Court filing

Exhibit E-4246 Ruling — USA v. Edwards et al (Dkt. 234.5)

Filed October 29, 2024 in USA v. Edwards et al; one of 112 filings from this case.

Record facts

Court	U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida
Filed	2024-10-29

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida · No. 8:18-cr-00344-VMC-AAS · Doc. 184 · 2024-10-29 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Case No.: 8:18-cr-344-VMC-AAS

MATTHEW DARIUS CHAPPELL
______________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The United States moves to remand Defendant Matthew Darius
Chappell to the custody of the Attorney General under 18 U.S.C. 4246 “to
determine if the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect as result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily
injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.” (Doc. 176).
I.
BACKGROUND

The procedural history in this matter is intricate and has been detailed
in prior reports. See (Doc. 172). In summation, on June 1, 2018, Mr. Chappell
was riding a motorcycle without a helmet when his motorcycle was hit by a
driver who failed to stop for a red light. (Doc. 151, Ex. 5, p. 48). Mr. Chappell
was hospitalized for six weeks as he recovered from “a traumatic brain injury,
multiple facial reconstructive surgeries, multiple left knee surgeries, chronic
right shoulder dislocation, lumbar spine fracture, multiple deep vein
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thrombosis, headache, right side blindness, and diminished smell and taste.”
(Doc. 36, p. 2).

On July 26, 2018, a grand jury indicted Mr. Chappell on one count of
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine from December 2017 to January
28, 2018 — over four months before his June 1 accident. (Doc. 1).

Four days later, on July 30, 2018, Mr. Chappell was admitted to Tampa
General Hospital for treatment of severe headaches. (Doc. 36, p. 2). Medical
scans showed Mr. Chappell had a large skull fracture and a large abscess of
air and fluid in the brain (called a “pneumocephalus”) in the right frontal lobe
of the brain “measuring approximately 6.3 x 5.8 cm.” (Doc. 151, Ex. 5, p. 51).
Mr. Chappell underwent emergency “bifrontal craniotomy and lumbar drain
placement” surgeries on August 3, 2018 and August 5, 2018. (Doc. 151, Ex. 5,
p. 41). These intense forms of cranial surgery, requiring the removal of parts
of the skull to drain air and fluid from the abscess, “invariably” result in the
removal of parts of brain matter. (Doc. 155, p. 107). While conducting the
surgery, doctors noted the presence of “iron deposits on . . . the left side of the
brain . . . which is again rare and is also related to permanent brain damage.”
(Id.).

Mr. Chappell’s brain injury later resulted in the loss of vision in his right
eye. (Doc. 151, Ex. p. 4). After a two-week recovery period, Mr. Chappell was
discharged from Tampa General Hospital on August 18, 2018 and taken into
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custody on his federal arrest warrant for the July 2021 indictment. (Doc. 9;
Doc. 12, p. 1).

On October 1, 2018, Mr. Chappell’s counsel moved for a hearing to
adjudicate Mr. Chappell’s competency to stand trial. (Doc. 26). On October 3rd,
2018, the court granted Mr. Chappell’s counsel’s request and ordered Dr.
Ouaou, an expert in neuropsychology, to conduct a competency evaluation.
(Doc. 27). Mr. Chappell has since remained in federal custody for over four
years pending the adjudication of his competency to stand trial. In this time,
Mr. Chappell has undergone seven competency evaluations by five different
medical examiners and had three separate months-long stays at Federal
Medical Center in Butner, NC (“Butner”) for competency evaluations.

On November 30, 2022, the court (without opposition from the
government) accepted and adopted the undersigned’s recommendation that
Mr. Chappell be found to “presently suffer[] from a mental disease or defect
rendering him incompetent to stand trial” and that “there is not a substantial
probability in the foreseeable future Mr. Chappell will attain the capacity to
permit the proceedings to go forward.” (Doc. 172, p. 30); (Doc. 178, p. 3).

The government now requests that the court remand Mr. Chappell again
to the custody of the Attorney General for a dangerousness evaluation under
18 U.S.C. § 4246. (Doc. 182). The government acknowledges Mr. Chappell has
been committed to federal custody under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) since December
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20, 2018, (Doc. 176, p. 2) (citing (Doc. 39)), and argues Section 4246 “provides
this Court with the discretion to order such an evaluation by a psychiatrist or
psychologist to determine if the defendant meets the standard for continued
commitment.” (Id. at 3). The undersigned heard oral argument on December
14, 2022 from the government and Mr. Chappell’s counsel on the government’s
motion to remand. (Doc. 183).
II.
ANALYSIS

Under Section 4241(d) of the Insanity Defense Reform Act (IDRA), once
a court finds a defendant is not competent to stand trial (meaning their “mental
condition has not so improved as to permit the proceedings to go forward”), “the
defendant is subject to the provisions of sections 4246 and 4248.” 18 U.S.C. §
4241(d). Section 4248 concerns the civil commitment of a “sexually dangerous
person.” § 4248(a). No allegations exist in the record supporting any contention
that Mr. Chappell is a sexually dangerous person and the government’s motion
to remand does not mention Section 4248. See (Doc. 176). This report therefore
only considers the government’s motion to remand Mr. Chappell to the custody
of the Attorney General under the statutory authority of Section 4246.

18 U.S.C. 4246(a) states:
“If the director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized certifies
that a person . . . who has been committed to the custody of the
Attorney General pursuant to section 4241(d) . . . is presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his
release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
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person or serious damage to property of another, and that suitable
arrangements for State custody and care of the person are not
available, he shall transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court
for the district in which the person is confined . . . [and t]he court
shall order a hearing to determine whether the person is presently
suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which his
release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another
person or serious damage to property of another.

18 U.S.C. § 4246(a). The government contends this section grants the court the
authority to temporarily remand Mr. Chappell to Butner so physicians at
Butner may evaluate whether Mr. Chappell poses a danger to himself or others
upon his release. (Doc. 176, p. 4).

The undersigned disagrees. “Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114
S.Ct. 1673, 1675, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). Thus, the court only possesses the
jurisdictional authority “authorized by [the] Constitution and statute.” Id.

The government does not contend any word or phrase in the IDRA
explicitly authorizes courts to unilaterally detain defendants for purposes of
conducting a dangerousness evaluation. Rather, the case law cited in the
government’s motion claims “in order for the statutory scheme to function
properly . . . a dangerousness certification need not be filed until the court
determines [that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial] because it is not
until such a determination is made by the court that the defendant becomes
‘subject to the provisions of section 4246.’” United States v. Ferguson, 2020 WL
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5100099, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 5, 2020), report and recommendation adopted,
2020 WL 4922360 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2020) (citing United States v. Rivera-
Morales, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1139, 1143 (S.D. Cal. 2005)).

However, “the text of a law controls over purported legislative intentions
unmoored from any statutory text.” Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct.
2486, 2496 (2022). On its face, the government’s interpretation appears at odds
with the text of Section 4246, which states “[i]f” the director of a facility
certifies a defendant is dangerous, then the court must hold a hearing on the
defendant’s dangerousness. 1 No provision of Section 4246 unambiguously
grants federal courts the authority to hold a dangerousness hearing without a
dangerousness certificate. Nor does the text of Section 4246 explicitly allow
courts to order the director of a medical facility to issue such a certificate. If we
are to “presume . . . the legislature says what it means and means what it
says,” Section 4246 does not grant courts the statutory authority to unilaterally
detain defendants for purposes of conducting a dangerousness evaluation.
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S.Ct. 1718, 1725, (2017)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

1 Though Section 4248 was enacted in 2006, Section 4248 “is similar to [Section 4246]”
in requiring the court conduct a hearing into whether a person is sexually dangerous
only if “the Attorney General or any individual authorized by the Attorney General
or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons [certifies] that the person is a sexually
dangerous person, and transmit the certificate to the clerk of the court for the district
in which the person is confined.” United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 141–142,
130 S.Ct. 1949, 176 L.Ed.2d 878 (2010); § 4248(a).
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This conclusion grows clearer when considered alongside the whole text
of the IDRA. “It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the
words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place
in the overall statutory scheme.” West Va. v. E.P.A., 142 S. Ct. 2587 (2022)
(citing Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500,
103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989)). It is therefore highly relevant that where Congress
intended to bestow upon district courts the authority to sua sponte begin
proceedings under the IDRA, “it did so unambiguously.” Biden v. Texas, 142
S.Ct. 2528, 2539 (2022).

Section 4241 of the IDRA states “[t]he court shall grant the motion, or
shall order such a hearing on its own motion,” when reasonable cause exists to
believe a defendant is not competent to stand trial. 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
Similarly, Section 4244 of the IDRA grants courts the authority to hold a
hearing on whether to hospitalize a convicted defendant “at any time prior to
the sentencing of the defendant . . . on its own motion,” if reasonable cause
exists to believe the convicted defendant suffers from a mental disease or defect
necessitating treatment in a suitable facility. § 4244(a).

By contrast, the other provisions of the IDRA do not grant the courts
power to “on its own motion” order relief. Section 4242, for example, does not
allow courts deference in ordering a psychiatric examination of a defendant for
purposes of an insanity defense. Instead, Section 4242 states courts “shall
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order that a psychiatrist or psychological examination of the defendant” once
the defendant files “notice, as provided in Rule 12.2 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, that the defendant intends to rely on the defense of
insanity” and upon subsequent “motion of the attorney for the Government.”
§ 4242(a). Section 4243 similarly requires, upon a defendant being found not
guilty only by reason of insanity at the time of the charged offense, that the
defendant “shall be committed to a suitable facility” until the defendant
improves such that they are eligible for release. § 4243(a).

The IDRA provisions governing the hospitalization or civil commitment
of a presently incarcerated person likewise do not grant courts deference in
whether to conduct proceedings. Section 4245, the IDRA provision governing
the involuntary transfer of a federal prisoner suffering from a mental disease
or defect to treatment facilities, states the government may only move to
remand a prisoner to a suitable treatment facility “at the request of the director
of the facility in which the person is imprisoned” and upon filing a “motion with
the court for the district in which the facility is located for a hearing on the
present mental condition of the person.” § 4245(a). Once the motion is filed,
“[t]he court shall grant the motion if there is reasonable cause to believe that
the person may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect for the
treatment of which he is in need of custody for care or treatment in a suitable
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facility.” Id. Section 4245 thus mimics Sections 4246 and 4248’s certification
requirement. See §§ 4246(a), 4248(a).

Section 4246(b) offers no aid to the government’s position as well. While
the government is correct that “Section 4246(b) allows the court to order an
examination of the defendant,” this authority only vests “[p]rior to the date of
the [dangerousness] hearing.” (Doc. 176, p. 3); § 4246(b). Section 4246(b)
presupposes the existence of a dangerousness certificate before requiring a
hearing on whether the defendant is a danger to the general public. “Because
the Court may not order the requisite hearing without a compliant
certification, it follows that the Court may not order a pre-hearing evaluation
without such a certification. Therefore, without a certification in this case, the
Court cannot order a dangerousness assessment.” U.S. v. Cruz-Ruiz, 585
F.Supp.3d 167, 170 (D. P.R. Feb. 11, 2022).

In interpreting statutory text, the court is obligated to ensure “every
word and every provision [] be given effect [such that n]one should needlessly
be given an interpretation that causes it to duplicate another provision or to
have no consequence.” Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2019)
(citing A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
140, 174 (2012)). The IDRA grants courts the statutory authority to begin
proceedings “on its own motion” only to determine whether a defendant is not
competent to stand trial and to determine whether a convicted defendant
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should be hospitalized for a mental disease and defect. §§ 4241, 4244.
Elsewhere in the IDRA, the court’s ability to hold a hearing and commence
proceedings is mandatory but limited by some notice or certification
prerequisite. Concluding courts retain the statutory authority under Section
4246 to unilaterally detain defendants for purposes of conducting a
dangerousness evaluation, despite the “on its own motion” language appearing
nowhere in Section 4246, would render that language “superfluous” within
Sections 4241 and 4244. Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314, 129 S.Ct.
1558, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009)

The plain meaning of Section 4246(a) thus controls. The court’s authority
to conduct a dangerousness evaluation under the IDRA is only triggered “[i]f
the director of a facility in which a person is hospitalized certifies that a person
. . . who has been committed to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant
to section 4241(d) . . . is presently suffering from a mental disease or defect as
a result of which his release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to
another person or serious damage to property of another.” Multiple courts have
similarly concluded this certification requirement is a prerequisite to the
dangerousness evaluation under the IDRA. See, e.g., United States v. Lapi, 458
F.3d 555, 563 (7th Cir. 2006) (“§ 4246 is triggered only by the filing of a
Certificate of Mental Disease or Defect and Dangerousness by the ‘director of
[the] facility in which [the defendant] is hospitalized.’”); United States v. Bonin,
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541 F.3d 399, 400–401 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Section 4246(a) establishes the
director’s certification as a necessary prerequisite to a dangerousness hearing;
without the certification, a court ordinarily lacks statutory authority to
conduct the hearing.”); United States v. Wigren, 641 F.3d 944, 946 (8th Cir.
2011) (“The [IDRA] sets forth procedures for involuntary civil commitment of
federal detainees. The warden is responsible for commencing proceedings
under § 4246”); Cruz-Ruiz, 585 F.Supp.3d at 170 (“this Court is unpersuaded
that it has the authority to continue to detain Defendant and order a
dangerousness assessment pursuant to Section 4246”).

The government’s response does not materially address the text of the
IDRA and instead asks this court to fill what the government sees as “troubling
gaps in the statutory scheme” of civil commitments and competency
proceedings. United States v. Jackson, No. 2:03-cr-173-RBS-4, 2009 WL
691973, at *3 (E.D. Penn. Mar. 16, 2009). The case law cited in the
government’s motion claims the court must at least retain some jurisdiction to
temporarily remand the defendant back to the medical facility to give the
director of the facility a period of time to consider the defendant’s
dangerousness. (Doc. 176, p. 3) (citing Ferguson, 2020 WL 5100099, at *4;
United States. v. Trillo-Cerda, 244 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1069 (S.D. Cal. 2002)).

This argument suffers from two fatal flaws. First, as previously detailed,
the text of the IDRA does not support that courts possess the authority to
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unilaterally detain defendants for purposes of a dangerousness evaluation.
That defendants found permanently incompetent under Section 4241 are
“subject to the provisions of” Section 4246 is immaterial. § 4241(d). In this
context, “subject to” means being “under the governing power of another.”
Subject, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Section 4241(d) simply
informs defendants of their status after being found incompetent to stand trial:
still governed by “the provisions of § 4246 and §4248.” § 4241(d). This portion
of Section 4241(d) does not independently confer to courts the authority to
detain a defendant beyond what is already conferred by Congress in Sections
4246 and 4248.

Second, “[a] civil commitment proceeding under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 is
completely separate from the criminal prosecution.” United States v. Williams,
No. CR–11–8022–PCT–GMS, 2013 WL 3864258, at *6 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2013).
See also Lapi, 458 F.3d at 560 (concluding a dangerousness hearing under
Section 4246 “is a matter completely separate from the merits of the action-
whether Mr. Lapi committed the bank robbery for which he is being
prosecuted”) (citations omitted). The IDRA is thus intentionally limited in
scope so as to remain appropriately deferential to state prerogatives in civil
commitment proceedings. See, e.g., Comstock, 507 F.Supp. 2d at 545
(explaining that § 4246 “is extremely deferential to the states”); United States
v. S.A., 129 F.3d 995, 1000 (8th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ivil commitment under section
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4246 occurs only in those rare circumstances where a person has no permanent
residence or there are no state authorities willing to accept him for
commitment.”) (internal citations omitted); Lapi, 458 F.3d at 563 (“The
legislative history of the Insanity Defense Reform Act makes clear that the
drafters of § 4246 did not intend for federal courts to play such an expansive
role. This history instead reflects the general principle that care of insane
persons is essentially the function of the several states.”) United States v.
Perry, 788 F.2d 100, 110 (3d Cir. 1986) (“Congress may not . . . authorize
commitment simply to protect the general welfare of the community at large.”).
Ecker v. United States, 575 F.3d 70 (1st Cir. 2009) (“the general policy
underlying the federal civil commitment statute that the states are tasked with
caring for the mentally ill and with protecting the general welfare of the larger
community.”).

The court’s limited authority to detain a defendant for a dangerousness
evaluation is in accordance with the structure of the IDRA and its deference to
the several states in their disposition of a defendant suffering from a mental
disease or defect. Whatever perceived gaps may exist in the statutory schema
of civil commitments and competency proceedings limiting the federal courts’
capacity to maintain the continued incarceration of an incompetent defendant,
it is the duty of Congress to remedy them, not the courts.
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More crucially, “[t]he civil commitment of an individual into a mental
hospital is a significant deprivation of liberty, particularly when that
commitment is of indefinite duration; such a deprivation, therefore, must be
accompanied by procedural safeguards which adhere to due process
requirements.” United States v. Baker, 807 F.2d 1315, 1321 (6th Cir. 1982).
These due process considerations are of vast importance in this matter
because, as the parties discussed during the December 14, 2022 hearing, Mr.
Chappell’s confinement in federal penitentiary continued solely pursuant to
the over-four-year effort at conclusively determining Mr. Chappell’s
competency. (Doc. 183). On August 29, 2018, Magistrate Judge Christopher
Tuite ordered Mr. Chappell conditionally released on $10,000 secured bond,
even in light of the “criminal history” cited in the government’s motion. (Doc.
13); (Doc. 176, p. 2). The parties also confirmed during the December 14, 2022
hearing Mr. Chappell committed no disciplinary infractions during his current
period of incarceration at the Hillsborough County Jail, Hernando County Jail,
or at Butner.

Mr. Chappell has undergone seven competency evaluations by five
different medical examiners during his over-four-year period of incarceration.
This period includes more than a year spent at Butner over the course of three
separate trips to and from Butner for competency evaluations. Mr. Chappell’s
seven competency evaluations, producing approximately seventy pages of
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reports, contain no evidence or opinions even slightly suggesting Mr. Chappell
is a danger to himself or others. To the contrary, the evidence in the record
suggested Mr. Chappell remained in stable mental condition for the duration
of his incarceration. See (Doc. 150, Ex. 5, p. 4) (“[Mr. Chappell] continues to
present with flat affect . . . has not incurred any disciplinary infractions . . .
denies having suicidal or homicidal ideation, intent, or plan.”); (Id. at 17) (“Mr.
Chappell’s mental status is stable, without suicidal or homicidal ideation.”).

Thus, absent any change in the considerations undergirding Judge
Tuite’s order, Mr. Chappell should be conditionally released in accordance with
Judge Tuite’s order.2 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (“due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed . . .
the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding

2 “Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed this issue, other federal courts
have held neither due process nor the statutory scheme codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241–
4247 mandates dismissal of charges against a defendant solely because the defendant
is not competent to stand trial.” United States v. De Matteis, No. 5:19- cr-75-AKK-
GMB, 2020 WL 4210501, at *4 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 2, 2020). See also United States v.
Sheffield, 2010 WL 4023969, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2010) (“The Court notes that
dismissal is not required by statute where the Defendant has been found incompetent
to stand trial.”); United States v. Ostolaza-Robles, No. 13-cr-771, 2022 WL 473037, at
*6 (D. P.R. Feb. 22, 2022) (“Though Mr. Ostolaza is incompetent but not dangerous
and, thus, cannot stand trial nor be civilly committed, the Court is not required by
statute to dismiss the indictment against him— Congress has left that decision to the
prosecutors’ discretion.”).
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that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the
defendant.”).
III.
CONCLUSION

Because neither the Butner director nor any other facility director has
forwarded to this court a certificate on Mr. Chappell’s dangerousness prior to
the court finding Mr. Chappell not competent to stand trial, this court is
without jurisdiction under the IDRA to temporarily remand Mr. Chappell to
Butner for purposes of a dangerousness evaluation or otherwise detain him
pursuant to the competency proceedings. It is therefore RECOMMENDED:
1. The government’s motion to remand Mr. Chappell to the custody of the
Attorney General (Doc. 176) be DENIED; and
2. The court refer the matter back to the undersigned to reopen Mr.
Chappell’s bond hearing.

ENTERED at Tampa, Florida on January 11, 2022.

NOTICE TO PARTIES
The parties have fourteen days from the date they are served a copy of
this report to file written objections to this report’s proposed findings and
recommendations or to seek an extension of the fourteen-day deadline to file
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written objections. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th Cir. R. 3-1. A party’s failure to
object timely in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives that party’s right
to challenge on appeal the district court’s order adopting this report’s
unobjected-to factual findings and legal conclusions. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
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Exhibit E-4246 Ruling — USA v. Edwards et al (Dkt. 234.5)

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