Exhibit Ex A. Dubin v. United States — USA v. Torjagbo (Dkt. 188.1)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC · Doc. 188-1 · 2025-06-05 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

Exhibit A.
Dubin v. United States
Supreme Court of the 
United States
February 27, 2023, 
No. 22-10.
599 U.S. 110 *; 143 S. Ct. 1557 
**; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136 **
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 1 of 22

LEIGH FINLAYSON
   Caution
As of: April 22, 2025 6:50 PM Z
Dubin v. United States
Supreme Court of the United States
February 27, 2023, Argued; June 8, 2023, Decided
No. 22-10.
Reporter
599 U.S. 110 *; 143 S. Ct. 1557 **; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136 ***; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420 ****; 29 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 892
DAVID FOX DUBIN, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES
Notice: The pagination of this document is subject to 
change pending release of the final published version.
Prior History:  [****1] ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 
THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States v. Dubin, 27 F.4th 1021, 2022 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 5704 (5th Cir. Tex., Mar. 3, 2022)
Disposition: 27 F. 4th 1021, vacated and remanded. 
Core Terms
identification, identity theft, patient’s, crux, billing, 
predicate offense, fraudulent, aggravated, verbs, terms, 
words, overbilling, ancillary, mandatory, sentence, 
restaurant, targeted, card, facilitates, belonging, offers, 
cases, reimbursement, deceit, theft, automatically, 
psychological, healthcare, inflated, suggests
Case Summary
Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-In defrauding Medicaid, petitioner did 
not also commit aggravated identity theft because 
petitioner did not use a patient’s means of identification 
in relation to a predicate offense within the meaning of 
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1). Petitioner’s use of the 
patient’s name was not at the crux of what made the 
underlying overbilling fraudulent. The crux of the 
healthcare fraud was a misrepresentation about the 
qualifications of petitioner’s employee. The patient’s 
name was an ancillary feature of the billing method 
employed. Petitioner’s fraud was in misrepresenting 
how and when services were provided to a patient, not 
who received the services.
Outcome
Judgment vacated and case remanded. 9-0 decision; 1 
concurrence.
LexisNexis® Headnotes
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN1[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) is violated when the 
defendant’s misuse of another person’s means of 
identification is at the crux of what makes the underlying 
offense criminal, rather than merely an ancillary feature 
of a billing method.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Penalties
Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Ranges
HN2[
]  Identity Theft, Penalties
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant, 
during and in relation to any predicate offense, 
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person. 
The predicate offenses include, among many others, 
healthcare fraud. § 1028A(c)(4). Section 1028A(a)(1) 
carries a severe penalty: a mandatory minimum 
sentence of two years in prison in addition to the 
punishment for the predicate offense.
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 2 of 22

Page 2 of 21
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN3[
]  Legislation, Interpretation
The word “use” poses some interpretational difficulties 
because of the different meanings attributable to it. The 
ordinary or natural meaning of “use” is variously defined 
as “to convert to one’s service,” “to employ,” “to avail 
oneself of, and “to carry out a purpose or action by 
means of.” These various definitions of “use” imply 
action and implementation. Beyond that general 
concept, however, “use” takes on different meanings 
depending on context, and because it draws meaning 
from its context, the court will look not only to the word 
itself, but also to the statute and the surrounding 
scheme, to determine the meaning Congress intended.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN4[
]  Legislation, Interpretation
A statute’s meaning does not always turn solely on the 
broadest imaginable definitions of its component words. 
Instead, linguistic and statutory context also matter. 
Even in cases where the literal language of the statute 
is neutral in isolation, reading the whole phrase can 
point to a more targeted reading.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN5[
]  Legislation, Interpretation
The title of a statute and the heading of a section are 
tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the 
meaning of a statute. A title will not, of course, override 
the plain words of a statute.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN6[
]  Legislation, Interpretation
A title to a statute is especially valuable where it 
reinforces 
what 
the 
text’s 
nouns 
and 
verbs 
independently suggest.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN7[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
Under 18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) a defendant must 
know that the means of identification he or she 
unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used, in fact, 
belonged to another person.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN8[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
The means of identification specifically is a key mover in 
the criminality of identity theft. This central role played 
by the means of identification, which serves to 
designate a specific person’s identity, explains why it is 
said that the “identity” itself has been stolen.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN9[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
Identity theft is committed when a defendant uses the 
means of identification itself to defraud or deceive.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN10[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
When a means of identification is used deceptively, this 
deception goes to “who” is involved, rather than just 
“how” or “when” services were provided. Use of the 
means of identification would therefore be at the locus 
of the criminal undertaking, rather than merely passive, 
passing, or ancillary employment in a crime.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Assault & 
Battery > Aggravated Offenses > Elements
HN11[
]  Aggravated Offenses, Elements
Typically, an “aggravated” offense is one made worse or 
more serious by circumstances such as violence, the 
presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit 
another crime.
599 U.S. 110, *110; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1557; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***136; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****1
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 3 of 22

Page 3 of 21
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Penalties
HN12[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant 
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person, 
during and in relation to any predicate offense.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN13[
]  Legislation, Interpretation
Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, a 
word is known by the company it keeps. This canon is 
often wisely applied where a word is capable of many 
meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended 
breadth to the Acts of Congress.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN14[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) covers unlawful possession 
or transfer of a means of identification belonging to 
“another person.” Generally, to unlawfully “possess” 
something belonging to another person suggests it has 
been stolen. And to unlawfully “transfer” something 
belonging 
to 
another 
person 
similarly 
connotes 
misappropriating it and passing it along.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN15[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
In virtually all cases where a defendant employs a 
means of identification to facilitate a crime, the 
defendant will also possess or transfer the means of 
identification in a way that facilitates the crime.
Criminal Law & 
Procedure > Sentencing > Sentencing 
Guidelines > Adjustments & Enhancements
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Penalties
Criminal Law & 
Procedure > Sentencing > Imposition of 
Sentence > Factors
HN16[
]  Sentencing Guidelines, Adjustments & 
Enhancements
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) is an enhancement, and a 
severe one at that. It adds a 2-year mandatory prison 
sentence onto underlying offenses that do not impose a 
mandatory prison sentence of any kind. This prevents 
sentencing judges from considering the severity of the 
offense, even if the amount of money involved was quite 
small or there are other mitigating factors. Interpretation 
of § 1028A(a)(1) should thus reflect the distinction 
between the aggravated identity theft crimes that 
Congress 
sought 
to 
distinguish 
for 
heightened 
punishment and other crimes.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Penalties
Criminal Law & Procedure > Sentencing > Ranges
HN17[
]  Identity Theft, Penalties
A far more sensible conclusion from the statutory 
structure 
is 
that 
18 
U.S.C.S. 
§ 
1028A(a)(1)’s 
enhancement is not indiscriminate, but targets situations 
where the means of identification itself plays a key 
role—one that warrants a 2-year mandatory minimum. 
This points once more to a targeted reading, where the 
means of identification is at the crux of the underlying 
criminality, not an ancillary feature of billing.
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Governments > Federal Government > US 
Congress
HN18[
]  Legislation, Interpretation
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally 
599 U.S. 110, *110; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1557; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***136; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****1
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 4 of 22

Page 4 of 21
exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal 
criminal statute. This restraint arises both out of 
deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of 
concern that a fair warning should be given to the world 
in language that the common world will understand of 
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. 
After all, crimes are supposed to be defined by the 
legislature, not by clever prosecutors riffing on equivocal 
language.
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Prosecutors
Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
HN19[
]  Counsel, Prosecutors
A court cannot construe a criminal statute on the 
assumption that the Government will use it responsibly. 
To rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the 
otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute’s 
highly abstract general statutory language places great 
power in the hands of the prosecutor.
Criminal Law & Procedure > ... > Theft & Related 
Offenses > Identity Theft > Elements
HN20[
]  Identity Theft, Elements
A defendant “uses” another person’s means of 
identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when 
this use is at the crux of what makes the conduct 
criminal. To be clear, being at the crux of the criminality 
requires more than a causal relationship, such as 
“facilitation” of the offense or being a but-for cause of its 
“success.” Instead, with fraud or deceit crimes, the 
means of identification specifically must be used in a 
manner that is fraudulent or deceptive. Such fraud or 
deceit going to identity can often be succinctly 
summarized as going to “who” is involved.
Lawyers' Edition Display
Decision
 [***136]  In defrauding Medicaid, petitioner did not also 
commit aggravated identity theft because petitioner did 
not use patient's means of identification in relation to 
predicate offense within meaning of 18 U.S.C.S. § 
1028A(a)(1); petitioner's use of patient's name was not 
at crux of what made underlying overbilling fraudulent.
Summary
Overview: HOLDINGS: [1]-In defrauding Medicaid, 
petitioner did not also commit aggravated identity theft 
because petitioner did not use a patient's means of 
identification in relation to a predicate offense within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1). Petitioner's use 
of the patient's name was not at the crux of what made 
the underlying overbilling fraudulent. The crux of the 
healthcare fraud was a misrepresentation about the 
qualifications of petitioner's employee. The patient's 
name was an ancillary feature of the billing method 
employed. Petitioner's fraud was in misrepresenting how 
and when services were provided to a patient, not who 
received the services.
Outcome: Judgment vacated and case remanded. 9-0 
decision; 1 concurrence.
Headnotes
 [***137] 
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN1.[
]  1. 
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) is violated when the 
defendant's misuse of another person's means of 
identification is at the crux of what makes the underlying 
offense criminal, rather than merely an ancillary feature 
of a billing method. (Sotomayor, J. joined  by Roberts, 
Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, 
and Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- 
PREDICATE OFFENSES > Headnote:
LEdHN2.[
]  2. 
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant, 
during and in relation to any predicate offense, 
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person. 
The predicate offenses include, among many others, 
healthcare fraud. § 1028A(c)(4). Section 1028A(a)(1) 
carries a severe penalty: a mandatory minimum 
599 U.S. 110, *110; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1557; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***136; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****1
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 5 of 22

Page 5 of 21
sentence of two years in prison in addition to the 
punishment for the predicate offense. (Sotomayor, J. 
joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, 
Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Statutes § 113  > CONSTRUCTION -- CONTEXT -- 
SURROUNDING SCHEME > Headnote:
LEdHN3.[
]  3. 
The word “use” poses some interpretational difficulties 
because of the different meanings attributable to it. The 
ordinary or natural meaning of “use” is variously defined 
as “to convert to one's service,” “to employ,” “to avail 
oneself of, and “to carry out a purpose or action by 
means of.” These various definitions of “use” imply 
action and implementation. Beyond that general 
concept, however, “use” takes on different meanings 
depending on context, and because it draws meaning 
from its context, the court will look not only to the word 
itself, but also to the statute and the surrounding 
scheme, to determine the meaning Congress intended. 
(Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, 
Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Statutes § 113  > CONSTRUCTION -- CONTEXT -- 
COMPONENT WORDS > Headnote:
LEdHN4.[
]  4. 
A statute's meaning does not always turn solely on the 
broadest imaginable definitions of its component words. 
Instead, linguistic and statutory context also matter. 
Even in cases where the literal language of the statute 
is neutral in isolation, reading the whole phrase can 
point to a more targeted reading. (Sotomayor, J. joined 
by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, 
Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Statutes § 120  > CONSTRUCTION -- TITLE > Headnote:
LEdHN5.[
]  5. 
The title of a statute and the heading of a section are 
tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the 
meaning of a statute. A title will not, of course, override 
the plain words of a statute. (Sotomayor, J. joined by 
Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, 
Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Statutes § 120  > CONSTRUCTION -- TITLE > Headnote:
LEdHN6.[
]  6. 
A title to a statute is especially valuable where it 
reinforces 
what 
the 
text's 
nouns 
and 
verbs 
independently suggest. (Sotomayor, J. joined by 
Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, 
Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 [***138] 
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN7.[
]  7. 
Under 18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) a defendant must 
know that the means of identification he or she 
unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used, in fact, 
belonged to another person. (Sotomayor, J. joined by 
Roberts,  Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, 
Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN8.[
]  8. 
The means of identification specifically is a key mover in 
the criminality of identity theft. This central role played 
by the means of identification, which serves to 
designate a specific person's identity, explains why it is 
said that the “identity” itself has been stolen. 
(Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, 
Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > IDENTITY THEFT -- ELEMENTS OF 
OFFENSE > Headnote:
LEdHN9.[
]  9. 
Identity theft is committed when a defendant uses the 
means of identification itself to defraud or deceive. 
599 U.S. 110, *110; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1557; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***137; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****1
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 6 of 22

Page 6 of 21
(Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, 
Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN10.[
]  10. 
When a means of identification is used deceptively, this 
deception goes to “who” is involved, rather than just 
“how” or “when” services were provided. Use of the 
means of identification would therefore be at the locus 
of the criminal undertaking, rather than merely passive, 
passing, 
or 
ancillary 
employment 
in 
a 
crime. 
(Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, 
Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Criminal Law § 75.8  > SENTENCING -- AGGRAVATED 
OFFENSE > Headnote:
LEdHN11.[
]  11. 
Typically, an “aggravated” offense is one made worse or 
more serious by circumstances such as violence, the 
presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent to commit 
another crime. (Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., 
and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and 
Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN12.[
]  12. 
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant 
knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person, 
during and in relation to any predicate offense. 
(Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, 
Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Statutes § 112  > CONSTRUCTION -- NOSCITUR A 
SOCIIS > Headnote:
LEdHN13.[
]  13. 
Under the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, a 
word is known by the company it keeps. This canon is 
often wisely applied where a word is capable of many 
meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended 
breadth to the Acts of Congress. (Sotomayor, J. joined 
by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, 
Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 [***139] 
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN14.[
]  14. 
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) covers unlawful possession 
or transfer of a means of identification belonging to 
“another person.” Generally, to unlawfully “possess” 
something belonging to another person suggests it has 
been stolen. And to unlawfully “transfer” something 
belonging 
to 
another 
person 
similarly 
connotes 
misappropriating it and passing it along. (Sotomayor, J. 
joined by Roberts, Ch. J.,  and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, 
Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN15.[
]  15. 
In virtually all cases where a defendant employs a 
means of identification to facilitate a crime, the 
defendant will also possess or transfer the means of 
identification in a way that facilitates the crime. 
(Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, 
Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- 
MANDATORY PRISON SENTENCE > Headnote:
LEdHN16.[
]  16. 
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1) is an enhancement, and a 
severe one at that. It adds a 2-year mandatory prison 
sentence onto underlying offenses that do not impose a 
mandatory prison sentence of any kind. This prevents 
sentencing judges from considering the severity of the 
offense, even if the amount of money involved was quite 
small or there are other mitigating factors. Interpretation 
599 U.S. 110, *110; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1557; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***138; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****1
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 7 of 22

Page 7 of 21
of § 1028A(a)(1) should thus reflect the distinction 
between the aggravated identity theft crimes that 
Congress 
sought 
to 
distinguish 
for 
heightened 
punishment and other crimes. (Sotomayor, J. joined by 
Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, 
Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Larceny § 3  > AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN17.[
]  17. 
A far more sensible conclusion from the statutory 
structure 
is 
that 
18 
U.S.C.S. 
§ 
1028A(a)(1)'s 
enhancement is not indiscriminate, but targets situations 
where the means of identification itself plays a key role--
one that warrants a 2-year mandatory minimum. This 
points once more to a targeted reading, where the 
means of identification is at the crux of the underlying 
criminality, 
not 
an 
ancillary 
feature 
of 
billing. 
(Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, 
Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 Statutes § 184  > CONSTRUCTION -- FEDERAL CRIME -- 
RESTRAINT > Headnote:
LEdHN18.[
]  18. 
The United States Supreme Court has traditionally 
exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal 
criminal statute. This restraint arises both out of 
deference to the prerogatives of Congress and out of 
concern that a fair warning should be given to the world 
in language that the common world will understand of 
what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. 
After all, crimes are supposed to be defined by the 
legislature, not by clever prosecutors riffing on equivocal 
language. (Sotomayor, J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and 
Thomas, 
Alito, 
Kagan, 
Kavanaugh, 
Barrett, 
and 
Jackson, JJ.)
 Statutes § 184  > CONSTRUCTION -- FEDERAL CRIME -- 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION > Headnote:
LEdHN19.[
]  19. 
A court cannot construe a criminal statute on the 
assumption that the Government will use it responsibly. 
To rely upon prosecutorial discretion to narrow the 
otherwise wide-ranging scope of a criminal statute's 
highly abstract general statutory language places great 
power in the hands of the prosecutor. (Sotomayor, J. 
joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, 
Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
 [***140] 
 Larceny § 3  >  AGGRAVATED IDENTITY THEFT -- MEANS 
OF IDENTIFICATION > Headnote:
LEdHN20.[
]  20. 
A defendant “uses” another person's means of 
identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when 
this use is at the crux of what makes the conduct 
criminal. To be clear, being at the crux of the criminality 
requires more than a causal relationship, such as 
“facilitation” of the offense or being a but-for cause of its 
“success.” Instead, with fraud or deceit crimes, the 
means of identification specifically must be used in a 
manner that is fraudulent or deceptive. Such fraud or 
deceit going to identity can often be succinctly 
summarized as going to “who” is involved. (Sotomayor, 
J. joined by Roberts, Ch. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, 
Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ.)
Syllabus
 [*110]   [**1559] Petitioner David Dubin was convicted 
of healthcare fraud under 18 U. S. C. §1347 after he 
overbilled Medicaid for psychological testing performed 
by the company he helped manage. The question is 
whether, 
in 
defrauding 
Medicaid, 
he 
also 
committed [**1560]  “[a]ggravated identity theft” under 
§1028A(a)(1). Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when a 
defendant, “during and in relation to any [predicate 
offense, such as healthcare fraud], knowingly transfers, 
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person.” The Government 
argued below that §1028A(a)(1) was automatically 
satisfied because Dubin's fraudulent Medicaid billing 
included 
the 
patient's 
Medicaid 
reimbursement 
number—a “means of identification.” Bound by Fifth 
Circuit precedent, the  [***141] District Court allowed 
Dubin's conviction for aggravated identity theft to stand, 
even though, in the District Court's view, the crux of the 
case was fraudulent billing, not identity theft. The Fifth 
Circuit sitting en banc affirmed in a fractured decision, 
599 U.S. 110, *110; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1557; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***139; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****1
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with five concurring judges acknowledging that under 
the Government's reading of §1028A(a)(1), “the 
elements of [the] offense are not captured [****2]  or 
even fairly described by the words 'identity theft.' ” 27 F. 
4th 1021, 1024 (opinion of Richman, C. J.).
Held: Under §1028A(a)(1), a defendant “uses” another 
person's means of identification “in relation to” a 
predicate offense when the use is at the crux of what 
makes the conduct criminal. Pp. ___ - ___, 216 L. Ed. 
2d, at 145-156.
(a) This case turns on the scope of two of 
§1028A(a)(1)s elements: Dubin was convicted under 
§1028A(a)(1) for “us[ing]” a patient's means of 
identification “in relation to” healthcare fraud. On the 
Government's view, a defendant “uses” a means of 
identification “in relation to” a predicate offense if the 
defendant employs that means of identification to 
facilitate or further the predicate offense in some way. 
Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any 
time a name or other means of identification happens to 
be part of the payment or billing method used in the 
commission of a long list of predicate offenses. Dubin's 
more targeted reading requires that the use of a means 
of identification have “a genuine nexus” to the predicate 
offense. When the underlying crime involves fraud or 
deceit, as many of §1028A’s predicates do, this entails 
using a means of identification specifically in a 
fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary 
feature of a payment [****3]   [*111]  or billing method. A 
careful examination of §1028A(a)(1)s text and structure 
points to a narrower reading. Pp. ___ - ___, 216 L. Ed. 
2d, at 145-146.
(b) The terms “uses” and “in relation to” have been 
singled out by this Court as being particularly sensitive 
to context. The “various definitions of 'use' imply action 
and implementation.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 
137, 145, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472. Beyond 
that general concept, however, “ 'use' takes on different 
meanings depending on context.” Id., at 143. This 
requires looking “not only to the word itself, but also to 
the statute and the [surrounding] scheme, to determine 
the meaning Congress intended.” Ibid. “In relation to” is 
similarly context sensitive. If extended to its furthest 
reach, “relate to” would be practically limitless. The 
phrase clearly refers to a relationship or nexus of some 
kind, but the nature and strength of this relationship or 
nexus will be informed by context. Because the 
presence of two such context-dependent terms renders 
§1028A(a)(1) doubly attuned to its surroundings, resort 
to context is especially necessary. Pp. ___ - ___, 216 L. 
Ed. 2d, at 146-148.
(c) Section 1028A(a)(1)s title and terms both point 
toward reading the provision to capture the ordinary 
understanding of identity theft, where misuse of a 
means of identification is at the crux of the criminality. 
Pp. ___ - ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 148-152.
 [**1561] (1) Section 1028A is [****4]  a focused, 
standalone provision, and its title—“Aggravated identity 
theft”—suggests  [***142] that identity theft is at the core 
of §1028A(a)(1). A statute's title has long been 
considered a “ 'too[l] available for the resolution of a 
doubt' about the meaning of a statute.” Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 234, 118 S. Ct. 
1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350. Section 1028A’s title is 
especially valuable here because it does not summarize 
a list of “complicated and prolific” provisions, Trainmen 
v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528, 67 S. 
Ct. 1387, 91 L. Ed. 1646, and also “reinforces what the 
text's nouns and verbs independently suggest,” Yates v. 
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 552, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 191 
L. Ed. 2d 64 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). The 
Court has previously observed the contrast between 
§1028A’s targeted title and the broad title of neighboring 
provision §1028: “ 'Fraud and related activity in 
connection with identification documents, authentication 
features, and information.' ” Flores-Figueroa v. United 
States, 556 U. S. 646, 655, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 173 L. Ed. 
2d 853. That “Congress separated the [identity] fraud 
crime from the [identity] theft crime in” §1028A suggests 
that §1028A is focused on identity theft specifically, 
rather than all fraud involving means of identification. 
Ibid.
The Government urges the Court to ignore §1028A’s 
title, because the Government's reading of the provision 
bears little resemblance to ordinary understandings of 
“identity theft.” This broad reading would, in practice, 
place garden-variety overbilling at the core of §1028A. 
Instead, [****5]  “identity theft” has a focused meaning: 
“[T]he fraudulent appropriation and use of another 
person's identifying data or documents,” Webster's 
Unabridged Dictionary xi, or “[t]he unlawful taking and 
use  [*112]  of another person's identifying information 
for fraudulent purposes,” Black's Law Dictionary 894. 
This understanding of identity theft supports a reading of 
“in relation to” where use of the means of identification 
is at the crux of the underlying crime. And under these 
definitions, identity theft occurs when a defendant “uses” 
the means of identification itself to defraud others. 
Further, the inclusion of “aggravated” in §1028A’s title 
suggests that Congress had in mind a particularly 
599 U.S. 110, *110; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1560; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***141; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****1
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serious form of identity theft, not just all manner of 
everyday overbilling offenses. Pp. ___ - ___, 216 L. Ed. 
2d, at 148-150.
(2) Section 1028A(a)(1)s language points in the same 
direction as its title. In particular, Congress used a trio of 
verbs that reflect an ordinary understanding of identity 
theft. Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant 
“knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful 
authority, a means of identification of another person,” 
“during and in relation to” any predicate offense. 
(Emphasis added). The two verbs neighboring “uses”—
“transfers” and [****6]  “possesses”—are most naturally 
read in the context of §1028A(a)(1) to connote not only 
theft, but ordinary understandings of identity theft in 
particular, i.e., they point to (1) theft of a (2) means of 
identification belonging to (3) another person. Because 
“transfer” and “possess” channel ordinary identity theft, 
the interpretative cannon noscitur a sociis (“ 'a word is 
known by the company it keeps,' ” McDonnell v. United 
States, 579 U. S. 550, 568-569, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 195 L. 
Ed. 2d 639) indicates that “uses” should be read in a 
similar 
manner. 
In 
 [***143] addition, 
the 
Court 
“assume[s] that Congress used [three] terms because it 
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous 
meaning.” Bailey, 516 U. S., at 146116 S. Ct. 501, 133 
L. Ed. 2d 472. On a more targeted reading, 
§1028A(a)(1)s three verbs capture the complexity of 
identity theft, which intermingles aspects of theft and 
fraud, misappropriation and deceitful use. While 
“transfer” and “possess” [**1562]  conjure up two steps 
of theft, “uses” supplies the deceitful use aspect. In 
contrast, if §1028A(a)(1) is not read in this narrow 
manner, then the two other verbs risk leaving “uses” 
without “virtually any function.” Ibid. Pp. ___ - ___, 216 
L. Ed. 2d, at 150-152.
(d) The list of §1028A(a)(1)s predicate offenses creates 
additional problems for the Government's broad reading. 
Section 1028A(a)(1)s enhancement adds a severe 2-
year mandatory prison sentence onto underlying [****7]  
offenses that do not impose any mandatory prison 
sentence at all. The Government's reading, however, 
does 
not 
meaningfully 
distinguish 
between 
the 
aggravated identity theft crime that Congress singled 
out for heightened punishment and other crimes. 
Instead, so long as the criteria for the broad predicate 
offenses are met, a defendant faces an automatic 2-
year sentence for generic overbilling that happens to 
use names or other means of identification for routine 
billing and payment. A far more sensible conclusion 
from the statutory structure is that §1028A(a)(1)s 
enhancement targets situations where the means 
 [*113]  of identification itself is at the crux of the 
underlying criminality, not just an ancillary billing feature. 
Pp. ___ - ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 152-154.
(e) In contrast to the staggering breadth of the 
Government's reading of §1028A, this Court has “ 
'traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach 
of a federal criminal statute,' ” Marinello v. United 
States, 584 U. S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 200 L. Ed. 
2d 356, and prudently avoided reading incongruous 
breadth into opaque language in criminal statutes. See, 
e.g., Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. ___, 141 S. 
Ct. 1648, 210 L. Ed. 2d 26. The vast sweep of the 
Government's 
reading—under 
which 
everyday 
overbilling cases would account for the majority of 
violations--“underscores 
the 
implausibility 
of 
the 
Government's interpretation.” [****8]  Id., at ___, 141 S. 
Ct. 1648, 210 L. Ed. 2d 26. While the Government 
represents that prosecutors will act responsibly in 
charging defendants under its sweeping reading, this 
Court “cannot construe a criminal statute on the 
assumption that the Government will 'use it responsibly.' 
” McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 576. Pp. ___ - ___, 216 L. 
Ed. 2d, at 154-155.
27 F. 4th 1021, vacated and remanded.
Counsel: Jeffrey L. Fisher argued the cause for 
petitioner.
Vivek Suri argued the cause for respondent.
Judges: Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the 
Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, 
Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. 
Gorsuch, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Opinion by: SOTOMAYOR
Opinion
 [**1563]  JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of 
the Court.
There is no dispute that petitioner David Fox Dubin 
overbilled Medicaid  [***144]  for psychological testing. 
The question is whether, in defrauding Medicaid, he 
also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft,” 18 U. S. C. 
§1028A(a)(1), triggering a  [*114]  mandatory 2-year 
prison sentence. The Fifth Circuit found that he did, 
based on a reading of the statute that covers 
599 U.S. 110, *112; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1561; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***142; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****5
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defendants who fraudulently inflate the price of a service 
or good they actually provided. On that sweeping 
reading, as long as a billing or payment method 
employs another person’s name or other identifying 
information, that is enough. A lawyer who rounds up her 
hours from 2.9 to 3 and bills her client electronically 
has [****9]  committed aggravated identity theft. The 
same is true of a waiter who serves flank steak but 
charges for filet mignon using an electronic payment 
method.
The text and context of the statute do not support such 
a boundless interpretation. HN1[
] LEdHN[1][
] [1] 
Instead, §1028A(a)(1) is violated when the defendant’s 
misuse of another person’s means of identification is at 
the crux of what makes the underlying offense criminal, 
rather than merely an ancillary feature of a billing 
method. Here, the crux of petitioner’s overbilling was 
inflating the value of services actually provided, while 
the patient’s means of identification was an ancillary 
part of the Medicaid billing process.
I
David Dubin helped his father manage a psychological 
services company. This company submitted a claim for 
reimbursement to Medicaid for psychological testing by 
a licensed psychologist. In fact, however, the claim 
overstated the qualifications of the employee who 
actually performed the testing and who was only a 
licensed 
psychological 
associate. 
This 
falsehood 
inflated the amount of reimbursement. Petitioner also 
changed the date on which the examination occurred.1 
Even with the inflation, the total reimbursement was only 
$338. App. 49. Petitioner [****10]  was accordingly 
charged with healthcare fraud, a federal offense under 
18 U. S. C. §1347.  [*115]  According to the 
Government, 
however, 
petitioner’s 
conduct 
also 
constituted 
“[a]ggravated 
identity 
theft” 
under 
§1028A(a)(1).
HN2[
] LEdHN[2][
] [2] Section 1028A(a)(1) applies 
when a defendant, “during and in relation to any 
[predicate offense], knowingly transfers, possesses, or 
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification 
of another person.” The predicate offenses include, 
among many others, healthcare fraud. §1028A(c)(4). 
Section 1028A(a)(1) carries a severe penalty: a 
1 The parties dispute whether changing the date affected the 
availability of Medicaid reimbursement. The Court does not 
reach that question, as the outcome of this case would be the 
same either way.
mandatory minimum sentence of two years in prison “in 
addition to the punishment” for the predicate offense.
According to the Government, this is a clear aggravated 
identity theft case. The Government argued at trial that 
§1028A(a)(1) was automatically satisfied because 
petitioner’s fraudulent billing included the patient’s 
Medicaid 
reimbursement 
number 
(a 
“means 
of 
identification”). The District Court was less sure. “[T]his 
doesn’t seem to be an aggravated identity theft case” 
the court explained, as “the whole crux of this case is 
how [petitioner was] billing.” App. 37-38. This overbilling 
was “criminal,” but it “wasn’t aggravated identity theft.” 
Id., at 38. Nevertheless,  [***145]  the District Court 
denied petitioner’s post-trial challenge [****11]  to his 
aggravated identity theft  [**1564]  conviction, explaining 
that contrary Fifth Circuit precedent tied its hands. The 
court said that it “hope[d]” it would “get reversed.” Id., at 
39.
On appeal, a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed. On rehearing 
en banc, a fractured court affirmed again. Five judges 
who 
agreed 
with 
the 
Government 
nonetheless 
acknowledged that under the Government’s reading of 
§1028A(a)(1), “the elements of [the] offense are not 
captured or even fairly described by the words ‘identity 
theft.’” 27 F. 4th 1021, 1024 (2022) (Richman, C. J., 
concurring). Eight dissenting judges agreed on this 
point.
This type of prosecution is not uncommon. The 
Government has, by its own admission, wielded 
§1028A(a)(1) well beyond ordinary understandings of 
identity theft. One  [*116]  prosecution targeted a 
defendant who “made a counterfeit handgun permit” for 
another person, using that person’s real name and at 
that person’s request. United States v. Spears, 729 F. 
3d 753, 754 (CA7 2013) (en banc). Another involved 
unlicensed doctors who violated the law by “issu[ing] 
prescriptions that their [actual] patients would then fill at 
. . . pharmacies.” United States v. Berroa, 856 F. 3d 
141, 148, 155-156 (CA1 2017). There was also a 
prosecution involving an ambulance service inflating its 
reimbursement rates by “mischaracteriz[ing] the nature 
of the transports, saying that the [****12]  patients had 
required stretchers when they had not.” United States v. 
Michael, 882 F. 3d 624, 628 (CA6 2018) (citing United 
States v. Medlock, 792 F. 3d 700, 705 (CA6 2015)). Yet 
another prosecution involved a defendant who “provided 
massage services to patients to treat their pain,” but 
improperly billed this “as a Medicare-eligible physical 
therapy service.” United States v. Hong, 938 F. 3d 1040, 
1051 (CA9 2019).
599 U.S. 110, *114; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1563; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***144; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****8
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Many 
lower 
courts 
have 
responded 
to 
such 
prosecutions with more restrained readings of the 
aggravated identity theft statute.2 The Fifth Circuit did 
not. To resolve the conflict in the courts below, this 
Court granted certiorari, 598 U. S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 416, 
214 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2022), and now vacates the 
judgment of the Fifth Circuit and remands.3
II
A
This case turns on two of §1028A(a)(1)’s elements. Of 
the various possible ways to violate §1028A(a)(1), 
petitioner was convicted for “us[ing]” a patient’s means 
of identification “in  [*117]  relation to” healthcare fraud. 
The parties offer competing readings of these two 
elements.
The Government reads the terms broadly and in 
isolation. On the Government’s view, “[a] defendant 
uses a means of identification ‘in relation to’  [***146]  a 
predicate offense if the use of that means of 
identification ‘facilitates or furthers’ the predicate offense 
in some way.” Brief for United States 10 (quoting Smith 
v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 232, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 
124 L. Ed. 2d 138 (1993)). As to “uses,” the 
Government seems just to mean “employ[s]” in any 
sense. Brief for United [****13]  States 5, 7, 10-11. 
Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any 
time a name or other means of identification happens to 
be part of the payment or billing method used in 
 [**1565]  the commission of a long list of predicate 
offenses. In other words, virtually all of the time.
Petitioner, in response, offers a more targeted reading. 
For petitioner, using a means of identification in relation 
to a predicate offense requires “a genuine nexus to the 
predicate offense.” Brief for Petitioner 15. On this 
reading, the means of identification is at the crux of what 
makes the predicate offense criminal, rather than merely 
an ancillary feature of a payment method. When the 
underlying crime involves fraud or deceit, as many of 
§1028A’s predicates do, this entails using a means of 
identification specifically in a fraudulent or deceitful 
2 See Berroa, 856 F. 3d, at 148, 155-157; Michael, 882 F. 3d, 
at 628; Spears, 729 F. 3d, at 754; Hong, 938 F. 3d, at 1051.
3 The Government argued below that because petitioner did 
not properly raise certain challenges to his §1028A conviction, 
he cannot obtain relief without meeting the higher bar for plain-
error review. The Fifth Circuit below did not decide that 
question, which this Court leaves for remand.
manner.
To illustrate, petitioner borrows a heuristic from the Sixth 
Circuit. See Michael, 882 F. 3d, at 628. The relevant 
language in §1028A(a)(1) “covers misrepresenting who 
received a certain service,” but not “fraudulent claims 
regarding how or when a service was performed.” Brief 
for Petitioner 15. In other words, fraud going to identity, 
not misrepresentation about services actually provided. 
Take an ambulance service that [****14]  actually 
transported patients but inflated the number of miles 
driven. The crux of this fraud was “how” services were 
rendered; the patients’ names were part of the billing 
process, but ancillary to what made the conduct 
fraudulent.  [*118]  See Michael, 882 F. 3d, at 628-629. 
In contrast, take the pharmacist who swipes information 
from the pharmacy’s files and uses it to open a bank 
account in a patient’s name. That “misuse of th[e] 
means of identification” would be “integral to” what 
made 
the 
conduct 
fraudulent, 
because 
misrepresentation about who was involved was at the 
crux of the fraud. Id., at 629.
In deciding between the parties’ readings, one limited 
and one near limitless, precedent and prudence require 
a careful examination of §1028A(a)(1)’s text and 
structure. While “uses” and “in relation to” are, in 
isolation, indeterminate, the statutory context, taken as 
a whole, points to a narrower reading.
B
In interpreting the scope of “uses” and “in relation to,” 
the Court begins with those terms themselves. Both 
terms have been singled out by this Court as particularly 
sensitive to context, and they do not, standing alone, 
conclusively resolve this case.
Start with “uses.” HN3[
] LEdHN[3][
] [3] As the 
Court has observed more than once, “the word ‘use’ 
poses some interpretational [****15]  difficulties because 
of the different meanings attributable to it.” Bailey v. 
United States, 516 U. S. 137, 143, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 
L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995); see also Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 
U. S. 1, 9, 125 S. Ct. 377, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271 (2004). 
The “‘ordinary or natural meaning’” of “‘use’” is 
“variously defined as ‘[t]o convert to one’s service,’ ‘to 
employ,’ ‘to avail oneself of,’ and ‘to  [***147]  carry out 
a purpose or action by means of.’” Bailey, 516 U. S., at 
145, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472. “These various 
definitions of ‘use’ imply action and implementation.” 
Ibid. Beyond that general concept, however, “‘use’ takes 
on different meanings depending on context,” and 
because it “draws meaning from its context, . . . we will 
599 U.S. 110, *116; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1564; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***145; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****12
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look not only to the word itself, but also to the statute 
and the [surrounding] scheme, to determine the 
meaning Congress intended.” Id., at 143, 116 S. Ct. 
501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472; see also Leocal, 543 U. S., at 9, 
125 S. Ct. 377, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271 (“Particularly when 
interpreting a statute that features as elastic a word as 
‘use,’ we construe language in its context and in light of 
the terms surrounding it”).
 [*119]  For example, the federal arson statute only 
applies to buildings “‘used in’ commerce or commerce-
affecting activity.”  [**1566]  Jones v. United States, 529 
U. S. 848, 850-851, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 
(2000). In that statutory context, the Court distinguished 
between uses of a building as “the locus of any 
commercial undertaking,” and noncovered “passive,” 
“passing,” or ancillary uses of a building “as collateral to 
obtain and secure a mortgage” or to obtain an 
insurance [****16]  policy. Id., at 855-856, 120 S. Ct. 
1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902. It is statutory context, 
therefore, 
that 
determines 
what 
kind 
of 
active 
employment or conversion to one’s service triggers 
§1028A(a)(1)’s harsh penalty.
“In relation to” is similarly context sensitive. If “‘relate to’ 
were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its 
indeterminacy, then for all practical purposes” there 
would be no limits, as “‘[r]eally, universally, relations 
stop nowhere.’” New York State Conference of Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U. 
S. 645, 655, 115 S. Ct. 1671, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1995) 
(quoting H. James, Roderick Hudson xli (New York ed., 
World’s Classics 1980)). This language thus cannot be 
“considered in isolation,” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U. S. 
48, 59, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 186 L. Ed. 2d 275 (2013), and 
the Court must “go beyond the unhelpful text and the 
frustrating difficulty of defining [this] key term” and look 
to statutory context. Travelers, 514 U. S., at 656, 115 S. 
Ct. 1671, 131 L. Ed. 2d 695. That the phrase refers to a 
relationship or nexus of some kind is clear. See Smith, 
508 U. S., at 238, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138 
(“‘[I]n relation to’” requires “some purpose or effect” 
between two things). Yet the kind of relationship 
required, its nature and strength, will be informed by 
context.
The presence of two such context-dependent terms 
renders 
§1028A(a)(1) 
doubly 
attuned 
to 
its 
surroundings. The parties’ competing readings both fall 
within the range of meanings of “uses” and “in relation 
to,” taken alone. Resort to context is thus especially 
necessary here.4
 [*120]   [***148]  C
Having found [****17]  the key terms “use” and “in 
relation to” indeterminate, the next step is to look to their 
surrounding words. HN4[
] LEdHN[4][
] [4] After all, 
“a statute’s meaning does not always turn solely on the 
broadest imaginable definitions of its component words.” 
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U. S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 
1612, 200 L. Ed. 2d 889 (2018) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Instead, “[l]inguistic and statutory 
context also matter.” Ibid. Even in cases where “the 
literal language of the statute is neutral” in isolation, 
reading “the whole phrase” can point to a more targeted 
reading. Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. ___, ___-
___, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 200 L. Ed. 2d 356, 362 (2018).
Such is the case here. Section 1028A(a)(1)’s title and 
terms both point to a narrower reading, one centered 
around  [**1567]  the ordinary understanding of identity 
theft. This cuts against the Government’s broad reading, 
which the Government admits bears little relationship to 
the common understanding of identity theft. In contrast, 
a more targeted reading accurately captures the 
ordinary understanding of identity theft, where misuse of 
a means of identification is at the crux of the criminality.
1
Start at the top, with the words Congress chose for 
§1028A’s title: “Aggravated identity theft.” 118 Stat. 831. 
4 The Government tries to head off any contextual analysis at 
the pass, urging that “uses” and “during and in relation to” in 
§1028A(a)(1) must be read identically to Smith and other of 
this Court’s cases interpreting 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(A). That 
provision applies to “any person who, during and in relation to 
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or 
carries a firearm.” One need look no further than this Court’s 
§924(c) case law to see why this argument fails. The teaching 
of those cases is that because “use” “draws meaning from its 
context, . . . we will look not only to the word itself, but also to 
the statute and the [broader] scheme.” Bailey v. United States, 
516 U. S. 137, 143, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 472 (1995). 
Section 1028A(a)(1) differs greatly from §924(c), from the 
thing that is “used,” to the title, to the nature of the predicate 
offenses to which the enhancement relates. Words can 
wound, but names and numbers are not guns. If anything, the 
ubiquity of names and their vast range of “uses” makes the 
verb especially indeterminate in this context. For that same 
reason, the Court’s decision today does not alter its §924(c) 
case law.
599 U.S. 110, *118; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1565; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***147; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****15
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HN5[
] LEdHN[5][
] [5] This Court has long 
considered that “‘the title of a statute  [*121]  and the 
heading of a section’ are ‘tools available for the 
resolution of a doubt’ about the [****18]  meaning of a 
statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 
224, 234, 118 S. Ct. 1219, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1998) 
(quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 
519, 528-529, 67 S. Ct. 1387, 91 L. Ed. 1646 (1947)). A 
title will not, of course, “override the plain words” of a 
statute. Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U. S. ___, ___, 141 
S. Ct. 1868, 210 L. Ed. 2d 137, 148 (2021)). Yet here, 
the key terms are so “elastic” that they must be 
construed “in light of the terms surrounding [them],” 
Leocal, 543 U. S., at 9, 125 S. Ct. 377, 160 L. Ed. 2d 
271, and the title Congress chose is among those 
terms. Even the Government acknowledged that if the 
terms in §1028A(a)(1) are unclear, “the title is a useful 
clue.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 80.
Two additional points bolster this approach. First, the 
title here is not serving the unenviable role of pithily 
summarizing a list of “complicated and prolific” 
provisions. Trainmen, 331 U. S., at 528, 67 S. Ct. 1387, 
91 L. Ed. 1646. Section 1028A is a focused, standalone 
provision. HN6[
] LEdHN[6][
] [6] Second, a title is 
“especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s 
nouns and verbs independently suggest.” Yates v. 
United States, 574 U. S. 528, 552, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 191 
L. Ed. 2d 64 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
As explained below, §1028A(a)(1)’s text independently 
suggests a focus on identity theft. See infra, at___-___, 
216 L. Ed. 2d, at 150-152.
Indeed, this Court has already once [***149]  used 
§1028A’s title and place in the statutory scheme to shed 
light on its text. In Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 
U. S. 646, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 173 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2009), 
this Court pointed out that a neighboring provision, 
§1028, carries the broad title “‘Fraud and related activity 
in 
connection 
with 
identification 
documents, 
authentication features, and information.’” Id., at 655, 
129 S. Ct. 1886, 173 L. Ed. 2d 853. Section 1028A, in 
contrast, is far more [****19]  targeted, “us[ing] the 
words ‘identity theft.’” Ibid. That “Congress separated 
the [identity] fraud crime from the [identity] theft crime in” 
§1028A suggests that §1028A is focused on identity 
theft specifically, rather than all fraud involving means of 
identification. Ibid. 5
5 HN7[
] LEdHN[7][
] [7] Flores-Figueroa held that under 
§1028A(a)(1) a defendant must know “that the ‘means of 
identification’ he or she unlawfully transferred, possessed, or 
 [*122]  Given that, it is abundantly clear why the 
Government urges the Court to ignore the title. The 
Government’s broad reading, covering any time another 
person’s means of identification is employed in a way 
that facilitates a crime, bears little resemblance to any 
ordinary meaning of “identity theft.” Consider again an 
unlicensed doctor who fills out a prescription actually 
requested  [**1568]  by a patient; no one would call that 
identity theft. Even judges below who agreed with the 
Government’s reading of §1028A(a)(1), and ultimately 
the Government itself, acknowledged that its reading of 
§1028A(a)(1) does not fairly capture the ordinary 
meaning of identity theft. Nor is the difference just 
around the edges; the Government’s reading would, in 
practice, place garden-variety overbilling at the core of 
§1028A.
Instead, “identity theft” has a focused meaning. One 
dictionary defines identity theft as “the fraudulent 
appropriation and use of another person’s [****20]  
identifying data or documents, as a credit card.” 
Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary xi (2d ed. 2001) 
(Webster’s). Another similarly offers “[t]he unlawful 
taking 
and 
use 
of 
another 
person’s 
identifying 
information for fraudulent purposes; specif[ically] a 
crime in which someone steals personal information 
about and belonging to another, such as a bank-account 
number or driver’s-license number, and uses the 
information to deceive others.” Black’s Law Dictionary 
894 (11th ed. 2019) (Black’s) (defining “identity theft”).6
This supports a reading of “in relation to” where use of 
the means of identification is at the crux of the 
underlying criminality. These definitions refer to offenses 
built around what the defendant does with the means of 
identification in particular. HN8[
] LEdHN[8][
] [8] In 
other words, the means of identification specifically 
 [*123]  is a key mover in the criminality. This central 
role played by the means of identification, which serves 
to designate a specific person’s identity, explains why 
we say that the “identity” itself has been stolen. See, 
e.g., Spears, 729 F. 3d, at 756  [***150]  (“identity theft” 
occurs when someone’s “identity has been stolen or 
used, in fact, belonged to ‘another person.’” 556 U. S., at 647, 
129 S. Ct. 1886, 173 L. Ed. 2d 853. The Court not only looked 
to §1028A(a)(1)’s theft-focused title and role in the statutory 
structure, but also drew on an understanding that the provision 
covers “classic identity theft.” Id., at 655-656, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 
173 L. Ed. 2d 853.
6 “Steal[ing]” can, of course, include situations where 
something was initially lawfully acquired. See Black’s 1710 
(defining “steal”).
599 U.S. 110, *120; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1567; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***148; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****17
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misappropriated”). This helps explain why the examples 
resulting from the Government’s [****21]  theory do not 
sound like identity theft. If a lawyer rounds up her hours 
from 2.9 to 3 and bills her client using his name, the 
name itself is not specifically a source of fraud; it only 
plays an ancillary role in the billing process. The same is 
true for the waiter who substitutes one cut of meat for 
another; we might say the filet mignon’s identity was 
stolen, perhaps, but not the diner’s.
This understanding of identity theft also supports a more 
targeted definition of “uses.” The word “use” appears in 
these definitions with a specific meaning: Identity theft 
encompasses when a defendant “uses the information 
to deceive others,” Black’s 894 (emphasis added), and 
“the fraudulent . . . use” of a means of identification, 
Webster’s xi (emphasis added). HN9[
] LEdHN[9][
] 
[9] In other words, identity theft is committed when a 
defendant uses the means of identification itself to 
defraud or deceive. This tracks the Sixth Circuit’s 
heuristic. HN10[
] LEdHN[10][
] [10] When a means 
of identification is used deceptively, this deception goes 
to “who” is involved, rather than just “how” or “when” 
services were provided. Use of the means of 
identification would therefore be at “the locus of [the 
criminal] 
undertaking,” 
rather 
than 
merely 
“passive,” [****22]  “passing,” or ancillary employment in 
a crime. Jones, 529 U. S., at 855-856, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 
146 L. Ed. 2d 902.
On top of that, §1028A’s title is not just “identity theft,” 
but “Aggravated identity theft.” HN11[
] LEdHN[11][
] 
[11] Typically, “[a]n ‘aggravated’ offense is one ‘made 
worse or more serious by circumstances such as 
violence, the presence of a deadly weapon, or the intent 
to commit another crime.’” Carachuri-Rosendo v. 
Holder, 560 U. S. 563, 574, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 177 L. Ed. 
2d 68 (2010)  [**1569]  (quoting Black’s  [*124]  Law 
Dictionary 75 (9th ed. 2009)). This suggests that 
Congress had in mind a particularly serious form of 
identity theft. Yet the Government’s reading “would 
apply an ‘aggravated’ . . . label” to all manner of 
everyday overbilling offenses. Carachuri-Rosendo, 560 
U. S., at 574, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 177 L. Ed. 2d 68. “Of 
course . . . Congress, like ‘Humpty Dumpty,’ has the 
power to give words unorthodox meanings.” Id., at 575, 
575, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 177 L. Ed. 2d 68.. Yet where “the 
Government argues for a result that the English 
language tells us not to expect, . . . we must be very 
wary of the Government’s position.” Ibid. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
The title suggests identity theft is at the core of 
§1028A(a)(1). On the Government’s reading, however, 
everyday overbilling would become the most common 
trigger for §1028A(a)(1)’s severe penalty. This would 
turn the core of “worse or more serious” identity theft 
into something the ordinary user of the English 
language would not consider identity theft [****23]  at all.
2
The title is, by definition, just the beginning. A title does 
not supplant the actual text of the provision, as the 
Government observes. The problem for the Government 
is that §1028A(a)(1)’s language points in the same 
direction as its title. In particular, Congress used a trio of 
verbs that reflect an ordinary understanding of identity 
theft.
While “uses” is indeterminate in  [***151]  isolation, here 
it has company. HN12[
] LEdHN[12][
] [12] Section 
1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant “knowingly 
transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a 
means of identification of another person,” “during and 
in relation to” any predicate offense. (Emphasis added.) 
HN13[
] LEdHN[13][
] [13] “Under the familiar 
interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, ‘a word is known by 
the company it keeps.’” McDonnell v. United States, 579 
U. S. 550, 568-569, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 195 L. Ed. 2d 639 
(2016) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U. S. 
303, 307, 81 S. Ct. 1579, 6 L. Ed. 2d 859, 1961-2 C.B. 
254 (1961)). “[T]his canon is often wisely applied where 
a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid 
the giving of unintended  [*125]  breadth to the Acts of 
Congress.” McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 569, 136 S. Ct. 
2355, 195 L. Ed. 2d 639 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
The two neighboring verbs here, “transfers” and 
“possesses,” are most naturally read in the context of 
§1028A(a)(1) to connote theft. While it is not necessary 
to determine the precise metes and bounds of these two 
verbs, their role in the provision points to this targeted 
reading. 
HN14[
] 
LEdHN[14][
] 
[14] 
Section 
1028A(a)(1) covers [****24]  unlawful possession or 
transfer of a means of identification belonging to 
“another person.” Generally, to unlawfully “possess” 
something belonging to another person suggests it has 
been stolen. And to unlawfully “transfer” something 
belonging 
to 
another 
person 
similarly 
connotes 
misappropriating it and passing it along. In Flores-
Figueroa, this Court drew a similarly intuitive link 
between a defendant taking a means of identification he 
knows belongs to another person and “‘theft.’” 556 U. 
S., at 655, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 173 L. Ed. 2d 853. The 
599 U.S. 110, *123; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1568; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***150; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****20
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Government, at argument, agreed: these two verbs 
“refer to circumstances in which the information is 
stolen.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 90.7
 [**1570]  “Transfer” and “possess” not only connote 
theft, but identity theft in particular. The verbs point to 
(1) theft of a (2) means of identification belonging to (3) 
another person. That tracks ordinary understandings of 
identity theft: “a crime in which someone [1] steals [2] 
personal information about and [3] belonging to 
another.” Black’s 894. Similarly, “the [1] fraudulent 
appropriation and use of [3] another person’s [2] 
identifying data or documents.” Webster’s xi. If this 
parallel were not enough, §1028A(a)(1)’s title indicates 
 [*126]  that the type of theft its verbs connote [****25]  
is identity theft specifically.
Because “transfer” and “possess” channel ordinary 
identity theft, noscitur a sociis indicates that “uses” 
should be read in a similar manner to its companions. 
See McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 568-569, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 
195 L. Ed. 2d 639. “Uses” is quite amenable to such a 
reading, and not just because of its indeterminacy. As 
explained above, “using” another person’s means of 
identification to deceive or defraud is a common feature 
of identity theft. See Webster’s xi (“the fraudulent . . . 
use” of a means of  [***152]  identification (emphasis 
added)); Black’s 894 (when a defendant “uses the 
information to deceive others” (emphasis added)).
Congress thus employed a trio of verbs that capture 
various aspects of “classic identity theft.” Flores-
Figueroa, 556 U. S., at 656, 129 S. Ct. 1886, 173 L. Ed. 
2d 853. There is “the defendant [who] has gone through 
someone else’s trash to find discarded credit card and 
bank statements,” ibid., and thus has taken possession 
unlawfully. There is the bank employee who passes 
along customer information to an accomplice, and thus 
transfers it unlawfully. Then there is use involving fraud 
or deceit about identity: “a defendant [who] has used 
another person’s identification information to get access 
to that person’s bank account.” Ibid.
7 Those who find legislative history helpful will find yet further 
support. “[P]ossesses” refers to “someone who has wrongly 
acquired another’s means of identification, but has not yet put 
it to use or transferred it elsewhere.” H. R. Rep. No. 108-528, 
p. 10 (2004). “[T]ransfers” is when the defendant “transferred it 
to another person or location where it can be put to use.” Ibid. 
And “uses” is when “a defendant . . . obtained someone else’s 
means of identification and actually put that means of 
identification to use.” Ibid.
Another canon of construction offers [****26]  a further 
point in favor of this narrow interpretation. The Court 
“assume[s] that Congress used [three] terms because it 
intended each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous 
meaning.” Bailey, 516 U. S., at 146, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 
L. Ed. 2d 472. Reading §1028A(a)(1)’s operative verbs 
as tracking aspects of classic identity theft, each verb 
has an independent role to play. As the definitions 
reveal, identity theft covers both when “someone steals 
personal information about and belonging to another . . . 
and uses the information to deceive others,” Black’s 894 
(emphasis added), and “fraudulent appropriation and 
use,” Webster’s xi (emphasis added). Identity theft thus 
intermingles aspects of  [*127]  theft and fraud, 
misappropriation 
and 
deceitful 
use. 
Section 
1028A(a)(1)’s three verbs capture this complexity. While 
“transfer” and “possess” conjure up two steps of theft, 
“uses” supplies the deceitful use aspect.
In contrast, if §1028A(a)(1)’s verbs do not track identity 
theft and if the means of identification need only 
facilitate the predicate offense, the other two verbs 
threaten to leave “uses” without “virtually any function.” 
Bailey, 516 U. S., at 146, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 2d 
472. Return to a definition of “in relation to” that just 
means “‘facilitates or furthers’ the predicate offense in 
some way.” Brief for United States 10. HN15[
] 
LEdHN[15][
] [15] In virtually [****27]  all cases where 
a defendant employs a means of identification to 
facilitate a crime, the defendant will also possess or 
transfer the means of identification in a way that 
facilitates 
the 
crime. 
For 
example, 
petitioner’s 
possession of the patient’s means of identification 
facilitated the fraud, as did petitioner’s transfer of the 
patient’s means of identification to Medicaid. It is hard to 
imagine when “uses” would not similarly be covered by, 
at least, one of the two  [**1571]  other verbs. This risk 
of superfluity suggests giving §1028A(a)(1) a more 
precise reading.
In sum, §1028A(a)(1)’s title and text are mutually 
reinforcing. Both point toward requiring the means of 
identification to be at the crux of the criminality.
D
Section 1028A’s list of predicate offenses points to yet 
another stumbling block for the Government’s broad 
reading. 
HN16[
] 
LEdHN[16][
] 
[16] 
Section 
1028A(a)(1) is an enhancement, and a severe one at 
that. It adds a 2-year mandatory prison sentence onto 
underlying offenses that do not impose a mandatory 
prison sentence of any kind. See, e.g.,  [***153]  18 U. 
599 U.S. 110, *125; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1569; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***151; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****24
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S. C. §1035 (“[f]alse statements relating to health care 
matters,” setting no minimum sentence). This prevents 
sentencing judges from considering the severity of the 
offense, even if the amount of money involved was quite 
small [****28]  or there are other mitigating factors. 
 [*128]  Interpretation of §1028A(a)(1) should thus 
reflect the “distinction between” the aggravated identity 
theft crimes that “Congress sought to distinguish for 
heightened punishment and other crimes.” Leocal, 543 
U. S., at 11, 125 S. Ct. 377, 160 L. Ed. 2d 271.
Far from distinguishing, the Government’s reading 
collapses the enhancement into the enhanced. Here, 
the Government claims that because petitioner’s 
overbilling was facilitated by the patient’s Medicaid 
reimbursement number, §1028A(a)(1) automatically 
applies. Patient names or other identifiers will, of 
course, be involved in the great majority of healthcare 
billing, whether Medicare for massages, Hong, 938 F. 
3d, at 1051, or for ambulance stretcher services, 
Medlock, 792 F. 3d, at 706. Patient names will be on 
prescriptions, Berroa, 856 F. 3d, at 148, 155-156, and 
patients committing fraud on their own behalf will often 
have to include the names of others on their forms, such 
as doctors or employers. Under the Government’s own 
reading, such cases are “automatically identity theft,” Tr. 
of Oral Arg. 82, independent of whether the name itself 
had anything to do with the fraudulent aspect of the 
offense.
Nor are these implications confined to healthcare. 
Section 1028A(a)(1)’s predicates include a vast array of 
offenses, 
including 
wire 
fraud 
and 
mail 
fraud. 
§1028A(c)(5). The Government’s boundless [****29]  
reading of “uses” and “in relation to” would cover 
facilitating mail fraud by using another person’s name to 
address a letter to them.8 Even beyond that,  [*129]  
8 To avoid this, the Government has advanced a medley of 
shifting and inconsistent readings of “without lawful authority,” 
another element of §1028A(a)(1). Sometimes the Government 
has claimed that a defendant would not violate §1028A(a)(1) if 
they had permission to use a means of identification to commit 
a crime. See Brief for United States 32 (“everyone is 
presumed to have permission to use other people’s names” in 
certain ways to facilitate crimes, such as addressing a letter); 
id., at 31-32 (a defendant can have “lawful authority” to use a 
co-conspirator’s name to commit bank fraud). Other times the 
Government has argued that no one ever has permission to 
commit a crime. App. 32 (a person “can’t give someone [else] 
permission” to use their name to facilitate a crime); Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 91-92 (doctor would violate §1028A(a)(1) even if patient 
granted permission to use his name in the fraud). The Court 
names or other means of identification are used 
routinely for billing and payment, whether payment 
apps, credit and debit cards, a bill sent by mail, or an 
invoice sent electronically. So long as the criteria for the 
broad  [**1572]  predicate offenses are met, the 
Government’s reading creates an automatic 2-year 
sentence for generic overbilling that happens to use 
ubiquitous payment methods.
HN17[
] LEdHN[17][
] [17] A far more sensible 
conclusion 
from 
the 
statutory 
structure 
is 
that 
§1028A(a)(1)’s enhancement is not indiscriminate, but 
targets situations where the means of identification itself 
plays a key role—one that warrants a 2-year mandatory 
minimum. This points once more to a targeted  [***154]  
reading, where the means of identification is at the crux 
of the underlying criminality, not an ancillary feature of 
billing.
E
If more were needed, a final clue comes from the 
staggering breadth of the Government’s reading. HN18[
] LEdHN[18][
] [18] This Court has “‘traditionally 
exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal 
criminal statute.’” Marinello, 584 U. S., at ___, 138 S. Ct. 
1101, 200 L. Ed. 2d 356, 362 (quoting United States v. 
Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593, 600, 115 S. Ct. 2357, 132 L. Ed. 
2d 520 (1995)); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United 
States, 544 U. S. 696, 703-704, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 161 L. 
Ed. 2d 1008 (2005); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U. 
S. 25, 27, 51 S. Ct. 340, 75 L. Ed. 816 (1931). This 
restraint arises “both out of deference [****30]  to the 
prerogatives of Congress and out of concern that a fair 
warning should be given to the world in language that 
the common world will understan[d] of what the law 
intends to do if a certain line is passed.” Marinello, 584 
U. S., at ___, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 200 L. Ed. 2d 356, 362 
(internal quotation marks omitted). After all, “[c]rimes are 
supposed to be defined by the legislature, not by clever 
 [*130]  prosecutors riffing on equivocal language.” 
Spears, 729 F. 3d, at 758.
Time and again, this Court has prudently avoided 
reading incongruous breadth into opaque language in 
criminal statutes. In Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. 
S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 210 L. Ed. 2d 26, 42 (2021), 
need not, and does not, reach the proper interpretation of 
“without lawful authority.” Suffice it to say, these attempts to 
rein in §1028A(a)(1) through another element of the statute 
show that the Government itself understands the problems 
that arise from its sweeping reading of “uses” and “in relation 
to.”
599 U.S. 110, *127; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1571; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***153; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****27
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the “far-reaching consequences” of the Government’s 
reading 
“underscore[d] 
the 
implausibility 
of 
the 
Government’s interpretation.” Id., at ___, 141 S. Ct. 
1648, 210 L. Ed. 2d 26, 42. In Marinello, the Court 
rejected the Government’s reading of a statute about 
obstructing administration of the Tax Code that would 
have swept in the “person who pays a babysitter $41 
per week in cash without withholding taxes,” as well as 
someone who “leaves a large cash tip in a restaurant, 
fails to keep donation receipts from every charity to 
which he or she contributes, or fails to provide every 
record to an accountant.” 584 U. S., at ___, 138 S. Ct. 
1101, 200 L. Ed. 2d 356. Nor was all such conduct 
innocent, as the statute required an individual to act 
“‘corruptly.’” Id., at ___, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 210 L. Ed. 2d 
26, 42 [****31] . Even still, “[h]ad Congress intended” to 
sweep so far, “it would have spoken with more clarity 
than it did.” Id., at ___, 141 S. Ct. 1648, 210 L. Ed. 2d 
26, 42. In Yates, the Court held that the Government’s 
“unrestrained” reading would have turned a provision 
focused on “records” and “documents” into “an all-
encompassing ban on the spoliation of evidence” that 
would “sweep within its reach physical objects of every 
kind,” including a fish. 574 U. S., at 536, 540, 135 S. Ct. 
1074, 191 L. Ed. 2d 64 (plurality opinion). Had Congress 
set out to do so, “one would have expected a clearer 
indication of that intent.” Ibid.
So too here. The Government’s reading would sweep in 
the hour-inflating lawyer, the steak-switching waiter, the 
building contractor who tacks an extra $10 onto the 
price of the paint he purchased. So long as they used 
various common billing methods, they would all be 
subject to a mandatory two years in federal prison. To 
say that such a result is  [***155]  implausible would be 
an  [**1573]  understatement.9 Because everyday 
 [*131]  overbilling cases would account for the majority 
of violations in practice, the Government’s reading 
places at the core of the statute its most improbable 
applications.
Finally, the Government makes a familiar plea: There is 
no reason [****32]  to mistrust its sweeping reading, 
because prosecutors will act responsibly. HN19[
] 
9 Even the Government had trouble stomaching some of these 
results, offering inconsistent accounts of certain examples. 
The Government claimed, for example, that if “an applicant for 
a bank loan . . . slightly inflates his salary while correctly 
identifying the co-signer,” “the inclusion of the co-signer’s 
name is not ‘in relation to’ the fraud.” Brief for United States 
31-32 (some internal quotation marks omitted). This cannot be 
squared with the Government’s own “facilitates” standard.
LEdHN[19][
] [19] To this, the Court gives a just-as-
familiar response: We “cannot construe a criminal 
statute on the assumption that the Government will ‘use 
it responsibly.’” McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 576, 136 S. Ct. 
2355, 195 L. Ed. 2d 639 (quoting United States v. 
Stevens, 559 U. S. 460, 480, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 176 L. 
Ed. 2d 435 (2010)). “[T]o rely upon prosecutorial 
discretion to narrow the otherwise wide-ranging scope 
of a criminal statute’s highly abstract general statutory 
language places great power in the hands of the 
prosecutor.” Marinello, 584 U. S., at ___, 138 S. Ct. 
1101, 200 L. Ed. 2d 356, 365. This concern is 
particularly salient here. If §1028A(a)(1) applies virtually 
automatically to a swath of predicate offenses, the 
prosecutor can hold the threat of charging an additional 
2-year mandatory prison sentence over the head of any 
defendant who is considering going to trial.
III
All the points above are different wells drawing from the 
same source. The Court need not decide whether any of 
these points, standing alone, would be dispositive. 
Taken together, from text to context, from content to 
common sense, §1028A(a)(1) is not amenable to the 
Government’s attempt to push the statutory envelope. 
HN20[
] LEdHN[20][
] [20] A defendant “uses” 
another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a 
predicate offense when this use is at the crux of what 
makes the conduct criminal. [****33]  To be clear, being 
at the crux of the criminality requires more than a causal 
relationship, such as “‘facilitation’” of the offense or 
being a but-for cause of its “success.” Post, at ___, ___-
___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 157, 158-160 (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in judgment). Instead, with fraud or deceit 
crimes like the  [*132]  one in this case, the means of 
identification specifically must be used in a manner that 
is fraudulent or deceptive. Such fraud or deceit going to 
identity can often be succinctly summarized as going to 
“who” is involved.10
10 Adrift in a blizzard of its own hypotheticals, the concurrence 
believes that it is too difficult to discern when a means of 
identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality. Post, 
at ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 158. The concurrence’s bewilderment 
is not, fortunately, the standard for striking down an Act of 
Congress as unconstitutionally vague. There will be close 
cases, certainly, but that is commonplace in criminal law. 
Equally commonplace are requirements that something play a 
specific role in an offense, whether that role is articulated as a 
“nexus,” Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. ___, ___, 138 S. 
Ct. 1101, 200 L. Ed. 2d 356, 365 (2018), a “locus,” Jones v. 
United States, 529 U. S. 848, 855-856, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. 
599 U.S. 110, *130; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1572; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***154; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****30
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Here, petitioner’s use of the patient’s  [***156]  name 
was not at the crux of what  [**1574]  made the 
underlying overbilling fraudulent. The crux of the 
healthcare fraud was a misrepresentation about the 
qualifications of petitioner’s employee. The patient’s 
name was an ancillary feature of the billing method 
employed. 
The 
Sixth 
Circuit’s 
more 
colloquial 
formulation is a helpful guide, though like any rule of 
thumb it will have its limits. Here, however, it neatly 
captures the thrust of the analysis, as petitioner’s fraud 
was in misrepresenting how and when services were 
provided to a patient, not who received the services.
***
Because petitioner did not use the patient’s means of 
identification in relation to a [****34]  predicate offense 
within the meaning of §1028A(a)(1), the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Concur by: GORSUCH
Concur
 [*133]  JUSTICE GORSUCH, concurring in the judgment.
Whoever among you is not an “aggravated identity 
thief,” let him cast the first stone. The United States 
came to this Court with a view of 18 U. S. C. 
§1028A(a)(1) that would affix that unfortunate label on 
almost every adult American. Every bill splitter who has 
overcharged a friend using a mobile-payment service 
like Venmo. Every contractor who has rounded up his 
billed time by even a few minutes. Every college hopeful 
who has overstated his involvement in the high school 
glee club. All of those individuals, the United States 
says, engage in conduct that can invite a mandatory 2-
year stint in federal prison. The Court today rightly 
rejects that unserious position. But in so holding, I worry 
the Court has stumbled upon a more fundamental 
Ed. 2d 902 (2000), or “proximate cause,” Robers v. United 
States, 572 U. S. 639, 645, 134 S. Ct. 1854, 188 L. Ed. 2d 885 
(2014). Such requirements are not always simple to apply. Yet 
resolving hard cases is part of the judicial job description. 
Hastily resorting to vagueness doctrine, in contrast, would 
hobble legislatures’ ability to draw nuanced lines to address a 
complex world. Such an approach would also leave victims of 
actual aggravated identity theft, a serious offense, without the 
added protection of §1028A(a)(1).
problem with §1028A(a)(1). That provision is not much 
better than a Rorschach test. Depending on how you 
squint your eyes, you can stretch (or shrink) its meaning 
to convict (or exonerate) just about anyone. Doubtless, 
creative prosecutors and receptive [****35]  judges can 
do the same. Truly, the statute fails to provide even 
rudimentary notice of what it does and does not 
criminalize. We have a term for laws like that. We call 
them vague. And “[i]n our constitutional order, a vague 
law is no law at all.” United States v. Davis, 588 U. S. 
___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L. Ed. 2d 757, 764 
(2019).
The “[a]ggravated identity theft” statute stipulates that 
“[w]hoever, during and in relation to any felony violation” 
listed in a later subsection, “knowingly transfers, 
possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person shall, in addition to the 
punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of 2 years.” §1028A(a)(1). Today, 
the Court sets out to determine what conduct that law 
reaches. It is, as the Court acknowledges, no easy task. 
Both the term “us[e]” and the phrase “in relation to” can 
support a multitude of possible meanings.  [***157]  
Ante, at ___-___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 146-148. They of 
course “‘imply action and implementation.’” Ante, at ___, 
216 L. Ed. 2d, at 147 (quoting Bailey v.  [*134]  United 
States, 516 U. S. 137, 145, 116 S. Ct. 501, 133 L. Ed. 
2d 472 (1995)). Beyond that “general concept,” 
however, we must fend for ourselves based only on 
limited contextual clues. Ante, at ___-___, 216 L. Ed. 
2d, at 146-148.
The United States offers up a rapacious interpretation 
that would require only “the use of th[e] means of 
identification [to] ‘facilitat[e] or furthe[r]’ [****36]  the 
predicate offense in some way.” Brief for United States 
10 (emphasis added). Admittedly, this reading “fall[s] 
within the range” of plausible meanings the statute could 
support. Ante, at ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 147. But so too 
do other readings—ones that require a more demanding 
“nexus” between the “means of identification” and the 
underlying misconduct.  [**1575]  Ante, at ___-___, 216 
L. Ed. 2d, at 147-148. For many of the reasons the 
Court gives (and more besides), I agree that we must 
adhere to those more restrained offerings. The United 
States’ maximalist approach has simplicity on its side, 
yes; an everybody-is-guilty standard is no challenge to 
administer. But the Constitution prohibits the Judiciary 
from resolving reasonable doubts about a criminal 
statute’s meaning by rounding up to the most punitive 
interpretation its text and context can tolerate. See 
Wooden v. United States, 595 U. S. ___, ___-___, 142 
599 U.S. 110, *132; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1573; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***155; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****33
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Page 19 of 21
S. Ct. 1063, 212 L. Ed. 2d 187 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring in judgment). That insight alone means Mr. 
Dubin’s §1028A(a)(1) conviction cannot stand.
Unfortunately, our opinion cannot end there. Having told 
lower courts how not to read the statute, we owe them 
some guidance as to how they should read it. That is 
where the real challenge begins. Drawing on contextual 
clues and rules of statutory interpretation, the Court 
concludes that a violation of §1028A(a)(1) occurs 
whenever 
the [****37]  
“use 
of 
the 
means 
of 
identification is at the crux of the underlying criminality.” 
Ante, at ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 149 (emphasis added). 
“In other words, the means of identification specifically” 
must be in some way “a key mover in the criminality.” 
Ibid. (emphasis added). Put still another way, the 
“means of identification” must play the (or maybe a) 
“central role” in the commission of the offense. Ibid. 
(emphasis added).
 [*135]  
Setting 
aside 
some 
definite-article 
inconsistency, those formulations all sound sensible 
enough. On closer review, however, they present 
intractable interpretive challenges of their own. When, 
exactly, is a “means of identification” “at the crux,” “a 
key mover,” or a “central role” player in an offense? No 
doubt, the answer “turns on causation, or at least 
causation often helps to answer the question.” United 
States v. Michael, 882 F. 3d 624, 628 (CA6 2018). The 
Court agrees but stresses that “a causal relationship” of 
any kind will not suffice. Ante, at ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 
155. At the same time, however, it studiously avoids 
indicating whether the appropriate standard is proximate 
cause or something else entirely novel. Ibid. All of which 
gives rise to further questions. In virtually every fraud, a 
“means of identification” plays some critical role in the 
fraud’s [****38]  success—good luck committing a mail 
or wire fraud, for instance, without relying heavily on the 
name of the  [***158]  victim and likely the names of 
other third parties. Just how much “causation” must a 
prosecutor 
establish 
to 
sustain 
a 
§1028A(a)(1) 
conviction? For that matter, how does one even 
determine the extent to which a “means of identification” 
“caused” an offense, as compared to the many other 
necessary inputs?
The Court supplies no firm answer. Instead, it leans on 
various illustrations that only highlight the difficulties 
inherent in this exercise. Take, for instance, the Court’s 
assurance that a “waiter who serves flank steak but 
charges for filet mignon using an electronic payment 
method” has not committed aggravated identity theft. 
Ante, at ___, ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 144, 150. Why not, 
exactly? In one sense, the “means of identification” (the 
credit card) lies “at the crux” of the fraud. The restaurant 
uses it to charge the customer for a product it never 
supplied. Maybe that feels less distasteful than a 
scenario in which an overseas hacker steals an 
individual’s credit card information and deploys it to 
order luxury goods on Amazon. But the Constitution’s 
promise of due process means that criminal statutes 
must provide [****39]  rules “knowable  [*136]  in 
advance,” not intuitions discoverable only after a 
prosecutor has issued an indictment and a judge offers 
an opinion.  [**1576] Percoco v. United States, 598 U. 
S. ___, ___, 143 S. Ct. 1130, 215  L. Ed. 2d 305, 320 
(2023) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
Not yet convinced? Consider some tweaks to the 
Court’s 
hypothetical. 
Suppose 
that, 
instead 
of 
misrepresenting the cut of its steaks, a restaurant 
charged a customer for an appetizer he ordered that 
never arrived. What about an appetizer he never 
ordered? An additional entrée? Three? Three plus a 
$5,000 bottle of Moët? How about a Boeing 737? Now 
suppose the restaurant ran the customer’s credit card 
for the same steak twice. What if it waited an hour to do 
so? A day? A year? What if the waiter gave the credit 
card information to a different employee at the same 
restaurant to run the charge? A different employee at a 
different restaurant? What if the restaurant sold the 
customer’s credit card information on the dark web, and 
another restaurant ran the card for filet mignon? On the 
Court’s telling, the “crux” of the fraud in some of these 
examples lies merely in “how and when services were 
provided,” while in others the “crux” involves “who 
received the services.” Ante, at ___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 
156. But how to tell which is which?
The Court’s “crux” test seemingly offers [****40]  no sure 
way through this “blizzard of . . . hypotheticals.” Ibid., n. 
10. Nor is that because I have cherry-picked “hard 
cases.” Ibid. Scenarios like these—and variations of 
them—illustrate the sorts of problems that invariably 
arise in even simple §1028A(a)(1) cases involving 
bogus restaurant bills. Other contexts can present still 
greater complications and still deeper uncertainties. The 
problem we face, then, is not that §1028A(a)(1) 
presents some hard cases at its edges; the problem is 
this statute has no easy cases. Really, you could spend 
a whole day cooking up scenarios—ranging from the 
mundane to the fanciful—that collapse even your most 
basic intuitions about what §1028A(a)(1) does and does 
not criminalize. Try making up some of your own and 
running them  [*137]  by a friend or family member. You 
may be surprised at how sharply instincts diverge.
599 U.S. 110, *134; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1575; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***157; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****36
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Page 20 of 21
 [***159]  For the less adventurous, consider just the 
facts of the case now before us. On one framing, it 
seems outrageous to convict Mr. Dubin of aggravated 
identity theft. After all, the patient did (at one point) 
receive psychological testing. So you might say, as the 
Court does, that Mr. Dubin lied only about the 
qualifications of the individual who provided those 
services and the [****41]  date on which they occurred. 
See ante, at ___, ___, L. Ed. 2d, at 144, 156. But on 
another framing, the patient’s identity was “a key 
mover,” perhaps even “at the crux,” of the fraud. Mr. 
Dubin could not have successfully billed the insurance 
provider without accurately offering up some specific 
patient’s name and information. Nor, as the United 
States notes, could Mr. Dubin have simply drawn a 
random name from a hat. Rather, his fraud depended 
on purloining the specific identity of a “Texas Medicaid 
enrollee who had at least three hours of psychological-
testing reimbursement left in his or her account.” Brief 
for United States 13. Along the way, Mr. Dubin’s fraud 
directly harmed the patient by depriving him of his 
annual 
eligibility 
for 
otherwisecompensable 
psychological services. From the patient’s perspective, 
Mr. Dubin’s use of his “means of identification” could 
hardly feel “ancillary.” Ante, at ___-___, 216 L. Ed. 2d, 
at 144.
As an abstract exercise, debating fact patterns like 
these may seem good fun. But there is nothing 
entertaining about a 2-year mandatory federal prison 
sentence. Criminal statutes are not games to be played 
in the car on a cross-country road trip. To satisfy the 
constitutional 
minimum 
of 
due 
process, 
they 
must [****42]  at least provide “ordinary people” with 
“fair notice of the conduct [they] punis[h].” Johnson v. 
United States, 576 U. S. 591, 595, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 
L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015). And, respectfully, I do not see how 
§1028A(a)(1) can clear that threshold. Under the 
 [**1577]  Court’s “crux” test, no boundary separates 
conduct that gives rise to liability from conduct that does 
not. And it appears I share this concern with the very 
lower  [*138]  court judges who will have to apply this 
standard prospectively. As even many of the Fifth 
Circuit dissenters below warned, the sort of “facilitation 
standard” 
the 
Court 
today 
adopts, 
“with 
its 
incidental/integral dividing line,” is unworkable because 
it “lacks clear lines and a limiting principle.” 27 F. 4th 
1021, 1042 (2022) (en banc) (Costa, J., dissenting). In 
the end, it is hard not to worry that the Court’s “crux” test 
will simply become a fig leaf for judges’ and jurors’ own 
subjective moral judgments about whether (as the Court 
itself puts it) the defendant’s crime is “one that warrants 
a 2-year mandatory minimum.” Ante, at ___, 216 L. Ed. 
2d, at 153.
I do not question that the Court today has done the best 
it might to make sense of this statute. It’s just that it 
faces an impossible task. In the past when this Court 
has grappled with similar statutory language, it has done 
so in contexts where the relevant [****43]  terms could 
carry only a few possible (and comparatively fixed) 
meanings. For example, when it comes to the “us[e]” of 
a firearm “in relation” to a crime of violence, 18 U. S. C. 
§924(c)(1)(A), the presence of a gun could be a but-for 
cause of (or a necessary ingredient of ) the offense—
used, for example, as compensation in an exchange for 
illicit drugs. Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 237-
238,  [***160]  113 S. Ct. 2050, 124 L. Ed. 2d 138 
(1993). Or the gun could be “‘used as a weapon’” by 
being discharged or brandished. Id., at 243 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). Because both those interpretations are 
relatively bounded and understandable, this Court could 
use principles of statutory interpretation to choose 
between them. The same holds true for many of the 
other statutes the Court (mistakenly) frets I would call 
into doubt. See ante, at ___, n. 10, 216 L. Ed. 2d, at 
155.
The same cannot be said for §1028A(a)(1), though. 
There are an uncountable number of ways in which an 
individual could “us[e]” the “means of identification” of 
another to commit fraud. That list covers everything 
from including a victim’s name in the subject line of a 
fraudulent email; to misrepresenting information on a 
loan form involving a  [*139]  co-signer; to putting on a 
wig and walking into a bank with a fake ID. And no 
obvious neutral rule exists to separate those “uses” that 
violate [****44]  §1028A(a)(1) from others that do not. In 
this way, §1028A(a)(1) is not just an “ambiguous” 
statute—“one that does define prohibited conduct with 
some precision, but [that] is subject to two or more 
different 
interpretations.” 
J. 
Decker, 
Addressing 
Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in 
American Criminal Laws, 80 Denver U. L. Rev. 241, 261 
(2002) (emphasis added). Instead, it is a vague 
statute—one that “does not satisfactorily define the 
proscribed conduct” at all. Id., at 260-261.
I do not write this opinion as wishcasting. Perhaps, by 
applying the Court’s “crux” test, lower courts will achieve 
a consistency that has, to date, eluded them. Or 
perhaps they will, prompted by today’s decision, locate 
a previously unseen path through this statutory 
quagmire. But I would not hold my breath. Section 
1028A(a)(1) simply does too little to specify which 
individuals deserve the inglorious title of “aggravated 
599 U.S. 110, *137; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1576; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***158; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****40
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Page 21 of 21
identity thief.” That is a problem Congress alone can fix. 
Until it does, I fear the issues that have long plagued 
lower courts will persist. And I will not be surprised if 
someday, maybe someday soon, they find their way 
back here.
References
18 U.S.C.S. § 1028A(a)(1)
4 Criminal Defense Techniques § 84.04 (Matthew 
Bender)
L Ed Digest, Larceny § 3
L Ed Index, Description or Identification
Supreme Court's application [****45]  of the rules of 
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis. 46 L. Ed. 2d 879. 
End of Document
599 U.S. 110, *139; 143 S. Ct. 1557, **1577; 216 L. Ed. 2d 136, ***160; 2023 U.S. LEXIS 2420, ****44
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 188-1     Filed 06/05/25     Page 22 of 22

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