Court filing
Joint Rule 26(f) Report — Marshall v. Prestamos (E.D. Pa. No. 5:21-cv-04337)
Filed December 27, 2021 in Marshall v. Prestamos; one of 15 filings from this case.
What This Document Is
This 18-page joint report, filed December 27, 2021 by counsel for both sides after their required Rule 26(f) discovery conference of December 13, 2021, lays out each side's description of claims and defenses and proposes a case-management schedule for the court's consideration.
Factual Summary
Plaintiffs' section states that after the SBA raised the fees payable to lenders for processing PPP loans, Prestamos processed nearly 500,000 loans in about five months and received nearly $1.2 billion in loan-processing fees, but failed to fund the loans of borrowers whose loans the SBA had approved — plaintiffs allege Prestamos kept receiving Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) funds through September 2021, months after the PPP application period closed in May 2021. Named plaintiffs Marshall, Pronsky, and Townsend are small-business owners whose SBA-approved loans SBA records show as disbursed but who never received the funds from Prestamos. Plaintiffs assert a nationwide breach-of-contract class claim for failure to fund SBA-approved PPP loans as required by the parties' standard loan documents and PPP timing rules, plus a California subclass claim under Business & Professions Code § 17200 for restitution of withheld PPP proceeds. The report notes plaintiffs anticipated adding parties and possibly additional claims in a forthcoming amended complaint — which followed as the First Amended Complaint (docket 18) on January 14, 2022.
Key Facts
- Filed 2021-12-27 as docket entry 17, following the parties' December 13, 2021 Rule 26(f) conference.
- Plaintiffs allege Prestamos processed nearly 500,000 PPP loans and received nearly $1.2 billion in processing fees while failing to fund SBA-approved loans.
- Plaintiffs allege continued PPPLF drawdowns by Prestamos through September 2021, after the PPP application window closed in May 2021.
- Asserts nationwide breach-of-contract claims and a California UCL subclass claim; plaintiffs flag an amended complaint is forthcoming.
- Lead counsel: Lawrence J. Lederer and Michael L. Murphy of Bailey & Glasser LLP for plaintiffs; Marcel S. Pratt, Roy Herrera, Daniel A. Arellano, and Michael R. McDonald of Ballard Spahr LLP for Prestamos.
Source Caveats
- Plaintiffs' factual allegations in this report are unadjudicated claims, not court findings.
- Use the linked source file for the full counsel lists, defendant's competing description of claims and defenses, and the detailed proposed schedule.
No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG · Doc. 17 · 2021-12-27 · Docket on CourtListener
Full text
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG Document 17 Filed 12/27/21 Page 1 of 18
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ALICIA MARSHALL, DANIEL
PRONSKY, and PARIS TOWNSEND,
individually, and on behalf of all others
Case No. 5:21-cv-04337-JMG
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.
PRESTAMOS CDFI, LLC,
Defendant.
JOINT RULE 26(f) REPORT
In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f), counsel for the parties conferred on December
13, 2021, and submit the following report of their meeting for the court’s consideration:
I. Counsel
A. Lead counsel for Plaintiff(s): Lawrence J. Lederer
Michael L. Murphy
BAILEY & GLASSER LLP
B. Lead counsel for Defendant(s): Marcel S. Pratt
Roy Herrera
Daniel A. Arellano
Michael R. McDonald
BALLARD SPAHR LLP
C. Counsel who participated in Rule 26(f) conference on behalf of Plaintiff(s):
Lawrence J. Lederer Matthew M. Zapala
Michael L. Murphy Nolan Heller Kauffman LLP
Bart D. Cohen
Bailey & Glasser LLP
D. Counsel who participated in Rule 26(f) conference on behalf of Defendant(s):
Case 5:21-cv-04337-JMG Document 17 Filed 12/27/21 Page 2 of 18
Marcel S. Pratt
Roy Herrera
Daniel A. Arellano
Michael R. McDonald
BALLARD SPAHR LLP
II. Description of Claims and Defenses
Plaintiffs
After the United States Small Business Administration (“SBA”) raised the fees payable to
lenders for processing Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans, Defendant Prestamos CDFI,
LLC (“Prestamos” or “Defendant”) processed nearly 500,000 loans over the course of only five
months. As a result, Prestamos received nearly $1.2 billion in loan processing fees. Despite its
contractual obligations under the same standard form promissory note and accompanying loan
documents to which Prestamos and all class member borrowers were parties, however,
Prestamos failed to fund the loans of borrowers whose loans had been approved by the SBA.
Further, Prestamos failed to fund these SBA-approved loans despite the fact that the PPP loan
proceeds had actually been paid to Prestamos and funded by the Paycheck Protection Program
Liquidity Facility (“PPPLF”) or otherwise. In fact, Prestamos continued to receive funds from
the PPPLF through September 2021, even though the loan application period closed in May
2021.
Plaintiffs Marshall, Pronsky, and Townsend are small business owners whose loans were
approved by the SBA but were never funded by Prestamos. SBA records reflect that those loans
were in fact disbursed. Internet sites including Reddit, the website of the Better Business Bureau
and other websites are replete with complaints by other borrowers throughout the country
alleging similar misconduct by Prestamos.
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Plaintiffs allege breach of contract claims on behalf of a nationwide class for Defendant’s
failure to fund the SBA-approved PPP loans in compliance with the parties’ loan agreements .
PPP lenders including Defendant were also subject to compliance with applicable rules regarding
PPP loans including, among other things, a requirement to fund PPP loans within 10 days after
their approval by the SBA. Plaintiffs Marshall and Townsend also allege claims on behalf of a
California subclass pursuant to California Business & Professions Code § 17200, which defines
unfair business competition to include any “unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent” act or practice, and
in this case provides for Defendant’s restitution of wrongfully withheld PPP loan proceeds to
those Plaintiffs and members of the subclass. Plaintiffs anticipate adding plaintiffs and possibly
alleging additional claims in the forthcoming amended complaint.
Contrary to Defendant’s defenses, Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently alleged and
meritorious. First, by confirming that the SBA had approved Plaintiffs’ loans, agreeing that it
would fund those loans, and executing loan documents accordingly, Defendant was obligated to
fund the loans. Accordingly, Defendant was bound by, and Plaintiffs have claims for breach of
Defendant’s central obligation under the parties’ loan documents. Second, Plaintiffs do not assert
claims based on Defendant’s agreements with the SBA. Third, the release terms in Plaintiffs’
contracts do not operate prospectively or otherwise immunize Defendant’s failure to fund, which
would be contrary to both their language and public policy. Fourth, Plaintiffs maintain a vested
interest in the funds at issue because Defendant was obligated to fund their loans, and because
Plaintiffs and other class member borrowers had to rely exclusively on Defendant to do so, as
they were precluded from seeking other PPP loans while under contract with Defendant. Fifth,
Plaintiffs have Article III standing because Defendant’s failure—and not mere delay—in funding
Plaintiffs’ loans constitutes a concrete injury-in-fact. Sixth, controlling precedent dictates that the
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mere absence of a private remedy in federal law does not displace remedies otherwise available
under state law. Reference to independent federal law and regulation in asserting a state law
claim does not dictate a different result.
Defendant
Defendant Prestamos CDFI, LLC, is a certified Community Development Financial
Institution who, like other lending institutions across the United States, participated in the
Paycheck Protection Program, a program enacted by Congress and administered by the SBA to
facilitate the distribution of financial aid—in the form of federally-backed, forgivable loans—to
small businesses affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. Prestamos denies Plaintiffs’ allegations of
wrongdoing.
Specifically, none of the documents that purportedly governed Plaintiffs’ applications for
PPP loans incorporated any requirements under the CARES Act or related rules and guidelines,
or obligated Prestamos to disburse money to Plaintiffs within a certain time period, or at all.
Whatever agreements Prestamos may have had with SBA cannot be enforced by non-parties like
Plaintiffs. And the Promissory Note each Plaintiff signed contains a broad release provision that
bars Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.
Nothing Prestamos did was “unfair” or “unlawful” under the California Business &
Professions Code § 17200. And Plaintiffs are not entitled to restitution—the only statutorily-
authorized remedy they seek—because that relief only is available where the defendant possesses
money in which the plaintiff has a vested interest. Plaintiffs did not have a vested interest in
proceeds from a loan from Prestamos, especially where Prestamos was not obligated to disburse
that loan and where such loan was conditioned on numerous criteria which lenders like
Prestamos were required to evaluate and verify.
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Additionally, Plaintiffs lack Article III standing to bring this suit—and therefore the
Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction—because the delayed receipt of loan proceeds to
which Plaintiffs were not entitled does not constitute a cognizable injury-in-fact and because
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that Prestamos was the cause of any delay in the disbursement of
Plaintiffs’ loans. Plaintiffs’ Complaint contemplates that delay may be attributable to persons
other than Prestamos.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are impermissible because they are an end-run of
Congress’s decision to omit from the CARES Act (the legislation creating the PPP) a private
right of action. Plaintiffs cannot sue to enforce the terms of a federal statute under state law
where they are not entitled to sue under the statute itself.
III. Stipulated Facts
1. Defendant Prestamos is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the state
of Arizona, having its principal place of business at 1024 E. Buckeye Road, Suite 270,
Phoenix, Arizona 85034, with additional offices in Tucson, Arizona, Las Vegas and
Reno, Nevada, and Santa Fe, New Mexico.
2. Prestamos is a Community Development Financial Institution certified by the United
States Treasury as a Loan Fund.
3. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a
“pandemic.”
4. On March 13, 2020, the United States declared a national emergency due to the COVID-
19 pandemic.
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5. Congress enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES
Act”) at least in part to provide assistance for individuals, families, and businesses
affected by the pandemic.
6. Prestamos participated in the Paycheck Protection Program, implemented pursuant to the
CARES Act, as a lender of federally-guaranteed, forgivable loans.
7. Prestamos entered into an agreement with Blueacorn PPP, LLC, a lender service
provider, whereby Prestamos compensated Blueacorn for its assistance with, inter alia,
facilitating the PPP loan application paperwork, collection, and approval process.
8. Prestamos, like other lenders participating in the PPP, received fees from SBA in
connection with processing PPP loan applications.1
IV. Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act
because at least one member of the proposed class is a citizen of a different state than
defendant Prestamos; there are more than 100 members of the proposed class; and the
aggregate amount in controversy exceeds $5,000,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A).
Defendant contends in its previously-filed Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15) that the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Although
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be mooted by the filing of Plaintiffs’ amended complaint
as set forth in the stipulation of the parties and Order of the Court dated December 22, 2021
1
Plaintiffs’ position is that the parties should stipulate to additional facts and therefore Plaintiffs
anticipate raising with Defendant additional possibilities for stipulation and to potentially
supplement this Rule 26(f) report, and will report to the Court to the extent the parties reach
further agreement.
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(ECF No. 16), Plaintiffs anticipate Defendant will raise the issue again in a motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint and dispute that contention and anticipate showing that, inter
alia: (1) it relies on the erroneous premise that Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has merely
delayed funding Plaintiffs’ loans, as Plaintiffs in fact allege that Defendant has failed to fund
those loans; and (2) it raises fact issues regarding that failure that are not properly resolved at
the pleading stage.
Defendant
Defendant contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs
lack Article III standing to bring this suit. Specifically, Plaintiffs did not suffer a cognizable
injury-in-fact from any delay in disbursement of loan funds because they cannot demonstrate
that they were entitled to receive those funds; and Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that any
injury caused by an alleged delay in receiving loan funds is traceable to any action taken by
Prestamos.
V. Insurance Coverage and Deductibles
While Defendant does not currently intend to rely on any insurance coverage related to
potential liability in this litigation, it is working to identify potentially applicable policies and
their terms and will, without waiving its right to argue as to the applicability of such coverage,
identify relevant insurance agreements as such information becomes available, and no later than
in the exchange of the parties’ initial disclosures.
VI. Dispositive Motions
Defendant intends to file a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) and, if denied, a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
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VII. Anticipated Scope of Discovery
Plaintiffs
A. Summarize with specificity those issues on which the Parties will need to conduct
discovery. Identify categories of information each Party needs in discovery and why.
i. Information identifying Defendant’s key personnel and reflecting its corporate
structure so that Plaintiffs can choose deponents and track the involvement of
Defendant’s corporate affiliates.
ii. Information regarding Defendant’s communications and other dealings with
Plaintiffs regarding the applicable PPP loans necessary to prove Defendant’s
violations.
iii. Information reflecting Defendant’s communications and other dealings with
absent class members regarding the applicable PPP loans necessary for the
Court to adjudicate, and for Plaintiffs to support, Plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification, including information necessary to properly define the proposed
class and any subclasses.
iv. Information regarding Defendant’s relationship with Blue Acorn PPP, LLC
and/or its affiliates (“Blueacorn”) concerning Plaintiffs’ and class members’
PPP loans, given Blueacorn’s role in helping identify borrowers to whom
Defendant could make PPP loans and assisting in the paperwork .
v. Information regarding Defendant’s communications and other dealings with
the SBA regarding the applicable PPP loans, necessary to assess the scope of
Defendant’s violations, including whether those dealings support the assertion
of additional claims against Defendant.
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vi. Information regarding Defendant’s compensation of its relevant personnel,
necessary to assess, inter alia, Defendant’s relevant policies and the
disposition of PPP loan fees on PPP loans of Plaintiffs and the class that
Defendant failed to fund .
vii. Information regarding the amount, location, and disposition of all applicable
PPP loan proceeds that Prestamos obtained or received from the PPPLF or
otherwise, including information regarding Defendant’s disbursement,
payment, transfer and/or holding of all such funds and the location and
applicable account information for all such PPP loan funds paid or advanced
to Defendant.
B. Anticipated number of interrogatories per Party: 35 .
C. Anticipated number of depositions per Party: 20 .
D. To the extent either Party proposes to exceed the presumptive limits in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery, explain the basis for that proposal.
This case involves what Plaintiffs believe may be hundreds or thousands of
proposed class members, and many millions of dollars or more in disputed and
unfunded PPP loan proceeds as Defendant committed to funding more PPP loans in
2021 than any other lender according to the SBA, and Defendant’s PPP transactions
extended throughout the United States. Plaintiffs will therefore need to pursue
substantial discovery commensurate with the scope of this case as is common under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for complex litigation including this case.
E. Do the Parties anticipate the need for any third-party discovery? If so, identify the
likely third-parties and the discovery to be sought.
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Yes. Plaintiffs anticipate seeking non-party discovery from Blueacorn and the
SBA regarding their communications and dealings with Defendant concerning
Plaintiffs’ and class members’ PPP loans, as well as other third-parties including any
third-party to whom Defendant may have transferred any applicable PPP loan
proceeds or fees that Plaintiffs contend should be paid to Plaintiffs and the class.
Defendants anticipate seeking non-party discovery from Plaintiffs’ personal banks
and the SBA regarding their communications and dealings with Plaintiffs.
F. Do the Parties anticipate the need for experts? If so, identify the subjects on which the
expert(s) may opine.
Yes. Plaintiffs presently anticipate needing experts. For example, Plaintiffs
anticipate needing one or more experts to opine as to the alleged damages incurred by
the members of the class and any subclasses. Plaintiffs also anticipate needing one or
more experts in forensic accounting and related areas depending on Defendant’s
disposition of PPP loan proceeds Plaintiffs contend should be paid to Plaintiffs and
the class. Defendants anticipate needing an expert to refute Plaintiffs alleged damages
calculations.
Defendant
A. Summarize with specificity those issues on which the Parties will need to conduct
discovery. Identify categories of information each Party needs in discovery and why.
i. Information about each of Named Plaintiff’s business, including history,
financial and revenue information, tax returns, and the impact on their
business caused by the Covid-19 pandemic to assess the Plaintiff’s eligibility
for a second-draw PPP loan.
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ii. Information verifying the representations each Named Plaintiff made to SBA,
Blueacorn, Prestamos, or others during the application process for a second-
draw PPP loan to assess the veracity of information provided in the
application process and the Plaintiff’s eligibility for a second-draw PPP loan.
iii. All communications each Named Plaintiff had with SBA, Blueacorn, their
bank, and others about their application for a second-draw PPP loan to assess
the veracity of information provided in the application process, the Plaintiff’s
eligibility for a second-draw PPP loan, and the Plaintiff’s knowledge with
respect to the status of their application for a second-draw PPP loan.
iv. Information regarding each Named Plaintiff’s efforts to secure disbursement
of loan proceeds from Prestamos or another entity, and efforts to apply for a
second-draw PPP loan from any other lender to assess the veracity of the
Plaintiff’s allegation that they regularly inquired about the status of their loan
and were unable to secure a second-draw PPP loan from another source.
v. Information about the bank accounts into which each Named Plaintiff sought
to have their second-draw PPP loan deposited to assess the Plaintiff’s
eligibility for a second-draw PPP loan and to investigate reasons why the
Plaintiff’s loan disbursement may have been rejected or otherwise delayed.
vi. Information detailing and verifying any harm each Named Plaintiff allegedly
suffered as a result of any delay in receiving a second-draw PPP loan.
B. Anticipated number of interrogatories per Party: 35 .
C. Anticipated number of depositions per Party: 20 .
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D. To the extent either Party proposes to exceed the presumptive limits in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery, explain the basis for that proposal.
Defendant believes this case will be resolved with evidence from Named
Plaintiffs, which will establish that they do not have claims for relief. In any event,
Defendant also intends to oppose certification of the plaintiff class and, accordingly,
does not believe class-wide discovery is appropriate at this juncture.
E. Do the Parties anticipate the need for any third-party discovery? If so, identify the
likely third-parties and the discovery to be sought.
Yes. Defendant anticipates seeking non-party discovery from Blueacorn,
SBA, and Plaintiffs’ financial institutions, regarding their communications and
dealings with Plaintiffs.
F. Do the Parties anticipate the need for experts? If so, identify the subjects on which the
expert(s) may opine.
Yes. At a minimum, and without waiving the right to retain additional experts,
Defendant anticipates retaining an expert to refute Plaintiffs’ claimed damages.
VIII. Status of Discovery
Plaintiffs served requests for production and interrogatories on November 16, 2021.
Defendant has advised that it will respond by January 12, 2022. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d). The
parties have agreed to hold an initial meet-and-confer as to those responses in the week
following their service on Plaintiffs. The parties have also agreed to exchange initial disclosures
no later than January 14, 2022. Accord ECF No. 16. The parties have not addressed informal
disclosures. However, Plaintiffs have requested that Defendant produces certain documents
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promptly so as to facilitate Plaintiffs’ selection of custodians whose ESI will be searched for
additional responsive documents. Defendant is considering Plaintiffs’ request.
IX. Proposed Case Management Deadlines
A. Deadline to serve initial disclosures under Rule 26(a)(1) (*must be exchanged at least
one (1) business day before Rule 16 conference): January 14, 2022 .
B. Deadline to amend pleadings to add claims or Parties (*must be as early as
practicable to avoid prejudice or unnecessary delays): January 14, 2022 .
C. Deadline for affirmative expert reports (if any) and disclosure of lay witness opinion
testimony with related information and documents (if any): November 18, 2022 .
D. Deadline for rebuttal expert reports (if any): January 10, 2023 .
E. Deadline to complete discovery: February 10, 2023 .
F. If any Party seeks more than 120 days for fact discovery, explain why.
Plaintiffs anticipate that Defendant will produce hundreds of thousands, and
perhaps millions of pages of documents, which Plaintiffs and their experts will be
required to carefully review prior to any depositions. Plaintiffs further anticipate
taking more fact depositions than in a standard case given the number of SBA-
approved borrowers at issue and Defendant’s relationship with Blueacorn. All of this
activity will require more than 120 days to complete.
Defendant concurs that discovery has the potential to be voluminous and will
require more than 120 days to complete.
G. Deadline to file motion for summary judgment: April 10, 2023 .
H. Estimated trial ready date: June 19, 2023 .
I. Estimated Number of Days for Trial: 15 .
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X. Deposition Scheduling
The Court expects the Parties to meet and confer as soon as practicable to set aside dates
to hold open for depositions before the close of discovery. If the Parties have not already done
so, the Court will order the Parties to do so within two weeks of the Rule 16 conference.
Have the Parties set aside dates for deposition? ___ Yes x No
If yes, what are those dates? ________________________________________________
If no, when do the parties intend to confer, and how many dates do they intend to set
aside?
The parties will confer within two weeks of the Rule 16 conference, and set aside
at least 10 days for depositions.
XI. Electronic Discovery
Plaintiffs have requested relevant ESI from Defendant, particularly including borrower
data for the members of the proposed class and any subclasses. Plaintiffs have asked Defendant
for the accelerated production of information necessary to enable Plaintiffs to begin to identify
potential custodians, and Defendant is considering Plaintiffs’ request. Plaintiffs also served on
Defendant a detailed document preservation letter substantially addressed to ESI issues on
November 16, 2021. Plaintiffs have served on Defendant a proposed ESI stipulation, as to which
the parties will meet-and-confer in coming weeks.
XII. Protective Orders and Confidentiality Agreements
The parties anticipate the need for a protective order, and have exchanged drafts to that
end. Defendant will move for entry of that order no later than January 14, 2022.
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XIII. Alternative Dispute Resolution
A. Have the Parties engaged in any settlement discussions? If so, set forth the status of
those negotiations. If not, explain why not.
No. Plaintiffs need information Defendant regarding class and subclass
membership, who Defendant funded and when, who Defendant failed to fund, and the
status of all class member PPP loan funds Defendant obtained in order to
meaningfully enter into settlement discussions regarding the conduct at issue.
B. Have the Parties explored or considered other forms of alternative dispute resolution?
If so, summarize those efforts. If not, state the Parties’ positions with respect to ADR,
as required under Local Rule of Civil Procedure 53.3.
Plaintiffs are receptive to considering ADR at an appropriate stage of the
proceedings after having received information from Defendant as summarized
above.
C. Identify the individual who will attend the Rule 16 conference who will have
authority to discuss settlement.
For Plaintiffs: Lawrence J. Lederer, Michael Murphy, Justin Heller
For Defendant: Marcel S. Pratt, Roy Herrera, Daniel A. Arellano, Michael
R. McDonald
XIV. Consent to Send Case to a Magistrate Judge
Both parties consent to Magistrate Judge Rice maintaining responsibility for resolving
discovery disputes.
XV. Policies and Procedures
Judge Gallagher’s Policies and Procedures are available for the Parties to review on the
Court’s website. By signing below, counsel for each Party and/or each pro se Party represents
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that he or she has reviewed the Judge’s Policies and Procedures and acknowledges the
requirements contained therein. The Parties and their counsel further acknowledge by signing
below that Judge Gallagher will strike pleadings and other submissions that do not comply with
his Policies and Procedures.
XVI. Other Matters
Plaintiffs request that their motion for class certification be due the same day as
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs further request that the Court establish a
deadline for Defendant’s substantial production of all documents responsive to Plaintiffs’
outstanding requests for production. Plaintiffs propose that deadline be May 13, 2022.
Defendant’s position is that, in light of, inter alia: (1) the expansive discovery Plaintiffs
seek on the minutia of Defendant’s dealings with virtually every individual or business who
applied for a PPP loan from Defendant; (2) Defendant’s contention that the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over this dispute; and (3) Congress’s decision to foreclose this type of private
enforcement of the PPP regime by omitting from the governing statute a private right of action, a
stay of discovery is warranted while Defendant’s motion to dismiss is pending. In the event no
such stay is issued, a bifurcation of discovery is necessary to prioritize discovery of information
related to issues that will expedite resolution of the litigation and thereby conserve judicial
resources and the resources of the parties and to adhere to Congress’s policy decisions regarding
the enforcement of PPP rules and guidelines.
Plaintiffs dispute Defendant’s right to a stay of discovery, and dispute that bifurcation of
discovery will expedite resolution of the litigation. Section II.A.1 of the Court’s Policies and
Procedures provides that “the Court will grant a stay of discovery only in extraordinary
circumstances.” (emphasis in original). Defendant suggest no “extraordinary circumstances” that
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would justify a stay. Conversely, Plaintiffs’ need for data regarding class members is necessary
for Plaintiffs to meet their burden of proof to demonstrate compliance with each applicable
requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, making Defendant’s timely production of all discovery
essential. Defendant’s suggestion that the Court should delay that discovery rests on the same
erroneous premise as its request to stay discovery generally, i.e., that the Court should dismiss
this case at the pleading stage. Defendant’s position is wrong on the merits and contrary to the
Court’s policy disfavoring stays of discovery. The parties are proposing what is a relatively
condensed schedule for a case of this complexity, consistent with the parties’ understanding of
the Court’s general preferences. Undue delay in Defendant’s production of any material
discoverable information would make it most difficult for the parties to comply with that
schedule.
The general rule is that discovery should proceed at the outset as to all relevant topics,
and that discovery should not be bifurcated on any basis.2 See also In re Plastics Additives
Antitrust Litig., 2004 WL 2743591, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 29, 2004) (“bifurcation [of class and
merits discovery] would further delay the resolution of the litigation in derogation of Rule 1 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (procedural rules must be
administered to secure “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”)….
Failure to permit simultaneous discovery of merits-related and class-related issues will further
delay the length of the overall discovery period, thereby inhibiting plaintiffs from receiving an
expeditious resolution of their claims.”). Likewise, in this case, as well as in Plastics Additives,
“[d] ue to the intermingling of the facts necessary to evaluate class certification and the merits of
plaintiffs' claims, separating the two would duplicate discovery efforts, which, in turn, would
2
See, e.g., Nathanson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 2001 WL 1392165, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 7,
2001) (“[B]ifurcation is an infrequent exception.”).
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force both parties to incur unnecessary expenses and would further protract the litigation.” Id.,
2004 WL 2743591, at *4. See also id., 2004 WL 2743591, at *3 (“the Court may be forced to
spend time and resources resolving discovery disputes over what is ‘merit’ discovery as
compared to ‘class’ discovery”).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF RULE 26(F) MEETING AND THE ABOVE SUBMISSION
TO THE COURT:
Date: December 27, 2021
/s/ Bart D. Cohen . /s/ Marcel S. Pratt .
Lawrence J. Lederer (Pa. ID 50445) Marcel S. Pratt (Pa. ID 307483 )
Michael L. Murphy (pro hac vice) Michael R. McDonald (Pa. ID 326873)
Patricia M. Kipnis (Pa. ID 91470) Ballard Spahr LLP
Bart D. Cohen (Pa. ID 57606) 1735 Market Street, 51st Floor
Bailey & Glasser LLP Philadelphia, PA 19103
1055 Thomas Jefferson Street NW T: 215-665-8500
Suite 540 F: 215-864-8999
Washington, DC 20007 PrattM@ballardspahr.com
T: 202.463.2101 McDonaldM@ballardspahr.com
F: 202.463.2103
llederer@baileyglasser.com Roy Herrera
mmurphy@baileyglasser.com (pro hac vice admission to be sought)
pkipnis@baileyglasser.com Daniel A. Arellano
bcohen@baileyglasser.com (pro hac vice admission to be sought)
Herrera Arellano LLP
Justin A. Heller (pro hac vice) T: 480-239-8814
Matthew M. Zapala (pro hac vice) roy@ha-firm.com
Nolan Heller Kauffman LLP daniel@ha-firm.com
80 State Street, 11th Floor
Albany, NY 12207 Counsel for Defendant
T: 518-449-3300
jheller@nhkllp.com
mzapala@nhkllp.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs
18
File and source
- File
- gov.uscourts.paed.589575.17.0.pdf
- Size
- 166,113 bytes
- SHA-256
- 401484eed1ab362eff25bff9d8c1cb5cb9e1fd293e411c6973d63828e9285781
- Original
- PACER (login required)