Sentencing Memorandum by USA as to Chad Brandon Thomas — USA v. Thomas (Dkt. 68, E.D. Tenn.)

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U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee · No. 2:22-cr-00076-JRG-CRW · Doc. 68 · 2023-08-14 · Docket on CourtListener

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
AT GREENEVILLE 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
) 
 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
 
 
) 
No. 2:22-CR-76 
 
 
 
) 
JUDGE GREER 
CHAD BRANDON THOMAS 
 
) 
 
 
UNITED STATES’ SENTENCING MEMORANDUM 
 
 
The United States, through the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Tennessee, files 
this sentencing memorandum in accordance with Rule 83.9(j), Local Rules (E.D. Tenn.).   
 
The United States requests that the Court sentence defendant to a term of imprisonment of 41 
months.  This sentence is the top of defendant’s advisory Guideline range as currently calculated (without 
considering the prior objections filed by the United States based on defendant’s previously filed motion to 
withdraw his plea).  The heightened aggravation in this case provides ample support for the requested 
sentence.  The requested sentence properly balances the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 
is a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with the statutory purposes of 
sentencing.  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
I. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The Court is well aware of the procedural background in this case, and the United States outlined 
that procedural background in its opposition to defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.  Instead of 
restating that procedural background here, the United States incorporates its previously filed opposition to 
defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea agreement and the overview of the case set forth in that pleading.  
[See Doc. 54].  
 
Sentencing currently is set for August 21, 2023, at 3:00 p.m. 
II. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
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The facts are outlined in defendant’s plea agreement [Doc. 3 at 2-7] and the Presentence 
Investigation Report (“PSR”) [Doc. 29 at 5-8].  The facts of the case are undisputed.  Defendant 
fraudulently obtained three Payroll Protection Program (“PPP”) loans in the total amount of $307,700.  In 
the third—and most egregious—defendant formed a business entity in the state of Tennessee named 
Kingdom of God, Inc.  He then falsely represented several religious celebrities, including a now-deceased 
minister with a global television ministry, was one of defendant’s full-time employees. 
 
In all, defendant misrepresented the true state of affairs, obtained monies meant by Congress to 
stem the effects of a global pandemic, and obtained funds that were never meant for him—all through lies 
and misrepresentations.      
III. 
STATUTORY MAXIMUM SENTENCE 
 
Defendant is guilty of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.  For that offense, defendant 
faces a statutory maximum sentence of not more than 20 years in prison, a fine of not more than 
$250,000, supervised release of not more than three years, and a special assessment of $100.  See 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 3571(b)(3), 3583(b)(2), and 3013(a)(2)(A).    
IV. 
ADVISORY GUIDELINE RANGE AND GUIDELINE OBJECTIONS 
 
The advisory guidelines are important because, upon appellate review, sentences falling within 
those guidelines “are generally presumed to be reasonable.” United States v. Muchow, 924 F.3d 272, 275 
(6th Cir. 2019); see United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2008) (presumption of 
reasonableness appropriate because “there is a confluence between the national views of the Sentencing 
Commission and the independent views of a sentencing judge, [and] that ‘double determination 
significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one”) (citation omitted).   
 
Here, the United States Probation Office calculated an offense level of 20 and a criminal history 
category of I.  PSR at ¶¶ 48 and 57.  Defendant has not objected to the PSR at this point.  The United 
States has filed objections to the PSR that were based upon defendant’s previously filed motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea.  Specifically, the United States had objected to a one-level objection for 
accepting responsibility and had advocated for an obstruction enhancement if defendant’s testimony at his 
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change of plea hearing was not truthful.  Because defendant has now withdrawn his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea [See Doc. 66], the United States no longer objects to the non-inclusion of an obstruction 
enhancement.  The United States is not, however, filing a motion for acceptance of responsibility on 
defendant’s part.  Nonetheless, the recommendation here would be within the Guideline range of either 
the score Probation computed or if the offense level was level 21.  In other words, regardless of whether 
defendant gets an extra point, the United States is still requesting a 41 month sentence. 
V. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) FACTORS 
 
The Government’s requested 41-month sentence properly accounts for each of the sentencing 
factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Notably, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history 
and characteristics of the defendant, the need to promote respect for the law (by defendant and generally), 
the need for specific and general deterrence, and the need to treat similarly situated offenders the same 
each support the requested sentence here.   
A. The Nature and Circumstances of the Offense 
 
Initially, the Court must look to the nature and circumstances of the offense.  This factor readily 
supports the Government’s recommendation. 
 
Regarding the nature of defendant’s offenses, potential punishment shows the crimes are serious.  
Defendant faces 20 years for wire fraud.  That length of time is serious and makes defendant’s offense a 
Class C felony—just two from the top of the Congressional classification scheme.  See 18 U.S.C. § 
3559(a).  
 
The circumstances of defendant’s scheme—to fleece the government—also show extremely 
heightened aggravation.  The guidelines capture some of this aggravation with certain specific offense 
characteristics (loss amount, sophisticated means, and impersonating a charitable organization).  Non-
guideline aggravation exists, too.   
 
The first requested guideline aggravation is loss.  The guidelines counsel that the more a person 
steals, the higher his or her sentence should be.  Here, the guidelines call for a 12-level increase for losses 
between $250,000 and $550,000.  See USSG §2B1.1(b)(1)(G).  As the Sixth Circuit once observed, “The 
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purpose of these loss gradations is to ensure that, the more harm the conduct at issue threatens [or causes], 
the more severely it is punished. In essence, ‘[t]he Guidelines use loss as a proxy for the seriousness of 
the fraud.’”  United States v. Simpson, 538 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).  Much of the 
offense level score increase advocated here is due to that increased loss amount.  The loss amount here is 
actual money stolen, so it shows the seriousness of defendant’s offenses and is a good proxy for the time 
defendant should serve.   
 
These losses show heightened aggravation in a few other ways.  First, the losses here are not to 
any one individual or company.  Instead, these losses will be absorbed by the United State taxpayers.  
Even worse, these losses involved the blatant swindle of a program created in the face of a global 
pandemic.  The funds defendant stole were intended to avoid massive business failures in the midst of a 
nationwide alarm due to the initial spread of COVID-19.  Defendant used a nationwide pandemic and a 
program designed to ease its economic impact for his own greed. 
 
The next guideline aggravation is “sophisticated means.”  Here, the guidelines counsel that a thief 
who conceals his or her tracks by “hiding assets or transactions” should be punished more severely than 
one who does not.  See USSG §2B1.1, comment. (n.9(C)).  Defendant is sophisticated when it comes to 
business matters.  He has operated businesses in the past.  Here, he fabricated at least one business, used 
phony business records and the anonymity of online financial transactions to accomplish his theft.  The 
sophisticated means defendant used makes his crime more aggravated than others. 
 
The other aggravating factor here is the impersonation of a religious organization.  Defendant 
called his sham business “Kingdom of God, Inc.” and represented to lenders that well-known ministers 
with nationwide audiences were on his payroll.  That conduct earned a two-level increase under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B1.1(b)(9)(A).  That conduct, moreover, is simply reprehensible when considering the state of 
emergency and the PPP program defendant exploited.  Put simply, that fact is very aggravating, and that 
conduct accounted for nearly half of the loss here.   
 
Apart from these well-defined, guideline aggravators, some non-guideline aggravation exists, too.  
For instance, defendant did this repeatedly.  This was not a one-time fraud.  Defendant stole from the 
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public fisc three times.  Additionally, the Guidelines do not fully capture the gravity of a fraud like this 
that used a global pandemic and steal money allocated to businesses that really needed it and, importantly, 
to workers who faced the very real risk of job loss.  
 
Accordingly, the serious nature of the offenses and the aggravating circumstances here support 
the Government’s recommended sentence. 
B. The History and Characteristics of the Defendant 
 
Although the nature and circumstances of the offense provide overwhelming aggravation, 
defendant’s history and characteristics provide some, too. 
 
Defendant does not have a bad criminal record in terms of score—he is a zero-point offender.  
Notwithstanding that, defendant’s crimes directed at his ex-spouse, to include trespassing and violating 
injunctions, show an escalating pattern of lack of respect for the law.  These matters are addressed more 
fully in the opposition the United States filed to defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.  While no need 
exists to elaborate on them further exists, they are concerning and show that the need to promote respect 
for the law and protect others, including defendant’s former spouse, are weighty sentencing factors here.   
.  
Equally concerning is defendant’s history of substance abuse and its effects on him when using 
drugs.  The competency evaluation in this case discussed those factors at length, and the United States 
simply notes them here in terms of defendant not being an average zero-point offender. 
C. The Statutory Purposes of Sentencing 
 
The need to address the statutory purposes of sentencing also supports the Government’s 
recommendation.  The Government’s requested sentence recognizes the seriousness of the offense and 
provides just punishment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).  The requested sentence also will promote 
respect for the law and the rights of taxpayers who are the ultimate victims in this case. 
 
The Government’s requested sentence also will afford deterrence and protect the public from 
future crimes.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(B) and 3553(a)(2)(C).  No serious question exists about 
incarceration being able to deter crimes like this. 
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General deterrence is weighty here, too.  This was a swindle that targeted a worldwide pandemic 
involving over a million deaths and government efforts to keep the nation afloat in the interim.  The Court 
can send a loud and clear message with this sentencing that is not at play in normal fraud cases.  The 
requested sentence will afford some measure of punishment to hopefully deter behavior like this from 
others.   
D. The Need to Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities 
 
The Government’s recommended sentence will avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).  The recommended sentence should be within the defendant’s advisory guidelines if 
the Court sustains the government’s objections.  A sentence within the advisory guidelines, of course, 
serves the sentencing purpose of treating similar offenders similarly.  A primary reason why Congress 
established the United States Sentencing Commission and authorized promulgated guidelines was to 
provide “reasonable uniformity in sentencing by narrowing the wide disparity in sentences imposed for 
similar criminal offenses by similar offenders.”  USSG Ch.1, Part A, intro. comment. (n.3).   The 
Government’s recommended sentence should be within defendant’s Guideline range (with or without an 
acceptance reduction) and, by definition, will support this factor. 
 
Indeed, when considering this factor, the Court needs only to correctly compute the Guidelines.  
“For when a district court correctly does so, it has ‘necessarily taken into account the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities, viewed nationally.’”  United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 935 (6th 
Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Houston, 529 F.3d 743, 754 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
E. The Need for Restitution 
 
Restitution is another factor at play.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7).  No realistic potential of 
repayment exists in this case based on defendant’s prior record of making payment and employability, so 
the need to provide restitution also weighs in favor of the requested sentence. 
 
Pre-case seizures has also secured substantial funds already. 
 
 
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VI. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons outlined above, the United States respectfully requests that the Court sentence 
defendant to a 41-month term of imprisonment. 
Respectfully submitted, this the 14th day of August, 2023. 
 
FRANCIS M. HAMILTON, III 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
 
 
By: 
s/ Mac D. Heavener, III 
 
Mac D. Heavener, III, Fla. Bar #0896748 
Assistant United States Attorney 
220 West Depot Street, Suite 423 
Greeneville, Tennessee 37743 
(423) 639-6759 
Mac.Heavener@usdoj.gov 
 
 
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