Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Reduction in Sentence — United States v. Aaron Ashcraft (E.D. Cal.)

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U.S. District Court, Eastern District of California · No. 2:22-cr-00087-KJM · Doc. 41 · 2024-01-16 · Docket on CourtListener

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PHILLIP A. TALBERT 
United States Attorney 
MATTHEW THUESEN 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
501 I Street, Suite 10-100 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Telephone:  (916) 554-2700 
Facsimile:   (916) 554-2900  
 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
United States of America 
 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
                                               Plaintiff, 
 
                                     v. 
 
AARON ASHCRAFT, 
 
                                              Defendant.  
 
 
CASE NO. 2:22-CR-00087-KJM 
 
UNITED STATES’ OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 
REDUCTION IN SENTENCE 
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) 
 
 
 
 
 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States opposes Aaron Ashcraft’s pro se motion for compassionate release under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). ECF No. 35. Based on purported family circumstances, Ashcraft moves for a 
time-served sentence, which would result in an almost 90% reduction to the sentence this Court 
imposed. Ashcraft has not met his burden of establishing that “extraordinary and compelling” reasons 
justify any reduction. Even if he could establish such reasons, the factors in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) weigh 
heavily against granting Ashcraft’s motion. For these reasons and those that follow, this Court should 
deny the motion. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. 
Ashcraft’s Crimes 
As detailed in the Factual Basis for Plea attached as Exhibit A to Ashcraft’s plea agreement, ECF 
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10, and the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), ECF 17, over an approximately four-year period, 
Ashcraft engaged multiple fraudulent schemes that involved him stealing almost $1 million from 
pandemic-relief programs and embezzling almost $800,000 from his employer.    
During the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, Ashcraft defrauded the Small Business 
Administration and its affiliated lenders. Through the use of shell companies, falsified tax documents, 
and falsified financial records, Ashcraft fraudulently obtained almost $1 million in federal disaster relief 
funds from the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”). He tried to get more. Specifically, from 
approximately May 2020 through April 2021, Ashcraft submitted seven fraudulent PPP loan 
applications, seeking a total of over $1.2 million. The PPP funds Ashcraft sought and obtained were 
meant to provide relief to small businesses, many of which were struggling to keep their doors open. 
Every dollar he took from the program was a dollar that could have and should have been used to keep 
real businesses afloat.  
Not only did the Ashcraft defraud the PPP program, he also embezzled from his former 
employer, a local street sweeping business. Over a period of almost three years—September 2017 
through June 2020—Ashcraft made more than 300 fraudulent charges to his employer’s credit card 
accounts. Those charges totaled approximately $780,000. Ashcraft carried out the embezzlement while 
holding multiple positions at the company, including chief financial officer. Ashcraft’s employer 
entrusted him with its finances. He exploited that trust for his own gain. 
In addition to stealing federal disaster relief funds and embezzling from his employer, Ashcraft 
also defrauded the State of Maine. Specifically, in approximately July 2020, Ashcraft submitted with the 
Maine Department of Labor a falsified application for Pandemic Unemployment Assistance. As with the 
PPP loan applications, the defendant provided falsified information and tax forms. By doing so, he 
fraudulently obtained almost $60,000. 
B. 
Guilty Plea and Sentencing 
 Based on his illicit conduct, on April 25, 2022, the United States charged Ashcraft with two 
counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, and five counts of bank fraud, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1344. ECF 1. Pursuant to a plea agreement, on May 9, 2022, Ashcraft pled guilty to one count 
of wire fraud and one count of bank fraud. ECF 6 and 10. In his plea agreement, Ashcraft and the 
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government stipulated to certain guideline factors and estimated a sentencing range of 41 to 51 months. 
ECF 10 at 9. And the government agreed to recommend a prison sentence at the low end of the 
applicable guideline range. ECF 10 at 6. In the PSR, the Probation Officer calculated a sentencing range 
of 41 to 51 months and recommended a sentence of 46 months. ECF 17-3 at 1. On December 13, 2022, 
this Court sentenced Ashcraft to a total term 41 months’ imprisonment—the low end of his guideline 
range. ECF 23. Ashcraft began serving his sentence on September 6, 2023. Ex. 1 at 2 (Public 
Information Inmate Data). On January 10, 2024, this Court entered an order reducing Ashcraft’s prison 
sentence to 33 months, based on the retroactive zero-point offender amendment to the Sentencing 
Guidelines. ECF 40.  
C. 
Incarceration and Projected Release Date 
Ashcraft is serving his sentence at FCI Sheridan. Ex. 1. Ashcraft’s projected release date initially 
was July 5, 2026, based upon application of his good conduct time and First Step Act Credits. Ex. 1 at 3. 
Ashcraft has served approximately four months of his recently reduced 33-month sentence. 
 
D. 
Administrative Remedies  
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1), an inmate may file a motion for sentence reduction after 
completing the BOP exhaustion requirements or after waiting 30 days from receipt of a request by the 
Warden, whichever is earlier. On October 16, 2023, Ashcraft submitted a request to the Warden. ECF 35 
at 7. That request is pending. Thus, Ashcraft has exhausted his administrative remedies. 
III. 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 
“Ordinarily, a federal court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.”  
United States v. Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 944 (9th Cir. 2022). The First Step Act, however, authorizes 
criminal defendants to move for a sentence reduction based on “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 
18 U.S.C § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Chen, 48 F.4th 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2022). When a 
defendant seeks what is known as compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), a district court:  
may reduce his term of imprisonment if four conditions are met: (1) the defendant exhausted 
administrative remedies; (2) ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ warrant a sentence 
reduction; (3) a sentence reduction is ‘consistent with applicable policy statements’ issued by the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission; and (4) the district court considered the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
Chen, 48 F.4th at 1094-95.  
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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, as amended November 1, 2023, provides six categories of “extraordinary and 
compelling” reasons applicable to compassionate release motions filed by defendants. As relevant here, 
it identifies “the death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant’s . . . child who is over 18 
years of age and incapable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability or a medical condition” 
as an extraordinary and compelling reason. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)(A). 
In addition to determining whether extraordinary and compelling circumstances exist, the Court 
“must consider and weigh the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to decide whether the requested 
sentence reduction is warranted ‘under the particular circumstances of the case.’” Wright, 46 F.4th at 
945 (quoting Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010)); United States v. Dogan, No. 2:16-cr-
00198-JAM, 2020 WL 4208532, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 22, 2020) (“In deciding a motion for 
compassionate release, a court can neither disregard nor undermine the relevant factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553.”). Compassionate release is a “narrow” remedy, and it is within the Court’s discretion to 
deny relief based on these factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); Wright, 46 F.4th at 944–45.  
As the movant, the burden of establishing eligibility for compassionate release falls on the 
defendant. Wright, 46 F.4th at 951. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. 
Ashcraft does not demonstrate that “family circumstances” warrant compassionate 
release. 
 
Ashcraft requests release to care for his adult son who, he asserts, recently was diagnosed with 
Multiple Sclerosis. ECF 35. Ashcraft claims his son is unable to care for himself. And he claims he is 
the sole available family member who can care for his son. ECF 35 at 1; see also id. at 3 (“The 
Defendant’s son has no family to care for him.”). Ashcraft provides no records or other support for his 
claims. 
According to the PSR, at the time of sentencing, Ashcraft’s son was living with his mother. PSR 
16. No record evidence supports a finding that she is “incapacitat[ed],” which is a high standard. See 
United States v. Rooks, 2022 WL 267899, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2022) (“To prove incapacitation, a 
defendant must establish a person is ‘completely disabled’ or unable to ‘carry on any self-care and [are] 
totally confined to a chair or bed.’ . . . [I]t is not enough to show a potential caregiver is merely 
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‘inconvenienced’ by the childcare or ‘somewhat sick.’”) (first alteration in original; citations omitted)). 
Ashcraft does not even claim that she is.  
Moreover, while Ashcraft asserts his efforts to seek support for his son from extended family and 
friends have “proven fruitless,” ECF 35 at 2, he provides no details of those efforts. Ashcraft makes no 
mention of why other family members cannot assist in care for his son. The PSR notes that Ashcraft has 
multiple family members, including his parents and three siblings, who appear potentially able to care 
for his son, if needed. ECF 17 at 15. It also indicates that family on his son’s mother’s side lives in 
Sacramento. ECF 17 at 16.  
Additionally, no record evidence supports Ashcraft’s claim that his son is unable to care for 
himself. Ashcraft contends that his “son was recently diagnosed with an aggressive and advanced strain 
of Multiple Sclerosis.” ECF 35 at 1. At the same time, he claims his son is undergoing testing to 
“specify the strain of his illness.” ECF 35 at 3. Although Multiple Sclerosis can be a severe, potentially 
disabling medical condition, this Court should not assume, without any evidence, that Ashcraft’s son is 
incapable of self-care at this time. 
Put simply, Ashcraft has failed to meet his burden of establishing that “extraordinary and 
compelling reasons” warrant a reduction in his in his sentence. As such, this Court should deny his 
motion.  
B. 
The §3553 Factors Weigh Against a Reduced Sentence.  
This Court also should deny Ashcraft’s motion on the independent ground that his requested 
reduction is not warranted based on consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. Any compassionate release 
decision, even for a statutorily eligible defendant, must also consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Those factors include, among others, (a) the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the defendant’s history and characteristics; (b) the need for the 
sentence imposed to (i) reflect the seriousness of the offense, (ii) promote respect for the law and 
provide just punishment for the offense, (iii) afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, i.e., general 
deterrence, and (iv) protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, i.e., specific deterrence. In 
applying these factors, courts have considered the length of the sentence and how much of that sentence 
the defendant has served. See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 330, 330–31 (7th Cir. 2020). 
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On December 13, 2022, this Court weighed the § 3553 factors and determined that a sentence of 
41 months’ imprisonment—the low end of Ashcraft’s then-applicable guideline range—was sufficient 
but not greater than necessary comply with the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2). It considered, among 
other things, the fact that Ashcraft defrauded not one, not two, but three victims. He exploited the trust 
his former employer placed in him to steal almost $800,000. He stole almost $1 million in PPP funds. 
And he stole almost $60,000 in unemployment compensation.  
Ashcraft has served only a little over four months in prison—approximately 12% of his recently 
reduced sentence. Releasing him now would not further the goals of sentencing; it would do the 
opposite. As such, a time-served sentence is not warranted.  
V. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny Ashcraft’s motion.  
 
Dated: January 16, 2024 
By: 
PHILLIP A. TALBERT 
United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MATTHEW THUESEN 
Assistant U.S. Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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PHILLIP A. TALBERT 
United States Attorney 
MATTHEW THUESEN 
Assistant United States Attorney 
501 I Street, Suite 10-100 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Telephone:  (916) 554-2700 
Facsimile:   (916) 554-2900  
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
AARON ASHCRAFT,  
 
 
 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO. 2:22-CR-00087-KJM 
                     
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL 
 
 
 
 
 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he/she is an employee in the Office of the United States 
Attorney for the Eastern District of California and is a person of such age and discretion to be competent 
to serve papers.  That on January 16, 2024, a copy of the GOVERNMENT’S OPPOSITION was served 
by placing said copy in a postpaid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter named, at the place(s) 
and address(es) stated below, which is/are the last known address(es), and by depositing said envelope 
and contents in the United States Mail at Sacramento, California.  Addressee(s): Aaron Ashcraft 
#00025-510, FCI-Sheridan, P.O. Box 6000, Sheridan, OR 97378.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ C. Buxbaum 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. BUXBAUM 
 
 
Case 2:22-cr-00087-KJM     Document 41     Filed 01/16/24     Page 7 of 7

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