Court filing

Motion to Dismiss Harun's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion by Channell Veena Singh — USA v. Harun (Dkt. 68, S.D. Ga.)

Filed May 1, 2025 in USA v. Harun; one of 89 filings from this case.

Record facts

Court	U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia
Filed	2025-05-01

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia · No. 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE · Doc. 68 · 2025-05-01 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
DUBLIN DIVISION

GLADYS HARUN
)

)

Movant,

)

)
v.

)
CR323-003

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
)

)

Respondent.
)

GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS HARUN’S
28 U.S.C. § 2255 MOTION

Harun is not entitled to relief on her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion because her
claims are either waived or unavailing. The Court should dismiss her motion.
Background

A.
Facts.
Harun was the owner and operator of a tax-preparation business. (Doc. 28 at
6.) She submitted materially false information to the United States Small Business
Administration (“SBA”) to obtain relief funding intended to support small businesses
struggling with the economic impact of COVID-19. (Doc. 28 at 5-7.)
B.
Superseding Indictment and Guilty Plea.

The grand jury returned a seven-count superseding indictment against Harun,
charging her in Count One with false declaration, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623; in
Counts Two and Seven with wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; and in Counts
Three through Six with money laundering transaction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
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1957.1 (Doc. 28 at 4.) Trial counsel2 negotiated with the Government a plea
agreement for Harun, allowing her to plead guilty to a single-count information
charging her with false statements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2), in exchange
for dismissal of the superseding indictment. (Docs. 1-1 at 4-5; 8 at 9; 47 at 4; 48 at
59.)

1. Plea Agreement.

The plea agreement stated that Harun was waiving her right to be charged by
indictment and was pleading guilty by information to one count of false statements.
(Doc. 8 at 1.) The agreement set forth the offense’s elements and factual basis, which
Harun stipulated was “true and accurate in every respect.” (Doc. 8 at 1, 11.)
According to the factual basis, Harun prepared and submitted, in the Southern
District of Georgia, a false application for an Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”),
using the personal identifying information of K.E.W. (Doc. 8 at 2.) On the
application, Harun stated that K.E.W. had a business, but Harun knew that K.E.W.
did not actually have a business. (Doc. 8 at 2.) Harun also provided fictitious gross
revenues and costs of goods on the application. (Doc. 8 at 2.)

1 Harun was indicted under case number CR 322-009.

2 After the grand jury returned the original indictment, Harun was represented
by Jimmy Thomas Howell, Jr. (Doc. 17; CR 322-009, Docs. 1, 38.) After the grand
jury returned the superseding indictment, Harun was represented by Dale Robert
Busbee. (Doc. 17; CR 322-009, Docs. 60-61, 63.) Harun was represented by Teri L.
Thompson and Mohammed S. Luwemba before and during her guilty plea. (Docs. 17;
47 at 3.) She was represented by Johnny E.C. Vines at sentencing. (Docs. 22; 33; 48
at 1.)

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The plea agreement stated that Harun would be subject to a maximum prison
sentence of five years and “such restitution as may be ordered by the Court.” (Doc. 8
at 2.) The plea agreement explained how the Court would use the guidelines in
imposing her sentence and that she was not promised any particular sentence. (Doc.
8 at 3.) The Government promised to recommend a low-end guideline sentence. (Doc.
8 at 4.) The Court was not bound by any sentence recommendation or required to
impose a sentence within the guidelines range. (Doc. 8 at 3-4.) The Government
agreed to recommend to the United States Probation Office that the amount of loss,
for guidelines purposes, was “less than $550,000.” (Doc. 8 at 4.) The agreement noted
that “[t]he amount of restitution ordered by the Court shall include restitution for the
full loss caused by Defendant’s conduct. Restitution is not limited to the specific count
to which Defendant is pleading guilty.” (Doc. 8 at 5.) Finally, the agreement stated
that Harun was waiving all of her jury-trial rights as well as her rights to challenge
venue and collaterally attack her conviction and sentence with exception to
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. (Doc. 8 at 7.) Harun signed the agreement
after careful review with trial counsel whom she believed “ha[d] represented [her]
faithfully, skillfully, and diligently” and with whom she was “completely satisfied.”
(Doc. 8 at 9, 11.)
2. Rule 11 Hearing.

The Court engaged in a lengthy and detailed colloquy at Harun’s Rule 11
hearing. (Docs. 5 at 1; 47.) First, the Court placed Harun under oath “to make sure
that [it was] getting the most reliable information.” (Doc. 47 at 3.) The Court elicited
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from Harun her background information. (Doc. 47 at 4.) Harun stated that she had
a Ph.D. in education and had received tax training from the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”). (Doc. 47 at 5.) She had taught special education and prepared taxes. (Doc.
47 at 5, 45.) She had used the money she generated from her tax-preparation
business to support underprivileged school children in Kenya. (Doc. 47 at 6.) Trial
counsel told the Court that Harun, who had no prior convictions, was the primary
caregiver to her six children—ages 15, 13, 10, 7, 5, and 3. (Doc. 47 at 44-45.) Her
oldest child was a varsity basketball star in high school. (Doc. 47 at 44.)

The Court ensured that Harun understood that she was pleading guilty to an
information filed by the Government, and that she was waiving her right to be
charged by the grand jury in an indictment. (Doc. 47 at 4, 8.) Harun told the Court
that she understood. (Doc. 47 at 4, 8-10.) The Court asked Harun whether she had
had enough time to discuss her case with trial counsel. (Doc. 47 at 8.) Harun
answered that she had. (Doc. 47 at 8.) The Court asked whether she was “entirely
satisfied” with trial counsel’s preparation and handling of her case.” (Doc. 47 at 8.)
Harun answered that she was. (Doc. 47 at 8.)

The Court asked Harun whether she had been in regular contact with trial
counsel about the plea negotiations which resulted in the information. (Doc. 47 at 9.)
Harun answered that she had. (Doc. 47 at 9.) The Court asked Harun whether she
had reviewed the information with trial counsel. (Doc. 47 at 12.) Harun answered
that she had reviewed it with trial counsel a month before and had talked about it,
again, that morning. (Doc. 47 at 13.) The Court did not want Harun “to have any
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question in her mind about what she’s agreeing to here.” (Doc. 47 at 13.) So, it
recessed to allow Harun and trial counsel more time to review the information. (Doc.
47 at 13.) Afterward, Harun told the Court that she had reacquainted herself with
the information’s allegations. (Doc. 47 at 14.) The prosecutor also summarized the
information. (Doc. 47 at 14-18.) Harun told the Court that she understood the
information and had no questions “about what the government lawyer would have to
prove in order to get [her] a verdict of guilty.” (Doc. 47 at 14-19.)

The Court also reviewed with Harun the elements of the false-statements
offense as set forth in the plea agreement. (Doc. 47 at 19-20.) Harun told the Court
that she understood and that she had no questions. (Doc. 47 at 20.) The Court
explained that Harun was waiving her jury-trial rights, including the right to the
presumption of innocence, which required the Government to prove her guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. (Doc. 47 at 21-22.) Harun stated that she understood. (Doc. 47
at 21-23.) The Court asked Harun whether she was familiar with the sentencing
guidelines. (Doc. 47 at 23.) Harun answered that she was. (Doc. 47 at 23.) The
Court told her that it would consider the guidelines as well as her background,
history, and other factors outlined in federal statutes to impose her sentence. (Doc.
47 at 23.)

The Court asked Harun whether it was her signature on the plea agreement.
(Doc. 47 at 24.) Harun confirmed that it was hers, and she stated that no one had
forced, pressured, or threatened her into pleading guilty. (Doc. 47 at 24.) The Court
summarized the plea agreement. (Doc. 47 at 26.) The Court explained that although
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the agreement stated that the Government would recommend a low-end guideline
sentence, “that is not an agreement with respect to the sentence” and that “[n]o
promises had been made to you regarding any particular sentence.” (Doc. 47 at 26.)
The Court told her that she was subject to a maximum sentence of five years in prison.
(Doc. 47 at 26.) Harun answered that she understood. (Doc. 47 at 26.) The Court
stated that she was agreeing to pay restitution for the full loss caused by her total
criminal conduct which was not limited to the count in the information. (Doc. 47 at
27, 42.) The Court told her that the restitution could be anywhere under $550,000,
the loss amount that the Government was recommending to the Court for guidelines
purposes, and that the total restitution amount had not been calculated yet. (Doc. 47
at 27-28, 42.) The Court also stated that it may impose a payment schedule to collect
the restitution. (Doc. 47 at 28-29.) Harun responded that she understood. (Doc. 47
at 29, 42-43.)

Next, the Court directly addressed the plea agreement’s collateral-attack
waiver, telling Harun, “You’ve also agreed to waive any collateral attack, any habeas
corpus or other attack on the fact of conviction or sentence unless you state that you
received ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Doc. 47 at 29.) The Court informed her
that she “agreed to waive any claim with respect to venue in this case.” (Doc. 47 at
30.) The Court asked Harun whether she understood its summary of the plea
agreement and whether it left anything out. (Doc. 47 at 26, 30.) Harun answered
that she understood the agreement, and that the Court was “clear” and “covered it
all.” (Doc. 47 at 31.) Harun confirmed that no one had given her “any other promise,
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any hope of benefit, guarantee or deal” other than what was outlined in the plea
agreement. (Doc. 47 at 31.)

Then, the Government presented the factual basis. (Doc. 47 at 32.) One of the
case agents testified that Harun had submitted a false EIDL application in the
Southern District of Georgia for Katina Wells. (Doc. 47 at 35.) The agent made this
determination by interviewing Wells and reviewing emails between Wells and Harun.
(Doc. 47 at 35-36.) The application falsely stated that Wells was an independent
contractor who opened a business, and it stated fictitious revenue for the fictitious
business. (Doc. 47 at 36-37.) Harun said that she did not disagree with these facts,
but that she had prepared the EIDL application with data from Wells’s tax return.
(Doc. 47 at 38.) The Court wanted to know whether Harun was stating that she had
not prepared a false application. (Doc. 47 at 38-40.) Again, the Court gave Harun
and trial counsel time to confer. (Doc. 47 at 40.) After the conference, Harun told the
Court that she did not disagree with the factual basis. (Doc. 47 at 41-42.) And, the
Court told her that when she is sentenced, it would consider her entire conduct
involving other false applications, and that she would be facing restitution owed for
those too. (Doc. 47 at 42.) Harun said that she understood. (Doc. 47 at 42.) The
Court told Harun, “I just don’t want you to come back and say that you misunderstood
something along that line.” (Doc. 47 at 42.) Harun answered that she understood.
(Doc. 47 at 42-43.)

The Court asked Harun, “Is there anything else you want to tell me or any
exculpatory statement you want to make?” (Doc. 47 at 43.) Harun responded, “No,
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Your Honor.” (Doc. 47 at 43.) She stated that she wanted to resolve her case by
pleading guilty; that her wish to plead guilty was consistent with the terms of her
plea agreement; and that she was, in fact, guilty as charged in the information. (Doc.
47 at 43.) Harun signed her guilty plea, and it was filed with, and accepted by, the
Court. (Docs. 6 at 1; 47 at 44.).
C.
Sentencing.

1. PSR.

The PSR determined that Harun had a base offense level of 6, under U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(a)(2), for her false-statements offense. (Doc. 28 at 19.) Her base offense level
was enhanced by 14 points, under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(H), because the total loss
and restitution amount owed to the SBA was $552,679.14. (Doc. 28 at 17, 19.) Harun
had fraudulently applied for five Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans and two
EIDL loans. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The first PPP loan was funded for $46,440.36 plus
$2,301.65 in lender fees paid by the SBA. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The second PPP loan was
funded for $20,787.09 plus $2,500 in lender fees. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The third PPP loan
was funded for $301,975.42 plus $14,955.65 in lender fees. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The fourth
PPP loan was funded for $15,625 plus $2,500 in lender fees. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The fifth
PPP loan was funded for $8,283.26 plus $2,500 in lender fees. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The
first EIDL loan was funded for $119,810.71. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The second EIDL loan
was funded for $15,000. (Doc. 28 at 17.) The sum of the calculations equaled a total
loss of $552,679.14 to the SBA. (Doc. 28 at 17.)
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Harris’s offense level was enhanced by two additional points, under U.S.S.G. §
3C1.1, for obstruction of justice because, while she was incarcerated, she contacted
her son and asked him to hide any cash in their home. (Doc. 28 at 19.) Because
Harun obstructed justice, under Application Note 4 of U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, she received
no reduction for acceptance of responsibility. (Doc 28 at 19.) Finally, her offense level
was reduced by two points, under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a) and (b), as a zero-point offender.
(Doc. 28 at 19.) Harun had a total offense level of 20 with a criminal history category
of I, and an advisory guideline range of 33 to 41 months’ imprisonment. (Doc. 28 at
26.)
The PSR also detailed information about Harun’s background. (Doc. 28 at 22.)
Harun was born in Kenya, Africa. (Doc. 28 at 22.) Her father ran a school there and
she was married there. (Doc. 28 at 22.) Her husband had filed for divorce, and he
was staying in their home where he was taking care of their six children. (Doc. 28 at
22.) Harun had a bachelor’s degree in education, a Master of Science degree, and a
Ph.D. in education. (Doc. 28 at 23-24.) She operated a non-profit organization,
Embrace Africa, which supported her father’s school in Kenya. (Doc. 28 at 24.) And,
she operated a tax-preparation service and had served as a special-education teacher.
(Doc. 28 at 24.)

2. PSR Objections.

Harun, through counsel, objected to the PSR. (Doc. 28 at 29-30.) Harun
objected that, in light of the plea agreement, that the actual loss amount and
restitution owed to the SBA should have been less than $550,000. (Doc. 28 at 29.)
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Harun provided documents to assert that the funding she received was used for
business purposes. (Doc. 28 at 29.) The first set of documentation “provide[d] figures
and a list of what the funds were reportedly used for without providing receipts or
other proof of these expenditures.” (Doc. 28 at 29.) The second set of documentation
simply stated that she ran a charity school in Kenya “which sponsor[ed] orphans and
children from poor backgrounds to access education.” (Doc. 28 at 32.) And, it stated
that she had provided “free or reduced tax filing to seniors, low economic families and
individuals struggling to afford normal Tax preparation fees.” (Doc. 28 at 32.)
Because Harun maintained that the restitution and actual-loss amount was less than
$550,000, she argued that the base offense level should have been increased by 12
levels, not 14. (Doc. 28 at 30.) She further objected to the total offense level, arguing
that she should have received a three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
(Doc. 28 at 30.)
3. Sentencing Memorandum.

Before sentencing, trial counsel filed several letters in support of Harun. (Doc.
33.) There was a letter of good character from Harun’s pastor in Kenya who wrote
that Harun had regularly attended church, and had volunteered to train teachers as
part of his initiative to develop skills for the youth in the community. (Doc. 33-1 at
1.) There was another letter from a clergy group which wrote about Harun’s hard
work and her dedication to her family, the church, and the community, including her
having organized a medical camp to save lives. (Doc. 33-1 at 2.) The letter also
mentioned Harun’s “looming divorce that engineered what she is going through now.”
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(Doc. 33-1 at 2.) Next, her best friend wrote about her hard work and good character.
(Doc. 33-1 at 3.) Finally, another friend also described her as a hard worker, who was
dedicated to her family and the community. (Doc. 33-1 at 4.)
4. Sentencing Hearing.

At sentencing, the Court asked Harun whether she had had the opportunity to
read and discuss the PSR with trial counsel. (Doc. 48 at 3.) Harun answered that
she had. (Doc. 48 at 3.) The Court asked trial counsel whether there were any
objections to the PSR. (Doc. 48 at 3.) Trial counsel stated that the defense objected
to the actual-loss amount and restitution owed to the SBA. (Doc. 48 at 3.) Trial
counsel argued that Harun had provided documentation to the U.S. Probation Office,
which showed that she had used the funding she had received for legitimate business
purposes. (Doc. 48 at 4.) The Government presented the testimony of Special Agent
Brian Jack of the IRS and Special Agent Justin Lott from the SBA to show actual loss
and restitution. (Doc. 48 at 4.)

Jack testified about how the loan applications were fraudulent, and Lott
testified about the funding amounts. (Doc. 48 at 6-14.) Jack testified that Harun had
applied for three PPP loans for herself for which she had received funding, and she
had applied for PPP and EIDL loans for four other individuals who had also received
funding. (Doc. 48 at 6-7.) In her PPP loan applications, Harun grossly inflated her
payroll “like tenfold.” (Doc. 48 at 10.) Jack told the Court that he and other
investigators had talked to all of the four individuals for whom Harun had prepared
the loan applications, and “all of them said that they did not have businesses during
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the timeframe that SBA required businesses to have actually already been
established.” (Doc. 48 at 7.) Lott testified about the loan amounts consistent with
the loan amounts listed in the PSR. (Docs. 28 at 17; 48 at 12-13.) However, Lott
clarified that the loan for $119,810.71 had already collected $6,101.23 in payments,
making its balance $113,913.95. (Doc. 48 at 14.) So, the total actual loss and
restitution owed to the SBA was $547,095.07. (Doc. 48 at 20.) The Court asked Lott
if he had “review[ed] the documents that were supplied to the probation office here
as an explanation of where all this money went.” (Doc. 48 at 17.) Lott stated that he
had, and that his overall conclusion was that there was “an overwhelming lack of
support.” (Doc. 48 at 18.)

Harun told the Court that she wanted “to take the stand.” (Doc. 48 at 22.) She
told the Court that she had been an employer of a tax-preparation service as a
Jackson Hewitt franchisee, and she had operated 12 locations with 55 employees.
(Doc. 48 at 23.) She had applied for the PPP loans for the payroll, to pay the rent,
and to pay for business supplies. (Doc. 48 at 23.) She explained that she had paid
her employees more than what she had reported to the IRS and that she had issues
with her payroll provider. (Doc. 48 at 23.) That is why she had qualified for the
money she had applied for even though it had appeared as if she did not. (Doc. 48 at
23.) As for the loan applications Harun had submitted on behalf of others, Harun
told the Court that they had qualified for the money as independent contractors based
on their tax returns for the previous year. (Doc. 48 at 24.) She said she had called
the SBA to confirm that they had qualified for the loans. (Doc. 48 at 25-26.) She said
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that the SBA had also approved her loans after it had interviewed her. (Doc. 48 at
26.) When the Court asked Harun about how the funding was used, she stated that
it was used for payroll, and that the IRS had proof. (Doc. 48 at 30.) She stated that
she had copies of this proof, but she did not provide the copies to the Court. (Doc. 48
at 31.) She told the Court that she had complied with all of the loan-application
requirements, but that she may have made a mistake. (Doc. 48 at 31.) The Court
reminded her that she had pleaded guilty. (Doc. 48 at 32.) She acknowledged that
she had pleaded guilty for the application regarding Katina Wells. (Doc. 48 at 32.)

Trial counsel asked for a total offense level of 18 instead of 20 because the total
loss amount was more than $250,000 but less than $550,000. (Doc. 48 at 34.) Trial
counsel argued that the offense level of 18 made Harun’s advisory guideline range 33
to 41 months’ imprisonment. (Doc. 48 at 34.) Trial counsel also asked for a reduction
based on Harun’s acceptance of responsibility, recognizing that Harun had “an uphill
battle” of proving it. (Doc. 48 at 34-35.) Trial counsel further argued for $433,181.12
in restitution because payments were already being made on the loan that was funded
for $119,810.71. (Doc. 48 at 35.)

The Court sustained the objection regarding the loss amount. (Doc. 48 at 36.)
It found that Harun had a total offense level of 18 with a criminal history category of
I, and an advisory guideline range of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment. (Doc. 48 at 37.)
The Court calculated the restitution owed as $547,095.07. (Doc. 48 at 37.) The Court
did not reduce Harun’s offense level for acceptance of responsibility. (Doc. 48 at 37.)
The Government recommended a low-end guideline sentence pursuant to the plea
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agreement. (Doc. 48 at 37.) The Court told Harun that it was considering a sentence
“anywhere from the low end of the guidelines to the maximum statutory
punishment.” (Doc. 48 at 38.) So, it asked Harun whether she wanted to delay
sentencing. (Doc. 48 at 38.) After conferring with Harun, trial counsel told the Court
that she wanted “to move forward.” (Doc. 48 at 38.)

Trial counsel presented the testimony of Harun’s son, daughter, and cousin in
mitigation. (Doc. 48 at 40-43.) They testified that Harun was a supportive mother,
hardworking, and dedicated to community service. (Doc. 48 at 40-43.) Harun’s cousin
added that Harun had helped “the needy to file their taxes very discounted or for
free.” (Doc. 48 at 44.) And, Harun had helped run a school for needy children. (Doc.
48 at 44.) Harun made a personal statement to the Court. (Doc. 48 at 45.) She stated
that she grew up in a remote area of Kenya without vehicles where people made only
four to eight dollars a day. (Doc. 48 at 45.) She stated that she had helped prepare
taxes for seniors at a reduced rate and had helped her father with community-service
projects in Kenya. (Doc. 48 at 46.)

Trial counsel asked for a low-end guideline sentence. (Doc. 48 at 40.) Again,
he asked for restitution in the amount of $433,181.12 or less. (Doc. 48 at 49.) The
Court varied upward and sentenced Harun to 60 months’ imprisonment, the
statutory maximum, in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. (Doc. 48 at 54, 56.)
The Court ordered Harun to pay $547,095.07 in restitution to the SBA.3 (Docs. 48 at

3 “[T]he restitution amount read into the record at the conclusion of the
sentencing hearing was misstated to be $552,679.14.” (Doc. 39 at 1.) The Court
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58; 38 at 6; 39 at 1.) The Court dismissed the superseding indictment. (Doc. 48 at
59.) Harun did not directly appeal. She is currently at a residential reentry center
operated by Dismas Charities in Macon, Georgia with a projected release date of June
10, 2026.4

Argument
No Relief for Ineffective-Assistance Claims.

Harun’s motion raises ineffective-assistance claims regarding her counsel’s
performance before and after her guilty plea. (Docs. 57 at 6-7, 10, 14, 17-21, 24-25,
28-36, 38-42, 44-51; 58 at 2-3, 6-9, 11-12.) Harun is not entitled to relief for these
claims. The standard announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
applies. Under Strickland,
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.

Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result
is reliable.

clarified, in a written order, that the correct restitution amount was $547,095.07.
(Doc. 39 at 1.)

4 BOP Inmate Locator, available at https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last
visited May 1, 2025). Projected release date indicates release from BOP custody and
may not reflect date by which BOP will consider defendant for placement in a halfway
house, a residential reentry center or home confinement.

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Id. at 687. Failure to establish either prong is fatal and makes it unnecessary to
consider the other. Id. at 697.
1. No Relief for Pre-Plea Ineffective-Assistance Claims.

Harun’s pre-plea claims allege that trial counsel failed to: (1) challenge venue;
(2) adequately investigate and challenge her guilt, including by not hiring an
unnamed and unspecified expert; (3) challenge the Government’s investigation; (4)
secure a dismissal of all charges, including by not presenting “any evidence of
mitigating circumstances to the Court and to the Government;” (5) challenge
overreach and misconduct by the prosecution by not arguing that one, the prosecution
violated her rights under the Contracts, Takings, and Double-Jeopardy Clauses for
bringing charges instead of allowing her to proceed with the terms and conditions of
the loans; and two, the prosecution failed to disclose unspecified emails and
communications as well as the loan applicants’ tax transcripts; and (6) challenge the
plea agreement’s factual basis and the Court’s non-consideration of the sentencing
guidelines. (Docs. 57 at 7, 10, 14, 17-18, 21, 25, 28-30, 32-35, 39-42, 44-50, 57; 28 at
2, 3, 6-9.)

Harun waived these claims by pleading guilty. A knowing, voluntary, and
unconditional guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects, including ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims, occurring before the entry of the plea. Wilson v. United
States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1992); Tiemens v. United States, 724 F.2d 928,
929 (11th Cir. 1984); Edwards v. United States, No. 17-10322-D, 2018 WL 3586866,
at *1 (11th Cir. June 4, 2018) (“[I]n accordance with his plea agreement and guilty
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plea, Edwards has waived the ineffective assistance claim concerning counsel’s
alleged failure to investigate the inventory search officers.”). For a guilty plea to be
knowing and voluntary, the court accepting the plea must “specifically address three
‘core principles,’ ensuring that a defendant (1) enters [her] guilty plea free from
coercion, (2) understands the nature of the charges, and (3) understands the
consequences of [her] plea.” United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir.
2005). Here, the Rule 11 colloquy ensured that each of these core principles was met.
a. Harun entered her guilty plea free from coercion.

First, the Court confirmed that Harun’s plea was free from coercion. Harun
told the Court that she had had enough time to discuss her case with trial counsel,
and that she had been in regular contact with counsel about the plea negotiations.
(Doc. 47 at 8-9.) Harun confirmed her signature on the plea agreement, and stated
that no one had forced, pressured, or threatened her into pleading guilty. (Doc. 47 at
24.) No one had given her any promise, hope of benefit, guarantee or deal to plead
guilty. (Doc. 47 at 31.) Harun stated that she wanted to resolve her case by pleading
guilty, that her wish to plead guilty was consistent with the terms of her plea
agreement, and that she was, in fact, guilty. (Doc. 47 at 43.) She signed her guilty
plea during the proceedings before it was filed with the Court. (Docs. 6 at 1; 47 at
44.)
b. Harun understood the nature of her false-statements
charge.

Second, the Court confirmed that Harun understood the nature of her false-
statements charge. Harun told the Court that she understood that she was pleading
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 17 of 26

guilty to an information filed by the Government, and that she was waiving her right
to be charged by the grand jury in an indictment. (Doc. 47 at 4, 8-10.) Harun told
the Court that she had reviewed the information with trial counsel, and the Court
allowed them additional time for review. (Doc. 47 at 13.) The prosecutor summarized
the information, and Harun told the Court she had no questions about it. (Doc. 47 at
14-19.) Harun also told the Court that she understood the elements of the false-
statements offense charged in the information, which the Court reviewed with her,
and she said that she had no questions. (Doc. 47 at 19-20.) The Court summarized
the plea agreement. (Doc. 47 at 26.) Harun stated that the Court’s summary was
“clear” and “covered it all.” (Doc. 47 at 31.) The Government presented the factual
basis for the false-statements charge—that she knowingly prepared and submitted
an EIDL application in the Southern District of Georgia for Katina Wells, which
falsely stated fake revenue for a fake business. (Doc. 47 at 36-37.) When pressed by
the Court and after conferring with trial counsel, Harun told the Court that she did
not disagree with the factual basis. (Doc. 47 at 41-42.)
c. Harun understood the consequences of her plea.

Third, the Court confirmed that Harun understood the consequences of her
guilty plea. Harun stated that she understood that she was waiving her jury-trial
rights. (Doc. 47 at 21-23.) She understood that although the Government promised
to recommend a low-end guideline sentence, she was subject to a maximum sentence
of five years in prison. (Doc. 47 at 26.) See United States v. Jones, 143 F.3d 1417,
1420 (11th Cir. 1998) (“We hold that where a signed, written plea agreement
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 18 of 26

describing a mandatory minimum sentence is specifically referred to during a Rule
11 plea colloquy, the core principle that the defendant be aware of the consequences
of his plea has been complied with.”) She understood that the Court would consider
the guidelines as well as her background, history, and other factors in imposing her
sentence. (Doc. 47 at 23.) She understood that the Court would consider her entire
conduct involving other false applications, and that she would be facing restitution
owed for those applications too. (Doc. 47 at 42.) She understood that she was
agreeing to pay restitution for the full loss caused by her total criminal conduct which
was not limited to the false-statements offense in the information. (Doc. 47 at 27,
42.)

Additionally, the above ineffective-assistance claims are without merit because
they are belied by the Rule 11 colloquy. When the Court reviewed the elements of
the false-statements offense, including it having been committed in the Southern
District of Georgia, Harun never contested venue. (Doc. 47 at 20.) The Court asked
whether she was “entirely satisfied” with trial counsel’s preparation and handling of
her case.” (Doc. 47 at 8.) She never complained about trial counsel’s failure to
adequately investigate her guilt, mitigating circumstances, or the Government’s
investigation. (Doc. 47 at 8.) She never stated that she wanted trial counsel to hire
an expert. (Doc. 47 at 8.) She never stated that she wanted trial counsel to secure a
dismissal of all the charges. (Doc. 47 at 21-23.) Notably, trial counsel did secure a
dismissal of the superseding indictment through the negotiated plea agreement.
(Docs. 8 at 9; 47 at 4; 48 at 59.) The Court asked whether she disagreed with the plea
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 19 of 26

agreement’s factual basis, and she did not. (Doc. 47 at 41-42.) The Court told her
that it did not want her to come back and say she misunderstood something about
the factual basis. (Doc. 47 at 42.) Still, she never told the Court that she wanted to
challenge the factual basis.5 (Doc. 47 at 42.) And, contrary to her contention, both
the plea agreement and the Court stated that the Court would consider the
sentencing guidelines. (Docs. 8 at 3; 47 at 23). The Court asked Harun whether she
wanted to make any exculpatory statement. (Doc. 47 at 43.) Harun never complained
about the Government’s investigation or its failure to disclose information. (Doc. 47
at 43.)

And, any challenge to prosecutorial overreach under the Contracts, Takings,
or Double-Jeopardy clauses would have been unsuccessful. The Contracts Clause
applies only to the States, not the Federal Government. See Cox Cable
Communications, Inc. v. United States, 992 F.2d 1178, 1182 (11th Cir. 1993). Harun
contends that trial counsel should have argued that the Government’s decision to
prosecute her impaired her loan contracts to the point of depriving her of her property
rights as a Takings-Clause violation. (Doc. 57 at 48.) Putting aside that her fraud
impaired her loan contracts and that the Government did not take any property, the
Takings Clause does not apply to property taken pursuant to criminal statutes. See
Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 452 (1996). Harun also argues that trial counsel

5 Harun argues that the factual basis is implausible under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 57 at 32-33.) However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
apply only to civil cases, not criminal cases. United States v. Beiter, No. 22-11334,
2022 WL 14458322, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 25, 2022).
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 20 of 26

should have claimed that the Government violated the Double-Jeopardy Clause
because it pursued civil and criminal remedies for her conduct. (Doc. 57 at 45-47.)
But, Harun fails to identify what civil remedies the Government pursued. And, the
Double-Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the Government from pursuing both
criminal and civil penalties for the same offense. Cole v. United States Dep’t of Agric.,
133 F.3d 803, 805 (11th Cir. 1998).

Harun further alleges that trial counsel failed to challenge the Court’s
jurisdiction because the information failed to charge a criminal offense. (Doc. 57 at
3, 7, 33.) Even if Harun’s guilty plea may not have waived this claim, it is without
merit. United States v. Bonilla, 579 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A plea of guilty
to a charge does not waive a claim that judged on its face the charge is one which the
[Government] may not constitutionally prosecute.”) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The information charged Harun with making false statements
under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). (Doc. 1-1 at 4-5.) Federal district courts have
jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the United States.” See 18 U.S.C. §
3231.
To the extent that Harun raises stand-alone challenges to her guilt and
prosecutorial misconduct, they are also unavailing. (Docs. 57 at 1, 30-31, 39, 40, 42;
58 at 2, 6, 8-9, 11.) They are waived by the guilty plea for the same reasons above.
They are also barred by the collateral-attack waiver in the plea agreement, which the
Court specifically questioned Harun about during the Rule 11 hearing and the record
shows that Harun understood the waiver’s full significance. (Doc. 47 at 29.) United
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 21 of 26

States v. Benitez-Zapata, 131 F.3d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997). The claims are also
procedurally defaulted because they were not raised on direct appeal, and Harun fails
to show cause and actual prejudice to overcome the default. Schumaker v. United
States, No. 16-15314-B, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 28250, at *6 (11th Cir. Feb. 10, 2017).
Moreover, free-standing claims of actual innocence are non-cognizable. See, e.g.,
McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013); House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 522
(2006); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993); Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043,
1065 (11th Cir. 2002).

Consequently, Harun is entitled to no relief with respect to her pre-plea
ineffective-assistance claims—either on the merits or because of waiver.
2. No Relief for Post-Plea Ineffective-Assistance Claims.

Nor is Harun entitled to relief for her post-plea ineffective-assistance claims.
She claims that, at sentencing, trial counsel failed to: (1) challenge the Government’s
presentation; (2) make an adequate mitigation presentation; and (3) challenge her
sentence and restitution.
a. Failure
to
Challenge
Government’s
Sentencing
Presentation.

Harun alleges that trial counsel failed to challenge the Government’s
sentencing presentation in two ways. One, she argues that the Government’s
presentation was speculative because it declared that her loans were improper
without specificity. (Doc. 57 at 38.) Two, she argues that IRS Special Agent Jack
testified falsely. (Docs. 57 at 40; 58 at 8.) Harun’s allegation is without merit for two
reasons. First, it is belied by the record. Jack testified that Harun’s PPP loan
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 22 of 26

applications were false because they grossly inflated her payroll. (Doc. 48 at 10.) He
further testified that the four people on whose behalf Harun had prepared and
submitted EIDL or PPP loan applications had told Jack that they did not own
businesses, a necessary condition for the loans. (Doc. 48 at 7.) Second, Harun’s claim
is vague and unsupported. She fails to show how Jack’s testimony was false. She
only generally asserts that some unnamed individuals to whom Jack had spoken were
confused about his questions. (Doc. 57 at 42.)

b. Failure to Make Adequate Mitigation Presentation.

Next, Harun alleges that trial counsel failed to make an adequate mitigation
presentation at sentencing. She argues that trial counsel failed to present evidence
regarding her background, “charity work, education, family life and work
involvement.” (Docs. 57 at 14; 58 at 9, 12.) She further argues that trial counsel
failed to tell the Court that her case involved minor infractions, that she acted in good
faith and did not misuse the loan proceeds, that the loan applications for the other
individuals were based on their tax returns, and that her payroll was not inflated.
(Docs. 57 at 10, 17, 19, 21, 30, 34; 58 at 8, 11.) Harun’s claim is unavailing because
this information was presented to the Court at the Rule 11 hearing; in the PSR and
the defense’s objections to the PSR; trial counsel’s sentencing memorandum; and in
the statements made by Harun, her children, and her cousin at sentencing. (Docs. 47
at 4-5, 44-45; 28 at 22-24, 29, 32; 33-1 at 1-4; 48 at 23-26, 30-31, 40-46, 50.) See
Raheem v. GDCP Warden, 995 F.3d 895, 922, 925 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 23 of 26

counsel was not ineffective for failing to uncover evidence that was cumulative to
evidence presented at trial).
c. Failure to Challenge Sentence.

Lastly, Harun alleges that trial counsel failed to object to the Court’s
imposition of sentence and restitution. First, she argues that trial counsel failed to
object to her above-guideline sentence as a breach of the plea agreement and as cruel
and harsh in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 57 at 50-51.) Second, she
argues that trial counsel failed to object to the restitution amount of $547,095.07 as
too large. (Doc. 57 at 50.) She also contends that trial counsel should have objected
to her payment schedule because it was different than the loans’ repayment plans.
(Doc. 57 at 48.) Harun’s allegation is without merit because trial counsel’s objections
would not have been sustained. The above-guideline sentence was not a breach of
the plea agreement. Although, under the agreement, the Government promised to
recommend a low-end guideline sentence, the Court was not bound by this
recommendation. (Doc. 8 at 2-4.) At the Rule 11 hearing, Harun told the Court that
she understood that the Court was not bound by this recommendation. (Doc. 47 at
26.)

Nor was Harun’s prison sentence of 60 months, the maximum for false
statements, a violation of the Eighth Amendment because “[i]n general, a sentence
within the limits imposed by statute is neither excessive nor cruel and unusual under
the Eighth Amendment.” Moriarty, 429 F.3d at 1024; § 1001(a). Moreover, Harun
agreed, pursuant to her plea agreement, that the amount of loss in the case was “less
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 24 of 26

than $550,000,” and that “[t]he amount of restitution ordered by the Court shall
include restitution for the full loss caused by [her] conduct.” (Doc. 8 at 4.) It was
based on the funds received, the lender fees, and interest for each false loan she
applied for as testified to by SBA Special Agent Lott. (Doc. 48 at 12-14, 20.) And,
trial counsel did object to the total-loss amount in the PSR, and he asked for
restitution less than the amount calculated by Lott. (Docs. 28 at 29; 48 at 3, 35.) As
for the payment schedule, at the Rule 11 hearing, Harun told the Court that she
understood that the Court may impose a payment schedule to collect restitution.
(Doc. 47 at 28-29.)

Harun also raises stand-alone challenges regarding her restitution, guidelines
calculation, and the reasonableness of her sentence. (Doc. 57 at 17, 24, 43-44, 50-51.)
These claims are non-cognizable. United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 185
(1973); Mamone v. United States, 559 F3d 1209, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009).
Conclusion

For the above reasons, this Court should dismiss Harun’s § 2255 motion.

Respectfully submitted,

TARA M. LYONS

ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

//s// Channell V. Singh

Channell V. Singh

Assistant United States Attorney

Georgia Bar No. 216540
P.O. Box 8970
Savannah, Georgia 31412
(912) 652-4422
Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 25 of 26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that I have on this day served all the parties in this case in
accordance with the notice of electronic filing (“NEF”) that was generated as a
result of electronic filing in this Court. In addition, I mailed a paper copy via U.S.
Postal Service to:
Gladys Harun, Reg. No. 09407-510

714 Second Street

Macon, GA 31201

This May 1, 2025.
Respectfully submitted,

TARA M. LYONS

ACTING UNITED STATES ATTORNEY

//s// Channell V. Singh

Channell V. Singh

Assistant United States Attorney

Georgia Bar No. 216540
P.O. Box 8970
Savannah, Georgia 31412
(912) 652-4422

Case 3:23-cr-00003-DHB-BKE Document 68 Filed 05/01/25 Page 26 of 26

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Motion to Dismiss Harun's 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion by Channell Veena Singh — USA v. Harun (Dkt. 68, S.D. Ga.)

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