RESPONSE in Opposition as to Carl Delano Torjagbo filed by USA re 178 MOTION in Limine to… — USA v. Torjagbo (Dkt. 179)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC · Doc. 179 · 2025-05-06 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

The government's response to Defendant Carl Torjagbo's motion in limine (Doc. 178) in United States v. Torjagbo, No. 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, filed May 6, 2025 as Doc. 179. The motion sought to exclude testimony and evidence relating to Count 2, an aggravated identity theft charge in the Superseding Indictment, citing Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023). The government argues that excluding the evidence would amount to pretrial dismissal of a count the defendant concedes is properly pleaded, citing United States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257 and United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306. It also argues the testimony is relevant to the bank fraud charge, which the indictment ties to a PPP loan of $9,554,425 for Kremkov Industries, LLC. The four-page response asks the court to deny the motion.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
CARL TORJAGBO 
Criminal Indictment 
 
No. 1:22-CR-171-MLB-RDC 
 
 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT’S  
MOTION IN LIMINE 
The United States of America, by its counsel, Richard S. Moultrie, Jr., Acting 
United States Attorney for the Northern District of Georgia, and Kelly K. Connors 
and Nicholas L. Evert, Assistant United States Attorneys, hereby files its response 
to Defendant Carl Torjagbo’s motion in limine. (Doc. 178).  
Though he acknowledges that Count 2 is properly pleaded in the Superseding 
Indictment and not subject to pretrial dismissal, Torjagbo asks the Court to exclude 
any testimony or evidence pertaining to Count 2 because the charge will not 
“survive Mr. Torjagbo’s future Rule 29 motion to dismiss.” (Id. at 2). But in making 
this request, he asks the Court to do exactly what he acknowledges is improper—
dismiss Count 2. The Court should decline to do so. 
ARGUMENT 
The Superseding Indictment alleges that Torjagbo committed bank fraud and 
other offenses related to a PPP loan that he obtained in the name of his sham 
company, Kremkov Industries, LLC. (Doc. 110 at 1-4). In this loan application, 
Torjagbo falsely alleged that he employed 493 people in the U.S. and had 
monthly payroll over $3.8 million. He submitted itemized payroll for those 493 
employees to justify his monthly payroll expenditure, and based on this payroll 
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 179     Filed 05/06/25     Page 1 of 4

Page 2 of 4 
 
data, he was approved for a PPP loan in the amount of $9,554,425, which was 2.5 
times the monthly payroll and was the standard calculation for a PPP loan.1  
Among the 493 people that Torjagbo fraudulently identified as employees of 
Kremkov was M.S., a personal acquaintance who did not work for Kremkov and 
whose identity was used on the payroll without her permission. Count 2 charges 
aggravated identity theft related to the use of her identity to fraudulently obtain 
a PPP loan based on false information about Kremkov’s monthly payroll and 
number of employees—two material misrepresentations that drove the eligibility 
and potential payment for a PPP loan.  
Citing Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023), Torjagbo asks the Court to 
exclude testimony from M.S. because the use of her identity was ancillary to the 
bank fraud scheme, and the Court will allegedly dismiss Count 2 after a Rule 29 
argument. He further alleges that her testimony is irrelevant and would be 
unduly prejudicial. (Doc. 178 at 4-5). He is mistaken. 
First, Count 2 is properly pleaded, as Torjagbo recognizes. Yet, despite this 
recognition, he seeks to exclude testimony and evidence pertaining to Count 2, 
which would effectively result in pretrial dismissal because it would be 
impossible for the government to prove the charge. Torjagbo cites to no authority 
that would permit the Court to do so, and there is none. “It is well-settled that ‘a 
court may not dismiss an indictment . . . on a determination of facts that should 
 
1 The maximum number of employees for a company applying for a PPP loan 
was 500. PPP loans had a standardized method for calculating the potential loan 
amount. The amount was 2.5 times the monthly payroll amount, not to exceed 
$10 million. Thus, both the number of employees and the monthly payroll 
amount were material components of the PPP loan application. 
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have been developed at trial.” United States v. Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th 
Cir. 2006). And the Eleventh Circuit has long made clear that there is no avenue 
for summary judgment in a criminal case. United States v. Critzer, 951 F.2d 306, 
307 (11th Cir. 1992) (“There is no summary judgment in criminal cases. Nor do 
the rules provide for a pre-trial determination of sufficiency of the evidence.”).  
Second, even if Torjagbo was not charged with aggravated identity theft, 
M.S.’s testimony would still be relevant to establish that Torjagbo lied on his PPP 
application when he identified her as an employee and claimed that he paid 
payroll to her. To prove that Torjagbo committed bank fraud, the government 
will have to prove, among other elements, that Torjagbo made material 
misrepresentations related to his PPP loan. These misrepresentations include 
Torjagbo’s false identification of 493 employees (including M.S.) and the payroll 
paid to these employees. M.S.’s testimony is highly probative, and Torjagbo 
makes only a bald assertion that it would be prejudicial. 
 
 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should deny Defendant Torjagbo’s 
motion in limine (Doc. 178). 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD S. MOULTRIE, JR. 
Acting United States Attorney 
                      /s/KELLY K. CONNORS 
     Assistant United States Attorney 
  
 
     Georgia Bar No. 504787 
     
  
     Kelly.Connors@usdoj.gov 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   /s/NICHOLAS L. EVERT 
     Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 693062 
      Nicholas.Evert@usdoj.gov 
 
600 U.S. Courthouse ▪ 75 Ted Turner Drive, SW 
Atlanta, GA 30303 ▪ 404-581-6000 
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 179     Filed 05/06/25     Page 4 of 4

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