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Home Court filings USA v. Thomas et al — Carla Jackson judgment, N.D. Ga. Exhibit One — USA v. Thomas et al (Dkt. 439.1)

Court filing

Exhibit One — USA v. Thomas et al (Dkt. 439.1)

Summary

Exhibit One to Jerry Baptiste's motion to suppress evidence from a Google search warrant, filed March 14, 2022 as Document 439-1 in Criminal Action No. 1:20-CR-296-JPB-CMS in the Northern District of Georgia, is FBI Special Agent Joseph D. Stites's August 18, 2020 application and affidavit for a warrant covering several Gmail accounts at Google; the case number is 1:20-mc-1472. The affidavit says agents were investigating alleged fraud and money laundering by people who obtained Paycheck Protection Program loans, and it cites the 30-count indictment returned August 4, 2020 against Darrell Thomas, Andre Lee Gaines, Kahlil Gibran Green, Sr., Bern Benoit and Carla Jackson.

Summary drafted by a model from the document's text below and checked by script against that text before publication. It is a navigation aid, not a reading of what the document proves. Where AI is used

Record facts

CourtU.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
Filed2022-03-14

Cite this document

“Exhibit One — USA v. Thomas et al (Dkt. 439.1).” U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, No. 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS, Doc. 439-1, filed 2022-03-14. Archived at Pandemic Darlings, https://pandemicdarlings.com/court-filings/full-docket-amanda-christian-gand-292218/2022-03-14-gov-uscourts-gand-292218-439-1-doc-439-1/, SHA-256 5e8719e311df5f2c4a25cfd416abfdfcca90630cec4d941f83d3614253050804.

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 1 of 52
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
V.

JERRY BAPTISTE, et al.

Criminal Action No.

1:20-CR-296-JPB-CMS-13

DEFENDANT BAPTISTE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND
FRUITS SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT DIRECTED
TO GOOGLE FOR NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM AND
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

EXHIBIT ONE
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 2 of 52
| U.S.D.C ATLANTA

Date: Aug 18 2020

(Rev. 4/30/2014 Search W arrant

United States District Court JAMES N. HATTEN, Clerk

By: s/B. Evans

Northern District of Georgia

Deputy Clerk
In the.Mattér of the Search of:
Information associated with the email addresses APPLICATION & AFFIDAVIT
DARRELL. THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM; FOR SEARCH WARRANT
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM;
BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM; CASE NUMBER: 1:20-mc-1472

TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM;
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM;
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM; and
CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM that is stored at
premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by
Google LLC, a company headquartered at 1600
Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.

I, Joseph D.Stites, being duly sworn, depose and says:

lam a(n) Special Agent of the FBI, and have reason to believe that, on the property or premises known as

Information associated with the email addresses DARRELL:.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM; GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM;
BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM; TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM; NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM;
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM; and CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM, as further described in Attachment A:

There is now concealed certain property, certain data, and certain information, namely,
See Attachment B

which constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense and property which has been used as the means of comimitting a
criminal offense, concerning violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343, 1344, 1349, 1014, 1956, and/or 1957, over which
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has jurisdiction. The facts to support a finding of Probable Cause
are as follows:

SEE ATTACHED AFFIDAVIT
Continued on the attached sheet and made a part hereof. klYes LINo
Josep D. Stites
Signature of Affiant

~~ Joseph D: Stites
Sworn to me by telephone pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 4.1

August 18, 2020 at Atlanta, Georgia

Date . City and State

JUSTIN S. ANAND

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE NAA

Name and Title of Judicial Officer Signature of Judicial Officer
g

AUSA Tal C. Chaiken / 404-581-6069
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 3 of 52
AFFIDAVIT

I, JOSEPH D. STITES, hereby depose and state under penalty of
perjury that the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge
and belief:

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

1. Iam a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and have been since July 2004. Iam currently assigned to the Atlanta
Division investigating financial crimes, including identity theft, wire, mail,
and bank fraud. I am also trained as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
and Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE). Iam a law enforcement officer of the
United States within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 2510(7), and I am
empowered by law to conduct investigations and to make arrests for
federal felony offenses.

2. I submit this Affidavit in support of an Application for a

search warrant for information associated with the email accounts

DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM;

e GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM;

e BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM;

e TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM;

e NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM;
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 4 of 52
e CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM; and

e CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM,
that is stored at premises controlled by Google LLC (“Google”), an email
provider headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View,
CA 94043; and the email account
DARRELL. THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM that is stored
at premises controlled by GoDaddy.com (“GoDaddy”), a service provider
headquartered at 14455 N. Hayden Road, Suite 219, Scottsdale, AZ 85260
(collectively, the “SUBJECT EMAIL ADDRESSES”). The information to

be searched is described in the following paragraphs and in Attachment A.

This Affidavit is made in support of an application for a search warrant
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), 2703(b)(1)(A), and 2703(c)(1)(A) to require
Google to disclose to the government copies of the information (including
the content of communications) further described in Section I of

Attachment B. Upon receipt of the information described in Section I of

Attachment B, government-authorized persons will review the

information to locate the items described in Section II of Attachment B.

Jurisdiction
3. This Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested warrant

because it is a “court of competent jurisdiction” as defined by 18 U.S.C. §

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 5 of 52
2711. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a), (b)(1)(A) & (c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Court
is a district court of the United States that has jurisdiction over the offenses
being investigated.

4. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law
enforcement officer is not required for the service or execution of this

warrant because, as described in Attachment A and Attachment B, the

email provider will execute the seizure and provide the information to law
enforcement. For this same reason, I request that this search warrant be
executable at any time, day or night.
Applicable Criminal Laws

5. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, makes it a federal
crime for anyone, having devised or intending to devise any scheme and
artifice to defraud by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, to transmit or cause to be transmitted by
means of wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice.

6. The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1344, makes it a federal
crime to execute or attempt to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a

financial institution or to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 6 of 52
securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of,
a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.

7. 18 U.S.C. § 1349 makes it a federal crime to conspire to commit
wire fraud or bank fraud.

8. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1014, it is a federal crime to, among
other things, knowingly make a false statement or report for the purpose
of influencing any institution the accounts of which are insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, regarding any application or loan.

9. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), it is a federal crime to
engage in a financial transaction, knowing that it involves funds that are
the proceeds of some unlawful activity, including wire fraud, if those
funds were in fact the proceeds of unlawful activity, including wire fraud,
and if the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the nature,
location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the unlawful
activity.

10. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1957, it is a federal crime to knowingly
engage or attempt to engage in a monetary transaction, knowing that the
transaction involved property or funds that were the proceeds of some

criminal activity, including wire fraud, if the property had a value of more

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 7 of 52
than $10,000, the property was in fact proceeds of that specified unlawful
activity, and the transaction took place in the United States.

PROBABLE CAUSE

11. As explained in more detail below, the government is
investigating alleged fraud and money laundering committed by several
individuals who obtained Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) loans for
their businesses.

12. On August 4, 2020, a grand jury sitting in the Northern
District of Georgia returned a 30-count indictment against DARRELL
THOMAS, ANDRE LEE GAINES, KAHLIL GIBRAN GREEN, SR., BERN
BENOIT, and CARLA JACKSON, charging them with violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1344 (bank fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1349
(conspiracy to commit bank fraud and wire fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false
statement to a federally insured financial institution); and/or 18 U.S.C. §§
1956 and 1957 (money laundering).

13. As explained further below, I respectfully submit that there is
probable cause to believe that DARRELL THOMAS and his associates
used, and are using, the SUBJECT EMAIL ADDRESSES to carry out and

facilitate the above-described violations.

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 8 of 52
The Paycheck Protection Program

14. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security
(“CARES”) Act is a federal law enacted in or around March 2020 and
designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the millions of
Americans who are suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-
19 pandemic. One source of relief provided by the CARES Act was the
authorization of up to $349 billion in forgivable loans to small businesses
for job retention and certain other expenses, through a program referred to
as the PPP. In or around April 2020, Congress authorized over $300 billion
in additional PPP funding.

15. In order to obtain a PPP loan, a qualifying business must
submit a PPP loan application, which must be signed by an authorized
representative of the business. The PPP loan application requires the
business (through its authorized representative) to acknowledge the
program rules and make certain affirmative representations and
certifications in order to be eligible to obtain the PPP loan. In the PPP loan
application, the small business (through its authorized representative)
must state, among other things, its: (a) average monthly payroll expenses;
and (b) number of employees. These figures are used to calculate the

amount of money the small business is eligible to receive under the PPP. In

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 9 of 52
addition, businesses applying for a PPP loan must provide documentation
showing their payroll expenses.

16. A PPP loan application must be processed by a participating
financial institution (the lender). If a PPP loan application is approved, the
participating financial institution funds the PPP loan using its own monies,
which are 100% guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (“SBA”).
Data from the application, including information about the borrower, the
total amount of the loan, and the listed number of employees, is
transmitted by the lender to the SBA in the course of processing the loan.

17. | PPP loan proceeds must be used by the business on certain
permissible expenses: payroll costs, interest on mortgages, rent, and
utilities. The PPP allows the interest and principal on the PPP loan to be
entirely forgiven if the business spends the loan proceeds on these expense
items within a designated period of time and uses a designated percentage
of the proceeds on payroll expenses.

18. The PPP is overseen by the SBA, which is headquartered at
409 3rd Street SW, Washington, DC 20416, and has authority over all loans.
Individual PPP loans, however, are issued by private approved lenders
(most commonly, banks and credit unions), which receive and process PPP

applications and supporting documentation, and then make loans using

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 10 of 52
the lenders’ own funds. To date, over 4,900 lending institutions have
participated in the PPP.

19. Cross River Bank and Celtic Bank are FDIC-insured, SBA
Approved Lenders and have participated as PPP lenders to small
businesses.

20. | Harvest Small Business Finance LLC (“Harvest”) is an SBA
Approved Lender and has participated as a PPP lender to small
businesses. Harvest is not an FDIC-insured financial institution.

21. BlueVine Capital Inc. (“BlueVine”) is an agent that pairs PPP
applicants with lenders. BlueVine collects applications and does the
underwriting and processing for lenders. BlueVine then submits the loans
to the lenders, such as Cross River Bank and Celtic Bank, for funding.

Overview of the Investigation

22. Inor around April 2020 and May 2020, at least four
individuals —-DARRELL THOMAS, ANDRE LEE GAINES, KAHLIL
GIBRAN GREEN SR., and BERN BENOIT — applied for, or assisted in
submitting an application for, PPP loans on behalf of five businesses -
Bellator Phront Group Inc. (“Bellator”), Gaines Reservation and Travel
LLC (“Gaines R&T”), Impact Creations LLC (“Impact”), Transportation

Management Services Inc. (“Transportation Management”), and Lee

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 11 of 52
Operations LLC (“Lee Operations”). Each loan was valued at
approximately $800,000, and the total amount obtained was approximately
$4.1 million. The applications contained false representations and
certifications and included substantively identical purported IRS Form
941s reflecting false payroll data for the businesses. Four of the five
applications also included a false bank statement for the business. Once
the loans were approved, the individuals identified above disbursed the
loan funds to entities that do not appear to be employees of their
businesses and do not otherwise constitute permissible uses for PPP loan
funds.

23. To support the requested loan amount, each applicant
supplied BlueVine and/or its respective lender with what were
purportedly the business’s IRS Form 941s (Employer’s Quarterly Federal
Tax Return) for January-December 2019. The 941s that the applicants
submitted listed the exact same number of employees and amount paid for
wages, tips, and other compensation for each quarter of 2019, except that
Bellator reported different figures for the third quarter of 2019.
Specifically, the 941s that the applicants submitted indicated, among other

information, that the businesses had the following number of employees

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 12 of 52
and amount paid for wages, tips, and other compensation for each of the

four quarters in 2019:

; Q1 2019 Q3 2019 Q4 2019

Impact 57 employees | 59 employees | 63 employees | 63 employees
$815,954.00 $865,954.00 | $905,132.00 $905,132.00

Gaines R&T 57 employees | 59 employees | 63 employees | 63 employees
$815,954.00 $865,954.00 | $905,132.00 $905,132.00

Transportation | 57 employees | 59 employees | 63 employees | 63 employees
Management $815,954.00 $865,954.00 | $905,132.00 $905,132.00

Lee Operations |57 employees | 59 employees | 63 employees | 63 employees
$815,954.00 $865,954.00 | $905,132.00 $905,132.00

Bellator 57 employees | 59 employees | 61 employees | 63 employees
$815,954.00 $865,954.00 | $895,923.00 $905,132.00

24. Based on a search of available IRS records related to the

employer identification numbers associated with each business, there were

no filings of Forms 941 for the first quarter of tax year 2020 or for any of

the four quarters of tax year 2019. In addition, there were no records

located for the filing of a Form 940 (Employer’s Annual Federal

Unemployment Tax Return) for tax year 2019.

The PPP loan applications for Impact, Gaines R&T,

Transportation Management, and Lee Operations also included fraudulent

bank statements. Specifically, the loan applications for Impact, Gaines

R&T, and Transportation Management included a purported bank

statement for their respective bank accounts for the period from February

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 13 of 52
1, 2020 to February 28, 2020. The bank statements were substantively
identical, except for differing business information and account numbers.
Each bank statement purports to show that the business’s bank account
had a beginning balance of $674,776.42 and ending balance of $790,576.16,
respectively, during the specified time period. JPMC confirmed that all
three February 2020 bank account statements were fake. In fact, Impact
opened its account on April 3, 2020 and therefore did not have a statement
for February 2020. Transportation Management opened its account on
April 21, 2020 and therefore did not have a statement for February 2020.
For Gaines R&T’s account, JPMC records show that the actual February
2020 beginning and ending balances were both $190.

26. DARRELL THOMAS submitted a purported bank statement
from Fifth Third Bank for Lee Operations for the period from February 1,
2020 through February 29, 2020.' The bank statement reflects a starting
balance of $646,674.16 and an ending balance of $437,207.05, including two

payments for $206,114.21 for “Payroll Services.” Fifth Third Bank

‘DARRELL THOMAS does not own Lee Operations. However, based on
information developed in the investigation, DARRELL THOMAS used the
business and personal information of Lee Operations and its owner to
submit a PPP loan application on behalf of Lee Operations. On the same
date that Lee Operations’ loan was funded, Lee Operations transferred all
but $2,000 of the PPP loan amount to a bank account controlled by
DARRELL THOMAS.

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 14 of 52
provided the actual bank statement for Lee Operations’ account for the
period from February 1, 2020 and February 29, 2020. That bank statement
reflects a beginning balance of $50 and an ending balance of $392.92, with

no payments for payroll services.

PPP Loan Applications and Use of the SUBJECT EMAIL ADDRESSES

DARRELL THOMAS / Bellator Phront Group Inc.

27. DARRELL THOMAS is a citizen of the United States who
claims sole ownership of Bellator Phront Group Inc. (“Bellator”), located at
11285 Elkins Road, Suite H6, Roswell, Georgia 30076. He is listed as the
Chief Financial Officer of Bellator according to records obtained from the
Georgia Secretary of State.

28. | According to records provided by Harvest, on or about April
21, 2020, DARRELL THOMAS digitally signed an application in support of
a $799,955.35 PPP loan for Bellator and submitted it to Harvest for funding.
The email address that DARRELL THOMAS listed on Bellator’s PPP loan
application was DARRELL.THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP
.COM. Based on an open source query, the domain
bellatorphrontgroup.com and the email address DARRELL.THOMAS@

BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM are hosted by GoDaddy.

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 15 of 52
29. After submitting Bellator’s PPP loan application, DARRELL
THOMAS used the email address DARRELL. THOMAS@
BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM to communicate with Harvest
regarding Bellator’s PPP loan application and to submit fraudulent
documentation associated with Bellator’s PPP loan. For example, on April
30, 2020, DARRELL THOMAS, using the email address
DARRELL. THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM, sent an
email to Harvest attaching an IRS Form 941 for the first quarter of 2020,
and stating: “Thank you! I’ve attached our most recent 941 the nearest
office to file has been closed so I submitted this via fax.” As explained
above, a search of IRS records revealed that Bellator did not file an IRS
Form 941 for the first quarter of 2020. On May 5, 2020, DARRELL
THOMAS, using the email address DARRELL.THOMAS@
BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM, sent an email to
pppnotes@harvestcref.com attaching a voided check and notarized
documents required to receive the PPP loan proceeds.

30. Based on DARRELL THOMAS’s untrue statements, Bellator’s
loan application was approved. On or about May 19, 2020, approximately
$799,955.35 in PPP loan funds was distributed to Bellator through a wire

transfer to Bank of America account number 334060043940 (“Account

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 16 of 52
3940”), which is one of Bellator’s bank accounts. Between May 22, 2020
and June 15, 2020, approximately $542,200 of proceeds from three other
fraudulently obtained loans (discussed further below) were transferred to
Account 3940. Bank of America records list DARRELL THOMAS and his
wife, Meghan Thomas, as authorized signers for Account 3940.

31. DARRELL THOMAS and Meghan Thomas are also
authorized signers for Bank of America bank account number
334060044823 (“Account 4823”), which is held in the business name of Elite
Executive Services Inc. (“Elite”). Between May 21, 2020 and June 16, 2020,
approximately $1,525,850.15 of proceeds from four other fraudulently

obtained loans (discussed further below) were transferred to Account 4823.

BERN BENOIT / Transportation Management Services Inc.

32. | BENOIT is a citizen of the United States who claims sole
ownership of Transportation Management Services Inc. (“Transportation
Management”), located at 2216 Kings Drive, Woodbury, Minnesota 55125.
He is listed as the Chief Executive Officer of Transportation Management
according to records obtained from the Minnesota Secretary of State.

33. According to records provided by Cross River Bank, on or
about May 20, 2020, an application in support of an $830,417 PPP loan for

Transportation Management was submitted to BlueVine. The email
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 17 of 52
address listed for Transportation Management on its PPP loan application
is TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM.

34. Based on documentation provided by BERN BENOIT on
behalf of Transportation Management, BERN BENOIT used the email
address BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM to communicate with others
regarding Transportation Management’s fraudulent PPP loan application.
For example, on May 29, 2020, the email address
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM sent an email to CJ
Baptiste, using the email address NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM,
which CJ Baptiste then forwarded to BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM.
The subject line of the email was “Expenses for Transportation
Management Services” and included an itemized list of purported
“expenses” for Transportation Management. Based on text messages and
other information provided by BERN BENOIT on behalf of Transportation
Management, both CJ Baptiste and a person identified as “Charles,” who
used the email address CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM,
were involved in the preparation and submission of Transportation
Management's fraudulent PPP loan application. According to records

provided by Google, the email address CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 18 of 52
GMAIL.COM was deleted on July 7, 2020, hours after I called BERN
BENOIT to discuss Transportation Management's fraudulent PPP loan.?

35. Once BlueVine processed the application, it was submitted to
Cross River Bank for funding. Based on the application’s untrue
statements, Transportation Management's loan was approved. On or
about May 18, 2020, approximately $830,417 in PPP loan funds was
distributed to Transportation Management's bank account.

ANDRE LEE GAINES /Gaines Reservation and Travel LLC

36. GAINES is a citizen of the United States who claims sole
ownership of Gaines Reservation and Travel LLC (“Gaines R&T”), located
at 85 Rosemont Court, Hiram, Georgia 30141. He is listed as the registered
agent of Gaines R&T according to records obtained from the Georgia
Secretary of State.

37. | According to records provided by Cross River Bank, on or

about May 18, 2020, an application in support of an $806,710 PPP loan for

*I sent a preservation request for the CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@
GMAIL.COM account on or about July 29, 2020. Google provided
information, including email headers, related to the email address
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM on or about August 3,
2020. Because Google retained and was able to provide that information
after the account was deleted, there is probable cause to believe that
Google has retained the information this warrant seeks despite the account
deletion.

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Gaines R&T was submitted to BlueVine. The email address listed for
Gaines R&T on its PPP loan application is GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.
COM. Based on information provided by Google, on May 18, 2020 - the
same day that Gaines R&T submitted its fraudulent PPP loan application -
the email address DARRELL.THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP
-COM sent an email to GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM.

38. Once BlueVine processed the application, it was submitted to
Cross River Bank for funding. Based on the application’s untrue
statements, Gaines R&T’s loan was approved. On or about May 18, 2020,
approximately $806,710 in PPP loan funds was distributed to Gaines R&T
through wire transfer to Gaines R&T’s bank account.

KAHLIL GIBRAN GREEN SR. /Impact Creations LLC

39. KAHLIL GIBRAN GREEN SR. is a citizen of the United States
who claims sole ownership of Impact Creations LLC (“Impact”), located at
600 Superior Avenue East, Fifth Third Center 1300, Cleveland, Ohio 44114.
He is listed as the registered agent of Impact according to records obtained
from the Ohio Secretary of State.

40. According to records provided by Cross River Bank, on or
about May 17, 2020, an application in support of an $830,000 PPP loan for

Impact was submitted to BlueVine. Impact’s PPP loan application lists

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CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM as the email address for Impact. The
application misrepresented critical information, including Impact’s
average monthly payroll and number of employees. The application was
digitally signed in Green’s name and certified that the application and the
information he provided in all supporting documents and forms was true
and accurate.

41. After BlueVine processed the application, it was submitted to
Cross River Bank for funding. Based on the application’s untrue
statements, Impact’s loan was approved. On or about May 19, 2020,
approximately $830,000 in PPP loan funds was distributed to Impact’s
bank account.

The Business Email Addresses Associated With Transportation
Management, Gaines R&T, and Impact

42. As discussed above, the business email addresses listed on the
PPP loan applications for Transportation Management, Gaines R&T, and
Impact Creations were TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.
COM, GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM, and CREATEIMPACT75@
GMAIL.COM, respectively. Based on information provided by Google,
there is probable cause to believe that these email addresses were created
and used for the sole or primary purpose of carrying out and facilitating

the violations being investigated.

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 21 of 52
43. First, each account was created shortly before the business’s
PPP loan application was submitted.
TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM was created on May
19, 2020, GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM was created on May 3,
2020, and CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM was created on April 24,

44. Second, each account is linked to DARRELL THOMAS. The
phone number associated with both GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM
and CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM is +14048205260. Based on
public source research, that phone number is registered to DARRELL
THOMAS. The recovery phone number associated with
TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM is +17705685744,
which based on publicly available information is registered to Meghan
Thomas, DARRELL THOMAS’s wife. In addition, the email address
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM is linked by cookies to the email
address DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM, which is DARRELL
THOMAS’s personal email address. Moreover, the email addresses
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM,
CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM, and

TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM are all linked by

Page 19 of 34
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 22 of 52
cookies with Meghan Thomas’s personal email address,
megthom1021@gmail.com.

45. Third, based on email header information provided by
Google, each account appears to have been used to communicate with
BlueVine, but engaged in few other communications. For example, on or
about May 19, 2020, the email address
TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM received an email
from noreply@pdffiller.com. According to the website www.pdffiller.com,
the website allows users to, among other things, “Edit, annotate and
blackout PDFs” and to “Get documents e-signed.” The very next email
that TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM received was
from service@bluevine.com. Between on or about May 19, 2020 and May
20, 2020, TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM received
approximately six emails from email addresses associated with BlueVine,
of a total of only approximately 18 emails sent or received by the email
address between May 19, 2020 and July 23, 2020.

46. Similarly, on May 18, 2020, the email address
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM received several emails from
service@bluevine.com and cares@bluevine.com, which are email addresses

associated with BlueVine, the company to which Gaines R&T submitted its
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 23 of 52
PPP loan application. The email address
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM sent or received only approximately
16 emails between May 3, 2020 and June 24, 2020.

47. Finally, between May 16, 2020 and May 18, 2020, the email
address CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM received several emails from
service@bluevine.com and cares@bluevine.com. The email address
CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM sent or received only approximately
25 emails between April 24, 2020 and June 23, 2020.

Transfers of Fraudulent PPP Loan Proceeds and
Use of the SUBJECT EMAIL ADDRESSES

Transfers to DARRELL , THOMAS’s Companies

48. After receiving their PPP loan proceeds, Impact,
Transportation Management, Gaines R&T, and Lee Operations made large
payments to DARRELL THOMAS ’s companies, Bellator and Elite.

49. The total amount deposited into Account 3940 between on or
about May 19, 2020 and on or about June 15, 2020 that is traceable to
fraudulently obtained PPP loan proceeds is approximately $1,342,155.35.
On or about June 5, 2020, approximately $620,000 was transferred from
Account 3940 to another Bellator bank account via wire.

50. The total amount traceable to fraudulently obtained PPP loans

that was deposited into Account 4823 between May 21, 2020 and June 16,

Page 21 of 34
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 24 of 52
2020 is approximately $1,525,850.15. On or about June 8, 2020,
approximately $100,000 was transferred from Account 4823 to another
Bellator bank account.

51. | Documents produced by Transportation Management and.
information provided by Google show that there is probable cause to
believe that the email addresses BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM,
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM, and
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM were used to facilitate
and carry out the money laundering of fraudulent PPP loan proceeds
deposited into Transportation Management's account. Specifically, on
June 15, 2020, CJ Baptiste, using the email address
Jerry@NetbasedStudios.com, sent an email to
BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM with the subject line “disbursement
time.” The email said:

Ok it’s disbursement time. Important...remember and remind Bern

that he will be getting about 322k out of this deal for free. And

everything done is for the purpose of keeping him legal and safe.

So...no angst, questioning, 3 way calls or other drama allowed. This

is the way it goes, no objection. Let’s make this easy and just do

what’s necessary. The split is 40% Bern and 60% processor/doc

people/cpa/ taxes etc

1) We need him to do another cashier check for 100K make it out to
warehouse rent same company name (he will get 50k of this back)

2) Payroll wire to Elite Executive Services Inc
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 25 of 52
7200 Grandview Overlook

Duluth, Ga 30097

Account: xxxxxxx44823

Routing: xxxxx9593

Total wire amount: $169,998.72

In memo line for wire put payroll business management services

Bern will get a big chunk of this back via wire/ payroll cards

There will be a second payroll run in about a week and a 1/2 for
169,998.72

And then a final payroll run two weeks after that for whatever the
balance is.

Need this done today. No conference call needed its easy.
Thanks.

52. On June 15, 2020, the same day as the email quoted above,
Transportation Management wired $169,998.72 to Elite and purchased a
$100,000 cashier’s check made out to Bellator.

53. | Header information provided by Google shows that Bern
Benoit, using the email address BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM,
received an email from CJ Baptiste, using the email address
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM on June 2, 2020, the same day that
Transportation Management made a $12,000 online ACH payment to J
Anthony Properties, a company affiliated with CJ Baptiste. The header

information also shows that the email addresses

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 26 of 52
BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM and
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM exchanged several emails in May
and June 2020, including the email quoted above regarding Transportation
Management's purported “expenses.” In addition, bank records show that
Transportation Management transferred at least $51,000 of the fraudulent
PPP loan proceeds to CJ Baptiste or his company, J Anthony Properties, in
May and June 2020.

54. Moreover, header information provided by Google shows that
CJ Baptiste, using the email address
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM, exchanged many emails with
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM in May and June 2020,
including exchanging approximately 19 emails on or about June 15, 2020,
the same date as the “disbursement time” email discussed above.

Purchases of Luxurv Vehicles

55. Bank of America records show that, on or about June 9, 2020,
Bellator sent a $137,953.00 wire transfer from Account 3940 to “Jakes
Motorcars.” Records produced by Jakes Motorcars show that this wire
transfer represented payment for DARRELL THOMAS’s purchase of a
2018 Mercedes-Benz S-Class S65 AMG (“2018 Mercedes”), which was

delivered to DARRELL THOMAS ’s residence on or about June 18, 2020.

Page 24 of 34
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 27 of 52
56. Bank of America records show that, on or about June 15, 2020,
Bellator sent a $126,441.00 wire transfer from Account 3940 to “CMD, LLC
DBA MCLAREN CHARL.” Records provided by McLaren Charlotte
establish that this wire transfer represented payment for DARRELL
THOMAS’s purchase of a 2018 Land Rover Range Rover (“2018 Land
Rover”), which was delivered to DARRELL THOMAS at his residence or
about June 27, 2020. The 2018 Land Rover has since been seized pursuant
to a seizure warrant signed by United States Magistrate Judge Alan J.
Baverman.

57. | Records provided by McLaren Charlotte show that
DARRRELL THOMAS used the email address
DARRELL. THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM in
connection with his purchase of the 2018 Land Rover. On June 11, 2020,
McLaren sales representative Kyle Slawter, using the email address
kslawter@charlottemclaren.com, sent an email to DARRELL THOMAS,
using the email address
DARRELL.THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM, and said, in
part: “Thank you for your interest in my 2018 Land Rover Range Rover
SVAUTOBIOGRAPHY. This vehicle is still in my inventory at the

moment. How may | assist you?” DARRELL THOMAS, using the email

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 28 of 52
address DARRELL.THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM,
responded that he was “looking to purchase immediately,” and later that
day stated that “I'll be doing cash no financing needed.” On June 15, 2020,
Kyle Slawter emailed DARRELL THOMAS, using the email address
DARRELL. THOMAS@BELLATORPHRONTGROUP.COM, to confirm
that McLaren had received the wire payment and that the vehicle would
be detailed before being transported.

58. The records provided by McLaren also show that DARRELL
THOMAS used the email address
DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM to carry out and facilitate his
money laundering. On June 11, 2020, Kyle Slawter, using the email
address kslawter@charlottemclaren.com, asked DARRELL THOMAS if he
had a “Gmail account.” The same day, DARRELL THOMAS responded
that his email address is DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM.
Based on header information provided by Google, on June 11, 2020,
DARRELL THOMAS, using the email address
DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM, received an email from
kslawter@gmail.com, which appears to be a Google email address used by

Kyle Slawter.

Page 26 of 34
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 29 of 52
BACKGROUND CONCERNING EMAIL

59. In my training and experience, I have learned that Google and

GoDaddy provide a variety of on-line services, including electronic mail
“email”) access, to the public. Google allows subscribers to obtain email

accounts at the domain name www.gmail.com, like the email accounts
listed in Attachment A. GoDaddy allows subscribers to obtain email
accounts using custom domain names created by the subscriber.
Subscribers obtain an account by registering with Google and GoDaddy.
During the registration process, Google and GoDaddy ask subscribers to
provide basic personal information. Therefore, the computers of Google
and GoDaddy are likely to contain stored electronic communications
(including retrieved and unretrieved email for Gmail and GoDaddy
subscribers) and information concerning subscribers and their use of
Gmail and GoDaddy services, such as account access information, email
transaction information, and account application information. In my
training and experience, such information may constitute evidence of the
crimes under investigation because the information can be used to identify
the account’s user or users.

60. | AGmail and GoDaddy subscriber can also store with the

provider files in addition to emails, such as address books, contact or

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 30 of 52
buddy lists, calendar data, pictures (other than ones attached to emails),
and other files, on servers maintained and/or owned by Google and
GoDaddy. In my training and experience, evidence of who was using an
email account may be found in address books, contact or buddy lists, email
in the account, and attachments to emails, including pictures and files.

61. In my training and experience, email providers generally ask
their subscribers to provide certain personal identifying information when
registering for an email account. Such information can include the
subscriber’s full name, physical address, telephone numbers and other
identifiers, alternative email addresses, and, for paying subscribers, means
and source of payment (including any credit or bank account number). In
my training and experience, such information may constitute evidence of
the crimes under investigation because the information can be used to
identify the account's user or users. Based on my training and my
experience, I know that, even if subscribers insert false information to
conceal their identity, this information often provides clues to their
identity, location, or illicit activities.

62. In my training and experience, email providers typically
retain certain transactional information about the creation and use of each

account on their systems. This information can include the date on which

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 31 of 52
the account was created, the length of service, records of log-in (.e.,
session) times and durations, the types of service utilized, the status of the
account (including whether the account is inactive or closed), the methods
used to connect to the account (such as logging into the account via the
provider's website), and other log files that reflect usage of the account. In
addition, email providers often have records of the Internet Protocol
address (“IP address”) used to register the account and the IP addresses
associated with particular logins to the account. Because every device that
connects to the Internet must use an IP address, IP address information
can help to identify which computers or other devices were used to access
the email account.

63. In my training and experience, in some cases, email account
users will communicate directly with an email service provider about
issues relating to the account, such as technical problems, billing inquiries,
or complaints from other users. Email providers typically retain records
about such communications, including records of contacts between the
user and the provider’s support services, as well as records of any actions
taken by the provider or user as a result of the communications. In my

training and experience, such information may constitute evidence of the

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 32 of 52
crimes under investigation because the information can be used to identify
the account's user or users.

64. As explained herein, information stored in connection with an
email account may provide crucial evidence of the “who, what, why,
when, where, and how” of the criminal conduct under investigation, thus
enabling the United States to establish and prove each element or
alternatively, to exclude the innocent from further suspicion. In my
training and experience, the information stored in connection with an
email account can indicate who has used or controlled the account. This
“aser attribution” evidence is analogous to the search for “indicia of
occupancy” while executing a search warrant at a residence. For example,
email communications, contacts lists, and images sent (and the data
associated with the foregoing, such as date and time) may indicate who
used or controlled the account at a relevant time. Further, information
maintained by the email provider can show how and when the account
was accessed or used. For example, as described below, email providers
typically log the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses from which users access
the email account, along with the time and date of that access. By
determining the physical location associated with the logged IP addresses,

investigators can understand the chronological and geographic context of

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 33 of 52
the email account access and use relating to the crime under investigation.
This geographic and timeline information may tend to either inculpate or
exculpate the account owner. Additionally, information stored at the
user’s account may further indicate the geographic location of the account
user at a particular time (e.g., location information integrated into an
image or video sent via email). Last, stored electronic data may provide
relevant insight into the email account owner’s state of mind as it relates to
the offense under investigation. For example, information in the email
account may indicate the owner’s motive and intent to commit a crime
(e.g., communications relating to the crime), or consciousness of guilt (e.g.,
deleting communications in an effort to conceal them from law
enforcement).

65. Based on my training and experience, user attribution
evidence can be found anywhere within the records associated with an
email account, including within records that were generated years prior to
criminal activity. Because this investigation involves a group of criminals
who are believed to be controlling the accounts sought in the warrant, it is
necessary to request records starting from March 31, 2020, when the PPP

loan program was announced, to the present.

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 34 of 52
66. Moreover, the stored communications and files connected to
the target accounts may provide direct evidence of the offenses under
investigation.

67. Google also maintains records for online (internet/web) and
application activity associated with a particular Google account, such as
the search history associated with the accounts listed in Attachment A.
Google retains a user’s search history whether the search is executed from
a mobile device or from a traditional computer. This history includes the
searched-for terms, the date and time of the search, and the user-selected
results. Furthermore, Google retains records about the specific type of
search a user performed, including general web searches and specialty
searches where the results are focused in a particular group such as
images, news, videos, and shopping. Based on my training and experience,
I believe that a review of the suspect’s search history would reveal
information relevant to the ongoing criminal investigation by revealing
what information the suspect sought and when he sought it.

68. According to representatives from Google and GoDaddy, the
companies keep records that can reveal other accounts accessed from the
same electronic device (i.e. computer or mobile phone) as a known

account, including accounts linked by “cookies,” which are small pieces of
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 35 of 52
text sent to the user’s Internet browser when visiting websites. Therefore,
Google and GoDaddy can identify any other accounts accessed by the
same device(s) that accessed the account(s) described in Attachment A,
including accounts linked by cookies, creation IP address, recovery email
address, or telephone number.

69. Therefore, Google’s and GoDaddy’s servers are likely to
contain stored electronic communications and other information
concerning subscribers and their use of email services. In my training and
experience, such information may constitute evidence of the crimes under
investigation including information that can be used to identify the
account’s user or users.

70. Based on my training, experience, and knowledge of law
enforcement guidelines for Google and GoDaddy, I know that these email
providers can conduct searches based on objective criteria like date ranges,
but they are unfamiliar with this investigation and cannot filter content for
subjective criteria based on the subject matter of communications.

INFORMATION TO BE SEARCHED AND THINGS TO BE SEIZED

71. Lanticipate executing this warrant under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, in particular 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a),

2703(b)(1)(A) and 2703(c)(1)(A), by using the warrant to require Google

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 36 of 52
and GoDaddy to disclose to the government copies of the records and
other information (including the content of communications and stored
data) particularly described in Section I of Attachment B. Upon receipt of
the information described in Section I of Attachment B, government-
authorized persons will review that information to locate the items
described in Section II of Attachment B.

CONCLUSION

72. | Asexplained in this Affidavit, there is probable cause to believe
that DARRELL THOMAS and his co-conspirators used the SUBJECT
EMAIL ADDRESSES to carry out and facilitate the offenses being
investigated.

73. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g), the presence of a law
enforcement officer is not required for the service or execution of this

watrant.

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 37 of 52
ATTACHMENT A

Property to Be Searched

This warrant applies to information associated with the email
accounts DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM,
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM, BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM,
TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM,
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM,
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM, and
CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM, that is stored at premises owned,
maintained, controlled, or operated by Google LLC, an email provider

headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 38 of 52
ATTACHMENT B

Particular Things to be Seized
I. Information to be disclosed by Google LLC (“the Provider”)

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is
within the possession, custody, or control of the Provider, regardless of
whether such information is located within or outside of the United States,
and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that has been
deleted but is still available to the Provider, or has been preserved
pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), the Provider is
required to disclose the following information to the government for each
account or identifier listed in Attachment A for the time period March 31,
2020 through the present:

a. The contents of all emails associated with the accounts,
including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the
account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with
each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size
and length of each email;

b. — All records or other information regarding the identification
of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers

and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 39 of 52
which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to
register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and
dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during
registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of
payment (including any credit or bank account number);

c. The types of service utilized;

d. All records or other information stored by an individual using
the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar
data, pictures, and files;

e. All records pertaining to communications between the
Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with
support services and records of actions taken.

f. A list of the types of Google service utilized by each account
in Attachment A and any dates associated with the commencement or
termination of that use;

g. Allrecords pertaining to devices from which the account
accessed any Google service or to which any Google service is synced, to
include device serial numbers, model type/number, IMEI, phone

numbers, and MAC Addresses; and

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 40 of 52
h. All search history and internet browsing history associated
with each account in Attachment A;

The Provider is hereby ordered to disclose the above information to
the government within 14 days of service of this warrant.

II. Information to be seized by the government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes
contraband, fruits, evidence and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, 1349, 1014, 1956, and/or 1957 involving the target
and/or any associates or accomplices, including, for each account or
identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following
matters:

a. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the email
account(s), including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such
person(s) and their employer;

b. | Evidence relating to the Paycheck Protection Program,
including any Paycheck Protection Program loan submitted by any
business, any communications with individuals or entities regarding
Paycheck Protection Program loan applications, and any documentation or
information submitted in connection with any Paycheck Protection

Program loan;

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 41 of 52
c. Evidence relating to any fraudulent loan application;

d. Evidence relating to the incorporation, ownership, or control of
Bellator Phront Group Inc., Elite Executive Services Inc., Gaines
Reservation and Travel LLC, Impact Creations LLC, Lee Operations LLC,
Transportation Management Services Inc., Management Resource Services
Inc., and 365 Enterprise LLC;

e. Evidence relating to the use or expenditure of proceeds from
any Paycheck Protection Program loan;

f. Evidence indicating the user agent strings used to access the
services;

g. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed
or used, to determine the chronological and geographic context of account
access, use and events relating to the crime under investigation and the
account subscriber;

h. Any records pertaining to the means and source of payment
for services (including any credit card or bank account number or digital
money transfer account information);

i. Evidence indicating the subscriber's state of mind as it relates

to the crime under investigation; and

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Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 42 of 52
j. | Evidence that may identify any co-conspirators or aiders and

abettors, including records that help reveal their whereabouts.

Page 5 of 5
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 43 of 52
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY OF DOMESTIC RECORDS PURSUANT TO
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 902(11) AND 902(13)

L , attest, under penalties of perjury by the

laws of the United States of America pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the information
contained in this certification is true and correct. Iam employed by Google LLC, and

my title is . Iam qualified to authenticate the records

attached hereto because I am familiar with how the records were created, managed,
stored, and retrieved. I state that the records attached hereto are true duplicates of the
original records in the custody of Google LLC. The attached records consist of

I further state that:

a. all records attached to this certificate were made at or near the time of the
occurrence of the matter set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge of those matters, they were kept in the ordinary course of the regularly
conducted business activity of Google LLC, and they were made by Google LLC as a
regular practice; and

b. such records were generated by Google LLC’s electronic process or system
that produces an accurate result, to wit:

1. the records were copied from electronic device(s), storage
medium(s), or file(s) in the custody of Google LLC in a manner to ensure that they are
true duplicates of the original records; and

2. the process or system is regularly verified by Google LLC, and at
all times pertinent to the records certified here the process and system functioned
properly and normally.

I further state that this certification is intended to satisfy Rules 902(11) and
902(13) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Date Signature
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 44 of 52
(Rewv..4/30/ 2014) Search W arrant

United States District Court

Northern District of Georgia

In the.Mattér of the Search of:

Information associated with the email addresses SEARCH WARRANT
DARRELL. THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM;
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM; CASE NUMBER: 1:20-mc-1472

BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM;
TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM;
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM;
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM; and
CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM that is stored at
premises owned, maintained, controlled, or operated by
Google LLC, a company headquartered at 1600
Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.

TO: FBI Special Agent Joseph D. Stites and any Authorized Officer of the United States:

An affidavit having been made before me by Special Agent Joseph D. Stites, who has reason to believe that, on the property or premises

known as

Information associated with the email addresses DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM; GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM;
BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM; TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM; NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM;
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM; and CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM, as further described in Attachment A:

There is now concealed certain property, certain data, and certain information, namely,

See Attachment B

which constitutes evidence of the commission of a criminal offense and property which has been used as the means of committinga
criminal offense, concerning violations of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343, 1344, 1349, 1014, 1956, and/or 1957, over which
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has jurisdiction. I find that the affidavit establishes probable cause
to search and seize the person or property from the person or premises described above.

YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to execute this warrant on or before Sept. 1,2020
Date

(not to exceed 14 days) AT ANY TIME IN THE DAY OR NIGHT AS I FIND GOOD CAUSE HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED. You must

give a copy of the warrant arid a receipt for the property taken to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the property was

taken, or leave a copy of the warrant and receipt at the place where the property was taken: The officer executing the warrant, or an
officer present during the execution of the warrant, must prepare an inventory as required by law and promptly return this warrant
and inventory to United States Magistrate Judge Justin S. Anand.- ~

August 18, 2020 at 2:30 pm at Atlanta, Georgia

Date and Time City and State

JUSTIN S. ANAND a

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE es Jha A
Name and Title of Judicial Officer Signature ¢f Judicial Officer

AUSA Tal C. Chaiken /404-581-6069 Issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4.1
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 45 of 52
RETURN
Case No: 1:20-mc-1472 Date and time warrant executed: Copy of warrant and inventory left with:
Inventory made in the presence of
A list of property /information/ data/ person(s) seized:
CERTIFICATION

I declare under penalty of perjury that this inventory is correct and was returned along with the original warrant to the designated

judge.

Date Executing officer's signature

Printed name and title
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 46 of 52
ATTACHMENT A

Property to Be Searched

This warrant applies to information associated with the email
accounts DARRELL.THOMAS1986@GMAIL.COM,
GRESERVETRAVEL@GMAIL.COM, BERNBENOIT23@GMAIL.COM,
TRANSPORTMANAGEMENTINC@GMAIL.COM,
NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM,
CHARLESWILLIAMKNIGHT7@GMAIL.COM, and
CREATEIMPACT75@GMAIL.COM, that is stored at premises owned,
maintained, controlled, or operated by Google LLC, an email provider

headquartered at 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway, Mountain View, CA 94043.
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 47 of 52
ATTACHMENT B

Particular Things to be Seized
I. Information to be disclosed by Google LLC (“the Provider”)

To the extent that the information described in Attachment A is
within the possession, custody, or control of the Provider, regardless of
whether such information is located within or outside of the United States,
and including any emails, records, files, logs, or information that has been
deleted but is still available to the Provider, or has been preserved
pursuant to a request made under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), the Provider is
required to disclose the following information to the government for each
account or identifier listed in Attachment A for the time period March 31,
2020 through the present:

a. The contents of all emails associated with the accounts,
including stored or preserved copies of emails sent to and from the
account, draft emails, the source and destination addresses associated with
each email, the date and time at which each email was sent, and the size
and length of each email;

b. — All records or other information regarding the identification
of the account, to include full name, physical address, telephone numbers

and other identifiers, records of session times and durations, the date on
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 48 of 52
which the account was created, the length of service, the IP address used to
register the account, log-in IP addresses associated with session times and
dates, account status, alternative email addresses provided during
registration, methods of connecting, log files, and means and source of
payment (including any credit or bank account number);

c. The types of service utilized;

d. All records or other information stored by an individual using
the account, including address books, contact and buddy lists, calendar
data, pictures, and files;

e. All records pertaining to communications between the
Provider and any person regarding the account, including contacts with
support services and records of actions taken.

f. A list of the types of Google service utilized by each account
in Attachment A and any dates associated with the commencement or
termination of that use;

g. Allrecords pertaining to devices from which the account
accessed any Google service or to which any Google service is synced, to
include device serial numbers, model type/number, IMEI, phone

numbers, and MAC Addresses; and

Page 2 of 5
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 49 of 52
h. All search history and internet browsing history associated
with each account in Attachment A;

The Provider is hereby ordered to disclose the above information to
the government within 14 days of service of this warrant.

II. Information to be seized by the government

All information described above in Section I that constitutes
contraband, fruits, evidence and/or instrumentalities of violations of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1344, 1349, 1014, 1956, and/or 1957 involving the target
and/or any associates or accomplices, including, for each account or
identifier listed on Attachment A, information pertaining to the following
matters:

a. The identity of the person(s) who created or used the email
account(s), including records that help reveal the whereabouts of such
person(s) and their employer;

b. | Evidence relating to the Paycheck Protection Program,
including any Paycheck Protection Program loan submitted by any
business, any communications with individuals or entities regarding
Paycheck Protection Program loan applications, and any documentation or
information submitted in connection with any Paycheck Protection

Program loan;

Page 3 of 5
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 50 of 52
c. Evidence relating to any fraudulent loan application;

d. Evidence relating to the incorporation, ownership, or control of
Bellator Phront Group Inc., Elite Executive Services Inc., Gaines
Reservation and Travel LLC, Impact Creations LLC, Lee Operations LLC,
Transportation Management Services Inc., Management Resource Services
Inc., and 365 Enterprise LLC;

e. Evidence relating to the use or expenditure of proceeds from
any Paycheck Protection Program loan;

f. Evidence indicating the user agent strings used to access the
services;

g. Evidence indicating how and when the account was accessed
or used, to determine the chronological and geographic context of account
access, use and events relating to the crime under investigation and the
account subscriber;

h. Any records pertaining to the means and source of payment
for services (including any credit card or bank account number or digital
money transfer account information);

i. Evidence indicating the subscriber's state of mind as it relates

to the crime under investigation; and

Page 4 of 5
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 51 of 52
j. | Evidence that may identify any co-conspirators or aiders and

abettors, including records that help reveal their whereabouts.

Page 5 of 5
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439-1     Filed 03/14/22     Page 52 of 52
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY OF DOMESTIC RECORDS PURSUANT TO
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 902(11) AND 902(13)

L , attest, under penalties of perjury by the

laws of the United States of America pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, that the information
contained in this certification is true and correct. Iam employed by Google LLC, and

my title is . Iam qualified to authenticate the records

attached hereto because I am familiar with how the records were created, managed,
stored, and retrieved. I state that the records attached hereto are true duplicates of the
original records in the custody of Google LLC. The attached records consist of

I further state that:

a. all records attached to this certificate were made at or near the time of the
occurrence of the matter set forth by, or from information transmitted by, a person with
knowledge of those matters, they were kept in the ordinary course of the regularly
conducted business activity of Google LLC, and they were made by Google LLC as a
regular practice; and

b. such records were generated by Google LLC’s electronic process or system
that produces an accurate result, to wit:

1. the records were copied from electronic device(s), storage
medium(s), or file(s) in the custody of Google LLC in a manner to ensure that they are
true duplicates of the original records; and

2. the process or system is regularly verified by Google LLC, and at
all times pertinent to the records certified here the process and system functioned
properly and normally.

I further state that this certification is intended to satisfy Rules 902(11) and
902(13) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

Date Signature


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