Court filing
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Restitution — United States v. Michelle Denise McIntyre (E.D. Wash.)
Filed December 8, 2025 in Prestamos; one of 5 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2025-12-08 |
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division · No. 2:24-cr-00211-ECM-KFP · Doc. 116 · 2025-12-08 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA
NORTHERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
)
)
v.
)
CRIM. CASE NO. 2:24-cr-211-ECM
)
[WO]
MICHELLE DENISE MCINTYRE
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 2024, a Middle District of Alabama grand jury returned a thirteen-count
indictment against Defendant Michelle Denise McIntyre (“McIntyre”). (See doc. 1).1
McIntyre devised a scheme to defraud and obtain money from the Small Business
Administration (“SBA”) under false pretenses by submitting applications for three
COVID-19 pandemic relief programs, including the: (1) Paycheck Protection Program
(“PPP”); (2) Economic Injury Disaster Loan [Program] (“EIDL”); and (3) Restaurant
Revitalization Fund (“RRF”). (See e.g., id. at 1–7, paras. 1–23).
On December 19, 2024, McIntyre pled guilty to two counts of the thirteen-count
indictment: (1) wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Count 4); and (2) money
laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Count 6).2 (See docs. 1, 33). On
April 2, 2025, the Court imposed a 114-month sentence on Counts 4 and 6 to be served
1 For clarity, the Court refers to the document and page numbers generated by CM/ECF.
2 As part of McIntyre’s plea agreement, the Government agreed, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11(c)(1)(A) to move to dismiss Counts 1–3, 5, and 7–13 at sentencing. (Doc. 33 at 4, para. 5).
Upon the Government’s oral motion, the Court dismissed Counts 1–3, 5, and 7–13 at sentencing. (See doc.
64; see also doc. 87 at 49:11–15).
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concurrently. (Doc. 72 at 2). At McIntyre’s sentencing hearing—after her sentence was
imposed—she objected to the Court’s restitution determination. (See doc. 87 at 44:23–45:3,
45:11–22). As explained more fully below, McIntyre’s rationale for challenging the
Court’s authority to order restitution has shifted. (See docs. 91, 97, 107).
Due to McIntyre’s objection, the Court withheld judgment on the amount of
restitution owed and set the matter for a “hearing to give the parties an opportunity to
investigate.” (Doc. 69 at 1). The Court held a hearing (docs. 94, 114), considered the
parties’ briefing (docs. 91, 92, 97, 98, 106, 107), and reviewed evidence (doc. 113).3 The
parties’ dispute centers on five main issues, whether: (1) the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) temporally bars a restitution order; (2) an award of
restitution must be tied to the counts of conviction; (3) the Government has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence the loss amount in this case; (4) there are additional
identifiable victims; and (5) the Court can award restitution to a victim identified after the
sentencing hearing.
After careful consideration of the record, the parties’ briefing, and applicable case
law, the Court finds that McIntyre must pay $775,373.52 in restitution.4 As explained
3 On July 25, 2025, the Government filed an additional position statement, which included citations to
various “supporting documents” produced in discovery. (Doc. 106 at 1). The Court ordered the
Government to file unredacted versions of the supporting documents under seal. (Doc. 108). The
Government complied and conventionally filed these documents via USB. (See doc. 113). Because the
filed documents are sealed, the Court will refer to them by their Bates numbers. (See e.g., 2021R00212-
0002292 at 1).
4 The Court will enter an “amended judgment in a criminal case” in accordance with this Memorandum
Opinion and Order. (See doc. 72 at 6; see also infra Section V).
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below, McIntyre must make restitution of $755,850.08 to the SBA and $19,523.44 to
Prestamos CDFI (“Prestamos”).5
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A.
Presentence Events
1.
Indictment
On June 4, 2024, McIntyre was named in a thirteen-count indictment. (Doc. 1).
McIntyre was charged with various counts of wire fraud (Counts 1–4, 8–13) and money
laundering (Counts 5–7). (Doc. 1 at 3–11, para. 12–33). McIntyre’s charged conduct fell
into three buckets. First, McIntyre submitted fraudulent applications to the SBA to enrich
herself. (See e.g., id. at 6, para. 22). Second, McIntyre submitted applications as a preparer
for members of the public. (See e.g., id. at 9–10, para. 32). McIntyre “advertised her
pandemic relief application services on social media and . . . routinely charged $200 per
application, then required successful applicants to pay her an additional fee, up to half of
the money they received.” (Id. at 8, para. 28). Third, McIntyre used proceeds obtained by
wire fraud to purchase property, including a 2018 GMC Yukon. (Id. at 7–8, para. 25).
Specifically, in Count 4, the Government alleged that McIntyre “devised and
intended to devise a scheme to defraud the [SBA], and to obtain money and property by
means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises.” (Id. at
5 The Government seeks a total restitution award of $775,373.52. (See doc. 92 at 10). However, in review
of the Government’s proposed figure, the Court identified a clerical error regarding a “PPP loan to R.S.”
(See id. at 8). The total restitution sought for this loan is listed as $23,261.01. However, the total loan
balance is $23,261.02—a difference of one penny. (See doc. 92-10). Because the reporting documents
confirm that the SBA was harmed and is entitled to restitution of $23,261.02, the Court will include that
amount in its order of restitution. (See id.).
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6, para. 21). Further, in Count 6, the Government charged that McIntyre “knowingly
engaged and attempted to engage in a monetary transaction by, through, or to a financial
institution, affecting interstate or foreign commerce, in criminally derived property of a
value greater than $10,000.” (Id. at 7, para. 25).
2.
Plea Agreement
On December 19, 2024, McIntyre pled guilty to Counts 4 and 6 of the indictment
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1957. (Doc. 33 at 1–2). In Count 4, McIntyre admitted
to making false representations on an RRF application submitted to the SBA. (Id. at 9–10,
para. 31). The SBA later approved McIntyre’s application and disbursed $131,478.76 in
grant funding. (Id.). Relatedly, in Count 6, McIntyre admitted to withdrawing $44,000 of
the RRF funds from her credit union account, which were “derived from [McIntyre’s] wire
fraud.” (Id. at 10).
Besides admitting the allegations charged in the indictment, McIntyre “agree[d] to
pay all fines and restitution imposed by the Court to the Clerk of the Court” and
acknowledged “the Court’s authority to order restitution.” (Id. at 5, para. 14; id. at 13, para.
43). The plea agreement plainly contemplates that the statutory penalties for Counts 4 and
6 include “order[s] of restitution.” (Id. at 1–2). The parties did not agree regarding the:
(1) number of identified victims; or (2) amount of restitution.6
6 McIntyre’s plea agreement also contains a “waiver of appeal and collateral attack.” (Doc. 33 at 10–11,
paras. 33–34; see also doc. 87 at 49:24–25).
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3.
Presentence Investigation Report
The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) documented McIntyre’s personal
history and characteristics and detailed her criminal conduct. McIntyre filed SBA
applications associated with COVID-19 relief programs. (Doc. 68 at 5–6, paras. 6–16).
McIntyre submitted SBA applications in two ways: (1) personally as the “applicant” or
borrower; and (2) as the “preparer” for members of the public—often associated with
McIntyre’s company, “Finesse Services.”7 (See e.g., doc. 68 at 5–6, paras. 9–10). McIntyre
“filed SBA applications on behalf of clients using information provided by the clients.”
(Id. at 6, para. 17). McIntyre charged $200 to submit EIDL applications and between $75
to $100 to file PPP applications.8 (Doc. 68 at 6, para. 17). McIntyre performed additional
client services “such as bookkeeping, taxes, and amendments[,] in addition to the loan
applications.” (Id.). McIntyre submitted 217 false EIDL loan applications for her clients,
which were denied. (Id. at 8, para. 24).
McIntyre lodged three objections to the PSI—unrelated to restitution and which do
not impact the restitution calculation in this case.9 McIntyre did not object to the facts
contained in the PSI or to Paragraphs 23, 24, or 25 which calculated financial loss. (Doc.
7 The record establishes that McIntyre prepared most applications submitted in connection with Finesse
Services. Notably, two EIDL applications prepared by Finesse Services (without McIntyre) “resulted in
funded EIDL advances totaling $30,000.” (Doc. 92-4 at 3). These EIDL advances are not included in the
PSI’s actual loss or restitution calculations. (See doc. 68 at 7–8, para. 23; see also doc. 92-2 at 1).
8 The record lacks evidence regarding whether McIntyre charged fees when preparing RRF applications.
(See doc. 68 at 6, paras. 16–17).
9 The Court overruled each of McIntyre’s objections at her April 2, 2025 sentencing hearing. (See doc. 87
at 18:23–21:15).
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68 at 7–8, paras. 23–25). McIntyre’s conduct resulted in $732,404.76 of actual loss and
$14,671,008.50 of intended loss.10 (Doc. 68 at 7–9, paras. 23–25). In the PSI, probation
calculated that the SBA suffered a $774,774.23 loss.11 (Doc. 68 at 9, para. 27); see also
United States v. Huff, 609 F.3d 1240, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he amount of loss (for
purposes of offense level calculation) is either the actual or intended loss while the
restitution amount must be the actual loss suffered by the victim.” (emphasis and
parenthetical in original). McIntyre failed to object to Paragraph 102 of the PSI which
states that “restitution in the total amount of $774,774.23 shall be ordered in this case.”12
(Doc. 68 at 21, para. 102) (emphasis added).
B.
Sentencing Hearing
On April 2, 2025, the Court sentenced McIntyre to a 114-month term of
imprisonment on Counts 4 and 6 to be served concurrently. (Doc. 72 at 2). The Court
accepted McIntyre’s plea agreement, wherein she “agree[d] to pay all fines and restitution
imposed by the Court to the Clerk of the Court” and acknowledged “the Court’s authority
to order restitution.” (Doc. 33 at 5, para. 14; id. at 13, para. 43; see also doc. 87 at 4:18).
10 The Sentencing Guidelines define “actual loss” as “the reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that
resulted from the offense” and “intended loss” as the “pecuniary harm that the defendant purposely sought
to inflict.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(C)(i), (ii).
11 The Sentencing Guidelines exclude “[i]nterest of any kind, finance charges, late fees, [and] penalties”
when determining “loss”—the greater of actual loss or intended loss. U.S.S.G. § 2B.1.1, cmt. n.3(C)(i).
Contrastingly, “restitution may include prejudgment interest while the amount of loss cannot.” United
States v. Huff, 609 F.3d 1240, 1247 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010). The inclusion of interest and finance charges
explains the delta between the Sentencing Guidelines calculation of loss and the restitution amount.
12 The Government now seeks a total restitution award of $775,373.52, consistent with the amounts listed
in the PSI and increased to account for “adjusted interest figures.” (Doc. 92 at 3, 6–10).
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The Court adopted the factual statements contained in the PSI and ordered McIntyre to
“make restitution in the total amount of $774,774.23 to the Small Business Administration,
which is due immediately.” (Doc. 87 at 44:16–18).
McIntyre’s counsel then objected that the imposed sentence “is neither procedurally
nor substantively reasonable . . . as well as the restitution not being tied to the offenses of
conviction.” (Id. at 44:25–45:3). Specifically, although McIntyre “d[id] not disagree with
how the Court calculated [the restitution figure] . . . [she] believe[s] that it’s not tied to
Counts 4 and 6.” (Id. at 46:12–14). At sentencing, McIntyre argued that the Court’s
authority to order restitution is limited to the counts of conviction—wire fraud (Count 4)
and money laundering (Count 6).13 After hearing from both parties, the Court “h[e]ld over
. . . the amount of restitution” and later vacated the restitution order “to give [the parties]
time to” discuss McIntyre’s objection. (Doc. 87 at 48:14–18).
C.
Post-sentencing Events
The Court set this matter for a restitution hearing on June 30, 2025—ninety days
after McIntyre’s April 2, 2025 sentencing hearing.14 (Doc. 69 at 1). The parties filed
position statements two weeks before the scheduled restitution hearing. (See docs. 91, 92).
In her position statement, McIntyre did not rely on her objection that the restitution order
must be tied to the counts of conviction; instead, McIntyre argued that “the government
13 At her sentencing hearing, McIntyre contended that the restitution amount should be $175,478.76. (Doc.
87 at 47:1–3). McIntyre reached this figure by adding the amounts charged in Counts 4 and 6 of the
indictment. (See doc. 1 at 7, para. 23; id. at 7–8, para. 25) ((ACH payment of $131,478.76 (Count 4) and
$44,000 (Count 6)).
14 Shortly after McIntyre’s sentencing hearing, her Attorney Christine Freeman withdrew from this case.
(See doc. 75).
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has failed to meet its statutory obligations under the MVRA, and it is appropriate for this
Court to deny the government’s claim for restitution” in its entirety. (Doc. 91 at 2).
McIntyre argued that “[b]ased on the government’s representations, there are multiple
victims in this case.” (Id. at 4). The Court will analyze McIntyre’s position in more detail
below.
Due to circumstances beyond the Court’s and parties’ control, the restitution hearing
was reset for July 11, 2025.15 (Doc. 94 at 1, para. 1). Before the restitution hearing, the
Court ordered responsive briefing. (Id. at 1, paras. 2–3). The parties timely filed responsive
briefing before the restitution hearing. (See docs. 97, 98). On July 11, 2025, the parties
appeared for a nearly two-hour hearing “on the issue of the amount of restitution due” in
this case. (Doc. 114 at 2:6–8).
After the hearing, the Court ordered the parties to “meet and confer regarding the
amount of restitution owed in this case on or before July 25, 2025.” (Doc. 102 at 1, para.
1). The parties were unable to settle the restitution issue, and subsequently filed additional
briefing. (See docs. 106, 107). Further, the Government submitted evidence under seal
regarding the number of victims in this case. (See doc. 113; see supra n.3). The Court
being fully briefed, now considers the parties’ positions on the amount of restitution owed
in this case.
15 McIntyre was unable to attend the hearing due to a miscommunication regarding her transport from a
Federal Bureau of Prisons facility. (See doc. 101 at 1; see also doc. 114 at 17:10–17).
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III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.
Restitution
“The burden of proof for establishing restitution is upon the government by a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Buchanan, 146 F.4th 1342, 1358 (11th
Cir. Aug. 12, 2025) (quoting United States v. Bourne, 130 F.3d 1444, 1447 (11th Cir. 1997)
(per curiam)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d). “An award of restitution must be based on
the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct.” United States v. Liss, 265
F.3d 1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 2001). “However, ‘the government need not calculate the
victim’s actual loss with laser-like precision, but may instead provide a ‘reasonable
estimate’ of that amount.’” United States v. Gladden, 78 F.4th 1232, 1249 (11th Cir. 2023)
(quoting United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 595 (11th Cir. 2015)). “[T]he purpose of
restitution is not to provide a windfall for crime victims but rather to ensure that victims,
to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their losses.” United States v. Young,
108 F.4th 1307, 1319 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Martin, 803 F.3d at 594).
B.
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act
“A federal district court has ‘no inherent authority to order restitution, and may do
so only as explicitly empowered by statute.’” United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330,
1335 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Hensley, 91 F.3d 274, 276 (1st Cir. 1996)).
The MVRA “requires the district court to grant restitution to all victims once a defendant
is convicted of ‘any offense . . . in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a
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. . . pecuniary loss.’” United States v. Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2013)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B)).
Relevant here, the MVRA mandates full restitution when: (1) a defendant commits
“an offense against property under [Title 18] . . . including any offense committed by fraud
or deceit;” (2) “in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a . . . pecuniary loss.”
See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1). The MVRA defines a “victim” as follows:
a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an
offense for which restitution may be ordered including, in the case of an
offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of
criminal activity, any person directly harmed by the defendant’s criminal
conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2). “Thus, a victim must have suffered harm, and the defendant
must have proximately caused that harm.” Martin, 803 F.3d at 593. “[T]he term ‘victim,’
as used in the MVRA, includes the government.” United States v. Mateos, 623 F.3d 1350,
1370 (11th Cir. 2010).
Although the MVRA does not define “offense against property,” the Eleventh
Circuit has held that “[t]he MVRA obligates district courts to order restitution in certain
cases, including wire fraud.” Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1335–36 (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Collins, 854 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases). Further,
other Courts of Appeals have held that money laundering convictions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957 constitute offenses against property and are thus “subject to the MVRA.”16 United
States v. Luis, 765 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Diaz, 245
16 McIntyre does not contend that the MVRA does not apply to her conduct. Rather, McIntyre objects to
the Court ordering restitution on other grounds.
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F.3d 294, 296, 312 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 707, 714 (7th
Cir. 2000).
“[A] criminal defendant cannot be compelled to pay restitution for conduct
committed outside of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal behavior underlying
the offense of conviction.” Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1341. “A district court may not order a
defendant to pay restitution for criminal conduct ‘unrelated to the offense of conviction.’”
United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1270 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (citing
Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1341). “However, the amount of loss does not necessarily equal
the amount of restitution to be paid because ‘[a] defendant’s culpability will not always
equal the victim’s injury.’” Huff, 609 F.3d at 1247 (quoting United States v. Catherine, 55
F.3d 1462, 1465 (9th Cir. 1995)).
“[W]here a defendant is convicted of a crime of which a scheme is an element, the
district court must, under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, order the defendant to pay restitution to all
victims for the losses they suffered from the defendant’s conduct in the course of the
scheme, even where such losses were caused by conduct outside the statute of limitations.”
Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1342. “[R]estitution orders for conduct closely related to the
offense of conviction are appropriate under either [18 U.S.C.] § 3663 or [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3663A(a)(2), in addition to the specific conduct for which the defendant was convicted.
United States v. Brown, 665 F.3d 1239, 1252 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The Eleventh
Circuit has held that under the MVRA “restitution for . . . wire fraud is not ‘limited to the
specific act of fraud underlying the mailing or use of the wires for which the defendant is
convicted,’ but is available for any victim of ‘the entire scheme or artifice to defraud
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furthered by the . . . use of the wires.’” United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 635 (11th Cir.
2007) (citation omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
McIntyre makes five arguments regarding restitution.17 First, McIntyre argues that
the MVRA temporally bars this Court from ordering restitution. Second, she contends that
even if the Court could order restitution, any restitution order must be tied to the counts of
conviction—Counts 4 and 6. Third, McIntyre argues that the Government has not proven
the actual loss amount by a preponderance of the evidence. Fourth, McIntyre contends that
the Government’s failure to fully investigate her case prevents this Court from ordering
any amount of restitution. Fifth, and finally, McIntyre posits that there are additional
victims, which bars the Court from ordering restitution. The Court addresses McIntyre’s
arguments in turn.
A.
Objection 1: MVRA’s Temporal Bar
Under the MVRA, “[i]f the victim’s losses are not ascertainable by the date that is
10 days prior to sentencing, . . . the [C]ourt shall set a date for the final determination of
the victim’s losses, not to exceed 90 days after sentencing.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5). The
Court set a restitution hearing for June 30, 2025—ninety days after McIntyre’s
April 2, 2025 sentencing hearing. (See doc. 69 at 1). Due to circumstances beyond the
Court’s control, the restitution hearing was reset for July 11, 2025—outside the MVRA’s
17 McIntyre’s arguments have evolved at each stage—before, during, and after sentencing. Despite this
evolution, the Court addresses all of McIntyre’s restitution objections in Section IV.
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ninety-day window. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5); see supra n.15. The Court received
additional briefing and evidence in August 2025. (See docs. 107, 113).
At the July 11, 2025 restitution hearing, McIntyre argued that the MVRA statutorily
bars this Court from ordering restitution more than ninety days after sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(d)(5). (See doc. 114 at 5:19–22). In Dolan v. United States, the United States
Supreme Court held “that a sentencing court that misses the 90-day deadline nonetheless
retains the power to order restitution—at least whe[n] . . . the sentencing court made clear
prior to the deadline’s expiration that it would order restitution, leaving open (for more
than 90 days) only the amount.” 560 U.S. 605, 608 (2010) (parenthetical in original); see
also United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2014).
Here, the Court made clear before the deadline’s expiration that it would order
restitution. At sentencing the Court stated, “I’m going to hold over, then, the amount of
restitution. . . . So to the extent that there is an objection as to the amount of restitution, . . .
I’m going to set that out for a separate hearing.” (Doc. 87 at 48:14–15, 22–24) (emphases
added). McIntyre’s April 7, 2025 judgment includes language that “[t]he determination of
restitution is deferred until 6/30/2025.” (Doc. 72 at 6). Further, on June 30, 2025, the Court
made clear that it would extend the time to finalize the restitution order. (Doc. 101 at 1).
Thus, although the Court is outside the MVRA’s ninety-day window, the Court retains the
power to order restitution. See Dolan, 560 U.S. at 611 (“The fact that a sentencing court
misses the statute’s 90-day deadline, even through its own fault or that of the Government,
does not deprive the court of the power to order restitution.”). Because the Court retains
the authority to order restitution, McIntyre’s objection is due to be overruled.
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B.
Objection 2: Tied to Offenses of Conviction
McIntyre first objected to the amount of restitution at the conclusion of her
April 2, 2025 sentencing hearing. McIntyre argued that she was “before the Court
convicted of Counts 4 and 6, and restitution should be tied to those counts.” (Doc. 87 at
45:17–21). For three independent reasons, McIntyre’s objection is due to be overruled.
First, McIntyre affirmatively abandoned her argument that the restitution order must
be tied to the two counts of conviction. The following exchange at the July 11, 2025
restitution hearing confirms McIntyre’s abandonment:
The Court: Have you abandoned . . . McIntyre’s initial argument that she only
should pay restitution for the two counts of conviction?
[McIntyre’s Counsel]: Your Honor, I believe there’s case law that says the Court
can order additional restitution.
The Court: So[,] you are abandoning that argument?
[McIntyre’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
(Doc. 114 at 7:8–14).
Second, even if McIntyre did not abandon this argument, it is foreclosed by Eleventh
Circuit precedent. McIntyre pled guilty to wire fraud (Count 4) and money laundering
(Count 6). McIntyre’s plea under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 established that “she (1) ‘participated
in a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) with the intent to defraud; and (3) used, or caused the
use of, interstate wire transmissions for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice to
defraud.’” See Martin, 803 F.3d at 588 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v.
Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 2008)). Because McIntyre pled guilty to a “crime
of which a scheme is an element,” this Court “must, under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, order
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[McIntyre] to pay restitution to all victims for the losses they suffered from [her] conduct
in the course of the scheme.” Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1342. Further, “when the crime of
conviction includes a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity as an element of
the offense, the court may order restitution for acts of related conduct for which the
defendant was not convicted.” Edwards, 728 F.3d at 1293 (citing Dickerson, 370 F.3d at
1339).
At sentencing, the Court adopted the factual statements contained in the PSI,
including the loss figures for: (1) PPP loans; (2) McIntyre’s RRF loan; (3) EIDL Advance
Funds; (4) EIDL Loans; and (5) lender fees and interest. (See doc. 87 at 21:24–22:4; see
also doc. 68 at 7–8, para. 23). McIntyre specifically targeted COVID-19 pandemic relief
programs and submitted fraudulent applications, which caused the SBA to suffer
substantial financial losses. (See doc. 68 at 5–8, paras. 6–24). At sentencing the Court
described McIntyre’s scheme as “very sophisticated.” (Doc. 87 at 38:16–17). The Court
noted that McIntyre’s conduct involved a common purpose—“[McIntyre] essentially stole
from the government . . . [McIntyre] went out and . . . found other people, and . . . impressed
them with [her] intellect, and . . . increased the fraud exponentially.” (Id. at 39:22–23, 40:2–
7).
The indictment also charged McIntyre with additional counts of wire fraud related
to false PPP applications (Count 1) and EIDL applications (Counts 2–3, 8–13). (Doc. 1 at
3–5, paras. 12–19; id. at 9–11, paras. 30–33). McIntyre concedes that “because of the
overall fraud scheme, it can be shown that . . . McIntyre held herself out to the public . . .
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whereby she collected fees based upon misrepresentations that she made to her clients.”
(Doc. 107 at 3) (emphasis added).
Here, although McIntyre’s role varied her conduct involved the same victim—the
SBA—who disbursed or administered the funds. Additionally, McIntyre’s conduct
involved the same modus operandi—submitting false information in the hopes of
defrauding the SBA. Therefore, because McIntyre: (1) pled guilty to a crime (wire fraud)
of which a scheme is an element; and (2) that scheme involved the same victim and similar
conduct, the Court must order McIntyre to pay restitution to Prestamos and the SBA for
“acts of related conduct for which [she] was not convicted.” See Edwards, 728 F.3d at 1293
(citation omitted).
Third, and finally, outside of her counsel’s statement at sentencing, McIntyre has
not briefed or provided legal authority in support of her objection. Thus, for three
independent reasons, McIntyre’s objection—to the extent it was not abandoned or
waived—is due to be overruled.
C.
Objection 3: Actual Loss Amount
McIntyre raises an untimely objection to the Court’s calculation of the actual loss
amount. (See doc. 107 at 7). For the reasons outlined below, McIntyre’s objection is due
to be overruled.
At McIntyre’s April 2, 2025 sentencing hearing, she did not object to the factual
findings underpinning the Court’s actual and intended loss calculations. When arguing in
support of her motion for a downward variance, McIntyre’s counsel specifically cited the
disparity between the uncontested loss amount of “under [$]800,000” and the intended loss.
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(See doc. 87 at 23:5–14). After McIntyre’s sentence was imposed, McIntyre’s counsel was
clear that her client did not, “disagree with how the Court calculated that number.
[McIntyre] believe[s] that it’s not tied to Counts 4 and 6.” (Id. at 46:12–14). “That number”
refers to the amount of uncontested loss identified in the PSI—$774,774.23. (Doc. 68 at
21, para. 102). Months later, during the July 11, 2025 restitution hearing McIntyre’s
counsel did not object to the calculation of actual loss.
The Court:
[D]o you refute the amount of restitution that the government
is putting forward, or is it your position they’re barred because we are past
the 90 days under the statute from any restitution?
[McIntyre’s Counsel]:
Your Honor, again, the position is that they have
not followed the statutory obligations under the MVRA in order to present
this Court with evidence of restitution. Therefore, any evidence of restitution
coming in front of the Court today for a restitution order would be - - would
be outside the time line allowed by the MVRA.
(Doc. 114 at 11:5–14).
For a second time during the restitution hearing, the Court probed the scope of
McIntyre’s objections:
The Court: [I]t sounds from the arguments of both sides that you’re taking
the position this is an all-or-nothing proposition. You’re not disputing the
amount of restitution that the government is seeking. . . .
[McIntyre’s Counsel]: Yes, Your Honor.
(Id. at 16:16–17:2).
Despite multiple opportunities to inform the Court of her basis for objecting to
restitution, on August 1, 2025, McIntyre submitted additional briefing in which she stated,
“McIntyre persists in her objection that the actual loss amount sustained by the SBA as
calculated by the government is not correct and has not been proven by a preponderance
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of the evidence.”18 (Doc. 107 at 7) (emphasis added). But the record reflects that McIntyre
failed to object to the actual loss amount before, during, and after her sentencing hearing.
The Court—at sentencing—adopted the factual findings in the PSI. (See doc. 87 at
21:24–22:8). McIntyre did not object to the actual loss calculation and thereby “waived
any objections and effectively admitted to the recited facts for sentencing purposes.”
United States v. Harris, 941 F.3d 1048, 1053 (11th Cir. 2019). “[C]hallenges to the facts
contained in the PSI must be asserted with specificity and clarity . . . . Otherwise, the
objection is waived.” United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825, 832–34 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam).
Even if McIntyre did not waive this untimely objection, the Government established
the amount of restitution by a preponderance of the evidence. See Buchanan, 146 F.4th at
1358. McIntyre has been on notice since at least March 26, 2025, that the Government
intended to seek $774,774.23 in restitution. (See doc. 50 at 10–14). The Government
specifically listed: (1) the name of the harmed party; (2) the harmed party’s address; (3)
the loan number; (4) the program associated with the loan (PPP, EIDL, RRF); and (5) the
amount owed. (See id.). The PSI described in great detail McIntyre’s scheme and
categorized McIntyre’s conduct based on her specific role: (1) as borrower or applicant;
and (2) as “preparer for other borrowers.” (Doc. 68 at 7–9, paras. 23–25). Further, after
sentencing, despite the Court already adopting the factual statements in the PSI, the
18 McIntyre failed to formally object to the actual loss calculation. Despite McIntyre’s failure, the Court
analyzes the potential objection because McIntyre’s briefing includes statements like, “[e]ven if the
government can show the actual loss to the SBA”—implying that the Government did not establish the
actual loss amount by a preponderance of the evidence. (See e.g., doc. 91 at 2).
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Government provided additional specific evidence establishing the loss amounts.19 (See
e.g., docs. 92-2, 92-5).
McIntyre, without evidence, cursorily states that the loss amount is incorrect for the
following reasons: (1) “at least one applicant has died”; (2) “another has maintained loan
payments”; and (3) “another applicant underwent an SBA audit before her loan was
approved for forgiveness.”20 (Doc. 107 at 10). McIntyre does not identify particular loans
or funds that were incorrectly calculated. Without more, the Court reaffirms its findings
that the Government proved by a preponderance of the evidence the loss amounts—as
evidenced by the undisputed facts contained in the PSI and additional evidence produced
by the Government.
Even if McIntyre had timely objected to the actual loss amounts, the Government
proved the restitution amount sought by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, to
the extent it has not been waived, McIntyre’s objection to the actual loss amount is due to
be overruled.
D.
Objection 4: MVRA Compliance
McIntyre argues that “the government has failed to meet its statutory obligations
under the MVRA, and it is appropriate for this Court to deny the government’s claim for
19 After sentencing, the Government identified that PPP loan number “47363190-08 to T.W. was not
forgiven.” (Doc. 92 at 5–6). The Government seeks restitution for “Prestamos CDFI, the lender.” (Id. at
6). The Court addresses McIntyre’s objection to awarding Prestamos restitution in Section IV.E.
20 To the extent McIntyre argues that the SBA recovered any amounts to offset her restitution amount, she
has failed to provide any documentary evidence to support these assertions. McIntyre bears the burden
under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2) to prove the value of any purported offset. See United States v. Parker, 927
F.3d 374, 381–82 (5th Cir. 2019). She has not met her burden, and this objection—to the extent McIntyre
makes it—is overruled.
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restitution.” (Doc. 91 at 2). McIntyre argues that the Government failed to seek restitution
or adequately determine if restitution was owed to McIntyre’s clients. (See id. at 4) (“The
government has presented more than once to this Court that . . . McIntyre charged fees to
each applicant with each loan application submitted to the SBA.”). McIntyre contends that
the Government failed “to identify and contact the potential victims of . . . McIntyre’s
scheme.” (Doc. 114 at 6:6–16). “The restitution award must be the full amount of the
victim’s loss that was actually and proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct,
regardless of the defendant’s current or anticipated ability to pay.” Collins, 854 F.3d at
1329.
McIntyre presents the Court with a novel theory: she argues, as the Defendant, that
there may be additional victims of her criminal scheme for which the Government has not
accounted. McIntyre contends that any clients that paid her a fee to submit an EIDL
application and were subsequently denied could be victims under the MVRA. Those
potential victims (McIntyre’s “clients”) are not government entities. Under McIntyre’s
reading of the MVRA, because there are potential individual victims, those hypothetical
victims must “receive full restitution before the United States receives any restitution.” 18
U.S.C. § 3664(i). Here, McIntyre contends that the Government failed to adequately
investigate the scope of her fraud. Therefore, according to McIntyre, because the
hypothetical victims were not properly investigated, and any non-government victim
receives priority, this Court is barred from ordering any restitution at all.
McIntyre’s interpretation is contrary to the MVRA’s purpose—“to ensure that
victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made whole for their losses.” Huff, 609 F.3d at
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1249 (citation omitted). McIntyre’s argument hinges on a nonbinding district court
opinion, which denied the government’s claim to restitution. See United States v. Hirmer,
767 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1316 (N.D. Fla. 2011). There, various defendants were prosecuted
“based on their involvement in a scheme to fraudulently promote and sell various tax- and
debt-elimination products.” Id. at 1306. The defendants sold promotional materials to
customers which promoted anti-tax theories. Id. at 1307. In Hirmer, the government agreed
that a number of the individuals who purchased the defendants’ fraudulent products were
MVRA victims. Id. at 1310. Instead of seeking restitution for the individual victims, the
government argued that it “was impracticable and too complex” to determine the number
of victims. Id. Notably, at a restitution hearing the government “argued that its actual loss
was not capable of determination and that restitution to the individual victims was
impracticable in this case.” Id. The Hirmer court found that an “award of restitution solely
to the government in this case would have improperly allowed the government alone to
decide whether the non-government victims should have received restitution, thus,
effectively eviscerating the requirement that the court ‘ensure that all other victims receive
full restitution before the United States receives any restitution.’” Id. at 1316 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3664(i)).
Here, the Court is presented with a different issue. The Government established by
a preponderance of the evidence the amount of actual loss to the SBA and Prestamos. The
record evidence contains examples of specific loss calculations as a result of McIntyre’s
criminal scheme. The evidence is supported by specific citation or reference to: (1) loan
numbers; (2) transaction dates; (3) interviews; (4) loss amounts; and (5) investigation
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documents. This is not a case where the Government determined that there were victims,
but sought restitution for itself with little evidence. The Government maintained
throughout that the SBA (and lender Prestamos) were victims of McIntyre’s scheme.
McIntyre flips the script by arguing that there may be “potential” victims that could be
entitled to some form of restitution. McIntyre did not lodge this objection until after
sentencing, and neither side points to record evidence sufficient to support a finding that
individuals who paid McIntyre an application fee, but were subsequently denied loans,
constitute victims under the MVRA.
First, based on the record evidence, the Court cannot determine if these individuals
were directly and proximately harmed by McIntyre’s conduct. The Government contends
that many individuals were denied because the applicants’ credit scores were too low for
approval. (Doc. 114 at 46:20–23). Other denied applicants were not charged a fee. (See
2021R00212-0003031). McIntyre does not state that these victims were harmed, instead
arguing that they were potentially harmed. (Doc. 114 at 23:9–12). If the individuals were
denied for reasons outside of McIntyre’s control—it stands that they were not harmed by
McIntyre’s fraudulent scheme.
Second, even if the Court were to consider these individuals to be victims, it cannot
ascertain on this record the alleged victims’ losses. “An award of restitution must be based
on the amount of loss actually caused by the defendant’s conduct.” Liss, 265 F.3d at 1231.
Put differently, “restitution is limited to ‘the victim’s provable actual loss.’” United States
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v. Lange, 592 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).21 The record indicates that
McIntyre submitted 217 false EIDL applications. (Doc. 68 at 8, para. 24). “[W]hen
McIntyre filed an EIDL application for a client, she charged [them] approximately $200.”
(Id. at 9, para. 26). Even if these individuals were harmed, the Court cannot adequately
determine the loss amounts, and neither party has established the loss amount by a
preponderance of the evidence to the hypothetical victims. The Court is not permitted on
this record to hypothesize how much would be owed. Although the record states that
McIntyre charged fees, the Government has presented evidence that other applicants were
not charged fees. This inconsistent record is insufficient for the Court to order restitution.
Third, McIntyre’s position that no restitution can be ordered under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act is contrary to its purposes. McIntyre attempts to use the argument
that potentially more victims exist as a sword to punish the SBA and Prestamos and a shield
to protect her from paying restitution. McIntyre had adequate notice before, during, and
after her sentencing that this Court would order restitution. McIntyre, in her plea
agreement explicitly agreed that restitution would be owed and acknowledged the Court’s
authority to order restitution. McIntyre failed to object to the portions of the PSI where
restitution was outlined with specificity. McIntyre’s efforts to skirt restitution are
unavailing. The victims of McIntyre’s fraudulent scheme must be made whole—an order
of restitution will follow.
21 The Court here and elsewhere in this Memorandum Opinion and Order cites to nonbinding authority.
While the Court recognizes that these cases are not precedential, the Court finds them persuasive.
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E.
Objection 5: “Newly” Identified Victim
On June 16, 2025, the Government informed the Court that in preparation for the
restitution hearing, the Government learned that a specific PPP loan was not forgiven—
meaning that the lender, Prestamos “is owed the $18,750 loan amount and $773.44 in
interest, while the SBA is owed the lender fee of $2,500.” (Doc. 92 at 6; see also doc. 92-
9 at 3). McIntyre does not dispute that Prestamos qualifies as a victim under the MVRA.
Instead, she argues that the Government failed to comply with the MVRA’s timing
provision that “not later than 60 days prior to the date initially set for sentencing, the
attorney for the Government, after consulting, to the extent practicable, with all identified
victims, shall promptly provide the probation officer with a listing of the amounts subject
to restitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(1); (doc. 114 at 22:19–23:1). McIntyre contends that
the Government’s identification of Prestamos over 130 days after the MVRA’s timeline
bars restitution. McIntyre does not cite any legal authority to support this proposition.
The Government opposes McIntyre’s argument and argues that the Government
“did not realize that Prestamos was the victim” until after the sentencing hearing. (Doc.
114 at 23:24–24–5). At sentencing, the Government requested $774,774.23. (See doc. 68
at 21, para. 102; see also doc. 87 at 44:15–18). Consistent with the Government’s previous
request, the Government does not ask the Court to enlarge the original order of restitution,
outside an adjustment for lender fees and interest. (Doc. 114 at 25:11–26:5). Here, the
Government seeks for a portion of the sought funds to be directed to the proper party—
Prestamos. The Government argued during the restitution hearing that McIntyre “was
certainly on notice of the amount that she would have to pay regarding that particular loan,
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even if perhaps she was not on notice as to which entity she would have to pay it to.” (Id.
at 26:13–16).
First, the purpose of restitution is to “ensure that victims, to the greatest extent
possible, are made whole for their losses.” Huff, 609 F.3d at 1249. Second, this Court held
open the issue of restitution to determine not only the amount of restitution owed, but also
to whom the restitution should be paid. Although the Government had not specifically
identified Prestamos as a “victim” during the allotted period, the Government previously
sought these same funds in its sentencing memorandum, at sentencing, and during the
restitution hearing. McIntyre does not contest that Prestamos: (1) suffered an actual loss;
or (2) that Prestamos’ loss was directly and proximately caused by McIntyre’s conduct in
the course of her scheme. See Dickerson, 370 F.3d at 1342–43. The record evidence
establishes that by a preponderance of the evidence the loan was linked to McIntyre’s
fraudulent scheme and was not forgiven—an actual loss. (See doc. 92-9).
Further, although the MVRA establishes various timelines for the Government and
probation to act—the United States Supreme Court—albeit in a different context, has
explained that missed deadlines, do not deprive the Court of the power to order restitution.
See Dolan, 560 U.S. at 607. This is especially true when McIntyre was on notice that she
would pay restitution and she requested that the amount be held over.22 Because this Court
“must order restitution” for actual losses directly and proximately caused by McIntyre’s
22 Courts, in certain circumstances, are permitted to substitute “victims” after the entry of judgment. See
United States v. Simpkins, 2024 WL 4288077 (M.D. Fla. 2024) (granting the government’s motion to
substitute the SBA as victim because the “SBA [after judgment] guaranty purchased the loan from [the
victim].”).
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conduct in the course of her scheme, the Court orders that Prestamos is entitled to
restitution.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, it is
ORDERED as follows:
1.
McIntyre must make restitution in the total amount of $755,850.08 to the
SBA, which is due immediately. Payments are to be made to the United States District
Court Clerk for distribution to the victim. Any balance remaining at the start of supervision
shall be paid at a rate of not less than $100 per month. Interest on the restitution is waived.
2.
McIntyre must make restitution in the total amount of $19,523.44 to
Prestamos, which is due immediately. Payments are to be made to the United States
District Court Clerk for distribution to the victim. Any balance remaining at the start of
supervision shall be paid at a rate of not less than $100 per month. Interest on the restitution
is waived.
3.
In accordance with 18 U.S.C. § 3664(i), Prestamos shall receive full
restitution before the SBA receives any restitution.
4.
The Court will enter an amended judgment in a criminal case consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion and Order. (See doc. 72 at 6).
DONE this 8th day of December, 2025.
/s/ Emily C. Marks
EMILY C. MARKS
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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