ORDER as to Dejane Reaniece Lattany (1) The Motion for Compassionate Release for Reduction… — USA v. Lattany (Dkt. 109)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado · No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW · Doc. 109 · 2025-05-13 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

An order by Judge Nina Y. Wang of the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado in United States v. Dejane Reaniece Lattany, No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW, dated May 13, 2025 and entered as Doc. 109. It resolves four pro se filings: a Motion for Compassionate Release [Doc. 81], a Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 91], a Request for Status Update [Doc. 101] and a Notice to the Court [Doc. 108]. The background recounts the guilty plea to one count of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and the sentence of 48 months' imprisonment imposed after the August 15, 2023 hearing. The court finds no exceptional circumstances for release pending the defendant's § 2255 Habeas Petition and applies the three-step test of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). It concludes that extraordinary and compelling reasons were not shown and denies all four filings.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Full text

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
Judge Nina Y. Wang 
 
Criminal Case No. 23-cr-00074-NYW-1 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
 
Plaintiff,  
 
v.  
 
1.  
DEJANE REANIECE LATTANY, 
 
Defendant.  
 
ORDER 
 
 
 
This matter comes before the Court on the following Motions filed by Defendant 
Dejane Reaniece Lattany (“Defendant” or “Ms. Lattany”), who is proceeding pro se:1    
(1) 
Motion for Compassionate Release for Reduction in Sentence/Release to 
Home Confinement (“Motion for Compassionate Release”) [Doc. 81, filed 
August 27, 2024]; 
(2) 
Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal/Motion for Injunctive Relief (“Motion 
for Injunctive Relief”) [Doc. 91, filed September 26, 2024];  
(3) 
Request for Status Check/Update and Notice to the Court (“Request for 
Status Update”) [Doc. 101, filed March 6, 2025; Doc. 102];2  and  
 
1 Because Ms. Lattany proceeds pro se, the Court construes her pleadings liberally, but 
does not and cannot act as her advocate, Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 
1991), and applies the same procedural rules and substantive law to Ms. Lattany as to a 
represented party, Murray v. City of Tahlequah, 312 F.3d 1196, 1199 n.3 (10th Cir. 2008).     
2 This Request for Status Update was filed under Level 1 Restriction because it contains 
unredacted BOP health records for Ms. Lattany.  [Doc. 101].  Doc. 102 is the public entry 
on the docket for Doc. 101.  Because Ms. Lattany does not seek any unique relief 
pursuant to her Request for Status Update, but rather simply seeks an update to her 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 1
of 13

2 
 
(4) 
Notice to the Court [Doc. 108, filed May 5, 2025].3  
In the Motion for Compassionate Release, Ms. Lattany seeks early release from 
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) custody.  [Doc. 81].  The Government opposes Ms. Lattany’s 
Motion for Compassionate Release.  [Doc. 86].  The United States Probation Office also 
filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate Release.  [Doc. 85].  In the 
Motion for Injunctive Relief, Ms. Lattany seeks to be released from BOP custody pending 
the Court’s adjudication of her Habeas Petition and her Motion for Compassionate 
Release.  [Doc. 91].  These Motions are ripe for review and the Court considers them 
below.   
BACKGROUND 
  
On March 3, 2023, Ms. Lattany was charged by Information with one count of wire 
fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  [Doc. 1].  She appeared before the Court for a 
Change of Plea hearing on April 26, 2023 at 1:00 p.m., during which the Court advised 
her of her constitutional rights and the consequences of pleading guilty.  [Doc. 12; Doc. 
60].4  After a robust colloquy with the Court, Ms. Lattany indicated that she did not have 
 
pending Petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and her instant Motion for 
Compassionate Release, the Court respectfully DENIES the Request for Status Update 
[Doc. 101; Doc. 102] as duplicative.  
3 This Notice to the Court was filed under Level 1 Restriction because it contains 
unredacted BOP health records for Ms. Lattany.  [Doc. 108].  Because Ms. Lattany does 
not seek any unique relief pursuant to her Notice to the Court, but rather simply seeks an 
update to her pending Petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and her instant 
Motion for Compassionate Release, the Court respectfully DENIES the Notice to the 
Court [Doc. 108] as duplicative. 
4 The Court cites to an official transcript for the Change of Plea hearing.  [Doc. 60].  
However, it cites to a preliminary nonpublic version of the hearing transcript for the 
Sentencing hearing (“Sentencing Tr.”).  Accordingly, there may be some variations with 
respect to page numbers, line numbers, or specific language should an official transcript 
be ordered and prepared for the Sentencing hearing. 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 2
of 13

3 
 
any questions, [Doc. 60 at 22:16–18]; she was satisfied with the representation that Mr. 
Flores-Williams had provided to her, [id. at 22:23–23:1]; and she believed that he had 
fully advised her with respect to her case, [id. at 23:2–4].  She then withdrew her plea of 
not guilty, pleaded guilty, and was adjudged guilty of Count I of the Information, charging 
her with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 based on her fraudulent applications 
for, and receipt of funds from, the Paycheck Protection Program and Economic Injury 
Disaster Grants promulgated in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. (“COVID-19 Relief 
Funds”).  [Doc. 13 at 7–13; Doc. 60 at 23:5–25:23, 14:11–17:24].  It is undisputed that 
Ms. Lattany ultimately stole over $ 3,000,000 that she used, in part, to purchase at least 
a residence, a Hummer luxury vehicle, and to pay off her existing credit card debt.  [Doc. 
13 at 2, 12]. 
Ms. Lattany then appeared for her Sentencing hearing on August 15, 2023.  [Doc. 
25].  The Parties filed no objections to the Presentence Investigation Report, including 
but not limited to the advisory guideline calculations, and the Court found that the 
applicable advisory guideline calculation was 24, with a criminal history category of II,5 
resulting in an advisory sentencing guideline range of 57–71 months’ imprisonment.  
[Sentencing Tr. at 3:5–8, 4:5–15].  In her Sentencing Memorandum, Ms. Lattany, through 
counsel, advocated for a sentence of incarceration of 45 months.  [Doc. 19 at 3].  The 
United States advocated for a sentence of incarceration of 51 months.  [Doc. 24 at 1].  
The United States Probation Office recommended a sentence of 48 months’ 
 
5 On May 22, 2023—between the execution of her Plea Agreement and the Change of 
Plea hearing on April 26, 2023 and her Sentencing Hearing on August 15, 2023—Ms. 
Lattany pleaded guilty and was convicted of a felony in state court.  [Doc. 22 at 13].  
Accordingly, her Criminal History score changed from the estimate of category I to 
category II.    
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 3
of 13

4 
 
incarceration.  [Doc. 22-1 at 1].  After argument by counsel and allocution by Defendant, 
this Court sentenced Defendant to 48 months’ imprisonment, to be followed by three 
years of supervised release.  [Doc. 25 at 2; Doc. 27].   
After granting two extensions, see [Doc. 41; Doc. 44], the Court ordered Defendant 
to self-surrender to federal custody on November 30, 2023, see [Doc. 45]; see also 
[Doc. 53 (permitting Ms. Lattany to self-surrender in Denver, Colorado)].  Ms. Lattany 
subsequently filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 (the “Original § 2255 Motion”), which remains pending before the Court.  
See [Doc. 46; Doc. 62].6  After the Court denied Ms. Lattany’s request for continued 
release pending resolution of the Original § 2255 Motion, see [Doc. 55; Doc. 56], 
Defendant surrendered to federal custody on November 30, 2023, where she remains in 
the custody of BOP.  Since that time, Ms. Lattany has filed the instant Motion for 
Compassionate Release and Motion for Injunctive Relief—both seeking immediate 
release from the BOP.  The Government concedes that she has exhausted her 
administrative remedies as to the relief she seeks through the instant Motion for 
Compassionate Release.  [Doc. 86 at 2 n.1]. 
ANALYSIS 
I. 
Injunctive Relief 
 
A. 
Pending Adjudication of Habeas Petition 
  
 
Though filed after her Motion for Compassionate Release, this Court first turns to 
Ms. Lattany’s Motion for Injunctive Relief, [Doc. 91], which seeks release pending the 
 
6 On February 5, 2024, Ms. Lattany filed an “Amended 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Motion],” 
[Doc. 62], which this Court construes as a supplement to the Original § 2255 Motion.  The 
Court refers to these two documents collectively as Ms. Lattany’s “Habeas Petition.”   
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 4
of 13

5 
 
Court’s adjudication of her Habeas Petition and her Motion for Compassionate Release.  
Previously, this Court noted that in the context of her request to be released pending the 
adjudication of her Habeas Petition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit (“Tenth Circuit”) has recognized that a federal court may release an inmate on 
bond pending a determination if the inmate demonstrates either “exceptional 
circumstances” or “a clear case on the merits of the habeas petition.”  See Pfaff v. Wells, 
648 F.2d 689, 693 (10th Cir.1981);7 [Doc. 56].  In support of her Motion for Injunctive 
Relief, Ms. Lattany reiterates her arguments that her former counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance of counsel; challenges her BOP classification and placement; and lists her 
various medical conditions.  See [Doc. 91].   
 
Without prejudging the merits of her Habeas Petition, Ms. Lattany has again failed 
to make a sufficient showing of a clearly meritorious post-conviction case based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  While Ms. Lattany now contends that she would not 
have entered the plea agreement due to her former counsel’s advice about sentencing, 
[Doc. 62 at 2], at the core, there are no new arguments that change this Court’s analysis 
with respect to whether Ms. Lattany has shown a clearly meritorious ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim.  Compare [Doc. 55], with [Doc. 91], and [Doc. 56].  To the extent that 
Ms. Lattany suggests that her concerns regarding her BOP placement or the conditions 
of her confinement can form the valid basis of her Habeas Petition brought pursuant to 
 
7 As discussed in its prior Order, see [Doc. 56 at 2 n.1], this Court does not construe the 
Tenth Circuit’s case law to require Ms. Lattany to demonstrate both a clear case on the 
merits of her Habeas Petition and exceptional circumstances, due to the timing of when 
Ms. Lattany’s Original § 2255 Motion was filed.  Compare United States v. Palermo, 191 
F. App’x 812, 813 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Pfaff, 648 F.2d at 693), with Vreeland v. Zupan, 
644 F. App’x 812, 813 (10th Cir. 2016).   
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 5
of 13

6 
 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 and thus, release pending its adjudication, respectfully, she is mistaken.  
Petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 are used to attack the validity of a conviction and 
sentence and must be filed in the district where the inmate was sentenced.  See 
Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996).  Insofar as she contests where she 
is confined, or the conditions of that facility, those challenges are properly construed as 
challenges to conditions of confinement and thus must be brought pursuant to Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
See United States v. Garcia, 470 F.3d 1001, 1003 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 
While courts have recognized a serious deterioration of health while incarcerated 
as an “exceptional circumstance” that can warrant bond pending habeas review, see 
Vreeland v. Zupan, No. 14-cv-02175-PAB, 2023 WL 5485627, at *6 (D. Colo. Aug. 24, 
2023) (citing cases); United States v. Smith, No. 14-cr-10137-JTM, 2020 WL 3288073, at 
*1 (D. Kan. June 18, 2020), they have also described this standard as a “high bar,” Heflin 
v. Black, No. 1:22-cv-00863-CEF, 2023 WL 5353133, at *1 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2023) 
(collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5352047 (N.D. Ohio 
Aug. 21, 2023), and observed that “[t]here will be few occasions where a prisoner will 
meet this standard,” Vreeland, 2023 WL 5485627, at *6 (quotation omitted).  This Court 
is not persuaded, even with the additional facts presented by Ms. Lattany, that she has 
demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting release pending the resolution of her 
Habeas Petition.  See King v. Ciolli, No. 23-cv-00519-CNS, 2023 WL 11196896, at *2 (D. 
Colo. Sept. 5, 2023).  There is also no indication that the BOP cannot adequately treat 
her various medical conditions.  Cf. Smith, 2020 WL 3288073, at *4 (denying a motion for 
release pending habeas review based, in part, of the petitioner’s failure to show that he 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 6
of 13

7 
 
could not provide adequate self-care or receive adequate medical care within the 
correctional environment).  And to the extent that Ms. Lattany contends that she is not a 
risk of flight nor a danger to the community, at least one court has observed that this 
“behavior is expected of all inmates and is in no way exceptional.”  See Mahan v. Douglas, 
643 F. Supp. 3d 783, 785 (E.D. Mich. 2022).   
 
B. 
Pending Adjudication of Motion for Compassionate Release 
 
In addition, Ms. Lattany cites no authority, nor could this Court find any, that 
contemplates release of a prisoner pending adjudication of a motion for compassionate 
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(a).  See generally [Doc. 91].  The United States 
Sentencing Commission’s Policy Statement with respect to compassionate release also 
does not contemplate release pending the adjudication of a motion for compassionate 
release.  See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13.  This Court will not infer such an avenue for relief, 
particularly when it is unclear how the standard would differ from the one already in place 
for substantive adjudication of a motion for compassionate release.  Rather, this Court 
turns to Ms. Lattany’s Motion for Compassionate Release. 
II. 
Compassionate Release 
Section 3582(c) of Title 18 of the United States Code sets forth a general rule that 
the “court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed[.]”  That 
statute also sets out some exceptions to the general rule, including: 
(A) the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon 
motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all 
administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a 
motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of 
such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, 
may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation 
or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exceed the 
unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 7
of 13

8 
 
factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if 
it finds that-- 
 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  This is commonly known as “compassionate release.”  See 
United States v. Davis, No. 24-3164, 2025 WL 1000344, at *1 (10th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025). 
The Tenth Circuit has recently summarized the procedure for evaluating a motion 
for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(a) as follows: 
Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a court may reduce a term of imprisonment if, after 
considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they 
are applicable, it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 
such a reduction and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.  The statute thus 
creates a three-step test:   a district court must (1) find whether 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction; (2) find 
whether such reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) consider any applicable 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the 
reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part 
under the particular circumstances of the case. 
 
To grant a motion for compassionate release, the district court must of 
course address all three steps.  However, if the most convenient way for the 
district court to dispose of a motion for compassionate release is to reject it 
for failure to satisfy one of the steps, we see no benefit in requiring it to 
make the useless gesture of determining whether one of the other steps is 
satisfied.  Thus, district courts may deny compassionate-release motions 
when any of the three prerequisites is lacking and do not need to address 
the others. 
United States v. Bradley, 97 F.4th 1214, 1217–18 (10th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).  The 
weight of authority indicates that, as the defendant and movant, Ms. Lattany carries the 
burden on her Motion for Compassionate Release.  United States v. Crespin, No. 23-
2111, 2024 WL 3084972, at *5 (10th Cir. June 21, 2024) (collecting cases); United States 
v. Eads, 749 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1155 (D. Colo. 2024). 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 8
of 13

9 
 
 
Ms. Lattany argues that the Court should grant her compassionate release due to 
extraordinary and compelling reasons based on (1) severe physical and mental health 
risks based on her current conditions of confinement; (2) the failure of her facility to 
provide adequate medical care and protect her from hazardous conditions, including 
exposure to multiple infectious diseases; (3) her psychological suffering based on her 
exposure to male inmates with severe criminal backgrounds in light of her prior history of 
molestation; (4) the failure of the facility to provide meaningful support to help her cope 
with her grief and trauma over the death of her father while incarcerated; and (5) the need 
to care for her medically incapacitated grandmother and to care for her four children, 
including her newborn.  [Doc. 81].  The Government opposes such release, arguing that 
Ms. Lattany’s various medical conditions that are being adequately treated within BOP 
custody; the speculative risks that an inmate may contract an infectious disease; and her 
family circumstances do not constitute “extraordinary and compelling circumstances” to 
justify compassionate release.  [Doc. 86 at 5–13]. 
 
Upon review of the record before it and the applicable case law, this Court 
respectfully finds that Ms. Lattany has failed to establish “extraordinary and compelling 
circumstances” to justify compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  
First, a review of Ms. Lattany’s BOP medical records does not indicate that she has any 
life-threatening medical condition or any condition that requires specialized medical care 
that is not being provided.8  Cf. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1) (setting forth certain medical 
 
8 The Court acknowledges that it is not limited to the United States Sentencing 
Commission’s Policy Statement in determining whether “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons” exist for the motion for compassionate release filed by Ms. Lattany.  See United 
States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1050 (10th Cir. 2021).  But this Court finds, as other 
courts have, the Commission’s Policy Statement to be a useful guidepost. 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg 9
of 13

10 
 
circumstances that constitute extraordinary and compelling circumstances:  (1) a terminal 
illness, (2) a serious medical issue that substantially diminishes the defendant’s ability to 
self-care within a correctional facility, (3) a medical condition requiring long-term or 
specialized care that is not being provided and without which the defendant risks serious 
deterioration in health or death, and (4) personal health factors and custodial status that 
create an increased risk of suffering severe medical complications or death from exposure 
to an ongoing outbreak of infectious disease).  To the contrary, her BOP medical records 
indicate that she has received extensive health care, including for her chronic conditions 
of having “a cardiovascular AV Block” and being a “borderline diabetic,” and postpartum 
care after the delivery of her newborn that was memorialized as having “[n]o 
complications related to birth or post-delivery.”  See generally [Doc. 87-1; id. at 21].  And 
while Ms. Lattany may wish to have different medical care, the mere desire to have such 
medical care is not an extraordinary or compelling reason for a sentence reduction. 
 
Second, to the extent that Ms. Lattany argues that exposure to communicable 
diseases (such as “COVID, MRSA, STAPH, hepatitis, strep C, EColi, C-diff and sepsis”), 
[Doc. 81 at 7], justifies compassionate release without articulating how she has a 
particular vulnerability to these infectious diseases or her health risk is distinguishable 
from others, this Court respectfully disagrees based on the weight of authority on this 
issue,9 see, e.g., United States v. Warren, 22 F.4th 917, 928 (10th Cir. 2022); Davis, 2025 
WL 1000344, at *1. 
 
9 The Court further notes that sepsis is generally not considered a communicable disease, 
and MRSA, staph, and hepatitis are generally not transmitted through casual exposure. 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg
10 of 13

11 
 
 
Third, while this Court in no way minimizes Ms. Lattany’s past trauma and the 
potentially triggering impact of encountering certain circumstances while incarcerated, 
this Court is not persuaded that her complaints of anxiety, depression, and panic attacks 
are sufficiently extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Ortiz-Cruz, No. 23-cr-00430-RAM, 2025 WL 289200, at *5 (D.P.R. 
Jan. 23, 2025) (finding that the defendant’s mental health complaints were not 
extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release); United States v. 
Busby, No. 2:15-cr-00353-GMN-NJK, 2020 WL 3883652, at *3 (D. Nev. July 8, 2020) 
(finding that the defendant’s mental health diagnoses even coupled with the risk of 
COVID-19 did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate 
release).   
 
Fourth, while this Court recognizes that grief and trauma associated with her 
father’s death while incarcerated may be substantial, Ms. Lattany cites no case in which 
a court has justified compassionate release based on a facility’s failure to provide 
“meaningful care and support” for such grief.  See [Doc. 81 at 9].  And looking at the 
record as a whole, this Court concludes that, again, it does not meet the medical 
circumstances constituting extraordinary and compelling circumstances.  Cf. United 
States v. Kiel, No. 13-cr- -00051-LG-RHW-2, 2021 WL 4037839, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 
3, 2021) (finding that the defendant’s loss of son and desire to provide care to his 
remaining family in their time of grief was not considered an extreme family circumstance 
justifying release). 
 
Fifth, while Ms. Lattany understandably wishes to provide care to her grandmother 
and four children, that desire does not constitute an “extraordinary and compelling 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg
11 of 13

12 
 
circumstance.”  There is no indication from the record that Ms. Lattany’s grandmother is 
not receiving care from other family members.  In addition, the Court granted Ms. 
Lattany’s request to extend her self-surrender date to permit her to secure care for her 
minor children, see [Doc. 37; Doc. 41; Doc. 43; Doc. 44], and there is no indication that 
such care plans—though perhaps not optimal—have changed,10 see [Doc. 81].   
 
For these reasons, this Court respectfully concludes that Ms. Lattany has not 
carried her burden to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying 
compassionate release at this time. 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that:  
(1) 
The Motion for Compassionate Release for Reduction in Sentence/Release 
to Home Confinement [Doc. 81] is DENIED; 
(2) 
The Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal/Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. 
91] is DENIED;  
(3) 
The Request for Status Update and Notice to the Court [Doc. 101] is 
DENIED as duplicative;  
(4) 
The Notice to the Court [Doc. 108] is DENIED as duplicative; and 
(5) 
A copy of this Order shall be sent to: 
Dejane Reaniece Lattany  
Inmate No. 51090-510 
Carswell Federal Medical Center  
P.O. Box 27137 
Fort Worth, Texas 76127 
 
 
 
10 Further, it appears that the father of the newborn picked up the newborn after her 
delivery in custody.  [Doc. 87-1 at 24–25]. 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg
12 of 13

13 
 
 
DATED:  May 13, 2025 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nina Y. Wang  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States District Judge 
 
 
Case No. 1:23-cr-00074-NYW     Document 109     filed 05/13/25     USDC Colorado     pg
13 of 13

File and source

File

gov.uscourts.cod.223008.109.0.pdf

Size

137,396 bytes

SHA-256

37db90a84abecb918ad3cf6045a13b0612e36e2cea40b4412762f5d59645932e

Our copy

gov.uscourts.cod.223008.109.0.pdf

Original

PACER (login required)