Court filing

ORDER denying 46 Motion to Vacate (2255) as to Dejane Reaniece Lattany (1).… — USA v. Lattany (Dkt. 113)

Record facts

Court	U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado
Filed	2025-06-06

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado · No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW · Doc. 113 · 2025-06-06 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

An order of United States District Judge Nina Y. Wang denying two motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, entered June 6, 2025 as Document 113 in United States v. Dejane Reaniece Lattany, Criminal Case No. 23-cr-00074-NYW-1, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. It denies the pro se original motion at Doc. 46, filed November 13, 2023, and the amended motion at Doc. 62, filed February 5, 2024. The background recounts a charge by Information on March 3, 2023 of one count of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and a guilty plea on April 26, 2023 under a plea agreement estimating an offense level of 24 and a range of 51-63 months. It states that at the August 15, 2023 sentencing the court found a range of 57-71 months and imposed 48 months' imprisonment. The order addresses a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, and claims of ineffective assistance by former counsel.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
Judge Nina Y. Wang

Criminal Case No. 23-cr-00074-NYW-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

1.
DEJANE REANIECE LATTANY,

Defendant.

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the following Motions filed by Defendant
DeJane Reaniece Lattany (“Defendant” or “Ms. Lattany”), who is proceeding pro se.1
(1)
Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 (“Original § 2255 Motion”). [Doc. 46, filed November 13, 2023];2 and

1 Because Ms. Lattany proceeds pro se, the Court construes her pleadings liberally, but
does not and cannot act as her advocate, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.
1991), and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to Ms. Lattany as to a
represented party, Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008).
2 Courts may take judicial notice of and consider documents on their own dockets. Tal v.
Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1264 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006). Here, the Court takes judicial notice
of Ms. Lattany’s separate filing in Lattany v. Colorado, Civil Action No. 23-cv-03027-LTB-
SBP (D. Colo. Nov. 11, 2023), [ECF No. 1]. Where the Court refers to the filings made in
the Electronic Court Filing (“ECF”) system in this action, it uses the convention [Doc. ___].
When the Court refers to the ECF docket number for Ms. Lattany’s other action, it uses
the convention [ECF No. ___]. In either case, the Court identifies the page number as
assigned by the ECF system.
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(2)
Amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Supplemental § 2255 Petition”, and
collectively with the Original § 2255 Petition, “Habeas Petition”) [Doc. 62,
filed February 5, 2024].3
The Government has responded to Defendant’s Original § 2255 Petition, [Doc. 61],
to which Ms. Lattany provided a “Response to Prosecution’s Rebuttal / 2255 / Ineffective
Counsel,” [Doc. 65]. Upon discovering that the Government had not responded to the
Supplemental § 2255 Petition, this Court ordered the Government to do so no later than
May 15, 2025. [Doc. 105]. In addition, given the nature of the allegations involving her
former counsel’s representation, the Court also ordered Ms. Lattany’s former counsel,
Jason Flores-Williams (“Mr. Flores-Williams”) to respond to Ms. Lattany’s specific
allegations no later than May 15, 2025, and directed the Clerk of the Court to serve a
copy of the Minute Order at his last known e-mail address. [Id.]. On May 15, 2025, the
Government filed its Response to the Supplemental § 2255 Petition. [Doc. 111]. Mr.
Flores-Williams did not respond to the Court’s order.4
BACKGROUND

On March 3, 2023, Ms. Lattany was charged by Information with one count of wire
fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343. [Doc. 1]. The following week, before her Initial

3 Generally, a petitioner may only amend a habeas petition pursuant to § 2255 after leave
of court. United States v. Roe, 913 F.3d 1285, 1296 (10th Cir. 2019) (“Pursuant to the
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a movant may file an amended § 2255 motion at
any time during post-conviction proceedings with leave of court.”). Here, Ms. Lattany did
not file a motion to amend her Original § 2255 Petition. However, because this Court
construes Ms. Lattany’s pro se filings liberally, it deems the Supplemental § 2255 Petition
as supplementing the Original § 2255 Petition, and considers them together.
4 Correspondence included in Ms. Lattany’s Motion for Compassionate Release suggests
that Mr. Flores-Williams may no longer be practicing law or residing in the United States.
[Doc. 81 at 80]. As discussed below, Mr. Flores-Williams is no longer counsel of record
in this action.
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Appearance, private counsel Mr. Flores-Williams entered an appearance on her behalf
and filed a Waiver of Indictment. [Doc. 3; Doc. 5]. The next day, Ms. Lattany, through
Mr. Flores-Williams, filed a Notice of Disposition. [Doc. 8]. In advance of her Change of
Plea hearing, Ms. Lattany executed a Plea Agreement with the United States and a
Statement in Advance of Plea of Guilty. [Doc. 13; Doc. 14]. The Plea Agreement
contained a portion entitled “VI. Advisory Guideline Computation and 3553 Advisement.”
[Doc. 13 at 15–17]. In that portion, the adjusted total offense level was 24, with an
estimate of her Criminal History category estimate as I, resulting in an advisory guideline
range of 51–63 months. [Id. at 17]. Ms. Lattany signed the Plea Agreement, as did her
attorney. [Id. at 18].
She appeared before the Court for a Change of Plea hearing on April 26, 2023 at
1:00 p.m., during which the Court advised her of her constitutional rights and the
consequences of pleading guilty. [Doc. 12]. Ms. Lattany confirmed that she understood
the charge being brought against her, [Doc. 60 at 8:20–22:]; that Mr. Flores Williams had
discussed the charges with her and he had answered all of her questions to her
satisfaction, [id. at 8:14–19]; and that she understood the plea agreement, [id. at 11:1–
17]. The Parties also discussed the anticipated application of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, as reflected in the Plea Agreement, and each side confirmed that
the estimated advisory guideline range for incarceration was 51 to 63 months based on
an offense level of 24 and a criminal history category I. [Id. at 19:7–20:21]. The Court
informed Ms. Lattany that those were only estimates, and that the calculation could
change based on the presentence investigation of the United States Probation Office. [Id.
at 20:4–17]. Ms. Lattany indicated that she did not have any questions, [id. at 22:16–18];
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she was satisfied with the representation that Mr. Flores-Williams had provided to her,
[id. at 22:23–23:1]; and she believed that he had fully advised her with respect to her
case, [id. at 23:2–4]. She then withdrew her plea of not guilty, pleaded guilty, and was
adjudged guilty of Count I of the Information, charging her with wire fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1343 fraudulently apply for, and accepting funds from, the Paycheck
Protection Program and Economic Injury Disaster Grants promulgated in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. [Doc. 13 at 7–13; Doc. 60 at 23:5–11; 24:7–25:23].
Ms. Lattany then appeared for her Sentencing hearing on August 15, 2023, again
represented by Mr. Flores-Williams. [Doc. 25; Doc. 111-1]. The Parties filed no
objections to the Presentence Investigation Report, including but not limited to the
advisory guideline calculations, and the Court found that the applicable advisory guideline
calculation was 24, with a criminal history category of II,5 resulting in an advisory
sentencing guideline range of 57–71 months imprisonment. [Doc. 111-1 at 4:7–5:16]. In
her Sentencing Memorandum, Ms. Lattany, through counsel, advocated for a sentence
of incarceration of 45 months. [Doc. 19 at 3]. The United States advocated for a sentence
of incarceration of 51 months. [Doc. 24 at 1]. The United States Probation Office
recommended a sentence of 48 months incarceration. [Doc. 22-1 at 2]. After argument
by counsel and allocution by Defendant, this Court sentenced Defendant to 48 months’
imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release. [Doc. 25 at 2; Doc.
27]. At no time during either her Change of Plea or Sentencing hearing did Ms. Lattany

5 On May 22, 2023, between the execution of her Plea Agreement and the Change of
Plea hearing on April 26, 2023, and her Sentencing Hearing on August 15, 2023, Ms.
Lattany pleaded guilty and was convicted of a felony in state court. [Doc. 22 at 13–14].
Accordingly, her Criminal History score changed from the estimate of I, to II.
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inform the Court—or even suggest—that she did not understand what was happening
during the proceedings or she disagreed with what her attorney was advocating for in
terms of incarceration. See generally [Doc. 60; Doc. 111-1]. Judgment entered against
Ms. Lattany on August 21, 2023. [Doc. 27]. That same day, Mr. Flores-Williams moved
to withdraw as counsel, indicating that his representation was only through sentencing
and that Ms. Lattany had notice of and “fully agree[d] to the withdrawal.” [Doc. 26]. Based
on those representations, the Court granted Mr. Flores-Williams’ Motion to Withdraw.
[Doc. 29]. Although this Court extended the deadline to file any Notice of Appeal directly
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit (“Tenth Circuit”) to October 5,
2023, [Doc. 30; Doc. 31], Defendant did not file an appeal.
After granting two extensions, see [Doc. 41; Doc. 44], the Court ordered Defendant
to self-surrender to federal custody on November 30, 2023, see [Doc. 45]; see also
[Doc. 53 (permitting Ms. Lattany to self-surrender in Denver, Colorado)]. On November
13, 2023, Ms. Lattany filed a pro se Original § 2255 Petition which was supplemented on
February 5, 2024. See [Doc. 46; Doc. 62]. After the Court denied Ms. Lattany’s request
for continued release pending resolution of the Original § 2255 Petition, see [Doc. 55;
Doc. 56], Defendant surrendered to federal custody on November 30, 2023, where she
remains in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). Since that time, Ms.
Lattany has also filed a Motion for Compassionate Release; Motion for Injunctive Relief;
and Notice to the Court—all seeking release from the BOP.6

6 The Court denied Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release, Motion for Injunctive
Relief, and Notice to the Court in a separate Order on May 13, 2025. [Doc. 109].
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LEGAL STANDARD

Section 2255 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides prisoners a
mechanism for vacating, setting aside, or correcting their federal sentence. The petition
must be filed in the district that imposed the sentence, because the sentencing court,
rather than the district court where the prisoner is confined, must determine the validity of
its sentence. See Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). The district
court must hold an evidentiary hearing “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of
the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” United States v.
Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 n.1 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)); accord
Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999) (noting that the court need
not grant an evidentiary hearing where the factual allegations are contradicted by the
record, inherently incredible, or when they are conclusions rather than statements of fact).
ANALYSIS

Defendant identifies various bases for habeas relief. [Doc. 46; Doc. 62]. First, Ms.
Lattany contends that she is entitled to relief because the Government violated her rights
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). [Doc. 46 at 4]. Ms. Lattany further alleges
that Mr. Flores-Williams made promises and advised her in a manner that “turned out to
be untrue and resulted in me having a higher criminal history score and now being safety
valve ineligible”—thus leading to a term of incarceration that was either completely
unexpected or was longer than she expected. [Id.]. Specifically, Ms. Lattany now avers
that Mr. Flores-Williams coerced her into accepting a state plea deal by strongly
suggesting to her that she not read the plea agreement; advising her to plead guilty to her
state charges that then led to her having a higher criminal history level than anticipated;
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by not providing her a copy of her Presentence Investigation Report or Sentencing
Memorandum until after the sentencing took place. [Id. at 6–11; Doc. 62 at 1–2]. In
addition, Ms. Lattany refers to certain advice that Mr. Flores-Williams purportedly gave
her about her home located at 11125 Quintero Court, Commerce City, Colorado, 80022,
which was subject to a forfeiture allegation pursuant to the Information, [Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 21–
23]; her Plea Agreement, [Doc. 13 at 2]; the Judgment, [Doc. 27 at ¶ 7]; and United States
v. 11125 Quintero Court, Commerce City, Colorado, 80022, No. 22-cv-01351-RM (D.
Colo. May 31, 2022). [Doc. 62 at 1–2].
I.
Brady Violation
Pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, a prosecutor is precluded from suppressing
“evidence favorable to an accused upon request . . . where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”
373 U.S. at 87. While the Government contends that Brady necessarily does not apply
because Ms. Lattany pleaded guilty before she was indicted, see [Doc. 61 at 4 (citing
United States v. Sgarlat, 705 F. Supp. 2d 347, 359 (D.N.J. 2010)],7 it cites no authority
binding on this Court nor could this Court find any independently.
Respectfully, this Court is not bound by decision by another district court. See
United States v. Rhodes, 834 F. App’x 457, 462 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict courts in this
circuit are bound by [Tenth Circuit] decisions and those of the United States Supreme
Court—they are not bound by decisions of other district courts.”). Nor is this Court

7 Cf. United States v. Sgarlat, 705 F. Supp. 2d 347, 359 (D.N.J. 2010) (holding that the
Government does not have an obligation under Brady to disclose exculpatory evidence
before an indictment); United States v. Smith, 824 F. Supp. 420, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(same).
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persuaded that the Supreme Court has extended its holding in United States v. Ruiz, 536
U.S. 622 (2002),8 upon which the Sgarlat court relies, beyond impeachment materials to
exculpatory materials under Brady. It is well-settled under Tenth Circuit authority that the
Government’s disclosure obligations under Brady “continues throughout the judicial
process.” Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156, 1173 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing Smith v.
Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 820 (10th Cir.1997)). And there is at least some Tenth Circuit
authority that favors the view that the Constitution requires the Government to provide a
defendant directly exculpatory information before that defendant pleads guilty. See
Freeman v. Att’y Gen., No. 20-cv-00910-JB-SCY, 2023 WL 5320041, at *6 n.6 (D.N.M.
Aug. 18, 2023), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Freeman v. Martinez,
2023 WL 7151075 (D.N.M. Oct. 31, 2023). There also appears to be no clear weight of
authority as to whether the Government is excused from its Brady obligations during pre-
indictment plea negotiations. Id. Given Ms. Lattany’s pro se status and the lack of any
robust argument with respect to important constitutional principles, this Court respectfully
declines to draw a brightline rule that the Government’s obligations to disclose
exculpatory materials pursuant to Brady never arises pre-indictment—particularly during
plea negotiations.

8 In Ruiz, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Constitution requires
the Government, prior to indictment, to disclose “impeachment information relating to any
informants or other witnesses.” Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625 (emphasis added). The Ruiz Court
did not address exculpatory information under Brady because the proposed plea
agreement specified that “any known information establishing the factual innocence of
the defendant has been turned over to the defendant, and it acknowledges the
Government’s continuing duty to provide such information.” Id. (internal quotations and
brackets omitted). In at least one circumstance, a panel of Tenth Circuit recognized that
Ruiz, in and of itself, did not extend to exculpatory evidence. United States v. Ohiri, 133
F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005).
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Nevertheless, this Court concludes, based on the record before it, that Ms. Lattany
has failed to demonstrate a Brady violation. “To establish that a Brady violation
undermines a conviction, a convicted defendant must make each of three showings: (1)
the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; (2) the [Government] suppressed the evidence, either willfully
or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice ensued.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536 (2011)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). Ms. Lattany has failed to persuade this Court
that any of the evidence she identifies at issue—e.g., an email from the state accountant
indicating that funds were owed to her—exculpate her from the wire fraud charges of
which she was convicted or could have prejudiced her. Indeed, Ms. Lattany expressly
admitted her culpability to this Court through her Plea Agreement,9 during the Change of
Plea hearing,10 and during her colloquy with the Court during her Sentencing hearing:
[A]s far as with the federal government, and I do take full responsibility of
that, but, Your Honor, I just ask that you look at it, from a standpoint of me,
just trying to take care of the people around me…

But I do take responsibility for what I have done, because I did do wrong,
and I did lie on the applications.

[Doc. 111-1 at 14:3–6, 14:13–14]. Accordingly, this Court respectfully concludes that Ms.
Lattany has not shown any violation of Brady v. Maryland that would justify habeas relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.11

9 [Doc. 13 at 7–15].
10 [Doc. 60 at 14:11–18].
11 The Government also argues that Ms. Lattany has procedurally defaulted on her Brady
violation argument by failing to directly appeal it. [Doc. 61 at 6–7]. The Court need not
reach this argument, having concluded that Ms. Lattany has not shown a Brady violation.
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II.
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
This Court next turns to Ms. Lattany’s various arguments that she is entitled to
habeas relief because but for her former counsel’s ineffective assistance of counsel she
“would not have taken a plea deal and would have went to trial[.]” [Doc. 62 at 2]. “[T]o
prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, ‘[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient. . . . Second, the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense.’” Ellis v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064, 1083 (10th Cir.
2017) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)).
Under the first prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel rendered
adequate assistance, which is overcome only upon a showing that the performance was
“outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”—conduct that is
“completely unreasonable, not merely wrong.” Byrd v. Workman, 645 F.3d 1159, 1168
(10th Cir. 2011). “As for the prejudice prong, the defendant must establish a reasonable
probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Barkell v. Crouse, 468 F.3d 684, 689 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). When, as here, a defendant’s conviction results from a guilty
plea she must demonstrate that the ineffective assistance “affected the outcome of the
plea process,” meaning that but for counsel’s ineffectiveness she would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on trial. See Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072
(10th Cir. 2001) (quotation and emphasis omitted). The Court may consider these prongs
in any order because a failure on either prong is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance.
See Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999).
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As an initial matter, insofar as Ms. Lattany contends that Mr. Flores-Williams’s
purported ineffective assistance impacted her state prosecution and sentence, such
arguments must be raised first to the Colorado Court of Appeals and then through a
proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Lattany v. Colorado, Civil Action No. 23-
cv-03027-LTB-SBP (D. Colo. June 13, 2024) [ECF No. 35; ECF No. 38] (dismissing Ms.
Lattany’s § 2254 petition).
With respect to her allegations that Mr. Flores-Williams failed to adequately inform
her regarding the consequences of her guilty plea with respect to her sentencing in this
case, this Court focuses on the second, prejudice prong. That prong looks to whether
Ms. Lattany has established a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different and that she would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial. See Miller, 262 F.3d at 1072. Ms.
Lattany’s mere allegation that she would have insisted on trial absent counsel’s errors are
insufficient; the Court must consider the “factual circumstances surrounding the plea to
determine whether the [defendant] would have proceeded to trial.” Heard v. Addison, 728
F.3d 1170, 1183–84 (10th Cir. 2013).
Based on the record before it, this Court is respectfully unpersuaded that Ms.
Lattany has carried her burden to establish that but for the various alleged errors by Mr.
Flores-Williams, she would have insisted on trial. Despite the number of applications and
wire transfers associated with her fraudulent scheme, see [Doc. 13 at 7–15], Ms. Lattany
was ultimately only charged with one count of wire fraud by Information, [Doc. 1]. Within
nine days of the filing of the Information, Ms. Lattany waived her right to Indictment and
filed a Notice of Disposition. [Doc. 5; Doc. 8]. Ms. Lattany then appeared before the
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Court for a Change of Plea hearing. [Doc. 12]. In the Plea Agreement, Ms. Lattany was
expressly advised:
The parties understand that the Court is free, upon consideration and
proper application of all 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors, to impose that reasonable
sentence which it deems appropriate in the exercise of its discretion and
that such sentence may be less than that called for by the advisory
guidelines (in length or form), within the advisory guideline range, or above
the advisory guideline range up to and including imprisonment for the
statutory maximum term, regardless of any computation or position of any
party on any 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factor.

[Doc. 13 at 17].
During that Change of Plea hearing, the Court specifically advised Ms. Lattany that
she was not bound by the Plea Agreement until it was accepted by the Court; that the
Court would assume that Ms. Lattany understood the Court’s questions and advisement
unless Ms. Lattany informed the Court otherwise; and at any time, Ms. Lattany could
request to speak in private to her attorney. [Doc. 60 at 6:20–7:10]. Ms. Lattany waived
her right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment and denied that she was subject to
any condition that impaired her ability to understand what was happening during the
proceedings. [Id. at 6:8–15, 7:18–8:2]. The Court then expressly confirmed with Ms.
Lattany that she had read and understood the Plea Agreement and she admitted to the
facts as reflected in the Plea Agreement. [Id. at 11:1–7, 14:11–18]. In addition, the
prosecutor set out a summary of the factual basis of the plea of guilty. [Id. at 14:24–
17:20]. Ms. Lattany made no objection to that recitation of facts. [Id.at 17:22–24].
With respect to sentencing, after advising Ms. Lattany about her waiver of certain
constitutional rights, this Court—upon request by Ms. Lattany—recessed the proceeding
to allow Ms. Lattany to speak with Mr. Flores-Williams about her questions related to
sentencing. [Doc. 60 at 13:17–23]. Then, after the prosecutor set out elements of the
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charge and the possible penalties for pleading guilty, the Court had the following colloquy
with Ms. Lattany:
THE COURT: Ms. Lattany, do you understand the nature of the charge
against you?