Export Report of Victor Stango (Exhibit 1) — In re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation (Dkt. 350-2, S.D. Cal. No. 3:21-md-02992)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 350-2 · 2024-10-24 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

EXHIBIT 1
FILED 
PROVISIONALLY 
UNDER SEAL WITH 
REDACTIONS 
PURSUANT TO 
STIPULATED 
PROTECTIVE ORDER
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
SAN DIEGO DIVISION 
IN RE: BANK OF AMERICA 
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
 Case No. -MD-02992-GPC-MSB 
EXPERT REPORT OF VICTOR STANGO 
October 24, 2024 
FILED PROVISIONALLY UNDER SEAL
PURSUANT TO STIPULATED PROTECTIVE ORDER
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Table of Contents 
 
I. 
Qualifications ...................................................................................................................... 1 
II. 
Assignment ......................................................................................................................... 2 
III. 
Summary of Opinions ......................................................................................................... 2 
IV. 
Background ......................................................................................................................... 4 
A. 
Fraud and the Claims Fraud Filter .......................................................................... 4 
B. 
The Remediation Plan and Associated Repayments ............................................... 5 
C. 
Plaintiff’s Allegations and Proposed Classes ......................................................... 6 
V. 
Summary of Mr. Regan’s Opinions and Damages Methodologies .................................... 7 
VI. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed Claim Denial Class Damages Methodology Does Not Distinguish 
Harmed from Unharmed Consumers, Ignores Important Consumer Heterogeneity That 
Would Require Individual Inquiry, Overstates Damages for Many Consumers, and Does 
Not Reliably Estimate Profits ........................................................................................... 11 
A. 
The Proposed Claim Denial Class Methodology Does Not Distinguish Consumers 
Harmed as a Result of the Bank’s Alleged Misconduct From Consumers Unharmed as a 
Result of the Bank’s Alleged Misconduct ........................................................................ 11 
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology for Calculating Alleged “Actual Damages” Overstates 
Damages by Failing to Account for Funds Paid and to Be Paid to Proposed Class 
Members ........................................................................................................................... 13 
1. 
BANA Has Already Paid 100% of Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of 
Actual Damages” .................................................................................................. 13 
2. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology Overstates “Consequential Damages” Because 
It Fails to Account for Funds Paid or To Be Paid to Proposed Class Members 
According to the Remediation Plan ...................................................................... 14 
C. 
Mr. Regan’s “Consequential Damages” Methodology Ignores Important 
Consumer Heterogeneity, Overstates Harm for Many Consumers and Cannot Measure 
Consumer Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis .......................................................... 15 
1. 
The Economic Circumstances of Consumers in the Proposed Class, and 
Any Potential Economic Impact of Claim Denials Would be Highly 
Individualized ....................................................................................................... 17 
2. 
Proposed Class Members’ “Costs Associated with Obtaining Substitute 
Funds” Would be Highly Individualized and are Overstated for Many Consumers 
Under Mr. Regan’s Methodology ......................................................................... 23 
3. 
Proposed Class Members’ Credit Card Late Fees Associated with Claim 
Denial, if Any, Would Be Highly Individualized and Overstated for Many 
Consumers Under Mr. Regan’s Methodology ...................................................... 30 
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D. 
Because Mr. Regan’s Methodology Overstates “Actual Damages,” It Necessarily 
Overstates “Treble Damages” ........................................................................................... 34 
E. 
The Claim Denial Damages Methodology Does Not Calculate “Profits” 
Associated with Claim Denials on a Class-Wide Basis .................................................... 34 
VII. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed Credit Rescission Class Methodology Does Not Distinguish 
Harmed From Unharmed Consumers, Ignores Important Consumer Heterogeneity That 
Would Require Individual Inquiry, Overstates Damages for Many Consumers, and Does 
Not Reliably Estimate Profits ........................................................................................... 35 
A. 
The Proposed Credit Rescission Class Damages Methodology Does Not 
Distinguish Consumers Harmed as a Result of the Bank’s Alleged Misconduct From 
Consumers Unharmed as a Result of the Bank’s Alleged Misconduct ............................ 35 
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology for Calculating Alleged “Actual Damages” Overstates 
Damages by Failing to Account for Funds Paid and to Be Paid to Proposed Class 
Members ........................................................................................................................... 36 
C. 
Mr. Regan’s “Consequential Damages” Methodology Ignores Important 
Consumer Heterogeneity, Overstates Harm for Many Consumers and Cannot Measure 
Consumer Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis .......................................................... 37 
D. 
Because Mr. Regan’s Methodology Overstates “Actual Damages,” It Necessarily 
Overstates “Treble Damages” ........................................................................................... 37 
E. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology Does Not Calculate “Profits” Associated with Credit 
Rescissions on a Class-Wide Basis ................................................................................... 38 
VIII. 
Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Proposed Account Freeze Class Ignores 
Important Consumer Heterogeneity That Would Require Individual Inquiry, Overstates 
Damages for Many Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate Profits ....................... 38 
A. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology for Calculating Alleged “Actual Damages” Overstates 
Damages by Failing to Account for Funds Paid and to Be Paid to Proposed Class 
Members ........................................................................................................................... 38 
B. 
Mr. Regan’s “Consequential Damages” Methodology Ignores Important 
Consumer Heterogeneity, Overstates Harm for Many Consumers and Cannot Measure 
Consumer Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis .......................................................... 39 
C. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology Does Not Calculate “Profits” Associated with Account 
Freezes on a Class-Wide Basis ......................................................................................... 41 
IX. 
Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Proposed Customer Service Class Ignores 
Important Consumer Heterogeneity and Fails to Propose a Damages Methodology that 
Reliably Measures Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis ............................................ 41 
X. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed EMV Chip Class Damages Methodology Does Not Distinguish 
Harmed from Unharmed Consumers, Ignores Important Consumer Heterogeneity That 
Would Require Individual Inquiry, Overstates Damages for Many Consumers, and Does 
Not Reliably Estimate Profits ........................................................................................... 45 
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XI. 
Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Members of the Proposed Credit Rescission, 
Claim Denial, Account Freeze and EMV Chip Classes Assesses Damages Multiple Times 
to the same Consumers ..................................................................................................... 46 
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I. 
Qualifications 
1. 
I am a Professor of Management at the University of California, Davis. I am also a 
Visiting Scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Consumer Finance Institute. Since 
receiving my Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California, Davis, in 1996, I have 
taught at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College, the Graduate School of Business at 
the University of Chicago, the Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and the University of Tennessee. I have also been an Economist and Senior Economist at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and a Visiting Senior Economist at the Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York. 
2. 
My research focus and area of expertise is consumer behavior in financial services 
markets. I have published more than 20 articles in leading academic finance and economics 
journals, including the American Economic Review, the Journal of Finance, and the Review of 
Financial Studies. My articles have covered topics such as consumer deposit account and credit 
card usage, consumers’ costs of credit card borrowing, the incidence of credit card and deposit 
account fees, and topics related to consumer saving and borrowing behavior.  
3. 
I have received grants from the National Science Foundation, Russell Sage Foundation, 
Networks, Electronic Commerce, and Telecommunications (“NET”) Institute, Filene Institute, 
and the FDIC in support of my research. I have presented my research at the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB), the National Bureau of Economic Research, the American Economic 
Association, and other venues.  
4. 
Appendix A contains my curriculum vitae. A list of materials I relied upon in forming 
my opinion in the current matter is included as Appendix B. A list of my prior testimony for the 
past four years is included as Appendix C. 
5. 
I am being compensated at $1,200 per hour. I have been assisted in this matter by staff of 
Cornerstone Research, who worked under my direction. I receive compensation from 
Cornerstone Research based on its collected billings for work its employees perform supporting 
me in this matter. Neither my compensation in this matter nor my compensation from 
Cornerstone Research is in any way contingent or based on the content of my opinion, the results 
of my analysis, or the outcome of this or any other matter. 
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II. 
Assignment 
6. 
I have been retained in this matter by Goodwin Procter LLP, counsel for Bank of 
America, N.A. (“BANA”). I have been asked to review and respond to certain opinions 
expressed by Greg J. Regan in his Report submitted on August 29, 2024 (the “Regan Report”) 
and to opine on whether Mr. Regan’s proposed “methodologies to calculate classwide damages 
available to each of the five Classes” can be reliably applied on a class-wide basis.1 Specifically, 
I have been asked to assess whether Mr. Regan’s damages methodologies can distinguish 
individuals who have been harmed from individuals who were unharmed by BANA’s alleged 
misconduct, and whether those same damages methodologies can measure class-wide economic 
harm to proposed class members as a result of BANA’s alleged misconduct. I have also been 
asked to assess whether Mr. Regan’s methodologies for calculating disgorgement can be applied 
on a class-wide basis for the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account Freeze 
classes. 
7. 
This report does not respond to all of the opinions in the Regan Report or any opinions in 
other plaintiff expert reports. It only responds to those specific opinions or assumptions that 
counsel has asked me to respond to for purposes of opposing Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification.  I reserve the right to respond to additional opinions or assumptions in the Regan 
Report or other plaintiff expert reports if asked to do so by counsel in the future. 
III. 
Summary of Opinions 
8. 
Mr. Regan proposes damages methodologies for each of five proposed classes. I discuss 
each of the proposed classes in detail below. Before doing so, I offer a summary of the principal 
methodological flaws in the Regan Report. 
9. 
To start, Mr. Regan’s methodology to identify members of the proposed Claim Denial, 
Credit Rescission, and EMV Chip classes does not explain how to 
 
 For the proposed Claim Denial and 
 
1 Expert Class Certification Report of Greg J. Regan, CPA/CFF, CFE, August 29, 2024, Backup Materials, and Materials listed 
in Appendix B (PX 4, “Regan Report”), ¶ 5. 
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EMV Chip classes, Mr. Regan further fails to demonstrate that all claims denied by the Bank 
based solely on Indicator 1 would have been paid absent the use of Indicator 1. See Sections 
VI.A, VII.A, and X. 
10. 
Second, Mr. Regan’s estimated “[a]ctual damages” for the proposed Claim Denial, Credit 
Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip classes overstate damages by failing to account for 
funds that BANA has already paid to proposed class members, and Mr. Regan fails to investigate 
whether any proposed class member remains harmed after receiving those payments from 
BANA. See Sections VI.B, VII.B, VIII.A, and X. 
11. 
Third, Mr. Regan’s proposed “consequential damages” methodologies for the proposed 
Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip classes are flawed approaches 
to estimating economic harm on a class-wide basis. Both Mr. Regan’s Methodology 1 and 
Methodology 2 erroneously assume average class-wide “inputs” that are not derived from class 
data, may be non-representative of proposed class members’ economic circumstances, and fail to 
capture the highly individualized nature of the proposed class members’ actual input values. 
Because Mr. Regan’s broad-brush assumptions obscure important heterogeneity in alleged 
damages across proposed class members and overstate harm for many proposed class members, 
his proposed methodology cannot identify economic harm class-wide. See Sections VI.C, VII.C, 
VIII.B, and X. 
12. 
Fourth, Mr. Regan’s proposed “actual damages” methodology for the proposed Customer 
Service class assumes that one could value proposed Customer Service class members’ time 
using a “minimum wage” or “other reasonable metric” applied identically to all proposed class 
members. Such an assumption does not constitute a reliable class-wide method for measuring 
economic harm, as the value of alleged “lost time” would vary among individuals in the 
proposed class, and an individualized inquiry would be required to measure any alleged harm. 
See Section IX. 
13. 
Fifth, Mr. Regan’s proposed “incremental Float Revenue” calculations for the proposed 
Claim Denial, Credit Rescission and Account Freeze classes erroneously assume that consumers 
would have withdrawn the full claim amount or frozen account balance immediately after the 
claim denial, credit rescission, or account freeze had the denial, rescission, or freeze not 
occurred. In my opinion, it would require individual inquiry to determine what the account 
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balance of each proposed class member would have been absent BANA’s use of Indicator 1 of 
the Claims Fraud Filter. Therefore, Mr. Regan’s methodology cannot be applied on a class-wide 
basis. See Sections VI.E, VII.E, VIII.C, and X. 
14. 
Finally, Mr. Regan’s damages methodologies assess damages multiple times for some 
cardholders who are members of the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account 
Freeze classes and for all members of the proposed EMV Chip class. By double-counting “actual 
damages” between the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and EMV Chip classes and 
also repeatedly assessing late fees for concurrent claims in multiple proposed classes and for 
concurrent claims in the same proposed class, Mr. Regan overstates damages to proposed class 
members. See Section XI. 
15. 
While I do not opine on the legal question of whether any damages in this matter should 
be trebled, the flaws in Mr. Regan’s damages methodologies carry through to his estimated treble 
damages for the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes. Mr. Regan estimates 
“[t]reble damages … by simply multiplying each class member’s actual damages by three,” so 
Mr. Regan’s errors in estimating “actual damages” for many proposed class members imply 
similarly proportional errors in his estimated treble damages.2 See Sections VI.D and VII.D. 
IV. 
Background 
A. 
Fraud and the Claims Fraud Filter 
16. 
BANA launched the Claims Fraud Filter (“CFF”) on September 28, 2020
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Regan Report, ¶¶ 9, 13, 76, 90. 
3 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 2, 2024, with Exhibits (PX 49, “Bank of America’s Responses and 
Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories”), p. 8:2–3. 
4 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, p. 8:2–9. 
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5 
As of June 9, 2021, BANA discontinued using the CFF to close error claims.6  
B. 
The Remediation Plan and Associated Repayments 
17. 
In October 2022, BANA submitted a Remediation Plan to the Consumer Financial 
Production Bureau and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
 
 
 Under the Remediation Plan, BANA committed to 
provide 
 
18. 
BANA noted that the 
 
and that the Remediation Plan was intended to 
 
 BANA clarified that 
 
 as it was 
 
 Jennifer Lennon, a BANA Senior 
Vice President and Product Management and State Liaison, described the implementation of the 
Remediation Plan as being
  
19. 
According to the Remediation Plan, 
 
12 Nevertheless, the plan 
 
 
5 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, p. 8:14–15. This criterion was 
amended on June 14, 2021. Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, p. 9:9–
11. 
6 Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of Interrogatories, p. 8:6–9. 
7 Bank of America, “Unemployment Insurance Prepaid Card Program Remediation Plan,” Submitted October 6, 2022 to the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and October 12, 2022 to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00102554–577 (PX 74, “Remediation Plan”), p. 1. 
8 Remediation Plan, p. 2. 
9 Remediation Plan, fn 16, p. 15. 
10 Remediation Plan, p. 12. 
11 Declaration of Jennifer Lennon in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, In Re: Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 23, 2024, Appendix of Exhibits to 
the Declaration of Laura Brys in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of 
America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 24, 2024, Ex. (“DX”) 8 (“Lennon Declaration”), ¶¶ 1, 11. 
12 Remediation Plan, p. 6. 
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 and 
 
13 
20. 
In the Remediation Plan, 
 
 
 
14 The Remediation Plan also 
 
 
 
 I understand that 
 
. 
C. 
Plaintiff’s Allegations and Proposed Classes  
21. 
Plaintiffs allege that there were “a series of unlawful policies and practices that 
Defendant Bank of America, N.A. (the ‘Bank’) implemented at the height of the Covid pandemic 
in 2020-2021” related to Indicator 1 of the CFF.16 According to Plaintiffs, “[t]hose policies and 
practices deprived more than 
Californians of access to critical unemployment insurance 
(‘UI’) and other public benefits for which they had been approved by California’s Employment 
Development Department (‘EDD’), and which the Bank had been entrusted to distribute through 
Bank-issued prepaid debit cards.”17 
22. 
Plaintiffs “seek to represent five related classes”:18  
a. Claim Denial Class: This class consists of “[a]ll Bank of America EDD 
cardholders who notified the Bank that an unauthorized transaction had occurred 
on their Bank of America EDD debit card account (‘Claim’) at an automated 
teller machine (‘ATM’), and whose Claim the Bank denied or closed at any time 
 
13 
, p. 6. 
14 
, p. 2. 
15 
 p. 2. 
16 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, August 29, 2024 (“Motion for Class Certification”), p. 1:3–5. See also Motion for Class 
Certification, p. 2:8–14. 
17 Motion for Class Certification, p. 1:6–10. 
18 Motion for Class Certification, p. 3:27. 
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from September 28, 2020 through June 8, 2021, based solely on Indicator 1 of the 
Bank’s CFF.”19 
b. Credit Rescission Class: This class consists of “[a]ll Bank of America EDD 
cardholders who received permanent credit from the Bank in connection with 
their Claim, which credit the Bank rescinded at any time from September 28, 
2020 through June 8, 2021, based solely on Indicator 1 of the Bank’s CFF.”20 
c. Account Freeze Class: This class consists of “[a]ll Bank of America EDD 
cardholders whose EDD debit card account (“Account”) the Bank froze at any 
time from September 28, 2020 through March 18, 2021, based solely on Indicator 
1 of the Bank’s CFF, and whose Account the Bank (i) subsequently unfroze, or 
(ii) subsequently converted from frozen to blocked status on or after March 18, 
2021, and then unblocked.”21 
d. Customer Service Class: This class consists of “[a]ll members of the Claim Denial 
Class and/or the Credit Rescission Class who telephoned the Bank’s customer 
service phone number for Bank of America EDD cardholders at any time between 
September 13, 2020 and November 21, 2020, inclusive, and whose telephone call 
was routed to the Bank’s Claims Call Center.”22 
e. EMV Chip Class: This class consists of “[a]ll members of the Claim Denial Class 
and/or the Credit Rescission Class whose EDD debit card did not include an EMV 
chip prior to June 9, 2021.”23 
V. 
Summary of Mr. Regan’s Opinions and Damages Methodologies 
23. 
Mr. Regan was assigned to “evaluate appropriate methodologies to measure the impact 
on each Class of the Bank’s policies and practices, as alleged by Plaintiffs.”24 In particular, Mr. 
 
19 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 31. See also Motion for Class Certification, pp. 9:25–10:3. 
20 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 81. See also Motion for Class Certification, p. 10:6–18. 
21 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 93. See also Motion for Class Certification, pp. 10:21–11:20. 
22 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 110. See also Motion for Class Certification, p. 12:2–26. 
23 Regan Report, ¶¶ 4, 119. 
24 Regan Report, ¶ 5. 
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Regan was retained to “provide methodologies to calculate classwide damages available to each 
of the… five Classes” described above in Section IV. Mr. Regan proposes damages 
methodologies to measure a combination of (1) “actual damages,” (2) statutory damages, (3) 
treble damages, and (4) disgorgement. Mr. Regan opines that these damage categories can be 
calculated on a class-wide basis.25 
24. 
For the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip 
classes, Mr. Regan defines “actual damages” as being comprised of “the principal amount of 
damages” and “consequential damages.”26  
25. 
Mr. Regan estimates “the principal amount of damages” for the proposed Claim Denial, 
Credit Rescission and Account Freeze classes as the total dollar amounts of denied claims, 
rescinded credit, and frozen balances respectively, thereby classifying as damages funds that 
were later repaid or released to proposed class members.27 For the proposed EMV Chip class, 
Mr. Regan estimates principal damages as the sum of denied claims and rescinded credit in the 
proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes.28 
26. 
Mr. Regan also proposes methodologies to estimate alleged “consequential damages” for 
the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, Account Freeze, and EMV Chip classes. The 
methodologies are similar for all four proposed classes. Mr. Regan opines that “financial harm 
after a denial of the reimbursement of [proposed class members’] stolen funds … was most 
likely to occur in the form of costs associated with obtaining substitute funds (e.g., interest 
costs), as well as fees associated with late payments or overdrafts” and proposes two 
methodologies to estimate that harm.29  
a. The first methodology (“Methodology 1”) allegedly “reflects the time value of 
money for this population of cardholders” by assessing compound interest on the 
principal amounts of the claims or account balances.30 Mr. Regan opines that the 
 
25 Regan Report, ¶ 5. 
26 Regan Report, ¶¶ 8, 12, 16, 20. 
27 Regan Report, ¶¶ 37, 83, 98. 
28 Regan Report, ¶ 120. 
29 Regan Report, ¶ 41. 
30 Regan Report, ¶¶ 45, 47, 51. Mr. Regan also describes Methodology 1 as measuring “economic harm” in addition to “financial 
harm.” See Regan Report ¶ 46. 
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time value of money represents economic harm resulting from “the lost ability to 
use [proposed class members’] funds.”31 He performs this calculation with two 
interest rates, each applied identically to every proposed class member: (1) 10%, 
which he states “is consistent with the interest rate applied to judgements in 
California,”32 and (2) 20%, which he opines “illustrate[s] the cost of the time 
value of money.”33 
b. The second methodology (“Methodology 2”) estimates the cost for proposed class 
members to “borrow[] substitute funds” on credit cards and is similarly applied 
identically to all proposed class members without regard to whether they had to 
borrow funds, whether they would do so on credit cards, and if so, at what interest 
rate they might borrow.  
c. Methodology 2 goes further than Methodology 1 by also attempting to estimate 
credit card late fees incurred by proposed class members as a consequence of their 
claim denial, credit rescission, or account freeze. The method assumes all 
proposed class members who were allegedly denied access to their funds 
 
 again without considering whether 
an individual proposed class member had credit cards, used them, or incurred late 
fees due to their denial, rescission, or freeze. Methodology 2 then calculates 
estimated damages based on the amount of time customers’ funds were 
unavailable and an assumed average late fee.34  
d. Methodology 2 further attempts to estimate the cost of delayed benefit payments 
for the proposed Account Freeze class. Mr. Regan performs this calculation by 
assuming that cardholders whose accounts were frozen for longer than 
 
would have been unable to receive deposits of additional EDD funds into their 
accounts and would have needed to wait until 
after their account was 
 
31 [FN 505] Regan Report, ¶ 46. 
32 Regan Report, ¶ 47. 
33 Regan Report, ¶ 51. Mr. Regan also claims that “[t]his 20% rate is consistent with my prior experience studying unsecured 
consumer debt such as credit cards, and lower than APRs associated with alternative lending sources frequently accessed by the 
impacted consumers.” 
34 Regan Report, ¶¶ 53–60. 
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frozen to receive their next 
 benefit payments, without considering whether 
any of those cardholders continued to be eligible for benefits at all during that 
time. Mr. Regan assumes that proposed class members would have needed to 
“access alternative funds” at a cost of 20% interest, again without considering 
whether each class member needed to access alternative funds at all.35 Mr. Regan 
applies these assumptions identically to all proposed Account Freeze class 
members. 
27. 
For the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes, Mr. Regan also estimates 
“treble damages.” He claims that “[t]reble damages under EFTA, 15 U.S.C. §1693f(e), can be 
calculated on a classwide basis by simply multiplying each class member’s actual damages by 
three.”36  
28. 
Mr. Regan’s methodology to calculate actual damages for the proposed Customer Service 
class is to provide “compensation for the value of Plaintiffs’ and class members’ lost time spent 
on hold with the Bank’s Claims call center” that was greater than “the reasonable wait-on-hold 
time by industry standards.”37 Mr. Regan proposes to calculate this proposed compensation by 
multiplying an “average excess hold time” by “the applicable minimum wage – or other 
reasonable metric,” without clarifying what “the applicable minimum wage” or the “other 
reasonable metric” would be, for all proposed Customer Service class members.38 
29. 
Mr. Regan’s methodology for disgorgement for the proposed Claim Denial, Credit 
Rescission, and Account Freeze classes proposes to measure the profits that BANA earned on 
amounts withheld from proposed class members, estimated as the 
 
 For the proposed Customer Service class, 
Mr. Regan claims that disgorgement of profits equals the avoided costs that were realized by 
“understaffing [BANA’s] Claims call center.”40 For the proposed EMV Chip class, Mr. Regan 
 
35 Regan Report, ¶¶ 105–106. 
36 [FN 500] Regan Report, ¶¶ 9, 13, 76, 90. 
37 Regan Report, ¶ 18. 
38 Regan Report, ¶ 18. 
39 Regan Report, ¶ 79. See also Regan Report, ¶¶ 92, 109. 
40 Regan Report, ¶ 115. 
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”44 and BANA’s responses to Plaintiff’s interrogatories describe 
.45 BANA’s Remediation Plan 
explains that 
 
 and to 
.46 Identifying any 
would require individual inquiry. As 
of October 14, 2024, BANA has identified 
 EDD cardholders (who have already been 
reimbursed for the value of their claims) for further review to 
 
 
”47 
 
 
.48  
34. 
Furthermore, Mr. Regan fails to demonstrate that all claims denied by the Bank based 
solely on Indicator 1 would have been approved absent the use of Indicator 1, meaning that the 
Bank’s use of Indicator 1 may not have represented a change in how those claims were treated. 
For example, plaintiff Jennifer Meza mistakenly filed a claim on a transaction that she later 
recalled making herself, which was denied.49 If transactions such as Plaintiff Meza’s would also 
have not been paid under an alternative investigation process, their treatment under Indicator 1 
would not represent economic harm as a result of the Bank’s alleged misconduct. Identifying 
how any denied claim would have been treated under a different investigation process would 
require individual inquiry, and Mr. Regan does not address this issue. 
35. 
By ignoring these factors, Mr. Regan’s proposed method for identifying proposed class 
members does not clearly distinguish individuals who were harmed by the Bank’s alleged 
 
44 Remediation Plan, p. 4. 
45 Bank of America’s Second Set of Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Seventh Set of Interrogatories (Interrogs. 39 & 
42), In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, April 23, 2024, 8:18–10:5.  
46 Remediation Plan, fn 16. 
47 Declaration of William Martin in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class 
Certification, In Re: Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 2024 (DX 7, “Martin Declaration”), 
¶¶ 8, 12. 
48 Martin Declaration, ¶ 12. 
49 Deposition of Jennifer Meza, April 30, 2024, p. 294:20–25. 
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misconduct from those who were unharmed, rendering it an unreliable method for isolating the 
harm from the alleged misconduct on a class-wide basis.  
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology for Calculating Alleged “Actual Damages” 
Overstates Damages by Failing to Account for Funds Paid and to Be Paid to 
Proposed Class Members 
36. 
Mr. Regan estimates “[a]ctual damages” for the proposed Claim Denial class as the sum 
of “[t]he principal amount of damages,” and “[c]onsequential damages resulting from loss of 
access to this principal amount.”50 However, Mr. Regan’s damages methodology fails to account 
for funds that BANA has already paid to proposed class members, and Mr. Regan fails to 
investigate whether any proposed class member remains harmed after receiving those payments 
from BANA. 
1. 
BANA Has Already Paid 100% of Mr. Regan’s “Principal Amount of 
Actual Damages”  
37. 
Mr. Regan defines the “principal amount of actual damages” for the proposed Claim 
Denial class as “the amount of the class members’ claim that the Bank denied based on Indicator 
1 of its Claim Fraud Filter.” Those claims total 
.51 While Mr. Regan acknowledges 
that his estimated damages “may require an offset for amounts that 
 
” he does not explain that 
 
, a fact shown in Mr. Regan’s 
Schedule 1.52 Mr. Regan’s damages methodology, the results of which are shown in his tables in 
Section II.B.3, is indifferent to that fact. This is economically illogical; because consumers have 
been fully repaid for the principal amounts of damages, they are no longer economically 
damaged by those amounts, and the entire 
 should be excluded from Mr. Regan’s 
estimation of alleged damages. 
 
50 Regan Report, ¶ 8. 
51 Regan Report, ¶¶ 37–38. 
52 Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories 
(Interrogatories 2-6, 14-15), In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, December 1, 2023 (“Bank of 
America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories”), Revised 
Exhibit 1 - BANA Response to Interrogs. 2 and 6. See also Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
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1. 
The Economic Circumstances of Consumers in the Proposed Class, 
and Any Potential Economic Impact of Claim Denials Would be 
Highly Individualized 
45. 
Mr. Regan’s assertions regarding proposed class members’ likely economic 
circumstances, which frame his economic assumptions underlying his “consequential damages” 
methodology, obscure what would be considerable heterogeneity in the class on each dimension 
he discusses. That heterogeneity would exist in terms of consumer wages, available savings 
consumers could have accessed during their claim denial, and claim denial amounts relative to 
those figures. 
46. 
First, in discussing proposed class members’ likely economic circumstances, Mr. Regan 
opines that “consumers who lost their jobs during the pandemic and received unemployment 
insurance tended to earn less than the median wage.”64 Mr. Regan does not document that the 
characteristics of proposed Claim Denial class members would match the characteristics of 
consumers more broadly who “lost their jobs during the pandemic and received unemployment 
insurance,” in terms of whether they would have “tended to earn less than the median wage.”65  
47. 
To the contrary, proposed class members who received EDD benefits in California likely 
would have come from different places in the wage distribution and included both 
unemployment and underemployment.66 For example, proposed class member 
 
had 
 payroll deposits of 
 into his EDD account through the end of the class 
period.67 By contrast, proposed class member
 largely had 
 payroll deposits 
of 
 into his EDD account through the end of the class period.68 Beyond class-specific 
evidence, people who submitted unemployment claims to the EDD during the class period 
 
64 Regan Report, ¶ 39. 
65 Regan Report, ¶ 39. 
66 Sarah Bohn, Marisol Cuellar Mejia, and Julien Lafortune, “Unemployment Benefits in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Public 
Policy Institute of California, April 9, 2020, https://www.ppic.org/blog/unemployment-benefits-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/. See 
also “Eligibility Requirements,” State of California Employment Development Department, https://edd.ca.gov/ui_eligibility/, 
accessed October 21, 2024 (“When applying for unemployment benefits, you must … [b]e totally or partially unemployed.”). 
67 BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814; Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
68 BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814; Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
 had an initial payroll deposit of 
 on 
 
, and a payroll deposit of 
 on 
. BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814. 
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spanned 20 distinct industry sectors, ranging from construction to finance and insurance.69 
Evidence from the Federal Reserve of New York’s Consumer Expectations Survey (“SCE”) 
indicates that 42% of respondents who indicated that they were “[n]ot working, but would like to 
work” or “[t]emporarily laid off” during September 2020–June 2021 were categorized as earning 
household incomes of greater than $50,000 a year at the time.70 Even millionaires collected 
unemployment benefits in 2020.71 
48. 
Evidence from the class illustrates this heterogeneity. Some class members were full-time 
students working part-time, while others were business owners. For example, prior to receiving 
unemployment benefits, Azuri Moon was 
 
72 By contrast, Stephanie Moore 
73 Still other class members 
were contractors, while others were self-employed or worked one or more jobs.74  
49. 
Second, proposed class members would not uniformly have been “less likely to have 
available savings,”75 as asserted by Mr. Regan, but rather likely would have had varying levels 
of savings. One study by the Federal Reserve finds considerable variation across households in 
 
69 See “California Unemployment Industry & Demographics Data Dashboard,” State of California Employment Development 
Department, September 2024, https://edd.ca.gov/siteassets/files/newsroom/facts-and-stats/excel/ada-county-and-statewide-
demographics--industry-data-9-21-24.xlsx. 
70 See “Center for Microeconomic Data: Survey of Consumer Expectations,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2020–2023, 
https://www newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/sce#/. Of the 281 respondents to the survey during this period who indicated they 
were “[n]ot working, but would like to work” or “[t]emporarily laid off,” 119 respondents reported household incomes of greater 
than $50,000 at some point in the period. Responses are weighted by the Federal Reserve to reflect differences between the 
survey sample and the general population. 
71 Brian Faler, “Unemployment Assistance to Millionaires Soared During Pandemic,” Politico, November 22, 2022, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/22/unemployment-assistance-millionaires-covid-pandemic-2020-00070446. 
72 Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re 
Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 2, 2024 (“Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental 
Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 6:24–26. 
73 Plaintiff Stephanie Moore’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024, p. 6:24–27. 
74 Alex Yuan worked as a 
 before he began receiving unemployment benefits. 
See Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re 
Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental 
Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 6:24–28. Candace Koole was 
 See Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank 
of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 4, 
2024 (“Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories”), pp. 6:25–26, 20:16–17. Vanessa Rivera worked as a 
. See Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera Objections 
and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to 
Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 9:3–6. 
75 Regan Report, ¶ 39. 
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the amount they have saved in “liquid savings,” or readily accessible cash to use for 
unanticipated expenses: roughly 60% of households have one month of recurring expenses 
saved, 40% have three months, and other households have nine or twelve months’ worth of 
savings.76 Another study observes that households’ median weekly checking account balances 
varies substantially.77 The Federal Reserve study notes that “quasi-liquid” savings balances may 
be greater.78 
50. 
Beyond this heterogeneity, studies find that during the proposed class period many 
consumers’ liquid assets increased substantively: “Household asset holdings and overall wealth 
expanded rapidly in the two years following the onset of the pandemic recession.”79 Overall, 
household savings rates increased substantially during the class period.80 During 2020, 
consumption expenditures fell for some households and rose for others, but fell on average.81 
Other household expenses fell for many households as mortgage, credit card, auto, and student 
 
76 Neil Bhutta, and Lisa Dettling, “Money in the Bank? Assessing Families’ Liquid Savings using the Survey of Consumer 
Finances,” FEDS Notes, November 19, 2018, https://www federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/assessing-families-liquid-
savings-using-the-survey-of-consumer-finances-20181119 html (“Bhutta and Dettling (2018)”). 
77 Fiona Greig, Erica Deadman, and Tanya Sonthalia, “Household Cash Balance Pulse: Family Edition,” JPMorgan Chase 
Institute, November 2021, https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-creation/household-cash-
balance-pulse-families. 
78 Bhutta and Dettling (2018). 
79 Hamza Abdelrahman, Luiz E. Oliveira, and Adam Hale Shapiro, “The Rise and Fall of Pandemic Excess Wealth,” FRBSF 
Economic Letter 2024-06, February 26, 2024, https://www frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/el2024-06.pdf. 
80 “Personal Saving Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Economic Data, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=FhxV#, accessed September 27, 2024. 
81 Cotton, Christopher D., Vaishali Garga, and Justin Rohan, “Consumption Heterogeneity by Occupation: Understanding the 
Impact of Occupation on Personal Consumption During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Working 
Papers, no. 20–16, 2020, pp. 1–2. See also Diana Farrell, et al., “Policy Brief: The Unemployment Benefit Boost: Trends in 
Spending and Saving When the $600 Supplement Ended,” JPMorgan Chase & Co. Institute, October 2020, 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-co/institute/pdf/Institute-UI-Benefits-Boost-Policy-
Brief_ADA.pdf (“Families who began receiving unemployment benefits in April of 2020 exhibited a 22 percent year-on-year 
spending increase upon benefit receipt, relative to spending of the employed… It is also surprising in light of the fact that average 
spending during this timeframe remained roughly 10 percent below baseline in July and August as a result of the pandemic.”). 
See also “Personal Consumption Expenditures by State, 2020,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, October 8, 2021, 
https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/personal-consumption-expenditures-state-2020. 
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loan lenders engaged in forbearance.82 Data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Household Pulse 
Survey indicates that many respondent households at the end of January 2021 who indicated that 
they were “laid off due to coronavirus pandemic” or whose “employer went out of business due 
to the coronavirus pandemic” used their COVID-19 stimulus payment to primarily pay off debt 
(66%) or primarily increase their savings (12%), consistent with the idea that these households 
were covering their living expenses with other sources of income.83 For lower-income 
consumers, pandemic-era unemployment benefits may have increased unemployed consumers’ 
income relative to their wages prior to unemployment, leading to increased savings among this 
population.84 All of these factors suggest that savings would have varied for individuals in the 
proposed class.  
51. 
Evidence of this is found in literature cited by Mr. Regan. For example, he claims that 
“the Federal Reserve’s data indicat[e] that lower income consumers increased credit card 
spending following the onset of the pandemic.”85 However, the study clarifies that this effect did 
 
82 Rajashri Chakrabarti, et al., “Who Received Forbearance Relief?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Liberty Street 
Economics, August 2, 2021, https://libertystreeteconomics newyorkfed.org/2021/08/who-received-forbearance-relief/ 
(“Forbearance on debt repayment was a key provision of the CARES Act, legislation intended to combat the widespread 
economic losses stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic. This pause on required payments for federally guaranteed mortgages 
and student loans has provided temporary relief to those affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and servicers of nonfederal loans 
often provided forbearances or other relief on request as well. … Across all markets, households that lost income and thus faced 
financial hardship were more likely to receive forbearance relief than other households.”); Daniel Sexton, “An In-Depth Look at 
Mortgage Forbearance Data,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, February 22, 2021, 
https://www.atlantafed.org/blogs/macroblog/2021/02/22/in-depth-look-at-mortgage-forbearance-data (“Looking at the ZIP code-
level map makes it plain that lower-income areas of most major cities have estimated [mortgage] forbearance rates substantially 
greater than rates in higher-income areas.”); “The Consumer Credit Card Market,” Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 
September 2021, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-credit-card-market-report_2021.pdf (“CFPB 
(2021)”) (“Large numbers of consumers benefitted from issuers’ relief programs in 2020. Bureau data indicate that 
approximately 25 million consumer credit card accounts entered relief programs in 2020… Payment-deferral programs were the 
major driver of the robust increase in relief, though fee reversals and waivers or interest rate reductions were also more common 
in 2020… The scale of this relief and the speed with which it was deployed therefore likely represented substantial benefits to the 
consumers who received it, allowing them to redeploy their limited and, likely in many cases, interrupted or diminished flow of 
income and other incoming funds towards other urgent needs… accounts held by consumers with lower scores received payment 
deferrals at the highest rates of any credit score tier – nearly one-in-six subprime and deep subprime accounts received a payment 
deferral, compared to roughly one in-ten among near-prime, one-in-twenty among prime, and just one-in-one-hundred among 
superprime accounts.”). 
83 See “Household Pulse Survey Public Use File: January 20 – February 1, 2021,” U.S. Census Bureau, 
https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/demo/datasets/hhp/2021/wk23/HPS_Week23_PUF_CSV.zip, accessed October 7, 
2024. Of the 5,207,469 respondents to the Census Bureau who indicated they were “laid off due to coronavirus pandemic” or did 
not work in the past seven days because their employer “went out of business,” “experienced a reduction in business (including 
furlough),” or “closed temporarily” due to the coronavirus pandemic and received a COVID-19 stimulus payment, 3,417,137 
respondents mostly used their payment to pay down debt, and 633,287 respondents mostly used their payment to increase 
savings. Responses are weighted by the Census Bureau to reflect differences between the survey sample and the general 
population of households. 
84 Sarah Bohn, Marisol Cuellar Mejia, and Julien Lafortune, “Unemployment Benefits in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Public 
Policy Institute of California, April 9, 2020, https://www.ppic.org/blog/unemployment-benefits-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/. 
85 Regan Report, ¶ 48. 
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not begin until “the second quarter of 2021,” and excess savings continued to increase until 
August 2021.86 Prior to March 2021, the Federal reserve study states that savings increased 
during the pandemic: 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, consumers reduced their spending due to 
mobility restrictions, while at the same time their income increased with the help 
of government stimulus checks and debt forgiveness on obligations such as rent 
and student loans.  
As a result, consumers in all income cohorts accumulated excess savings in their 
bank accounts relative to their pre-pandemic levels.87 
52. 
Plaintiffs exhibit varying levels of access to liquid funds. For example, around the time 
he submitted a claim, Azuri Moon had 
88 Other plaintiffs had 
more liquid funds available. For example, Roland Oosthuizen had 
 
 
 
.89 Michael Willrich and Alex Yuan 
.90 
And similarly, consumers in the proposed Claim Denial class likely would have had different 
levels of savings. The amount of liquid funds available to each proposed class member at the 
time of the claim denial would be highly individualized and would impact the likelihood of 
borrowing on a credit card or incurring credit card late fees due to the Bank’s alleged 
misconduct. 
 
86 Joanna Stavins, “Credit Card Spending and Borrowing Since the Start of the Covid-19 Pandemic,” Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, October 19, 2023, https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2023/credit-card-spendingand- 
borrowing-since-the-start-of-the-covid-19-pandemic.aspx (“Stavins (2023)”), pp. 2–3. 
87 Stavins (2023), p. 3. 
88 Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
30:4–6. 
89 Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen’s 
Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 26:1–6. 
90 Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 (“Plaintiff J. Michael 
Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 33:15–16; 
Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 29:24–
25. 
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53. 
Mr. Regan also fails to compare, or provide a method for comparing, liquid funds to 
claim denial amounts, which also would have varied among the proposed class members. 
Consumers’ varying levels of savings and claim amounts would generate heterogeneity in how 
claims affected their borrowing and risks of late fees. As an example, one consumer with a $500 
claim denial and $5,000 in their checking account could spend out of their available funds 
without borrowing on a credit card or missing a credit card payment. Another with a similar 
$500 claim and $300 in savings might have to borrow and could risk missing a payment—but a 
third with the same $300 in savings and a $200 claim would not. These three consumers could 
have different economic harms associated with the denial of their claims, but one would need to 
know not just how their individualized claims varied, but how those claims compared to their 
individualized available liquid funds and other economic circumstances. Mr. Regan’s 
methodology neither measures such heterogeneity nor provides a method for measuring such 
heterogeneity, but rather assumes that all proposed class members needed to borrow an identical 
share of their claim amount and would be identically certain to incur credit card late fees. This 
applies even for a claim denial amount as small as $10.00, which could be covered by the vast 
majority of savings levels documented in the literature I discuss above.91  
54. 
All of this heterogeneity in economic circumstances is crucial to understand, as it would 
generate similar diversity in whether or not proposed class members accessed “substitute funds” 
by borrowing on credit cards due to the Bank’s alleged misconduct. It would also generate 
diversity in whether or not proposed class members incurred credit card late fees due to the 
Bank’s alleged misconduct, as assumed in Mr. Regan’s methodology. As I show in the next two 
sections, diversity in those things would be substantial and require individual inquiry to 
understand. I also discuss how Mr. Regan’s assumptions would overstate both the cost of 
obtaining substitute funds and the incidence of credit card late fees for many proposed class 
members. 
 
91 See Chris Wheat, Erica Deadman, and Daniel M. Sullivan, “How Vulnerable Are Americans to Unexpected Expenses?” 
JPMorgan Chase Institute, July 30, 2024, https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-
creation/how-vulnerable-are-americans-to-unexpected-expenses (“Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024)”); Bhutta and Dettling 
(2018); “Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2022,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May 2023, 
https://www federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2022-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202305.pdf (“Federal 
Reserve (2022)”). 
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2. 
Proposed Class Members’ “Costs Associated with Obtaining 
Substitute Funds” Would be Highly Individualized and are 
Overstated for Many Consumers Under Mr. Regan’s Methodology 
55. 
For a given consumer, the “costs associated with obtaining substitute funds” depends on 
two factors: the source(s) of funds, and the associated interest cost of each source. As I describe 
above in Section V, Mr. Regan’s approach generalizes on both counts: it considers one specific 
source of funds (credit cards) for all proposed class members, and it assumes a uniform interest 
cost for that source of funds for all consumers. Both generalizations are inappropriate, and Mr. 
Regan fails to explain how such an approach could measure economic harm on a class-wide 
basis.  
56. 
It is well-established in the academic literature in household finance that “costs of 
obtaining substitute funds” are highly individualized—both because consumers borrow using 
different sources of funds and because consumers face varying interest rates for borrowing, even 
within the same broad “source” of funds such as credit cards.92 That finding also applies to costs 
associated with unanticipated expenses or liquidity, in particular.93 Mr. Regan’s assumptions fail 
to capture that heterogeneity and do not represent an applicable class-wide method for 
calculating “consequential damages” associated with obtaining substitute funds. 
57. 
As a starting point, consumers can fund unanticipated expenses (or analogously, fund 
expected expenses following an unanticipated drop in income) from a variety of sources other 
than credit cards. They can use available cash or other liquid assets such as savings and money 
market account funds. They can also borrow from friends/family, cut back on spending, use a 
bank loan or line of credit, or turn to other sources of short-term borrowing.94 Each of these 
specific sources of funds can have a different interest rate, and even within a category (such as 
loans), interest rates can differ across consumers. A given customer may even have multiple 
 
92 Zinman, Jonathan, “Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies,” Annual Review of Economics 7, no. 2, 2015, pp. 
251–276, p. 260. See “Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2021,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
May 2022, https://www federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2021-report-economic-well-being-us-households-202205.pdf 
(“Federal Reserve (2021)”); Stavins, Joanna, “Unprepared for Financial Shocks: Emergency Savings and Credit Card Debt,” 
Contemporary Economic Policy 39, no. 1, 2021, pp. 59–82 (“Stavins (2021)”), p. 59–60. 
93 Stavins (2021), p. 75. 
94 Federal Reserve (2021); Stavins (2021), p. 62. 
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methodology would be zero.101 A 2022 survey noted that more than half of consumers (57%) 
could fund an unanticipated expense of $1,000 or more out of savings.102 Other consumers 
indicate they would use different sources of funds, or multiple sources in varying combinations. 
One study shows that in 2021, 68% of consumers state that they would meet an unanticipated 
$400 expense by using “cash or its equivalent”—which has a zero interest cost.103 Of the 
remainder, 14% of consumers would use credit cards.104 Another 2017 study found that for an 
unanticipated $2,000 expense, consumers reported using funds from cash (19%), checking 
(38%), or savings (34%) more than reported using a credit card (18%) to meet those expenses.105  
60. 
Another study expands the scope beyond focusing on cash as the only ready source of 
liquidity, observing “considering cash savings alone as a source of financial resiliency leads to 
an unnecessarily pessimistic view of financial resilience and how many households are living 
paycheck-to-paycheck. For example, households that contribute to a retirement plan and have an 
established rainy-day fund may comfortably spend most of their income every month and still be 
very resilient to emergency expenses.”106 Using that framework, that study finds that 92% of 
households can cover a $400 expense, with the significant majority of those funds (87%) coming 
from cash and disposable income. The study also finds significant heterogeneity, with those 
shares varying by the amount of the expense and income level.107 In the lowest income quartile, 
approximately 72% of households can weather a $400 expense and approximately 29% can 
weather a $1,600 expense using a combination of cash, disposable income, and credit cards they 
pay off before incurring interest.108  
61. 
To give an example illustrating how this would affect “costs of obtaining substitute 
funds,” suppose two proposed class members each required $900 in substitute funds, and that 
 
101 Bhutta and Dettling (2018). 
102 Federal Reserve (2022). 
103 Federal Reserve (2021). 
104 Mr. Regan opines that consumers “may have turned to other alternative sources such as… payday lenders,” with “APRs 
substantially in excess of 20%,” but in a study by the Federal Reserve 1% of consumers reported turning to such options for an 
unanticipated expense. Regan Report, fn 54; Federal Reserve (2022). Those data contradict Mr. Regan’s claim that such sources 
of funds are “alternative lending sources frequently accessed by the impacted consumers.” Regan Report, ¶ 51. 
105 Stavins (2021), p. 62. 
106 Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024). 
107 Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024). 
108 Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024). 
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each similarly would borrow at a 21% credit card rate. A consumer who could cover the $900 
out of savings would pay a 0% interest rate. A consumer who could cover $600 would pay 
interest on only one third of the amount, for an “effective interest rate” of 7% on the expenses 
covered. Other values would of course generate different effective interest rates—even among 
consumers who carried credit cards with identical contract APRs. Heterogeneity in those contract 
APRs would further individualize “costs of obtaining substitute funds.” 
62. 
Evidence from the class is consistent with such heterogeneity in costs associated with 
obtaining substitute funds. Some class members obtained funds from friends and family to cover 
expenses. For example, Lindsay McClure 
 
.109 Similarly, Vanessa Rivera 
110 
Azuri Moon 
.111 Other class members paid 
for expenses using their savings. For example, Roland Oosthuizen 
 
 
.112 Michael 
Willrich and Alex Yuan 
.113 Candace Koole 
 
.114 
63. 
Alternatively, some class members cut back on expenses. For example, Michael Willrich 
 
 
109 Plaintiff Lindsay McClure’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 2, 2024 (“Plaintiff Lindsay McClure’s 
Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories”), p. 29:12–16. 
110 Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
37:2–4. 
111 Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
30:25. 
112 Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, p. 26:2–6. 
113 Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, p. 33:15–16; Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set 
of Interrogatories, p. 29:24–25. 
114 Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, p. 
32:18–22. 
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.115 Mr. Regan’s methodology does not 
measure the impact of cutting back on expenses. 
64. 
Even for households that use credit cards to fund expenses, one study notes credit card 
interest costs could be below the 20% figure assumed by Mr. Regan, because consumers can 
repay their debt quickly enough to avoid interest charges before falling out of the card’s “grace 
period” for repayment: “households can access a portion of their future disposable income by 
tapping any available credit on their open and current credit cards. If the household has enough 
disposable income to pay the amount back within one month, then this short-term use of credit 
does not incur any interest charges.”116 Research shows that during the class period, fewer than 
half of credit card accounts “revolved” or incurred interest charges, while the remainder did not 
incur interest charges.117 One study notes that in the two lowest income brackets it surveyed in 
2021, fewer than half of households had credit card balances that incurred interest charges.118  
65. 
Evidence from the proposed class indicates that many consumers could have been 
situated similarly to consumers in such studies. A review of claim data shows that 
 claims 
in the proposed Claim Denial class, 
of the total, had a claim denial period of less than 
 
.119 In contrast, Mr. Regan’s methodology assumes prospective class members would have 
incurred credit card interest on some portion of their denied claims even when there was only a 
single day between when the claim was denied and paid out to the consumer. 
 
 Mr. 
Regan assesses his alleged “consequential damages” on this claim under both Methodology 1 
 
115 Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, N.A.’s First Set of 
Interrogatories, p. 33:13–15. 
116 Wheat, Deadman, and Sullivan (2024). 
117 “Credit Cards: Pandemic Assistance Likely Helped Reduce Balances, and Credit Terms Varied among Demographic 
Groups,” United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, September 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105269.pdf. 
118 Federal Reserve (2022). 
119 See Regan Report, Schedule 1. 
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130 O
 
 
 
 
 
131 
70. 
Mr. Regan acknowledges aspects of this heterogeneity in his report, then fails to 
incorporate it into his calculations.132 For example, he acknowledges credit cards have differing 
APRs across consumers, yet applies 20% identically to all proposed class members.133 As such, 
Mr. Regan, by his own admission, does not capture the “costs of obtaining substitute funds” for 
proposed class members. In my opinion, individualized inquiry would be necessary to measure 
actual economic harms to consumers, given the demonstrated heterogeneity discussed in this 
section. 
3. 
Proposed Class Members’ Credit Card Late Fees Associated with 
Claim Denial, if Any, Would Be Highly Individualized and Overstated 
for Many Consumers Under Mr. Regan’s Methodology 
71. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology 2 calculation for alleged “consequential damages” assumes 
that all proposed class members whose claim denials “persisted for more than thirty days” 
identically incurred one late fee per month.134 Mr. Regan assumes that the first late fee equals 
$26 and subsequent late fees equal $35, for up to six months between the claim denial date and 
 
130 Lennon Declaration, ¶¶ 14–15.  
131 Lennon Declaration, ¶ 16. 
132 See, e.g., Regan Report, fn 54. Regan lists alternatives to credit card borrowing, though he only discusses more expensive 
alternatives to credit card borrowing. He does not acknowledge the less expensive alternatives described in the literature and the 
documentary record of this matter I discuss herein. 
133 Regan Report, ¶¶ 49–51.  
134 Regan Report, ¶ 59. 
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reasons other than lack of available funds, i.e., due to inattention or for other reasons.143 An 
individualized inquiry would be required to learn the reason that a particular consumer incurred a 
late fee, and specifically whether a claim denial led to the late payment.  
76. 
Even for the subset of proposed class members who incurred a late fee associated with a 
claim denial, many lenders offered waivers and other opportunities during the pandemic for 
consumers to recoup late fees they incurred: “In response to pandemic-related hardship, issuers 
provided a considerable number of payment deferrals and fee waivers to their cardholders in 
2020.”144 One study notes “about 25 million consumer credit card accounts (with a total of $68 
billion in balances) enrolled in payment relief programs in 2020.”145 As with the other necessary 
steps for a consumer to experience economic harm associated with the late fee, consumers would 
be diverse in whether they sought and/or received such payment relief, and an individualized 
inquiry would be necessary to assess harm for each consumer.146 
77. 
As with the “costs associated with obtaining substitute funds,” Mr. Regan’s late fee 
methodology not only obscures important heterogeneity with the class, but also would overstate 
economic damages for many proposed class members. It would overstate damages for consumers 
who did not increase credit card borrowing because they funded their expenses from less 
 
143 Gathergood et al. found that late payments are concentrated among new cardholders and cardholders who do not set up 
automatic payments for their credit card bills. They further found that the adoption of autopay, and thus the avoidance of late 
fees, was not “driven by occasional borrowing needs or liquidity constraints” and “suggests a role for myopia.” Gathergood, 
John, et al., “How Do Consumers Avoid Penalty Fees? Evidence From Credit Cards,” Management Science 67, no. 4, 2020, pp. 
2565–2578, p. 2563 (“We find that late payment fees are front-loaded, peaking in the first month of card life and then declining 
sharply over the following months. … We show that the average decline in late payment fees across all consumers over time is 
wholly attributable to a subset of consumers who activate autopay in the month following a late payment. By adopting autopay, 
these card holders override the need to remember to pay the minimum payment, therefore avoiding future late payment events. 
Although adopting autopay all but eliminates the likelihood of future fees, we find that among nonadopters, the probability of fee 
payment remains as high as it was before these consumers incurred their first fee, at approximately 20% per month. … [w]e show 
that nonadopters in our data actually have lower levels of debt, lower utilization, and slightly higher average repayments 
compared with adopters, indicating that their failure to adopt autopay does not arise due to liquidity constraints.”). 
144 CFPB (2021). 
145 “Credit Cards: Pandemic Assistance Likely Helped Reduce Balances, and Credit Terms Varied among Demographic 
Groups,” United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, September 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105269.pdf. 
146 Mr. Regan makes other claims at odds with likely consumer experiences in the pandemic-era credit card market. He mentions 
that consumers could have incurred “penalty rates,” but a CFPB report notes “[u]pward repricing declined to near-zero in 2019 
and 2020.” See Regan Report, fn 68; CFPB (2021). He opines that late payments could lead to a “credit score decline if the 
delinquency was reported to credit bureaus,” but the CARES Act prevented some credit reporting that would have reduced credit 
scores. See Regan Report, ¶ 60; Liane Fiano, “Protecting Your Credit During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau, July 29, 2020, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/protecting-your-credit-during-coronavirus-
pandemic/;Stefan Lembo Stolba, “How the CARES Act Affects Credit Reports and Scores,” Experian, April 24, 2020, 
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/how-the-cares-act-affects-credit-reports-and-scores/. Whether or not any consumer 
experienced these things would require individual inquiry. 
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expensive sources. It would overstate harm for consumers who may have funded expenses using 
credit cards but did not incur late fees. And it would overstate harm for consumers who would 
have incurred late fees independent of any claim denials. Understanding the extent to which the 
Regan methodology overstates damages for consumers throughout the proposed class would 
require individual inquiry of those consumers. 
D. 
Because Mr. Regan’s Methodology Overstates “Actual Damages,” It 
Necessarily Overstates “Treble Damages”  
78. 
 
As mentioned in Section II, I have not been asked to opine on the legal question 
of whether any damages in this matter should be trebled. However, if they should be trebled, Mr. 
Regan’s methodology carries through to his estimated treble damages for the proposed Claim 
Denial class is unreliable, and his estimates are overstated.  
79. 
In Sections VI.A–C, I have described how Mr. Regan’s “actual damages” methodology 
overstates harm by failing to distinguish (and exclude) proposed class members who were not 
harmed, failing to account for funds paid and to be paid to proposed class members, and 
overstating “consequential damages” for many consumers. The flaws in Mr. Regan’s damages 
methodologies carry through to his estimated treble damages for the proposed Claim Denial 
class. Mr. Regan estimates “[t]reble damages … by simply multiplying each class member’s 
actual damages by three,”147 so Mr. Regan’s errors in estimating “actual damages” for many 
proposed class members imply similarly proportional errors in his estimated treble damages. 
E. 
The Claim Denial Damages Methodology Does Not Calculate “Profits” 
Associated with Claim Denials on a Class-Wide Basis 
80. 
Mr. Regan defines 
 
 and opines that 
 
 
 
147 [FN 808] Regan Report, ¶ 76. 
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Misconduct From Consumers Unharmed as a Result of the Bank’s Alleged 
Misconduct 
82. 
Mr. Regan describes the proposed Credit Rescission class as consisting of “[a]ll Bank of 
America EDD cardholders who received permanent credit from the Bank in connection with 
their Claim, which credit the Bank rescinded at any time from September 28, 2020 through June 
8, 2021, based solely on Indicator 1 of the Bank’s CFF.”152 As with the proposed Claims Denial 
class, Mr. Regan’s methodology to identify members of the proposed Credit Rescission class 
does not explain how to exclude 
 that were paid under BANA’s 
Remediation Plan. See Section VI.A. 
B. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology for Calculating Alleged “Actual Damages” 
Overstates Damages by Failing to Account for Funds Paid and to Be Paid to 
Proposed Class Members 
83. 
Mr. Regan estimates “[a]ctual damages” for the proposed Credit Rescission class as the 
sum of “[t]he principal amount of damages,” and “[c]onsequential damages.”153 As with the 
proposed Claim Denial class, Mr. Regan’s damages methodology fails to account for funds that 
BANA has already paid to proposed class members, and Mr. Regan fails to investigate whether 
any proposed class member remains harmed after receiving those payments from BANA. The 
critiques of his methodology for calculating alleged “actual damages” for the proposed Claim 
Denial class described in Section VI.B apply equally here. 
84. 
First, BANA 
 Mr. Regan estimates in 
“Principal Amount of Actual Damages.”154 Mr. Regan’s damages methodology is flawed and 
illogical as it is 
.  
85. 
Second, Mr. Regan’s methodology overstates alleged “consequential damages” because it 
fails to account for 
 
 As noted above in Section VI.B,
 
 
152 Regan Report, ¶ 4, 81. See also Motion for Class Certification, p. 10:6–18. 
153 Regan Report, ¶ 12. 
154 Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories, 
Revised Exhibit 2 - BANA Response to Interrog. 3. See also Regan Report, Schedule 1. According to Regan Report Schedule 1, 
there are 126 claims in the proposed Credit Rescission class that may not have been paid. These claims have a total principal 
amount of $0.2 million. 
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and in aggregate, the Remediation 
Plan 
 than Mr. Regan has estimated in Schedule 1. As 
with the principal amounts of damages, dollars paid (or to be paid) to consumers are an 
economic benefit to consumers—or an offset to economic harm. 
C. 
Mr. Regan’s “Consequential Damages” Methodology Ignores Important 
Consumer Heterogeneity, Overstates Harm for Many Consumers and 
Cannot Measure Consumer Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis 
86. 
For the proposed Credit Rescission class, Mr. Regan applies a “consequential damages” 
methodology similar to that for the proposed Claim Denial class.155 Accordingly, the critiques of 
his methodology for calculating alleged “consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial 
class described in Section VI.C apply equally here. First, the economic circumstances of 
consumers in the proposed class, and any potential economic impact of credit rescission would 
be highly individualized. Second, proposed class members’ “costs associated with obtaining 
substitute funds” would be highly individualized and are overstated for many consumers under 
Mr. Regan’s methodology. Third, proposed class members’ credit card late fees associated with 
credit rescission, if any, would be highly individualized and overstated for many consumers 
under Mr. Regan’s methodology. Mr. Regan does not engage with any of these issues and fails to 
provide a methodology that can reliably measure damages on a class-wide basis.  
D. 
Because Mr. Regan’s Methodology Overstates “Actual Damages,” It 
Necessarily Overstates “Treble Damages” 
87. 
 
As mentioned in Section II, I have not been asked to offer any opinion regarding 
whether treble damages are available in this matter. However, if they are available, Mr. Regan’s 
methodology to calculate treble damages for the proposed Credit Rescission class is unreliable, 
 
155 Regan Report, ¶ 85 (“One methodology to measure Credit Recission class damages is by using a compound interest rate 
reflecting the time value of money for this population of cardholders as described in § II.B.2.a) above.”), ¶ 87 (“Accordingly, for 
the same reasons as the Claim Denial class members (see § II.B.2.b)(1)), the members of the Credit Rescission class would likely 
have been required to obtain alternative funds to mitigate the inability to access the credited funds that the Bank had rescinded 
from their accounts. I have applied the same methodology as described therein to calculate the cost of the inability to access 
impacted funds for the Credit Rescission class.”), ¶ 88 (“Similarly, the members of the Credit Recission class also would likely 
have experienced late or overdraft fees for the same reasons as the Claim Denial class and the Account Freeze class members 
(see § II.B.2.b)(2)). Accordingly, I have applied the same methodology as described therein to calculate the cost of late or 
overdraft fees experienced by members of the Credit Recission class.”). 
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and his estimates are overstated for the same reasons described for the proposed Claim Denial 
class in Section VI.D.  
E. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology Does Not Calculate “Profits” Associated with 
Credit Rescissions on a Class-Wide Basis 
88. 
Mr. Regan applies the same methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement of 
profits” for the proposed Claim Denial class to the proposed Credit Rescission class.156 
Accordingly, the critiques of his methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement” for the 
proposed Claim Denial class described in Section VI.D apply equally here. 
VIII. Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Proposed Account Freeze Class Ignores 
Important Consumer Heterogeneity That Would Require Individual Inquiry, 
Overstates Damages for Many Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate Profits 
A. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology for Calculating Alleged “Actual Damages” 
Overstates Damages by Failing to Account for Funds Paid and to Be Paid to 
Proposed Class Members 
89. 
Mr. Regan estimates “[a]ctual damages” for the proposed Account Freeze class as the 
sum of “[t]he principal amount of damages,” and “[c]onsequential damages.”157 Similar to Mr. 
Regan’s methodology for the proposed Claim Denial class, Mr. Regan’s damages methodology 
fails to account for funds to which proposed class members have already regained access, and 
Mr. Regan fails to investigate whether any proposed class member remains harmed after 
regaining access to those funds in their EDD accounts. The critiques of his methodology for 
calculating alleged “actual damages” for the proposed Claim Denial class described in Section 
VI.B apply analogously here. 
90. 
First, proposed class members have already 
 
Mr. Regan estimates in “Principal Amount of Actual Damages.”158 Mr. Regan’s damages 
 
156 Regan Report, ¶ 92. 
157 Regan Report, ¶ 12. 
158 Regan Report, ¶ 99. 
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methodology is flawed and illogical as it is indifferent to the fact that proposed class members’ 
accounts are no longer frozen.  
91. 
Second, Mr. Regan’s methodology overstates alleged “consequential damages” because it 
fails to account for funds paid and to be paid to proposed class members through the 
Remediation Plan. As noted above in Section VI.B, 
 
, and in aggregate, the Remediation 
Plan has 
 than Mr. Regan has estimated in Schedule 1. As 
with the principal amounts of damages, dollars paid (or to be paid) to consumers are an 
economic benefit to consumers—or an offset to economic harm. 
B. 
Mr. Regan’s “Consequential Damages” Methodology Ignores Important 
Consumer Heterogeneity, Overstates Harm for Many Consumers and 
Cannot Measure Consumer Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis 
92. 
For the proposed Account Freeze class, Mr. Regan applies a “consequential damages” 
methodology similar to that for the proposed Claim Denial class.159 Accordingly, the critiques of 
his methodology for calculating alleged “consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial 
class described in Section VI.C apply equally here. First, the economic circumstances of 
consumers in the proposed class, and any potential economic impact of accounting freezes would 
be highly individualized. Second, proposed class members’ “costs associated with obtaining 
substitute funds” would be highly individualized and are overstated for many consumers under 
Mr. Regan’s methodology. Third, proposed class members’ credit card late fees associated with 
accounting freezes, if any, would be highly individualized and overstated for many consumers 
under Mr. Regan’s methodology. Mr. Regan does not engage with any of these issues and fails to 
provide a methodology that can reliably measure damages on a class-wide basis.  
 
159 Regan Report, ¶ 100 (“One methodology to measure the Account Freeze class’s consequential damages is to apply a 
compound interest rate that reflects the time value of money for this population of cardholders. I have applied the same 
methodology described in § II.B.2.a) above to make these illustrative calculations.”), ¶ 102 (“For the same reasons as the Claim 
Denial class members (see § II.B.2.b)(1)), the members of the Account Freeze class would likely have been required to obtain 
alternative funds to mitigate the inability to access their funds in their then-frozen Bank-controlled EDD accounts that otherwise 
would have been available. Following the same methodology described therein, I have identified the amount and duration data 
specific to each impacted cardholder for this calculation using the Bank’s data.”), ¶ 104 (“For the same reasons as the Claim 
Denial class members (see § II.B.2.b)(2)), the members of the Account Freeze class would likely have incurred late or overdraft 
fees while unable to access their funds otherwise available in their then-frozen Bank-controlled EDD accounts. I have applied the 
same methodology as described therein to make the example calculations of the cost incurred by each EDD Cardholder 
attributable to such late fees.”). 
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93. 
Beyond those issues, for the proposed Account Freeze class Mr. Regan also estimates the 
“Cost of Delayed Benefit Payments.”160 He opines that “[i]f a cardholder’s account 
 
 
”161 Instead, according to Mr. Regan, 
 
162 
Mr. Regan asserts that he can calculate 
 as a 
function of 
 
163 as well as the 20% APR he assumes 
based on his estimate of “costs associated with obtaining substitute funds.”164  
94. 
As an initial matter, proposed class members’ “costs associated with obtaining substitute 
funds” would be highly individualized and are overstated for many consumers under Mr. 
Regan’s methodology, as described in my critique of his methodology for calculating alleged 
“consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial class in Section VI.C. 
95. 
Beyond that, Mr. Regan’s methodology for this class does not explain how to determine 
the “length of the delayed receipt” for any proposed class member. Mr. Regan “illustrate[s]” his 
calculation with a 
 which includes 
 
165 Mr. Regan is silent on how he plans to 
calculate, on a class-wide basis, 
 
In 
my opinion, making such a determination would require individual inquiry, and Mr. Regan could 
not perform this calculation on a class-wide basis. 
 
160 Regan Report, Section IV.B.2.b.3. 
161 Regan Report, ¶ 105. 
162 Regan Report, ¶ 105. 
163 Regan Report, ¶ 106. 
164 Regan Report, fn 140, ¶¶ 41, 51. 
165 Regan Report, fn 140, ¶ 106. Mr. Regan’s delayed benefit payment calculation also implicitly assumes that the proposed 
class member remained eligible for benefits for 30 days after their account was frozen, although he does not acknowledge or 
support this assumption.  
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C. 
Mr. Regan’s Methodology Does Not Calculate “Profits” Associated with 
Account Freezes on a Class-Wide Basis 
96. 
Mr. Regan applies the same methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement of 
profits” for the proposed Claim Denial class to the proposed Account Freeze class.166 
Accordingly, the critiques of his methodology for calculating alleged “disgorgement” for the 
proposed Claim Denial class described in Section VI.D apply equally here. 
IX. 
Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Proposed Customer Service Class 
Ignores Important Consumer Heterogeneity and Fails to Propose a Damages 
Methodology that Reliably Measures Economic Harm on a Class-Wide Basis  
97. 
Mr. Regan’s proposed “actual damages” methodology for the proposed Customer Service 
class assumes that one could value proposed Customer Service class members’ time using a 
“minimum wage” or “other reasonable metric” applied identically to all proposed class members. 
Such an assumption does not constitute a reliable class-wide method for measuring economic 
harm, as the value of alleged “lost time” would vary among individuals in the proposed class, 
and an individualized inquiry would be required to measure any alleged harm. Mr. Regan does 
not provide any calculation of “actual damages.” Nor does he specify what would be the 
“applicable minimum wage,” or how one could construct some “other reasonable metric.” 
98. 
As a preliminary observation, while the “applicable minimum wage” would not measure 
the value of time for individual consumers, as I discuss below, even understanding what 
minimum wage would be “applicable” to a proposed class member requires individual inquiry. 
In California the minimum wage a consumer faces can vary based on the consumer’s place of 
work or other factors.167 For example, the minimum wage in Belmont, California on January 1, 
2021 was $15.90; in Oakland, it was $14.36; and in Mountain View, it was $16.30.168 Learning 
where a proposed class member worked would require individual inquiry. A further source of 
 
166 Regan Report, ¶ 109.  
167 During 2020-2021, employers were required to pay a different minimum wage depending on how many employees they 
hired. Also, some localities in California imposed higher minimum wages than required by federal or state law. “Minimum Wage 
Frequently Asked Questions,” State of California Department of Industrial Relations, July 2024, 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage htm. 
168 “California City and County Minimum Wages as of 7/1/2021,” UC Berkeley Labor Center, July 1, 2021, 
https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/california-city-and-county-minimum-wages-as-of-7-1-2021/. 
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heterogeneity in applicable wages derives from the fact that proposed class members are, by dint 
of receiving UI benefits, no longer fully employed. Mr. Regan does not specify whether the 
“applicable” minimum wage would be that associated with the proposed class member’s pre-
benefit employment, the job the consumer would have after becoming re-employed, or 
something else. Finally, whether the minimum wage or some other wage earned or potentially 
earned by the proposed class member would be the “applicable minimum wage” or “other 
reasonable metric” would require individualized inquiry.169 
99. 
More crucially, as Mr. Regan states, the appropriate metric for compensation would be 
the value of lost time for each class member.170 Those values will be highly individualized, 
require individualized inquiry to understand, and, more importantly, may not be captured by 
wages for many consumers. 
100. 
In economics, it is accepted that a consumer’s value of time (“VOT”) may not equal their 
wage (or hypothetical wage, as assumed in the Regan methodology). One reason for this is 
practical, as consumers may not be able to flexibly trade time for labor income. One study 
explains: “[a]ssuming the average wage is the appropriate opportunity cost of time presumes that 
the individual faces no constraints on hours worked, derives no utility or disutility from work, 
and has a linear wage function.”171 Another study notes “we learn very little about the value of 
time for individuals without flexible work hours.”172 Yet another study notes that applying a 
wage-based VOT obscures important labor market heterogeneity: “[m]ore fundamentally, wages 
may be a poor proxy for VOT for people who are outside the formal labor market such as the 
unemployed, the retired, or students. Implicitly income-based measures value their time at 
zero.”173 
 
169 The actual wage earned by a proposed class member could differ from the applicable minimum wage. 
170 Regan Report, ¶ 18. 
171 Larson, Douglas M., and Sabina L. Shaikh, “Recreation Demand Choices and Revealed Values of Leisure Time,” Economic 
Inquiry 42, no. 2, 2004, pp. 264–278, pp. 264–265. 
172 Palmquist, Raymond B., Daniel J. Phaneuf, and V. Kerry Smith, “Short Run Constraints and the Increasing Marginal Value 
of Time in Recreation,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 14986, 2009, p. 5. 
173 Lloyd-Smith, Patrick, et al., “Decoupling the Value of Leisure Time from Labor Market Returns in Travel Cost Models,” 
Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 6, no. 2, 2019, pp. 1–28 (“Lloyd-Smith et al. (2019)”), pp. 
2–3.  
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101. 
As alternatives, studies have proposed assessing how consumers value their time on an 
individual basis, finding that those values can be substantially different from wages, in principle 
and practice. One study observes “[p]eople do not simply equate the value of their time with 
their wage rate or some monetary equivalent.”174 Another notes, emphasizing that VOTs are 
heterogeneous, “[w]e find that respondents value their leisure time heterogeneously and 
substantially differently from their implied wage rate,” and “the majority of individual-level 
differences in the VOT are not explained by reference to their return on the labor market.”175 The 
study concludes “[t]hese findings raise concerns with the common practice of solely relying on 
labor market information to value people’s leisure time.”176 Studies estimating VOTs find 
heterogeneity across consumers, particularly when alternatives such as leisure or home 
production are considered.177 Some studies find that consumers “value their leisure time at one 
quarter of their take home pay.”178 Another notes “[t]ime, on the other hand, is not as liquid and 
furthermore highly perishable, which makes the opportunity cost more difficult to estimate and 
more dependent on context.”179 This heterogeneity can arise due to differences in whether 
consumers are employed: “[o]n average, [willingness-to-accept] values for unpaid work and 
leisure time were [] higher for the subgroup of respondents with paid work than for those not in 
paid employment.”180 
102. 
 Some research on the value of time specifically assesses how consumers value their time 
spent waiting, as would apply in this matter. That work similarly observes that the VOT can 
differ from wages, and similarly observes heterogeneity. One study observes “[h]owever, 
determining the value of time is not straightforward, because it is highly flexible…” and “[t]he 
value of time is what people believe their time is worth which varies across situations and 
 
174 Caruelle, Delphine, Line Lervik-Olsen, and Anders Gustafsson, “The Clock is Ticking—Or is it? Customer Satisfaction 
Response to Waiting Shorter vs. Longer Than Expected During a Service Encounter,” Journal of Retailing 99, 2023, pp. 247–264 
(“Caruelle, Lervik-Olsen, Gustafsson (2023)”), p. 249. 
175 Lloyd-Smith et al. (2019), pp. 1, 25.  
176 Lloyd-Smith et al. (2019), p. 1. 
177 Verbooy, Kaya, et al., “Time is Money: Investigating the Value of Leisure Time and Unpaid Work,” Value in Health 21, 
2018, pp. 1428–1436 (“Verbooy, et al. (2018)”), pp. 1428–1429, 1432, 1434. 
178 McDonald, Aleecia M., and Lorrie Faith Cranor, “The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy 
for the Information Society 4, no. 3, 2008, pp. 543–568, p. 562. 
179 Okada, Erica Mina, and Stephen J. Hoch, “Spending Time versus Spending Money,” Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. 
2, 2004, pp. 313–323, p. 321.  
180 Verbooy, et al. (2018), p. 1432.  
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contexts.”181 As such, proposed Customer Service class members’ valuations of time spent 
waiting would also be heterogeneous, and require individualized inquiry to understand. 
103. 
A further nuance to assessing consumers’ values of time spent waiting is that values of 
time may depend not just on the absolute time spent, but on how that compares to consumer 
expectations. One study observes “the same wait duration might have different effects on 
customers depending on whether it is shorter or longer than what customers expected.”182 And, 
that compared to waiting shorter than expected, “waiting longer than expected leads to a minor 
decrease in satisfaction.”183 To the extent that proposed Customer Service class members valued 
their time similarly and had varying expectations of wait times, this would only amplify 
heterogeneity and the need for individual inquiry to understand any potential consumer harm. 
104. 
A final potential source of heterogeneity in consumer values of time in this context is that 
research shows that many consumers “multi-task” while on hold, engaging in other activities that 
can affect their value of time while on hold. Conceptually, one study notes “the amount of multi-
tasking may have a considerable impact on the VOT” and in “the early days of time use research, 
[researchers] stressed the importance of recording so-called secondary activities that are carried 
out during the primary activity.”184 A study of consumer behavior while on hold notes “79% of 
callers engaged in some form of secondary activity while on hold. These activities were diverse, 
with the majority of participants reporting different types of secondary activities.”185 Those 
activities included emailing or doing other computer work, “doing work or homework,” making 
other calls, exercising, and others.186 The study concludes: “[m]ost of these callers actively 
perform some secondary activity that, with the exception of doodling, was an activity that they 
would normally engage in as a primary activity if they were not on hold.”187 To the extent that 
proposed Customer Service class members behaved similarly, and both engaged in different 
 
181 Caruelle, Lervik-Olsen, Gustafsson (2023), p. 249.  
182 Caruelle, Lervik-Olsen, Gustafsson (2023), p. 247. 
183 Caruelle, Lervik-Olsen, Gustafsson (2023), p. 247.  
184 Ettema, Dick, and Laura Verschuren, “Multitasking and Value of Travel Time Savings,” Transportation Research Record 
2010, no. 1, 2007, pp. 19–25, pp. 19, 25.  
185 Kortum, Philip, and S. Camille Peres, “A Survey of Secondary Activities of Telephone Callers Who Are Put on Hold,” 
Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 51st Annual Meeting, 2007, pp. 1153–1157 (“Kortum and Peres 
(2007)”), p. 1153. 
186 Kortum and Peres (2007), p. 1154. 
187 Kortum and Peres (2007), p. 1155. 
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secondary activities and valued the secondary activities differently, actual consumers’ VOTs 
would be further individualized. 
105. 
Summing up, Mr. Regan’s assumption that one could value proposed Customer Service 
class members’ time using “the minimum wage” or other “reasonable metric” does not constitute 
a method that could measure economic harm from waiting time on a class-wide basis. The 
individuals in the proposed class would vary in terms of the value of any “lost time,” and an 
individualized inquiry would be required to measure any alleged harm. 
X. 
Mr. Regan’s Proposed EMV Chip Class Damages Methodology Does Not 
Distinguish Harmed from Unharmed Consumers, Ignores Important Consumer 
Heterogeneity That Would Require Individual Inquiry, Overstates Damages for 
Many Consumers, and Does Not Reliably Estimate Profits 
106. 
Mr. Regan’s “actual damages” methodology for the proposed EMV Chip Class is 
identical to his methodology for the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes with 
an extended period for “consequential damages.”188 First, to identify members of the proposed 
EMV Chip Class, Mr. Regan was “asked to assume that the EMV Chip class consists of all 
members of the Claim Denial class and all members of the Credit Rescission class.”189 Next, Mr. 
Regan estimates “actual damages” for the proposed EMV Chip Class as the sum of “[t]he 
principal amount of damages” and “[c]onsequential damages,”190 and he defines “[t]he principal 
amount of damages” the exact same way as he does for the proposed Claim Denial class: “the 
amount of the class member’s claim that the Bank denied based on Indicator 1 of its Claim Fraud 
Filter.”191 Finally, as with the proposed Credit Rescission class, Mr. Regan claims that 
 
188 Mr. Regan estimates “consequential damages” for the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes for the period 
“from the application of the CFF … to the paid date.” See Regan Report, ¶ 43. Mr. Regan estimates “consequential damages” for 
the proposed EMV Chip class for the period “from the date the Bank opened the claim until the date the Bank finally reimbursed 
the class member for the value of the claim.” See Regan Report, ¶ 120. 
189 Regan Report, ¶ 119. 
190 Regan Report, ¶ 120. 
191 Regan Report, ¶¶ 37, 120. Mr. Regan says that he has “been asked to assume that EMV chips would have prevented the 
unauthorized ATM withdrawals that were the subject of Claim Denial and Credit Rescission class members’ claims that triggered 
the Bank’s CFF Indicator 1.” See Regan Report, ¶ 118. I am not opining on whether this assumption is accurate. However, to the 
extent this assumption is inaccurate, the methodology Mr. Regan describes in Section VI of his report would not measure harm 
attributable to the alleged misconduct. Furthermore, even though Mr. Regan only assumes that the unauthorized ATM 
withdrawals would have been prevented by EMV chips, he also includes amounts from unauthorized point-of-sale transactions in 
his “principal amount of damages” for the proposed EMV Chip class. Mr. Regan does not explain how these unauthorized point-
of-sale transactions are relevant to the alleged misconduct. 
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“[c]onsequential damages can be calculated using the same two alternative methodologies 
described above with respect to the Claim Denial class.”192 
107. 
Therefore, Mr. Regan’s methodology for the proposed EMV Chip class is subject to the 
same critiques described above in Sections VI and VII. 
XI. 
Mr. Regan’s Damages Methodology for the Members of the Proposed Credit 
Rescission, Claim Denial, Account Freeze and EMV Chip Classes Assesses Damages 
Multiple Times to the same Consumers  
108. 
Mr. Regan’s damages methodologies assess damages multiple times for some 
cardholders who are members of the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account 
Freeze classes and for all members of the proposed EMV Chip class. 
109. 
First, to the extent Mr. Regan is opining that the harm of members of multiple proposed 
classes is measured as the sum of the damages he estimates in each class, Mr. Regan’s damages 
methodology for the proposed EMV Chip class double-counts damages already calculated for the 
proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes. As described in Section X, Mr. Regan’s 
“actual damages” methodology for the proposed EMV Chip Class is identical to his 
methodology for the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes, with an extended 
period for “consequential damages.” Therefore, the “actual damages” Mr. Regan estimates for 
every member of the proposed Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes are double counted in 
his “actual damages” for the proposed EMV Chip class. By double-counting damages between 
the proposed EMV Chip, Claim Denial, and Credit Rescission classes, Mr. Regan overstates 
overall damages to proposed class members. 
110. 
Second, Mr. Regan’s methodology for estimating credit card late fees repeatedly assesses 
late fees for proposed class members with concurrent claims in multiple classes.193 As discussed 
in Section V, Mr. Regan attempts to approximate the cost of credit card late fees based on the 
amount of time customers’ funds were unavailable and the alleged average late fee rates for the 
proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account Freeze classes. When the period that a 
 
192 Regan Report, ¶ 120. 
193 As in the first point, this only applies to the extent that Mr. Regan is opining that the harm of members of multiple proposed 
classes is measured as the sum of the damages he estimates in each class. 
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proposed class member’s claim was denied (or credit was rescinded) overlaps with the period 
their account was frozen, Mr. Regan’s methodology assesses late fees during this overlapping 
period twice for that consumer. Of the 
in late fees Mr. Regan estimates across all 
claims in the proposed Claim Denial, Credit Rescission, and Account Freeze classes, 
are double counted across classes in this manner.194
111.
Mr. Regan’s methodology for estimating credit card late fees also repeatedly assesses late 
fees for proposed class members with multiple concurrent claims in the same proposed class. 
This is problematic regardless of whether Mr. Regan is opining that members of multiple 
proposed classes are entitled to the damages he estimates in each class. For example, Mr. Regan 
identifies 
as a proposed class member of the Claim Denial and Credit 
Rescission classes. Of their claims assigned to the proposed Claim Denial class, 
195 Mr. Regan’s method assesses 
 even though the 
claims are for the same cardholder during the same months.196 By assessing overlapping late fees 
for overlapping claims, Mr. Regan overstates the credit card late fees some proposed class 
members may have faced.
Executed this 24th day of October, 2024 
Victor Stango
194 See Regan Report, Schedule 1. For a given claim, duplicate late fees are computed by determining the number of overlapping 
days for which the claim denial period and account freeze period overlap. If this overlapping period is at least 30 days, a 
duplicate late fee of $26 is computed, with additional late fees of $35 computer for every subsequent month up to six months. 
195 See Regan Report, Schedule 1.
196 See Regan Report, Schedule 1.
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Appendix A 
Professor Victor Stango 
Graduate School of Management 
University of California, Davis 
Davis, California 95616 
Email: vstango@ucdavis.edu 
Phone: (530) 752-3535 
Web: https://gsm.ucdavis.edu/profile/victor-stango  
 
 
FIELDS 
 
Household finance, behavioral economics, banking. 
 
CURRENT AND PAST FULL-TIME POSITIONS 
x 
Professor, UC Davis Graduate School of Management, Davis California USA 
August 2017-present 
x 
Associate Professor, UC Davis Graduate School of Management, Davis 
California USA August 2008-July 2016 
x 
Associate Professor, Tuck School of Business, Hanover New Hampshire USA 
August 2004-July 2008 
x 
Economist/Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago Illinois 
USA August 2001- July 2004 
x 
Assistant Professor, University of Tennessee, Knoxville Tennessee USA August 
1996- July 2001 
 
JOURNAL PUBLICATIONS 
 
1. “We are all behavioral, more or less: A taxonomy of consumer decision making” 
(with Jon Zinman), The Review of Economic Studies 90:3, May 2023: 1470–1498. 
 
2. “Borrowing High vs. Borrowing Higher: Price Dispersion and Shopping Behavior in 
the US Credit Card Market” (with Jon Zinman), Review of Financial Studies 29:4, 
2016: 979-1006. 
 
3. “Limited and Varying Consumer Attention: Evidence from Shocks to the Salience of 
Overdraft Fees” (with Jon Zinman), Review of Financial Studies 27:4, 2014: 990-
1030. 
 
4. “Celebrity Endorsements, Reputation Risk and Firm Value: Evidence from the Tiger 
Woods Scandal” (with Chris Knittel). Management Science 60(1), 2014: 21-37. 
  
5. “Fuzzy Math, Disclosure Regulation and Credit Market Outcomes: Evidence from 
Truth in Lending Reform” (with Jon Zinman), Review of Financial Studies 24(2), 
2011: 506-534. 
 
6. “Strategic Incompatibility in ATM Markets” (with Chris Knittel), Journal of Banking 
and Finance 35(10), October 2011: 2627- 2636. 
 
7. “Some New Evidence on Competition in Payday Lending Markets,” Contemporary 
Economic Policy, March 2011.  
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8. “Exponential Growth Bias and Household Finance” (with Jon Zinman), Journal of 
Finance 64(6), December 2009: 2807-2849. 
 
9. “How Does Incompatibility Affect Prices? Evidence from ATMs” (with Chris 
Knittel), Journal of Industrial Economics LVII (3), September 2009: 557-582. 
 
10. “What Do Consumers Really Pay on Their Checking and Credit Card Accounts? 
Explicit, Implicit and Avoidable Costs” (with Jon Zinman), American Economic 
Review Papers and Proceedings 99 (2), May 2009: 424-429. 
 
11. “Incompatibility, Product Attributes and Consumer Welfare: Evidence from ATMs” 
(with Chris Knittel), BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 8(1) (Advances), 
2008. 
 
12. “The Causes of Bargaining Failure: Evidence from Major League Baseball” (with 
Amy Farmer and Paul Pecorino), Journal of Law and Economics XLVII(2), October 
2004: 543-568. 
 
13. “Ask Prices, Offers and Time-to-Sale in an Online Exchange” (with Amy Farmer), 
Economic Inquiry 42(1), January 2004: 14-28. 
 
14. “The Economics of Standards Wars,” Review of Network Economics 3(1), March 
2004:1-19. 
 
15. “Price Ceilings, Focal Points, and Tacit Collusion: Evidence from Credit Cards” 
(with Chris Knittel), American Economic Review 93(5), December 2003: 1703-1729. 
 
16. “Strategic Responses to Regulatory Threat in the Credit Card Market,” Journal of 
Law and Economics XLVI (2), October 2003: 427-452. 
 
17. “Pricing with Consumer Switching Costs: Evidence from the Credit Card Market,” 
Journal of Industrial Economics 50(4), December 2002: 475-492. 
 
18. “Competition and Pricing in the Credit Card Market,” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 82(3), August 2000: 499-508. 
 
19. “Environmental Regulation as an Entry Barrier for Small Manufacturing 
Establishments: A Longitudinal Examination,” Journal of Environmental Economics 
and Management 40, 2000: 56-75. (with Tom Dean and Robert Brown). 
 
20. “Ranking Graduate Programs by Graduate Publications,” Economic Inquiry 38(2), 
April 2000, 358-367. (with Jeffery T. Collins and Richard G. Cox). 
 
21. “The Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Composition of Consumer Debt,” National 
Tax Journal LII (4), December 1999, 717-739. 
 
OTHER PUBLICATIONS 
  
22. “Debit or Credit: How People Choose to Pay” (with Jon Zinman), Research 
Monograph, Filene Institute, November 2008. 
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23. “The Economics and Strategy of Standards and Standardization” (with Shane 
Greenstein), in Scott Shane (ed.), Handbook of Technology and Innovation 
Management: Blackwell, Oxford, UK 2008. 
 
24. “Outsource or Die,” Research Monograph, Filene Institute, August 2007. 
 
25. “Credit Cards,” (with Julian Wright), New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics: 
MacMillan, Hampshire, UK, 2007. 
 
26. Standards and Public Policy (ed., with Shane Greenstein), Cambridge Press, 2006. 
 
27. “Outsourcing, Firm Size and Product Complexity,” (with Yukako Ono), Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 1st Quarter 2005: 2-11. 
 
28. “Emerging Payment Standards and Public Policy,” (with Tom Ciesielski and Carrie 
Jankowski), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Annual Report, 2004. 
 
29. “The Economics of Standards: Public Policy and Market Performance” (with Carrie 
Jankowski), Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Fed Letter, August 2004. 
 
EDUCATION 
UC Davis (1996), Ph.D. in Economics. 
University of Pennsylvania (1991), B.A. in Economics and Political Science. 
 
GRANTS AND AWARDS 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (MRRC) Grant “Behavioral Factors and Long-
Run Financial Well-Being,” 2016-2017. 
Pension Research Council/TIAA Institute Grant “Behavioral Factors and Long-Run 
Financial Well-Being,” 2016-2017. 
Russell Sage Foundation Grant “Behavioral Biases in Household Financial Decision-
making,” 2011-2012. 
Finalist, UCD GSM Professor of the Year, 2010. 
National Science Foundation Grant “Information Technology, Outsourcing and 
Productivity,” 2008-2010. 
 
NET Institute Research Grant, Summer 2004, Summer 2006. 
 
Filene Institute Research Grant “Outsource or Die,” 2006-2007. 
 
Filene Institute Research Grant “Payment Choices,” 2006-2008. 
 
FDIC Research Grant, 2006. 
Allen H. Keally Teaching Award, University of Tennessee, 1999-2000. 
Club 6 (High Teaching Evaluations), Haas School, UC Berkeley, 1998. 
Finalist, Allen H. Keally Teaching Award, University of Tennessee, 1997-98. 
 
OTHER PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS 
Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Consumer Finance Institute, 
2018-present; Associate Editor, International Journal of Industrial Organization (2004-
present); Consulting Economist, Chicago Fed (2007-10); Research Economist, NBER 
(2009-2011); Visiting Senior Economist, New York Fed (2004); Adjunct Professor, 
Chicago GSB (2001-2003); Visiting Professor, Haas School (1998). 
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Appendix B 
Documents Considered List 
Academic Articles 
x 
Caruelle, Delphine, Line Lervik-Olsen, and Anders Gustafsson, “The Clock is 
Ticking—Or is it? Customer Satisfaction Response to Waiting Shorter vs. Longer 
Than Expected During a Service Encounter,” Journal of Retailing 99, 2023, pp. 247–
264 
x 
Cotton, Christopher D., Vaishali Garga, and Justin Rohan, “Consumption 
Heterogeneity by Occupation: Understanding the Impact of Occupation on Personal 
Consumption During the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
Working Papers, no. 20–16, 2020 
x 
Ettema, Dick, and Laura Verschuren, “Multitasking and Value of Travel Time 
Savings,” Transportation Research Record 2010, no. 1, 2007, pp. 19–25 
x 
Gathergood, John, et al., “How Do Consumers Avoid Penalty Fees? Evidence From 
Credit Cards,” Management Science 67, no. 4, 2020, pp. 2565–2578 
x 
Gathergood, John, et al., “How Do Individuals Repay Their Debt? The Balance-
Matching Heuristic,” American Economic Review 109, no. 3, 2019, pp. 844–875 
x 
Keys, Benjamin J., and Jialan Wang, “Minimum Payments and Debt Paydown in 
Consumer Credit Cards,” National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, 
2016 
x 
Kortum, Philip, and S. Camille Peres, “A Survey of Secondary Activities of 
Telephone Callers Who Are Put on Hold,” Proceedings of the Human Factors and 
Ergonomics Society 51st Annual Meeting, 2007, pp. 1153–1157 
x 
Larson, Douglas M., and Sabina L. Shaikh, “Recreation Demand Choices and 
Revealed Values of Leisure Time,” Economic Inquiry 42, no. 2, 2004, pp. 264–278 
x 
Lloyd-Smith, Patrick, et al., “Decoupling the Value of Leisure Time from Labor 
Market Returns in Travel Cost Models,” Journal of the Association of Environmental 
and Resource Economists 6, no. 2, 2019, pp. 1–28 
x 
McDonald, Aleecia M., and Lorrie Faith Cranor, “The Cost of Reading Privacy 
Policies,” I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 4, no. 3, 2008, 
pp. 543–568 
x 
Okada, Erica Mina, and Stephen J. Hoch, “Spending Time versus Spending Money,” 
Journal of Consumer Research 31, no. 2, 2004, pp. 313–323 
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x 
Palmquist, Raymond B., Daniel J. Phaneuf, and V. Kerry Smith, “Short Run 
Constraints and the Increasing Marginal Value of Time in Recreation,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 14986, 2009 
x 
Stango, Victor, and Jonathan Zinman, “Borrowing High vs. Borrowing Higher: 
Sources and Consequences of Dispersion in Individual Borrowing Costs,” National 
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper, no. 19069, 2013 
x 
Stango, Victor, and Jonathan Zinman, “What Do Consumers Really Pay on Their 
Checking and Credit Card Accounts? Explicit, Implicit, and Avoidable Costs,” 
American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 99, no. 2, 2009, pp. 424–429 
x 
Stavins, Joanna, “Unprepared for Financial Shocks: Emergency Savings and Credit 
Card Debt,” Contemporary Economic Policy 39, no. 1, 2021, pp. 59–82 
x 
Verbooy, Kaya, et al., “Time is Money: Investigating the Value of Leisure Time and 
Unpaid Work,” Value in Health 21, 2018, pp. 1428–1436 
x 
Zinman, Jonathan, “Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies,” Annual 
Review of Economics 7, no. 2, 2015, pp. 251–276 
Bates Stamped Documents 
x 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00694814 
x 
Bank of America, “Unemployment Insurance Prepaid Card Program Remediation 
Plan,” Submitted October 6, 2022 to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
and October 12, 2022 to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00102554–577 
Data 
x 
“California Unemployment Industry & Demographics Data Dashboard,” State of 
California Employment Development Department, September 2024, 
https://edd.ca.gov/siteassets/files/newsroom/facts-and-stats/excel/ada-county-and-
statewide-demographics--industry-data-9-21-24.xlsx 
x 
“Center for Microeconomic Data: Survey of Consumer Expectations,” Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, 2020–2023, 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/sce#/ 
x 
“Household Pulse Survey Public Use File: January 20 – February 1, 2021,” U.S. 
Census Bureau, https://www2.census.gov/programs-
surveys/demo/datasets/hhp/2021/wk23/HPS_Week23_PUF_CSV.zip, accessed 
October 7, 2024 
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Depositions 
x 
Deposition of Azuri Moon, February 27, 2024 
x 
Deposition of Jennifer Meza, April 30, 2024 
x 
Deposition of Juanita Isles, May 2, 2024 
x 
Deposition of Miguel Salazar, May 3, 2024 
Declarations 
x 
Declaration of Jennifer Lennon in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 23, 2024 
x 
Appendix of Exhibits to the Declaration of Laura Brys in Support of Defendant’s 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 24, 2024 
x 
Declaration of William Martin in Support of Defendant’s Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, In Re: Bank of America 
California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, October 2024 
Expert Reports 
x 
Expert Class Certification Report of Greg J. Regan, CPA/CFF, CFE, August 29, 
2024, Backup Materials, and Materials listed in Appendix B 
Legal Documents 
x 
Bank of America’s Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s Fourth Set of 
Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, 
January 2, 2024, with Exhibits 
x 
Bank of America’s Second Set of Responses and Objections to Plaintiff Yick’s 
Seventh Set of Interrogatories (Interrogs. 39 & 42), In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, April 23, 2024 
x 
Bank of America’s Revised Second Supplemental Responses and Objections to 
Plaintiff Yick’s First Set of Interrogatories (Interrogatories 2-6, 14-15), In Re Bank of 
America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, December 1, 2023, with 
Exhibits 
x 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Class Certification, 
In Re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation, August 29, 
2024 
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x 
Plaintiff Alex Yuan’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, 
N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment 
Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff Azuri Moon’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of America, 
N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California Unemployment 
Benefits Litigation, January 2, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff Candace Koole’s Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 4, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff J. Michael Willrich’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff Kuang Ting Chong’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 2, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff Lindsay McClure’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 2, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff Roland Oosthuizen Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff Stephanie Moore’s Supplemental Objections and Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
x 
Plaintiff Vanessa Rivera Objections and Supplemental Responses to Bank of 
America, N.A.’s First Set of Interrogatories, In Re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, January 29, 2024 
Online Public Press Articles and Other Web Content 
x 
“California City and County Minimum Wages as of 7/1/2021,” UC Berkeley Labor 
Center, July 1, 2021, https://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/california-city-and-county-
minimum-wages-as-of-7-1-2021/ 
x 
“COVID-19 Tenant Relief Act,” State of California Business, Consumer Services, 
and Housing Agency, https://www.bcsh.ca.gov/covidrelief/, accessed October 22, 
2024. 
x 
“Credit Cards: Pandemic Assistance Likely Helped Reduce Balances, and Credit 
Terms Varied among Demographic Groups,” United States Government 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 350-2     Filed 10/24/24     PageID.10940 
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY 
Page 5 
Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees, September 2023, 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/d23105269.pdf 
x 
“Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2021,” Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, May 2022, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2021-report-economic-well-being-
us-households-202205.pdf 
x 
“Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2022,” Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, May 2023, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2022-report-economic-well-being-
us-households-202305.pdf 
x 
“Eligibility Requirements,” State of California Employment Development 
Department, https://edd.ca.gov/ui_eligibility/, accessed October 21, 2024  
x 
“Minimum Wage Frequently Asked Questions,” State of California Department of 
Industrial Relations, July 2024, https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_minimumwage.htm 
x 
“Personal Consumption Expenditures by State, 2020,” Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
October 8, 2021, https://www.bea.gov/news/2021/personal-consumption-
expenditures-state-2020 
x 
“Personal Saving Rate,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED Economic Data, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=FhxV#, accessed September 27, 2024 
x 
“The Consumer Credit Card Market,” Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, 
September 2021, https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_consumer-
credit-card-market-report_2021.pdf 
x 
Brian Faler, “Unemployment Assistance to Millionaires Soared During Pandemic,” 
Politico, November 22, 2022, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/11/22/unemployment-assistance-millionaires-
covid-pandemic-2020-00070446 
x 
Chris Wheat, Erica Deadman, and Daniel M. Sullivan, “How Vulnerable Are 
Americans to Unexpected Expenses?” JP Morgan Chase Institute, July 30, 2024, 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-
creation/how-vulnerable-are-americans-to-unexpected-expenses 
x 
Daniel Sexton, “An In-Depth Look at Mortgage Forbearance Data,” Federal Reserve 
Bank of Atlanta, February 22, 2021, 
https://www.atlantafed.org/blogs/macroblog/2021/02/22/in-depth-look-at-mortgage-
forbearance-data 
x 
Diana Farrell, et al., “Policy Brief: The Unemployment Benefit Boost: Trends in 
Spending and Saving When the $600 Supplement Ended,” JP Morgan Chase & Co. 
Institute, October 2020, 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 350-2     Filed 10/24/24     PageID.10941 
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY 
Page 6 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-
co/institute/pdf/Institute-UI-Benefits-Boost-Policy-Brief_ADA.pdf 
x 
Evelyn Waugh, “How Is a Credit Card Minimum Payment Calculated?” Experian, 
May 28, 2023, https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/how-is-your-credit-
card-minimum-payment-calculated/, accessed October 21, 2024 
x 
Fiona Greig, Erica Deadman, and Tanya Sonthalia, “Household Cash Balance Pulse: 
Family Edition,” JP Morgan Chase Institute, November 2021, 
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/institute/all-topics/financial-health-wealth-
creation/household-cash-balance-pulse-families 
x 
Hamza Abdelrahman, Luiz E. Oliveira, and Adam Hale Shapiro, “The Rise and Fall 
of Pandemic Excess Wealth,” FRBSF Economic Letter 2024-06, February 26, 2024, 
https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/el2024-06.pdf 
x 
Joanna Stavins, “Credit Card Spending and Borrowing Since the Start of the Covid-
19 Pandemic,” Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, October 19, 2023, 
https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/current-policy-perspectives/2023/credit-card-
spending-and-borrowing-since-the-start-of-the-covid-19-pandemic.aspx 
x 
Liane Fiano, “Protecting Your Credit During the Coronavirus Pandemic,” Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, July 29, 2020, 
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/blog/protecting-your-credit-during-
coronavirus-pandemic/ 
x 
Neil Bhutta, and Lisa Dettling, “Money in the Bank? Assessing Families’ Liquid 
Savings using the Survey of Consumer Finances,” FEDS Notes, November 19, 2018, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/assessing-families-liquid-
savings-using-the-survey-of-consumer-finances-20181119.html 
x 
Rajashri Chakrabarti, et al., “Who Received Forbearance Relief?” Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York Liberty Street Economics, August 2, 2021, 
https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2021/08/who-received-forbearance-
relief 
x 
Sarah Bohn, Marisol Cuellar Mejia, and Julien Lafortune, “Unemployment Benefits 
in the COVID-19 Pandemic,” Public Policy Institute of California, April 9, 2020, 
https://www.ppic.org/blog/unemployment-benefits-in-the-covid-19-pandemic/ 
x 
Stefan Lembo Stolba, “How the CARES Act Affects Credit Reports and Scores,” 
Experian, April 24, 2020, https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/how-the-
cares-act-affects-credit-reports-and-scores/ 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 350-2     Filed 10/24/24     PageID.10942 
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY 
Page 7 
Publicly Available Documents 
x 
 “California Employment Development Department Debit Card Account Agreement,” 
Bank of America, March 1, 2018 
 
Note: In addition to the documents on this list, I considered all documents cited in my 
report to form my opinions. 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 350-2     Filed 10/24/24     PageID.10943 
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HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL – ATTORNEYS’ EYES ONLY 
Appendix C 
List of cases in which Victor Stango testified  
as an expert by trial or by deposition in the past four years 
 
Charles Daniel Bickerstaff, as executor of the estate of Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., on behalf of himself 
and all persons similarly situated, v. SunTrust Bank, State Court of Georgia, Fulton County. 
Case No. 10-ev-010485-H. Deposition, November 28, 2023 
 
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection v. Progrexion Marketing Inc., et al., United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. Deposition, December 14, 2021 
 
Moss v BMO Harris Bank, N.A. et al., United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
New York. Case No. 2:13-cv-05438. Deposition, December 10, 2021 
 
Kristen Schertzer, et al. v. Bank of America et al., United States District Court for the Southern 
District of California. Case No. 3:19-cv-00264-JM-MSB. Deposition, November 20, 2021 
 
Robert Trepeta, et al. v. National Consumer Telecom and Utilities Exchange, Inc., and Equifax 
Information Services, LLC, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 
Case No. 2:19-cv-00405-MSD-LRL. Deposition, October 22, 2020 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 350-2     Filed 10/24/24     PageID.10944 
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