Criminal Complaint — United States v. David Staveley (Dkt. 133, D.R.I. No. 1:20-cr-00074)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the District of Rhode Island · No. 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA · Doc. 133 · 2023-08-11 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
UNITED STATES  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
Cr. No. 20-074 WES 
 
) 
DAVID STAVELEY, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Defendant. 
 
) 
______________________________) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
WILLIAM E. SMITH, District Judge. 
 
Defendant David Staveley has filed a motion to vacate, set 
aside, or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the 
above-captioned matter.  See Mot. to Vacate, ECF No. 79.  The 
government has filed a response to the Motion to Vacate.  Gov’t 
Resp., ECF No. 117.  The Court has determined that no hearing is 
necessary.  For the following reasons, the Motion to Vacate is 
DENIED and DISMISSED.1 
I. 
Background and Travel 
As recounted by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit:2 
When the COVID-19 pandemic ravaged the nation, Congress 
created emergency financial assistance programs to 
 
1 Staveley has also filed several additional motions, which 
will be addressed at the end of this Memorandum and Order.  
 
2 The First Circuit took these facts from the change-of-plea 
colloquy, 
the 
unchallenged 
portions 
of 
the 
presentence 
investigation report (“PSR”), and the transcript of the sentencing 
hearing.   United States v. Staveley, 43 F.4th 9, 11 (1st Cir. 2022).      
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 1 of 24 PageID #:
1226

 
2 
ameliorate the economic consequences wrought by the 
crisis.  One of these programs—the Paycheck Protection 
Program (PPP)—provided small businesses with funds 
necessary to meet their employees’ salaries and other 
operating expenses. 
 
In April of 2020, the defendant—along with a co-
conspirator—submitted several false and fraudulent loan 
applications seeking PPP funds.  Those applications were 
ostensibly made on behalf of various entities, claiming 
that the entities had several employees and large 
payrolls.  In reality, those entities—at the time the 
applications were made—either had no employees at all or 
paid out no wages in the relevant time frame. 
 
After these machinations came to light, the defendant 
was charged by criminal complaint in the District of 
Rhode Island.  The affidavit accompanying the complaint 
alleged in substance that the defendant had committed 
bank fraud, had conspired to commit bank fraud, and had 
perpetrated other federal crimes.  While awaiting trial, 
the defendant was released on personal recognizance and 
was later required to stay in home confinement. 
   
In disregard for the conditions of his release, the 
defendant fled from the state.  To avoid apprehension, 
he staged a fake suicide and—while on the lam—used false 
identities and stolen license plates.  Those events led 
to an additional federal charge for failing to appear in 
court. 
 
Staveley, 43 F.4th at 11-12 (internal citations omitted). 
 
Staveley was apprehended by the United States Marshal Service 
in Alpharetta, Georgia, on July 23, 2020.  Tr. of May 17, 2021, 
Change of Plea Hrng. (“Plea Hrng. Tr.”) 24, ECF No. 68; see also 
Tr. of October 7, 2021, Sentencing Hrng. (“Sent. Hrng. Tr.”) 17, 
ECF No. 69.  In the meantime, he had missed a court appearance 
scheduled for June 2, 2020.  Plea Hrng. Tr. at 24.  Staveley was 
subsequently indicted by a grand jury in the District of Rhode 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 2 of 24 PageID #:
1227

 
3 
Island.  See Staveley, 43 F. 4th at 12; see also Indictment, ECF 
No. 27.   
On May 17, 2021, Staveley pleaded guilty to two counts of the 
Indictment, charging him with conspiracy to commit bank fraud 
(Count 1) and failure to appear in court as required (Count 7).  
See Plea Hrng. Tr. at 26; Plea Agrmt. ¶ 1, ECF No. 42; see also 
Staveley, 43 F.4th at 12.  In exchange, the government agreed to 
recommend a sentence within the range determined by the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG” or the “Guidelines”) and to dismiss 
the remaining counts (Counts 2-6)3 of the Indictment at the time 
of sentencing.  Plea Hrng. Tr. at 11-12; see also Sent. Hrng. Tr. 
at 20, 54; Plea Agrmt. ¶ 2. 
 
Staveley was sentenced on October 7, 2021, to an aggregate 
term of 56 months of incarceration, followed by three years of 
supervised release.  Sent. Hrng. Tr. at 63; J. 2-3, ECF No. 51; 
see also Staveley, 43 F.4th at 12.  He filed a Notice of Appeal, 
ECF No. 53, as well as a motion for reconsideration, ECF No. 59.  
The latter was denied by text order dated October 19, 2021.  The 
First Circuit dismissed Staveley’s appeal without prejudice to 
bringing his ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a motion 
 
3 Counts 2-6 included three counts of bank fraud, one count 
of making false statements to influence the Small Business 
Administration (“SBA”), and one count of aggravated identity 
theft.  See Indictment ¶¶ 23-36. 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 3 of 24 PageID #:
1228

 
4 
to vacate.  Staveley, 43 F.4th at 19; see also First Circuit Op., 
ECF No. 72.  Staveley did not seek further review.  See Mot. to 
Vacate at 2.4 
On August 29, 2022, Staveley timely filed the instant Motion 
to Vacate.   
II. Legal Standard 
A. 
Section 2255   
Section 2255 provides in relevant part: 
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court 
established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be 
released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed 
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess 
of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject 
to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed 
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the 
sentence. 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).   
Generally, the grounds justifying relief under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255(a) are limited.  A court may grant relief pursuant to § 2255 
in instances where the court finds a lack of jurisdiction, a 
constitutional error, or a fundamental error of law.  United States 
v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185 (1979).  “[A]n error of law does 
not provide a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error 
constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results in a 
 
4 Page numbers reflect the pagination generated by the Court’s 
Electronic Filing System (“ECF”).  
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 4 of 24 PageID #:
1229

 
5 
complete miscarriage of justice.”  Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Rosario-Rosado v. United States, CIVIL NO. 21-
1431 (RAM), 2023 WL 2665594, at *1 (D.P.R. Mar. 27, 2023) (“[A]part 
from claims of constitutional or jurisdictional nature, a 
cognizable 
section 
2255 
claim 
must 
reveal 
exceptional 
circumstances that make the need for redress evident.” (quoting 
David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998))) 
(alteration in original).  Moreover, § 2255 is not a substitute 
for a direct appeal.  Knight v. United States, 37 F.3d 769, 772 
(1st Cir. 1994) (citing cases). 
B. 
Strickland Standard 
The standard for analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel stems from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), which provides a two-pronged test for evaluating such 
claims.  Kholi v. Wall, CA No. 14-307-JJM, 2015 WL 567148, at *4 
(D.R.I. Feb. 10, 2015).  Under the “performance prong” of the 
Strickland test, a defendant must show his counsel “made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  Under the “prejudice prong,” a defendant must show 
that “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.”  Id.  “The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether 
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 5 of 24 PageID #:
1230

 
6 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”  Id. at 686. 
Strickland instructs that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s 
performance must be highly deferential.”  Id. at 689; see also id. 
(“It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel’s 
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too 
easy for a court, examining counsel’s defense after it has proved 
unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of 
counsel was unreasonable.”).  The court “must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must 
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”  
Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).  
Moreover, “[a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires 
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances 
of 
counsel’s 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s 
perspective at the time.”  Id. at 689.   
The same principles apply in the context of guilty pleas.  
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985).  The Hill Court held 
that “the two-part Strickland v. Washington test applies to 
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 6 of 24 PageID #:
1231

 
7 
counsel.”  Id. at 58; see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 
371 n.12 (2010) (“In Hill, the Court recognized—for the first time—
that Strickland applies to advice respecting a guilty plea.”).  
The first prong of the Strickland test is “nothing more than a 
restatement of the standard of attorney competence” described 
above.  Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. 
The second, or “prejudice,” requirement, on the other 
hand, focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally 
ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea 
process.  In other words, in order to satisfy the 
“prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that 
there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial. 
 
Id. at 59; see also Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012) 
(“In the context of pleas a defendant must show the outcome of the 
plea process would have been different with competent advice.”); 
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372 (noting that “to obtain relief on this 
type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision 
to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 
circumstances”).  These predictions, as the Supreme Court 
reiterated in Hill, should be made objectively.  See 474 U.S. at 
59-60.   
III. Discussion 
A.   Motion to Vacate 
Staveley argues that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel from two attorneys who represented him during these 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 7 of 24 PageID #:
1232

 
8 
proceedings, Mark Josephs and Jason Knight, on several grounds.  
The bottom line is this: Staveley has not demonstrated prejudice 
under Strickland with respect to any of his claims regarding 
counsel’s actions and/or omissions.  Accordingly, the Motion to 
Vacate must be denied.5  
1.   Mark Josephs 
Although Staveley makes no allegations against Josephs in the 
Motion to Vacate itself, he does so in other filings.6  Accordingly, 
 
5 Under Strickland, a defendant must make both showings.  See 
466 U.S. at 687.  Accordingly, because Staveley has failed to 
demonstrate prejudice, the Court need not address the performance 
prong.  See id. at 697 (“Although we have discussed the performance 
component of an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice 
component, there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective 
assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even 
to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes 
an insufficient showing on one.  In particular, a court need not 
determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before 
examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of 
the alleged deficiencies.”). 
   
6 In addition to the allegations against Josephs, Staveley 
also seeks to add another claim against trial counsel as well as 
a claim against the government.  See Mot. for Leave to Amend Pet. 
23 (“Mot. to Amend”), ECF No. 113; Mot. to Show Prosecution/US 
Attorney Failed to Provide Exculpatory Evidence 6-7 (“Mot. to Show 
Failure to Provide”), ECF No. 82; Mot. Identifying Prejudice 
Egregious Performance—Ineffective Counsel (“Mot. Identifying 
Prejudice”) 1-3, ECF No. 83.  The former is currently pending; the 
latter two were denied without prejudice by text order on September 
15, 2022, with the notation that: “These Motions include 
allegations that are part of the Petitioner’s Motion to Vacate and 
will be addressed when that motion is addressed by the Court.” 
 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 8 of 24 PageID #:
1233

 
9 
the Court addresses Staveley’s contentions that Josephs provided 
ineffective assistance. 
According to Staveley: 
Attorney Josephs represented Defendant in the early stages 
of these proceedings, a period of eight (8) months, during 
which time he did not communicate with the Defendant, did 
not show or zealously assert evidence showing an illegal 
search and never brought proof of Defendant’s location 
which would have from the outset prevented negative court 
action upon the Defendant.  Josephs during his term of 
representation of the Defendant took no action on the 
Defendant’s behalf, as displayed in [the] Court Docket, 
other 
than 
filing 
a 
withdrawal 
without 
prior 
knowledge/notice or assent of the Defendant and to file a 
motion for compassionate release for which the Defendant 
was not yet entitled. 
 
Def.’s Reply 3 (“Reply”), ECF No. 125; see also Mot. Identifying 
Prejudice at 1-3. 
The Court need not address in detail Staveley’s allegations 
against Josephs because Staveley has not shown that he was 
prejudiced by Josephs’ actions or omissions, i.e., that “there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”  
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.7  The Court, therefore, rejects Staveley’s 
claim that he received ineffective assistance from Josephs.   
 
7 It is true that the motion for compassionate release was 
initially not filed under seal, see Docket, despite containing 
deeply personal information.  That was error on Josephs’ part.  
However, 
“[a]n 
error 
by 
counsel, 
even 
if 
professionally 
unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a 
criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.  
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 9 of 24 PageID #:
1234

 
10 
2.   Jason Knight   
Staveley first alleges that Knight failed to provide him with 
discovery materials prior to his signing the Plea Agreement.  Mot. 
to Vacate at 4.  Although it strains credulity to believe that 
Knight did not go over the evidence with Staveley before the change 
of plea hearing, even assuming, arguendo, that that is the case, 
Staveley heard the government’s recitation of the facts of the 
case during the plea colloquy and agreed that they were accurate.  
Plea Hrng. Tr. at 20-26. 
At the outset of the hearing, the Court asked Staveley if he 
had received a copy of the Indictment and had discussed it with 
Knight; whether he had had an opportunity to read and discuss the 
plea agreement with Knight before signing it; whether he understood 
all the terms of the plea agreement; whether he was satisfied with 
Knight’s representation; whether he understood that the terms of 
the plea agreement were recommendations which the Court could 
reject without allowing him to withdraw the plea and could sentence 
him to a sentence more severe than he may anticipate; whether he 
understood that he was pleading guilty to felony offenses and that 
if the Court accepted the plea and adjudged him guilty of those 
offenses he could be deprived of certain valuable civil rights.  
Id. at 9-11.  To all these questions, Staveley responded 
affirmatively, and he further denied that anyone made any promises 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 10 of 24 PageID
#: 1235

 
11 
or assurances to him not contained in the plea agreement, or 
threatened him in any way, to persuade him to accept it.  Id. 
   
The Court then asked the government to place on the record 
the elements of the two charges to which Staveley was pleading 
guilty and the facts that the government would prove if the case 
went to trial.  Id. at 18-19.  The Court advised Staveley to 
“[l]isten carefully.  At the end I’m going to ask you if you have 
any questions and if you agree that those are the facts the 
Government would present.”  Id. at 19. 
 
After listening to the government’s lengthy and detailed 
recitation of the facts it would prove at trial, id. at 20-24, 
Staveley stated that he agreed with the government, id. at 25.  
The Court asked: 
THE COURT: 
All right.  Do you understand that you’re 
admitting that those are the facts that the Government 
would prove if this case were to go to trial? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
 
THE COURT:  
And you’re admitting to those facts? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor. 
 
Id. 25-26.  Then Court asked Staveley how he wished to plead, 
guilty or not guilty.  Id. at 26.  Staveley replied, “Guilty, your 
Honor.”  Id.  
The Court found that Staveley was “fully competent and capable 
of entering an informed plea” and that “the plea of guilty is a 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 11 of 24 PageID
#: 1236

 
12 
knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis in 
fact containing each of the essential elements of the two charges.”  
Id. at 26.  Accordingly, the Court accepted the plea.  Id.; see, 
e.g., United States v. Spinks, 63 F.4th 95, 102 (1st Cir. 2023) 
(“[T]he ‘district court [is] entitled to rely on the defendant’s 
representations that he was satisfied with his counsel’s 
handiwork, that he had reviewed the terms of the plea agreement 
with his counsel, and that he understood all of those terms.’” 
(quoting Staveley, 43 F.4th at 15)) (second alteration in 
original); see also Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017) 
(noting that courts “should not upset a plea solely because of 
post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have 
pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies,” but “should instead 
look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant’s 
expressed preferences”); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 
Whether Staveley viewed the actual evidence prior to signing 
the plea agreement, Mot. to Vacate at 4, he clearly heard the 
evidence during the plea colloquy.  Surely, he was not hearing 
these facts for the first time.  Were that the case, logic dictates 
that he would not, under oath, have agreed with and admitted to 
the government’s recitation.  See, e.g., Spinks, 63 F.4th at 102; 
see also Staveley, 43 F.4th at 16 (noting “copious evidence that 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 12 of 24 PageID
#: 1237

 
13 
he fully understood his plea agreement and was satisfied with his 
representation”). 
  
Staveley now says, in his Reply, that “[b]ut for Attorney 
Knight’s failure to provide Defendant with discovery materials and 
to review those materials with Defendant, Knight’s repeated 
improper threats to withdraw in a prejudicial manner and his 
failure to request a continuance at sentencing as requested by 
Defendant, the Defendant would have proceeded to trial.”  Reply at 
14.8  This argument is too little too late. 
 
Leaving aside the fact that Staveley’s argument that he would 
have gone to trial is not in the Motion to Vacate but, rather, 
appears for the first time in his Reply, see United States v. Tosi, 
897 F.3d 12, 15 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[A]rguments available at the 
outset but raised for the first time in a reply brief need not be 
considered.”), and is undeveloped, see Barreto-Barreto v. United 
States, 551 F.3d 95, 99 (1st Cir. 2008) (declining to address 
argument that petitioners “do not develop . . . beyond this 
assertion”), such a decision would not have been “rational under 
the circumstances” of the case, Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372.   
 
8 The “threats to withdraw” Staveley mentions presumably 
relate to his fourth ground for relief, discussed infra.  The 
request for continuance at sentencing to which Staveley refers 
constitutes ground two of the Motion to Vacate, also addressed 
infra.  
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 13 of 24 PageID
#: 1238

 
14 
For example, looking only at the two counts to which Staveley 
pleaded guilty, he could have received a statutory maximum sentence 
of 40 years in prison — 30 years for the conspiracy charge and a 
10-year consecutive sentence for failing to appear in court.  See 
PSR ¶ 117.  Instead, he was sentenced to an aggregate 56-month 
term of incarceration, Sent. Tr. at 63; J. at 2, within the 
advisory guideline range of 51-63 months incarceration, Sent. 
Hrng. Tr. at 12, 20; see also Plea Agrmt. ¶ 2a.  
Further, the government agreed to — and did — dismiss Counts 
2-6 of the Indictment as part of the Plea Agreement.  See Sent. 
Hrng. Tr. at 54; Plea Agrmt. ¶ 2e.  Had Staveley been found guilty 
of these additional counts, he would have been facing additional 
prison time.  As the government notes, the aggravated identity 
theft count (Count 6) alone carries a mandatory minimum consecutive 
sentence of two years.  Gov’t Resp. at 15; see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1028A(a)(1), (b)(2).  Under these circumstances, the Court 
cannot find that rejecting the plea would have been a rational 
choice.  See Padilla, 559 U.S. at 372. 
 
The Court is aware that Staveley and Knight have differing 
memories of what Knight did or failed to do.  However, no matter 
whose account is more accurate, Staveley has not shown “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 14 of 24 PageID
#: 1239

 
15 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.   
Second, Staveley faults Knight for his failure to seek a 
continuance at sentencing.  Mot. to Vacate at 5.  According to 
Staveley, during the sentencing hearing the Assistant U.S. 
Attorney (“AUSA”) indicated that Staveley “was a liar, regarding 
being sexually assaulted by a [Federal Bureau of Prisons] guard 
some years earlier.”  Id.  Staveley avers that Knight “not only 
did not object, but was aware there was a U.S. Federal Court 
ordered psychological report available that would demonstrate the 
Defendant was truthful.”  Id. 
 
During the sentencing hearing, the AUSA stated: 
I do want to spend a little while talking about this 
Defendant as an individual because I know that’s what 
Mr. Knight is probably going to be spending a significant 
amount of time on.  I don’t really think it’s appropriate 
for me in this venue to talk about the allegations that 
the Defendant made in the past.  All I would say on that 
point, your Honor, is reading through the presentence 
report, there’s a lot of mixed information on that and 
it’s very unclear.  I’m not saying it didn’t happen, I 
just don’t know; and I don’t think the Court can just 
accept this Defendant’s word that that happened.  It may 
have; if it did, you know, I’m deeply sorry and I can’t 
imagine how horrible it is, but there’s no factual basis 
one way or the other. 
 
Sent. Hrng. Tr. at 20-21.   
It is true that Knight did not object at the time.  See id.  
But, when it was his turn to argue for a recommended sentence, he 
asked the Court “to strongly consider compassion in this case as 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 15 of 24 PageID
#: 1240

 
16 
you figure out what to do about David Staveley and his sentence.  
And I’m asking you to consider the man.”  Id. at 25.  Knight noted 
that he had provided the Court with a detailed memo, which the 
Court stated it had read.  Id.  The Court continued: 
THE COURT: 
You’re free to go over anything you and 
your client want, but I know there are personal details 
in there. 
 
MR. KNIGHT:  
Right.  But I will say this.  He’s got 
bad PTSD, and the Government says that the source of 
that PTSD, that is an allegation.  But I gave the Court 
medical records showing that the providers, the medical 
providers believe it is the case, it is the diagnosis.  
And a correctional setting, because of the nature of the 
event, is what causes that PTSD; it’s what triggers him.  
And they are back, those symptoms, so bad that he ran to 
avoid jail, which is documented in Count VII. 
 
Id. at 25-26. 
 
It is clear from the foregoing that Knight was well aware of 
Staveley’s prior experience, that Staveley carried a diagnosis of 
PTSD as a result, that he had obtained medical records, and that 
he had provided those medical records to the Court.9  There was, 
 
9 In sentencing Staveley, the Court recognized the need for 
compassion: 
 
But I am also mindful of the other factors under 3553(a) 
besides deterrence of you and deterrence of the public; 
and that the idea that you’re an individual human being 
who deserves individual sentencing is absolutely true, 
that you deserve my compassion and the compassion of 
this court is absolutely true as well, and you have that. 
 
The fact that serving time in prison for you is more 
difficult because of the PTSD and the things that you’ve 
been through, it is something that is awful and that 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 16 of 24 PageID
#: 1241

 
17 
therefore, no need for Knight to seek a continuance to further 
investigate (and disprove) the AUSA’s statements, and Staveley was 
not prejudiced by Knight’s failure to do so at that point.  See 
Vieux v. Pepe, 184 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Counsel is not 
required to waste the court’s time with futile or frivolous 
motions.” (quoting United States v. Wright, 573 F.2d 26, 27 (1st 
Cir. 1978))).  Staveley’s second claim is therefore rejected.  
Relatedly, 
Staveley 
alleges 
that 
the 
AUSA 
withheld 
exculpatory evidence from the defense and the Court.  See Mot. to 
Vacate at 5 (noting that AUSA was in possession of the document in 
question and did not reveal it to the Court or provide it to the 
defense); Mot. to Show Failure to Provide at 7-8.  The “exculpatory 
evidence” in question is a psychological report ordered by the 
District of New Hampshire and completed in late June of 2015 by a 
BOP psychiatrist at Brooklyn MDC.  Mot. to Show Failure to Provide 
at 6.  This claim is baseless. 
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),  
 
this Court cannot pretend to understand, but it’s also 
a risk that you knew you were taking at the time that 
you were engaging in this behavior. 
 
Sent. Hrng. Tr. at 61-62; see also Staveley, 43 F.4th at 17 (“At 
the disposition hearing, the district court acknowledged the 
defendant’s PTSD ‘and the things that [the defendant had] been 
through,’ which strongly indicates that the court gave at least 
some credit to the defendant’s allegations of assault.”) 
(alteration in original). 
 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 17 of 24 PageID
#: 1242

 
18 
the Supreme Court held that the government’s suppression 
of evidence favorable to the accused violates due 
process if the evidence is material to guilt or 
punishment.  To prevail on a Brady claim, “petitioner 
must demonstrate: (1) the evidence at issue is favorable 
to him because it is exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the 
Government suppressed the evidence; and (3) prejudice 
ensued from the suppression (i.e., the suppressed 
evidence was material to guilt or punishment).” 
 
Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 38 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting 
Conley v. United States, 415 F.3d 183, 188 (1st Cir. 2005)).  To 
satisfy the prejudice, or materiality, prong, “the petitioner must 
show there is ‘a reasonable probability that, had the evidence 
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.’”  Id. (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 
263, 280 (1999)).  
Staveley has not met any prong of the Brady test — 
favorability, suppression, or materiality.  See Bucci, 662 F.3d at 
38.  Staveley’s allegation that the AUSA withheld evidence is pure 
speculation.  See Mot. to Show Failure to Provide at 7 (“[B]eing 
that many other psychological documents were offered from the BOP 
in discovery, specifically other documents that were in the same 
file as the Court ordered Psychological Report, it can only be 
determined this key document was withheld and obstructed by the 
Prosecution.”); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez Castro, 
Criminal Action No. 15-10338-FDS-56, 2023 WL 2529635, at *2 (D. 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 18 of 24 PageID
#: 1243

 
19 
Mass. Mar. 15, 2023) (noting that court “need not give weight to 
conclusory allegations”). 
Moreover, Staveley has not shown that the report in question 
was exculpatory in any way.  If anything, the report was relevant 
to sentencing, not guilt or innocence, and it is obvious from their 
statements, quoted above, that both Knight and the Court were aware 
of its contents (as was Staveley himself).  Thus, whether Knight 
received the report is irrelevant to the materiality, or prejudice, 
question, as the incident and diagnosis described therein were 
known to Knight (and the Court) at the time of sentencing.  In 
short, even assuming Staveley’s allegation regarding the AUSA 
withholding the report is true, Staveley has not shown a 
“reasonable probability” that the non-disclosure affected the 
outcome of the proceeding.  Barrett v. United States, 965 F.2d 
1184, 1189 (1st Cir. 1992) (“The materiality test under Brady is 
not met unless the nondisclosure of the evidence ‘undermine[s] 
confidence in the outcome of the trial,’ which can occur only if 
‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.’” (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 
682 (1985))) (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted); 
see also Vieux, 184 F.3d at 64.     
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 19 of 24 PageID
#: 1244

 
20 
Third, Staveley contends that counsel failed to assist in 
filing necessary motions relating to his direct appeal until the 
Court of Appeals explicitly ordered him to “effectively represent 
[his] client . . . until relieved.”  Mot. to Vacate at 6; see also 
id., Ex. D; 1st Cir. R. 46.6(a).  Knight responds that he does not 
do appellate work and was not aware of the rule cited by the First 
Circuit.  Mot. to Vacate, Ex. C at 80 ¶ 7.  
In any event, after receiving the First Circuit’s order, 
Knight filed the necessary paperwork, the appeals court appointed 
new counsel for Staveley, and his appeal progressed.  Id. at 60 
¶ 20.  Therefore, he cannot claim prejudice from Knight’s lack of 
immediate action.  Staveley’s third claim of error is meritless.    
Lastly, Staveley alleges that Knight falsified documents, 
specifically the date on a fee agreement.  Mot. to Vacate at 8.  
He states that “Knight represented the Defendant without a 
Contract/Fee Agreement in place[,] only a verbal agreement for fees 
with Defendant’s 81 year old mother.”  Id.  According to Staveley, 
after several months of representation, Knight “approached the 
Defendant with only a signature page of a[n] agreement.”  Knight 
states that he had lost the original copy and was simply replacing 
it in his files.  Mot. to Vacate, Ex. C at 60 ¶ 18; id. at 76 ¶ 3; 
id. at 80.  Staveley signed, but refused to date the document, 
Mot. to Vacate at 8, and Knight later inserted the original date 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 20 of 24 PageID
#: 1245

 
21 
he says the original agreement was executed, id., Ex. C at 76 ¶ 3.  
Staveley also complains that Knight never provided billing 
statements, itemized invoices, or agreement terms.  Mot. to Vacate 
at 8. 
Disputes between Staveley and Knight regarding Knight’s 
billing practices are not relevant to a motion to vacate.  Section 
2255 provides a remedy for sentences imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, without jurisdiction, 
in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or otherwise subject 
to collateral attack.  28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Addonizio, 442 U.S. at 
185.  Section 2255 simply does not apply to billing disputes. 
Accordingly, the Court rejects Staveley’s fourth ground for 
relief. 
 
B. 
Pending Motions 
1.   Motion for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 113) 
Staveley has also filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Petition 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2255.  In it, he seeks to add an additional 
allegation against Knight, in essence a conflict-of-interest 
claim.  According to Staveley: 
Information has recently come to Staveley’s attention 
surrounding the relationship between Staveley’s counsel, 
who never revealed or informed his client that Knight 
was an elected official, part of the State General 
Assembly, and a member of the House of Representatives 
leadership.  Knight never disclosed his relationships 
with elected officials from Warwick, R.I[.] or his 
communication with these individuals who are very 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 21 of 24 PageID
#: 1246

 
22 
powerful elected officials.  Both the Speaker and Sen. 
M. McCaffrey are from Warwick and were or had an 
involvement in matters relevant to these proceedings 
which Knight undoubtedly was aware of and did not 
disclose. 
 
Mot. for Leave to Amend ¶ 5.  This motion is frivolous and is 
denied.  First, Staveley provides no information on how Knight’s 
relationship with fellow legislators affected the “matters 
relevant to these proceedings” or what “involvement,” if any, they 
had in these proceedings.  Moreover, Staveley’s statement that 
Knight “undoubtedly was aware” of this involvement is pure 
speculation.  See United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st 
Cir. 1993).  The fact that the two named legislators are from 
Warwick and two of the restaurants involved in the allegations are 
in Warwick is not enough on which to base an allegation of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of interest. 
2.   Emergency Motion to Extend Time (ECF No. 123) 
 Staveley’s emergency motion to extend the time in which to 
respond to the government’s opposition to the Motion to Vacate is 
denied as moot.  Staveley filed his Reply, ECF No. 125, on December 
21, 2022. 
3.   Motion to Compel (ECF No. 124) 
 
In his Motion to Compel Return of Defendant’s Property, 
Staveley seeks the return of his property, other than his 
Massachusetts driver’s license, that he states has not yet to be 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 22 of 24 PageID
#: 1247

 
23 
returned to him.  Mot. to Compel at 2.  The government responds 
that it has contacted various law enforcement agencies which may 
have personal items to return to Staveley.  Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s 
Mot. to Compel Return of Def.’s Property 1-2, ECF No. 126.  These 
agencies have responded that they either have no documents, have 
documents and have unsuccessfully attempted to return them to 
Staveley, or have fraudulent identification documents which will 
not be returned.  See id.  Based on the representations in the 
government’s response, Staveley’s Motion to Compel is denied. 
 
4.   Emergency Motion to Enlarge Time (ECF No. 128) 
Through this motion, Staveley seeks an enlargement of time to 
reply to the government’s response to his Motion to Compel.  
However, he filed his reply, ECF No. 130, on January 23, 2023.  
Accordingly, the motion to enlarge is denied as moot. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Staveley has not 
met the Strickland standard in that he has failed to demonstrate 
prejudice from Attorneys Josephs’ and Knight’s actions or 
omissions.  Accordingly, the Motion to Vacate, ECF No. 79, is 
DENIED and DISMISSED.  Staveley’s remaining motions are DENIED for 
the reasons stated above.  Specifically, his motion to amend, ECF 
No. 113, is DENIED; his motion to extend time, ECF No. 123, is 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 23 of 24 PageID
#: 1248

 
24 
DENIED as MOOT; his motion to compel, ECF No. 124, is DENIED; and 
his motion to enlarge time, ECF No. 128, is DENIED as MOOT. 
RULING ON CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 
Proceedings in the United States District Courts, this Court hereby 
finds that this case is not appropriate for the issuance of a 
certificate of appealability (COA) because Staveley failed to make 
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as 
to any claim, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).  
 
Staveley is advised that any motion to reconsider this ruling 
will not extend the time to file a notice of appeal in this matter.  
See Rule 11(a), Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 
William E. Smith 
District Judge 
Date:  August 11, 2023 
 
Case 1:20-cr-00074-WES-LDA     Document 133     Filed 08/11/23     Page 24 of 24 PageID
#: 1249

File and source

File

gov.uscourts.rid.49679.133.0.pdf

Size

141,980 bytes

SHA-256

9ddd3d88239b7b610999da535d8c865625021ed22b15e79d5cf31fd0a74f6c61

Our copy

gov.uscourts.rid.49679.133.0.pdf

Original

PACER (login required)