Exhibit 1 — In re Bank of America California Unemployment Benefits Litigation (Dkt. 324-4, S.D. Cal. No. 3:21-md-02992)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California · No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB · Doc. 324-4 · 2024-08-29 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

Exhibit 1 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
IN RE BANK OF AMERICA  
CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS LITIGATION 
Case No. 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB 
EXPERT CLASS CERTIFICATION REPORT OF J. DANIEL KREIS 
August 29, 2024 
REDACTED PUBLIC VERSION
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
 
I. 
ASSIGNMENT ................................................................................................................... 1 
II. 
QUALIFICATIONS ........................................................................................................... 1 
III. 
FACTS AND DATA CONSIDERED................................................................................. 4 
IV. 
HOURLY RATE ................................................................................................................. 4 
V. 
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS .............................................................................................. 4 
VI. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND ............................................................................................. 5 
A. 
The EDD Debit Card Program .................................................................................... 5 
B. 
Overview of the Bank’s Claims Operation ................................................................. 6 
C. 
The Bank’s Use of the Claim Fraud Filter .................................................................. 9 
VII. STATEMENT AND EXPLANATION OF OPINIONS ................................................. 10 
A. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is widely recognized that a  
debit card issuer cannot deny an unauthorized transaction claim unless it has 
conducted an adequate investigation of that claim that includes the review of all 
available relevant records. ......................................................................................... 10 
B. 
The Bank’s 
 and related training materials for claims analysts provide  
sensible procedures for EFTA/Reg E compliance that are consistent with well-
established industry standards for investigating unauthorized transaction claims. ... 13 
C. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for  
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was a significant 
departure from the Bank’s
 ............................................................................ 27 
D. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for  
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was contrary to  
industry standards. ..................................................................................................... 29 
E. 
The Bank could have adopted strategies other than CFF Indicator 1 to deal with  
any operational challenges related to EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized  
ATM withdrawals, including prioritizing investigation of higher-value claims and 
hiring or contracting additional claims analysts. ....................................................... 33 
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F. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
rescinding permanent credits that the Bank had previously paid EDD cardholders 
was contrary to industry standards. ........................................................................... 34 
G. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for  
freezing EDD cardholder accounts was contrary to industry standards.................... 35 
H. 
The Banks’ continued use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter to deny claims, 
rescind permanent credits, and freeze accounts, despite having data showing that 
Indicator 1 was highly inaccurate, was contrary to industry standards. .................... 40 
I. 
The claim denial letter that the Bank sent to EDD cardholders whose claims  
were denied, or whose prior permanent credit was rescinded, by CFF Indicator 1  
was contrary to industry standards. ........................................................................... 47 
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I. 
ASSIGNMENT 
1. 
I have been retained by Plaintiffs’ counsel in In re Bank of America California 
Unemployment Benefits Litigation, Case No. 3-21-md-02992-LAB-MSB, to provide expert 
opinions on the following topics related to cardholders who received unemployment and other 
benefits payments from the California Employment Development Department (“EDD”) on 
prepaid debit cards (“EDD debit cards”) issued by Bank of America (the “Bank”) during the 
period March 2020 through June 8, 2021: 
a. 
Whether the Bank’s policies and practices for investigating and 
decisioning unauthorized transaction claims (“claims”) made by EDD debit cardholders (“EDD 
cardholders”) were consistent with financial industry standards for investigating and decisioning 
claims. 
b. 
Whether the Bank’s policy and practice of using its Claim Fraud Filter to 
rescind permanent credits was consistent with financial industry standards for investigating and 
decisioning claims. 
c. 
Whether the Bank’s policy and practice of using its Claim Fraud Filter to 
freeze EDD cardholder accounts was consistent with financial industry standards for freezing 
cards and accounts. 
d. 
Whether there were other available strategies that the Bank reasonably 
could have used to deal with claims submitted by EDD cardholders. 
II. 
QUALIFICATIONS 
2. 
I am the principal of First Camden Consulting, a limited liability company based 
in Maryland that I founded in 2019. Through First Camden Consulting, I provide consulting, 
project management, training, and related services to consumer-facing financial institutions, 
particularly as relates to designing, implementing, and improving policies, practices, and systems 
for detecting and investigating suspicious transactions and fraud involving consumer electronic 
payments, especially payments involving credit cards and debit cards. 
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3. 
I have 42 years of experience in the field of consumer electronic payments. 
During my career, I have designed, implemented, developed, managed, and consulted on 
consumer payment systems and operations for major financial institutions, businesses, and U.S. 
government agencies, with a focus on consumer fraud analytics and operations. Since 1996, I 
have been retained to consult on these topics by over 100 financial institutions, businesses, and 
government agencies in 17 countries. I have significant experience and expertise in industry 
standard policies, practices, and procedures for detecting fraudulent transactions and for 
investigating and resolving consumer claims of unauthorized transactions, both under the 
Electronic Fund Transfers Act and Regulation E (“EFTA/Reg E”) framework applicable to debit 
cards, and the similar Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z (“TILA/Reg Z”) framework 
applicable to credit cards. 
4. 
A sampling of my experience includes the following engagements: 
a. 
From June 1982 to August 1989, I held several positions at First Omni 
Bank (now M&T Bank), a regional bank that led in the development of automated teller machine 
(“ATM”) networks and risk management technologies. I had several job titles and roles, 
including Group Vice President of Risk Operations, which required managing a staff of 
approximately 150 full-time equivalent employees and overseeing the bank’s fraud investigations 
related to deposit accounts, including under EFTA/Reg E.  
b. 
From August 1989 to October 1995, I was the Regional Director at FICO, 
a leading developer of fraud management tools for financial institutions globally. In that role, I 
managed FICO’s Mid-Atlantic and Mexican markets, working with FICO’s financial institution 
customers, including major banks, in the development and execution of their consumer fraud 
analytics and fraud management strategies. This included working with a top-three (by assets) 
U.S. bank1 in the development and implementation of an early version of the Falcon fraud 
 
1 The name of the bank is not disclosed here because, as is common in the industry, the 
consulting engagement was subject to a non-disclosure agreement. 
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model, which is a widely used tool in the financial industry for fraud management, including for 
detecting suspicious and potentially fraudulent or illegal transactions. 
c. 
From October 1996 to January 2021, I was the Director of Portfolio 
Management at First Annapolis Consulting (now part of Accenture). In that role, I managed a 
team that consulted with over 100 financial institutions with a focus on consumer payments risk 
and operations management. Approximately 70% of my team’s engagements included an 
assessment of our financial institution clients’ fraud management practices. While subject to non-
disclosure agreements, a sampling of my engagements included (i) Large Regional Bank: 
designed fraud operations for new consumer credit card offering, including the policies and 
procedures for investigating cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims in compliance with 
Regulation Z; (ii) Top 3 U.S. Retailer: managed all fraud-related functions and operations for the 
retailer’s private label credit card, including operations for investigating and decisioning 
cardholders’ claims of unauthorized transactions; (iii) U.S. Financial Regulator: acted as the 
regulator’s agent for 11 months in managing the back-office operations and winding-down and 
sale of a failed bank, including management of the call center that handled customer calls 
following the simultaneous closure of more than 500,000 card accounts; (iv) Leading U.S. Bank: 
designed and implemented all fraud operations for a major new consumer credit card offering; 
(v) Top 3 U.S. Card Issuer: developed plan for card issuer’s collections call center, which had 
hundreds of agents, to implement artificial intelligence systems for improving and streamlining 
call center’s regulatory compliance and other back-office operations. 
d. 
From 2021 to 2024, I was as a co-founder and the Director of Credit and 
Operations of Percapita, a New York City-based financial technology company that provides 
banking services to historically underserved communities. In that role, I managed the design, 
implementation, and development of the policies and procedures for fraud identification, 
investigations, and recovery practices for Percapita’s debit card offering. This included managing 
the company’s policies and procedures for investigating and decisioning claims of unauthorized 
transactions in compliance with EFTA/Reg E. 
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5. 
My curriculum vitae is attached as Appendix A. I have not testified as an expert 
witness at trial or by deposition during the last four years. 
III. 
FACTS AND DATA CONSIDERED 
6. 
In preparing this report, I relied on my knowledge, training, experience, and 
expertise accumulated during my 42-year career in consumer payment systems and operations. I 
also relied on the Plaintiffs’ complaint, documents and information produced in discovery in this 
case, and documents and information that are publicly available. The specific materials I relied 
upon are cited in this report and in the list attached as Appendix B.  
7. 
My work on this matter is ongoing and I may review additional materials or 
conduct further analysis. I reserve the right to supplement, amend, and revise my opinions in this 
report, including based on additional materials made available to me.  
IV. 
HOURLY RATE 
8. 
I am being paid for my work on this case at the rate of $450 per hour, which is not 
contingent on the opinions I express or the outcome of this matter. 
V. 
SUMMARY OF OPINIONS2 
9. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is widely recognized that a debit 
card issuer cannot deny an unauthorized transaction claim unless it has conducted an adequate 
investigation of that claim that includes the review of all available relevant records. 
10. 
The Bank’s 
 
and related training materials for claims analysts provide sensible procedures for compliance 
with the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E (“EFTA/Reg E”) that are consistent with 
well-established industry standards for investigating unauthorized transaction claims. 
 
2 All opinions stated in this report, including all opinions about what is consistent with or 
contrary to industry standards or contrary to industry standards, apply to the Class Period, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
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11. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was a significant departure from the 
Bank’s 
. 
12. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was contrary to industry standards. 
13. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
rescinding permanent credits that the Bank had previously paid EDD cardholders was contrary to 
industry standards. 
14. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
freezing EDD cardholder accounts was contrary to industry standards.  
15. 
The Banks’ continued use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter to deny claims, 
rescind permanent credits, and freeze accounts, despite 
 
, was contrary to industry standards. 
16. 
The claim denial notices that the Bank sent to EDD cardholders whose claims it 
denied, or whose permanent credits it rescinded, based solely on Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud 
Filter failed to meet industry standards for providing notice of a denied claim. 
VI. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND3 
A. 
The EDD Debit Card Program 
17. 
I understand that the California Employment Development Department (“EDD”) 
administers programs concerning unemployment insurance, disability insurance, and other public 
benefits (“EDD benefits”) payable to California residents. Throughout 2020-2021, I understand 
that EDD had contracted with the Bank to handle the distribution of EDD benefits through Visa-
branded prepaid debit cards, often referred to as “EDD debit cards.” My general understanding is 
that installments of each EDD benefits recipient’s EDD benefits were periodically deposited into 
 
3 This factual overview is based on my experience in the financial services industry, and my 
review of the deposition transcripts and all other documents cited herein and in Appendix B. 
 
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that recipient’s Bank of America EDD debit card account, and that the Bank issued each 
recipient an EDD debit card to access the EDD benefits in their account. I understand that the 
number of active EDD debit cards was fewer than 1 million cards before the Covid pandemic 
began in March 2020, and that this number increased to approximately 3 million active cards by 
the end of March 2020 and approximately 8-9 million active cards by September 2020.4 
B. 
Overview of the Bank’s Claims Operation 
18. 
EFTA/Reg E is a major regulatory compliance issue for banks and other 
consumer-facing financial institutions. When a debit cardholder contacts their card issuer5 to 
report an unauthorized transaction involving their debit card or associated account, this is often 
referred to in the industry as “making an unauthorized transaction claim.” When a cardholder 
makes an unauthorized transaction claim, it triggers a series of rights and obligations under 
EFTA/Reg E’s “error resolution” procedures. In general terms, if a debit cardholder reports an 
unauthorized transaction to their card issuer, the EFTA/Reg E error resolution procedures 
typically require the card issuer to open an unauthorized transaction claim, conduct an investigation 
of the transaction, and reimburse the cardholder for the amount of the transaction unless the card 
issuer’s investigation shows that the cardholder authorized or benefited from the transaction. 
19. 
The following describes the typical process in the industry by which a card issuer 
opens an unauthorized transaction claim. The process typically begins when the cardholder calls 
the card issuer’s customer service phone line and informs a customer service agent that there is a 
transaction or transactions on their debit card account that they (the cardholder) did not make. 
The customer service agent then gathers from the cardholder information sufficient to identify 
the cardholder’s account (e.g., name and card number or social security number), information 
sufficient to identify the specific transaction(s) that the cardholder is disputing, and the reason(s) 
that the cardholder is disputing the transaction(s) (e.g., the cardholder states they didn’t make the 
 
4 See Ex. 15 (Chestnut Tr.) 31:13-23; 50:15-21. In this report, “Ex.” refers to exhibits attached to 
the Declaration of Connie K. Chan in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, which 
are also listed in Plaintiffs’ concurrently filed Index of Exhibits. 
5 In the case of the EDD debit card, the card issuer was Bank of America. 
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transaction). This is the industry-standard information that is needed to open a claim.6 Once this 
information is gathered, it is industry standard for the card issuer (typically through the customer 
service agent) to open a claim, and for the card issuer’s system to assign that claim a unique claim 
number. My understanding is that the above process, which is typical in the industry, 
 
.7 
20. 
Once a claim is opened, EFTA/Reg E’s error resolution procedures then generally 
require that the card issuer investigate the claim. To ensure EFTA/Reg E compliance, it is a 
standard practice in the banking and financial services industry for debit card issuers to have a 
department of trained personnel who are dedicated to investigating claims (“claims analysts”). In 
general terms, it is industry standard for a claims analyst to investigate claims by reviewing 
relevant records that might contain information corroborating or disproving the cardholder’s 
claim that they (the cardholder) did not authorize the transaction at issue. After reviewing such 
records, the claims analyst will “decision” the claim, which means deciding whether to “pay” the 
claim (i.e., reimburse the cardholder for the unauthorized transaction by issuing a permanent 
credit in the amount of the unauthorized transaction to the cardholder’s account) or to “deny” the 
claim. After the claim is decisioned and any necessary post-decision processes are completed, 
the claim is typically “closed” in the card issuers’ system. It is widely recognized in the industry 
that, under EFTA/Reg E’s error resolution procedures, a card issuer cannot deny a claim unless 
its claims investigation uncovers evidence the cardholder authorized or benefitted from the 
transaction. I understand that at Bank of America, the name of the department that conducted 
 
6 There is additional information that can be useful to the claims investigation that card issuers 
typically have their call center agents gather during this same phone call. Examples include the 
cardholder’s responses to questions posed by the call center agent about whether the cardholder 
has the physical card in their possession, whether the card has been lost or stolen, whether the 
cardholder shared their card personal identification number (“PIN”) with anyone, and where the 
cardholder was at the time of the unauthorized transaction. 
 
. But this additional information is not part of the industry-standard information 
needed to open a claim, which is limited to information sufficient to identify the cardholder 
account, the transactions being disputed, and the reason why. 
7 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 78:6-89:25. 
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claims investigations for EDD cardholders and other Bank customers during 2020-2021 was 
“Claims Resolution and Recovery” (or “CR&R”),8 and that CR&R had in place policies—
namely, the Bank’s 
—that if followed would have resulted in the Bank’s claims analysts 
conducting investigations that are generally consistent with the industry standard process 
described above.  
21. 
Because debit card issuers have a great variety of records and information that are 
potentially relevant to claims, it is also industry standard practice for card issuers to have detailed 
written policies about what records and information their claims analysts need to review when 
conducting a claims investigation. I understand that, during 2020-2021, the Bank’s written policy 
for how to conduct investigations of unauthorized transaction claims submitted by its debit 
cardholders, including EDD cardholders, was the Bank’s 
. As is standard in the industry, 
the Bank’s 
 
 
 
. The overarching purpose of the 
 and similar documents used by 
other financial institutions is to ensure that claims analysts are consistently following the same 
investigation procedures to comply with the EFTA/Reg E error resolution procedures.9 My 
understanding is that, before September 28, 2020, the Bank’s general practice and policy with 
respect to investigating and decisioning EDD cardholder unauthorized transaction claims, 
 
8 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 133:5-8, 135:9-20; Ex. 79 at -12738. 
9 
 
 
; Ex. 80 at -3890 (Sept. 24, 2020 training) (“
 
 
 
 
”). 
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including EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized ATM withdrawals, was to follow the 
procedures set forth in the 
10 
C. 
The Bank’s Use of the Claim Fraud Filter  
22. 
I understand that the Bank applied a “Claim Fraud Filter” (“CFF”) during the 
period September 28, 2020 to June 8, 2021 (the “Class Period”) to automatically deny all EDD 
cardholder claims that were submitted or pending during the CFF Period, and that met the 
criteria of any one of the CFF’s three “Indicators.”11 
23. 
I also understand that the Bank used the CFF during the Class Period to 
automatically rescind permanent credits issued on claims that had been opened on or after April 
1, 2020, that the Bank had previously paid before implementing the CFF on September 28, 2020, 
and that met the criteria of any one of the CFF’s three Indicators.12  
24. 
During the period of September 28, 2020 until March 17, 2021, if the Bank used 
its CFF to automatically deny a claim or rescind permanent credit issued on a claim as set forth 
above, I understand that the Bank also automatically “froze” the associated EDD debit card 
account. I understand such freezing of an EDD debit card account prevented the affected EDD 
cardholder from accessing any EDD benefits in their account and prevented EDD from 
depositing any new benefits payments into that account so long as it remained frozen.13 
25. 
Because I understand that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification seeks to 
certify classes of EDD cardholders whose claims were denied, whose permanent credits were 
rescinded, and/or whose accounts were frozen based solely on Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud 
Filter, this report focuses on Indicator 1. My understanding is that CFF Indicator 1 is a 
 
14 
 
10 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 146:16-21, 234:24-236:5 (
 
 
). 
11 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 21:6-23, 39:16-40:8, 42:3-8, 52:21-53:9, 209:20-24, 234:13-21; 
Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 124:20-125:17, 162:1-25, 173:7-23. 177:6-178:12. 
12 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 233:3-9, 234:24-235:11, 284:15-20; Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 173:24-
174:16, 175:6-14, 178:13-23, 179:13-180:1. 
13 See Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 159:15-18, 179:13-180:6, 192:24-193:10, 223:18-224:16. 
14 See ¶¶58-59. 
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that the Bank used to identify and automatically deny, or automatically rescind permanent credit 
issued on, any EDD cardholder claim that consisted entirely of one or more disputed PIN-enabled 
ATM withdrawals (commonly referred to in the industry as an “ATM claim”), or that consisted of 
a combination of disputed 
 
 (often referred to in Bank documents as an “
” claim).15 I understand that 
EDD debit cards had a four-digit PIN. 
26. 
In the banking and financial services industry, a card transaction is commonly 
referred to as “PIN-enabled” or “pinned” if completing the transaction requires entry of the 
personal identification number (“PIN”) associated with the card. The terms “PIN-enabled” and 
“pinned” are synonymous in this context. 
VII. 
STATEMENT AND EXPLANATION OF OPINIONS 
A. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is widely recognized that a 
debit card issuer cannot deny an unauthorized transaction claim unless it has 
conducted an adequate investigation of that claim that includes the review of 
all available relevant records. 
27. 
The Electronic Fund Transfer Act protects individual consumers who engage in, 
or whose cards or accounts are used to engage in, various kinds of electronic transactions, 
including debit card transactions at ATMs and POS terminals. EFTA is implemented by 
Regulation E, commonly referred to in the industry as “Reg E.” EFTA/Reg E provide a number 
of requirements that debit card issuers must follow when a cardholder makes an unauthorized 
transaction claim. 
28. 
It is widely recognized in the banking and financial services industry that, to deny 
an unauthorized transaction claim under EFTA/Reg E, the financial institution must conduct an 
 
15 See Ex. 81 at -592328 (describing Indicator 1 as “
 
”); Ex. 50 at -90640, -90643 (same); Ex. 47 at -100649 (describing Indicator 1 as 
“
”); Ex. 17 (Letson Tr.) 92:19-23 (agreeing that Indicator 1 
“
 
”); id. 93:6-94:5 (Indicator 1 applied to any “
 
”); Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 125:25-126:8, 127:8-10 (similar); Ex. 14 
(Daniels Tr.) 285:22-286:12; 289:11-12 (similar). 
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adequate investigation that includes the review of all available relevant records and must 
conclude based on that adequate investigation that the cardholder authorized the transaction. This 
industry standard practice is reflected in Bank of America’s AISOP and related training 
materials.16 
29. 
In the banking and financial services industry, it is industry standard when 
investigating an unauthorized transaction claim to review relevant records of both the card issuer 
(in this case, Bank of America) and third-party service providers that the card issuer can easily 
access. An example of available relevant records of a third-party service provider that the Bank 
could easily access in this case would be records in the Visa Prepaid Administration System 
(“Visa PAS”), which is Visa’s platform for financial institution management of prepaid debit 
cards. Visa PAS contains information that is highly relevant to investigations of EDD cardholder 
claims, including information about each EDD debit card’s card activity, transaction history, 
account history, and notes entered by financial institution employees and contractors.17 
30. 
The above industry standard practices are reflected in the Bank’s 
 and 
related training documents that instruct claims analysts how to investigate unauthorized 
transaction claims. These Bank documents state that claims investigations and decisions must be 
based on “
”18 and “
,” and that the 
 
16 See, e.g., Ex. 82 at -559693 (
 
 
 
 
); Ex. 35 at -1312 (
 
). 
17 See Ex. 83 at -100507, -100514, -100516-17, -100520, -100528 (Bank training materials 
detailing numerous “
”); 
Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 159:24-160:11, 163:1-3 (agreeing Visa PAS contains relevant and helpful 
information for investigating claims); Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 184:10 (calling Visa PAS “
 
” for EDD debit cards). 
18 See Ex. 84 at -6484 (Apr. 2020 training) (“
 
 
.”); Ex. 80 at -3890 (Sept. 2020 training) (same); Ex. 
47 at -100637 (Oct. 2020 training) (same); Ex. 36 at -4542 (Mar. 2021 training) (same); see also 
 
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cardholder is not required to “
” that fraud occurred for the claim to be paid but rather it is 
the card issuer that has 
” in order to deny the claim.19 In other words, 
“
 
 
.”20 All these statements are consistent with industry standards. 
 
Ex. 84 at -6487 (Apr. 2020 training)21 
 
Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 120:16-21 (describing 
 
”). 
19 Ex. 84 at -6847 (Apr. 2020 training); Ex. 80 at -3888 (Sept. 2020 training); Ex. 47 at -100636 
(Oct. 2020 training). 
20 Ex. 36 at -4536 (Jan. 2021 training). 
21 Slides with the same or similar language also appear in later training documents. See Ex. 80 at 
-3888 (Sept. 2020); Ex. 47 at -100636 (Oct. 2020). 
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B. 
The Bank’s 
 and related training materials for claims analysts provide 
sensible procedures for EFTA/Reg E compliance that are consistent with 
well-established industry standards for investigating unauthorized 
transaction claims. 
31. 
The Bank’s training materials state that claims analysts must follow the 
 
(sometimes referred to as the “
”) when investigating and 
decisioning claims, in order to ensure that claims investigations and decisions are “
,” 
“
,” and “
.”22 This is all industry standard. 
32. 
The Bank’s 
 
 
.23 
33. 
The claim type of a particular disputed transaction is determined by the kind of 
transaction that is being disputed and the reason why. A few basic facts are usually sufficient to 
establish the claim type. Such facts include whether the transaction at issue involves a debit card 
or credit card; whether the transaction was “card present” (i.e., whether it required using the 
physical card, as would be the case with an ATM withdrawal or purchase through a POS 
terminal) or “card not present” (e.g., an online purchase); and whether the customer is alleging 
the transaction was unauthorized (commonly referred to as a “fraud claim”) or that the merchant 
simply charged them the wrong amount (commonly referred to as a “billing dispute” or “non-
fraud claim”). 
34. 
This report focuses on the Bank’s 
, 
because this is the only complete copy of the 
 that I understand the Bank has produced in 
this litigation. Ex. 82 at -559693 (
).24 That 
 
 
22 Ex. 84 at -6484 (Apr. 2020 training); Ex. 80 at -3890 (Sept. 2020 training); Ex. 47 at -100637 
(Oct. 2020 training); Ex. 36 at -4542 (Mar. 2021 training). 
23 See Ex. 82 at -559693 (
) (“
 
”). 
24 I assume that any other versions of the 
 in effect in during or near the Class Period are 
generally consistent with the
 version, as relates to the two relevant claim types 
identified in this paragraph. This assumption is informed by a 
 
 
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. Of these, there are only two claim types that I understand to 
be relevant to investigations of EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized ATM withdrawals: 
(1) “
” (id. at -559893-98), which I 
understand to be applicable to EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized 
 
;25 and (2) “
” (id. at -559898-901), which I 
understand to apply to EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized 
 
 submitted 
by EDD cardholders.26  
35. 
The 
 for those two claim types are generally 
consistent with what I would expect to see, and in my opinion are generally consistent with 
industry standards. For example, the claim type 
 
 
” Id. at -559893-94. 
 
” 
Id. at -559898-99. Bank training materials and deposition testimony 
 
 
 
 
, Ex. 82 at -559979, as well as by 
excerpts of other versions of the 
 produced by the Bank, which appear to be generally 
consistent with the 
 version. See Ex. 35 at -1312 (19-page excerpt with effective 
date of 
); Ex. 85 at -718756 (15-page excerpt of undated version). 
25 Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 152:1-25, 287:19-288:12. 
26 
 
 (Ex. 82 at -559911-14), which I understand would apply to 
reconsideration of EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized ATM withdrawals that were denied 
by the Bank’s CFF, and the claim type 
 
 (id. at -559914-18), which I understand would apply to 
 denied by Indicator 1 of the 
CFF. My analysis does not focus on either of these claim types, however, because “reconsideration” 
investigations—i.e., when a financial institution re-investigates a denied claim at the 
cardholder’s request—are widely deemed in the industry not to be required by EFTA/Reg E, but 
to be a voluntary customer service measure. 
 
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15 
 
.27 
36. 
Below, I provide my understanding of each of the 
 
 
 
.28 For each 
, I provide some 
illustrations of the kinds of information the 
 could reveal that would be helpful 
to determining whether the cardholder authorized or benefited from the transaction, and therefore 
helpful to correctly decisioning a claim. 
(1) “
” – I understand this to refer to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 137:9-138:10; Ex. 36 at -4549 (
 
 
 
 
 
). 
28 
 
 
 
 
. See Ex. 82 at -559898-99. Of these, 
 
 
 
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16 
 
 
(2) “
” – 
 
 
 
 
 
.29 
For disputed ATM withdrawals, other important information that is industry standard to review 
would have been located in 
 
 
 
.30 Such information could be critical to correctly decision a 
claim, as it could reveal activity consistent with criminal activity, such as 
 
 
.31 
(3) “
” – The Bank describes this 
 
 
 
 
 
29 See also Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 90:1-91:5 (
 
”). 
30 Ex. 47 at -100656. 
31 See, e.g., Ex. 36 at -100546 (Bank training materials) (“
 
 
 
 
”); id. at -100555 (“
 
 
.”). 
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.”32 It is industry standard to review these kinds of 
 
 information. 
(4) “
” – It is industry standard 
to review 
 
 
 
. Such information 
that is highlighted in Bank training materials, and this is industry standard to review, includes the 
following: 
• 
 – 
 
. For example, if the 
account history shows that a nondisputed ATM withdrawal was made in California only 20 
minutes before a disputed ATM withdrawal was made in New York, that would indicate that it 
was impossible for the cardholder to personally complete both card-present transactions, and that 
there are therefore multiple copies of the card (at least one of which is very likely counterfeit). 
This would be key information indicating that the disputed ATM withdrawal was very likely 
unauthorized. 
• 
 – It is industry standard to review 
 
. It is widely recognized in the industry that 
transactions that 
 indicate an increased 
risk that those transactions may be fraudulent. Conversely, transactions that ar
 
 indicate an increased likelihood that the transactions were authorized. 
For example, if a cardholder disputes a $100 ATM withdrawal but the analysis of 
 
 
32 Ex. 84 at -6502 (
); Ex. 47 at -100657 (
). 
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18 
 
, this would increase the likelihood that the cardholder may have made the 
disputed ATM withdrawal but forgot that they did so.33 
• 
 – Visa 
and other major card networks use 
 
. Review of this 
information helps to establish 
 and is industry standard to review. For 
example, if a card has previously only been used to make transactions of 
 
 
, that 
would indicate a significant 
 that would increase the likelihood 
that the disputed transaction was not authorized. 
• 
 – 
 
, and it is an important component of comparing 
disputed transactions with 
. For example, if a
 
 shows that a card has only been previously used to make transactions 
 
 
, that is a 
significant increase in 
 
 and consistent with unauthorized use, increasing the likelihood that the disputed ATM 
withdrawals were not authorized. 
(5) “
” – This is a standard piece of 
information to analyze when investigating a fraud ATM claim. For example, if a cardholder 
 
33 See Ex. 86 at -3924 (Sept. 2020 training) (“
 
 
 
 
 
”); Ex. 47 at -100669 (Oct. 2020 training) (same). 
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reports 
 
, this would increase the 
likelihood that the disputed ATM withdrawal was not authorized.34  
(6) “
 
 – It is 
industry standard when investigating ATM fraud claims to review 
 
 for multiple reasons. The first is 
 
 
 If 
there are significant differences in 
 
 
, thus 
increasing the likelihood that the transaction was unauthorized. 
 can also 
reveal additional helpful information, such as 
 
, which would be indicative of fraud and increase the likelihood 
that the cardholder did not authorize the disputed ATM withdrawal.35 
(7) “
” – As 
discussed above, 
 
. Bank training documents indicate that 
 
 
, all of which would be 
important, industry standard information to review when investigating a fraud ATM claim.36 
 
34 See also Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 155:23-156:21. 
35 See, e.g., Ex. 47 at -100663 (
 
 
 
35k”). 
36 See Ex. 83 at -100507, -100514, -100516-17, -100520 (
); Ex. 86 at -3924; Ex. 
14 (Daniels Tr.) 153:24-154:7, 154:15-16, 156:1-10, 158:8-11, 159:24-160:11, 163:1-3. 
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20 
(8) “
” – 
 
 
would be important information. For example, 
 
 
, this would increase the likelihood that the cardholder 
 
.  
(9) “
”37 – If a cardholder 
 
, it is industry standard to review 
 
. If this revealed, for example, that the cardholder 
 
 
, this would corroborate a representation from the 
cardholder that they were not in Northern California but in Arizona when the disputed 
transaction was made, and would increase the likelihood that the cardholder did not make or 
authorize the disputed ATM withdrawal. 
(10) “
”38 – The Bank 
describes this 
 as involving review of “
 
 
,” in order to “[
 
 
37 The corresponding 
 
,” Ex. 82 at -559899, 
which I understand to mean that 
 
 
 
 
. 
38 The corresponding 
 
 
,” Ex. 82 at -559898, which I understand to mean 
that 
 
 
 
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.”39 
Bank training materials list 
 
 
 
.40 Such information could tend to support or disprove a theory that 
disputed transactions are the result of an “account takeover,” which is an industry term that refers 
to a third party having unlawfully gained control of the cardholder’s account, including by 
 in order to (for example) 
change the card PIN and address and have a new card mailed to that address.41 
(11) “
 – A common practice in the 
industry is to review 
 
. As stated in Bank training materials, 
the information in 
 
.”42 
(12) “
” – It is a common practice to review the 
 
 during a fraud claim investigation, especially if 
other evidence indicates suspicion of account takeover activity. As stated in Bank training 
materials, review of “
 
 
.” can help to 
 
39 Ex. 84 at -6504. 
40 Ex. 87 at -100621, -100623. 
41 See, e.g., Ex. 86 at -3929-35 (
 
 
 
”); Ex. 50 at -90640 (
) (
 
 
 
”). 
42 Ex. 84 at -6500. 
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“
 
.”43 
(13) “
” – It is 
a common practice to review 
, including a 
. For example, if the cardholder 
 
 
 
, this would increase the 
likelihood that the customer is telling the truth about having been out of the country when the 
disputed ATM withdrawals were made, and therefore increase the likelihood the cardholder did 
not make or authorize the disputed ATM withdrawals. 
37. 
As the Bank’s training materials correctly emphasize, each of these 
 
could reveal information that is not just relevant but potentially outcome-dispositive: “
 
 
 
.”44 For example, take the sixth 
 
 listed above (“
”). If 
 
 used a blank white card 
(i.e., a counterfeit card) to make the disputed ATM withdrawal, and the Bank had no evidence 
the Cardholder had authorized or benefited from the withdrawal, the industry standard claim 
decision would be to pay the cardholder’s claim.45 On the other hand, if 
 
 
), this would be important 
 
43 Ex. 84 at -6492. 
44 Ex. 36 at -4542 (emphasis in original); Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 141:14-142:15. 
45 See also Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 73:17-23.  
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23 
information that would increase the likelihood that the cardholder had made or authorized the 
disputed ATM withdrawal. 
38. 
In addition to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.46 According to a designated 
representative of the Bank, this means that 
 
 
.47 
 
 
46 Ex. 82 at -559895-97, -559901. The same is true of 
 
 
” See id. at -559906, -559910, -559914, -
559918, -559922, -559925. 
47 Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 138:14-140:4; cf. Ex. 82 at -559896-97, -559900-01 (
 
 
).  
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24 
Ex. 82 at -559897, -559901 (
) 
39. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
;48 
 
 
 
49 
 
 
48 Accord Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 147:5-16 (
 
). 
49 See, e.g., Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 147:5-16 (
 
); Ex. 50 at -90640 (
 
 
 
; Ex. 86 at -3929-35 (
 
 
 
).  
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25 
50 
,” as set 
forth in the following excerpt from a Bank training document: 
Ex. 36 at -4556 (Mar. 2021 training)51 
40. 
The Bank’s training materials provide a useful example of how the Bank’s stated 
 might play out in a real-life investigation. The Bank’s 
example, reproduced below, illustrates the importance of following the industry-standard 
practice of giving each claim an individualized investigation in which all pertinent records and 
details are review by a trained claims analyst in order to make a fully informed and evidence-
based decision about whether the Bank has sufficient information to conclude that a cardholder 
authorized the transaction, and thus sufficient information to deny the claim. 
 
50 
 is well-known and long-standing problem in the debit and credit card industry, 
 
 
 
 Accord Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 49:21-53:14, 65:21-66:6 
(
 
; Ex. 17 (Letson Tr.) 156:14-157:5, 
165:1-12 (similar); Ex. 89 at -57505 (
 
 
); id. at -
57504 (
). 
51 The same information appears in other training materials. See Ex. 47 at -100669 (Oct. 2020 
training). 
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Ex. 86 at -3927-28 (Sept. 24, 2020 training)52 
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41. 
In the above example, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. What this illustrates is the importance 
of each piece of relevant information in reaching a correct claim decision, 
 
 
. 
 
C. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was a significant 
departure from the Bank’s 
. 
42. 
As stated above, my understanding from reviewing Bank documents and 
deposition testimony listed in Appendix B is that the Bank used its Claim Fraud Filter to 
automatically deny EDD cardholder claims that met the criteria of any one of the CFF’s three 
“indicators,” without any further review or investigation.  
43. 
My understanding from reviewing Bank documents and deposition testimony 
listed in Appendix B is that CFF Indicator 1 was a screening tool designed to identify whether an 
EDD cardholder’s unauthorized transaction claim 
 
 and, if so, to automatically deny the claim. To my knowledge, 
 
 
 
 
 
52 See also Ex. 36 at -4577-78 (
). 
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. My understanding is informed by, and appears to be 
consistent with, the Bank’s designated representatives’ deposition testimony.53  
44. 
If my understanding is correct that CFF Indicator 1 
 
, and that the Bank used CFF Indicator 1 as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholder unauthorized transaction claims, this was in my opinion a significant 
departure from the Bank’s 
. It was a 
significant departure because it means the Bank denied EDD cardholders’ ATM claims and 
ATM combo claims without 
 
 
, as summarized and discussed above at paragraph 36 and note 28. 
45. 
This opinion is informed and supported by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 See, e.g., Ex. 17 (Letson Tr.) 92:19-23, 93:6-12 (
 
 
”); 
Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 289:11-12, 290:12-15 (
 
”); 
Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 125:22-126:8, 127:8-10, 173:20-23, 177:25-178:7 (
 
 
). 
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“
 
.”54 All of these considerations are part of the applicable 
 summarized and discussed above at paragraph 36, and all of these 
considerations would be industry-standard information to review when investigating a claim of 
an unauthorized ATM withdrawal. 
46. 
As stated above, 
 
 
 
 
,”55 
all of which is industry standard. 
 
 
 
. This too was a significant departure from the Bank’s 
 
and contrary to industry standards. 
 
D. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
denying EDD cardholders’ unauthorized transaction claims was contrary to 
industry standards. 
47. 
For largely the same reasons explained above, the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 
to deny all EDD cardholder claims that included an ATM withdrawal was contrary to industry 
standards for multiple independent reasons. 
48. 
One reason that the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all EDD cardholder 
claims that included an ATM withdrawal was contrary to industry standards is that it resulted in 
the denial of claims without the Bank conducting an industry-standard investigation of relevant 
records available to the Bank, 
 
 
54 Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 128:20-21, 129:16-132:15. 
55 Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 90:1-16, 91:6-2. 
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. 
49. 
Another reason that the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all EDD 
cardholder claims that included an ATM withdrawal was contrary to industry standards is that it 
resulted in the denial of claims without any claim-specific reason to believe the cardholder 
authorized or benefited from the transaction, which is the only industry-standard reason for 
denying a claim. The fact that a claim involves an ATM withdrawal is not an industry-standard 
reason to conclude that the cardholder authorized or benefited from the ATM withdrawal; if it 
were, debit card issuers would not have claim types applicable to investigating fraud ATM 
claims, and would instead simply deny all ATM claims as a matter of course without conducting 
any investigation. But that is not what occurs in the industry. Instead, it is industry standard 
among debit card issuers to conduct an adequate investigation of fraud ATM claims.  
50. 
The Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all EDD cardholder claims that 
included an ATM withdrawal was also contrary to industry standards for at least three reasons 
specific to the EDD debit card and the EDD debit card program.  
(1)  It is my understanding that all EDD debit cards issued before July 2021 were 
magnetic-stripe-only debit cards without EMV chips.56 It is well known in the industry that 
magnetic-stripe-only debit cards without EMV chips are vulnerable to card skimming and card 
counterfeiting.57 This makes magnetic-stripe-only debit cards more susceptible to card-present 
transaction fraud, including the use of counterfeit cards to make ATM withdrawals.58 Given this 
 
56 See Ex. 15 (Chestnut Tr.) 190:14-17. 
57 See note 50. 
58 See, e.g., Ex. 32 at -228914 (
 
 
 
 
 
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known vulnerability of EDD debit cards, which I understand were issued as magnetic-stripe-only 
cards without EMV chips throughout the Class Period, it would have been industry standard for 
the Bank to look both for evidence that the card had been skimmed and for signs of counterfeit 
card fraud when investigating EDD cardholder claims of unauthorized ATM withdrawals. 
 
 
(2)  It is also my understanding that the Bank 
 
 
, which could provide critical information to correctly 
decision claims.59 When a card issuer has intelligence about significant criminal activity 
impacting a particular product, it is industry standard for the card issuer to inform claims analysts 
about that known threat to enable the claims analysts to leverage that intelligence to detect 
similar fraud and correctly decision claims. 
 
 
 
. 
(3)  Given the size of the EDD debit card program (approximately 8-9 million 
active EDD debit cards in September 2020, see ¶17) and the amount of benefits on those cards, 
one would expect that incoming claims would contain some mix of fraudulent claims and 
legitimate claims. For example, I understand that the Bank had concerns before and during the 
Class Period about fraudulent claims being submitted by criminals who had used stolen identities 
 
”); Ex. 34 at -297295 (
 
 
 
; Ex. 33 at -455617 (
 
 
 
 
 
. 
59 See, e.g., Ex. 47 at -100663 (
 
”). 
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to be approved for EDD benefits and EDD debit cards, had used those cards to make transactions, 
and who had submitted fraudulent unauthorized transaction claims in an attempt to receive 
provisional or permanent credit on those claims, thereby doubling their ill-gotten gains. (I’ll refer 
to these as “fraudulent claims”). On the other hand, during the same period, I also understand 
that legitimate EDD cardholders’ card information and PINs were wrongfully obtained in a 
variety of ways by criminals, who used that information to make unauthorized ATM withdrawals 
and other unauthorized transactions, which led the legitimate EDD cardholders who were the 
victims of this transaction fraud to make unauthorized transaction claims (I’ll refer to these as 
“legitimate claims”). I understand that the Bank was aware of both kinds of fraud affecting EDD 
debit cards and accounts, and thus should have expected, 
, its incoming claims to 
include both fraudulent claims and legitimate claims.60 The industry-standard way of ferreting 
out fraudulent claims from legitimate claims is to conduct an adequate investigation of each 
claim (which can be supplemented by claims and non-claims personnel conducting separate and 
ongoing investigations of suspected organized criminal activity, fraud rings, and the like). The 
Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 to deny all claims that include an ATM withdrawal was contrary 
to industry standards because it made no attempt to differentiate the fraudulent claims from the 
legitimate claims, but instead summarily denied all claims that included an ATM withdrawal. 
 
 
60 See, e.g., Ex. 33 at -455617 (
 
 
 
; Ex. 90 at -218256 (
 
 
 
”); 
Ex. 44 at -450517 (
 
 
 
”). 
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E. 
The Bank could have adopted strategies other than CFF Indicator 1 to deal 
with any operational challenges related to EDD cardholder claims of 
unauthorized ATM withdrawals, including prioritizing investigation of 
higher-value claims and hiring or contracting additional claims analysts. 
51. 
While I understand that the Bank’s prepaid claims operation faced elevated claims 
volume and other operational challenges during the Class Period, it is contrary to industry 
standards to deal with such operational challenges by summarily denying claims without 
conducting an adequate investigation. Banks and other financial institutions subject to 
EFTA/Reg E sometimes face unusual circumstances that may cause a spike in claims volume or 
concerns about fraudulent claims, and industry standard methods have developed for dealing 
with those challenges. 
52. 
Industry standard strategies for dealing with a spike in claims volume include 
prioritizing investigation of higher-dollar-value claims; increasing the monetary threshold at 
which low-dollar-value claims are auto-paid without conducting an investigation thereby 
decreasing the number of claims that need to be investigated; and increasing the number of full-
time-equivalent claims analysts, including through the use of large staffing companies such as 
Accenture, as necessary to timely process claims and ensure that no claims are denied without 
first receiving an adequate investigation. 
53. 
While there are costs to implementing these industry standard strategies, that is a 
standard cost of doing business. Additionally, the Bank has long been a highly profitable 
financial institution and had sufficient resources to bear the costs of implementing these 
strategies. For example, I understand that in April 2021, the Bank announced a $25 billion 
common stock repurchase plan “to return to shareholders excess capital that is not needed to … 
deliver for customers and communities.”61 A small fraction of that “excess capital” would have 
been sufficient to hire or contract for the additional claims analysts required to investigate all 
 
61 Bank of America Announces $25 Billion Common Stock Repurchase Plan, Bank of America 
Newsroom (April 15, 2021), https://newsroom.bankofamerica.com/content/newsroom/press-
releases/2021/04/bank-of-america-announces--25-billion-common-stock-repurchase-pl.html. 
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EDD cardholder claims, including those that were summarily denied by the Bank’s use of CFF 
Indicator 1. 
 
F. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
rescinding permanent credits that the Bank had previously paid EDD 
cardholders was contrary to industry standards.  
54. 
As stated above, my understanding is that the Bank also used CFF Indicator 1 as 
the sole basis for automatically rescinding permanent credits that it had paid to EDD cardholders 
between April 1, 2020 and September 28, 2020.62 In other words, my understanding is that once 
the Bank developed and began implementing CFF Indicator 1, it used that “filter” to 
automatically take back permanent credits that the Bank had issued to EDD cardholders on any 
claim that included an ATM withdrawal, despite having previously resolved that claim in the 
cardholder’s favor. 
55. 
I also understand that when the Bank issued permanent credits to EDD 
cardholders between April 1, 2020 and September 28, 2020, it sent a notice to the affected EDD 
cardholders informing them that the credit the Bank was issuing them was “permanent.”63 This is 
an industry standard practice. Consistent with its ordinary meaning, the word “permanent” is 
commonly used in the industry in this context to convey that the claim process has been 
conclusively resolved in the cardholder’s favor.64 
56. 
Rescinding permanent credit is a rare event. I am aware of it occurring only in 
circumstances that, at minimum, involve the discovery new information, ideally new information 
not previously available to the financial institution, that clearly establishes the cardholder 
authorized or benefited from the transaction. For example, it would be consistent with industry 
 
62 Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 179:13-180:1, 320:24-321:12. 
63 See, e.g., Ex. 61 at Moore_S_0000367 (Aug. 31, 2020) (Bank letter to Plaintiff who was 
issued permanent credit: “We’ve completed our investigation of this disputed transaction. The 
previously issued [provisional] credit for [claim amount] is now permanent.”); Ex. 62 at 
PLFF00000011 (Sept. 2, 2020) (same). 
64 
 
 
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standards, in my opinion, for a debit card issuer to rescind permanent credit if, after issuing the 
permanent credit, the card issuer received a communication from the cardholder stating that they 
now remember having made the disputed transaction. This would be consistent with industry 
standards because this would be new information not previously available to the card issuer and 
that conclusively establishes that the cardholder made the transaction. On the other hand, it 
generally would be contrary to industry standards, in my opinion, for a card issuer to rescind 
permanent credit based on information that was known to the card issuer at the time it 
investigated and decided to pay the claim. 
57. 
In my opinion, the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 as the sole basis for rescinding 
permanent credit issued to EDD cardholders was contrary to industry standards for at least three 
independent reasons. Specifically, it was contrary to industry standards because the fact that the 
affected claims included a disputed ATM withdrawal (
 
): (1) was known to the Bank when it decided to pay the claim by issuing 
permanent credit; (2) did not involve any new information, much less new information not 
previously available to the Bank; and (3) did nothing to call into question the correctness of the 
Bank’s previous decision to pay the claim, much less clearly establish that the cardholder 
authorized or benefitted from the transaction, for all the reasons discussed above in Part VII, 
Sections D-E. 
G. 
The Bank’s use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter as the sole basis for 
freezing EDD cardholder accounts was contrary to industry standards. 
58. 
It is standard in the industry for financial institutions to monitor their customers’ 
cards and accounts for signs of fraudulent activity. At a very general level, financial institutions 
carry out this monitoring through a variety of industry-standard rules and technologies, which 
include fraud “rules” and fraud “models.” Fraud rules are instructions structured as if-then 
statements—i.e., if certain conditions are present (e.g., an attempted ATM withdrawal greater 
than or equal to $500 originating outside North America), then take a specific action (e.g., decline 
the transaction). The terms “fraud rule” and “fraud filter” are generally synonymous; both are 
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structured as if-then statements.65 Fraud models are a more complex technology that are often 
developed by third parties, have long leveraged artificial intelligence and machine learning based 
on large data sets of known fraud and non-fraud payment data, and can be tailored to specific 
geographic regions and lines of business; an example is FICO’s Falcon Fraud Manager.66 Fraud 
models and rules are often used together. For example, fraud models typically assign individual 
transactions a “score,” which is intended to capture in numerical form the risk that the transaction 
is fraudulent, and card issuers commonly write rules where one of the conditions in the “if” part 
of the rule statement is based on that scoring (e.g., if a transaction with defined characteristics is 
scored within a particular range, then decline the transaction).67 
59. 
In my opinion, based on my understanding of CFF Indicator 1 as stated in this 
report, CFF Indicator 1 was not a fraud model, but was a fraud rule with a simple if-then 
structure that could be paraphrased as follows: 
 
.68 My understanding is that the Bank used 
CFF Indicator 1 to deny claims and freeze the associated EDD debit card accounts during the 
 
65 Accord Ex. 17 (Letson Tr.) 61:5-7 (a fraud filter is “
”); id. 225:3-7 (similar). 
66 See, e.g., FICO Blog, “The Fraud Consortium: 9,000 Heads Are Better than 1” (Dec. 6, 2017), 
fico.com/blogs/fraud-consortium-9-000-heads-are-better-1; FICO Blog, “FICO Fights Prepaid 
Card Fraud with AI and Machine Learning” (Mar. 9, 2020), fico.com/blogs/fico-fights-prepaid-
card-fraud-ai-and-machine-learning; FICO, “Falcon Intelligence Network: A Fraud Consortium 
for Fraud-Fighting Machine Learning Innovation” (Mar. 26, 2021), fico.com/blogs/falcon-
intelligence-network-fraud-consortium-fraud-fighting-machine-learning-innovation; see 
generally FICO, “FICO® Falcon® Fraud Manager,” https://www.fico.com/en/products/fico-
falcon-fraud-manager. 
67 Accord Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 208:3-21 (
 
 
”). 
68 Accord Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 127:1-10, 209:12-210:5 (
 
 
 
”); see also id. 171:8-15, 207:21-208:8 (“
 
”); Ex. 17 (Letson Tr.) 61:1-7, 225:3-7 (similar). 
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37 
period September 28, 2020 to March 17, 2021,69 and that the Bank thereafter stopped using CFF 
Indicator 1 to freeze EDD debit accounts and instead used Indicator 1 to deny claims and block 
the associated EDD debit card accounts during the period March 18, 2021 to 
 
.70 
60. 
As a designated representative of the Bank testified (correctly in my view), fraud 
rules by their nature are 
 
 
 
.71  
61. 
The “then” component of fraud rules is the consequence that occurs when the “if” 
part of the rule is triggered. Consequences used by card issuers include, in order from least to 
most severe: declining transactions, suspending cards/accounts, blocking cards/accounts, and 
freezing cards/accounts.72 Freezing a card/account is the most severe consequence with an 
enormous impact on the cardholder.  
62. 
I have never heard of a debit card issuer doing what I understand the Bank to have 
done here with respect to CFF Indicator 1—i.e., using a fraud rule as the sole basis either for 
summarily denying claims, or for summarily freezing cards/accounts. In my experience, freezing 
an account typically occurs only in limited circumstances due to reasons such as receipt of a 
court order to freeze specified cards/accounts, a request from a prepaid card sponsor (in this case, 
EDD) to freeze specified cards/accounts, or an individualized investigation conducted by a 
 
69 See Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 221:11-224:16. 
 
 
. See id. 
70 See Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 302:2-25; 321:19-23; Ex. 91 at -125920-21 (
 
 
).  
71 Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 286:25-288:8. 
72 In the prepaid context, taking a particular action with respect to the card (e.g., suspending, 
blocking, freezing) is generally synonymous with taking that same action with respect to the 
account. 
. 
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38 
trained analyst that leads the card issuer to conclude with a high degree of confidence that a 
specific card/account is being used for criminal purposes.  
63. 
My understanding is that the Bank used the CFF to freeze EDD cardholder 
accounts and 
 
 
.73 I also understand that the Bank continued 
following this practice of 
 
 
 
 
.74 
I understand that the Bank was also aware that many EDD cardholders who managed to reach an 
EDD call center agent were told by the agent that 
 
, thereby subjecting EDD 
cardholders whose accounts were frozen by the CFF Indicator 1 to a “
 
.”75 
64. 
In my opinion, the Bank’s use of CFF Indicator 1 as the sole basis for summarily 
freezing EDD debit card accounts was contrary to industry standards for at least three 
independent reasons. (1) For all the same reasons underlying my opinion that CFF Indicator 1 
did not provide a reasonable basis for the Bank to conclude that the cardholder had made or 
 
73 See Ex. 15 (Chestnut Tr.) at 146:1-25, 157:9-14. 
74 See Ex. 15 (Chestnut Tr.) at 71:9-12, 155:17-157:14; Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 226:17-227:18, 
235:15-236:1, 272:16-274:13; Ex. 18 (Golden Tr.) 146:7-147:19, 149:10-21, 150:20-151:6, 
165:18-167:17; Ex. 63 at 16, 18. 
75 Ex. 64 at -90722 (
 
 
); see also Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 272:16-274:13 (
 
 
 
 
). 
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39 
authorized the disputed transaction and that the claim at issue was therefore fraudulent (see Part 
VII, Sections D-F), there was no reasonable basis for the Bank’s derivative conclusion that the 
account was therefore engaged in fraud and could be frozen. (2) As a fraud rule or filter, CFF 
Indicator 1 was only predictive and therefore provided only a suspicion that the submission of a 
fraud ATM claim meant that the associated EDD debit card account was being used for criminal 
purposes. It was contrary to industry standards for the Bank to use a fraud rule or filter as the 
sole basis for freezing EDD debit cards and accounts. (3) To the extent that the Bank considered 
CFF Indicator 1 as providing not just a predictive suspicion but a definitive determination that 
the associated EDD debit card account was being used for criminal purposes, that too was 
contrary to industry standards because the Bank reached such a determination based on a single 
criterion (Indicator 1),76 and without 
 
 
 
 (see Part VII, Sections D-F) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (see Part VII, Section H).  
65. 
In my opinion, there were reasonably available strategies other than freezing 
accounts based solely on CFF Indicator 1 that the Bank could have adopted to help identify EDD 
debit card accounts being used for criminal purposes, and which would have significantly 
reduced the harmful impact on legitimate EDD cardholders. In addition to the alternatives to 
 
76 See Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 326:6-9 (“
 
”); id. 283:1-15 (
 
 
). 
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40 
CFF Indicator 1 discussed above (see ¶¶51-53), the Bank could have blocked instead of freezing 
accounts, which would have permitted legitimate EDD cardholders an opportunity to 
authenticate identity directly with the Bank under the Bank’s “
 
 
 
 
 
.78  
66. 
This opinion is supported by my understanding that the Bank did precisely this 
(i.e., stopped using CFF Indicator 1 to freeze accounts, and instead used it to block accounts) 
during the period March 18, 2021 to 
, and by my understanding that there were no 
particular reasons why the Bank could not have implemented this same strategy during the 
period September 28, 2020 to March 17, 2021.  
H. 
The Banks’ continued use of Indicator 1 of the Claim Fraud Filter to deny 
claims, rescind permanent credits, and freeze accounts, 
 
, was contrary to industry 
standards. 
67. 
Card issuers use industry standard metrics for assessing the accuracy of their 
decisioning of claims. For example, it is industry standard for card issuers to periodically review 
each of their claims analysts for key performance indicators (“KPIs”), which measure 
compliance with organization-defined performance goals. For individual claims analysts, 
 
77 See Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 30:8-33:13; 188:4-190:16, 208:14-21, 218:2-220:7, 220:17-20, 268:2-4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
); see also id. 36:5-7, 108:3-18, 250:2-9, 255:23-256:17 (
 
” 
). 
78 See Ex. 16 (Martin Tr.) 277:25-278:12 (
 
); id. 314:25-315:11 (similar); 
Ex. 57 (
) (similar). 
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41 
industry standard KPIs include whether the analyst is complying with the issuer’s claims 
investigation procedures and policies, and the extent to which the analyst is correctly or 
incorrectly decisioning claims. To determine this, the person(s) performing the review takes a 
random sample of claims (i.e., the industry standard is to use a software-based randomizer) that 
the analyst has decisioned within a defined recent time frame, and reviews the analyst’s 
documentation and the available evidence for each sampled claim to determine whether the 
analyst complied with the card issuer’s procedures and policies, and whether the analyst 
correctly decisioned the claim (i.e., whether the reviewer disagrees with the analyst’s ultimate 
decision to pay or deny the claim). In my experience, card issuers typically review approximately 
ten investigations/decisions per month per claims analyst (more when an analyst is new). In my 
experience, which includes working with the claims organizations of many card issuers, an 
average claims analyst has an average claims audit overturn rate of approximately 1% or less. An 
analyst who incorrectly decisions more than 10% of reviewed claims would typically be required 
to undergo remedial training (e.g., take a re-training class), and if the analyst’s error rate 
continues to be above 10%, the industry standard card issuer response would be to terminate the 
analyst or move the analyst to another role in which they do not have responsibilities for 
investigating and decisioning claims. 
68. 
Throughout the Class Period, my understanding is that the Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79 I also understand that 
 
 
79 See, e.g., Ex. 93 at -517113 (
 
 
 
 
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42 
 
 
 
.80 
69. 
With respect to reconsideration of claims denied by the CFF, I understand that 
cardholders generally 
 
.81 
 
 
 
 
 (see note 26), 
 
 
 (see ¶¶35-
36 & note 28). 
 
 
 
; Ex. 94 at -159470 (
 
 
 Ex. 95 at 1 (
 
 
; Ex. 96 at -90135, -90143 (
 
 
). 
80 See, e.g., Ex. 94 at -159471 (
 
); Ex. 97 at -
406129 (
 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
 (see ¶63), 
 
. 
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43 
 
82 
70. 
With respect to Bank’s use of the CFF to rescind permanent credits, my 
understanding is that the Bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.83 
71. 
My understanding is that the Bank also 
 
. For example, in a Bank slide deck presenting what I 
understand to be 
 
 
,84 
 
. The slide also states that 
 
 
.85 In 
my opinion, such rates are incredibly high and virtually unheard of in the industry. Such rates 
 
82 See, e.g., Ex. 47 at -100641-44 (
 
 
). 
83 Ex. 141 at -571310 (
); Ex. 143 at -77224; Ex. 142 at -417490. 
84 EDD cardholders represent approximately 
. 
Ex. 98 (
 
 
 
). 
85 Ex. 100 at -572768. 
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44 
are, in my opinion, contrary to industry standards because they are many times higher than the 
1% and 10% industry standard rates discussed above. 
72. 
I understand that, during this litigation, the Bank produced data from the Class 
Period as set forth in the table below, which I understand shows 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.86 To this data provided by the 
Bank, I have added my own two columns that calculate, using basic excel formulas set forth in 
column title, 
 
 
. 
 
 
 
86 Ex. 98 (Bank’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory No. 39) at 9:11-21. 
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45 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
Chart derived from the Bank’s Data in Ex. 98 
(Bank’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Interrogatory 42, Exhibit 13) 
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46 
73. 
Assuming these data provided by the Bank are accurate, they show that the 
 
 
 
 
. Again, my opinion is that 
such rates are virtually unheard of in the industry and are contrary to industry standards because 
they are many times higher than the 1% and 10% industry standard rates discussed above.  
74. 
While I understand that 
 
 
 
 
 
 .87  
75. 
Additionally, I understand from a Bank interrogatory response in this litigation 
that, 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, I understand that the Bank 
 
 
 
.88 
My assumption, based on my industry experience 
 
 
 
87 Ex. 100 at -572767-68. 
88 Ex. 98 (
) at 9:11-21. 
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47 
 
 
. This is based on my understanding, first, 
 
 
 
 
. Second, my understanding is based on 
 
 
.89 
I. 
The claim denial letter that the Bank sent to EDD cardholders whose claims 
were denied, or whose prior permanent credit was rescinded, by CFF 
Indicator 1 was contrary to industry standards. 
76. 
It is widely recognized in the banking and financial services industry that, when a 
debit card issuer denies a customer’s unauthorized transaction, EFTA/Reg E requires the issuer 
to send the customer a written notice informing the customer that the claim was denied, and 
stating the reason(s) why the claim was denied. The card issuer’s reason(s) for denying a given 
claim are typically selected by the claims analyst that denied the claim, at the time that the claim 
is denied, typically from a preset menu of claim of denial reasons established by the card issuer. 
The claim denial reason selected by the claims analyst then goes into the claim denial letter that 
is sent to the cardholder. It is standard in the industry for debit card issuers to have procedures 
for automatically generating such claim denial letters once claims are denied, and that 
automatically populate the claim denial reason selected by the claims analyst into the text of the 
letter. My understanding is that this is generally consistent with 
 
 
89 See, e.g., Ex. 101 at -510145 (
 
 
). 
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48 
 
.90 
77. 
My understanding is that, with respect to each EDD cardholder whose claim was 
denied by operation of the CFF, or whose permanent credit was rescinded by operation of the 
CFF, the Bank 
 
informing them that their claim had been denied. I 
understand that these letters were based on 
 
 letters that I understand the Bank sent to 
plaintiffs being proposed as representatives of the Claim Denial and Credit Rescission classes 
after their claim was denied or permanent credit rescinded due to the Bank’s use of CFF 
Indicator 1.91  
 
90 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 187:14-189:5; Ex. 82 at -559895-97, -559899-901 (
 
 
 
). 
91 See Ex. 52 (
); Ex. 53 (denial/rescission letters sent to Claim 
Denial Plaintiffs Koole, McClure, Moon, Oosthuizen, Rivera, and Yuan, and Credit Rescission 
Plaintiffs Chong and Moore); Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 53:2-54:12, 220:12-221:11, 225:13-231:1; Ex. 
16 (Martin Tr.) 132:20-133:3. 
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49 
78. 
The identical content of those letters reads as set forth below. The only reason that 
this form letter provides for why the claim was closed is: “Your claim has been closed because 
we believe the account or the claim have been the subject of fraud or suspicious activity.” 
Exs. 52-53 
79. 
In my opinion, the Bank’s reason provided by its letters (Exs. D15-D16) is 
contrary to industry standards for at least three reasons. (1) The reason given is not one clear 
reason why the claim was denied, but two vague and unrelated alternative reasons for why the 
claim might have been denied (i.e., the account was the subject of fraud or suspicious activity, 
the claim was the subject of fraud or suspicious activity). It is contrary to industry standards, in 
my opinion, not to provide the cardholder a single and reasonably clear reason why the claim 
was actually denied (e.g., “we believe you authorized the disputed transaction”). (2) Although it 
could be consistent with industry standards to provide two reasons reason for denying the claim 
connected by an “or,” the two reasons need to be closely related conceptually (e.g., “we believe 
you made or authorized the disputed transaction”) in order to be consistent with industry 
standards. The Bank’s multiple reasons (i.e., the account was the subject of fraud or suspicious 
activity or the claim was the subject of fraud or suspicious activity) are contrary to industry 
standards because they are not conceptually related. It is a very different concept for an account 
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50 
to be the subject of fraud or suspicious activity (which could just as easily be a reason for paying 
the claim) than for a claim to be the subject of fraud or suspicious activity (which, although 
vague, could be interpreted as indicating the Bank believes the submission of the claim itself was 
fraudulent or suspicious). (3) The Bank’s reason for denying the claim is so vague that it could 
also be a reason for paying the claim. Specifically, any cardholder who makes a legitimate 
unauthorized transaction claim made the claim because they believe, in the Bank’s words, that 
their “account … ha[s] been the subject of fraud or suspicious activity” in the form of one or 
more unauthorized transactions.92 That is why they made the claim and, unless disproved, would 
be a reason that the Bank would be required to pay the claim. In my opinion, it is contrary to 
industry standards to provide a claim denial reason that is so vague that it could also be a reason 
to pay the claim. 
 
 
Executed on August 29, 2024  
 
                           
                         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J. Daniel Kreis 
 
92 See Ex. 14 (Daniels Tr.) 84:15-21 (
 
 
 
). 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6621     Page
54 of 63

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
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55 of 63

1 
 
J. Daniel Kreis 
2743 Gingerview Lane 
Annapolis, Maryland 21401 
jdkreis@gmail.com  443-510-8060 
 
SUMMARY 
Extensive experience driving innovation and impeccable execution in Consumer and Small Business 
lending, Risk and Portfolio Management with industry leaders. Expertise includes: 
• 
Development and implementation of Risk Tools and Treatment Strategies 
• 
Managing credit operations (Credit, Customer Service, Collections and Fraud) 
• 
Design and execution of Portfolio Governance and Financial Models 
• 
Managing test-and-control Marketing Campaigns  
• 
Directly managed portfolios and consulted with 100 plus lenders in 20 countries. 
 
WORK EXPEREINCE 
A history of developing new approaches to managing credit portfolios, using the latest tools, 
technologies and concepts working with some of the best minds in financial services. 
 
January 2021 – Present 
Founding Partner, Director of Lending and Shared Services – Percapita 
Founding Partner responsible for the development of Credit Products and shared services for credit and 
deposit (Customer Service and Fraud Mitigation). 
 
April 2019 – January 2021 
Founder – First Camden Consulting 
Launched a consultancy focused on credit portfolio management. Completed the following 
engagements: 
 
• 
Regional Credit Card Issuers – developed the Secured Credit Card graduation strategy to 
unsecured for a major regional US bank. 
• 
Fintech Credit Card Issuer – assisted an emerging Credit Card issuer analyze and develop 
mitigating strategies for application fraud management. 
• 
Fintech Credit Card Issuer – developed the credit underwriting and compliance policies for a 
new Credit Card program for a high wealth focused Fintech. 
• 
U.S. Retail Lender – directed the redesign of credit, collections, and compliance practices for a 
North American specialty lender. 
 
October 1996 – April 2019 
Director of Portfolio Management – First Annapolis Consulting (acquired by Accenture in 2017) 
Managed a consulting practice that focused on consumer and small business lending (primarily credit 
cards and retail finance). Key engagements include: 
 
• 
Regional Credit Card Issuers – developed several growth strategies for regional credit card 
issuers focused on Product Design, Marketing, Credit Underwriting and Account Management. 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6623     Page
56 of 63

2 
 
• 
Major Canadian Financial Institution – managed the implementation of risk systems (FD/Zoot) 
and practices for a new credit card start up. 
• 
Retail Lending – assisted numerous leading retail lenders in the U.S., Canada, RSA, and Spain. 
• 
U.S. Fleet Card Issuer – designed the underwriting and account management practices for 3 of 
the top 4 fleet card issuers. 
• 
Interim Operations Manager – directly managed credit card operations for 5 issuers on an 
interim basis for over 50 months combined. 
 
August 1989 – October 1996  
Regional Director (MidAtlantic) – Fair, Isaac Company (“FICO”) 
Responsible for the launch and growth of the Wilmington, DE service and sales office. Lead the 
development of a team of five that serviced many of FICO’s leading clients including – Amex, AT&T, 
Capital One, Chase, CITI, GE Capital, PNC, Macy’s, MBNA, and M&T.  Key contributions included: 
 
• 
FICO SCORE Marketing Campaign – developed and executed a marketing campaign to replace 
MDS Scores with FICO Scores (migrated 34 of 35 targeted organizations in the first year). 
• 
Major Account Relationships – coordinated the creation of onsite customer service support for 
the largest regional lenders – improving brand image. 
• 
Account Acquisition – worked with numerous lenders in the development of test-and-control 
marketing campaigns, prospect targeting and credit underwriting and credit line assignment 
strategies. 
• 
Account Management – developed collections, authorizations and fraud risk and operations 
workflows for numerous lenders. 
 
June 1982 – August 1999 
Group Vice President Risk Operations – First Omni Bank (now part of M&T Bank) 
Promoted five times from Systems Analyst to Group VP Risk Operations. Key accomplishments included: 
 
• 
Affinity Card Launch – managed the launch of the ACE Hardware affinity card. 
• 
Davox Auto-dialer – implemented the third Davox auto-dialer in existence. 
• 
Inclusive Operations – developed and hired the bank’s first blind collector and “job sharing” 
positions. 
• 
Test-and-Control Marketing – implemented numerous Prescreen marketing campaigns testing 
more than 20 concepts in 1985. 
 
EDUCATION 
University of Maryland at Baltimore County (UMBC) – MA Economics with Finance Minor 
Degree conferred – June 1982 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6624     Page
57 of 63

3 
 
 
EXAMPLES OF FORMER CLIENTS 
 
 
 
 
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58 of 63

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6626     Page
59 of 63

Date
Doc Type
Title/Description
Bates Range
4/1/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100530
4/1/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00006482-6535
4/24/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00228914
6/1/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100741
8/18/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00455617
8/19/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00218256
8/31/2020
Letter
Moore_S_0000367
9/1/2020
PowerPoint 
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00004535-4580
9/1/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDDMDL-00003912-3937
9/2/2020
Letter
PLFF00000011
9/16/2020
Document
9/22/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00104526-104527
9/23/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00225047-225048
9/23/2020
Email
BANA_EDDMDL-00570333-570334
9/24/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00129437-129440
9/24/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDDMDL-00003887-3911
9/28/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00125177-125179
9/28/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00450516-450518
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6627     Page
60 of 63

10/1/2020
PowerPoint 
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00005509-5545
10/5/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00592192-592194
10/6/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00863943-863948
10/9/2020
Document
BANA_EDD_MDL-00592324-592330
10/13/2020
Excel
BANA_EDD_MDL-00181896
10/14/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090135-90137
10/22/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100506-529
10/26/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100634-100679
10/28/2020
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100616-00100633
10/30/2020
Excel
BANA_EDD_MDL-00225867
10/30/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00057504-57506
11/2/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00163307-163308
12/3/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100390; 
BANA_EDD_MDL-00100634 -100679 
12/29/2020
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090640-90647
12/31/2020
Letter
BANA_EDD_MDL-00411205, 
-005560, -00556122, -00556152, 
-00556324, -00558991, -00558996, 
-00559094, -00559101; 
PLFF00000008; 
Yuan—A-0000003, -0000004
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6628     Page
61 of 63

1/1/2021
PowerPoint
(Training Slide Deck)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00004535-4580
1/12/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00417487-417490
1/13/2021
PowerPoint
BANA_EDD_MDL-00571310
1/14/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090695-90698
1/14/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00107327-107335
1/26/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00090721-90724
3/10/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00125919-125923
4/5/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00028946-28949
4/7/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00273305-273307
4/12/2021
Document
(AISOP)
BANA_EDD_MDL-00559693-559980
4/23/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00297295
5/11/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00159469-159474
5/11/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00510141-510148
5/17/2021
Court Filing
6/2/2021
Court Filing
7/7/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00406128-406130
7/21/2021
PowerPoint
BANA_EDD_MDL-00517105-517126
8/25/2021
Document
BANA_EDD_MDL-00001312
10/29/2021
Email
BANA_EDD_MDL-00077223-77225
7/14/2022
Consent Order
5/25/2023
Court Filing
6/13/2023
Court Filing
10/20/2023
Organizational Charts
BANA_EDD_MDL-00057837-57878
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6629     Page
62 of 63

2/2/2024
Discovery Response
2/2/2024
Discovery Response
2/4/2024
Deposition Notice
2/6/2024
Deposition Transcript
2/8/2024
Deposition Transcript
2/14/2024
Deposition Transcript
2/16/2024
Deposition Transcript
2/22/2024
Deposition Transcript
4/23/2024
Discovery Response
N/A
PowerPoint
BANA_EDD_MDL-00556536-556537
N/A
Letter
BANA_MDD_MDL-00012790
N/A
Document
BANA_EDD_MDL-00718756-718770
N/A
Document
BANA_EDD_MDL-00012738-12739
N/A
PowerPoint
BANA_EDD_MDL-00572766-572770
Case 3:21-md-02992-GPC-MSB     Document 324-4     Filed 08/29/24     PageID.6630     Page
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gov.uscourts.casd.709615.324.4.pdf

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db0cef591bc83f4aeeee6aaf9ec67ecf2b1f60408d90304796e90e143b8e20da

Our copy

gov.uscourts.casd.709615.324.4.pdf

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