Motion to Transfer Venue — U.S. v. Reis & Hockridge (N.D. Tex.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas (Fort Worth Division) · No. 4:24-cr-00287-O · Doc. 75 · 2025-03-21 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS 
FORT WORTH DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
§  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Case No. 4:24 CR-00287-O 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
NATHAN REIS and   
 
 
§  
(01) 
 
STEPHANIE HOCKRIDGE, a/k/a 
 
§ 
(02) 
STEPHANIE REIS,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendants. 
 
 
§ 
 
 
DEFENDANTS’ JOINT OPPOSED MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE 
 
COME NOW Defendants Nathan Reis and Stephanie Hockridge (collectively, the 
“Defendants”) by and through their undersigned counsel, and hereby move this Court to transfer 
the venue in this action to the U.S. District for the District of Arizona, pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 21(a)–(b). As set forth below, the transfer of venue is in the interest of justice 
for the convenience to the parties, the witnesses, and their attorneys, as well as necessary in light 
of the demands of the Court’s calendar, which otherwise threaten to deprive Defendant Nathan 
Reis of his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel of choice and the Defendants of their 
constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel. In support of their motion, the 
Defendants respectfully submit the following: 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
1. 
On November 14, 2024, the Government filed its Sealed Indictment charging 
Defendants with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, 
and four counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Doc. #3). The Court unsealed the 
Indictment on November 21, 2024 (Doc. #7).   
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2. 
On November 26, 2024, this Court entered its Scheduling Order for Criminal Trial 
and Pretrial Order setting a trial date of January 6, 2025, with corresponding earlier pretrial 
deadlines. See Scheduling Order (Doc. #13) (the “Order”). Since that time, the Court granted the 
Defendants’ prior request for a continuance such that trial is now set for April 21, 2025. See Order 
(Doc. #51). 
3. 
On March 14, 2025, Mr. Goebel, who was previously entered as counsel for 
Defendant Nathan Reis, filed a motion to withdraw in order to permit Kevin Chambers to substitute 
as counsel of record and trial counsel for Mr. Reis. See Mot. to Withdraw (Doc. #69). The 
Defendants contemporaneously filed a motion to continue the trial to permit Mr. Chambers, as 
well as Ms. Hockridge’s existing counsel, the time necessary to prepare the Defendants’ cases for 
trial. See Mot. to Continue (Doc. #70).  
4. 
On March 18, 2025, this Court entered an order denying both motions. The Court 
held that, although Mr. Reis was, as a “general rule[,] . . . entitled to replace counsel,” “issues of 
fairness and the burden on the Court’s calendar outweigh the Defendant’s desire to change 
counsel.” See Order (Doc. #71) at 3–4. 
5. 
As the Order noted, this Court “carries one of the highest case loads in the Northern 
District of Texas and already has trial settings through the end of the year,” and “any additional 
continuance would place a significant burden on the Court’s docket.” See id. at 3 n.1, 5. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
6. 
At the time the acts in the Indictment are alleged to have occurred, both the 
Defendants resided within the District of Arizona. Indeed, neither Defendant was physically 
present in Texas during either of the two rounds of Paycheck Protection Act (PPP) funding that 
are the subject of the instant case.  
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7. 
In addition, the overwhelming majority of the Government’s potential fact 
witnesses reside outside this district. James Flores, Michael Cota, Vivian Arriaga, Adam Spencer, 
Kristin Spencer, Barry Calhoun, Aaron Frank, and Noah Spirakus resided in Arizona at the time 
of the alleged acts giving rise to the Indictment and, to the Defendants’ knowledge, still reside 
there today. The attorneys of record for Flores, Cota, and Arriaga are all likewise located in 
Arizona. The Government’s key witness, Eric Karnezis, resides in and is being prosecuted in the 
District of Oregon.  
8. 
In response to an inquiry from the Defendants, on March 19, 2025, the Government 
has indicated that three of the witnesses it intends to call reside in the Northern District of Texas, 
but the Defendants are unaware of who those witnesses might be. 
9. 
None of the witnesses that the Defendants anticipate calling at trial reside in the 
Northern District of Texas. At least five witnesses the Defendants anticipate calling to testify reside 
within the District of Arizona.  
10. 
Likewise, none of the Defendants’ trial attorneys reside in the Northern District of 
Texas. Mr. Reis’s original counsel Blake Goebel and his recently retained counsel of choice Kevin 
Chambers both reside in Washington, D.C., while Ms. Hockridge’s counsel, Richard Finneran, 
resides in St. Louis, Missouri.1  
11. 
Similarly, all but one of the Government’s attorneys reside outside the Northern 
District of Texas. Aside from AUSA Matthew Weybrecht, the Government attorneys entered in 
 
1  Although Michael Heiskell and Gregg Gallian reside within the Northern District of Texas, 
both are entered as local counsel for Mr. Reis and Ms. Hockridge, respectively, pursuant to this 
Court’s local rules requiring admission of local counsel, and are not expected to have any role at 
trial regardless of the ultimate venue. See N.D. Tex. L.R. 57.10. 
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this case (Philip Trout, Elizabeth Carr, Ryan McClaren, Steven Michaels, and Lindita Ciko-Torza) 
are all based at the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. (“Main Justice”). 
12. 
Defendants currently reside in Puerto Rico. The Defendants welcomed their first 
child in September 2024. As of the current trial date of April 21, 2025, their child will be less than 
eight months old.  
LEGAL STANDARDS 
13. 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21(a), the Court must transfer a case if 
the prejudice from failing to grant a transfer is so great “that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and 
impartial trial” in the district where the case was charged. Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(a) (emphasis added); 
see also United States v. Nat’l City Lines, 7 F.R.D. 393, 397 (S.D. Cal. 1947) (noting the 
“obligatoriness” of Rule 21(a)’s command “once a satisfactory showing is made”). 
14. 
The Court may also transfer a case to another district “for the convenience of the 
parties, any victim, and the witnesses, and in the interest of justice.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b). That 
may include transfer to a district where venue might not have been proper in the first instance. See 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 21 advisory committee note (1966) (“Upon occasion . . . convenience of the 
parties and witnesses and the interest of justice would best be served by trial in a district in which 
no part of the offense was committed.”); United States v. Angiulo, 497 F.2d 440, 441 (1st Cir. 
1974) (affirming district courts’ discretion to transfer a case to “a place away from the scene of 
the charged events”); United States v. Marcello, 280 F. Supp. 510, 517–18 (E.D. La. 1968), aff’d  
423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1968) (approving transfer to Southern District of Texas despite lack of 
factual connection to the transferee district).  
15. 
The purpose of Rule 21(b) was to eliminate the previously existing rule that “the 
Government has the final choice of the jurisdiction where the prosecution should be conducted” 
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and to instead place the question of venue “in the discretion of the court.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 21 
advisory committee note (1944); see also United States v. Guzman-Meza, No. 4:17-CR-00198-
SDJ-KPJ, 2020 WL 6482978, at *2 (E.D. Tex. June 30, 2020); United States v. Campa, 459 F.3d 
1121, 1146 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that district courts have substantial discretion with respect to 
the grant of a motion for change of venue).  
16. 
 In considering whether to transfer venue, the Court must consider at least nine 
factors: (1) the residence of the Defendants; (2) the location of possible witnesses; (3) the location 
of events likely to be in issue; (4) the location of documents and records likely to be involved; 
(5) the disruption of defendant’s business unless the case is transferred; (6) the expense to the 
parties; (7) the location of counsel; (8) the relative accessibility of the place of trial; and (9) the 
docket condition of each district or division involved. Id. (citing Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 
376 U.S. 240, 243–44 (1964)). 
DISCUSSION 
17. 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21, the interests of justice served by a 
transfer of venue outweigh any possible prejudice to the Government from such a transfer. Not 
only will a change of venue be of significantly increased convenience to the Defendants, the likely 
witnesses, and their attorneys, but it will also permit Mr. Reis to be represented at trial by his 
counsel of choice and for both Defendants’ counsel to have adequate time to prepare for trial, 
without placing the burdens on the Court’s calendar identified in its recent Order (Doc. #71).  
18. 
The Northern District of Texas, meanwhile, has only the most incidental connection 
to the allegations in this case. Although the Indictment alleges that a bank (which is not identified 
as a coconspirator) within the Northern District of Texas sent funds to the Defendants’ alleged 
coconspirators “outside the state of Texas,” Indictment (Doc. #3) ¶ 21, the vast majority of the 
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conduct at issue in the case is alleged to have occurred in Arizona. The fact that a wire transfer 
was initiated in a particular district is the sort of fact that would normally be addressed by a 
stipulation between the parties and which would therefore not require any witness from the 
initiating bank. Main Justice’s reasons for shopping its prosecution to this Court, when venue 
would have been proper in other districts of far greater convenience to the parties, the potential 
witnesses in this case, and their attorneys, are unknown to the Defendants.  
19. 
As applied to the facts of this case, all of the enumerated factors the Court must 
consider (hereafter, the “Platt factors”) either (1) favor a transfer to another district or (2) are 
neutral and therefore do not weigh against a transfer. See United States v. Morris, 176 F. Supp. 2d 
668, 672 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (“Some of the factors are neutral. For example, the disruption to the 
defendant’s business will be the same regardless of the location of the trial.”). None of the factors 
favor venue remaining in this district. 
20. 
Five of the nine Platt factors are neutral and therefore do not weigh either for or 
against a transfer. The Defendants acknowledge that, as in Morris, the potential of disruption to 
the Defendants’ business is not a distinguishing factor between this district and any other potential 
district. Likewise, the location of documents and records likely to be involved is a neutral factor, 
as all of the discovery disclosed by the Government has been produced in an electronic format. Cf. 
United States v. McGraw, No. 3:19-CR-225-S, 2020 WL 419731, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 
2020) (“The fact that other electronically-stored data may be located in other states is of little 
significance to the Court’s analysis, because ‘electronically-stored documents . . . can be easily 
transferred or made available in any location.’” (quoting United States v. Patel, No. 4:18CR127, 
2018 WL 6274034, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2018) (cleaned up)). 
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21. 
The location of counsel, the expense to the parties, and the relative accessibility of 
each district are likewise relatively neutral as between this district and the District of Arizona. 
Aside from Defendants’ local counsel, who are not expected to take a role at trial in this case 
regardless of the venue, and AUSA Matthew Weybrecht, who the Defendants would not expect to 
remain involved in the case in the event of a transfer, all counsel of record in this case reside in 
locations that are a multi-hour plane ride from both this district and the District of Arizona.  
22. 
As set forth below, however, each of the other remaining four Platt factors strongly 
favors a transfer of venue to the District of Arizona.  
The Residence of the Defendants 
23. 
Although the Defendants both currently reside in Puerto Rico, the Defendants also 
own a condominium in Scottsdale, Arizona where they could stay during trial if the case were 
transferred to the District of Arizona. As a result, the District of Arizona is more convenient for 
the Defendants than the Northern District of Texas. That is especially true because the Defendants 
have a child who will not even be eight months old at the time of trial, and his needs will require 
that his parents be physically proximate to him during the trial. The location of events therefore 
weighs heavily in favor of a transfer to the District of Arizona. 
The Location of Events 
24. 
The acts alleged in the Indictment occurred almost exclusively in the District of 
Arizona when Defendants resided there full-time. By contrast, the only event alleged to have 
occurred in the Northern District of Texas is the transmission of four wires by a bank in this district 
(which is not alleged to be a coconspirator) to alleged coconspirators “outside of the state of 
Texas.” Indictment (Doc. #3) ¶ 21. The location of events therefore weighs heavily in favor of a 
transfer to the District of Arizona. 
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The Location of Possible Witnesses 
25. 
As detailed above, the vast majority of the potential witnesses in this case reside in 
the District of Arizona. See supra ¶¶ 7–9; see also Indictment (Doc. #3) ¶¶ 5, 9–13 (detailing 
residence of potential witnesses in Arizona). The Government has indicated that three of its 
witnesses reside in the Northern District of Texas, but it is not clear who those witnesses are. Thus, 
the location of possible witnesses weighs heavily in favor of a transfer to the District of Arizona. 
Relative Docket Conditions 
26. 
Based on the findings of this Court’s recent Order (Doc. #71), the docket condition 
of this Division weighs heavily in favor of a transfer to the District of Arizona.  
27. 
As it stands, the crowded nature of this Court’s docket has already impacted Mr. 
Reis’s ability to secure his counsel of choice. See Order (Doc. #71) at 4. 
28. 
The demands of this Court’s calendar have also impaired the Court’s ability to grant 
the Defendants’ counsel the time they require to be fully prepared for trial. See Order (Doc. #71) 
at 5.   
29. 
Courts in the District of Arizona, by contrast, have regularly granted defendants in 
similar cases trial continuances of lengths similar to or longer than that requested by the 
Defendants in this case. See, e.g., United States v. Jeremy, No. CR-23-01586-PHX-SMB, Minute 
Entry (Doc. #30) (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2023) (granting continuance until two years after return of 
indictment due to case complexity and the government’s production of over 150,000 discovery 
documents); United States v. Sheafe, No. CR16-438, 2018 WL 2179721, at *1 (D. Ariz. Apr. 27, 
2018) (noting, in case where defendant was charged with bank fraud and conspiracy that initial 
trial date of June 21, 2016 had been continued to June 5, 2018); United States v. Gentry, No. CV–
12–02210–PHX–SRB, 2013 WL 6795957, at *2 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2013) (noting, in case where 
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defendant was indicted in May 2006 with securities fraud, wire fraud, and other white-collar 
crimes, that the court had granted “numerous continuances” and tried the case in September 2008).  
30. 
The relative docket conditions of this district and the District of Arizona therefore 
heavily favor a transfer to the District of Arizona, as it is likely that courts in that jurisdiction 
would have the capability of providing the Defendants’ counsel of choice the time they require in 
order to adequately prepare the case for trial. 
31. 
Indeed, even if any of the Platt factors weighed against transfer (which they do 
not), transfer would still be required. The alternative of requiring trial to be held in this district on 
a date that, due to the Court’s calendar, would deny Mr. Reis his counsel of choice and deny both 
Defendants’ counsel the time required to provide them effective representation would cause “so 
great a prejudice” to the Defendants that transfer would be mandated by Rule 21(a)2—even if the 
factors this Court must consider under Rule 21(b) did not already uniformly point in that direction.   
 
 
 
2  The Defendants acknowledge that Rule 21(a) has usually been applied in cases seeking 
transfer due to concerns that prejudicial pretrial publicity might taint the jury pool within a 
particular district. The plain language of Rule 21(a), however, is broad enough to encompass the 
type of prejudice the Defendants would suffer in this district, which is far more serious and much 
more difficult to cure than the potential risk of a tainted jury pool. Compare United States v. 
Garcia-Flores, 246 F.3d 451, 458 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding “that the district judge’s thorough 
curative instruction [during voir dire] adequately ensured the integrity of the jury pool”), United 
States v. Smith-Bowman, 76 F.3d 634, 637 (5th Cir. 1996) (denying motion to transfer where, 
despite pretrial publicity, all ten prospective jurors indicated they could base their verdict solely 
on the evidence presented in court and had not formed an opinion on the defendant’s guilt or 
innocence), with Carlson v. Jess, 526 F.3d 1018, 1027 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding Sixth Amendment 
violation where trial court “ignored the presumption in favor of [the petitioner’s] counsel of 
choice” and denied petitioner’s motion for continuance).  
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CONCLUSION 
32. 
The Government cannot offer any serious reason why it would be preferable for 
this case to be tried in this Division, as opposed to the numerous other venues the Government 
could have selected when it brought its charges. This district is not only inconvenient for the 
Defendants, the vast majority of the potential witnesses, and their attorneys; it is inconvenient for 
most of the Government’s own prosecutors, who are Main Justice lawyers.  
33. 
Especially given the burden that this case has already placed on this Court’s already 
crowded docket, it is in the interest of justice and all affected parties, witnesses, and their attorneys 
for this case to be transferred to another, less overburdened district, where the Defendants’ counsel 
of choice can be provided the time they require to be prepared to effectively represent their clients 
at trial. 
34. 
Prior to filing the instant motion, the undersigned conferred via email with AUSA 
Matthew Weybrecht, who confirmed that the Government opposed the Defendants’ being granted 
the relief requested herein. 
 
WHEREFORE Defendants Nathan Reis and Stephanie Hockridge respectfully request that 
the Court grant their motion to transfer this case to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Arizona, and that it grant such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. A 
proposed order is filed herewith. 
Dated: March 21, 2025  
Respectfully submitted, 
 
BOIES SCHILLER FLEXNER LLP  
 
/s/ Blake C. Goebel  
BLAKE C. GOEBEL 
1401 New York Ave, NW 
Washington, DC 20005 
Tel: (202) 895-5248 
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Fax: (202) 237-6131 
bgoebel@bsfllp.com 
 
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Reis 
 
JOHNSON, VAUGH & HEISKELL 
 
/s/ Michael P. Heiskell               
Michael P. Heiskell, TX Bar: 09383700 
5601 Bridge Street, Suite 220 
Fort Worth, Texas 76112 
Tel: (817) 457-2999 
Fax: (817) 496-1102 
mheiskell@johnson-vaughn-heiskell.com 
 
Attorneys for Defendant Nathan Reis 
 
 
BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER LLP 
 
/s/ Richard E. Finneran              
RICHARD E. FINNERAN 
211 North Broadway, Suite 3600 
St. Louis, Missouri 63102 
Tel: (314) 259-2000 
Fax: (314) 259-2020 
richard.finneran@bryancave.com 
 
Attorneys for Defendant Stephanie Hockridge 
 
GALLIAN FIRM 
 
/s/ Gregg Gallian               
Gregg Gallian, TX Bar: 24085952 
3500 Maple Avenue, Suite 1150 
Dallas, Texas 75219 
Tel: (214) 432-8860 
Fax: (972) 433-5835 
gregg@gallianfirm.com 
 
Attorneys for Defendant Stephanie Hockridge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 
I hereby certify that on this 21st day of March, 2025, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served on all counsel of record by operation of the Court’s CM/ECF 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
/s/  Richard Finneran             
RICHARD E. FINNERAN 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE 
 
 
I hereby certify that counsel for Defendants conferred via email with AUSA Matthew 
Weybrecht on March 19, 2025, who confirmed that the Government has no opposition to the 
Defendants being granted the relief requested herein.  
 
 
/s/  Richard Finneran               
RICHARD E. FINNERAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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