RESPONSE in Opposition as to Carl Delano Torjagbo filed by USA re 50 MOTION for Review of… — USA v. Torjagbo (Dkt. 52)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia · No. 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC · Doc. 52 · 2023-03-14 · Docket on CourtListener

Summary

The government's response in opposition to the defendant's motion for revocation of a magistrate judge's detention order, filed March 14, 2023 as Document 52 in United States v. Carl Delano Torjagbo, Criminal Action Number 1:22-cr-171-MLB-RDC, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. It states the defendant seeks review under 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b) and argues the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) favor detention. It summarizes the May 10, 2022 indictment charging bank fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 in Count 1, concealment money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) in Counts 2 through 4, and transactional money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 in Counts 5 through 7. It describes an alleged Paycheck Protection Program application for $9,554,425.00 and recounts the magistrate judge's findings on flight risk and danger to the community. It runs 25 pages.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
CARL DELANO TORJAGBO, 
a/k/a KARL LUCIUS DELANO 
CRIMINAL ACTION NUMBER 
1:22-cr-171-MLB-RDC 
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR REVOCATION OF 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S DETENTION ORDER 
The United States of America files this response in opposition to 
Defendant’s motion for revocation of the Magistrate Judge’s detention order. 
Introduction 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b), Defendant Carl Delano Torjagbo, a/k/a 
Karl Lucius Delano, asks this Court to conduct a de novo review on the issue of 
detention, revoke the Magistrate Judge’s detention order, and release him on 
bond pending trial. (Doc. 50). A de novo review of the pleadings and the 
evidence developed at the detention hearing will show that the Magistrate 
Judge’s factual findings are supported and that the Magistrate Judge’s legal 
conclusions are correct. 
 
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Release or detention of a defendant pending trial is governed by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(g). Here, the relevant factors—including the nature and circumstances of 
the offense charged, the weight of the evidence, the defendant’s history and 
characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the danger posed by the 
defendant’s release—all weigh in favor of detention. The Magistrate Judge 
properly considered the § 3142(g) factors and correctly found that Torjagbo 
should be detained because he is both a flight risk and a danger to the 
community. This Court should adopt the Magistrate Judge’s detention order. 
The indictment and the evidence proffered at the detention hearing 
Torjagbo was indicted by a grand jury on May 10, 2022. (Doc. 1). He is 
charged with the following offenses: 
 Count 1: bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; 
 Counts 2 through 4: concealment money laundering in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); and 
 Counts 5 through 7: transactional money laundering in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1957. 
(Id.). 
 
 
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Evidence of bank fraud 
JPMorgan Chase Bank is a federally insured financial institution. (Id. ¶ 1). 
Chase participated as a lender in the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which 
was designed to help small businesses survive the COVID-19 pandemic by 
providing them with funds to cover certain payroll costs, including benefits, 
interest on mortgages, rent, and utilities. (Id. ¶ 3). 
To be eligible for a PPP loan, a business had to have been “in operation on 
February 15, 2020.” (Id. ¶ 4). 
Kremkov Industries LLC is a Georgia entity organized by Torjagbo on 
January 4, 2021, over 10 months after the PPP-eligibility date had expired. (Id. 
¶ 5). Kremkov was not eligible for a PPP loan because it was not “in operation on 
February 15, 2020.” (Id. ¶ 6). 
Torjagbo claims that Kremkov was in the mining business in Africa. 
(Transcript of Detention Hearing (Tr.) at 28). That is simply not true. Kremkov 
never conducted any business related to mining or anything else. (Doc. 1 ¶ 7). 
And it never paid wages to employees because it had no employees. (Id.). 
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Nevertheless, on February 16, 2021, Torjagbo signed a PPP loan 
application on behalf of Kremkov and submitted it to Chase, requesting a PPP 
loan of $9,554,425.00. (Id. ¶ 8). 
Torjagbo swore that the information he provided on Kremkov’s PPP loan 
application and in all supporting documents and forms was “true and accurate 
in all material respects.” (Id. ¶ 9). It was not. 
 Torjagbo falsely stated that Kremkov was “in operation on February 15, 
2020.” (Id. ¶ 10). 
 Torjagbo falsely stated that a PPP loan was necessary to support the 
“ongoing operations” of Kremkov. (Id. ¶ 11). 
 Torjagbo falsely stated that Kremkov had 493 employees. (Id. ¶ 12). 
 Torjagbo falsely stated that Kremkov had an average monthly payroll 
of $3,821,770.00. (Id. ¶ 13). 
 Torjagbo submitted fraudulent documents to Chase, including false tax 
returns (IRS Forms 940, 941, and 1040) and fake reports that listed the 
names and make-believe payroll information of 493 people who 
allegedly worked for Kremkov. (Id. ¶ 15). 
On March 29, 2021, as a result of Torjagbo’s materially false and fraudulent 
representations, Chase transferred $9,554,425.00 in PPP loan proceeds to 
Torjagbo’s custody and control. (Id. ¶ 16). 
 
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Evidence of money laundering 
The PPP loan proceeds were initially deposited into Kremkov’s account at 
Chase. (Id. ¶ 18). Immediately before that deposit, the account balance was only 
$105.00. (Id.). 
On Kremkov’s PPP loan application, Torjagbo certified that “[a]ll loan 
proceeds [would] be used only for business-related purposes as specified in the 
loan application and consistent with the Paycheck Protection Program Rules.” 
(Id. ¶ 19). But Torjagbo used the PPP loan proceeds to pay his personal debts and 
expenses: 
 Torjagbo used six different accounts at three different banks to launder 
the fraud proceeds, including two accounts in the name of Kremkov, 
three accounts in the name of Carl Torjagbo, and one account in the 
name of FlyingJack. (Id. ¶ 29). 
 After March 29, 2021—the date on which Torjagbo received the PPP 
loan proceeds—there were no significant deposits into any of those six 
accounts from any legitimate source, and there were only small 
deposits into a few of those accounts before March 29, 2021. 
 On April 8, 2021, Torjagbo transferred $3 million of the PPP loan 
proceeds from one Kremkov account to another, at a different bank. In 
the “for” section on that check, Torjagbo wrote “payroll.” But Kremkov 
had no payroll because it had no employees. (Id. ¶¶ 22, 7). 
 On July 29, 2021—four months after receiving the PPP loan proceeds—
Torjagbo filed a petition in the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia 
to change his name to Karl Lucius Delano. (Id. ¶¶ 16, 23). 
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 On August 17, 2021, Torjagbo created “FlyingJack freight& Logistics 
LLC” and registered it in the State of Wyoming. (Id. ¶ 24).  
 Torjagbo used more than $950,000 of the PPP loan proceeds that he 
obtained in the name of Kremkov to pay startup expenses for 
FlyingJack and to purchase 11 tractor-trailers and a parcel of 
undeveloped land for FlyingJack. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 27; Doc. 1 at Count 4). 
 Torjagbo used PPP loan proceeds to purchase the following items for 
his personal enjoyment: 
Date 
Description 
Amount 
05-28-21 
House located at 5114 Greythorne Lane, Marietta, 
GA, titled in name of Carl Torjagbo 
$1,660,861.01 
06-11-21 
Plastic surgery (“surfer abs”) for Carl Torjagbo 
$15,030.38 
08-06-21 
2021 Land Rover Velar, titled in name of Carl 
Torjagbo 
$87,020.00 
10-27-21 
Undeveloped land - Tract 4, Fiber Drive, Cartersville, 
GA, titled in name of Karl Lucius Delano 
$91,076.66 
01-24-22 
2022 BMW M850XL, titled in name of Carl Torjagbo 
$115,250.79 
04-21-22 
Down payment on a yacht for Carl Torjagbo 
$51,000.00 
04-22-22 
2014 Lamborghini Aventador, titled in name of  Karl 
Lucius Delano 
$332,999.80 
 
 
 
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Evidence of aggravated identity theft and wire fraud 
Torjagbo also committed aggravated identity theft and wire fraud. The 
Government might add those charges in a superseding indictment. The 
aggravated identity theft charge arises from the fraudulent documents that 
Torjagbo submitted to Chase to obtain the PPP loan. The wire fraud charges stem 
from not just one but two fraudulent tax returns (Forms 1040) for tax year 2020 
that Torjagbo electronically filed with the IRS on February 13, 2021—three days 
before he submitted his fraudulent PPP loan application. One return used 
Torjagbo’s SSN, and the other used his ITIN. Both returns reported large 
fictitious Form W-2 wages, withholdings, and losses from Kremkov, generating 
over $6.3 million in total tax refunds. IRS records do not contain any evidence 
that the alleged wages or withholdings were ever paid. And IRS records show 
that Kremkov never filed any W-2s or business or employment tax returns for tax 
year 2020 or for any other tax year. On April 23, 2021, based on the fraudulent 
Form 1040 that Torjagbo filed using his SSN, the IRS issued a refund check 
payable to Carl Torjagbo for $3,366,240.76. But the IRS placed an identity theft 
hold on the Form 1040 that Torjagbo filed using his ITIN, and the IRS did not 
issue the refund of $3,015,573.00 that Torjagbo requested in that return. 
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The Magistrate Judge’s findings 
 “The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not 
apply to detention hearings, and the parties may proceed solely by proffer.” 
United States v. Kachkar, 701 F. App’x 744, 746 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations and 
quotation marks omitted). The evidence introduced at the detention hearing 
consisted of the Pretrial Services Report, the Indictment, the Government’s 
proffer, and Torjagbo’s proffer. 
The Magistrate Judge stated that the following factors led her to conclude 
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure Torjagbo’s 
appearance at trial and the safety of the community: 
 Torjagbo is “alleged to have defrauded the U.S. government out of $9.5 
million. Actually, seeking 13 million, [with] in excess of 6 million still 
outstanding.” 
 “[H]e does not have substantial ties to the charging district. He’s lived 
at this address for a year.” 
 “The Court notes its concern about his use of an alias or changing his 
identity . . . after the alleged criminal conduct at issue. . . . The Court 
also notes [that] he’s alleged to have committed fraud in both names.” 
 “[T]he defendant has ties to a foreign country and . . . his family resides 
in Ghana where he was born.” 
 “The Court finds there’s no verifiable . . . legitimate work history.” 
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 “The Court also notes [that] the defendant, who [is] a trained pilot, is 
unable to find his passport and could not recall where his passport 
would be. . . . [T]here’s a substantial sum of money that is still 
outstanding. . . . [He is] a pilot and can rent [an airplane] to flee the 
country . . . . This was a lot of money barely a year ago. We’re not 
talking about conduct in 2018 or 2017 or 2019. We’re talking about 
substantial sums of money that [he] had last year. . . . But what stands 
out to me most is the concern about [him being a] pilot.” 
 Torjagbo was “in the military, [and he] didn’t mention that to Pretrial 
Service or [his] pilot experience.” 
 This is the largest PPP fraud that I have seen. 
 He conducted “an extensive number of transactions between 
accounts[,] transferring here and there, the . . . $3 million [tax] refund 
from a business that allegedly did not exist or income [he] did not 
make.” 
 “With regard to [defense counsel’s statement that Torjagbo had 
reported to Immigration that his passport had been lost or perhaps 
stolen by his ex-girlfriend], he was able to manufacture substantial 
documents to engage in the alleged conduct so he would probably . . . 
be able to obtain a passport, even if he couldn’t find his legitimate one, 
and because there’s a substantial amount of money missing, that money 
could be used to hire a pilot to fly [him] somewhere close to here. In 
any event, . . . it does not change the Court’s opinion.” 
(Tr. at 34-37). 
After the detention hearing, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142(i), the Magistrate 
Judge issued a written order that includes findings of fact and a statement of 
reasons that Torjagbo should be detained pending trial. (Doc. 11). 
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Argument 
In United States v. King, 849 F.2d 485, 490 (11th Cir. 1988), the Eleventh 
Circuit set forth the procedures to be followed when a defendant moves the 
district court to revoke a magistrate judge’s pretrial detention order under 18 
U.S.C. § 3145(b). A district court may adopt the magistrate’s order if “a careful 
review of the pleadings and the evidence developed at the magistrate’s detention 
hearing [shows] that the magistrate’s factual findings are supported and that the 
magistrate’s legal conclusions are correct.” Id. Alternatively, the district court 
may conduct an evidentiary hearing if it “determines that additional evidence is 
necessary or that factual issues remain unresolved.” Id. If, based solely on a 
careful review of the evidence presented at the magistrate’s detention hearing, 
the district court agrees with the magistrate that pretrial detention is necessary, 
but determines that some of the magistrate’s legal conclusions are incorrect or 
that some of the magistrate’s factual findings are not adequately supported, the 
district court must issue a written order explaining its decision. Id. at 491. “The 
district court has ‘substantial latitude in determining whether pretrial detention 
is appropriate.’” United States v. Ellis, 646 F. App’x 889 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
King, 849 F.2d at 487). 
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The Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142, governs the release and detention of 
defendants awaiting trial. The defendant shall be detained if the court finds that 
“no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the [defendant] as required and the safety of . . . the community.” 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). A finding of either risk of flight or danger to the 
community is sufficient to detain the defendant pending trial. King, 849 F.2d at 
488. The government bears the burden of establishing that the defendant should 
be detained, either by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is a 
flight risk, or by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is a danger to 
the community. United States v. Quartermaine, 913 F.2d 910, 917 (11th Cir. 1990). 
In determining whether a defendant poses a flight risk or a danger to the 
community, a court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 
charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the defendant’s 
history and characteristics, including, among other things, his family ties, 
employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, 
community ties, and criminal history; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the 
danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s 
release. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Here, those factors all weigh in favor of detention. 
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1. 
The first factor, the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, 
weighs in favor of detention. 
The nature and circumstances of Torjagbo’s offenses are serious. The 
maximum punishment for bank fraud is 30 years in prison. 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The 
maximum punishment for concealment money laundering is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). And the maximum punishment for transactional money 
laundering is 10 years. 18 U.S.C. § 1957. 
Torjagbo went to great lengths to convert the fraud proceeds to his own 
use. For example, on August 17, 2021, he created a sham company, FlyingJack. 
(Doc. 1 ¶ 24). But instead of registering it in the State of Georgia where he lived, 
he registered it in Wyoming, roughly 1400 miles away. (See id.). He then opened 
a bank account in the name of FlyingJack and used it to launder fraud proceeds. 
(Id. ¶¶ 25-27, 29; Doc. 1 at Counts 4, 7). FlyingJack was not established for valid 
business purposes; it conducted no legitimate business, it did not earn legitimate 
income, and its corporate office was little more than a mail drop. See Comptroller 
of The Treasury v. Syl, Inc., 375 Md. 78, 106, 825 A.2d 399, 415 (2003) (describing 
the characteristics of a sham company). 
 
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Kremkov had only $105.00 in its bank account immediately before 
receiving over $9.5 million in PPP loan proceeds. (Doc. 1 ¶ 18). This belies 
Torjagbo’s sworn statement in his PPP loan application that Kremkov employed 
493 people and had an average monthly payroll of more than $3.8 million. 
Torjagbo used six accounts at three different banks to launder the PPP loan 
proceeds. (Id. ¶ 29). Using “multiple bank accounts . . . to conceal income and 
cash expenditures” is a sign that Torjagbo’s scheme was sophisticated. See United 
States v. Suarez, 364 F. App’x 602, 605 (11th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. 
Reyes, 781 F. App’x 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2019) (finding that defendant’s money 
laundering was “sophisticated” because he wired fraud proceeds to bank 
accounts in the names of “fictitious entities and shell corporations that existed 
only to launder money”); United States v. Clarke, 562 F.3d 1158, 1166 (11th Cir. 
2009) (stating that there is “no material difference between concealing income 
and transactions through the use of third-party accounts . . . and using a 
corporate shell or a fictitious entity to hide assets”). 
 
 
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After March 29, 2021—the date on which Torjagbo first received control of 
the PPP loan proceeds—there were no significant deposits into any of Torjagbo’s 
six accounts from any legitimate source, and there were only small deposits into 
a few of those accounts before March 29, 2021. 
After the detention hearing, the Government uncovered evidence of 
aggravated identity theft. See United States v. Keel, No. 1:16-CR-187-CAP-JKL, 
2017 WL 1371870, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2017) (adopting the magistrate judge’s 
detention order and noting that the government’s investigation showed that the 
defendant was an even greater danger to the community than the government 
realized at the time of the detention hearing). Even if aggravated identity theft 
charges are not added, given the enormous loss amount in this case and the 
sophisticated conduct involved, Torjagbo faces a significant sentence under the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1. 
The nature and circumstances of the offense charged weigh in favor of 
detention. 
 
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2. 
The second factor, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, 
weighs in favor of detention. 
Bearing in mind the general presumption of innocence in criminal cases, 
the Court nevertheless must consider the weight of the evidence against the 
defendant in determining whether detention is appropriate. The grand jury’s 
indictment, standing alone, establishes probable cause for purposes of the Bail 
Reform Act. See United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(stating that “the return of a true bill by a grand jury, resulting in indictment, 
conclusively demonstrates that probable cause exists implicating a citizen in a 
crime”).  
Torjagbo does not deny that he received the $9,554,425.00 PPP loan 
described in the indictment or the $3,366,240.76 tax refund described at the 
detention hearing, nor does he deny that he engaged in the specific financial and 
monetary transactions described in the indictment. (See Tr. at 12-14, 25). The 
Government’s evidence consists of, among other things, bank records, tax 
records, emails, records maintained by the Georgia Secretary of State and the 
Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia, and documents showing how Torjagbo 
laundered the fraud proceeds. The overwhelming evidence against Torjagbo 
weighs in favor of detention. 
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3. 
The third factor, the defendant’s history and characteristics, weighs in 
favor of detention. 
In evaluating the defendant’s history and characteristics, the Court 
considers, among other things, the defendant’s family ties, employment, 
financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, and 
criminal history. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Evidence concerning the defendant’s history 
and characteristics may be presented through written reports prepared by the 
Pretrial Services Division of the United States Probation Office. United States v. 
Young, 647 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (N.D. Ga. 1986). 
Torjagbo’s community ties are weak. Defense counsel told the Magistrate 
Judge that Torjagbo had been living in Atlanta for “approximately the past 
couple of years.” (Tr. at 28). At the time he was indicted, however, Torjagbo had 
been living at 5114 Lane, Marietta, Georgia for just one year—in a house that he 
purchased for $1,660,861.01 in cash and paid for entirely with fraud proceeds. (Id. 
at 14, 15, 21, 37). He lived there alone. (Id. at 21). That property is subject to 
forfeiture. (Doc. 1, Forfeiture Provision). Torjagbo told Pretrial Services that he 
intends to keep living there if the Court lets him out on bond. (Id. at 13-14). 
 
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Torjagbo moved for reconsideration of his detention order and alleged that 
he “has a local support group of friends and family, including a relative” with 
whom he can live if he is released on bond. (Doc. 31 ¶ 4). He did not provide 
further details, such as the names and addresses of these people. 
Torjagbo is not married and has no children; his parents and siblings all 
live in Ghana, where he was born. (Tr. at 15, 20, 21). Defense counsel told the 
Magistrate Judge that Torjagbo “was in the process of applying for his family to 
be able to come here with visas to visit him.” (Id. at 29). Torjagbo wired more 
than $80,000 of the fraud proceeds to his mother in Ghana because she was sick 
and needed medical treatment. (Id. at 20-21). That is yet another reason to believe 
that Torjagbo might flee if released on bond. 
Torjagbo’s relatively brief residence in the community, his lack of 
community ties in this district, and his strong family ties in Africa all weigh in 
favor of detention. 
Torjagbo’s lack of legitimate employment and lack of financial resources 
also weigh in favor of detention. Torjagbo told Pretrial Services that he was 
employed by FlyingJack and had been for eight months. (Id. at 14, 21). FlyingJack 
was funded entirely by fraud proceeds and had no legitimate income with which 
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to pay Torjagbo a salary. PPP loan proceeds must be used solely for the business 
that obtained the loan. Here, that was Kremkov. At the detention hearing, 
however, defense counsel admitted that Torjagbo used PPP loan proceeds to buy 
“physical assets like tractors and trailers [for] his other business,” FlyingJack. (Id. 
at 26, 28). Torjagbo reported having no employment other than FlyingJack, and 
he reported no other financial resources. All of the tractor-trailers and real 
property that Torjagbo purchased in the name of FlyingJack were paid for 
entirely with fraud proceeds and are subject to forfeiture. (Doc. 1, Forfeiture 
Provision).  
Contrary to what he told Pretrial Services, Torjagbo told the IRS that he 
was employed by Kremkov (rather than FlyingJack) and that he earned almost 
$9.2 million in wages from Kremkov in 2020. (Tr. at 22). That was not true. 
Torjagbo’s dishonest statements concerning his employment and income also 
weigh in favor of detention. 
The next factor is Torjagbo’s criminal history. It, too, weighs in favor of 
detention. Torjagbo does not have any felony convictions, but he was twice 
charged with failure to appear in connection with misdemeanor offenses. (Tr. at 
23). Failure to appear “shows, at best, a disregard for a court’s requirements and 
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rules, and certainly is strong evidence that the trend of failing to appear for court 
will continue if not detained in this case.” United States v. Munoz-Hernandez, No. 
CR 12-0128 JB, 2012 WL 5476892, at *11 (D.N.M. Nov. 5, 2012). Torjagbo was also 
charged with driving on a suspended license. (Tr. at 23). As with the failure-to-
appear charges, driving on a suspended license shows that Torjagbo has “little to 
no respect for the law.” United States v. Wilson, No. 13-CR-2011 CJW-MAR, 2020 
WL 5894193, at *6 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 5, 2020); see also United States v. Tann, No. 
CRIM.A.04-392(CKK), 2006 WL 1313334, at *5 (D.D.C. May 12, 2006) (denying 
bond pending sentencing because defendant’s behavior “force[d] the Court to 
question her personal characteristics, such as her capacity for honesty, her 
respect for the law, and her ability to be cabined by legal consequences”). 
Torjagbo was also charged with aggravated assault, but that charge was 
dead docketed. (Tr. at 23). In addition, he was charged with simple battery, 
family violence, false imprisonment, and intimidating and harassing a 911 
operator. Those charges were also dead docketed. (Id. at 23-24). Even though 
those charges did not result in a conviction, the Court can consider them in 
determining whether pretrial detention is appropriate. See United States v. Rich, 
No. CR RDB-19-0506, 2020 WL 2747395, at *3 (D. Md. May 27, 2020) (denying 
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defendant’s motion for reconsideration of pretrial detention, and stating that 
although an assault charge that was pending at the time of the detention hearing 
“has since been nolle prossed, this fact does not have a material bearing on the 
court’s detention analysis”). 
At the detention hearing, Torjagbo argued that his prior arrests “are 
extremely dated” and involved “minor things.” (Tr. at 31). This Court takes a 
defendant’s “entire history into account in making the determination of whether 
he is a danger to the community.” United States v. Gray, No. 22-CR-20258, 2022 
WL 4379583, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2022). 
Torjagbo has special skills that also make him a flight risk:  he is both a 
licensed airline transport pilot and a flight instructor. See United States v. 
Armstrong, 397 F. App’x 466, 468 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that the defendant was 
a flight risk because he “had a pilot’s license, traveled frequently to Mexico 
where he owned property and his wife had a real estate business, and transferred 
and received money from overseas banks”); United States v. Farrell, 115 F. Supp. 
3d 746, 763 (S.D.W. Va. 2015) (finding that defendant’s “British citizenship, 
passport, and private pilot’s license furnished an objective factual basis for 
determining that [he] was a flight risk”); United States v. Nichols, No. CRIM.A. 15-
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85-01, 2015 WL 2126807, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 2015) (“Given defendant’s limited 
ties to the Philadelphia area, his connections to California, his flight training, and 
his history of accessing large sums of cash, the Court determines that defendant 
would pose a flight risk if released pending trial.”). 
Torjagbo’s skill as a pilot would remain with him even if he were to 
surrender his pilot’s license. And as the Magistrate Judge found, because a large 
part of the fraud money is still unaccounted for, Torjagbo presumably has the 
money to rent an airplane and leave the country by either flying the plane 
himself or by hiring someone else to fly it for him. (Tr. at 38).  
When Torjagbo was employed as an airline pilot at FlyDubai Airlines and 
SkyWest Airlines, he traveled all over the world. Since he was born in Ghana and 
still has family there, he could easily leave this district permanently if given an 
opportunity to do so. See United States v. Kachkar, 701 F. App’x at 747 (holding 
that a large amount of “unaccounted for” fraud money and defendant’s 
“significant ties and travel to foreign countries” supported the district court’s 
finding that defendant was a flight risk). 
Torjagbo’s risk of flight cannot be adequately addressed simply by 
requiring him to post a secured bond. A defendant facing a lengthy prison 
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sentence “might well prefer to lose his financial assets rather than his freedom.” 
United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 77 (2d Cir. 2007). “Further, [he] might easily 
persuade some friend or family member to lend [him] the money necessary to 
finance flight from the United States. Neither such a modest indebtedness nor 
forfeiture of [multimillion-dollar] bail bonds is likely to have long-term negative 
consequences for [him].” Id. 
Torjagbo claims that he reported his passport lost or stolen in August 2021. 
(Tr. at 37). But as the Magistrate Judge recognized, since Torjagbo “was able to 
manufacture substantial documents” to engage in the fraudulent conduct alleged 
in the indictment, he would probably be able to “obtain a [fraudulent] passport, 
even if he couldn’t find his legitimate one.” (Id. at 38). “Defendant’s access to and 
capability of obtaining fraudulent identity documents supports a finding that he 
is a risk of flight.” United States v. Rives, No. 1:14-CR-00130-TWT-JFK-4, 2014 WL 
12698578, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2014); see also United States v. Alfred, No. 1:16-CR-
245-01-WSD, 2016 WL 5389185, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2016) (finding that 
defendant presented a flight risk because he had family and friends in Trinidad 
and visited them often and was “facing serious federal felony offenses and ha[d] 
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Page 23 of 25 
 
been put on notice that more significant charges [might] be presented to the 
grand jury”). 
On balance, Torjagbo’s history and characteristics weigh in favor of 
detention, and the Magistrate Judge properly found that no conditions of release 
would guarantee his appearance at trial. 
4. 
The fourth factor, the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person 
or the community that would be posed by the defendant’s release, 
weighs in favor of detention. 
Torjagbo is not charged with crimes of violence, but he is charged with 
extremely serious fraud and money laundering offenses, and he faces the 
possibility of being charged with multiple counts of aggravated identity theft. 
The Magistrate Judge properly found that no conditions of release would 
guarantee the safety of the community if Torjagbo were released pending trial. 
(Tr. 36-37). The record and the relevant case law amply support that finding. 
A defendant may pose a danger to the community not only through 
“physical violence” but also if he “might engage in criminal activity to the 
detriment of the community.” King, 849 F.2d at 487 n.2; see United States v. 
Wardlaw, No. 1:08-CR-478-JTC, 2009 WL 10674241, at *2 n.1 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 
2009) (recognizing that “[d]anger to the community also encompasses pecuniary 
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Page 24 of 25 
 
or economic harm, not just physical harm”); see also Rives, 2014 WL 12698578, at 
*3 (affirming defendant’s detention order because the community would be 
exposed to the danger of further “financial fraud and identity theft” if defendant 
were released on bond). Hence, the Magistrate Judge was correct in finding that 
Torjagbo’s release would pose a danger to the community. (See Tr. at 36-37). 
Conclusion 
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should adopt the Magistrate 
Judge’s detention order. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ryan K. Buchanan 
United States Attorney 
/s/ John Russell Phillips 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 576335 
600 U.S. Courthouse 
75 Ted Turner Drive, SW 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
(404) 581-6000 
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Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that, on March 14, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing 
document with the Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system. 
/s/ John Russell Phillips 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Georgia Bar No. 576335 
 
 
 
600 U.S. Courthouse 
75 Ted Turner Drive, SW 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
(404) 581-6000 
Case 1:22-cr-00171-MLB-RDC     Document 52     Filed 03/14/23     Page 25 of 25

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