Georgia Sdga 1 21 Cv 00163 11Th 21 14269 Doc 061 Att 0

Record facts

United States District Court, For The Southern District Of Georgia, Augusta Division · No. 1:21-cv-00163-RSB-BKE · Doc. 61 · 2021-11-26 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
AUGUSTA DIVISION 
 
THE STATE OF GEORGIA, et al. 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
JOSEPH R. BIDEN in his official 
capacity as President of the United 
States, et al. 
 
Defendants. 
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) 
) 
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) 
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Case No. 1:21-cv-163-RSB-BKE 
 
 
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO INTERVENE 
 
This case raises legal issues pertaining to the issuance and implementation of Executive 
Order 14042, which requires, for certain categories of federal government contracts, that agencies 
include a clause imposing COVID-19 safety protocols—including vaccination requirements—in 
“any new contract,” “new solicitation for a contract,” “extension or renewal of an existing 
contract,” and “exercise of an option on an existing contract.” Executive Order No. 14042, 86 Fed. 
Reg. 50,985 (Sept. 14, 2021) (“EO 14042”). A trade association, Associated Builders and 
Contractors, Inc. and its Georgia chapter (collectively “ABC”), has moved to intervene as a 
plaintiff. See Notice of Mot. to Intervene, ECF No. 48. It claims that intervention as of right is 
warranted because, among other things, it seeks to protect the “economic interests” of its members 
that bid on the types of contracts that are now subject to EO 14042. See Memo. of Law in Supp. 
of Mot. to Intervene by Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. & Associated Builders & 
Contractors of Georgia, Inc., at 16, ECF No. 49 (“Mot.”). It alternatively seeks permissive 
intervention. Id. at 18–19. ABC has failed, however, to satisfy the prerequisites under Federal 
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Rules of Civil Procedure 24 for establishing either that it is entitled to intervene as of right or that 
it should be permitted to intervene. Its motion should therefore be denied.  
BACKGROUND 
On September 9, 2021, the President issued EO 14042 to “promote[] economy and 
efficiency in Federal procurement by ensuring that the parties that contract with the Federal 
Government provide adequate COVID-19 safeguards to their workers performing on or in 
connection with a Federal Government contract or contract-like instrument.” See EO 14042 § 1. 
EO 14042 directs federal executive departments and agencies, “to the extent permitted by law,” to 
include in certain contracts a clause requiring compliance with workplace safety guidance issued 
by the Safer Federal Workforce Task Force (“Task Force”) and approved by the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) upon a finding that the guidance, “if adhered to by 
contractors or subcontractors, will promote economy and efficiency in Federal contracting.” See 
EO 14042 § 2. 
The Task Force initially issued safety guidance on September 24, 2021. See Task Force, 
COVID-19 Workplace Safety: Guidance for Federal Contractors and Subcontractors, 
https://perma.cc/6DRV-LV2Q. That guidance (which the OMB Director approved) required that 
covered contractor and subcontractor employees receive a COVID-19 vaccination, except insofar 
as any such employee is legally entitled to an accommodation. See id. at 1; see also Determination 
of the Promotion of Economy and Efficiency in Federal Contracting Pursuant to Executive Order 
No. 14042, 86 Fed. Reg. 53,691, 53,691–92 (Sept. 28, 2021), https://perma.cc/CL8P-YV5B. 
The EO also directs the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council (“FAR Council”) to make 
corresponding amendments to the Federal Acquisition Regulation and, in the interim, to issue 
guidance on how to use existing agency authority to include a COIVD-19 safety clause in covered 
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contracts. See EO 14042 § 3. The FAR Council issued initial guidance on September 30, 2021, 
which provided a sample clause that agencies could use to implement the EO. See Memorandum 
from FAR Council to Chief Acquisition Officers, et al., re: Issuance of Agency Deviations to 
Implement Executive Order 14042 (Sept. 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/9BQ8-XBT6. 
On November 10, 2021, the Task Force issued updated guidance that, among other things, 
extended from December 8 to January 18 the date by which employees of covered contractors 
must be fully vaccinated. See Determination of the Acting OMB Director Regarding the Revised 
Safer Federal Workforce Task Force Guidance for Federal Contractors and the Revised Economy 
& 
Efficiency 
Analysis, 
86 
Fed. 
Reg. 
63,418, 
63,418 
(Nov. 
16, 
2021), 
http://federalregister.gov/d/2021-24949 (“OMB Determination”). The Acting OMB Director then 
issued a new determination that compliance by federal contractors and subcontractors with the 
revised Task Force guidance “will promote economy and efficiency in Federal contracting.” Id. 
The OMB Determination also revoked the prior determination, gave covered contractors additional 
time to comply with EO 14042’s vaccination requirements (consistent with the new timeline of 
the November 10 Task Force guidance), and provided a more detailed analysis supporting its 
economy-and-efficiency determination. See generally id. Thus, the OMB Determination provides 
that, as of January 18, 2022, covered contractor employees must be vaccinated on the first day of 
performance under a covered contract (unless a religious or medical exemption applies). Id. at 
63,420.  
Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on October 29, 2021, see Compl., ECF No. 1, and moved for a 
preliminary injunction on November 5, 2021, see Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Inj. & Brief in Supp., ECF 
No. 19. Plaintiffs’ amended complaint contains eleven claims challenging EO 14042, the OMB 
Determination, and the FAR Council’s interim guidance. See First Am. Compl. for Declaratory & 
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Prelim. & Permanent Inj. Relief, ¶¶ 191–288, ECF No. 54 (“Pls.’ Am. Compl.”). On November 
18, 2021, ABC filed a motion to intervene and a complaint asserting largely the same claims and 
requesting virtually identical relief as Plaintiffs. See Pl.-Intervenors’ Compl. for Declaratory & 
Prelim. & Permanent Inj. Relief, ECF No. 48-1 (“ABC Proposed Compl.”). 
ARGUMENT 
I.  
ABC is not entitled to intervene as of right.  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) allows a party to intervene as of right only if:  
(1) their application to intervene is timely; (2) they have an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) they are so situated 
that disposition of the action, as a practical matter, may impede or impair their 
ability to protect that interest; and (4) their interest is represented inadequately by 
the existing parties to the suit. 
 
Tech. Training Assocs., Inc. v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 874 F.3d 692, 695–96 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(alterations adopted and citation omitted). “The proposed intervenor must prove each of the four 
factors; failure to meet one of the criteria will require that the motion to intervene be denied.” 
Grubbs v. Norris, 870 F.2d 343, 345 (6th Cir. 1989); accord Sierra Club, Inc. v. Leavitt, 488 F.3d 
904, 910 (11th Cir. 2007); Burke v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., 833 F. App’x 288, 291 (11th Cir. 2020) 
(unpublished) (“Putative intervenors . . . bear the burden of proof to establish all four bases for 
intervention as a matter of right.”). Additionally, a proposed intervenor of right “must have 
standing to pursue its claims.” See Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th 
Cir. 2007) 
The Court should deny ABC’s motion to intervene as of right for three reasons. 
First, ABC has not established standing to bring its claims. See id. (“Any party, whether 
original or intervening, that seeks relief from a federal court must have standing to pursue its 
claims.”). “For all relief sought, there must be a litigant with standing, whether that litigant joins 
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the lawsuit as a plaintiff, a coplaintiff, or an intervenor of right.” Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified 
Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 861 F.3d 1278, 1290 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Town of Chester v. 
Laroe Ests., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2017)). A proposed intervenor may establish standing in 
the Eleventh Circuit in one of two ways: independently or by “piggybacking” on the standing of 
an original party. See Dillard, 495 F.3d at 1330.  
ABC claims to possess “organizational” standing to bring claims on behalf of its members. 
See ABC Proposed Compl. ¶ 24. “An organization has standing to bring an action on its members’ 
behalf” only if, among other things, “its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their 
own right.” Black Warrior Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 781 F.3d 1271, 1279 
(11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To meet this requirement, ABC 
must demonstrate that at least one of its members satisfies each of the three basic elements of 
standing—(i) that the member has “suffered an injury in fact” that is both “concrete and 
particularized” and “actual or imminent”; (ii) that there is “a causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of”; and (iii) that  it is “likely, rather than merely speculative, that a 
favorable decision by the court will actually remedy” the member’s injury. ACLU of Fla., Inc. v. 
Dixie Cnty., 690 F.3d 1244, 1248 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560 (1992)).   
ABC fails, however, to allege—let alone demonstrate—that any member has been injured 
by EO 14042 or its implementing guidance. See Ga. Republican Party v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 
888 F.3d 1198, 1203 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[An] organization must ‘make specific allegations 
establishing that at least one identified member has suffered or will suffer harm.’” (alterations 
adopted) (quoting Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 498 (2009))). ABC’s complaint 
alleges vaguely that its members “would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right as they 
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are directly and irreparably injured in their ability to be awarded and perform federal contracts by 
the challenged mandate.” ABC Proposed Compl. ¶ 24. But ABC does not show or otherwise allege 
that any member is (or will soon be) a party to a covered contract—i.e., a contract including a 
COVID-19 safety clause—or is seeking to bid on such a contract. There is thus no indication that 
ABC’s members have been injured by the challenged actions, or that such an injury is imminent. 
Accordingly, ABC has failed to independently establish standing.  
 
Nor can ABC “‘piggyback’ upon the standing of [an] original part[y] to satisfy the standing 
requirement.” Dillard, 495 F.3d at 1330. It is black letter law that “[i]ntervention cannot create 
jurisdiction if none existed before.” Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocs. v. FCC, 457 F.3d 
1238, 1250 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration adopted) (quoting 7C Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. 
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1917, at 457–58 (2d ed.1986)). 
“‘[P]iggyback’ standing [thus] requires the existence of a justiciable case or controversy at the 
point at which intervention is sought.” Dillard, 495 F.3d at 1330. As explained in Defendants’ 
joint opposition to Plaintiffs’ and ABC’s motions for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs—like 
ABC—do not identify a covered contract to which they are (or will soon be) a party and have thus 
failed to establish standing. Because there is no existing “justiciable case or controversy” before 
this Court, ABC has failed to show “standing under either of the avenues available to” it and is 
thus not entitled to intervene as of right. See id.  
Second, ABC does not have a “direct, substantial and legally protectable” “interest in the 
subject matter of th[is] litigation,” as required under Rule 24(a)(2). See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. 
Sandy Lak Properties, Inc., 425 F.3d 1308, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Georgia v. U.S. Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 302 F.3d 1242, 1249 (11th Cir. 2002)). ABC claims it has a sufficient interest to 
intervene as of right because the challenged actions will affect its members’ “economic status” 
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and “[a] negative decision would adversely affect [their] economic interests.” Mot. at 14–16. But 
the Eleventh Circuit requires a proposed intervenor to show “something more than an economic 
interest” to establish a “legally protectable interest” under Rule 24(a)(2). Mt. Hawley, 425 F.3d at 
1311 (quoting United States v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 922 F.2d 704, 710 (11th Cir. 1991)). 
“What is required is that the interest be one which the substantive law recognizes as belonging to 
or being owned by the applicant”—i.e., “an interest that derives from a legal right.” Id. (citation 
omitted).  
 
ABC’s stated interest in the subject matter of this action is purely economic. See, e.g., Mot. 
at 14–16. It points to “no property or other legal right” of its members that is affected by the 
challenged actions. See S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 922 F.2d at 710. ABC merely repeats the 
unsubstantiated assertion throughout its motion and complaint that its members “face a risk of 
breach and material noncompliance” with their federal contracts because they will either have to 
fire unvaccinated employees (thus risking unsatisfactory performance because of a reduced 
workforce) or by retaining unvaccinated employees (thus violating a COVID-19 safety clause). 
See, e.g., Mot. at 15. But this alleged contractual interest “is purely speculative,” because ABC has 
not identified a single member that is (or will soon be) a party to a covered contract and thus 
subject to a COVID-19 safety clause. See Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 425 F.3d at 1311; accord Burke, 
833 F. App’x at 292 (“The interest must be direct, substantial, and legally protectable”; “[it] must 
be more than purely economic and cannot be speculative.” (cleaned up)).  
 
Finally, even if ABC had an interest in this litigation, that interest would be adequately 
represented by Plaintiffs. In assessing the adequacy of representation under Rule 24(a)(2), the 
Eleventh Circuit “presume[s] adequate representation when an existing party seeks the same 
objectives as the would-be interveners.” Sierra Club, 488 F.3d at 910 (quoting Clark v. Putnam 
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Cnty., 168 F.3d 458, 461 (11th Cir.1999)). This presumption can be overcome only if the proposed 
intervenor “com[es] forward with some evidence to the contrary.” Id. (citation omitted). If that 
burden is met, a court will resort to “the general rule that adequate representation exists [1] if no 
collusion is shown between the representative and an opposing party, [2] if the representative does 
not have or represent an interest adverse to the proposed intervenor, and [3] if the representative 
does not fail in fulfillment of his duty.’” United States v. 324 Auto. Grilles, Case No. CV418-195, 
2019 WL 11544480, at *3 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2019) (quoting Clark, 168 F.3d at 461). 
 
Here, ABC concedes that its interests in this matter “are aligned” with Plaintiffs. Mot. at 
16; see also id. at 19 (suggesting that ABC “will assert the same claims” and “wish[es] to present” 
the same arguments as “the current plaintiffs”). In fact, according to ABC’s own pleadings, there 
appears to be no discernable difference between its objectives and those that Plaintiffs seek to 
achieve in this case. ABC’s complaint recites essentially verbatim the two specific forms of relief 
that Plaintiffs request from this Court: 
2. Enter a declaratory judgment that Defendants, individually 
and 
collectively, 
have acted to 
impose 
a broad-sweeping, 
unlawful, 
and 
unconstitutional COVID-19 vaccine mandate, and that such COVID-19 vaccine 
mandate is unlawful and unenforceable. 
 
3. Grant a temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunction prohibiting 
Defendants and those acting in concert with them from enforcing this broad-
sweeping, unlawful, and unconstitutional mandate. 
 
Compare ABC Proposed Compl., Prayer for Relief, with Pls.’ Am. Compl., Prayer for Relief. 
Similarly, eleven of the twelve counts in ABC’s complaint are virtually identical to the eleven 
counts contained in Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint.1 Compare ABC Proposed Compl. ¶¶ 121–
                                              
1 There is only one claim that ABC attempts to assert in this matter that is not already 
asserted by Plaintiffs—a perfunctory allegation that Defendants violated the Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, 5 U.S.C. § 604. But this statutory provision—which is 
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217, with Pls.’ Am. Compl. ¶¶ 191–288; see also Sierra Club, 488 F.3d at 911 (finding adequate 
representation where there was “no claim or defense on behalf of” the proposed intervenor that 
was “not or [would] not be asserted by” an original party to the litigation (citation omitted)). And 
even assuming ABC may wish to one day “go about making these arguments in a different manner 
or otherwise believe[] [themselves] to be in a better position to make” these arguments, that alone 
“does not make [Plaintiffs’] representation inadequate.”2 See United States v. 60 Auto. Grilles, 799 
F. App’x 693, 697 (11th Cir. 2020) (unpublished).  
 
ABC offers no serious argument or evidence suggesting that its objectives in this case 
diverge materially from those of Plaintiffs. See Sierra Club, 488 F.3d at 910 (requiring a proposed 
intervenor to offer “some evidence” to rebut the presumption that its objectives align with an 
original party (citation omitted)). Instead, ABC simply asserts that Plaintiffs may not provide 
adequate representation because ABC’s “interests are narrower and more focused.” Mot. at 18. 
But even if such vague, conclusory allegations were sufficient to rebut the presumption of adequate 
representation, the Court would simply apply “the general rule that adequate representation exists 
‘if no collusion is shown between the representative and an opposing party, if the representative 
does not have or represent an interest adverse to the proposed intervenor, and if the representative 
                                              
addressed in more detail in Defendants’ joint opposition to Plaintiffs’ and ABC’s motions for a 
preliminary injunction—applies only to agency final rules issued under the APA. See Nat'l Tel. 
Coop. Ass’n v. FCC, 563 F.3d 536, 540 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires 
that agencies issuing rules under the Administrative Procedure Act publish a final regulatory 
flexibility analysis.” (citing 5 U.S.C. § 604)). Because no such rule is at issue in this case, ABC’s 
claim under 5 U.S.C. § 604 is meritless. 
 
2 Therefore, the fact that ABC moves for a preliminary injunction on its arbitrary-and-
capricious claim while Plaintiffs do not “does not make [Plaintiffs’] representation inadequate,” 
See 60 Auto. Grilles, 799 F. App’x at 697, because ABC and Plaintiffs are still “pursu[ing] the 
same ultimate objective” in challenging and seeking to enjoin EO 14042 and its implementing 
guidance, see Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Co. v. Falls Chase Special Taxing Dist., 983 F.2d 211, 215 
(11th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added). 
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does not fail in fulfillment of his duty.’” Clark, 168 F.3d at 461 (citation omitted). Because there 
is no indication (i) of collusion between Plaintiffs and Defendants, (ii) that Plaintiffs have an 
interest inimical to ABC, or (iii) that Plaintiffs will not adequately litigate their claims, the Court 
should find that ABC’s interests are adequately represented.  
II.  
ABC has not demonstrated that permissive intervention is warranted. 
 
 
ABC alternatively seeks permissive intervention under Rule 24(b). Upon timely motion, a 
court “may” permit intervention under Rule 24(b) where the proposed intervenor has a “claim or 
defense” that shares “a question of law or fact in common” with the main action, and where “the 
intervention will not unduly prejudice or delay the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.” 
Georgia, 302 F.3d at 1250. But even where “there is a common question of law or fact, or the 
requirements of Rule 24(b) are otherwise satisfied, the court may refuse to allow intervention,” as 
“it is wholly discretionary with the court whether to allow intervention under Rule 24(b).” Worlds 
v. Dep’t of Health & Rehab. Servs., 929 F.2d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting 7C C. Wright, A. 
Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1913, at 376–77 (2d ed. 1986)). 
The Court should deny ABC’s request for permissive intervention for two reasons.  
First, ABC’s permissive intervention would not be “an appropriate device to cure” the fact 
that Plaintiffs have “stated causes of action that they have no standing to litigate.” See McClune v. 
Shamah, 593 F.2d 482, 486 (3d Cir. 1979). Whether intervention is sought as of right or by 
permission, it “cannot create jurisdiction if none existed before.” Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. 
Consumer Advocs., 457 F.3d at 1250 (citation omitted). As explained in Defendants’ joint 
opposition to Plaintiffs’ and ABC’s motions for a preliminary injunction, there is no justiciable 
cases or controversy between Plaintiffs and Defendants because Plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate standing. There is thus no jurisdictional basis to support ABC’s intervention.  
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But even if Plaintiffs did have standing, ABC’s “lack[] [of] Article III standing in its own 
right” would still be a “factor[] counsel[ing] against permissive intervention.” See West Virginia 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 21-cv-00465, 2021 WL 5300944, at * 13 (N.D. 
Ala. Nov. 15, 2021). Rather than establish standing independently, ABC has sought to 
“piggyback” on Plaintiffs’ alleged standing in order to intervene in this action. And while 
“‘piggyback’ standing” is permissible for an intervenor of right under Rule 24(a), see Dillard, 495 
F.3d at 1330, if the Court were to find that Plaintiffs have standing, it should exercise its broad 
discretion under Rule 24(b) by denying ABC permissive intervention in an action it would have 
lacked standing to bring in its own right, see West Virginia, 2021 WL 5300944, at * 13. In these 
circumstances, it would be more appropriate for ABC to raise its generalized concerns by 
participating as an amicus curiae and present its views as a trade association in that manner. 
Second, making ABC a party to this suit will simply create more duplicative briefing for 
the Court and the parties to address. As the Eleventh Circuit has found, “[t]he duplicative nature 
of the claims and interests . . . asserted” by a proposed intervenor can “threaten[] to unduly delay 
the adjudication of the rights of the parties in the lawsuit and makes it unlikely that any new light 
will be shed on the issues to be adjudicated.” Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1215 (11th 
Cir. 1989); accord United States v. Territory of Virgin Islands, 748 F.3d 514, 525 (3d Cir. 2014); 
First Nat’l Bank of Tenn. v. Pinnacle Props. V, LLC, No. 11-CV-2087, 2011 WL 13221046, at *4 
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2011) (“Even if [the proposed intervenor] were to meet the requirements of 
permissive intervention, this Court would decline intervention. . . . Defendant asserts the same 
position that movant asserts, and [the proposed intervenors’] involvement in the litigation would 
be duplicative of the efforts already being expended.”). As ABC admits, it seeks to “assert the 
same claims as those of” Plaintiffs, see Mot. at 19,  and “the arguments that [it] wish[es] to 
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present”—“that the Contractor Mandate is not a lawful exercise of the federal government’s 
powers”—are the same arguments pressed by “the current plaintiffs,” see id.3 ABC’s involvement 
in this matter will thus result in the duplication of the Court’s and the parties’ efforts. 
And although ABC claims that its “expertise” as a trade association “will benefit the Court 
and assist it in addressing the primary questions in this lawsuit,” see Mot. at 19, this case involves 
primarily legal questions. The Court’s resolution of those questions will not be assisted by ABC’s 
expertise “representing the many diverse business interests of [its] members.” See id. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Associated Builders’ motion to intervene should be denied.   
Dated: November 26, 2021 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BRIAN M. BOYNTON 
Acting Assistant Attorney General 
 
DAVID ESTES 
Acting United States Attorney 
 
BRAD P. ROSENBERG 
Assistant Branch Director 
Civil Division 
 
/s/ Vinita B. Andrapalliyal 
JODY D. LOWENSTEIN 
VINITA B. ANDRAPALLIYAL 
LEE REEVES 
Trial Attorneys 
United States Department of Justice 
Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch 
P.O. Box No. 883, Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
Phone: (202) 305-0845 
Fax: (202) 616-8470 
E-mail: vinita.b.andrapalliyal@usdoj.gov 
                                              
3 That is why adequacy of representation is also a relevant factor in determining whether 
permissive intervention is proper. See, e.g., South Dakota ex rel Barnett v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 
317 F.3d 783, 787 (8th Cir. 2003); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir.1978). 
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/s/ Matthew A. Josephson 
Matthew A. Josephson 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar. No. 367216 
Post Office Box 8970 
Savannah, Georgia 31412 
Telephone: (912) 652-4422 
Email: Matthew.Josephson@usdoj.gov 
 
 
Attorneys for Defendants 
 
 
 
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