Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue — U.S. v. Reis (N.D. Tex.)

Record facts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT · No. 4:24-cr-00287-O · Doc. 247 · 2025-07-16 · Docket on CourtListener

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
FORT WORTH DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
NATHAN REIS and STEPHANIE 
HOCKRIDGE a/k/a STEPHANIE REIS, 
Defendants.  
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Case No. 4:24 CR-00287-O 
 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT ONE OF THE SUPERSEDING 
INDICTMENT FOR IMPROPER VENUE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Count One of the Superseding Indictment charges Mr. Reis with conspiracy to commit 
wire fraud, but it fails to adequately allege any factual basis to establish venue for that charge in 
the Northern District of Texas.  See Dkt. 163 (“Indictment” or “Indict.”).  Venue is not a matter of 
convenience or happenstance—it is a constitutional requirement that protects an individual’s right 
to a fair legal proceeding.  Because the Indictment does not adequately allege such facts with 
respect to any purported conspirator in this District, and because the government has already failed 
to prove such conduct at trial, the charge should be dismissed. 
The Constitution requires that a criminal defendant be tried in the district where the alleged 
crime was committed. U.S. Const. amend. VI.  In conspiracy cases, that means venue is proper 
only where the conspiracy was formed or a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of 
it.  United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2012).  That is no mere “technicality”—
it is a foundational safeguard against prosecutorial forum shopping and gamesmanship, unmoored 
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from any meaningful connection to the forum.  United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1123 (5th 
Cir. 1984). 
Here, the Indictment makes no particularized allegation that Mr. Reis—or any alleged 
coconspirator—either formed the alleged conspiracy or took any overt action in furtherance of it 
in the District.  The Indictment does not allege any facts showing that the conspiracy was formed 
here, that any purported conspirator resides here, traveled here, or took any action here related to 
any conspiracy.  The Indictment’s only asserted tie to this District is that two financial institutions 
involved in processing PPP loans—Bank-1 and Lender-2—operate here.  But venue must be based 
on the conduct of a conspirator in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy, not the 
administrative actions of third parties.  See United States v. Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d 326, 331 (5th 
Cir. 1979). 
The government has already shown it cannot meet that standard.  In the recent trial of Mr. 
Reis’s co-defendant, Ms. Hockridge, the government failed to offer any evidence that would 
support venue in this District.  That failure corroborates what the face of the Indictment already 
reveals: Count One was brought in the wrong venue and must be dismissed.  Failing to do so before 
trial would force the parties and the Court to once again proceed through a trial where even a guilty 
verdict on Count One would not be supported by sufficient evidence. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
Venue is a foundational constitutional requirement in criminal prosecutions.  The 
government may prosecute the accused only in “the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed.”  U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 18 (“Unless a statute or these 
rules permit otherwise, the government must prosecute an offense in a district where the offense 
was committed.”).  The government bears the burden of establishing venue, and it must “show by 
preponderance of the evidence that the trial is occurring in a district ‘where the offense [was] 
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done.’”  United States v. Strain, 396 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. 
Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 705 (1946)).  In a conspiracy case, venue is proper only in a district where 
the conspiracy was formed or where a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the 
object of the conspiracy.  See United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2012); United 
States v. Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1979) (“For a conviction of conspiracy, there 
must be proof of . . . an overt act committed by one of the coconspirators in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.” (emphasis added)).  
ARGUMENT 
I. 
COUNT ONE OF THE SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY 
ALLEGE VENUE IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
The government has charged Mr. Reis in a district with no meaningful connection to the 
alleged conspiracy—and the Indictment offers no factual basis to justify that choice.  The 
Indictment contains no factual allegations that the conspiracy was formed in the Northern District 
of Texas.  It does not allege that Mr. Reis or any alleged coconspirator lived in or ever set foot in 
the District—acknowledging that they lived in Arizona.  See Indict. ¶¶ 9, 10, 11.  Nor does it allege 
that any conspirator communicated with anyone in this District, held meetings here, or directed 
any action here.  Indeed, the bare assertion that the conspiracy occurred “in the Fort Worth Division 
of the Northern District of Texas and elsewhere,” id. ¶ 14, is contradicted by the rest of the 
Indictment’s factual allegations.  The only alleged connections between the charged conspiracy 
and this District set forth in the Indictment are: (1) that Bank-1 was “headquartered in Happy, 
Texas” and stores records in the Northern District of Texas, and (2) that Lender-2 is “headquartered 
in Bedford, Texas.”  Id. ¶¶ 6-7.  But neither allegation shows that a conspirator committed an overt 
act in this District.   
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As to Bank-1, the Indictment does not allege that it was a conspirator that took an overt act 
in furtherance of the conspiracy in the District.  See Indict. ¶¶ 7, 17(d), 17(j), 19.  Nor does it allege 
that Bank-1 acted at the direction of any conspirator.  In fact, the only function Bank-1 allegedly 
served was as an intermediary depository bank for Lender-2—a mechanical role far removed from 
any knowing act in furtherance of a criminal agreement, let alone such an act “by one of the 
coconspirators.”  Wieschenberg, 604 F.2d at 331 (emphasis added). 
As to Lender-2, the Indictment alleges that Blueacorn had a lender service provider 
agreement with the lender, and that PPP applications were submitted through that channel.  See 
Indict. ¶¶ 6-7, 16(d), 17(d), 17(j).  But again, it does not allege that Lender-2 was a conspirator 
that took an overt action in furtherance of the conspiracy.  See id.  Nor does Lender-2’s geographic 
location itself amount to an overt act by a conspirator.  See Strain, 396 F.3d at 694 (acts by third 
parties, or “circumstance elements” that do not involve conduct by a conspirator, cannot establish 
venue).   
To establish venue, the government must show that the conduct was undertaken by a 
conspirator aimed at “advanc[ing] the ultimate objects of the conspiracy.”  United States v. Cornet, 
195 F.3d 776, 783 (5th Cir. 1999).  That is because venue is proper only where an offense is 
“committed,” U.S. Const. amend. VI, and the only way to “commit” a conspiracy is to form a 
conspiratorial agreement or to take an act in furtherance of the conspiracy.  The Indictment fails 
to adequately allege either.   
To the extent the government may argue, as it did at times in Ms. Hockridge’s trial, that an 
“innocent agent” acting at a conspirator’s direction can establish venue, that argument fails for 
multiple reasons.  For one, the Indictment makes no such allegation—that is, it never alleges that 
any third party in the District acted as an agent of a conspirator to further the conspiracy.   
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More fundamentally, this argument is wrong on the law.  The government has previously 
invoked the quotation of a legal treatise in United States v. Perez, 223 F. App’x 336, 340-41 (5th 
Cir. 2007) to argue that the acts of innocent third parties can constitute an overt act by a conspirator 
for purposes of establishing venue.  See Proposed Charge (Doc. #143) at 66 n.41 (citation omitted).  
But that quotation in Perez was pure dicta unnecessary to the holding in that case:  In Perez, “the 
record clearly support[ed] venue” because “[t]estimony established that the conspirators used an 
Amtrak train on at least one occasion to transport methamphetamine to San Antonio, from whence 
conspirators drove the drugs to Dallas,” and “San Antonio is indisputably within the Western 
District of Texas.” 223 F. App’x at 342.  Thus, nothing in Perez turned on that quotation, which 
was simply dicta. 
Further, Perez, an unpublished decision, quoted a treatise that is inconsistent with binding 
Fifth Circuit precedent.  See Perez, 223 F. App’x at 341 & n.4 (quoting LaFave, Israel & King, 
Criminal Procedure § 16.3(f) (2d ed. 1999)).  In United States v. Wieschenberg, the Fifth Circuit 
held unequivocally that venue in a conspiracy case requires “an overt act committed by one of the 
conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.”  604 F.2d 326, 331 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis 
added).  That standard leaves no room for acts by third parties who are not themselves 
coconspirators.  The government’s speculative “agency” theory thus finds no support in governing 
law.  It is likely for this reason that, when pressed by the Court on this issue, counsel for the 
government conceded:  “I don’t disagree with the law in the sense that . . . an act must be done by 
a co-conspirator in the district.”  6/20 Tr. 19:2-8. 
Because the only alleged conduct in this District was performed by non-conspirators, the 
Indictment fails to allege that a conspirator committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy 
in the Northern District of Texas.  Venue is thus improper and Count One must be dismissed.  
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II. 
THE GOVERNMENT’S FAILURE TO PROVE VENUE AT TRIAL FURTHER 
UNDERSCORES THE INADEQUACY OF THE INDICTMENT 
The government has already had an opportunity to prove venue for this charge—and failed.  
At the trial of Mr. Reis’s co-defendant, Ms. Hockridge, the government did not offer any evidence 
that a conspirator committed an overt act in this District in furtherance of the conspiracy.  It relied 
instead on two discrete events: a text message Mr. Reis allegedly sent from the Dallas airport, and 
a short message from Ms. Hockridge to a customer while she was briefly in Dallas.  Neither 
qualifies as an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
At that trial, the government elicited testimony from an alleged coconspirator, James 
Flores, that Mr. Reis once sent a text message from the Dallas airport asking Mr. Flores whether 
Mr. Flores should use a “multitiered partner network.”  6/12 Tr. 112; GX 27A, at 18.  Nothing 
about this testimony or text message suggests any connection to the charged conspiracy, much less 
that it was an act in furtherance of such a conspiracy.  The message made no reference to fraud or 
any illicit activity, and the government introduced no evidence at Ms. Hockridge’s trial that any 
unlawful conduct flowed from it.  To the contrary, the evidence at trial established that Blueacorn 
had a legitimate operation separate and apart from any alleged conspiracy.  See 6/12 Tr. 212:13-
212:18 (Mr. Flores testifying that legitimate borrowers would sometimes get caught up in 
underwriting); id. 213:12-213:17 (Mr. Flores testifying that his job at Blueacorn included helping 
banks understand and resolve issues for legitimate loans); id. 243:7-243:12 (Mr. Flores testifying 
that part of his job was to help legitimate borrowers understand how to structure their loans 
correctly). 
The government also introduced a text message from Ms. Hockridge to a Blueacorn 
customer, Jessica Stackpoole, in which she stated that she was in Dallas and would be returning to 
Arizona the next day.  6/12 Tr. 9:11-9:16, 10:19-11:8.  But there was no evidence that this message 
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advanced the alleged conspiracy, or that Ms. Stackpoole was involved in any fraudulent conduct.  
The trial record does not even contain any evidence that Ms. Stackpoole submitted a fraudulent 
loan application at all.     
The failure of proof at Ms. Hockridge’s trial confirms what the Indictment already shows: 
The government cannot tie Count One to this District through the conduct of a conspirator.  
Because venue is a constitutional requirement, and because the government has now demonstrated 
that it cannot meet it, dismissal is required. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Count One of the Superseding Indictment fails to adequately allege facts sufficient 
to establish venue in the Northern District of Texas, and because the government has shown that 
it lacks any evidence sufficient to cure that defect, the Court should dismiss Count One.   
 
Dated: July 16, 2025  
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP 
 
/s/ Kevin Andrew Chambers                                                   
Kevin Andrew Chambers (Pro Hac Vice) 
DC Bar No. 495126 
555 11th Street NW, Suite 1000 
Michael Clemente (Pro Hac Vice pending) 
DC Bar No. 1708793 
Washington, DC 20004 
Tel: (202) 637-2200 
Fax: (202) 637-2201 
kevin.chambers@lw.com 
 
Matthew S. Salerno (Pro Hac Vice) 
1271 Avenue of the Americas 
New York, NY 10020 
Tel: (212) 906-1200 
Fax: (212) 751-4864 
matthew.salerno@lw.com 
 
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Reis 
[admitted pro hac vice] 
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Michael P. Heiskell, TX Bar: 09383700 
JOHNSON, VAUGH & HESKELL  
5601 Bridge Street, Suite 220  
Fort Worth, Texas 76112  
Tel: (817) 457-2999 
Fax: (817) 496-1102 
mheiskell@johnson-vaughn-heiskell.com  
 
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Reis 
 
 
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CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE  
I hereby certify that I conferred with AUSA Philip Trout via email on July 16, 2025, who 
indicated that the Government opposed the Defendant being granted the relief requested herein.  
 
Dated: July 16, 2025  
 
 
 
/s/ Matthew S. Salerno  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Matthew S. Salerno  
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that on this July 16, 2025, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was served on all counsel of record by operation of the Court’s CM/ECF system. 
 
 
Dated: July 16, 2025  
 
 
 
/s/ Kevin Andrew Chambers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kevin Andrew Chambers 
 
 
 
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