Court filing
Transcript of Restitution Hearing as to Eric Dean Sheppard — USA v. Sheppard (Dkt. 300, S.D. Fla.)
Filed October 9, 2024 in USA v. Sheppard; one of 253 filings from this case.
Record facts
| Court | U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida |
|---|---|
| Filed | 2024-10-09 |
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida · No. 1:22-cr-20290-BB · Doc. 300 · 2024-10-09 · Docket on CourtListener
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
CASE NO. 22-CR-20290-BB-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Miami, Florida
Plaintiff,
August 23, 2024
vs.
1:28 PM - 2:36 PM
ERIC DEAN SHEPPARD,
Defendant.
Pages 1 to 53
____________________________________________________________
TRANSCRIPT OF RESTITUTION HEARING
HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE BETH BLOOM
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
LANCE W. STEINBEISSER, FCRR, RPR, FPR-C
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
400 North Miami Avenue
Miami, Florida 33128
305.523.5633
Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; transcript
produced by computer-aided transcription.
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APPEARANCES:
FOR THE GOVERNMENT:
AIMEE JIMENEZ, AUSA
ANA MARIA MARTINEZ, AUSA
MITCHELL E. HYMAN, AUSA
United States Attorney's Office
99 Northeast Fourth Street
Miami, Florida 33132
aimee.jimenez@usdoj.gov
ana.maria.martinez@usdoj.gov
mitchell.hyman@usdoj.gov
305-530-7976
ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT:
HOWARD M. SREBNICK, ESQ.
Black Srebnick, P.A.
201 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 1300
Miami, Florida 33131
hsrebnick@royblack.com
305-371-6421
JASON ZARROW, ESQ.
O'Melveny & Myers LLP
400 South Hope Street, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90071
jzarrow@omm.com
213-430-8367
JAYNE CLAIRE WEINTRAUB, ESQ.
Sale & Weintraub, P.A.
Two South Biscayne Boulevard, 21st Floor
Miami, Florida 33131
jweintraub@saleweintraub.com
305-374-1818
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JONATHAN ETRA, ESQ.
CHRISTOPHER C. CAVALLO, ESQ.
Nelson Mullins Broad and Cassel
2 South Biscayne Boulevard, Floor 21
Miami, Florida 33131
jonathan.etra@nelsonmullins.com
chris.cavallo@nelsonmullins.com
305-373-9400
RICHARD C. KLUGH, ESQ.
Richard C. Klugh, P.A.
40 Northwest Third Street, Penthouse 1
Miami, Florida 33128
rickklu@aol.com
305-536-1191
ALSO PRESENT: Shannon Culbertson, Probation Officer
Sarah Halleran, Special Agent
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(Call to the Order of the Court.)
THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Calling Criminal Case
Number 22-20290, United States of America versus Eric Dean
Sheppard.
Counsel, please state your appearances for the
record.
MS. JIMENEZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Aimee
Jimenez for the United States. With me are Assistant United
States Attorneys Ana Maria Martinez, Mitch Hyman, and FBI
Special Agent Sarah Halleran.
THE COURT: Good afternoon to each of you.
MR. SREBNICK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. On behalf
of Mr. Sheppard, who's present in the courtroom, Howard
Srebnick, Jason Zarrow, Richard Klugh, Jane Weintraub.
MS. WEINTRAUB: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Hi. Good afternoon to each of you.
May I have the name of the probation officer who is
also present in the courtroom?
THE PROBATION OFFICER: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
Shannon Culbertson on behalf of the probation office.
THE COURT: Good afternoon, Officer.
MR. SREBNICK: Judge, Mr. Etra and Mr. Cavallo just
walked in.
THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon to each of you
as well.
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Let me first state that the purpose of this
proceeding is for the limited issues of restitution and
forfeiture. I do want to note for purposes of logistics that
as the defendant has represented and as the Court has
confirmed, the defendant's designated institution is FCI
Miami. The court ordered that Mr. Sheppard surrender today --
to self-surrender either at the institution designated by the
marshal or at the United States Marshal Service by 4:00 PM.
However, FCI Miami will only intake until
approximately 2:00, 2:30 at the latest. So I do wish to
advise. I'm not certain how long this proceeding is going to
take, but Mr. Sheppard would then just self-surrender to the
marshal this afternoon.
MR. SREBNICK: So, Your Honor, on that issue, two
things. When we spoke last time about self-surrender, we had
told you we would notify you of the destination. In the
interim -- I assume the Court knows, but in case you don't, we
had asked the Court of Appeals to consider giving Mr. Sheppard
bail pending appeal. A one-judge decision was rendered today
denying bail pending appeal. And we believe under the rules
we can ask the court -- the three-judge court to consider that
issue, and we intend to ask the court over the weekend to have
a second judge consider bail pending appeal.
THE COURT: Then if the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals determines that bail is appropriate pending the
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appeal, then it can enter its order and he can be released
from the institution.
MR. SREBNICK: So unless the Court would consider
extending his surrender until Monday or Tuesday to give the
Court of Appeals that chance, if the Court would do that, we
would request that to give the court a chance to consider that
and so that Mr. Sheppard can stay with us here today. So
that's my first request, if the Court would consider extending
his surrender until Tuesday to give the court until Monday to
consider our motion.
THE COURT: The court meaning the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
MR. SREBNICK: Exactly.
THE COURT: Does the Government wish to be heard?
MS. JIMENEZ: The Government opposes that request.
THE COURT: I'm sorry? I didn't hear you.
MS. JIMENEZ: The Government opposes that request.
THE COURT: Did you say you're not opposed?
MS. JIMENEZ: The Government opposes that request.
THE COURT: All right. Well, what's the second
question, Mr. Srebnick?
MR. SREBNICK: Well, if the Court doesn't give him an
extended surrender until Tuesday, then we would ask that he be
permitted to excuse himself from here so he can get to the
institution -- I think it's a satellite camp Miami, actually.
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Because if he doesn't get there, he loses all the credits --
FSA credits that start to accumulate on the day you enter. If
he goes to the marshals and they hold him for days or weeks,
he loses that benefit that other inmates get. I have this
issue in another case right now. That's the way the BOP
interprets how FSA credits accumulate.
THE COURT: Is Mr. Sheppard absenting himself from
these proceedings voluntarily and he agrees to waive his
presence at this proceeding for purposes of restitution and
forfeiture?
MR. SREBNICK: Only if he's required to surrender
today; otherwise, he would stay and participate.
THE COURT: Well, I did state, Mr. Srebnick, I don't
see any basis. It's not as if the Court of Appeals has stated
that they are going to agree to a bond pending appeal. And to
the extent that they do, sir, then you can immediately seek
his release by the posting of the bond that the Eleventh
Circuit requires.
MR. SREBNICK: Understood.
So with that, he would ask to be excused from today's
proceeding. We'll cover for him so that he can make it to the
institution by the time you just indicated.
THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Sheppard? Today,
we're going to address the issues of forfeiture and
restitution. Are you waiving your presence, sir?
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THE DEFENDANT: I am.
THE COURT: All right, then.
(The defendant was excused.)
THE COURT: All right. Let us proceed. First, with
the issue of forfeiture, the Government has filed a notice on
forfeiture, Docket Entry 289, stating that the United States
seeks only a forfeiture/money judgment in the amount of
$146,587 based on the April 15, 2020, Alafaya Trails PPP loan,
under 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), one of the
loans of which the United States seeks restitution.
Is there any objection to the Court entering an order
of forfeiture with regard to that amount?
MR. SREBNICK: Yes, but let me just explain what
we've agreed with the Government --
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SREBNICK: -- because we've reached an agreement.
Mr. Sheppard has delivered a cashier's check in the
amount of $146,457, the loan amount, which he is repaying
ahead of this -- of the Court's hearing today so that that
would moot out the issue of restitution --
THE COURT: With regard to the SBA loan?
MR. SREBNICK: Yes, Your Honor. This would be the
April 2020 loan. From our perspective, it was not a count of
conviction. We understand the Court expressed its view. And
so Mr. Sheppard has agreed to just pay it back. In doing
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that, the Government agrees that once this cashier's check is
acknowledged by the SBA, that would then credit against
forfeiture as well and so that we would no longer have a
forfeiture issue in this case.
THE COURT: Is that correct?
MR. HYMAN: Yes, Your Honor, we would just file a
notice on forfeiture at a later point in time once it's --
once it's verified.
THE COURT: All right. Then the Court will wait for
that notice and not enter an order as requested.
MR. SREBNICK: In addition, today, Mr. Sheppard is
also agreeing to pay voluntarily the interest on that loan,
which was $1,582.55, as well as the processing fees that were
identified to us by Government counsel in the amount of
$22,172.25. And so that would moot out the issue of the
restitution that the Government was seeking for those
particular amounts. And that would leave you, Judge, with the
only issue, I believe, remaining for today would be the
restitution that was being sought by Mr. Cupersmith.
THE COURT: All right, then. Then let us address the
restitution that the Government is claiming with regard to
Mr. Cupersmith. And as the parties are well aware, the Court
entered a judgment of acquittal with regard to the aggravated
identity theft counts.
So my question to the Government is why would the
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Government be entitled to restitution with respect to
Mr. Cupersmith?
MS. JIMENEZ: Yes, Your Honor. Under the Mandatory
Victim Restitution Act, 18, USC, 3663A, there is restitution
which is mandatory -- I'm having difficulty with my eyes
again -- restitution is mandatory for victims of fraud
offenses, including in a case in which an offense involves as
an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or pattern of criminal
activity any person directly harmed by the defendant's
criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or
pattern.
And the statute talks about two different concepts:
The concept of harm and the concept of loss. And obviously,
first, to determine that the individual is a victim, the
individual must be directly harmed by the defendant's criminal
conduct. And here being that it was a scheme, he would be
directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme.
And the case law in the Eleventh Circuit is clear,
obviously, which was the issue that is no longer an issue with
respect to the SBA that a victim who's harmed in the course of
a scheme, whether or not it is a charged -- directly charged
in the indictment, if the conduct is relevant conduct, that
harm is recoverable -- or losses resulting from that harm are
recoverable. Here we have a victim who was harmed by the wire
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fraud scheme, both the counts that are specifically listed in
the indictment, Counts 7, 8, and 9, for which the defendant
was convicted, and as well as the relevant conduct -- well, I
should say -- let me leave the relevant conduct out because
there wasn't a tax return associated with that one.
So Mr. Cupersmith, as the Court knows, was someone
whose identity was used in connection with the fraudulent tax
returns that were submitted. One of the cases that I cited in
the memorandum that I had filed, In Re: Stewart, 552 F.3d
1285, Eleventh Circuit, 2008, that was a case in which the
defendant was a bank executive charged with conspiracy to
deprive the bank of services in connection with an illegal
fee-splitting arrangement with the developers.
The home purchasers who had paid a mortgage brokerage
fee to the bank had sought to be part of the case under the
Crime Victim's Rights Act, which is similar language regarding
the definition of a victim. The district court denied that
request, deeming they were not victims, and then the Eleventh
Circuit granted a writ of mandamus for the home purchasers to
be deemed victims in that case.
The Court said in that case as to the Crime Victim's
Rights Act, it says, "It does not limit the class of crime
victims to those whose identity constitutes an element of the
defense or who happen to be identified in the charging
document. The statute, rather, instructs the district court
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to look at the offense itself only to determine the harmful
effects the offense has on parties. Under the plain language
of the statute, a party may qualify as a victim even though it
may not have been the target of the crime as long as it
suffers harm as a result of the crime's commission."
Here, of course, we have the defendant who pretended
that those falsified tax returns were Mr. Cupersmith's work
product. There was obvious identity theft in the commission
of the wire fraud, and I think the Court acknowledged that.
Maybe not aggravated identity theft under post-Dubin standard,
according to the court, but I think the Court acknowledged
that there was identity theft.
Mr. Cupersmith's name, his signature, his prepared
tax identification number, which is nonpublic information,
housed with the IRS, the name of his firm -- his entire
professional identity was used in the commission of this
crime.
And I would say looking, for instance, at the
run-of-the-mill white collar investigation/white collar case
where it's not uncommon to subpoena the records of an
accountant or an accounting firm and to have an accountant
testify even in the PPP context. If you envision, for
instance -- which the defendant did here as well -- a
defendant who submits or an applicant who submits a ledger
with a long list of purported employees with purported wages
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paid, which is false, and the Government in its investigation
subpoenas the financial records of the accountant to
determine, you know, what records were actually provided to
the accountant, and the accountant produces those records and
the accountant maybe testifies at the trial regarding those
records.
We are in an entirely different universe here with
respect to Mr. Cupersmith. Mr. Cupersmith has to
affirmatively convince the FBI that he did not take part in
this crime, that he did not commit this crime, that he -- even
though the signatures look like his, that he did not sign --
he did not prepare the tax returns, that he did not sign the
tax returns and that even this nonpublic information that was
used on those tax returns, PTIN, that he did not commit the
crime.
And so the costs associated with that is the loss
that would be quantified, that is, him responding to
subpoenas, him producing records, him being interviewed by the
FBI, him letting the FBI see that the records that he actually
prepared were different from the ones that were filed with
those loan applications, and then, of course, having to be
part of these proceedings.
But I think as a threshold matter, he is in a very
different position as a victim than someone who's merely a
witness producing records in the case, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: And the Court even accepts the argument
that this is somehow related to the offense of conviction and
that Mr. Cupersmith is a victim under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act. I'm unclear -- and perhaps you can clarify
for the Court -- how Mr. Cupersmith's claim for attorneys'
fees with regard to his investigation or participation in the
Government's investigation and his response to certain
subpoenas and the hiring of an attorney for those purposes,
how that is based on the loss actually caused by the
defendant's conduct.
If he's participating in response to the Government's
subpoena and the Government's investigation, how is that a
loss directly attributable to Mr. Sheppard's conduct?
MS. JIMENEZ: Well, Your Honor, under the statute,
Subsection B4, it provides for -- in any case reimburse the
victim for lost income, which is obviously the schedule that
he provided for himself and his firm, the time that they had
to spend looking for records, reviewing the records, producing
the records, meeting with the Government to prepare for the
trial. All of that lost income, which is -- for him and his
firm -- it's his firm -- is directly reimbursable as a --
under the statute. So that's part of the cost associated with
his -- that he's entitled to recover.
As for attorneys' fees, that same paragraph refers to
other expenses related to participation in the investigation
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or prosecution of the offense or attendance in proceedings.
Attorneys' fees have been deemed to be recoverable. A lot --
THE COURT: Is there a case that you can provide to
the Court where attorneys' fees were recoverable because an
alleged victim -- in this case Mr. Cupersmith is a victim of
the aggravated identity theft -- responded to a subpoena
issued by the Government?
MS. JIMENEZ: Well, so let me just say that
Mr. Cupersmith -- because this was a criminal matter in which
he was implicated -- retained counsel to deal with the FBI, to
deal with the Government -- I have a case. It's a Southern
District of Florida case, US versus Fiorentino, 149 F. Supp.
3rd 1352. I don't remember the particulars of the case at
this moment, but there were attorneys' fees that were awarded
under Subsection B4 of the statute, which is the other
expenses associated with the investigation and prosecution of
the offense.
And then there's, of course, Second Circuit case
law -- the Battista case that involved the NBA as a victim out
of the Second Circuit, which I had previously cited -- and I
have that case, 575 F.3d 226, 2009, the same thing. The
attorneys' fees were deemed other expenses relating to the
investigation and prosecution of the offense. And because the
NBA in that case was deemed to be a victim of the fraud, those
attorneys' fees were recoverable.
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There's also Bahel, US versus Bahel, B-A-H-E-L, 662
F.3d 610. Again, Second Circuit, 2011. The same result where
attorneys' fees were recoverable.
So under that provision of the statute, it has been
interpreted to allow the attorneys' fees of the victim to be
recovered.
THE COURT: Are you waiting for me? I'm reading what
you --
MS. JIMENEZ: I thought you were reading something,
Your Honor.
So the case law, as I understand it, has interpreted
that phrase as other expenses related to the participation in
the investigation and prosecution of the offense were
intendant to the proceedings to allow the recovery of
reasonable attorneys' fees. And that is what Mr. Cupersmith
has been requesting. We have removed the travel of counsel
and the court appearance of counsel from the attorneys' fees,
which we do not think are appropriate fees to be recovered.
THE COURT: Are those items subtracted from the
amount you're seeking?
MS. JIMENEZ: Yes. They were included in the billing
schedule that Mr. Cupersmith's counsel provided, but we
deducted that amount from the total, since we asked him to
give us the categories of expenditures. And so we removed
those from the total attorneys' fees we are seeking.
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THE COURT: All right. I'm just looking at the last
case that you cited.
MS. JIMENEZ: And the earlier pleading that I had
filed, Your Honor, was Docket Entry 258.
THE COURT: I'm sorry. What is included in 258?
MS. JIMENEZ: It's the docket entry of the filing I
had made before, when we were proceeding to sentencing, and I
had cited the cases to establish Mr. Cupersmith as a victim.
You have the Stewart case, the Battista case...
THE COURT: I don't know why this isn't letting me
in. Hold on. I'm having issues with Westlaw right now. 575
F.3d 226, do you have a copy of it?
MS. JIMENEZ: I do, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. Appreciate it.
MS. JIMENEZ: That was the betting scheme in which an
NBA referee had provided nonpublic information belonging to
the NBA to the individuals who were placing these bets. The
court first deemed the NBA was a victim. Private information
had been used.
And secondly, part of the restitution included their
attorneys' fees associated with the investigation and
prosecution of the offense.
THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further,
Ms. Jimenez?
MS. JIMENEZ: No, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: Is there any testimony or other
information to be provided by the Government?
MS. JIMENEZ: We have the exhibits that we had filed
previously. But specifically regarding Mr. Cupersmith's fees,
we had a Docket Entry 291, Exhibits 4, 5, and 6. Exhibit 291,
5, are the itemized costs for Mr. Cupersmith's lost income.
And then 291 -- Exhibit 4 is a letter from the attorney. And
then Exhibit 6 -- where is Exhibit 6? Exhibit 6 is actually
from Docket Entry 258. It was Exhibit 2 with Docket Entry
258, which has the whole billing -- all the billing records
from the accountant, but the letter, which is attached to
Docket Entry 291, which is 291, Exhibit 4, it breaks out those
fees into buckets of -- and that's where we removed the travel
time and the court time of the attorney.
So just to correct -- yes. I'm sorry, Your Honor.
Exhibit 258-1 was the billing records, not 258-2.
THE COURT: Is there anything further?
MS. JIMENEZ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. ZARROW: Your Honor, may I approach the podium?
THE COURT: Yes, of course.
MR. ZARROW: Thank you.
Good afternoon, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What's your name?
(No response.)
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MR. ZARROW: As I understand it, there are four
issues relating to Mr. Cupersmith. Two of them are legal.
Two of them are factual or questions of evidentiary
sufficiency. I'll start up top with the two legal issues, but
just to give a high-level summary whether Mr. Cupersmith is a
victim, whether his claimed -- whether there's lost causation
to the claims here, whether the lost business income is
sufficiently justified as a matter of the evidentiary record
and the same question for the legal fees, whether they're
sufficiently justified in the record, and I'll start up top on
whether Mr. Cupersmith is a victim.
The question that Your Honor asked first of the
Government, the text of the MVRA states in a case of fraud
that a victim is any person who is directly harmed by the
defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme. The
conduct at issue here is placing Mr. Cupersmith's name on
those tax returns. Your Honor already held that's not
criminal. So it's not fitting within that language in the
statute.
THE COURT: Well, it wasn't criminal for purposes of
the aggravated identity theft statute --
MR. ZARROW: Right.
THE COURT: -- but the Government is making an
argument that it relates to the wire fraud statutes.
MR. ZARROW: Correct. So it wasn't criminal conduct,
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and then the government's next argument is but it was in the
course of the scheme. I heard the Government say in the
scheme of functionally means related to, and there's actually
Eleventh Circuit case law that requires an even tighter nexus,
closely related to. That's United States versus Dickerson,
370 F.3d 1343, closely related to the scheme. As I read in
the course of the scheme, I actually think it requires an even
tighter nexus, and that has to be scheme conduct, but no
matter.
What this Court held in the Rule 29 opinion was that
there was not a genuine nexus between Mr. Sheppard's use of
Mr. Cupersmith's name and the wire fraud. A fortiori, it
wasn't in the course of the scheme. It wasn't closely
related. The statutory language in the aggravated identity
theft statute is related to -- and Your Honor already found
that there wasn't a relation. So I think that's both the
beginning and the end of Mr. Cupersmith as a victim.
I just want to make one first principles point
besides the text point and that is Mr. Cupersmith was a victim
of a count on which the Government failed to convict. It
doesn't seem fair to me that they would be recovering fees on
a count that failed.
If Your Honor would like, I can move on to the lost
causation question, unless you have any questions.
THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at the Dickerson
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case --
MR. ZARROW: Yes.
THE COURT: -- and obviously -- the Eleventh Circuit
speaks of the relevant conduct --
MR. ZARROW: Right.
THE COURT: -- so I just want to make sure that I
understand the argument because the Court stated that with
regard to the relevant conduct, even if it occurs outside the
statute of limitations, the district court has to find that
the victim's losses resulted directly from the defendant's
criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, and the harm to
the victim must be closely related. So in determining whether
Mr. Cupersmith's losses resulted directly from the defendant's
criminal conduct, the Government, as I understand it, is
making an argument that Mr. Cupersmith would not have incurred
these attorneys' fees but for the fact that Mr. Sheppard used
his name in the course of submitting these applications.
And as a result, he needed to defend himself because
the Government believed by virtue of the subpoena that it
issued that he was a participant. So how do you get outside
of the loss resulting directly from the defendant's criminal
conduct?
MR. ZARROW: Your Honor, are you asking that question
as a question about loss causation or whether Cupersmith is a
victim in the first instance?
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THE COURT: Well, the victim -- obviously, the victim
must have suffered harm, and the defendant must have
proximately the caused harm. So if we look at the victim's
harm, the victim's harm, as claimed, is that because of the
prosecution by the Government directed at first to
Mr. Cupersmith that he had to respond to the subpoena,
participate in their investigation in order to show that he
himself was a victim. So I'm trying to understand because
you've said there's four prongs. Two of them are legal issues
so --
MR. ZARROW: Yes.
THE COURT: -- first under the MVRA, is
Mr. Cupersmith a victim?
MR. ZARROW: No. And I want to be very clear. I
understand the question that Your Honor is requesting. To me
that goes to the lost causation question which is -- you get
to only once you've determined that Mr. Cupersmith is a
victim. To determine whether he's a victim, you ask whether
Mr. Eric Sheppard's conduct in the course of the scheme harmed
him.
And Your Honor already has held as a matter of law, I
believe, that the placement of Mr. Cupersmith's name on the
tax returns was not in the course of the scheme because there
was no genuine nexus. That's the language in Dubin. That's
the language Your Honor used. There was no genuine nexus
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between the use of Mr. Cupersmith's name and the wire fraud.
It wasn't related to. That's the language of the aggravated
identity theft statute.
THE COURT: That's with regard to the aggravated
identify theft --
MR. ZARROW: Absolutely, and I think --
THE COURT: -- but the government's argument is with
regard to the wire fraud.
MR. ZARROW: Well, what Your Honor held was that
there was sufficient nexus between the wire fraud and the use
of Mr. Cupersmith's name. I think that it also forecloses the
Government claiming him as a victim under the MVRA because the
MVRA requires that the harm flow from criminal conduct in the
course of the scheme, and the scheme here was the wire fraud.
So Your Honor found no sufficient nexus, and I think
that no sufficient nexus also necessarily applies under the
MVRA. You seem not convinced --
THE COURT: Well, I -- because the Eleventh Circuit
has held that in light of the expanded statutory language,
restitution orders for conduct closely related to the offense
of conviction are appropriate under the MVRA --
MR. ZARROW: Correct.
THE COURT: -- in addition to the specific conduct
for which the defendant was convicted. So that puts the
aggravated identity theft to the side. So now we look at
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the --
MR. ZARROW: Yes.
THE COURT: -- offenses of conviction, which in this
case were the wire fraud.
MR. ZARROW: Yes.
THE COURT: So with regard to those offenses of
conviction, how is Mr. Cupersmith not a victim?
MR. ZARROW: Okay. So the conduct that allegedly
harmed Mr. Cupersmith was Mr. Sheppard's placement of his
identification on the tax forms; correct? Your Honor has
already said that is not related to the wire fraud. That was
the holding with respect to the aggravated identity theft
count.
THE COURT: Related to the wire fraud. All right --
MS. WEINTRAUB: Right, because that's the statutory
language in 1028A. So you've already said that placing the
name on the tax form is not related to the wire fraud. The
Eleventh Circuit quote you just read to me requires a close
relation, which is an even tighter nexus than is required
under the aggravated identity theft statute. That's the basic
argument.
So if a related -- if a relation -- unmodified is
insufficient, it is necessarily true that the conduct at issue
here is not closely related.
THE COURT: Okay.
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MR. ZARROW: The second argument is loss causation.
Your Honor, that's the question of whether the fees and
business income actually incurred here by Mr. Cupersmith were
directly caused by Mr. Sheppard. I don't think any of the
cases the Government cited involve a response to a Government
subpoena. If you apply principles of proximate cause, usually
you require foreseeability.
I don't think there's any argument that Mr. Sheppard
foresaw requiring Mr. Cupersmith to respond to a Government
subpoena. In addition to that, I personally am not aware of
any case in which the alleged victim responds to a Government
subpoena and incurs fees and then gets to recover those. So
that's the second point.
If Your Honor would like, I can turn now to the two
evidentiary sufficiency points.
THE COURT: Well, before we get past the second, the
lost causation with regard to the attorneys' fees -- and I'm
not certain if you read the case that the Government just
provided --
MR. ZARROW: Battista?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. ZARROW: I have. Sure.
THE COURT: All right. How do you distinguish -- and
I understand that although the court held that the two, the
VWPA and the MVRA, are closely aligned in terms of their
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context -- so they apply equally, but the court found that the
attorneys' fees were recoverable.
MR. ZARROW: There's no question that attorneys' fees
are recoverable as an abstract matter. The question here is
just whether it was directly caused by Mr. Sheppard's conduct
or the government's subpoena. So I don't have any quarrel
with the general rule for which the Government cited the case.
I'll also say that case doesn't help the Government
on the victim question. I don't know if Your Honor is
familiar with the fact pattern in Carpenter, the Supreme Court
case about wire fraud, but it's essentially the same fact
pattern.
The victim in this case and the defendant -- or the
victim in Carpenter, they both lost the right to use their
confidential information. That's obviously a harm cognizable
under the wire fraud statute. So I don't think that's any
problem for us on the victim question. It's a pretty direct
harm and it's a match to a Supreme Court case.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ZARROW: On the question of evidentiary
sufficiency, I want to break this out. We've got the lost
business income and we've got the attorneys' fees. I can
start with the lost business income. That is -- if Your Honor
has the document, it's document number 291-5.
THE COURT: Let me pull it up on the record.
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MR. ZARROW: Sure.
And I can start just with a prefatory matter which is
the Government bears the burden of proof here, and it needs to
prove that this is actually lost business income. That's what
our argument flows from. So what Your Honor will see, if you
have the document available --
THE COURT: Give me two seconds. I'm getting there
as fast as I can. It's just running a little slow. I just
got out of it to get into Westlaw. So hold on.
MR. ZARROW: If Your Honor would like, I can hand you
my physical copy --
THE COURT: I have it here. It just took me a moment
to get into the computer. All right. I'm with you.
MR. ZARROW: All right. So what Your Honor will see
are essentially billing entries by people at Mr. Cupersmith's
firm and then dollar values associated with the billing
entries. That's all the Government has in support of its
claim that this is lost business income, but there's no
affidavit, no attestation, nothing like that actually proving
this is lost business income.
You can imagine, for example, that the office was
slow one day. And while they were waiting around for a client
to come in -- let's say they had three hours in between
clients -- they went and analyzed documents and compiled
subpoena information. That's not lost business income.
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That's just the time they spent doing these tasks.
What the Government has not done is carried its
burden of proof. It's not even come particularly close to
carrying its burden of proving that this is lost business
income that the -- Mr. Cupersmith's firm forewent other
opportunities because of what you see on this sheet.
The only thing the Court has from Mr. Cupersmith is
his victim impact statement, which was not signed under
penalty of perjury, in which he doesn't mention lost business
income at all. He doesn't vouch for this. There's absolutely
nothing in the record that substantiates this as lost business
income.
All you have before you is the time -- the value of
the time that these people spent -- allegedly spent because
it's not under perjury -- doing the things listed here.
That's not sufficient. That's plainly not sufficient.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. ZARROW: And then on attorneys' fees you have
more or less the same problem. The attorney fee submission
that Your Honor first received looked like this. This is
document entry 258-1, but it looked like this. Oh, I'm sorry.
It was completely redacted. We have no idea what the time was
spent for. If I submitted a bill like this to a client, they
would reject it out of hand. Again, the Government bears the
burden of proof.
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What the Government responded with when it, I think,
figured out it had a very substantial problem is Docket
Entry 291-4. That's a summary letter from the law firm Fox
Rothschild in which essentially they went month by month and
provided an extremely vague high-level summary -- just a
high-level summary of what types of things in the abstract the
attorneys were doing.
So this isn't block billing by day or by hour. What
you're looking at is block billing by month. Again, I could
not submit a bill to a client that looked like this. I don't
think the Government could submit it and expect to receive
restitution from the court.
For example, in October, there was an invoice for
$40,000 and the description is conferences with clients,
docket review for possible subpoena response, conference with
Government team. We don't know -- there's no way for the
Court to scrutinize whether the hours are reasonable, whether
there was duplicative billing, whether it was done by a
paralegal, whether it was done by an attorney. There's just
nothing in the record.
In the summary description what you'll see is stuff
like review selected docket entries. Obviously,
Mr. Cupersmith's attorney couldn't review every single entry
on the docket and expect to be compensated. Many of them have
nothing to do with Mr. Cupersmith. We have no way to know
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what docket entries they were reviewing. Review selected case
law. We have no way to know whether the case law was germane
to Mr. Cupersmith or whether just out of intellectual
curiosity the attorneys were researching the wire fraud issues
in this case. It is completely, completely unsubstantiated.
That's on the substance.
If you turn back to the fully redacted version that
the Government has submitted with no time entries, there's no
way for us to tell, for example, whether the attorneys were
performing tasks that should have been done by paralegals. As
I mentioned previously, duplicative time -- I'm sure Your
Honor has seen many attorneys' fees applications -- maybe in
Equal Access to Justice Act cases or the like. And usually,
people substantiate their time. The court goes through it
pretty carefully and parses out what's necessary time, what
should have been done by a paralegal. There's no way to do
that here even if the Court wanted to. It's not possible.
The Government hasn't carried its burden to prove that these
fees were reasonable or necessary.
The Battista case that Your Honor mentioned earlier,
that the Government cited, actually has a nice little
recitation towards the end. I don't remember the page number
specifically. But they -- the Second Circuit credited the
district court for meticulously -- I think is the word --
meticulously going through the billing fee records and
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determining which were compensable, which were not. There's
no way to do that here. Your Honor could not meticulously go
through the billing fee records because we have month-by-month
block billing with overly vague entries and no way to actually
figure out what the attorneys were doing or whether they were
related to the representation of Mr. Cupersmith as necessary
to this case.
The last issue is the hourly rate. I believe more or
less the attorney hourly rate charged was 900 and the
paralegal rate was something like 4- or 500. It was a
substantial sum. Typically, in a case like this, what you
have see -- what you probably have seen is that people submit
declarations and affidavits attesting that the rate was
reasonable in the market in order to persuade the court to
compensate the attorney at the rates charged. There's nothing
like that here. There's nothing. So there's no way for the
Court to perform that analysis either.
So what you have is a woefully, in my view,
inadequate record on both lost business income and on
attorneys' fees. I don't think you need to reach that because
you've got the threshold issue of whether Mr. Cupersmith is a
victim. In my mind, the Government is seeking compensation on
a count for which they failed to convict. But if you do get
to the evidentiary sufficiency question, there's just no
record for you to perform the review that the case law
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requires. Thank you.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MS. JIMENEZ: Your Honor, with respect to issue of
whether or not Mr. Cupersmith is a victim, the analysis here
is under the Mandatory Victim Rights Act. It is not for the
Court, I submit, to engage in a Dubin analysis, which the
court did for the aggravated identity theft counts. Here, it
is whether or not he is a victim, which the case law in
Dickerson and the subsequent cases say that it is to be an
expansive term, not a narrow term. It is to be defined
expansively in scheme-based crimes. It is not to apply a
Dubin standard for purposes of determining whether or not it
satisfies the elements of an aggravated identity theft.
Here, the Government is claiming that Mr. Cupersmith
was a victim of the wire fraud. And we have three wire fraud
counts, a count where there was a falsified loan application
to Northeast Bank, which is Count 7, an actual tax return
stand-alone count submitted, which is Count 8, and that was a
tax return submitted to support that loan application, and
that tax return used Mr. Cupersmith's identity on the tax
return where the defendant claimed this was Mr. Cupersmith's
work product, and then Count 9, which is a loan application
submitted together with a tax return in that count to Cross
River Bank where that tax return, again, represented
Mr. Cupersmith's work product -- purported work product,
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fraudulent work product.
And so under the statute, the question is was he
directly harmed as a result of the defendant's criminal
conduct in the scheme. And as I've already discussed with the
Court, he's not just a regular witness. It's his tax return
in those counts purportedly prepared and signed by him and his
firm. And so he had to defend himself against that.
The statute provides for the victim to be reimbursed
for their expenses. It's not just, I don't know, lost
business, even though every minute that he had to spend
dealing with this matter and clearing his name and helping the
Government with its investigation in the prosecution of the
person who actually falsified those tax returns in his name,
those are his expenses -- and of course, time lost away from
his actual business.
Does the Court have any questions for me on the --
THE COURT: Well, I think it comes down to a question
of law and then, obviously, a question of fact with regard to
this income that was lost and these attorneys' fees that were
incurred with regard to whether it was directly related.
Let me first say that it appears under the statute --
because the question is whether Mr. Sheppard's fraud here on
the bank and the SBA with regard to the wire fraud charges can
be considered a proximate cause of the loss to Mr. Cupersmith.
So I think that is, obviously, the legal issue, whether he is
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a victim. It appears that it's broadly defined by the
Eleventh Circuit, a person directly and proximally harmed as a
result of the commission of the offense for which restitution
may be ordered, including in the case of an offense that
involves as an element a scheme conspiracy, or a pattern of
criminal activity any person directly harmed.
It's clear that with regard to these three counts --
7, 8 and 9 -- that Mr. Cupersmith's name and the use of his
name and his company was placed on each of the tax returns
that were part of the package that were submitted to the
banks. So I think in terms of the victim, it would appear he
is a victim. The argument that's been made -- and I'm looking
at the document to try to discern -- is how the Government
parses out the amounts and comes to a figure in this case of
$113,382 justified as loss of business income.
MS. JIMENEZ: Well, it's actually $93,000 with
respect to the expenses or costs associated with
Mr. Cupersmith's business that is separate from the attorneys'
fees, which are $113,000. There is the schedule, which is
291-5 --
THE COURT: But how does the Government -- I mean,
the Court is just to accept the line items that the lost
income and expenses related to the investigation and
prosecution as well as the attorneys' fees totaled this
amount. I guess the question is factually whether that is
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justified. And Mr. Cupersmith is not here to testify. What's
before the Court is a chart that the Government has filed, and
I'm just questioning whether that's sufficient.
MS. JIMENEZ: So, obviously, hearsay is admissible in
this proceeding. Mr. Cupersmith provided a written account by
date, by units, by staff, including himself, and Mr. Alex
Zaslow, both of whom testified in this case, with an amount of
time and description for each item which talks about the
companies associated with this case. It makes references to
the FBI, to document review, to trial preparation, itemized.
That is what he submitted.
Restitution in a case is -- what is required is to
provide a reasonable estimate of the expenses and the loss to
Mr. Cupersmith that he be made whole. Mr. Cupersmith here is
not asking for anything extra, simply the cost that he
incurred associated with this.
As for the attorneys' fees, there is the letter from
his counsel, Mr. Kaminski, and, obviously, he considered the
individual -- the details associated with the billing
statements to be confidential information, but it is broken
down by time. I counted Mr. Kaminski's time, which is the
highest billing rate, to be about 40 percent of the time. So
there was a younger associate and a paralegal who worked on
this matter as well, and he categorized the time and amounts
not just by month but by hours associated with the type of
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work that he was doing.
And so from the government's standpoint, we believe
that it's a reasonable estimate of the cost incurred by
Mr. Cupersmith for his involvement in this case and for being
a victim in this case.
THE COURT: But it's not merely the involvement in
the case. I guess that's what I'm having a hard time -- I'm
looking at Mr. Kaminski's letter --
MS. JIMENEZ: I don't want to throw another ambiguous
term into this. We have harm, which is what determines
whether or not he is a victim, and then how is that harm
quantified; that is, what are the costs associated with this
individual having been a victim in this case, the cost that
should be reimbursed.
So the defendant claims that Mr. Cupersmith being
subpoenaed and having to incur costs associated with
responding to subpoenas was not foreseeable even though he
took his identity and submitted tax returns that were false
and that used his identity. That was apparently not
foreseeable. I submit of course it was foreseeable. To the
extent that his fraud would be discovered, it is most
definitely foreseeable because he was a centerpiece of the
fraud and, in fact, that there are specific counts that he was
convicted on which involved those tax returns. So of course
it's foreseeable.
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And then the question is what are the losses
associated with him being a victim that is caused by the
conduct of the defendant that the victim should be reimbursed
for. The statute provides for him being reimbursed for
transportation -- hold on. Right -- you know, lost income,
child care, transportation, and other expenses incurred during
the participation in the investigation and prosecution of the
offense. These are expenses for which he is entitled to be
reimbursed.
THE COURT: Well, it's what's necessary and
reasonable. And I'm looking at Mr. Kaminski's letter and I'm
trying to cross-reference it with this spreadsheet and docket
entries, research issues, conferences with clients, document
review. It's hard to discern what, in fact, is necessary and
reasonable. And in this case, he certainly intended to put
Mr. Cupersmith in the same position as he would have been,
which is, had the crime not been committed, not in a better
position, and it appears to have some entries that I'm not
certain are necessary and reasonable.
Is there anything else for the Government to present?
MS. JIMENEZ: Well, if the attorneys' fees are not
sufficiently detailed, I would ask the Court to allow the
Government to submit a supplement by next Tuesday to detail
the attorneys' fees in a way that would set out essentially
item by item that Mr. Cupersmith should be reimbursed for.
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And I would just submit it's not Mr. Cupersmith's
fault. I mean, it's our fault here that there was a
back-and-forth with counsel not wanting to sort of reveal what
was confidential in trying to come up with some middle ground
allowing him to provide the information in terms of
categories. But if the Court deems that to be insufficient, I
would --
THE COURT: I'm merely saying it should not be a
windfall. It should be necessary and reasonable to place the
victim in the same position had the criminal conduct not
occurred. This is the restitution hearing, so the Government
appears to rest on what it submitted to the Court.
Is there anything further?
MS. MARTINEZ: May I just make one point, Your Honor?
One approach, if you have some concern with the
attorneys' fees, is just to the fact that you were here in the
courtroom. You saw Mr. Cupersmith testify, the extent to
which he was cross-examined. You saw all the items that were
admitted into evidence that had been provided by
Mr. Cupersmith's firm. You saw Mr. Zaslow, who is also from
Mr. Cupersmith's firm, testify. You saw the documents that
had been produced by Mr. Zaslow in this courtroom that were
submitted into evidence.
And the reason I mention that is because I think you
have a good amount in the record of reliable evidence to
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support that at least a portion of these attorneys' fees are
certainly reasonable in this case that became quite complex
paperwise and where a lot of the documents that were false
were documents that were tax returns that were reported to be
falsified by this poor man, Mr. Cupersmith, with numbers being
crunched that were false.
And so one suggested approach, Your Honor, to
conclude this case, is for you to rely on what you saw
yourself and what is in this record and perhaps make an
adjustment downward on the attorneys' fees side so that
basically you still make the victim whole but you ensure that
you satisfy your concern that he doesn't have a windfall.
The other comment that I feel like I must make, Your
Honor, is that the defendant in this case testified on the
stand that he realized that his conduct impacted others and
that as a result, he made a decision to pay the attorneys'
fees of Jeanette Gonzalez and his other employees because he
felt they needed them.
And so he affirmatively recognized that his conduct
impacted others. He made a choice to pay for some. And it
was in fact the ones that he had a joint defense agreement
with. And after he bought representation for them, they
stopped speaking to the FBI.
Mr. Cupersmith is the one person who Mr. Sheppard did
not pay for attorneys' fees. Mr. Cupersmith continued to
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speak to the FBI, and he participated in this investigation
and in this prosecution. And the Mandatory Victim Restitution
Act specifically says that time that is spent in assisting the
Government in the investigation and prosecution of the case is
the type of restitution harm, the type of pecuniary loss that
is covered. And when I've seen some debate in the case law,
Your Honor, it's when sometimes victims are out there and they
say, "Oh, we filed a civil lawsuit and we want to recover our
attorneys' fees for the civil lawsuit" or something like that,
and courts squarely reject that. But what the courts grant is
when the person asks for attorneys' fees in the -- for the
attorneys' help in assisting with the government's criminal
investigation and prosecution.
So I just want to add the defendant himself made a
decision to pay attorneys' fees for people who would not speak
to the FBI, but the poor victim who did speak to the FBI --
you know, I just would ask this Court to maybe adjust it
downward to allay your concerns, but you have a very
sufficient record.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
At this point I would like to parse through the fees
and costs to determine whether they are necessary and
reasonable, understanding that the Government carries the
burden. So to the extent that the Court is unable to based on
what the Government is relying upon, then it obviously weighs
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against the Government. But I do believe at this point the
Court should enter a written order with regard to the
government's request for restitution.
The Government is also going to advise the Court with
regard to the forfeiture and whether that's unnecessary given
the clearance of the check.
Is there anything further that we need to address at
this time?
MS. MARTINEZ: Your Honor, if I may. I want to make
clear that we are seeking a restitution judgment with respect
to the SBA. The SBA is entitled to full and timely
restitution. I made an effort in writing and with the
conference a month in advance of this proceeding asking,
"Please, if you're going to pay, pay in advance because we
need to have proper verification from the victim." And so --
THE COURT: It's my understanding that the Government
was not going to. So at this point you are seeking --
MS. MARTINEZ: Oh, no, no -- Your Honor, we do need
the restitution judgment in place because the victim has not
received the money --
THE COURT: And then Mr. Sheppard will be credited
for the amount that he's paid.
MS. MARTINEZ: He will be 100 percent credited for
the restitution. And then the forfeiture matters are being
handled by Mr. Hyman, but we just need the restitution order
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in place for the amount that I requested, which was 170,000 --
I have it.
Does the Court need that number?
THE COURT: No. I have it by way of the government's
filings.
Is there any objection to that restitution amount for
the SBA loan?
MR. SREBNICK: Yes. To avoid confusion and since the
Court is already going to be reviewing the attorneys' fees
issue, what I would propose is we'll get the check to the SBA.
The Court will await the affirmative clearance of that check,
at which point there's no need for a restitution order;
otherwise -- I want to avoid triple payment.
THE COURT: I think it would avoid the forfeiture
order, but the Court will enter an order of restitution with
regard to the SBA loan of $170,211.80, and Mr. Sheppard will
be credited for the amount that he's already paid toward the
restitution, and the Government will not move forward on the
issue of forfeiture. Am I correct?
MS. MARTINEZ: You understand it correctly. We need
the restitution judgment. And we have provided the reference
numbers for the loans to probation, which need to be provided.
And I've provided them to the defense as well. Because to be
able to receive that payment, the SBA needs those specific
loan numbers.
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We need the restitution judgment today, in fact,
because time has passed -- accounted -- and we only have a few
more days within the 90-day window. That's why I had asked a
month in advance to the defense and the defense then came here
today.
I even inquired as to how long it would take for the
victim to be able to receive the money, and it just wouldn't
be enough time. Again, that's why I did a month in advance.
So now we're forced into having the restitution judgment and
then we will -- I have my financial litigation program
attorney awaiting it. As soon as the SBA gets it credited,
she will credit at the US Attorney's Office. So that will
take care of that. And then Mr. Hyman will be able to move
forward with his agreement regarding forfeiture.
THE COURT: When is the ninetieth day? Do we know?
MS. MARTINEZ: It's going to be roughly, Your Honor,
September 6 or 7 because --
THE COURT: All right. Then we'll enter the order in
short order with regard to restitution, and certainly that
will be part of the amended judgment with regard to the
restitution amount.
Is there anything further that we need to address?
MR. SREBNICK: One moment, Your Honor.
THE COURT: On behalf of the defendant?
MR. SREBNICK: Nothing else, Your Honor.
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THE COURT: On behalf of the Government?
MS. JIMENEZ: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. Have a nice weekend. Good to see
everyone.
(Proceedings concluded at 2:36 PM.)
CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER
I certify that the foregoing is a correct
transcription of the record of proceedings in the
above-entitled matter prepared from my stenotype notes.
DATE: 9th of October, 2024
/s/Lance W. Steinbeisser
Lance W. Steinbeisser,
FCRR, RPR, FPR-C
Official Court Reporter
United States District Court
Southern District of Florida
Miami, Florida
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 44 of 53
$
$1,582.55 [1] - 9:13
$113,000 [1] - 34:19
$113,382 [1] - 34:15
$146,457 [1] - 8:18
$146,587 [1] - 8:8
$170,211.80 [1] -
42:16
$22,172.25 [1] - 9:15
$40,000 [1] - 29:14
$93,000 [1] - 34:16
/
/s/Lance [1] - 44:10
1
1 [2] - 1:8, 3:7
100 [1] - 41:23
1028A [1] - 24:16
1285 [1] - 11:10
1300 [1] - 2:11
1343 [1] - 20:6
1352 [1] - 15:13
149 [1] - 15:12
15 [1] - 8:8
170,000 [1] - 42:1
18 [2] - 8:9, 10:4
18th [1] - 2:15
1:28 [1] - 1:6
2
2 [2] - 3:2, 18:9
2008 [1] - 11:10
2009 [1] - 15:21
201 [1] - 2:11
2011 [1] - 16:2
2020 [2] - 8:8, 8:23
2024 [2] - 1:5, 44:10
21 [1] - 3:2
213-430-8367 [1] -
2:17
21st [1] - 2:19
22-20290 [1] - 4:3
22-CR-20290-BB-1
[1] - 1:2
226 [2] - 15:21, 17:12
23 [1] - 1:5
258 [4] - 17:4, 17:5,
18:9, 18:10
258-1 [2] - 18:16,
28:21
258-2 [1] - 18:16
289 [1] - 8:6
29 [1] - 20:10
291 [5] - 18:5, 18:7,
18:12
291-4 [1] - 29:3
291-5 [2] - 26:24,
34:20
2:00 [1] - 5:10
2:30 [1] - 5:10
2:36 [2] - 1:6, 44:5
3
305-371-6421 [1] -
2:13
305-373-9400 [1] -
3:4
305-374-1818 [1] -
2:21
305-530-7976 [1] -
2:8
305-536-1191 [1] -
3:8
305.523.5633 [1] -
1:21
33128 [2] - 1:20, 3:7
33131 [3] - 2:12,
2:20, 3:3
33132 [1] - 2:6
3663A [1] - 10:4
370 [1] - 20:6
3rd [1] - 15:13
4
4 [4] - 18:5, 18:7,
18:12, 31:10
40 [2] - 3:7, 35:22
400 [2] - 1:20, 2:15
44 [1] - 1:8
4:00 [1] - 5:8
5
5 [2] - 18:5, 18:6
500 [1] - 31:10
552 [1] - 11:9
575 [2] - 15:21, 17:11
6
6 [5] - 18:5, 18:8,
43:17
610 [1] - 16:2
662 [1] - 16:1
7
7 [4] - 11:2, 32:17,
34:8, 43:17
8
8 [3] - 11:2, 32:18,
34:8
9
9 [3] - 11:2, 32:22,
34:8
90-day [1] - 43:3
900 [1] - 31:9
90071 [1] - 2:16
981(a)(1)(C [1] - 8:9
99 [1] - 2:5
9th [1] - 44:10
A
able [3] - 42:24, 43:7,
43:13
above-entitled [1] -
44:9
absenting [1] - 7:7
absolutely [2] - 23:6,
28:10
abstract [2] - 26:4,
29:6
accept [1] - 34:22
accepts [1] - 14:1
Access [1] - 30:13
according [1] - 12:11
account [1] - 35:5
accountant [7] -
12:21, 13:2, 13:4,
13:5, 18:11
accounted [1] - 43:2
accounting [1] -
12:21
accumulate [2] - 7:2,
7:6
acknowledged [3] -
9:2, 12:9, 12:11
acquittal [1] - 9:23
Act [7] - 10:4, 11:16,
11:22, 14:4, 30:13,
32:5, 40:3
activity [2] - 10:9,
34:6
actual [2] - 32:17,
33:15
add [1] - 40:14
addition [3] - 9:11,
23:23, 25:10
address [4] - 7:24,
9:20, 41:7, 43:22
adjust [1] - 40:17
adjustment [1] -
39:10
admissible [1] - 35:4
admitted [1] - 38:19
advance [4] - 41:13,
41:14, 43:4, 43:8
advise [2] - 5:11,
41:4
affidavit [1] - 27:19
affidavits [1] - 31:13
affirmatively [2] -
13:9, 39:19
afternoon [10] - 4:7,
4:11, 4:12, 4:15,
4:16, 4:19, 4:21,
4:24, 5:13, 18:23
Agent [2] - 3:10, 4:10
aggravated [12] -
9:23, 12:10, 15:6,
19:21, 20:14, 23:2,
23:4, 23:25, 24:12,
24:20, 32:7, 32:13
agree [1] - 7:15
agreed [2] - 8:14,
8:25
agreeing [1] - 9:12
agreement [3] - 8:16,
39:21, 43:14
agrees [2] - 7:8, 9:1
ahead [1] - 8:19
aided [1] - 1:23
Aimee [1] - 4:7
AIMEE [1] - 2:3
aimee.jimenez@
usdoj.gov [1] - 2:6
Alafaya [1] - 8:8
Alex [1] - 35:6
aligned [1] - 25:25
allay [1] - 40:18
alleged [2] - 15:5,
25:11
allegedly [2] - 24:8,
28:14
allow [3] - 16:5,
16:14, 37:22
allowing [1] - 38:5
alone [1] - 32:18
ALSO [1] - 3:10
ambiguous [1] - 36:9
amended [1] - 43:20
America [1] - 4:3
AMERICA [1] - 1:4
amount [15] - 8:7,
8:12, 8:18, 9:14,
16:20, 16:23,
34:25, 35:7, 38:25,
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
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41:22, 42:1, 42:6,
42:17, 43:21
amounts [3] - 9:17,
34:14, 35:24
ANA [1] - 2:4
Ana [1] - 4:9
ana.maria.martinez
@usdoj.gov [1] -
2:7
analysis [3] - 31:17,
32:4, 32:6
analyzed [1] - 27:24
Angeles [1] - 2:16
appeal [5] - 5:19,
5:20, 5:23, 6:1,
7:15
Appeals [5] - 5:18,
5:25, 6:5, 6:12,
7:14
appear [1] - 34:11
appearance [1] -
16:17
appearances [1] -
4:5
APPEARANCES [1] -
2:1
applicant [1] - 12:24
application [3] -
32:16, 32:19, 32:22
applications [3] -
13:21, 21:17, 30:12
applies [1] - 23:16
apply [3] - 25:6, 26:1,
32:11
appreciate [1] -
17:14
approach [3] - 18:20,
38:15, 39:7
appropriate [3] -
5:25, 16:18, 23:21
April [2] - 8:8, 8:23
argument [11] - 14:1,
19:24, 20:1, 21:7,
21:15, 23:7, 24:21,
25:1, 25:8, 27:5,
34:12
arrangement [1] -
11:13
Assistant [1] - 4:8
assisting [2] - 40:3,
40:12
associate [1] - 35:23
associated [14] -
11:5, 13:16, 14:22,
15:16, 17:21,
27:16, 34:17, 35:9,
35:16, 35:19,
35:25, 36:12,
36:16, 37:2
assume [1] - 5:17
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attached [1] - 18:11
attendance [1] - 15:1
attestation [1] -
27:19
attesting [1] - 31:13
attorney [9] - 14:8,
18:7, 18:14, 28:19,
29:19, 29:23, 31:9,
31:15, 43:11
Attorney's [2] - 2:5,
43:12
attorneys [4] - 29:7,
30:4, 30:9, 31:5
Attorneys [1] - 4:9
attorneys' [37] - 14:5,
14:24, 15:2, 15:4,
15:14, 15:22,
15:25, 16:3, 16:5,
16:15, 16:17,
16:25, 17:21,
21:16, 25:17, 26:2,
26:3, 26:22, 28:18,
30:12, 31:20,
33:19, 34:18,
34:24, 35:17,
37:21, 37:24,
38:16, 39:1, 39:10,
39:16, 39:25, 40:9,
40:11, 40:12,
40:15, 42:9
attributable [1] -
14:13
August [1] - 1:5
AUSA [3] - 2:3, 2:4,
2:4
available [1] - 27:6
Avenue [1] - 1:20
avoid [3] - 42:8,
42:13, 42:14
await [1] - 42:11
awaiting [1] - 43:11
awarded [1] - 15:14
aware [2] - 9:22,
25:10
B
B4 [2] - 14:15, 15:15
back-and-forth [1] -
38:3
Bahel [2] - 16:1
BAHEL [1] - 16:1
bail [4] - 5:19, 5:20,
5:23, 5:25
Bank [2] - 32:17,
32:24
bank [4] - 11:11,
11:12, 11:15, 33:23
banks [1] - 34:11
based [4] - 8:8, 14:9,
32:11, 40:24
basic [1] - 24:20
basis [1] - 7:14
Battista [4] - 15:19,
17:9, 25:20, 30:20
bears [2] - 27:3,
28:24
became [1] - 39:2
BEFORE [1] - 1:12
beginning [1] - 20:17
behalf [4] - 4:12,
4:20, 43:24, 44:1
BEHALF [1] - 2:9
belonging [1] - 17:16
benefit [1] - 7:4
BETH [1] - 1:12
bets [1] - 17:17
better [1] - 37:17
betting [1] - 17:15
between [4] - 20:11,
23:1, 23:10, 27:23
bill [2] - 28:23, 29:10
billing [14] - 16:21,
18:10, 18:16,
27:15, 27:16, 29:8,
29:9, 29:18, 30:25,
31:3, 31:4, 35:19,
35:22
Biscayne [3] - 2:11,
2:19, 3:2
Black [1] - 2:11
block [3] - 29:8, 29:9,
31:4
BLOOM [1] - 1:12
bond [2] - 7:15, 7:17
BOP [1] - 7:5
bought [1] - 39:22
Boulevard [3] - 2:11,
2:19, 3:2
break [1] - 26:21
breaks [1] - 18:12
Broad [1] - 3:2
broadly [1] - 34:1
broken [1] - 35:20
brokerage [1] - 11:14
buckets [1] - 18:13
burden [6] - 27:3,
28:3, 28:4, 28:25,
30:18, 40:24
business [16] - 19:7,
25:3, 26:22, 26:23,
27:4, 27:18, 27:20,
27:25, 28:4, 28:9,
28:11, 31:19,
33:10, 33:15,
34:15, 34:18
C
California [1] - 2:16
camp [1] - 6:25
care [2] - 37:6, 43:13
carefully [1] - 30:15
Carpenter [2] -
26:10, 26:14
carried [2] - 28:2,
30:18
carries [1] - 40:23
carrying [1] - 28:4
CASE [1] - 1:2
Case [1] - 4:2
case [58] - 5:17, 7:5,
9:4, 10:7, 10:19,
11:10, 11:15,
11:20, 11:21,
12:19, 13:25,
14:15, 15:3, 15:5,
15:11, 15:12,
15:13, 15:18,
15:19, 15:21,
15:24, 16:11, 17:2,
17:9, 19:13, 20:4,
21:1, 24:4, 25:11,
25:18, 26:7, 26:8,
26:11, 26:13,
26:18, 30:1, 30:2,
30:5, 30:20, 31:7,
31:11, 31:25, 32:8,
34:4, 34:14, 35:7,
35:9, 35:12, 36:4,
36:5, 36:7, 36:13,
37:15, 39:2, 39:8,
39:14, 40:4, 40:6
case.. [1] - 17:9
cases [5] - 11:8,
17:8, 25:5, 30:13,
32:9
cashier's [2] - 8:17,
9:1
Cassel [1] - 3:2
categories [2] -
16:24, 38:6
categorized [1] -
35:24
causation [6] - 19:6,
20:24, 21:24,
22:16, 25:1, 25:17
caused [5] - 14:9,
22:3, 25:4, 26:5,
37:2
CAVALLO [1] - 3:1
Cavallo [1] - 4:22
centerpiece [1] -
36:22
certain [4] - 5:11,
14:7, 25:18, 37:19
certainly [3] - 37:15,
39:2, 43:19
CERTIFICATE [1] -
44:6
certify [1] - 44:8
chance [2] - 6:5, 6:6
charged [5] - 10:22,
11:11, 31:9, 31:15
charges [1] - 33:23
charging [1] - 11:24
chart [1] - 35:2
check [5] - 8:17, 9:1,
41:6, 42:10, 42:11
child [1] - 37:6
choice [1] - 39:20
chris.cavallo@
nelsonmullins.
com [1] - 3:4
CHRISTOPHER [1] -
3:1
Circuit [15] - 5:24,
6:11, 7:18, 10:19,
11:10, 11:19,
15:18, 15:20, 16:2,
20:4, 21:3, 23:18,
24:18, 30:23, 34:2
cited [7] - 11:8,
15:20, 17:2, 17:8,
25:5, 26:7, 30:21
civil [2] - 40:8, 40:9
claim [2] - 14:5,
27:18
claimed [3] - 19:6,
22:4, 32:21
claiming [3] - 9:21,
23:12, 32:14
claims [2] - 19:7,
36:15
CLAIRE [1] - 2:18
clarify [1] - 14:4
class [1] - 11:22
clear [4] - 10:19,
22:14, 34:7, 41:10
clearance [2] - 41:6,
42:11
clearing [1] - 33:11
client [3] - 27:22,
28:23, 29:10
clients [3] - 27:24,
29:14, 37:13
close [2] - 24:18,
28:3
closely [7] - 20:5,
20:6, 20:13, 21:12,
23:20, 24:24, 25:25
Code [1] - 8:9
cognizable [1] -
26:15
collar [2] - 12:19
comment [1] - 39:13
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
46
commission [4] -
12:5, 12:8, 12:16,
34:3
commit [2] - 13:10,
13:14
committed [1] -
37:17
companies [1] - 35:9
company [1] - 34:9
compensable [1] -
31:1
compensate [1] -
31:15
compensated [1] -
29:24
compensation [1] -
31:22
compiled [1] - 27:24
completely [3] -
28:22, 30:5
complex [1] - 39:2
computer [2] - 1:23,
27:13
computer-aided [1] -
1:23
concept [2] - 10:13
concepts [1] - 10:12
concern [2] - 38:15,
39:12
concerns [1] - 40:18
conclude [1] - 39:8
concluded [1] - 44:5
conduct [30] - 10:10,
10:16, 10:17,
10:23, 11:3, 11:4,
14:10, 14:13,
19:15, 19:16,
19:25, 20:8, 21:4,
21:8, 21:11, 21:14,
21:22, 22:19,
23:13, 23:20,
23:23, 24:8, 24:23,
26:5, 33:4, 37:3,
38:10, 39:15, 39:19
conference [2] -
29:15, 41:13
conferences [2] -
29:14, 37:13
confidential [3] -
26:15, 35:20, 38:4
confirmed [1] - 5:5
confusion [1] - 42:8
connection [2] -
11:7, 11:12
consider [7] - 5:18,
5:21, 5:23, 6:3, 6:6,
6:8, 6:10
considered [2] -
33:24, 35:18
conspiracy [4] - 10:8,
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 46 of 53
10:10, 11:11, 34:5
constitutes [1] -
11:23
context [2] - 12:22,
26:1
continued [1] - 39:25
convict [2] - 20:20,
31:23
convicted [3] - 11:3,
23:24, 36:24
conviction [5] - 8:24,
14:2, 23:21, 24:3,
24:7
convince [1] - 13:9
convinced [1] - 23:17
copy [2] - 17:12,
27:11
correct [8] - 7:23,
9:5, 18:15, 19:25,
23:22, 24:10,
42:19, 44:8
correctly [1] - 42:20
cost [4] - 14:22,
35:15, 36:3, 36:13
costs [6] - 13:16,
18:6, 34:17, 36:12,
36:16, 40:22
counsel [8] - 4:5,
9:14, 15:10, 16:16,
16:17, 16:22,
35:18, 38:3
Count [3] - 32:17,
32:18, 32:22
count [8] - 8:23,
20:20, 20:22,
24:13, 31:23,
32:16, 32:18, 32:23
counted [1] - 35:21
Counts [1] - 11:2
counts [7] - 9:24,
11:1, 32:7, 32:16,
33:6, 34:7, 36:23
course [19] - 10:10,
10:18, 10:21, 12:6,
13:21, 15:18,
18:21, 19:15, 20:2,
20:7, 20:13, 21:11,
21:17, 22:19,
22:23, 23:14,
33:14, 36:20, 36:24
COURT [74] - 1:1,
4:11, 4:16, 4:21,
4:24, 5:24, 6:11,
6:14, 6:16, 6:18,
6:20, 7:7, 7:13,
7:23, 8:2, 8:4, 8:15,
8:21, 9:5, 9:9, 9:20,
14:1, 15:3, 16:7,
16:19, 17:1, 17:5,
17:10, 17:14,
17:23, 18:1, 18:17,
18:19, 18:21,
18:24, 19:20,
19:23, 20:25, 21:3,
21:6, 22:1, 22:12,
23:4, 23:7, 23:18,
23:23, 24:3, 24:6,
24:14, 24:25,
25:16, 25:21,
25:23, 26:19,
26:25, 27:7, 27:12,
28:17, 32:2, 33:17,
34:21, 36:6, 37:10,
38:8, 40:20, 41:16,
41:21, 42:4, 42:14,
43:15, 43:18,
43:24, 44:1, 44:3
court [21] - 5:6, 5:21,
5:22, 6:6, 6:9, 6:11,
11:17, 11:25,
12:11, 16:17,
17:18, 18:14, 21:9,
25:24, 26:1, 29:12,
30:14, 30:24,
31:14, 32:7
Court [51] - 1:19,
1:19, 4:1, 5:4, 5:17,
5:18, 5:24, 6:3, 6:5,
6:8, 6:12, 6:22,
7:14, 8:11, 8:24,
9:9, 9:22, 11:6,
11:21, 12:9, 12:11,
14:1, 14:5, 15:4,
20:10, 21:7, 26:10,
26:18, 28:7, 29:17,
30:17, 31:17, 32:6,
33:5, 33:16, 34:22,
35:2, 37:22, 38:6,
38:12, 40:17,
40:24, 41:2, 41:4,
42:3, 42:9, 42:11,
42:15, 44:12, 44:12
Court's [1] - 8:19
COURTROOM [1] -
4:2
courtroom [4] - 4:13,
4:18, 38:17, 38:22
courts [2] - 40:10
cover [1] - 7:21
covered [1] - 40:6
credit [2] - 9:2, 43:12
credited [5] - 30:23,
41:21, 41:23,
42:17, 43:11
credits [3] - 7:1, 7:2,
7:6
crime [7] - 11:22,
12:4, 12:17, 13:10,
13:15, 37:17
Crime [2] - 11:16,
11:21
crime's [1] - 12:5
crimes [1] - 32:11
Criminal [1] - 4:2
CRIMINAL [1] - 1:2
criminal [17] - 10:8,
10:10, 10:15,
10:17, 15:9, 19:15,
19:18, 19:20,
19:25, 21:11,
21:14, 21:21,
23:13, 33:3, 34:6,
38:10, 40:12
cross [2] - 37:12,
38:18
Cross [1] - 32:23
cross-examined [1] -
38:18
cross-reference [1] -
37:12
crunched [1] - 39:6
Culbertson [2] -
3:10, 4:20
Cupersmith [45] -
9:19, 9:22, 10:2,
11:6, 13:8, 14:3,
15:5, 15:9, 16:15,
17:8, 19:2, 19:5,
19:11, 20:17,
20:19, 21:15,
21:24, 22:6, 22:13,
22:17, 24:7, 24:9,
25:3, 25:9, 28:7,
29:25, 30:3, 31:6,
31:21, 32:4, 32:14,
33:24, 35:1, 35:5,
35:14, 36:4, 36:15,
37:16, 37:25,
38:17, 39:5, 39:24,
39:25
Cupersmith's [23] -
12:7, 12:13, 14:5,
16:22, 18:4, 18:6,
19:16, 20:12,
21:13, 22:22, 23:1,
23:11, 27:15, 28:5,
29:23, 32:20,
32:21, 32:25, 34:8,
34:18, 38:1, 38:20,
38:21
curiosity [1] - 30:4
D
DATE [1] - 44:10
date [1] - 35:6
days [2] - 7:3, 43:3
deal [2] - 15:10,
15:11
dealing [1] - 33:11
Dean [1] - 4:3
DEAN [1] - 1:7
debate [1] - 40:6
decision [3] - 5:19,
39:16, 40:15
declarations [1] -
31:13
deducted [1] - 16:23
deemed [5] - 11:20,
15:2, 15:22, 15:24,
17:18
deeming [1] - 11:18
deems [1] - 38:6
defend [2] - 21:18,
33:7
DEFENDANT [2] -
2:9, 8:1
defendant [16] - 5:4,
8:3, 11:2, 11:11,
12:6, 12:23, 12:24,
22:2, 23:24, 26:13,
32:21, 36:15, 37:3,
39:14, 40:14, 43:24
Defendant [1] - 1:8
defendant's [10] -
5:5, 10:9, 10:15,
10:17, 14:10,
19:15, 21:10,
21:13, 21:21, 33:3
defense [5] - 11:24,
39:21, 42:23, 43:4
defined [2] - 32:10,
34:1
definitely [1] - 36:22
definition [1] - 11:17
delivered [1] - 8:17
denied [1] - 11:17
denying [1] - 5:20
deprive [1] - 11:12
DEPUTY [1] - 4:2
description [3] -
29:14, 29:21, 35:8
designated [2] - 5:5,
5:7
destination [1] - 5:16
detail [1] - 37:23
detailed [1] - 37:22
details [1] - 35:19
determine [5] -
10:14, 12:1, 13:3,
22:18, 40:22
determined [1] -
22:17
determines [2] -
5:25, 36:10
determining [3] -
21:12, 31:1, 32:12
developers [1] -
11:13
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
47
Dickerson [3] - 20:5,
20:25, 32:9
different [4] - 10:12,
13:7, 13:20, 13:24
difficulty [1] - 10:5
direct [1] - 26:17
directed [1] - 22:5
directly [16] - 10:9,
10:15, 10:17,
10:22, 14:13,
14:21, 19:14,
21:10, 21:13,
21:21, 25:4, 26:5,
33:3, 33:20, 34:2,
34:6
discern [2] - 34:13,
37:14
discovered [1] -
36:21
discussed [1] - 33:4
distinguish [1] -
25:23
district [4] - 11:17,
11:25, 21:9, 30:24
DISTRICT [3] - 1:1,
1:1, 1:13
District [4] - 1:19,
15:12, 44:12, 44:13
DIVISION [1] - 1:2
docket [6] - 17:6,
29:15, 29:22,
29:24, 30:1, 37:12
Docket [7] - 8:6,
17:4, 18:5, 18:9,
18:12, 29:2
document [8] -
11:25, 26:24, 27:6,
28:21, 34:13,
35:10, 37:13
documents [4] -
27:24, 38:21, 39:3,
39:4
dollar [1] - 27:16
done [5] - 28:2,
29:18, 29:19,
30:10, 30:16
down [2] - 33:17,
35:21
downward [2] -
39:10, 40:18
Dubin [4] - 12:10,
22:24, 32:6, 32:12
duplicative [2] -
29:18, 30:11
during [1] - 37:6
E
effects [1] - 12:2
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 47 of 53
effort [1] - 41:12
either [2] - 5:7, 31:17
element [3] - 10:8,
11:23, 34:5
elements [1] - 32:13
Eleventh [11] - 5:24,
6:11, 7:17, 10:19,
11:10, 11:18, 20:4,
21:3, 23:18, 24:18,
34:2
employees [2] -
12:25, 39:17
end [2] - 20:17, 30:22
engage [1] - 32:6
ensure [1] - 39:11
enter [6] - 6:1, 7:2,
9:10, 41:2, 42:15,
43:18
entered [1] - 9:23
entering [1] - 8:11
entire [1] - 12:15
entirely [1] - 13:7
entitled [5] - 10:1,
14:23, 37:8, 41:11,
44:9
entries [8] - 27:15,
27:17, 29:22, 30:1,
30:8, 31:4, 37:13,
37:18
entry [3] - 17:6,
28:21, 29:23
Entry [7] - 8:6, 17:4,
18:5, 18:9, 18:12,
29:3
envision [1] - 12:22
Equal [1] - 30:13
equally [1] - 26:1
ERIC [1] - 1:7
Eric [2] - 4:3, 22:19
ESQ [6] - 2:10, 2:14,
2:18, 3:1, 3:1, 3:6
essentially [4] -
26:11, 27:15, 29:4,
37:24
establish [1] - 17:8
estimate [2] - 35:13,
36:3
Etra [1] - 4:22
ETRA [1] - 3:1
evidence [3] - 38:19,
38:23, 38:25
evidentiary [5] - 19:3,
19:8, 25:15, 26:20,
31:24
exactly [1] - 6:13
examined [1] - 38:18
example [3] - 27:21,
29:13, 30:9
excuse [1] - 6:24
excused [2] - 7:20,
8:3
executive [1] - 11:11
Exhibit [8] - 18:5,
18:7, 18:8, 18:9,
18:12, 18:16
exhibits [1] - 18:3
Exhibits [1] - 18:5
expanded [1] - 23:19
expansive [1] - 32:10
expansively [1] -
32:11
expect [2] - 29:11,
29:24
expenditures [1] -
16:24
expenses [11] -
14:25, 15:16,
15:22, 16:12, 33:9,
33:14, 34:17,
34:23, 35:13, 37:6,
37:8
explain [1] - 8:13
expressed [1] - 8:24
extended [1] - 6:23
extending [2] - 6:4,
6:8
extent [4] - 7:16,
36:21, 38:17, 40:24
extra [1] - 35:15
extremely [1] - 29:5
eyes [1] - 10:5
F
F.3d [5] - 11:9, 15:21,
16:2, 17:12, 20:6
fact [9] - 21:16,
26:10, 26:11,
33:18, 36:23,
37:14, 38:16,
39:21, 43:1
factual [1] - 19:3
factually [1] - 34:25
failed [3] - 20:20,
20:22, 31:23
fair [1] - 20:21
false [4] - 13:1,
36:18, 39:3, 39:6
falsified [4] - 12:7,
32:16, 33:13, 39:5
familiar [1] - 26:10
fast [1] - 27:8
fault [2] - 38:2
FBI [10] - 4:9, 13:9,
13:19, 15:10,
35:10, 39:23, 40:1,
40:16
FCI [2] - 5:5, 5:9
FCRR [2] - 1:18,
44:11
fee [5] - 11:13, 11:15,
28:19, 30:25, 31:3
fee-splitting [1] -
11:13
fees [46] - 9:13, 14:6,
14:24, 15:2, 15:4,
15:14, 15:22,
15:25, 16:3, 16:5,
16:15, 16:17,
16:18, 16:25,
17:21, 18:4, 18:13,
19:9, 20:21, 21:16,
25:2, 25:12, 25:17,
26:2, 26:3, 26:22,
28:18, 30:12,
30:19, 31:20,
33:19, 34:19,
34:24, 35:17,
37:21, 37:24,
38:16, 39:1, 39:10,
39:17, 39:25, 40:9,
40:11, 40:15,
40:21, 42:9
felt [1] - 39:18
few [1] - 43:2
figure [2] - 31:5,
34:14
figured [1] - 29:2
file [1] - 9:6
filed [7] - 8:5, 11:9,
13:20, 17:4, 18:3,
35:2, 40:8
filing [1] - 17:6
filings [1] - 42:5
financial [2] - 13:2,
43:10
Fiorentino [1] - 15:12
firm [11] - 12:15,
12:21, 14:17,
14:21, 27:16, 28:5,
29:3, 33:7, 38:20,
38:21
first [12] - 5:1, 6:8,
8:4, 10:14, 17:18,
19:12, 20:18,
21:25, 22:5, 22:12,
28:20, 33:21
fitting [1] - 19:18
Floor [3] - 2:15, 2:19,
3:2
FLORIDA [1] - 1:1
Florida [10] - 1:4,
1:20, 2:6, 2:12,
2:20, 3:3, 3:7,
15:12, 44:13, 44:13
flow [1] - 23:13
flows [1] - 27:5
FOR [1] - 2:2
forced [1] - 43:9
forecloses [1] -
23:11
foregoing [1] - 44:8
foresaw [1] - 25:9
foreseeability [1] -
25:7
foreseeable [5] -
36:17, 36:20,
36:22, 36:25
forewent [1] - 28:5
forfeiture [14] - 5:3,
7:10, 7:24, 8:5, 8:6,
8:12, 9:3, 9:4, 9:7,
41:5, 41:24, 42:14,
42:19, 43:14
forfeiture/money [1]
- 8:7
form [1] - 24:17
forms [1] - 24:10
forth [1] - 38:3
fortiori [1] - 20:12
forward [2] - 42:18,
43:14
four [2] - 19:1, 22:9
Fourth [1] - 2:5
Fox [1] - 29:3
FPR [2] - 1:18, 44:11
FPR-C [2] - 1:18,
44:11
fraud [24] - 10:6,
11:1, 12:9, 15:24,
19:13, 19:24,
20:12, 23:1, 23:8,
23:10, 23:14, 24:4,
24:11, 24:14,
24:17, 26:11,
26:16, 30:4, 32:15,
33:22, 33:23,
36:21, 36:23
fraudulent [2] - 11:7,
33:1
FSA [2] - 7:2, 7:6
full [1] - 41:11
fully [1] - 30:7
functionally [1] -
20:3
G
general [1] - 26:7
genuine [3] - 20:11,
22:24, 22:25
germane [1] - 30:2
given [1] - 41:5
Gonzalez [1] - 39:17
Government [59] -
6:14, 6:15, 6:17,
6:19, 8:5, 8:14, 9:1,
9:14, 9:16, 9:21,
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
48
9:25, 10:1, 13:1,
14:19, 15:7, 15:11,
18:2, 19:13, 19:23,
20:2, 20:20, 21:14,
21:19, 22:5, 23:12,
25:5, 25:9, 25:11,
25:18, 26:7, 26:8,
27:3, 27:17, 28:2,
28:24, 29:1, 29:11,
29:16, 30:8, 30:18,
30:21, 31:22,
32:14, 33:12,
34:13, 34:21, 35:2,
37:20, 37:23,
38:11, 40:4, 40:23,
40:25, 41:1, 41:4,
41:16, 42:18, 44:1
GOVERNMENT [1] -
2:2
government's [7] -
20:1, 23:7, 26:6,
36:2, 40:12, 41:3,
42:4
Government's [3] -
14:7, 14:11, 14:12
grant [1] - 40:10
granted [1] - 11:19
ground [1] - 38:4
guess [2] - 34:25,
36:7
H
Halleran [2] - 3:10,
4:10
hand [2] - 27:10,
28:24
handled [1] - 41:25
hard [2] - 36:7, 37:14
harm [15] - 10:13,
10:24, 12:5, 21:11,
22:2, 22:3, 22:4,
23:13, 26:15,
26:18, 36:10,
36:11, 40:5
harmed [11] - 10:9,
10:15, 10:17,
10:21, 10:25,
19:14, 22:19, 24:9,
33:3, 34:2, 34:6
harmful [1] - 12:1
hear [1] - 6:16
heard [2] - 6:14, 20:2
HEARING [1] - 1:11
hearing [2] - 8:19,
38:11
hearsay [1] - 35:4
held [6] - 19:17,
20:10, 22:21, 23:9,
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 48 of 53
23:19, 25:24
HELD [1] - 1:12
help [2] - 26:8, 40:12
helping [1] - 33:11
hi [1] - 4:16
high [3] - 19:5, 29:5,
29:6
high-level [3] - 19:5,
29:5, 29:6
highest [1] - 35:22
himself [8] - 6:24,
7:7, 14:17, 21:18,
22:8, 33:7, 35:6,
40:14
hiring [1] - 14:8
hold [4] - 7:3, 17:11,
27:9, 37:5
holding [1] - 24:12
home [2] - 11:14,
11:19
Honor [51] - 4:7,
4:12, 4:15, 4:19,
5:14, 8:22, 9:6,
10:3, 13:25, 14:14,
16:10, 17:4, 17:13,
17:25, 18:15,
18:18, 18:20,
18:23, 19:12,
19:17, 20:15,
20:23, 21:23,
22:15, 22:21,
22:25, 23:9, 23:15,
24:10, 25:2, 25:14,
26:9, 26:23, 27:5,
27:10, 27:14,
28:20, 30:12,
30:20, 31:2, 32:3,
38:14, 39:7, 39:14,
40:7, 41:9, 41:18,
43:16, 43:23,
43:25, 44:2
HONORABLE [1] -
1:12
Hope [1] - 2:15
hour [1] - 29:8
hourly [2] - 31:8,
31:9
hours [3] - 27:23,
29:17, 35:25
housed [1] - 12:15
HOWARD [1] - 2:10
Howard [1] - 4:13
hsrebnick@
royblack.com [1] -
2:12
Hyman [3] - 4:9,
41:25, 43:13
HYMAN [2] - 2:4, 9:6
I
idea [1] - 28:22
identification [2] -
12:14, 24:10
identified [2] - 9:14,
11:24
identify [1] - 23:5
identity [19] - 9:24,
11:7, 11:23, 12:8,
12:10, 12:12,
12:16, 15:6, 19:21,
20:14, 23:3, 23:25,
24:12, 24:20, 32:7,
32:13, 32:20,
36:18, 36:19
illegal [1] - 11:12
imagine [1] - 27:21
immediately [1] -
7:16
impact [1] - 28:8
impacted [2] - 39:15,
39:20
implicated [1] - 15:10
inadequate [1] -
31:19
included [3] - 16:21,
17:5, 17:20
including [3] - 10:7,
34:4, 35:6
income [19] - 14:16,
14:20, 18:6, 19:7,
25:3, 26:22, 26:23,
27:4, 27:18, 27:20,
27:25, 28:5, 28:10,
28:12, 31:19,
33:19, 34:15,
34:23, 37:5
incur [1] - 36:16
incurred [6] - 21:15,
25:3, 33:20, 35:16,
36:3, 37:6
incurs [1] - 25:12
indicated [1] - 7:22
indictment [2] -
10:23, 11:2
individual [4] - 10:14,
10:15, 35:19, 36:13
individuals [1] -
17:17
information [9] -
12:14, 13:13,
17:16, 17:18, 18:2,
26:15, 27:25,
35:20, 38:5
inmates [1] - 7:4
inquired [1] - 43:6
instance [3] - 12:18,
12:23, 21:25
institution [5] - 5:5,
5:7, 6:2, 6:25, 7:22
instructs [1] - 11:25
insufficient [2] -
24:23, 38:6
intake [1] - 5:9
intellectual [1] - 30:3
intend [1] - 5:22
intendant [1] - 16:14
intended [1] - 37:15
interest [1] - 9:12
interim [1] - 5:17
interpreted [2] - 16:5,
16:11
interprets [1] - 7:6
interviewed [1] -
13:18
investigation [16] -
13:1, 14:6, 14:7,
14:12, 14:25,
15:16, 15:23,
16:13, 17:21, 22:7,
33:12, 34:23, 37:7,
40:1, 40:4, 40:13
investigation/white
[1] - 12:19
invoice [1] - 29:13
involve [1] - 25:5
involved [2] - 15:19,
36:24
involvement [2] -
36:4, 36:6
involves [2] - 10:7,
34:5
IRS [1] - 12:15
issue [18] - 5:14,
5:22, 7:5, 8:5, 8:20,
9:4, 9:15, 9:18,
10:20, 19:16,
24:23, 31:8, 31:21,
32:3, 33:25, 42:10,
42:19
issued [2] - 15:7,
21:20
issues [8] - 5:2, 7:24,
17:11, 19:2, 19:4,
22:9, 30:4, 37:13
item [3] - 35:8, 37:25
itemized [2] - 18:6,
35:10
items [3] - 16:19,
34:22, 38:18
itself [1] - 12:1
J
Jane [1] - 4:14
JASON [1] - 2:14
Jason [1] - 4:14
JAYNE [1] - 2:18
Jeanette [1] - 39:17
Jimenez [2] - 4:8,
17:24
JIMENEZ [23] - 2:3,
4:7, 6:15, 6:17,
6:19, 10:3, 14:14,
15:8, 16:9, 16:21,
17:3, 17:6, 17:13,
17:15, 17:25, 18:3,
18:18, 32:3, 34:16,
35:4, 36:9, 37:21,
44:2
joint [1] - 39:21
JONATHAN [1] - 3:1
jonathan.etra@
nelsonmullins.
com [1] - 3:3
judge [3] - 5:19, 5:21,
5:23
JUDGE [1] - 1:13
Judge [2] - 4:22, 9:17
judgment [8] - 8:7,
9:23, 41:10, 41:19,
42:21, 43:1, 43:9,
43:20
Justice [1] - 30:13
justified [4] - 19:8,
19:10, 34:15, 35:1
jweintraub@
saleweintraub.
com [1] - 2:20
jzarrow@omm.com
[1] - 2:16
K
Kaminski [1] - 35:18
Kaminski's [3] -
35:21, 36:8, 37:11
KLUGH [1] - 3:6
Klugh [2] - 3:6, 4:14
knows [2] - 5:17,
11:6
L
Lance [1] - 44:11
LANCE [1] - 1:18
language [9] - 11:16,
12:2, 19:18, 20:14,
22:24, 22:25, 23:2,
23:19, 24:16
last [3] - 5:15, 17:1,
31:8
latest [1] - 5:10
law [12] - 10:19,
15:19, 16:11, 20:4,
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
49
22:21, 29:3, 30:2,
31:25, 32:8, 33:18,
40:6
lawsuit [2] - 40:8,
40:9
least [1] - 39:1
leave [2] - 9:17, 11:4
ledger [1] - 12:24
legal [5] - 19:2, 19:4,
19:9, 22:9, 33:25
less [2] - 28:19, 31:9
letter [6] - 18:7,
18:11, 29:3, 35:17,
36:8, 37:11
letting [2] - 13:19,
17:10
level [3] - 19:5, 29:5,
29:6
light [1] - 23:19
limit [1] - 11:22
limitations [1] - 21:9
limited [1] - 5:2
line [1] - 34:22
list [1] - 12:25
listed [2] - 11:1,
28:15
litigation [1] - 43:10
LLP [1] - 2:15
loan [12] - 8:8, 8:18,
8:21, 8:23, 9:12,
13:21, 32:16,
32:19, 32:22, 42:7,
42:16, 42:25
loans [2] - 8:10,
42:22
logistics [1] - 5:3
look [4] - 12:1, 13:11,
22:3, 23:25
looked [3] - 28:20,
28:21, 29:10
looking [8] - 12:18,
14:18, 17:1, 20:25,
29:9, 34:12, 36:8,
37:11
Los [1] - 2:16
loses [2] - 7:1, 7:4
loss [11] - 10:13,
13:16, 14:9, 14:13,
21:21, 21:24, 25:1,
33:24, 34:15,
35:13, 40:5
losses [4] - 10:24,
21:10, 21:13, 37:1
lost [24] - 14:16,
14:20, 18:6, 19:6,
19:7, 20:23, 22:16,
25:17, 26:14,
26:21, 26:23, 27:4,
27:18, 27:20,
27:25, 28:4, 28:9,
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 49 of 53
28:11, 31:19, 33:9,
33:14, 33:19,
34:22, 37:5
M
man [1] - 39:5
mandamus [1] -
11:19
Mandatory [4] - 10:3,
14:3, 32:5, 40:2
mandatory [2] - 10:5,
10:6
MARIA [1] - 2:4
Maria [1] - 4:9
market [1] - 31:14
marshal [2] - 5:8,
5:13
Marshal [1] - 5:8
marshals [1] - 7:3
MARTINEZ [7] - 2:4,
38:14, 41:9, 41:18,
41:23, 42:20, 43:16
Martinez [1] - 4:9
match [1] - 26:18
matter [10] - 13:23,
15:9, 19:8, 20:9,
22:21, 26:4, 27:2,
33:11, 35:24, 44:9
matters [1] - 41:24
mean [2] - 34:21,
38:2
meaning [1] - 6:11
means [1] - 20:3
mechanical [1] - 1:23
meeting [1] - 14:19
memorandum [1] -
11:9
mention [2] - 28:9,
38:24
mentioned [2] -
30:11, 30:20
merely [3] - 13:24,
36:6, 38:8
meticulously [3] -
30:24, 30:25, 31:2
Miami [12] - 1:4, 1:20,
1:20, 2:6, 2:12,
2:20, 3:3, 3:7, 5:6,
5:9, 6:25, 44:13
middle [1] - 38:4
mill [1] - 12:19
mind [1] - 31:22
minute [1] - 33:10
Mitch [1] - 4:9
MITCHELL [1] - 2:4
mitchell.hyman@
usdoj.gov [1] - 2:7
moment [3] - 15:14,
27:12, 43:23
Monday [2] - 6:4, 6:9
money [2] - 41:20,
43:7
month [9] - 29:4,
29:9, 31:3, 35:25,
41:13, 43:4, 43:8
month-by-month [1]
- 31:3
moot [2] - 8:20, 9:15
mortgage [1] - 11:14
most [1] - 36:21
motion [1] - 6:10
move [3] - 20:23,
42:18, 43:13
MR [41] - 4:12, 4:22,
5:14, 6:3, 6:13,
6:22, 7:11, 7:19,
8:13, 8:16, 8:22,
9:6, 9:11, 18:20,
18:22, 19:1, 19:22,
19:25, 21:2, 21:5,
21:23, 22:11,
22:14, 23:6, 23:9,
23:22, 24:2, 24:5,
24:8, 25:1, 25:20,
25:22, 26:3, 26:20,
27:1, 27:10, 27:14,
28:18, 42:8, 43:23,
43:25
MS [30] - 4:7, 4:15,
6:15, 6:17, 6:19,
10:3, 14:14, 15:8,
16:9, 16:21, 17:3,
17:6, 17:13, 17:15,
17:25, 18:3, 18:18,
24:15, 32:3, 34:16,
35:4, 36:9, 37:21,
38:14, 41:9, 41:18,
41:23, 42:20,
43:16, 44:2
Mullins [1] - 3:2
must [5] - 10:15,
21:12, 22:2, 39:13
MVRA [7] - 19:13,
22:12, 23:12,
23:13, 23:17,
23:21, 25:25
Myers [1] - 2:15
N
name [15] - 4:17,
12:13, 12:15,
18:24, 19:16,
20:12, 21:17,
22:22, 23:1, 23:11,
24:17, 33:11,
33:13, 34:8, 34:9
narrow [1] - 32:10
NBA [5] - 15:19,
15:24, 17:16,
17:17, 17:18
necessarily [2] -
23:16, 24:23
necessary [8] -
30:15, 30:19, 31:6,
37:10, 37:14,
37:19, 38:9, 40:22
need [11] - 31:20,
41:7, 41:15, 41:18,
41:25, 42:3, 42:12,
42:20, 42:22, 43:1,
43:22
needed [2] - 21:18,
39:18
needs [2] - 27:3,
42:24
Nelson [1] - 3:2
next [2] - 20:1, 37:23
nexus [9] - 20:4,
20:8, 20:11, 22:24,
22:25, 23:10,
23:15, 23:16, 24:19
nice [2] - 30:21, 44:3
ninetieth [1] - 43:15
NO [1] - 1:2
nonpublic [3] -
12:14, 13:13, 17:16
North [1] - 1:20
Northeast [2] - 2:5,
32:17
Northwest [1] - 3:7
note [1] - 5:3
notes [1] - 44:9
nothing [7] - 27:19,
28:11, 29:20,
29:25, 31:15,
31:16, 43:25
notice [3] - 8:5, 9:7,
9:10
notify [1] - 5:16
number [4] - 12:14,
26:24, 30:22, 42:3
Number [1] - 4:3
numbers [3] - 39:5,
42:22, 42:25
O
O'Melveny [1] - 2:15
objection [2] - 8:11,
42:6
obvious [1] - 12:8
obviously [12] -
10:13, 10:20,
14:16, 21:3, 22:1,
26:15, 29:22,
33:18, 33:25, 35:4,
35:18, 40:25
occurred [1] - 38:11
occurs [1] - 21:8
October [2] - 29:13,
44:10
OF [5] - 1:1, 1:4,
1:11, 2:9, 44:6
offense [13] - 10:7,
12:1, 12:2, 14:2,
15:1, 15:17, 15:23,
16:13, 17:22,
23:20, 34:3, 34:4,
37:8
offenses [3] - 10:7,
24:3, 24:6
Office [2] - 2:5, 43:12
office [2] - 4:20,
27:21
Officer [2] - 3:10,
4:21
officer [1] - 4:17
OFFICER [1] - 4:19
Official [2] - 1:19,
44:12
ON [1] - 2:9
once [4] - 9:1, 9:7,
9:8, 22:17
one [11] - 5:19, 8:9,
11:5, 11:8, 20:18,
27:22, 38:14,
38:15, 39:7, 39:24,
43:23
one-judge [1] - 5:19
ones [2] - 13:20,
39:21
opinion [1] - 20:10
opportunities [1] -
28:6
opposed [1] - 6:18
opposes [3] - 6:15,
6:17, 6:19
Order [1] - 4:1
order [12] - 6:1, 8:11,
9:10, 22:7, 31:14,
41:2, 41:25, 42:12,
42:15, 43:18, 43:19
ordered [2] - 5:6,
34:4
orders [1] - 23:20
otherwise [2] - 7:12,
42:13
outside [2] - 21:8,
21:20
overly [1] - 31:4
P
P.A [3] - 2:11, 2:19,
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
50
3:6
package [1] - 34:10
page [1] - 30:22
Pages [1] - 1:8
paid [4] - 11:14, 13:1,
41:22, 42:17
paperwise [1] - 39:3
paragraph [1] - 14:24
paralegal [4] - 29:19,
30:16, 31:10, 35:23
paralegals [1] - 30:10
parse [1] - 40:21
parses [2] - 30:15,
34:14
part [7] - 11:15, 13:9,
13:22, 14:22,
17:20, 34:10, 43:20
participant [1] -
21:20
participate [2] - 7:12,
22:7
participated [1] -
40:1
participating [1] -
14:11
participation [4] -
14:6, 14:25, 16:12,
37:7
particular [1] - 9:17
particularly [1] - 28:3
particulars [1] -
15:13
parties [2] - 9:22,
12:2
party [1] - 12:3
passed [1] - 43:2
past [1] - 25:16
pattern [5] - 10:8,
10:11, 26:10,
26:12, 34:5
pay [8] - 8:25, 9:12,
39:16, 39:20,
39:25, 40:15, 41:14
payment [2] - 42:13,
42:24
pecuniary [1] - 40:5
penalty [1] - 28:9
pending [5] - 5:19,
5:20, 5:23, 5:25,
7:15
Penthouse [1] - 3:7
people [5] - 27:15,
28:14, 30:14,
31:12, 40:15
percent [2] - 35:22,
41:23
perform [2] - 31:17,
31:25
performing [1] -
30:10
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 50 of 53
perhaps [2] - 14:4,
39:9
perjury [2] - 28:9,
28:15
permitted [1] - 6:24
person [7] - 10:9,
19:14, 33:13, 34:2,
34:6, 39:24, 40:11
personally [1] - 25:10
perspective [1] - 8:23
persuade [1] - 31:14
phrase [1] - 16:12
physical [1] - 27:11
place [3] - 38:9,
41:19, 42:1
placed [1] - 34:9
placement [2] -
22:22, 24:9
placing [3] - 17:17,
19:16, 24:16
plain [1] - 12:2
plainly [1] - 28:16
Plaintiff [1] - 1:5
pleading [1] - 17:3
PM [4] - 1:6, 5:8, 44:5
podium [1] - 18:20
point [9] - 9:7, 20:18,
20:19, 25:13,
38:14, 40:21, 41:1,
41:17, 42:12
points [1] - 25:15
poor [2] - 39:5, 40:16
portion [1] - 39:1
position [4] - 13:24,
37:16, 37:18, 38:10
possible [2] - 29:15,
30:17
post [1] - 12:10
post-Dubin [1] -
12:10
posting [1] - 7:17
PPP [2] - 8:8, 12:22
prefatory [1] - 27:2
preparation [1] -
35:10
prepare [2] - 13:12,
14:19
prepared [4] - 12:13,
13:20, 33:6, 44:9
presence [2] - 7:9,
7:25
PRESENT [1] - 3:10
present [3] - 4:13,
4:18, 37:20
pretended [1] - 12:6
pretty [2] - 26:17,
30:15
previously [3] -
15:20, 18:4, 30:11
principles [2] -
20:18, 25:6
private [1] - 17:18
probation [3] - 4:17,
4:20, 42:22
Probation [1] - 3:10
PROBATION [1] -
4:19
problem [3] - 26:17,
28:19, 29:2
proceed [1] - 8:4
proceeding [7] - 5:2,
5:11, 7:9, 7:21,
17:7, 35:5, 41:13
proceedings [5] -
7:8, 13:22, 15:1,
16:14, 44:8
Proceedings [2] -
1:23, 44:5
processing [1] - 9:13
produced [2] - 1:23,
38:22
produces [1] - 13:4
producing [3] -
13:18, 13:25, 14:18
product [5] - 12:8,
32:22, 32:25, 33:1
professional [1] -
12:16
program [1] - 43:10
prongs [1] - 22:9
proof [3] - 27:3, 28:3,
28:25
proper [1] - 41:15
propose [1] - 42:10
prosecution [12] -
15:1, 15:16, 15:23,
16:13, 17:22, 22:5,
33:12, 34:24, 37:7,
40:2, 40:4, 40:13
prove [2] - 27:4,
30:18
provide [3] - 15:3,
35:13, 38:5
provided [12] - 13:3,
14:17, 16:22,
17:16, 18:2, 25:19,
29:5, 35:5, 38:19,
42:21, 42:22, 42:23
provides [3] - 14:15,
33:8, 37:4
proving [2] - 27:19,
28:4
provision [1] - 16:4
proximally [1] - 34:2
proximate [2] - 25:6,
33:24
proximately [1] -
22:3
PTIN [1] - 13:14
pull [1] - 26:25
purchasers [2] -
11:14, 11:19
purported [3] -
12:25, 32:25
purportedly [1] -
33:6
purpose [1] - 5:1
purposes [5] - 5:3,
7:9, 14:8, 19:20,
32:12
put [1] - 37:15
puts [1] - 23:24
Q
qualify [1] - 12:3
quantified [2] -
13:17, 36:12
quarrel [1] - 26:6
questioning [1] -
35:3
questions [3] - 19:3,
20:24, 33:16
quite [1] - 39:2
quote [1] - 24:18
R
rate [5] - 31:8, 31:9,
31:10, 31:13, 35:22
rates [1] - 31:15
rather [1] - 11:25
Re [1] - 11:9
reach [1] - 31:20
reached [1] - 8:16
read [3] - 20:6, 24:18,
25:18
reading [2] - 16:7,
16:9
realized [1] - 39:15
reason [1] - 38:24
reasonable [12] -
16:15, 29:17,
30:19, 31:14,
35:13, 36:3, 37:11,
37:15, 37:19, 38:9,
39:2, 40:23
receive [3] - 29:11,
42:24, 43:7
received [2] - 28:20,
41:20
recitation [1] - 30:22
recognized [1] -
39:19
record [12] - 4:6,
19:8, 19:10, 26:25,
28:11, 29:20,
31:19, 31:25,
38:25, 39:9, 40:19,
44:8
recorded [1] - 1:23
records [15] - 12:20,
13:2, 13:3, 13:4,
13:6, 13:18, 13:19,
13:25, 14:18,
14:19, 18:10,
18:16, 30:25, 31:3
recover [3] - 14:23,
25:12, 40:8
recoverable [8] -
10:24, 10:25, 15:2,
15:4, 15:25, 16:3,
26:2, 26:4
recovered [2] - 16:6,
16:18
recovering [1] -
20:21
recovery [1] - 16:14
redacted [2] - 28:22,
30:7
referee [1] - 17:16
reference [2] - 37:12,
42:21
references [1] - 35:9
refers [1] - 14:24
regard [19] - 8:12,
8:21, 9:21, 9:23,
14:6, 21:8, 23:4,
23:8, 24:6, 25:17,
33:18, 33:20,
33:23, 34:7, 41:2,
41:5, 42:16, 43:19,
43:20
regarding [4] - 11:16,
13:5, 18:4, 43:14
regular [1] - 33:5
reimbursable [1] -
14:21
reimburse [1] - 14:15
reimbursed [6] -
33:8, 36:14, 37:3,
37:4, 37:9, 37:25
reject [2] - 28:24,
40:10
related [19] - 14:2,
14:25, 16:12, 20:3,
20:5, 20:6, 20:14,
20:15, 21:12, 23:2,
23:20, 24:11,
24:14, 24:17,
24:22, 24:24, 31:6,
33:20, 34:23
relates [1] - 19:24
relating [2] - 15:22,
19:2
relation [3] - 20:16,
24:19, 24:22
release [1] - 7:17
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
51
released [1] - 6:1
relevant [5] - 10:23,
11:3, 11:4, 21:4,
21:8
reliable [1] - 38:25
rely [1] - 39:8
relying [1] - 40:25
remaining [1] - 9:18
remember [2] -
15:13, 30:22
removed [3] - 16:16,
16:24, 18:13
rendered [1] - 5:19
repaying [1] - 8:18
reported [1] - 39:4
REPORTER [1] -
44:6
Reporter [2] - 1:19,
44:12
representation [2] -
31:6, 39:22
represented [2] - 5:4,
32:24
request [7] - 6:6, 6:8,
6:15, 6:17, 6:19,
11:18, 41:3
requested [2] - 9:10,
42:1
requesting [2] -
16:16, 22:15
require [1] - 25:7
required [3] - 7:11,
24:19, 35:12
requires [6] - 7:18,
20:4, 20:7, 23:13,
24:18, 32:1
requiring [1] - 25:9
research [1] - 37:13
researching [1] -
30:4
respect [7] - 10:1,
10:21, 13:8, 24:12,
32:3, 34:17, 41:10
respond [2] - 22:6,
25:9
responded [2] - 15:6,
29:1
responding [2] -
13:17, 36:17
responds [1] - 25:11
response [5] - 14:7,
14:11, 18:25, 25:5,
29:15
rest [1] - 38:12
RESTITUTION [1] -
1:11
restitution [33] - 5:2,
7:9, 7:25, 8:10,
8:20, 9:16, 9:19,
9:21, 10:1, 10:4,
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 51 of 53
10:6, 17:20, 23:20,
29:12, 34:3, 35:12,
38:11, 40:5, 41:3,
41:10, 41:12,
41:19, 41:24,
41:25, 42:6, 42:12,
42:15, 42:18,
42:21, 43:1, 43:9,
43:19, 43:21
Restitution [3] - 10:4,
14:4, 40:2
result [6] - 12:5, 16:2,
21:18, 33:3, 34:3,
39:16
resulted [2] - 21:10,
21:13
resulting [2] - 10:24,
21:21
retained [1] - 15:10
return [8] - 11:5,
32:17, 32:19,
32:20, 32:21,
32:23, 32:24, 33:5
returns [12] - 11:8,
12:7, 13:12, 13:13,
13:14, 19:17,
22:23, 33:13, 34:9,
36:18, 36:24, 39:4
reveal [1] - 38:3
review [7] - 29:15,
29:22, 29:23, 30:1,
31:25, 35:10, 37:14
reviewing [3] - 14:18,
30:1, 42:9
RICHARD [1] - 3:6
Richard [2] - 3:6,
4:14
rickklu@aol.com [1]
- 3:8
Rights [3] - 11:16,
11:22, 32:5
River [1] - 32:24
Rothschild [1] - 29:4
roughly [1] - 43:16
RPR [2] - 1:18, 44:11
rule [1] - 26:7
Rule [1] - 20:10
rules [1] - 5:20
run [1] - 12:19
run-of-the-mill [1] -
12:19
running [1] - 27:8
S
Sale [1] - 2:19
Sarah [2] - 3:10, 4:10
satellite [1] - 6:25
satisfies [1] - 32:13
satisfy [1] - 39:12
saw [5] - 38:17,
38:18, 38:20,
38:21, 39:8
SBA [11] - 8:21, 9:2,
10:21, 33:23,
41:11, 42:7, 42:10,
42:16, 42:24, 43:11
schedule [3] - 14:16,
16:22, 34:19
scheme [22] - 10:8,
10:10, 10:16,
10:18, 10:22, 11:1,
17:15, 19:15, 20:2,
20:3, 20:6, 20:7,
20:8, 20:13, 21:11,
22:19, 22:23,
23:14, 32:11, 33:4,
34:5
scheme-based [1] -
32:11
scrutinize [1] - 29:17
Second [4] - 15:18,
15:20, 16:2, 30:23
second [5] - 5:23,
6:20, 25:1, 25:13,
25:16
secondly [1] - 17:20
seconds [1] - 27:7
Section [1] - 8:9
see [8] - 7:14, 13:19,
27:5, 27:14, 28:6,
29:21, 31:12, 44:3
seek [1] - 7:16
seeking [6] - 9:16,
16:20, 16:25,
31:22, 41:10, 41:17
seeks [2] - 8:7, 8:10
seem [2] - 20:21,
23:17
selected [2] - 29:22,
30:1
self [3] - 5:7, 5:12,
5:15
self-surrender [3] -
5:7, 5:12, 5:15
sentencing [1] - 17:7
separate [1] - 34:18
September [1] -
43:17
Service [1] - 5:8
services [1] - 11:12
set [1] - 37:24
Shannon [2] - 3:10,
4:20
sheet [1] - 28:6
SHEPPARD [1] - 1:7
Sheppard [17] - 4:4,
4:13, 5:6, 5:12,
5:18, 6:7, 7:7, 7:23,
8:17, 8:25, 9:11,
21:16, 25:4, 25:8,
39:24, 41:21, 42:16
Sheppard's [6] -
14:13, 20:11,
22:19, 24:9, 26:5,
33:22
short [1] - 43:19
show [1] - 22:7
side [2] - 23:25,
39:10
sign [2] - 13:11,
13:12
signature [1] - 12:13
signatures [1] -
13:11
signed [2] - 28:8,
33:6
similar [1] - 11:16
simply [1] - 35:15
single [1] - 29:23
slow [2] - 27:8, 27:22
someone [2] - 11:6,
13:24
sometimes [1] - 40:7
soon [1] - 43:11
sorry [4] - 6:16, 17:5,
18:15, 28:21
sort [1] - 38:3
sought [2] - 9:19,
11:15
South [4] - 2:11,
2:15, 2:19, 3:2
Southern [2] - 15:11,
44:13
SOUTHERN [1] - 1:1
speaking [1] - 39:23
speaks [1] - 21:4
Special [2] - 3:10,
4:10
specific [3] - 23:23,
36:23, 42:24
specifically [4] -
11:1, 18:4, 30:23,
40:3
spend [2] - 14:18,
33:10
spent [5] - 28:1,
28:14, 28:23, 40:3
splitting [1] - 11:13
spreadsheet [1] -
37:12
squarely [1] - 40:10
SREBNICK [16] -
2:10, 4:12, 4:22,
5:14, 6:3, 6:13,
6:22, 7:11, 7:19,
8:13, 8:16, 8:22,
9:11, 42:8, 43:23,
43:25
Srebnick [4] - 2:11,
4:14, 6:21, 7:13
staff [1] - 35:6
stand [2] - 32:18,
39:15
stand-alone [1] -
32:18
standard [2] - 12:10,
32:12
standpoint [1] - 36:2
start [5] - 7:2, 19:4,
19:10, 26:23, 27:2
state [3] - 4:5, 5:1,
7:13
statement [1] - 28:8
statements [1] -
35:20
STATES [3] - 1:1,
1:4, 1:13
states [1] - 19:13
States [11] - 1:19,
2:5, 4:3, 4:8, 4:9,
5:8, 8:6, 8:9, 8:10,
20:5, 44:12
stating [1] - 8:6
statute [18] - 10:12,
11:25, 12:3, 14:14,
14:22, 15:15, 16:4,
19:19, 19:21,
20:15, 21:9, 23:3,
24:20, 26:16, 33:2,
33:8, 33:21, 37:4
statutes [1] - 19:24
statutory [3] - 20:14,
23:19, 24:15
stay [2] - 6:7, 7:12
STEINBEISSER [1] -
1:18
Steinbeisser [2] -
44:10, 44:11
stenography [1] -
1:23
stenotype [1] - 44:9
Stewart [2] - 11:9,
17:9
still [1] - 39:11
stopped [1] - 39:23
Street [3] - 2:5, 2:15,
3:7
stuff [1] - 29:21
submission [1] -
28:19
submit [7] - 29:10,
29:11, 31:12, 32:6,
36:20, 37:23, 38:1
submits [2] - 12:24
submitted [11] - 11:8,
28:23, 30:8, 32:18,
32:19, 32:23,
34:10, 35:11,
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
52
36:18, 38:12, 38:23
submitting [1] -
21:17
subpoena [11] -
12:20, 14:12, 15:6,
21:19, 22:6, 25:6,
25:10, 25:12, 26:6,
27:25, 29:15
subpoenaed [1] -
36:16
subpoenas [4] -
13:2, 13:18, 14:8,
36:17
Subsection [2] -
14:15, 15:15
subsequent [1] -
32:9
substance [1] - 30:6
substantial [2] -
29:2, 31:11
substantiate [1] -
30:14
substantiates [1] -
28:11
subtracted [1] -
16:19
suffered [1] - 22:2
suffers [1] - 12:5
sufficiency [4] - 19:4,
25:15, 26:21, 31:24
sufficient [7] - 23:10,
23:15, 23:16,
28:16, 35:3, 40:19
sufficiently [3] -
19:8, 19:10, 37:22
suggested [1] - 39:7
Suite [1] - 2:11
sum [1] - 31:11
summary [5] - 19:5,
29:3, 29:5, 29:6,
29:21
Supp [1] - 15:12
supplement [1] -
37:23
support [3] - 27:17,
32:19, 39:1
Supreme [2] - 26:10,
26:18
surrender [8] - 5:6,
5:7, 5:12, 5:15, 6:4,
6:9, 6:23, 7:11
T
talks [2] - 10:12, 35:8
target [1] - 12:4
tasks [2] - 28:1,
30:10
tax [23] - 11:5, 11:7,
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 52 of 53
12:7, 12:14, 13:12,
13:13, 13:14,
19:17, 22:23,
24:10, 24:17,
32:17, 32:19,
32:20, 32:23,
32:24, 33:5, 33:13,
34:9, 36:18, 36:24,
39:4
team [1] - 29:16
term [3] - 32:10,
36:10
terms [3] - 25:25,
34:11, 38:5
testified [2] - 35:7,
39:14
testifies [1] - 13:5
testify [4] - 12:22,
35:1, 38:17, 38:21
testimony [1] - 18:1
text [2] - 19:13, 20:19
THE [79] - 1:12, 2:2,
2:9, 4:2, 4:11, 4:16,
4:19, 4:21, 4:24,
5:24, 6:11, 6:14,
6:16, 6:18, 6:20,
7:7, 7:13, 7:23, 8:1,
8:2, 8:4, 8:15, 8:21,
9:5, 9:9, 9:20, 14:1,
15:3, 16:7, 16:19,
17:1, 17:5, 17:10,
17:14, 17:23, 18:1,
18:17, 18:19,
18:21, 18:24,
19:20, 19:23,
20:25, 21:3, 21:6,
22:1, 22:12, 23:4,
23:7, 23:18, 23:23,
24:3, 24:6, 24:14,
24:25, 25:16,
25:21, 25:23,
26:19, 26:25, 27:7,
27:12, 28:17, 32:2,
33:17, 34:21, 36:6,
37:10, 38:8, 40:20,
41:16, 41:21, 42:4,
42:14, 43:15,
43:18, 43:24, 44:1,
44:3
theft [14] - 9:24, 12:8,
12:10, 12:12, 15:6,
19:21, 20:15, 23:3,
23:5, 23:25, 24:12,
24:20, 32:7, 32:13
Third [1] - 3:7
three [4] - 5:21,
27:23, 32:15, 34:7
three-judge [1] - 5:21
threshold [2] - 13:23,
31:21
throw [1] - 36:9
tighter [3] - 20:4,
20:8, 24:19
timely [1] - 41:11
today [10] - 5:6, 5:19,
6:7, 7:12, 7:23,
8:19, 9:11, 9:18,
43:1, 43:5
today's [1] - 7:20
together [1] - 32:23
took [2] - 27:12,
36:18
top [2] - 19:4, 19:10
total [2] - 16:23,
16:25
totaled [1] - 34:24
toward [1] - 42:17
towards [1] - 30:22
Trails [1] - 8:8
TRANSCRIPT [1] -
1:11
transcript [1] - 1:23
transcription [2] -
1:23, 44:8
transportation [2] -
37:5, 37:6
travel [2] - 16:16,
18:13
trial [3] - 13:5, 14:20,
35:10
triple [1] - 42:13
true [1] - 24:23
try [1] - 34:13
trying [3] - 22:8,
37:12, 38:4
Tuesday [4] - 6:4,
6:9, 6:23, 37:23
turn [2] - 25:14, 30:7
two [9] - 5:14, 10:12,
19:2, 19:3, 19:4,
22:9, 25:14, 25:24,
27:7
Two [1] - 2:19
type [3] - 35:25, 40:5
types [1] - 29:6
typically [1] - 31:11
U
unable [1] - 40:24
unclear [1] - 14:4
uncommon [1] -
12:20
under [22] - 5:20, 8:9,
10:3, 11:15, 12:2,
12:10, 14:3, 14:14,
14:22, 15:15, 16:4,
22:12, 23:12,
23:16, 23:21,
24:20, 26:16, 28:8,
28:15, 32:5, 33:2,
33:21
understood [1] - 7:19
UNITED [3] - 1:1, 1:4,
1:13
United [11] - 1:19,
2:5, 4:3, 4:8, 5:8,
8:6, 8:9, 8:10, 20:5,
44:12
units [1] - 35:6
universe [1] - 13:7
unless [2] - 6:3,
20:24
unmodified [1] -
24:22
unnecessary [1] -
41:5
unsubstantiated [1] -
30:5
up [4] - 19:4, 19:10,
26:25, 38:4
US [3] - 15:12, 16:1,
43:12
USC [1] - 10:4
V
vague [2] - 29:5, 31:4
value [1] - 28:13
values [1] - 27:16
verification [1] -
41:15
verified [1] - 9:8
version [1] - 30:7
versus [4] - 4:3,
15:12, 16:1, 20:5
victim [55] - 10:14,
10:21, 10:25,
11:17, 12:3, 13:24,
14:3, 14:16, 15:5,
15:19, 15:24, 16:5,
17:8, 17:18, 19:6,
19:11, 19:14,
20:17, 20:19,
21:12, 21:25, 22:1,
22:8, 22:13, 22:18,
23:12, 24:7, 25:11,
26:9, 26:13, 26:14,
26:17, 28:8, 31:22,
32:4, 32:8, 32:15,
33:8, 34:1, 34:11,
34:12, 36:5, 36:11,
36:13, 37:2, 37:3,
38:10, 39:11,
40:16, 41:15,
41:19, 43:7
Victim [3] - 10:4,
32:5, 40:2
Victim's [2] - 11:16,
11:21
victim's [3] - 21:10,
22:3, 22:4
victims [5] - 10:6,
11:18, 11:20,
11:23, 40:7
Victims [1] - 14:3
view [2] - 8:24, 31:18
virtue [1] - 21:19
voluntarily [2] - 7:8,
9:12
vouch [1] - 28:10
vs [1] - 1:6
VWPA [1] - 25:25
W
wages [1] - 12:25
wait [1] - 9:9
waiting [2] - 16:7,
27:22
waive [1] - 7:8
waiving [1] - 7:25
walked [1] - 4:23
weekend [2] - 5:22,
44:3
weeks [1] - 7:3
weighs [1] - 40:25
WEINTRAUB [3] -
2:18, 4:15, 24:15
Weintraub [2] - 2:19,
4:14
Westlaw [2] - 17:11,
27:9
white [1] - 12:19
whole [3] - 18:10,
35:14, 39:11
windfall [2] - 38:9,
39:12
window [1] - 43:3
wire [18] - 10:25,
12:9, 19:24, 20:12,
23:1, 23:8, 23:10,
23:14, 24:4, 24:11,
24:14, 24:17,
26:11, 26:16, 30:4,
32:15, 33:23
wish [2] - 5:10, 6:14
witness [2] - 13:25,
33:5
woefully [1] - 31:18
word [1] - 30:24
writ [1] - 11:19
writing [1] - 41:12
written [2] - 35:5,
41:2
Lance W. Steinbeisser, Official Court Reporter
53
Y
younger [1] - 35:23
yourself [1] - 39:9
Z
Zarrow [1] - 4:14
ZARROW [26] - 2:14,
18:20, 18:22, 19:1,
19:22, 19:25, 21:2,
21:5, 21:23, 22:11,
22:14, 23:6, 23:9,
23:22, 24:2, 24:5,
24:8, 25:1, 25:20,
25:22, 26:3, 26:20,
27:1, 27:10, 27:14,
28:18
Zaslow [3] - 35:7,
38:20, 38:22
Case 1:22-cr-20290-BB Document 300 Entered on FLSD Docket 10/09/2024 Page 53 of 53File and source
- File
- gov.uscourts.flsd.615773.300.0.pdf
- Size
- 566,090 bytes
- SHA-256
- 9a27ed1c57a4f1cc54020334a4052c6fdc177ede4463107cf21dbba02f829fbc
- Original
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