Response in Opposition by USA as to Ayaz Qureshi re 20 Motion to Withdraw Plea of Guilty — USA v. Qureshi (Dkt. 25, D. Md.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · No. 1:22-cr-00330-JKB · Doc. 25 · 2023-09-19 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
AYAZ QURESHI, 
 
          Defendant. 
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****** 
 
 
CRIMINAL NO.  RDB-22-330 
 
 
 
 
  
GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S  
MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO 
FIND DEFENDANT IN BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
 
The United States of America, by its undersigned attorneys, respectfully submits this 
response in opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (the “Motion”).  ECF No. 
20.  For the reasons described below, the United States requests that the Court deny Defendant’s 
motion and find that Defendant has breached the terms of the plea agreement. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
Summary of the Charges Against Defendant. 
On September 19, 2022, the Government filed a single count Information charging 
Defendant with Wire Fraud Conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.  ECF No. 1.  These 
charges arise out of Defendant’s receipt of more than $250,000 in fraudulent Paycheck Protection 
Program (PPP) loan funds and his payment of a $75,000 to a co-conspirator in exchange for the 
co-conspirator’s assistance in obtaining the loan.  
On October 14, 2022, after an extensive Rule 11 inquiry, Defendant pled guilty to Count 
One of the Information pursuant to a plea agreement.  Ex. 1 (Plea Agreement); Ex. 2 (Transcript).  
The proceedings were conducted in English, and the Court made a specific finding that Defendant 
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was “fully competent and capable of understanding English, and also find specifically he can 
understand English and understand reading English.”  Ex. 2 at 64-65. 
The Plea Agreement was negotiated between Defendant’s first lawyer, Patrick Smith, and 
the Government.  Defendant’s second lawyer, Thomas Maronick, appeared on behalf of Defendant 
at the guilty plea proceeding.  Sentencing was twice postponed at the request of the parties.  
Defendant’s current lawyer formally appeared on behalf of Defendant on August 29, 
2023—the date Defendant filed the Motion. 
The Motion was filed 10 and a half months after Defendant had pleaded guilty. 
B. 
Plea Agreement Dated September 14, 2022. 
Pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to Count One of the 
Information.  Ex. 1 at 1.  The parties’ plea agreement set out the maximum possible penalty for 
the offense and contained a stipulation concerning the offense level calculation under the 
Sentencing Guidelines.  Id. at 2, 4-5.  Specifically, the parties agreed that the base offense level 
was 7 and that it was increased by 12 levels because the loss amount was more than $250,000 but 
less than $550,000.  Id. at 4-5.  The parties also agreed that Defendant should receive a three-level 
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in an anticipated final offense level of 16.  Id. 
at 5.   
The parties also stipulated to the Statement of Facts that were set forth in Attachment A, 
which was on Pages 10-11 of the plea agreement.  Id. at 10-11.   
Defendant signed the plea agreement on Page 10, and he also separately signed the 
Statement of Facts on Page 11.  Id.  The following statement appears directly above Defendant’s 
signature on Page 9: 
I have read this Agreement, including the Sealed Supplement, and carefully 
reviewed every part of it with my attorney.  I understand it and I voluntarily agree 
to it.  Specifically, I have reviewed the Factual and Advisory Guidelines Stipulation 
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with my attorney and I do not wish to change any part of it.  I am completely 
satisfied with the representation of my attorney. 
Id. at 9.1  
C. 
Guilty Plea on October 14, 2022. 
On October 14, 2022, Defendant appeared for his arraignment and guilty plea proceeding.   
While reviewing the Waiver of Indictment signed by Defendant, the Court began by confirming 
with Defendant and prior counsel Defendant’s American citizenship status and his ability to speak 
and understand English, as follows: 
 
Id. at 8.  The Court confirmed with Defendant that he signed the Waiver of Indictment and made 
the following finding: 
 
 
1  See also Ex. 3 at 16; Ex. 4 at 41.  
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Id. at 9.  The Court then painstakingly read the Information to Defendant.  Id. at 13-29.  
The Court confirmed numerous times with Defendant that he understood the allegations in the 
Information.  Id.  at 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28.  The Court then confirmed once again 
that Defendant understood the charge in the Information:   
 
Id. at 30.  The Court thereafter proceeded with the guilty plea proceeding.    
After being placed under oath, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Count One and 
pursuant to the written plea agreement described above.  Id. at 35.  The Court then conducted a 
thorough and extensive colloquy under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to 
ensure that Defendant’s plea was knowing and voluntary and that there was a factual basis for the 
plea.   
At the outset, the Court confirmed that Defendant was not having any difficulty 
understanding the proceedings and that he could read and write the English language.  Id. at 37.   
The Court went on to confirm that Defendant did not have any problems or concerns with Mr. 
Maronick’s legal representation of Defendant.  Id. at 38-39.  The Court and Defendant had the 
following exchange:  
 
 
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Id. at 38-39.   
After confirming that Defendant was satisfied with Mr. Maronick, the Court discussed the 
specific terms of the plea agreement with him.  The Court began by confirming that Defendant had 
reviewed the plea agreement with counsel and understood it; Defendant confirmed that he did.  Id. 
at 41.  The Court confirmed that Defendant understood that the Court was not a party to the 
agreement, Id. at 42-43, and that Defendant was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily:  
 
Id. at 43. 
The Court then reviewed, among other things: (i) the various collateral consequences as a 
result of the conviction, id. at 43-45; (ii) the possibility of forfeiture, id. at 45; (iii) the maximum 
penalties associated with the charge of conviction, including supervised release, id. at 45-47; (iv) 
the role of the sentencing guidelines at sentencing, id. at 47-48; (v) the parties’ stipulation as to 
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the sentencing guidelines calculation and that the guidelines calculation would “expose 
[Defendant] to time in federal prison,” id. at 48-49; (vi) the fact that there is no parole in the federal 
system, id. at 51-52; (vii) that Defendant waived his rights to appeal his sentence, id. at 52; (viii) 
all of the rights—including trial rights—that Defendant was giving up by pleading guilty, id. at 
53-57; and (ix) the essential elements of the count of conviction, id. at 57-58.   
The Court then asked Government counsel to read or summarize the factual stipulation 
associated with the plea.  Id. at 59.  And the Court was careful to direct Defendant to read the 
factual stipulation at the same time: 
 
Id. at 60.  Government counsel then proceeded to read the plea agreement’s stipulation of facts.  
Id. at 60-64.   
After that, the following exchange occurred:  
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Id. at 64.  Defendant reaffirmed his desire to plead guilty.  Id.  Thereafter, the Court found that 
“the Defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea. I also find he's fully 
competent and capable of understanding English, and also find specifically he can understand 
English and understand reading English.”  Id. at 64-65.   
The Court further found that “the Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the 
relevant consequences of his plea of guilty and great pain has been taken to make sure he 
understands he's accused of fraud. He's accused of fraud in connection with the PPP program and 
CARES Act in the face of the pandemic. That's not very confusing.”  Id. at 65.  The Court noted 
that “I'm satisfied the Defendant has no confusion about what he's pleading guilty to. And he's 
acknowledged his guilt of that fraud here today.”  Id.  
The Court further found that “Defendant’s plea of guilty on advice of competent counsel 
with whose services he is satisfied is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by independent bases 
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and facts sustaining each of the essential elements of the offense charged” and adjudged Defendant 
guilty of Count One of the Information.  Id.  
The Court would go on to enter an Order Setting Conditions of Release, which Defendant 
signed and acknowledged he understood too.  Id. at 71.  Sentencing was scheduled for February 2, 
2023, but was twice postponed at the request of the parties.   
D. 
Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw His Guilty Plea. 
On August 29, 2023—almost a year after his guilty plea—Defendant moved to withdraw 
his guilty plea, supported by an affidavit and a so-called “competency evaluation” written by a 
psychologist named Michael Mintz after a single in-person and single Zoom meeting with 
Defendant—all conducted in English.  ECF Nos. 20 (Motion), 20-1 (Mintz Report), 20-2 (Qureshi 
Affidavit).   
Defendant essentially claims that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea 
because (1) he “is not competent to understand [sic] his plea due to low cognitive functioning,” 
Motion at 2; (2) he required an interpreter at the guilty plea hearing, Motion at 4; (3) he did not 
have the assistance of competent counsel, Motion at 8-9; (4) and “Defendant is innocence [sic] of 
the Charge of Conspiracy,” Motion at 9-10.  
These contentions are meritless.  They are belied by Defendant’s repeated sworn statements 
under oath and the Court’s observations and findings during the Rule 11 proceedings.  A 
straightforward application of the factors enumerated in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 
248 (4th Cir. 1991)—controlling authority not cited by Defendant—make plain that Defendant’s 
Motion should be denied.   
 
 
 
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ARGUMENT 
A. 
Legal Standard. 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, after the court accepts a 
guilty plea but before it imposes its sentence, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea if “the 
defendant can show a fair and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
11(d)(2)(B).  The Fourth Circuit has held that “there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, 
thus, the defendant has the burden of showing a fair and just reason for the withdrawal.”  United 
States v. Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000).  This burden is a “heavy” one.  United 
States v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).  Indeed, a “fair and just reason for 
withdrawing a guilty plea is one that essentially challenges the fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding.”  
United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). 
In United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit set forth 
the following six factors for a district court to consider in determining whether a defendant has 
met his burden: 
(1)  
whether the defendant has offered credible evidence that his plea was not knowing 
or otherwise involuntary; 
(2) 
whether the defendant has credibly asserted his legal innocence; 
(3) 
whether the defendant has had close assistance of counsel; 
(4) 
whether there has been a delay between entry of the plea and filing of the motion; 
(5) 
whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the government; and 
(6) 
whether withdrawal will inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources. 
 
The Fourth Circuit has held that the inquiry into whether the guilty plea was valid “is 
ordinarily confined to whether the plea was both counseled and voluntary.”  United States v. 
Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 
(4th Cir. 1993)).   
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A voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is “an admission of all the elements of a formal 
criminal charge … and constitutes an admission of all material facts alleged in the charge.”  Id.  
“The most important consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation 
of the Rule 11 colloquy at which the guilty plea was accepted.”  Id.  Accordingly, a “properly 
conducted Rule 11 guilty plea leaves a defendant with a very limited basis upon which to have his 
plea withdrawn” and “raises the strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.”  United 
States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414); see 
also United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1307 (4th Cir. 1996) (“The key to a [plea withdrawal] 
motion is whether or not the Rule 11 proceeding was properly conducted.”); United States v. 
Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995) (“a ‘fair and just’ reason for withdrawing a guilty plea 
is one that ‘essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11 proceeding.’” (quoting Lambey, 
974 F.2d at 1394)). 
Indeed, “[w]ere withdrawal automatic in every case where the defendant decided to alter 
his tactics and present his theory of the case to the jury, the guilty plea would become a mere 
gesture, a temporary and meaningless formality reversible at the defendant’s whim.” United States 
v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 (1997) (quotation omitted). 
B. 
Defendant’s Plea was Knowing and Voluntary. 
Again, the most important consideration in resolving a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. United States v. Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 414 (4th 
Cir. 2003).  Here, there can be no question that it was.     
A guilty plea is knowing and voluntary when the defendant is fully aware of the direct 
consequences of the guilty plea.  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).  The Supreme 
Court has explained that, under Rule 11, “the district court is required, as a precondition to 
acceptance of a guilty plea, to inform the defendant in person of the specified rights he or she may 
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claim in a full criminal trial and then verify that the plea is voluntary by addressing the defendant.”  
Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 247 (2008).   This “requirement is satisfied by a colloquy 
between the judge and the defendant, reviewing all the rights listed in Rule 11.”  Id. 
Here, although Defendant claims that his plea was not knowing or voluntary, Defendant 
has not pointed to any actual deficiency in the Rule 11 colloquy and has not offered credible 
evidence that his plea was not knowing or voluntary. 
In fact, the plea agreement and the extensive from record from the plea hearing demonstrate 
just the opposite.  In the plea agreement itself, Defendant acknowledged that he carefully reviewed 
the agreement with his attorney, that he understood the terms of the agreement, and that he 
voluntarily agreed to its terms.  Ex. 1 at 9.   
By signing his name to the plea agreement, Defendant expressly confirmed:  
I have read this agreement, including the sealed supplement, and carefully reviewed 
every part of it with my attorney. I understand it and I voluntarily agree to it.  
Specifically, I have reviewed the factual and advisory guideline stipulation with my 
attorney, and I do not wish to change any part of it.  I am completely satisfied with 
the representation of my attorney. 
Id.  Then, at the plea colloquy, Defendant—after being placed under oath—confirmed that he had 
signed the agreement, and that he was pleading guilty because he was, in fact, guilty.  Ex. 2 at 40, 
43. 
The Court also reviewed the terms of the plea agreement in detail with Defendant during 
the plea colloquy.  The Court explained the nature and elements of the charges to which Defendant 
was pleading guilty, as well as the maximum penalties he was facing.  Id. at 57-58.  Defendant 
indicated that he fully understood.  Id.  The Court also explained the rights Defendant was waiving 
by pleading guilty, including the right to trial and certain appellate rights.  Id. at 52-57.  Again, 
Defendant acknowledged that he understood the rights he was waiving.  Id. at 57. 
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The Court then reviewed the factual basis for the plea with Defendant.  Id. at 60-64.  When 
the Court asked Defendant if the summary of the facts read by Government counsel was accurate, 
Defendant stated, “Yes, Your Honor” and confirmed once again his desire to plead guilty.  Id. at 
64.  
The Court also confirmed that Defendant was entering his plea voluntarily by ensuring that 
no one had made threats to him or tried to force him to plead guilty.  Id. at 43.  And the Court 
confirmed that Defendant was pleading guilty because he was guilty.  Id. 
  The Court ensured that Defendant was satisfied by the representation of his lawyer, Mr. 
Maronick.  Defendant confirmed that counsel was “doing well,” that he was fully satisfied with 
counsel, and that counsel had done every Defendant had asked him to do.  Id. at 39.     
The Court also repeatedly ensured that Defendant could read and understand English.  Id. 
at 8, 37, 60.  Indeed, the Court explicitly—twice—made such a finding.  Id. at 9 (“I'm making a 
finding that I believe -- he's a naturalized American citizen, which he could not be if he doesn't 
understand English. I'm satisfied that the representation has been that his lawyer has explained to 
him in English the charges. And I'm satisfied that he understands what I've just said to him.”); id. 
at 64-65 (“I also find he's fully competent and capable of understanding English, and also find 
specifically he can understand English  and understand reading English.”).   
At no point during the Rule 11 proceeding did Defendant raise any problem, issue, or 
concern he had with his counsel or the advice he had received about pleading guilty.  At no point 
did Defendant say that he did not understand what was happening during the proceeding or that he 
did not understand the language being spoken.  At no point did Defendant ask for an interpreter or 
indicate that one might be helpful.  At no point did Defendant say anything about wanting to make 
changes to the Stipulation of Facts.  At no point did Defendant hesitate, pause, or equivocate when 
asked whether he was in fact guilty of the offense as charged.     
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This is Court conducted a thorough and extensive Rule 11 proceeding in which the Court 
ensured that Defendant understood and could read English, discussed the nature and elements of 
the charges, ensured that Defendant had consulted with and was satisfied with counsel, ensured 
that Defendant understood the rights he forfeited by pleading guilty, entered the guilty plea freely 
and voluntarily, and satisfied itself that there was a factual basis for the plea.   
After all of that occurred, the Court determined that Defendant is “fully competent and 
capable of entering an informed plea,” “fully competent and capable of understanding English,” 
and that “Defendant is aware of the nature of the charges and the relevant consequences of his plea 
of guilty and great pain has been taken to make sure he understands he's accused of fraud.” Id. at 
64-65.  The Court further found that “I'm satisfied the Defendant has no confusion about what he's 
pleading guilty to. And he's acknowledged his guilt of that fraud here today.”  Id. at 65.  And the 
Court further found that Defendant’s “plea of guilty on advice of competent counsel with whose 
services he is satisfied is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by independent bases and facts 
sustaining each of the essential elements of the offense charged.”  Id. 
Simply put, Defendant’s claims that he required an interpreter at the Rule 11 proceeding 
are belied by his statements under oath and the Court’s explicit findings that Defendant is able to 
understand English.  His claim that he was threatened by his lawyer is likewise contradicted by 
Defendant’s sworn statements under oath that no one had made threats to him or tried to force him 
to plead guilty, id. at 43, and are simply not credible.  “Because the district court conformed to the 
requirements of Rule 11 … the plea is presumed to be final and binding.”  United States v. 
Beckworth, 210 F.3d 362, 2000 WL 296308, *1 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished); see also United 
States v. Nostratis, 321 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting defendant’s argument that his 
plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not have a Tagalog interpreter at the Rule 11 
hearing in light of, among other things, guilty plea colloquy).   
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At bottom, Defendant has no credible basis to claim that he did not knowingly or willingly 
agree to his plea agreement.  The district court was careful to ensure that the Defendant’s plea was 
knowing and voluntary, and Defendant’s “cold feet” after pleading guilty is not a sufficient basis 
to withdraw his plea.  United States v. Wilson, 81 F.3d 1300, 1309 (4th Cir. 1996); see also United 
States v. Newson, 46 F.3d 730, 732 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The plea of guilty is a solemn act not to be 
disregarded because of belated misgivings about its wisdom.”); Bowman, 348 F.3d at 416 
(rejecting effort by defendant “to second guess his guilty plea”). 
C. 
The Defendant Has Not Credibly Asserted His Legal Innocence. 
Aside from falling far short in establishing the first Moore factor, Defendant has not made 
any credible assertions under the second Moore factor related to his legal innocence.  Nor could 
he, since he stipulated to the Statement of Facts, which support each element of the crime 
Defendant admitted to committing.  This factor weighs strongly in favor the Government.   
Defendant asserts that he is innocent and that he “lacked the mens rea to commit the crimes 
alleged.”  Motion at 9.  But he provides limited information about what specifically his defense 
would have been or how we would have proven it—apart from his own self-serving statements in 
his affidavit.  And he provides nothing to overcome his admission under oath to the truth of the 
detailed statement of facts read by the Government at the Rule 11 hearing.  Ex. 2 at 64.   
Thus, any claim of legal innocence that Defendant might try to assert now is unsupported 
and unbelievable. “[T]he mere allegation of innocence, without any new evidentiary support is not 
entitled to much weight.”  United States v. Wells, 82 F.3d 411, 1996 WL 174631, at *5 (4th Cir. 
Apr. 12, 1996) (unpublished); see also United States v. O'Neil, 352 F. App’x 859, 866 (4th Cir. 
2009) (“[A] defendant’s bare allegation of innocence does not, without more, satisfy the second 
Moore factor.”); United States v. Cray, 47 F.3d 1203, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A defendant 
appealing the denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea, unlike a defendant who has not first 
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pled guilty, must do more than make a general denial in order to put the Government to its proof; 
he must affirmatively advance an objectively reasonable argument that he is innocent . . . for he 
has waived his right simply to try his luck before a jury”) (emphasis added). 
Instead, to credibly assert actual innocence, Defendant must “present evidence that (1) 
inspires belief and (2) tends to either defeat the elements in the government’s prima facie case or 
make out a successful affirmative defense.” United States v. Howard, 549 F. App’x 164, 168 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Thompson–Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 353 (4th Cir. 2009)).  
Defendant has not and cannot do that, particularly in light of the admissions he has already made 
under oath.  See Bowman, 348 F.3d at 415 (bare assertion that defendant lied at the plea colloquy 
when he admitted guilt was inconsistent with record, and did not state a plausible claim of legal 
innocence).  This factor weighs in favor of the Government. 
D. 
There Was A Delay Of More Than 10 Months Between Defendant’s Guilty Plea 
And The Motion To Withdraw.  
The third Moore factor is “whether there has been a delay between the entering of the plea 
and the filing of the motion.” Moore, 931 F.2d at 248.  Courts have distinguished between “a 
hastily entered plea made with unsure heart and confused mind,” on the one hand, and “a tactical 
decision to enter a plea, wait several weeks, and then obtain a withdrawal if [the defendant] 
believes that he made a bad choice in pleading guilty.”  United States v. Alexander, 948 F.2d 1002, 
1004 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Carr, 740 F.2d 339, 345 (5th Cir. 1984)).  Courts 
have found that even delays of several weeks are beyond the bounds of the time frame considered 
appropriate for motions to withdraw.  See Alexander, 948 F.2d at 1004 (5 months); United States 
v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1987) (5 weeks); Carr, 740 F.2d at 345 (22 days).  Indeed,  
“[t]he timing of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is important . . . because it is highly probative 
of motive. While an immediate change of heart may well lend considerable force to a plea 
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withdrawal request, a long interval between the plea and the request often weakens any claim that 
the plea was entered in confusion or under false pretenses.” United States v. Fernández-Santos, 
856 F.3d 10, 18 (1st Cir. 2017) (two month delay weighed against defendant). 
Here, Defendant pleaded guilty on October 14, 2022, and his motion to withdraw was not 
filed until over 10 months later on August 29, 2023—many months after sentencing was originally 
scheduled (February 2, 2023) and twice postponed.  This period of delay is significant and weighs 
against Defendant.  See Moore, 931 F.2d at 248 (six week delay too long); United States v. Dickey, 
2011 WL 4793196, *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2011) (unpublished) (less than two months was “a 
significant period of delay” that weighed in favor of the district court’s denial of the defendant’s 
motion to withdraw his guilty plea); United States v. Cline, 286 F. App’x 817, 822 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(unpublished) (delay of nearly three months was “significant” and properly weighed against 
defendant in denying her motion to withdraw plea); United States v. Sandoval Delgado, 148 F. 
App’x 166, 168 (4th Cir. 2005) (delay of 2.5 months weighed against defendant’s motion to 
withdraw plea). The more than 10 month delay here is yet another factor supporting the denial of 
Defendant’s Motion. 
E. 
Defendant Had The Close Assistance of Counsel.   
To prevail on the fourth Moore factor, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) that his counsel's 
performance ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness' and (2) that ‘there [was] a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would 
have insisted on going to trial.’” United States v. DeFreitas, 865 F.2d 80, 82 (1989) (quoting Hill 
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985)); see also Bowman, 348 F.3d at 416; Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 
at 425.  “Under this standard, the Court's inquiry is limited to whether the defendant's counsel ‘was 
reasonable under prevailing professional norms, and in light of the circumstances.’”  Bowman, 
348 F.3d at 416 (quoting Carter v. Lee, 283 F.3d 240, 249 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Hill, 474 U.S. 
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at 58 (holding that the two-part Strickland test applies to motions to withdraw guilty pleas based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Here, Defendant’s post-hoc claim that Mr. Maronick was ineffective is belied by the plea 
agreement and Defendant’s sworn statements under oath.  Mr. Maronick wisely advised Defendant 
to plead guilty based on the strength of the Government’s evidence, the fact that Defendant had 
twice met with the Government and confessed (including in a proffer session), and that, in light of 
the posture of the case, it was likely that Government counsel would recommend a variant below-
guidelines sentence.  
Defendant stipulated in his plea agreement that he had “carefully reviewed every part of 
[the agreement] with [his] attorney” and that he was “completely satisfied with the representation 
of [his] attorney.” Ex. 1 at 9.  And the Court confirmed with Defendant his satisfaction with Mr. 
Maronick’s legal representation of him:  
 
 
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Ex. 2 at 38-39.  At bottom, Defendant’s advice to plead guilty was effective and sound advice 
based on the information known to the parties at the time, and Defendant testified to his satisfaction 
with his lawyer at the Rule 11 hearing.   
Further, Defendant’s sensational claim that Mr. Maronick coerced him, threatened him or 
somehow intimidated him into pleading guilty, Motion at 8-9, cannot be squared with Defendant’s 
statements under oath either.  Ex. 2 at 43 (THE COURT: Has anyone in any way tried to threaten 
you or force you to plead guilty in this case? THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.  THE COURT: 
Are you pleading guilty on your own freely because you are, in fact, guilty?  THE DEFENDANT: 
Yes, Your Honor.”).   
Simply put, none of Defendant’s claim’s as to his former counsel’s performance provide a 
basis for the relief Defendant seeks here.  See Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 425 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting 
claim by defendant that “he was ‘misinformed’ or ‘intimidated’ into pleading guilty” and had 
pleaded guilty “due to his attorney’s intimidation and poor advice” in light of defendant’s sworn 
statements and district court’s findings that defendant was no coerced and contents of plea 
agreement, which defendant had agreed he understood); United States v. Dyess, 478 F.3d 224, 240 
(4th Cir. 2007) (rejecting motion to withdraw guilty plea and reasoning “the defendant expressed 
satisfaction with his attorney during the colloquy; this statement of fact cannot be so easily 
repudiated”); United States v. Gaines, No. 21-4195, 2023 WL 5745367, at *2 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 
2023) (affirming denial of motion to withdraw guilty plea and noting that “in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances, the truth of sworn statements made during a Rule 11 colloquy is 
conclusively established” (quoting United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221–22 (4th Cir. 
2005)).   
Defendant had the close assistance of counsel.  This Moore factor weighs against 
Defendant.   
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F. 
The Remaining Moore Factors Weigh Against Defendant.  
The fifth and sixth factors (which are often considered together) are whether there would be 
prejudice to the government or a waste of judicial resources owing to a withdrawal of the guilty 
plea. These factors weigh in favor of denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 
The Fourth Circuit has repeatedly reiterated the guilty plea’s importance to the efficient 
administration of justice. See, e.g., Lemaster, 403 F.3d at 219-20 (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 
431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977)); Bowman, 348 F.3d at 414. 
Allowing the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea after he had the benefit of competent 
counsel, and an exhaustive Rule 11 colloquy would burden the government and needlessly waste 
judicial resources. 
Indeed, as time passes, evidence grows stale and witnesses’ memories fade. Thus, 
allowing Defendant to withdraw his guilty plea would prejudice the Government. See Sparks, 67 
F.3d at 1154 n.5 (“[W]ithdrawal of a guilty plea almost invariably prejudices the government to 
some extent and wastes judicial resources.”).  Moreover, allowing Defendant to withdraw his plea 
after a clear affirmance of his guilt, as indicated by the signed plea agreement and the properly 
conducted Rule 11 proceeding, would be a gross waste of judicial resources too.  See Moore, 931 
F.2d at 249 (finding that the sixth factor weighed against the defendant because “a reopening of 
the plea would have been futile”; there “was no substance to [the defendant's] claims”; and “[i]t 
would be pointless, perhaps even unjust, to allow him to relitigate”).  The final two Moore factors 
weigh against Defendant too. 
G.  
Defendant’s Claims As To His Purported “Disability” Are Meritless.    
Finally, Defendant claims that withdrawal is warranted because he “suffers from a 
developmental disability” and supposedly did not understand the parties’ plea agreement or the 
nature of the charge.  Motion at 3.  He relies entirely on the Mintz Report in support of his 
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conclusion.  Id.  This contention is likewise belied by Defendant’s statements under oath during 
the Rule 11 proceeding and is meritless. 
To begin, Defendant claims he has a disability, but doesn’t even bother to state what his 
purported disability is.  Nor does Mintz; indeed, Mintz’s report is devoid of any diagnosis of 
Defendant made pursuant to, for example, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-V).  The closest Dr. Mintz comes is his statement that Defendant “may meet 
diagnostic criteria for attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)” but even Dr. Mintz 
acknowledges that “further testing”—testing which Mintz didn’t perform—“would be necessary 
to confirm the diagnosis.”  Mintz Report at 10.   
Defendant states, that he “suffers from a developmental disability as established by Dr. 
Mintz’s report, which ‘impairs his ability to understand complex legal proceedings and impairs his 
ability to assist his legal counsel in respect to any legal proceeding.’”  Motion at 3 (purporting to 
quote Mintz Report).   
But Defendant misquotes the Mintz Report.  See Mintz Report at 11 (“Mr. Qureshi’s verbal 
deficits and executive functioning deficits may also impair his ability to assist his legal counsel in 
respect to any legal proceedings.”) (emphasis added).  Mintz does not even use the term 
“developmental disability” in his report at all.  Moreover, though Mintz’s report is styled as 
“Competency Evaluation,” Mintz does not in fact render any opinion concerning Defendant’s 
competency—i.e., whether the “defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or 
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature 
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”  See 18 
U.S.C.  § 4241(a).2 
 
2 Mintz describes his assignment on page 10 of the report—to “assess [Defendant’s] 
cognitive functioning as it pertains to the crimes of which he has been accused” and “consider 
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And for good reason.  Defendant is competent today, and he was competent at the Rule 11 
proceeding.  What’s more, there is a significant question as to whether Mintz—a psychologist who 
specializes in infant and toddler development and early childhood mental health 3—is even 
qualified to render an expert opinion with respect to Defendant’s competency or any sort of 
“developmental disability” Defendant purportedly has.  Next, Dr. Mintz met with Defendant just 
once in person and once via Zoom for a total of five hours.  Mintz Report at 1.  He interviewed 
Defendant’s wife4—someone with an interest in the outcome of this matter—and relied on her 
assertions in support of certain conclusions.  Mintz Report at 3-4, 9.  His Report likewise takes 
information provided by Defendant at face value.  Mintz Report at 3.   
Moreover, in reaching his conclusion—that Defendant’s verbal abilities are “very poor”—
Mintz relies on tests that were not normed on non-native English speakers such as Defendant.  
Mintz Report at 4 (“The instruments utilized in this evaluation have been normed on a United 
States population. Individuals from south Asia (including Pakistan) are included in the normative 
sample in numbers that approximate their percentage of the overall United States population. 
However, the normative sample may not include individuals who speak Urdu as their primary 
language.”) (emphasis added).  Even Mintz acknowledges that this undercuts the validity or 
reliability of his conclusions, noting that Defendant’s “poor performance on verbal tasks is related, 
at least in part, to the fact that testing was administered in English. Testing was administered in 
 
whether he has the cognitive or reading skills to comprehensively understand the arrangements of 
his plea bargain.”   
 
3
 See 
Children’s 
National, 
Michael 
Mintz 
Bio, 
available 
at 
https://childrensnational.org/visit/find-a-provider/michael-mintz. 
  
4  Government counsel has twice (on August 30, 2023 and September 7, 2023) requested 
all of the materials underlying Mintz’s report and which form the basis of Mintz’s conclusions.  
To date, no materials have been provided.  
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22 
English based on broad limitations (i.e., the examiner is not proficient in Urdu, and materials in 
Urdu were not available).”  Report at 10 (emphasis added).  But Mintz points to nothing to justify 
the use of these tests (or the validity or acceptability of their results) under such circumstances 
besides his ipse dixit, and the reliability of Mintz’s conclusions thus rests on very shaky ground.   
At bottom, Defendant has not established that he suffers from any sort of cognitive 
“disability” or that he was not competent to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea when he did 
so.  Defendant’s behavior, demeanor, and answers under oath to the Court at the Rule 11 hearing 
suggest likewise.  See, e.g.,United States v. Malone, No. 3:13-CR-104 JD, 2014 WL 12659415, at 
*3 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2014) (rejecting motion to withdraw where defendant claimed he had low 
IQ  and noting “that [t]he only rational manner in which a judge may determine whether a plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily made, is to observe the defendant's demeanor and responses to the 
court's questions and to rely on the defendant's sworn answers.” (quoting United States v. Hoke, 
569 F.3d 718, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2009)); cf. United States v. Bryant, 540 F. App'x 241, 247 (4th Cir. 
2014) (unpublished) (concluding the defendant failed to establish a fair and just reason to withdraw 
his guilty plea where it was “undisputed that Defendant suffers from a variety of mental illnesses,” 
but “nothing in the record indicate[d] that his illnesses had any impact on his competence or his 
ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him”).  Indeed, the Court conducted a 
thorough and exhaustive Rule 11 colloquy with Defendant.  At no time was there any suggestion 
by Defendant that he did not understand what was happening during the guilty plea hearing or the 
terms of his plea agreement, which the Court explained in painstaking detail.   
Defendant has not satisfied his heavy burden to withdraw his guilty plea and the Motion 
should be denied.  
GOVERNMENT’S MOTION TO FIND 
DEFENDANT IN BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
 
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By filing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, Defendant has breached the plea 
agreement and the government should be relieved of its obligations under the agreement.  Pursuant 
to Paragraph 18 of the plea agreement, Defendant agreed, among other things, that he “will not 
violate any federal, state, or local law; will acknowledge guilt to the probation officer and the 
Court; … and will not move to withdraw from the plea of guilty of from this agreement.”  Ex. 1 ¶ 
18.  Paragraph 18 sets forth the consequences if Defendant were to violate Paragraph 18.  
Specifically: 
If the Defendant engages in conduct prior to sentencing that violates the above 
paragraph of this Agreement, and the Court finds a violation by a preponderance of 
the evidence then: (i) this Office will be free from its obligations under this 
Agreement; (ii) this Office may make sentencing arguments and recommendations 
different from those set out in this Agreement, even if the Agreement was reached 
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C)…. 
Id. ¶ 18.  Moreover, the plea agreement provides that “[a] determination that this Office is released 
from its obligations under this Agreement will not permit the Defendant to withdraw the guilty 
plea” and that “the Defendant may not withdraw the Defendant’s guilty plea—even if made 
pursuant to Rule 11(c)(1)(C)—if the Court finds that the Defendant breached the Agreement.”  Id. 
 
The plea agreement further provides that the Government may oppose a two-level 
adjustment under U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a) for acceptance of responsibility and decline to make a 
motion under U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(b) if Defendant, among other things, “denies involvement in the 
offense” or “attempts to withdraw the plea of guilty.”  Ex. 1 at ¶ 6(c). 
 
Here, Defendant’s motion to withdraw from the guilty plea is a clear violation of the plea 
agreement.  The Government should be relieved of its obligations under the agreement and should 
be free to oppose the adjustments under U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a) and to decline to make a motion under 
U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(b) and make sentencing recommendations and arguments without regard to the 
plea agreement.  Defendant’s filing of the Motion coupled with the allegations made therein, reflect 
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a gross failure to accept responsibility.  Therefore, the Sentencing Guidelines calculation in the 
plea agreement should be adjusted to reflect this failure.  Without the three-level reduction for 
acceptance of responsibility, the final offense level would be 19 rather than 16, resulting in a 
guideline sentencing range of 30-37 months’ imprisonment. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons described above, the Court should deny Defendant’s Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea, find that Defendant has breached the terms of the plea agreement, and proceed to 
sentencing in this matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erek L. Barron 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By: 
 
/s/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul A. Riley 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant United States Attorney 
 
36 South Charles Street, 4th Floor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baltimore, Maryland 21201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(410) 209-4800 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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