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Florida Mdfl 8 21 Cv 02524 11Th 22 10257 Doc 033 Att 0

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Florida's 10-page supplemental brief in State of Florida v. Bill Nelson, et al., No. 8:21-cv-2524-SDM-TGW, in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, filed December 15, 2021 as Document 33. It answers four questions the court posed about the class deviation clauses implementing Executive Order No. 14042, 86 Fed. Reg. 50,985 (Sept. 9, 2021), and the requirements of 41 U.S.C. § 1707. The brief argues that the deviation clauses are procurement regulations subject to § 1707, that the district court has jurisdiction because 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1) does not apply, and that the clauses were issued without the required notice and comment. It asks the court to preliminarily enjoin enforcement or implementation of the OMB rule and, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 702 and 706(2), to set aside the deviation clauses.

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No. 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW · Doc. 33 · Docket on CourtListener

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Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 1 of 10 PageID 456




                      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                       MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
                             TAMPA DIVISION

 STATE OF FLORIDA,

       Plaintiff,

       v.                                           No. 8:21-cv-2524-SDM-TGW

 BILL NELSON, et al.,

       Defendants.

 _________________________________/

                      FLORIDA’S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

       This Court asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing four

 questions related to the deviation clauses that implement the challenged executive

 order and the requirements of 41 U.S.C. § 1707. See Doc. 31. Florida addresses each

 question below.

       Before doing so, however, Florida wishes to highlight an issue that may inform

 the Court’s consideration of these questions. Each of the deviation clauses uses the

 contract clause drafted by the FAR Council. See FAR Council guidance at 4–5; Ex. 1.

 That clause requires contractors to comply with guidance “published by the Safer

 Federal Workforce Task Force.” FAR Council guidance at 5. Under the executive

 order, the Task Force may only publish such guidance when the OMB Director

 “approves” the guidance and makes an economy and efficiency finding. Exec. Order

 No. 14042, Ensuring Adequate COVID Safety Protocols for Federal Contractors, 86

 Fed. Reg. 50,985, 50,985 (Sept. 9, 2021).
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 2 of 10 PageID 457




          As a result of this framework, the deviation clauses impose no obligations on

 federal contractors unless and until the OMB Director approves the Task Force

 guidance. OMB attempted to do so via the new OMB rule, which Florida challenges

 on multiple grounds. If this Court preliminarily enjoins enforcement or

 implementation of the new OMB rule, that will have the effect of nullifying the

 deviation clauses because there will be no Task Force guidance with which contractors

 must comply. In other words, even if this Court agrees with the government’s

 contention that each agency is implementing its deviation clause pursuant to its own

 authority (and that authority alone), those clauses have no effect absent OMB approval

 of the Task Force guidance. For this reason, Florida respectfully submits that the Court

 should at a minimum preliminarily enjoin enforcement or implementation of the new

 OMB rule, which would render the deviation clauses a nullity.

     I.      SECTION 1707 APPLIES TO THE CLASS DEVIATIONS.1

          Pursuant to the executive order, the government is using identical contract

 clauses across its agencies, as reflected in each agency’s class deviation. See Ex. 1.

 Section 1707 applies to each such deviation.

          Section 1707 applies to “a procurement policy, regulation, procedure, or form

 (including an amendment or modification thereto)” so long as two conditions are met.



 1
   The government argues that Florida waived any arguments related to the class deviations by raising
 them for the first time in its reply. See Doc. 26 at 8. But Florida’s reply was also an amended motion
 in response to the government taking new action, and the parties’ joint submission to this Court did
 not limit the arguments Florida could raise. See Doc. 19. In any event, Florida’s argument that the
 class deviations violate § 1707 is made in response to that new action—specifically the § 1707(d)
 finding in the new OMB rule.

                                                   2
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 3 of 10 PageID 458




 41 U.S.C. § 1707(a)(1). Those conditions are (A) that it “relates to the expenditure of

 appropriated funds,” and (B) that it either (i) “has a significant effect beyond the

 internal operating procedures of the [issuing] agency,” or (ii) “has a significant cost or

 administrative impact on contractors or offerors.” Id. The deviation clauses satisfy (A)

 because they relate to government contracts and they satisfy (B) because they require

 government contractors to mandate vaccination for millions of American workers.

 The deviation clauses also relate to procurement, so the only question is whether the

 deviation clauses are “polic[ies], regulation[s], procedure[s], or form[s].”

       The deviation clauses are both procurement regulations and procurement

 policies. They are procurement regulations because they impose burdensome and

 unprecedented requirements on contractors. In other words, the deviation clauses

 “create[] new law, rights, or duties.” Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.

 2009). The government recognizes as much, which is why it is seeking to amend the

 Federal Acquisition Regulation. But in the meantime, imposing these requirements

 via class deviation does not exempt them from § 1707. See Navajo Refining Co. v. United

 States, 58 Fed. Cl. 200, 209 (2003) (noting that “a class deviation may fall within any

 of the various categories of procurement changes identified” in § 1707); see also FAR

 § 1.404 (“When an agency knows that it will require a class deviation on a permanent

 basis, it should propose a FAR revision.”).

       The government has already admitted that the class deviations are regulations.

 In its surreply and at the hearing, the government asserted that it is implementing the

 deviation clauses pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2)(A). See Doc. 26 at 3. That
                                             3
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 4 of 10 PageID 459




 provision exempts from § 1303(a)(2)’s exclusivity rule certain “regulations relating to

 procurement issued by an executive agency.” 41 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (emphasis

 added). 2 But if they are “regulations” then they are subject to § 1707.

        The deviation clauses are also procurement policies because they are “[a]

 standard course of action that has been officially established by an organization,

 business, political party, etc.” Policy, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th. ed. 2019). The

 government suggests that the deviation clauses are not procurement policies but

 merely actions implementing the procurement policy set by the executive order and

 the OMB rules. See Doc. 26 at 8. But that argument is inconsistent with the

 government’s position that each agency is issuing “agency-specific class deviations.”

 Id. at 3. The government cannot have it both ways. Florida’s position is that the new

 OMB rule creates government-wide requirements. But if the government is arguing

 otherwise, it cannot simultaneously argue that each class deviation is not a separate

 procurement policy.

        For these reasons, the deviation clauses are subject to § 1707.




 2
  At the hearing, the government argued that § 1303(a)(2) is an affirmative grant of authority. But that
 provision merely explains that “regulations relating to procurement issued by an executive agency
 [other than the FAR Council] shall be limited to” certain things. 41 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2). Put
 differently, it creates an exception to the FAR Council’s exclusivity, but it does not affirmatively
 authorize any specific procurement regulation. Rather, an agency must identify statutory authority to
 impose the requirements in any regulation it issues. The government has utterly failed to do so in each
 of its class deviations.

                                                   4
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 5 of 10 PageID 460




     II.      THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER A CHALLENGE TO THE
              DEVIATION CLAUSES.

           Section 1491(b)(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Court of Federal Claims

 “to render judgment on an action by an interested party objecting to a solicitation by

 a Federal agency for bids or proposals for a proposed contract or to a proposed award

 or the award of a contract or any alleged violation of statute or regulation in

 connection with a procurement or a proposed procurement.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1). 3

           The Federal Circuit has interpreted § 1491(b)(1) to include disputes related to

 “the application of” regulations to specific solicitations and contracts. See Land Shark

 Shredding, LLC v. United States, 842 F. App’x 589, 593 (Fed. Cir. 2021). But challenges

 to “the validity of a regulation governing a procurement must be brought in federal

 district court under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. (citing Southfork Sys., Inc.

 v. United States, 141 F.3d 1124, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). For the reasons explained

 above, the class deviations are procurement regulations, and this court has jurisdiction.

 At least two courts, relying on these same cases, have agreed that district courts have

 jurisdiction to hear APA challenges to class deviations. See Bayaud Enters. v. U.S. Dep’t

 of Veteran’s Affairs, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1237 (D. Colo. 2020); Alphapointe v. Dep’t of

 Veteran’s Affairs, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2019).

           To be sure, the court in Navajo Refining, in adjudicating a damages claim with

 respect to specific contracts, considered the validity of several “individual deviations”


 3
   While the statute mentions concurrent jurisdiction in the district courts, Congress terminated that
 jurisdiction in 2001 via a “sunset provision.” See Bayaud Enters. v. U.S. Dep’t of Veteran’s Affairs, 440 F.
 Supp. 3d 1230, 1237 n.2 (D. Colo. 2020).

                                                      5
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 6 of 10 PageID 461




 and one “class deviation.” 58 Fed. Cl. at 203, 209. But Florida does not seek damages

 with respect to specific contracts, it seeks wholesale invalidation of several agency-

 wide class deviations. 4

         Moreover, with respect to contracts Florida is not a party to—but which the

 government asserts preempt Florida law—§ 1491(b)(1) is inapplicable for the

 additional reason that Florida is not an “interested party” able to bring an action under

 that statute. See AFL-CIO v. United States, 258 F.3d 1294, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

 (interpreting “interested party” to include only “actual or prospective bidders or

 offerors”). Florida’s exclusive remedy for its sovereign injury, therefore, is to file an

 APA challenge in district court.

         For these reasons, § 1491(b)(1) does not apply to Florida’s challenge to the class

 deviations and this Court has jurisdiction.

     III.    THE DEVIATION CLAUSES VIOLATE § 1707.

         If this Court finds that § 1707 applies to the deviation clauses, the government

 lacks even a plausible defense that it complied with that provision. The government

 has not conducted notice and comment, and it cannot invoke the exception in

 § 1707(d) without publishing a notice in the Federal Register that each class deviation

 is “temporary” and providing “for a public comment period of 30 days beginning on

 the date on which the notice is published.” See 41 U.S.C. § 1707(e)(1). The government



 4
  Florida also notes that the court in Najavo Refining never discussed whether it had jurisdiction to
 consider the validity of a class deviation, presumably because the government raised no such defense.
 See Jacobson v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 974 F.3d 1236, 1268 (11th Cir. 2020) (“When a jurisdictional issue is
 neither challenged nor discussed, [a court’s] exercise of jurisdiction carries no precedential weight.”).

                                                     6
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 7 of 10 PageID 462




 has not done so. And even if it does so now, it cannot satisfy the “urgent and

 compelling circumstances” exception for the reasons Florida has already explained.

 Doc. 24 at 15–16.

         The government argues, however, that the new OMB rule’s invocation of

 § 1707(d) is sufficient for each class deviation to comply with § 1707. See Doc. 26 at 8.

 The government is wrong for several reasons.

         First, if a deviation clause is a “procurement policy, regulation, procedure, or

 form” under § 1707, then it “may not take effect until 60 days after it is published for

 public comment.” 41 U.S.C. § 1707(a)(1) (emphasis added); accord id. § 1707(e)(1)(A)

 (requiring “a notice of the policy, regulation, procedure, or form” (emphasis added)).

 Put differently, the deviation clause must itself be published for comment, not some

 other document purportedly describing the policy or regulation, such as the new OMB

 rule.

         Second, the government’s argument is a poor fit for the facts of this case. The

 class deviations were issued before the new OMB rule, which was not issued until

 November 16. See Ex 1. It is thus implausible for the government to argue that the new

 OMB rule’s § 1707(d) finding obviated the need for the earlier issued class deviations

 to comply with § 1707.

         Third, as Florida has explained, the § 1707(d) finding in the new OMB rule is

 legally insufficient. Doc. 24 at 15–16. As such, even if that finding applied to the

 deviation clauses, they would still be unlawful.



                                             7
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 8 of 10 PageID 463




    IV.    THE REMEDY IF THE DEVIATION CLAUSES VIOLATE § 1707.

        Challenges to “the validity of a regulation governing a procurement must be

 brought in federal district court under the Administrative Procedure Act.” Land Shark

 Shredding, 842 F. App’x at 593 (citing Southfork Sys., 141 F.3d at 1135). Florida brings

 such a challenge here.

       Under the APA, “the reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside

 agency action” that is “not in accordance with law,” “in excess of statutory

 jurisdiction, authority, or limitations,” or “without observance of procedure required

 by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C)–(D). A violation of § 1707 falls within each of these

 categories. The ultimate remedy, therefore, is for the Court to hold unlawful and set

 aside the deviation clauses. The remedy at this stage is preliminarily enjoining the

 agencies from enforcing or implementing those clauses.

       The Court has also asked what relief is available “against the named

 defendants.” Doc. 31 at 2. Because Florida names the United States as a Defendant,

 this Court may “enter[] . . . a judgment or decree . . . against the United States” itself.

 5 U.S.C. § 702. All § 702 requires is that the Court “specify the Federal officer or

 officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for

 compliance.” Id. Florida’s position is that the Court should preliminarily enjoin

 enforcement or implementation of the new OMB rule. But if the Court reaches the

 validity of the deviation clauses, § 702 authorizes an injunction against the head of

 each agency that issued such a clause. See Ex. 1. In other words, because Florida has



                                             8
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 9 of 10 PageID 464




 sued the United States, the Court need not limit relief to the named agencies and

 officials. 5



                             Respectfully submitted,

                             Ashley Moody
                             ATTORNEY GENERAL

                             John Guard (FBN 374600)
                             CHIEF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

                             /s/ James H. Percival
                             James H. Percival* (FBN 1016188)
                             DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LEGAL POLICY
                             *Lead Counsel

                             Henry C. Whitaker (FBN 1031175)
                             SOLICITOR GENERAL

                             Natalie P. Christmas (FBN 1019180)
                             ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LEGAL POLICY

                             Office of the Attorney General
                             The Capitol, Pl-01
                             Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
                             (850) 414-3300
                             (850) 410-2672 (fax)
                             james.percival@myfloridalegal.com

                             Counsel for the State of Florida




 5
  At a minimum, because Florida sued officials from NASA, GSA, and DOD, those officials should
 be enjoined from enforcing or implementing their agencies’ deviation clauses.

                                               9
Case 8:21-cv-02524-SDM-TGW Document 33 Filed 12/15/21 Page 10 of 10 PageID 465




                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

        I hereby certify that on December 15, 2021, a true and correct copy of the

 foregoing was filed with the Court’s CM/ECF system, which will provide service to

 all parties.

                                                   /s/ James H. Percival
                                                   James H. Percival




                                        10


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