to care for himself and there are no other 
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family members other than the Defendant that provide for him.”  Id. at 1; see also id. at 3.  The 
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government opposes the motion, Opp’n, ECF No. 41, and defendant has replied, Reply, ECF 
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No. 43.  
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II. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
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In general, district courts “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 
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imposed.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).  However, in exceptional circumstances, the court can modify 
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the term of imprisonment under § 3582(c)(1)(A).  Id.  A defendant must first exhaust 
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administrative remedies.  Id.  If a defendant has exhausted administrative remedies, the analysis is 
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twofold.  First, to grant relief, the court must find “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” 
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the requested reduction.  Id.  Second, the court must consider the same factors that were 
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applicable at the original sentencing, enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent they 
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remain applicable.  Id.   
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Section 3582 further requires a reduction to be “consistent with applicable policy 
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statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.”  Id.  The Sentencing Commission has issued a 
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policy statement addressing what qualifies as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to release a 
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defendant from BOP custody.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (last amended Nov. 1, 2023).  The relevant 
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policy statement outlines the following family circumstances that may constitute “extraordinary 
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and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction: “The death or incapacitation of the caregiver of 
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the defendant’s minor child or the defendant’s child who is 18 years of age or older and incapable 
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of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition.”  U.S.S.G. 
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§ 1B1.13(b)(3)(A).  Defendant bears the burden of “establish[ing] his eligibility for 
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compassionate release.”  United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 951 (9th Cir. 2022).   
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1 The court uses initials to protect the privacy interest of defendant’s son, who is a third 
party.   
Case 2:22-cr-00087-KJM   Document 44   Filed 02/09/24   Page 2 of 4

 
 
 
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III. 
ANALYSIS  
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The parties do not dispute defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies as 
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required by § 3582(c).  See Mot. at 2; Opp’n at 3.  Thus, the remaining questions before the court 
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are whether: 1) defendant’s request is supported by “extraordinary and compelling” reasons, and 
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2) the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors weigh in favor of a reduction in sentence.   
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Defendant has not met his burden of showing extraordinary and compelling reasons for a 
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reduction.  As noted, defendant cites his son’s MS diagnosis and need for care.  Family 
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circumstances involving the “death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s minor 
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child or the defendant’s child who is 18 years of age or older and incapable of self-care because 
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of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition” can constitute an extraordinary and 
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compelling reason to warrant early release.  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A).  Defendant has not 
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shown, however, that his circumstances fall within this guidance. 
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First, defendant does not show D.A. is incapable of self-care.  Although defendant does 
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not specify D.A.’s age, the presentence investigative report notes D.A. is not a minor.  
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Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 64, ECF No. 17 (sealed).  Certain aspects of D.A.’s 
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health issues were before the court at the time of sentencing.  Id.  Without questioning the 
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severity of D.A.’s diagnosis, the court has no basis to conclude D.A.’s recent diagnosis renders 
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him incapable of self-care, as there are no medical records or other relevant evidence to support 
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defendant’s description of D.A.’s condition and needs.   
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Second, defendant does not show D.A.’s caregiver has passed away or has been otherwise 
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incapacitated.  Although defendant does not state who D.A.’s caregiver has been in his motion, 
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see generally Mot., at the time of sentencing, D.A. was living with his mother.  PSR ¶ 67.  Her 
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issues as well as defendant’s position he was a “single dad” also were before the court at the time 
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of sentencing.  Id. ¶¶ 65-72.  For the first time on reply, defendant argues D.A.’s mother “has no 
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legal requirement to care for him anymore,” and is unable to care for D.A. because she is 
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homeless, an alcoholic, and has severe mental and physiological condition.  Reply at 5.  As with 
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D.A.’s condition, defendant does not support his arguments with any relevant evidence.  The 
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court has no firm basis on which to conclude D.A.’s mother is incapacitated.   
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Case 2:22-cr-00087-KJM   Document 44   Filed 02/09/24   Page 3 of 4

 
 
 
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To the extent defendant states D.A. is no longer living with his mother and is living on his 
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own, Reply at 3, 6–8, the court does not have relevant evidence to determine who D.A.’s 
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caregiver is and whether D.A. is living on his own because he is in fact capable of self-care.  
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Because defendant does not show 1) his child is incapable of self-care, and 2) his son’s caregiver 
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has died or is incapacitated, he has not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons 
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warrant compassionate release.  See, e.g., United States v. Velazquez-Inchaurregui, No. 22-
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02528, 2023 WL 7926797, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2023) (“Because Defendant fails to show 
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that the caregiver of her minor children has died or is incapacitated, she has failed to demonstrate 
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extraordinary and compelling reasons for her release.”), cf. United States v. Lanphear, No. 19-19, 
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2024 WL 97369, at *2 (D. Mont. Jan. 9, 2024) (“[B]ecause [the father] was the caregiver of [the 
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defendant’s] minor child at the time of his death and there is no requirement that the defendant be 
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the child’s only available caregiver, [the father’s] death qualifies as an extraordinary and 
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compelling reason under § 1B1.13.”).   
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Because the court concludes defendant’s request is not supported by “extraordinary and 
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compelling” reasons, the court does not reach the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  See United States 
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v. Keller, 2 F.4th 1278, 1284 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[A]lthough a district court must perform this 
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sequential inquiry before it grants compassionate release, a district court that properly denies 
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compassionate release need not evaluate each step.” (emphasis in original)). 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION 
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Defendant’s motion for compassionate release is denied without prejudice to renewal 
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with supporting evidence, if possible.  
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This order resolves ECF No. 35. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED.  
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DATED:  February 8, 2024.   
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Case 2:22-cr-00087-KJM   Document 44   Filed 02/09/24   Page 4 of 4

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