Motion by USA in limine as to Te Dora Brown — USA v. Brown, et al. (Dkt. 137, N.D. Ill.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois · No. 1:23-cr-00097 · Doc. 137 · 2026-05-06 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
   v. 
 
TE DORA BROWN 
 
No. 23 CR 97 
 
Honorable Elaine E. Bucklo 
 
THE GOVERNMENT’S CONSOLIDATED MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
The United States of America, by its attorney, ANDREW S. BOUTROS, United 
States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, hereby respectfully moves, in 
limine, for entry of the following orders concerning evidence, argument, or inquiry at 
trial in this case.1 
I. 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE OR ARGUMENT THAT IS IRRELEVANT  
It is fundamental that “evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” FED. 
R. EVID. 402, 103(c). “Relevant evidence” is defined as Aevidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.@ FED. R. 
EVID. 401. Even if arguably Arelevant,@ evidence should be excluded Aif its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.@ FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 
1 For purposes of efficiency and ease of reference, the government has filed its motions 
in limine in a single document. No single motion herein exceeds the 15-page limit as imposed 
by the Local Rules.   
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In this case, defendant was indicted along with her husband, co-defendant 
Christopher Scott. As outlined in the indictment, defendant and Mr. Scott jointly 
devised and participated in a scheme to defraud Paycheck Protection Program 
(“PPP”) and the Economic Injury Disaster Loan Program (“EIDL Program”). See Dkt. 
1. In April 2025, Mr. Scott pleaded guilty, and in August 2025, the Court sentenced 
him to seventy months in prison. Dkts. 85, 112, 117. While evidence of Mr. Scott’s 
participation in defendant’s scheme to defraud the PPP and EIDL Program is 
relevant, the government anticipates the defendant may seek to introduce evidence 
relating to irrelevant topics, such as marital issues or Mr. Scott’s bad conduct that is 
wholly unrelated to fraudulent conduct at issue in this trial.   
 With the foregoing tenets in mind, the government requests that the Court 
exclude evidence or argument concerning the foregoing matters or, at a minimum, 
require a proffer of such evidence outside of the presence of the jury to ensure that 
the evidence is properly admissible.  
II. 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE ARGUMENT, EVIDENCE, OR INQUIRY THAT MAY 
ENCOURAGE JURY NULLIFICATION 
 This Court should preclude the defendant from arguing, presenting evidence, 
or pursuing lines of inquiry designed to elicit jury nullification. The law is clear: it is 
improper for a defendant to suggest in any way that the jury should acquit a 
defendant even if it finds that the government has met its burden of proof. See, e.g., 
United States v. Laguna, 693 F.3d 727, 731 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Perez, 86 
F.3d 735, 736 (7th Cir. 1996) (“An unreasonable jury verdict, although unreviewable 
if it is an acquittal, is lawless, and the defendant has no right to invite the jury to act 
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lawlessly. Jury nullification is a fact, because the government cannot appeal an 
acquittal; it is not a right, either of the jury or of the defendant.”) (citations omitted)); 
United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir. 1993) (“Neither the court nor 
counsel should encourage jurors to exercise [nullification] power. . . . A trial judge, 
therefore, may block defense attorneys’ attempts to serenade a jury with the siren 
song of nullification.@); see also Seventh Circuit Pattern Federal Criminal Jury 
Instruction 1.01 (2023). 
Although the government cannot anticipate each form of potential Ajury 
nullification@ argument or evidence in this case, the government moves to exclude the 
potential areas noted below, all of which are irrelevant to the elements of the crimes 
charged. The government seeks to preclude any argument or questioning, no matter 
what its form, that would, in effect, Aencourage [the] jury to acquit ‘under any 
circumstances= regardless of the applicable law or proven facts.@ United States v. 
Anderson, 716 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v. Dougherty, 473 
F.2d 1113, 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1972)). 
A. 
Argument or Questioning about the Motivation for 
Investigating or Prosecuting this Case Should Be 
Precluded. 
Evidence bearing on the government=s decision to prosecute is Aextraneous and 
collateral@ and thus properly excluded from trial. United States v. Johnson, 605 F.2d 
1025, 1030 (7th Cir. 1979) (affirming the exclusion of evidence offered to show that 
the Aindictment was a political instrument@); see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 
607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (“So long as the prosecutor had probable 
cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the 
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decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” (internal quotations omitted)); United 
States v. Goulding, 26 F.3d 656, 667 (7th Cir. 1994). In addition, inquiries regarding 
the subjective intentions or motivations of a government agent are irrelevant to 
determining the factual guilt or innocence of a defendant. E.g., id. (noting that, even 
in the context of an entrapment defense, it was proper for the trial court not to Aallow 
the defense to mount an inquiry into the mental states of the investigating officers 
since such evidence was irrelevant@).  
Accordingly, this Court should preclude the defendant from making argument 
or inquiries concerning the government=s motivations for investigating and 
prosecuting this case.  
B. 
Argument 
or 
Evidence 
Concerning 
Allegations 
of 
Governmental Misconduct or Outrageous Government 
Conduct Arguments Should Be Precluded 
Defendant should be barred from suggesting that the government engaged in 
misconduct or outrageous conduct in front of the jury, for that is not relevant at trial. 
See United States v. Stallworth, 656 F.3d 721, 730 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Outrageous 
government conduct is not a defense in this circuit.”); United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 
239, 241-42 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Swiatek, 819 F.2d 721, 726 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (“All of the circuits that have considered the question have held that the 
issue of outrageous government conduct is not a jury question.”).  
Nor should the defendant be permitted to offer evidence or argument about the 
government’s charging decisions by, for example, suggesting that others engaged in 
the same conduct without having been charged. United States v. Young, 20 F.3d 758 
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(7th Cir. 1994) (government’s failure to charge other defendants was irrelevant to the 
question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant on trial); United States v. 
Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that the “selective 
prosecution” and “outrageous government conduct” defenses are a matter of law for 
the district court, rather than an issue of fact for the jury); accord United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1996) (holding that selective prosecution claims are 
“not a defense on the merits” and should only be granted in extraordinary cases, 
because the “Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain broad discretion 
to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws”); United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909-10 
(10th Cir. 1992) (noting that the circuits which recognize this “extraordinary defense” 
do so as a matter of law in the most “narrow” and “egregious circumstances”). Thus, 
courts routinely grant motions in limine “to bar defendants from presenting evidence 
or making arguments to the jury suggesting that they should be acquitted because 
the government engaged in misconduct in the course of its investigation.” United 
States v. Shields, 1991 WL 236492, *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 13, 1991); see also United States 
v. Infelise, 1991 WL 251654 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 1991) (holding that “selective 
prosecution and outrageous government conduct must be resolved by the court and 
not the jury.”). 
The introduction of any such evidence would serve no purpose other than “to 
try some person other than the defendant and some issues other than [her] guilt.” 
United States v. Griffin, 867 F. Supp. 1347, 1347 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citation omitted). 
The “thrust of the defense” is this: “the prosecution was not nice or could have done 
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it better and so the jury ought to acquit, whether or not guilt has been proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.” Id. Defendant thus should be prohibited from offering any 
evidence or argument about the government’s charging decisions or any other 
perceived government misconduct.2 
C. 
Argument or Cross-Examination Regarding Investigative 
Steps Not Taken by the Government. 
Cross-examining government agents about investigative steps not taken is 
another irrelevant line of inquiry that is sometimes pursued by a defendant at trial. 
Investigative decisions, much like charging decisions, typically have little or no 
relevance to the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence. Shifting the spotlight from 
a defendant to the government inevitably wastes time and diverts the jury’s attention 
from the issue of guilt. United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1192 (10th Cir. 
1998). It is well within a district court’s discretion, then, to preclude a defendant from 
questioning witnesses about investigative steps not taken. United States v. Robbins, 
197 F.3d 829, 845 (7th Cir. 1999).  
The Robbins case is one such example. There, the district court precluded 
defense counsel from attempting to cross-examine an agent “about the extent of his 
investigation,” sustaining an objection to counsel’s question as to whether the agent 
“had investigated the length of time that [a co-defendant] and [defendant] had known 
each other.” Id. The court explained: “[I]t is not my intention to allow this trial to 
 
2 Defendant may, of course, inquire about benefits that specific government witnesses 
received that may be relevant to questions of bias. But any inquiry in this regard should be 
limited to the benefits a witness received or expected, without further commentary as to 
whether it was appropriate for the government to extend such benefits to the witnesses. 
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become a trial of the investigation. And it is my intention that the jury make its 
decision based on evidence actually presented rather than . . . speculation about the 
possible existence of other evidence that might have been developed if the 
investigation had been carried out in some other way.” Id.  
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court had not abused its 
discretion in limiting defense counsel’s cross- examination of the agent. Id. The 
district court’s perception that defense counsel’s line-of-questioning might confuse 
the jury and cause it to speculate about evidence not before the jury were “valid 
reason[s]” for limiting cross-examination, the Seventh Circuit concluded, adding that 
the subject matter only had “marginal relevance.” Id.  
“Under our system of criminal justice, the issue submitted to the jury is 
whether the accused is guilty or not guilty. The jury is not asked to render judgment 
about non-parties, nor is it normally asked to render a verdict on the government’s 
investigation.” McVeigh, 153 F.3d at 1192; see also United States v. Veal, 23 F.3d 985, 
989 (6th Cir. 1994) (“the jury would not be called upon to determine whether the 
government’s investigation had been good or bad”). And, unless a defendant can 
connect his line-of-questioning with other evidence in the case or with a specific 
defense, such an inquiry has limited probative value while risking substantial 
prejudice. United States v. Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 23 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[s]uch speculative 
evidence of the inadequacy of the police investigation would have shifted the jury’s 
focus from the accusations against [the defendant] to accusations against the police, 
thus creating a real danger of unfair prejudice and jury confusion that ‘substantially 
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outweighed’ the evidence’s probative value”); United States v. Estell, 641 F. App’x. 
552, 556 (7th Cir. Mar. 10, 2016) (unreported) (“But trial judges have discretion to 
limit argument on tangential issues that could confuse the jury, and that includes a 
defendant’s complaints about the adequacy of the government’s investigation. 
Establishing Estell’s coercion defense was his responsibility, not the government’s.”) 
(cleaned up).  
The investigative agencies are not on trial in this case. Without a reasonable 
and specific connection to the evidence introduced at trial, as opposed to general 
claims that the agents could have done things better or differently, any line of 
questioning or argument intended to put the investigation on trial should be 
excluded. 
D. 
Argument 
or 
Evidence 
Regarding 
Specific 
Lawful 
Conduct 
Except for general reputation or opinion evidence, which may be properly 
offered by a character witness under Rule 405(a), the government moves to exclude 
all specific evidence of the defendant’s lawful conduct. See United States v. White, 737 
F.3d 1121, 1137 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Under 405(a), admissible character evidence may 
be introduced in the form of opinion or reputation testimony.”). In this regard, the 
law is clear: “Evidence that a defendant acted lawfully on other occasions is generally 
inadmissible to prove he acted lawfully on the occasion alleged in the indictment.” 
United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1020 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. 
Heideke, 900 F.2d 1155, 1162 (7th Cir. 1990)). Therefore, a defendant “may not seek 
to establish [her] innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on [other] 
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specific occasions.” United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (excluding 
evidence that defendants met regularly and did not discuss criminal activity); see also 
United States v. Grimm, 568 F.2d 1136, 1138 (5th Cir. 1978) (excluding evidence that 
car dealer paid for some cars instead of stealing them). 
To hold otherwise would be to eviscerate Rule 405’s limitations, which forbid 
proof of good character through evidence of specific acts where character is not an 
element of the charge or defense. See White, 737 F.3d at 1137 (“Specific instances of 
the defendant's character . . . may only be introduced if that character ‘is an essential 
element of a charge, claim, or defense.’” (citing Rule 405(b)). Like Rule 403, Rule 405 
is intended to prevent the series of wasteful mini trials that would inevitably ensue 
if a defendant were allowed to pursue this irrelevant line of inquiry. See Committee 
Notes to Rule 405, Subdivision (a) (“Fearing . . . wholesale allowance of opinion 
testimony might tend to turn a trial into a swearing contest between conflicting 
character witnesses.”). The Notes conclude that proof of character by means of specific 
acts “possesses the greatest capacity to arouse prejudice, to confuse, to surprise, and 
to consume time.” See Grimm, 568 F.2d at 1136 (evidence of lawful transactions 
“could have complicated the case and confused the jury”).  
Here, several of the businesses involved in defendant’s fraudulent scheme 
purportedly provided childcare or daycare services. The government anticipates that 
defendant may seek to elicit testimony that, at some point in her life, she may have 
provided such services to the public lawfully. The defendant may attempt to offer 
such evidence directly or through cross examination. If offered to establish that she 
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operated such businesses at times that are irrelevant to the charged scheme, such 
questioning should be prohibited as irrelevant and as inadmissible under Rule 403. 
And to the extent the defendant intends to offer evidence regarding her character, 
this Court should permit her to do so only in accordance with Rule 405(a)’s 
requirements.  
E. 
Arguments and Evidence Regarding Penalties Faced by 
the Defendant Should Be Precluded 
The government moves this Court to preclude the defendant from introducing 
evidence, making argument, or otherwise mentioning the potential penalties she will 
face if convicted. Such argument or evidence concerning punishment is improper 
because the potential penalty faced by a defendant is irrelevant to the jury’s 
determination of guilt or innocence. See, e.g., Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 
579 (1994) (“It is well established that when a jury has no sentencing function, it 
should be admonished to ‘reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be 
imposed.’”) (quoting Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 40 (1975)); United States v. 
Lewis, 110 F.3d 417, 422 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. McKenzie, 922 F.2d 1323, 
1327 (7th Cir. 1991). Mention of the potential penalties faced by the defendant would 
serve only the improper purpose of promoting jury nullification. See, e.g., United 
States v. Reagan, 694 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir. 1982) (“The authorities are 
unequivocal in holding that presenting information to the jury about possible 
sentencing is prejudicial.”) (quoting United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1384 (10th 
Cir. 1980)).  
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Accordingly, this Court should preclude the defendant from introducing 
evidence, making argument, or otherwise mentioning potential penalties resulting 
from her conviction in this case. 
F. 
Argument 
or 
Evidence 
by 
Defendant 
of 
Family 
Circumstances 
While the government acknowledges that a defendant is permitted to introduce 
limited testimony concerning her background, the government respectfully moves 
this Court to preclude evidence and argument regarding defendant’s family needs or 
the needs of her children, including any arguments or evidence designed either to 
imply that defendant’s criminal conduct resulted from a sympathetic motive or 
excuse, or to invoke sympathies regarding the impact of a conviction upon defendant’s 
family.  Such evidence is irrelevant to defendant’s factual guilt, is designed for no 
purpose other than to invoke improper appeals for jury nullification, and should be 
excluded. See United States v. Henderson, 2012 WL 698796, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 2, 
2012) (“Argument or evidence relating to a defendant’s family needs is not admissible 
to infer a motive or an excuse for [a] defendant’s criminal conduct or to invoke 
sympathies regarding the impact of a conviction upon a defendant’s family.”); Shields, 
1991 WL 236492 at *4 (granting motion in limine precluding “any testimony 
regarding the possible impact which a conviction might have upon any family 
member”). Accordingly, the defendant should be barred from discussing her family’s 
needs. 
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III. 
MOTION TO PRECLUDE REQUESTS FOR OR COMMENTARY REGARDING 
DISCOVERY IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY 
The government respectfully moves to preclude the defendant from requesting 
discovery from witnesses or opposing counsel, moving the Court for such discovery, 
or otherwise commenting on discovery matters, in the presence of the jury. Such 
requests in front of the jury are inappropriate and may create the impression that 
one side has suppressed information as a means of seeking an unfair advantage. See 
United States v. Sargent, No. 16 CR 10-2, 2017 WL 11505360, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 
2017) (“Requesting discovery and commenting on discovery matters in the presence 
of the jury is inappropriate.”) (citations omitted); United States. v. Dochee, No. 08 CR 
108-4, 2009 WL 102986, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 15, 2009) (granting the government’s 
motion in limine on similar grounds because “commentary on discovery matters by 
either party in the presence of the jury could create the impression that the opposing 
party is withholding information.”). 
Discovery requests by the defendant, if appropriate, can easily be made to the 
Court or opposing counsel outside the presence of the jury with no prejudice resulting 
to either side. Accordingly, the government seeks an order from this Court that any 
requests for discovery or comments relating to discovery be made outside the presence 
of the jury. See generally United States v. Gray, No. 2:07 CR 166, 2010 WL 1258169, 
at *2-3 (N.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2010) (“[G]rant[ing] the government’s motion to preclude 
requests of discovery from witnesses or opposing counsel, moving the court for such 
discovery or otherwise commenting on discovery matters in the presence of the jury. 
Any necessary requests for or comments about discovery can be made outside of the 
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jury’s presence.”); see also Thompson v. Glenmede Trust Co., 1996 WL 529693 (E.D. 
Pa. 1996) (“Rather than focus on the issues in the case, the jury may instead be misled 
by the irrelevant side issues of the discovery process. Therefore, the Court will not 
permit either party to refer to the discovery process in the presence of the jury at 
trial.”). 
IV. 
MOTION TO PRECLUDE ARGUMENT EXPLAINING OR DEFINING REASONABLE 
DOUBT 
The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that Areasonable doubt@ is a term that 
should not be defined by the trial court or counsel. E.g., United States v. Hatfield, 590 
F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Thompson, 117 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“The law is clear in this circuit that it is improper for attorneys to attempt to 
define the term [reasonable doubt]”). The pattern jury instructions for the Seventh 
Circuit similarly omit any instruction defining “reasonable doubt.” See Committee 
Comment to Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction 1.04. Though the 
defendant may argue that the government bears the burden of proving her guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, neither party should be permitted to define that term to 
the jury at trial. Glass, 846 F.2d at 386 (“Trial counsel may argue that the 
government has the burden of proving the defendant’s guilt ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt,’ but they may not attempt to define ‘reasonable doubt.’”) (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, the government seeks an order from this Court precluding 
defendant from explaining or defining reasonable doubt at trial. 
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V. 
MOTION TO PRECLUDE A “MISSING WITNESS” ARGUMENT 
It is within the Court’s discretion to prohibit argument by either side 
concerning missing witnesses not under the control of either side. United States v. 
Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1394 (7th Cir. 1987). Indeed, “when the witness is equally 
available to both sides, the preferred practice is to preclude the [missing witness] 
argument rather than to leave the jury free to speculate about a lot of non-evidence.” 
United States v. Simpson, 974 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992); see also United States v. 
Cochran, 955 F.2d 1116, 1123 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its 
discretion in prohibiting discussion of missing witnesses during closing arguments. 
Because the court determined that Jones and O’Sheilds were equally available to 
either party, it was appropriate not to allow either party to comment on the absent 
witnesses.”). Therefore, the government requests that the Court prohibit defendant 
from introducing evidence about or arguing that any relevant inference can be drawn 
from the fact that additional witnesses did not testify.  
Alternatively, if the Court allows defendant to introduce evidence or make any 
such argument regarding missing witnesses, the government seeks permission to 
respond to this argument appropriately. Ordinarily, a prosecutor may reply to “an 
argument by the defense that the absence of some witness counts against the 
prosecution” by pointing out that the defense has the same subpoena power as the 
government. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d at 1392-93. In Sblendorio, defense counsel for two 
defendants commented during closing argument that the government did not call two 
individuals to the witness stand. Id. at 1390. In rebuttal, the prosecutor replied, “You 
heard every defense attorney ask about, ‘Where is this witness[?]. . . They don’t have 
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to prove anything, but they have subpoena power just like the government.’” Id. at 
1390-91. 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the prosecutor’s remarks were improper 
because they tended to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. Id. at 1391. The 
court disagreed, holding that the prosecutor may comment on a defendant’s failure to 
call witnesses as long as the comments do not invite inferences based on the privilege 
against compulsory self-incrimination. Id. The court explained that “[t]he jury is 
entitled to know that the defendant may compel people to testify; this legitimately 
affects the jury’s assessment of the evidence.” Id. at 1393-1394; see also United States 
v. Miller, 276 F.3d 370, 374-75 (7th Cir. 2002). Thus, once the subject had been 
opened, it was permissible for the government to respond. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d at 
1394; see also United States v. King, 150 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 1998) (prosecutor’s 
reference during closing argument to the defendant’s opportunity to call government 
agents —“where the defendant himself has broached the subject of missing witnesses 
by asking the jury to in a sense penalize the government for its failure to produce the 
[witnesses]” —was “clearly” proper); United States v. Aldaco, 201 F.3d 979, 988 (7th 
Cir. 2000) (“[I]t was not improper for the prosecutor to make clear to the jury that the 
defendant, like the government, has the power to subpoena any witness or witnesses 
relevant to the case after [the defendant’s] counsel had opened the door to this reply 
argument by the prosecution.”); United States v. Villegas, 655 F.3d 662, 671-72 (7th 
Cir. 2011) (same). 
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VI. 
MOTION 
TO 
PRECLUDE 
DEFENDANT’S 
INTRODUCTION 
OF 
SELF-
EXCULPATORY HEARSAY 
The government anticipates that its trial presentation will include, among 
other evidence, emails exchanged by the defendant, as well as testimony regarding 
defendant’s statements. The items of evidence encompassing defendant’s prior 
admissions may contain defendant’s own statements that they contend are self-
exculpatory. By this motion, the government seeks to preclude defendant’s 
introduction of her own self-exculpatory statements, whether through excerpts of 
their own emails or recorded statements, or during cross-examination of the 
government’s witnesses, as inadmissible hearsay. 
When offered by the government, defendant’s past out-of-court statements 
constitute party-opponent admissions, which are exempt from the hearsay rule. Fed. 
R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A); United States v. McGee, 189 F.3d 626, 631 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(“[A]dmissions by a party-opponent do not constitute hearsay.”). If elicited by 
defendant, however, those same statements are inadmissible hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 
801(c); United States v. Doxy, 225 F. App’x 400, 402 (7th Cir. Apr. 13, 2007) 
(“Typically, a party’s self-serving, exculpatory, out-of-court statement is inadmissible 
hearsay.”); United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252, 1258 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Ordinarily 
a defendant’s self-serving, exculpatory, out of court statements would not be 
admissible.”); Stock v. Rednour, 621 F.3d 644, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2010) (recognizing 
“the basic evidentiary principle that self-serving, out-of-court statements are 
inadmissible for the purpose of exculpating the declarant”). 
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Hearsay “does not become admissible just because it favors a defendant,” and, 
as the Seventh Circuit notes, the “hearsay rule and its exceptions” are “compatible 
with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.” Gomez v. Greer, 896 F.2d 252, 253–54 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (exculpatory portions of non-testifying co-defendant’s statements properly 
excluded as hearsay); see also United States v. Vargas, No. 08 CR 630, 2011 WL 
116826, at *2 (Jan. 6., 2011) (Kennelly, J.) (denying motion for new trial predicated, 
among other things, on court’s exclusion of defendant’s self-exculpatory out-of-court 
statement, where defendant failed to establish any hearsay exceptions justifying its 
admission). Moreover, permitting defendant to place her own statements before the 
jury without subjecting them to cross-examination is “precisely what the hearsay rule 
forbids.” United States v. Fernandez, 839 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988) (trial court 
properly sustained hearsay objection to defendant’s attempt to solicit his post-arrest 
statement during cross-examination of government’s witness); see also United States 
v. Willis, 759 F.2d 1486, 1501 (11th Cir. 1985) (defendant’s attempt to elicit 
exculpatory statements made at the time of arrest to prove he lacked requisite 
knowledge was inadmissible hearsay). 
What’s more, defendant cannot invoke the rule of completeness under Fed. R. 
Evid. 106 to introduce new emails or recordings containing their own statements that 
are not “‘necessary to (1) explain the admitted portions, (2) place the admitted portion 
in context, (3) avoid misleading the trier of fact, and (4) insure a fair and impartial 
understanding.’” United States v. Ambrose, 668 F.3d 943, 964 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting 
United States v. Yarrington, 640 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2011)); see also Reese, 666 
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F.3d at 1019 (holding self-exculpatory statements on recording of conversation 
between defendant and a co-conspirator inadmissible under rule of completeness, 
where conversation at issue was “entirely separate and distinct from the admitted 
recorded conversations” offered into evidence by the government).  
Defendant’s self-exculpatory statements, similarly, cannot be admitted under 
the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). The 
exception applies only to the “declarant’s then-existing statement (such as motive, 
intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or physical condition.” Id. It does not apply to 
a “statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.” Id. The 
“statement must be contemporaneous with the mental state sought to be proven,” “it 
must be shown that [the] declarant had no time to reflect, that is, no time to fabricate 
or misrepresent his thoughts,” and “the declarant’s state of mind must be relevant to 
an issue in the case.” United States v. Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir. 1992). 
Future-looking statements may qualify for the exception, but backwards-looking 
statements generally do not. See United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 877 (7th Cir. 
2012) (past tense of statement demonstrated it sought to “prove a fact remembered” 
and thus did not qualify for 803(3) exception). To the extent any state-of-mind 
statements are admitted, they must be limited to the bare statement and not the 
reason for those statements. See United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 810 (9th Cir. 
1987) (“[T]he state-of-mind exception does not permit the witness to relate any of the 
defendant’s statements as to why he held the particular state of mind, or what he 
might have believed that would have induced the state of mind.”); United States v. 
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Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223, 1225 (5th Cir. 1980) (same, and noting: “If the reservation in 
the text of the rule is to have any effect, it must be understood to narrowly limit those 
admissible statements to declarations of condition—“I’m scared”—and not belief—
“I’m scared because Galkin threatened me.”). 
Defendant may, of course, make any self-exculpatory statements she wishes, 
so long as she takes the witness stand. But should she decide to exercise her right not 
to testify, she does not thereby have license to circumvent the rules of evidence. In 
light of well-settled precedent cited herein, the Court should grant the government’s 
motion in limine and forbid defendant from introducing her own self-exculpatory 
hearsay statements at trial. 
VII. 
MOTION TO PRECLUDE IMPERMISSIBLE USE OF WITNESS INTERVIEW 
MEMORANDA DURING CROSS-EXAMINATION 
In discovery provided to defendant, the government produced numerous 
memoranda prepared by law enforcement agents memorializing information 
conveyed by witnesses during interviews with the government. While the statements 
in these interviews do not qualify for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1) because they 
were not made “under penalty of perjury” or at a “proceeding” as required by that 
rule, statements made in these interviews could be admissible under Rule 613 for 
impeachment purposes if they are inconsistent with the witness’s trial testimony.3 
 
3 If the witness admits on the stand that the prior inconsistent statement is true, there 
is no hearsay issue and the statement is properly treated as substantive evidence, not merely 
as impeachment. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) advisory committee notes to 1972 Proposed 
Rules (“If the witness admits on the stand that he made the statement and that it was true, 
he adopts the statement and there is no hearsay problem.”).  
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20 
 
As explained above, these interview statements must be truly inconsistent with trial 
testimony to be used for impeachment purposes under Rule 613. See supra page 24. 
Of course, the agent’s interview report itself—unless adopted by the witness—
is not the witness’s statement. See United States v. Allen, 798 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 
1986) (“A federal agent's written impression of what a witness said, his strategy, or 
his conclusions from what the witness said are obviously not statements of the 
witness—unless the government agent who is the interviewer is himself a witness 
and testifies about the subject matter of the report.”); see also United States v. 
Schoenborn, 4 F.3d 1424, 1429 and n.3 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding district court erred in 
admitting an FBI agent’s interview report as a trial witness’s past recollection 
recorded when the witness did not adopt the report). And it would “be grossly unfair 
to allow the defense to use statements to impeach a witness which could not fairly be 
said to be the witness’ own rather than the product of the investigator’s selections, 
interpretations, and interpolations.” Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 350 
(1959) (affirming district court’s decision that a government agent’s interview 
summary was not a statement within the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 3500).  
Because an agent’s interview report is not the statement of the witness, its 
contents are simply inadmissible because they are not relevant to the impeachment 
of the trial witness. See Schoenborn, 4 F.3d at 1429, n.3 (“If a third party’s notes 
reflect only that note-taker’s summary characterization of a witness’s prior 
statement, then the notes are irrelevant as an impeaching prior inconsistent 
statement, and thus inadmissible.”). Therefore, given that the report itself is 
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21 
 
inadmissible to impeach a witness, the government moves the Court to prohibit 
counsel from reading from an agent’s interview report that is not in evidence while 
questioning a witness, displaying the report to the jury while asking a witness about 
a prior inconsistent statement from the interview, or asking the witness to read out 
loud from the report. Likewise, in cross-examining a witness about statements in an 
interview, unless the witness is the agent who prepared the report, counsel should 
not make verbal reference to the report in the questioning or use the report in a way 
that suggests that counsel has a memorialization of the statement.  
Rule 612 permits a party to use a writing to refresh a witness’s recollection. 
Under appropriate circumstances, an interview report could be used to refresh a 
witness’s recollection about what was said during an interview. However, given the 
prejudice that can result from suggesting that an interview report is anything other 
than an agent’s memorialization of a witness’s interview, the government requests 
that the Court hold the parties to their obligation to lay a proper foundation prior to 
showing a witness an interview report. 
A document (like an agent’s interview report) may only be used to refresh a 
witness’s recollection “only after his memory has been ‘exhausted.’” United States v. 
Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 891-92 (6th Cir. 2016) (reversed on other grounds, Carpenter 
v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 2206 (2018)). Therefore, the government would object to 
counsel showing a document to a witness to refresh their memory without the witness 
first testifying that they cannot recall something relevant in response to a question. 
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VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the government respectfully requests that the 
Court grant the foregoing motions in limine. 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
ANDREW S. BOUTROS 
United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
/s/ Mary Katherine McClelland  
 
 
MARY KATHERINE McCLELLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUINN FORD 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
219 South Dearborn Street, 5th Floor 
Chicago, Illinois 60604 
(312) 353-5300 
Dated: May 6, 2026 
 
 
 
Case: 1:23-cr-00097 Document #: 137 Filed: 05/06/26 Page 22 of 22 PageID #:604

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