MOTION to Suppress Search and Seizure with Brief In Support by Jerry Baptiste as Jerry… — USA v. Thomas et al (Dkt. 439)

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Defendant Baptiste's Motion to Suppress Evidence and Fruits Seized Pursuant to the Search Warrant Directed to Google, with a Memorandum of Law in Support, filed 03/14/22 as Document 439 in United States of America v. Jerry Baptiste, et al., Criminal Action No. 1:20-CR-296-JPB-CMS-13, in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division. Jerry Baptiste, through counsel, moves under the Fourth Amendment and Rules 12(b)(3) and 41(h) to suppress evidence obtained from an August 18, 2020 search warrant seeking the emails in his email account. He argues that the affidavit contained a false description and material omissions and that the warrant was an impermissible general warrant, and asks for a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The signature line reads /s/ Douglas W. Gilfillan, dated the 14th day of March, 2022.

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ATLANTA DIVISION 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v. 
JERRY BAPTISTE, et al. 
Criminal Action No. 
 
1:20-CR-296-JPB-CMS-13 
 
 
 
DEFENDANT BAPTISTE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND 
FRUITS SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT DIRECTED 
TO GOOGLE FOR NETBASEDSTUDIOS@GMAIL.COM AND 
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT 
 
Defendant Jerry Baptiste (“Defendant”), through counsel, pursuant to the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Rules 12(b)(3) and 41(h) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, respectfully moves this Court to 
suppress evidence obtained from an August 18, 2020, Search Warrant directed to 
Google, Inc., seeking the production of all the emails in the account 
netbasedstudios@gmail.com (“Defendant’s email account” or “the target email 
account”).  For the reasons set forth below, Defendant asks that this Court conduct 
a hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), and order that all 
emails, documents, and other items obtained from Defendant’s email account 
pursuant to the warrant be suppressed and inadmissible in any trial. 
 
 
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INTRODUCTION 
The search warrant at issue, attached as Exhibit 1, is fatally flawed, 
overbroad and was issued in violation of Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.  
The affidavit for the warrant falsely described and made material omissions in 
portraying as nefarious and evidence of criminal activity one of only two emails 
specifically alleged involving Defendant’s email account. Because the email was 
already in the government’s possession when this false description was made, the 
Court should conclude that the false description was made either intentionally or 
with reckless disregard for the truth.  The Court also should conclude that the false 
statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause because the remainder of 
the affidavit as to Defendant’s email account consists of another email that is not 
alleged to be false or contain false information and conclusory statements which 
are insufficient to establish probable cause.  
Moreover, the warrant is an impermissible general warrant in two related 
ways.  First, the warrant compelled Google to produce to the government, among 
other information, “[t]he contents of all emails associated with” Defendant’s email 
account and other information within a certain time period, despite the lack of 
probable cause for such a sweeping, general production. And second, the affidavit 
does not set forth a legally sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity 
and specific, articulable facts sufficient to guide the agent’s discretion in selecting 
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items to be seized beyond those relating to the TMS loan. As a result, the warrant 
authorized government agents to rummage through Defendant’s email account to 
seize emails and information falling well outside the limited alleged probable cause 
related to Defendant’s email account. In these respects, the warrant was a 
prohibited general warrant.   
The false statement and material omissions remove this warrant from the 
Leon good faith exception.  The exception would not apply in any event because 
no law enforcement officer could reasonably rely on this affidavit in obtaining the 
entire contents of Defendant’s email account and seizing all of the items described 
in the warrant. As a result, after a Franks hearing, the Court should suppress the 
evidence and fruits thereof seized pursuant to the search warrant.  
RELEVANT BACKGROUND 
 
On or about July 7, 2020, during the course of his investigation of this 
matter, the FBI agent who later obtained the warrant at issue placed a recorded call 
to Bern Benoit about a PPP loan obtained for his business Transportation 
Management Services, Inc. (“TMS”).  During that call, among other things, the 
agent asked Benoit about Defendant.  Benoit told the agent that Defendant was his 
friend and that he had known him for a while.  Benoit also told the agent that 
Benoit had provided his business information for TMS to Defendant, who Benoit 
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believed had in turn had provided it to an individual named Charles Knight (a/k/a 
Charles Petty) (“Knight”).   
 
On August 4, 2020, a federal grand jury in the Northern District of Georgia 
returned a 30 count indictment against five defendants, including Benoit, alleging a 
scheme to obtain fraudulent loans from the U.S. Small Business Administration 
(“SBA”) under the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP”) established as part of the 
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act enacted in or 
about March 2020. (Doc. 1.)  The charges alleged against Benoit all related to a 
single alleged loan obtained by Benoit for his company TMS. (Id. at ¶¶ 51- 60, 71, 
73.) 
 
On or about August 16, 2020, the government applied for and obtained a 
search warrant for Defendant’s email account and others, including Knight’s. Ex. 
1. As described below, the warrant  required Google to give the government the 
entire contents of, and all available information about, Defendant’s email account.  
Based on allegations regarding a single loan and the agent’s training and 
experience that the information to be seized would identify the user of the target 
email account, the warrant allowed government agents to read and review all the 
emails in Defendant’s email account and to seize, among other things, evidence 
relating to “any” PPP loan, including communications about “any” PPP loan, and 
“any fraudulent loan application.” Ex. 1, Attachment B. 
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Almost a year later, on July 13, 2021, the government obtained a 
superseding indictment charging Defendant and 14 additional individuals in 62 
counts arising from an alleged scheme to obtain fraudulent SBA PPP loans. (Doc. 
135.)  Despite the number of charges and defendants in this superseding 
indictment, Defendant was charged only in connection with the single alleged loan 
that Benoit obtained for his company TMS.  (Doc. 135.) The superseding 
indictment included Knight, among others, as a co-defendant in the charges against 
Defendant.  (Id.).  The Government subsequently obtained a Second Superseding 
Indictment adding another defendant and 63rd count not relevant here.  (Doc. 290.)  
SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATION AND AFFIDAVIT 
 
In support of its search warrant for Defendant’s email account, the 
Government’s affidavit specifically alleges the following1 regarding Defendant’s 
email account: 
 Based on documents produced by Benoit, on May 29, 2020, Knight “sent 
an email to” Defendant with a subject line of “Expenses for 
Transportation Management” and including an “itemized list of 
‘purported’ expenses” for Benoit’s company TMS, which Defendant 
“then forwarded to” Benoit’s email. Ex. 1 at ¶ 34.2  The allegation that 
                                                 
1 In recounting the affidavit allegations, Defendant does not concede that they are true. Indeed they are not as 
described here.  
2 The affidavit alleges that Knight used the email address, charleswilliamknight7@gmail.com, to send this email.   
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the list of expenses for Benoit’s company originated with Knight and that 
he sent the email to Defendant is false, as the only email that Benoit 
produced to the government shows that it was Defendant who sent 
Knight the list of expenses for TMS and that Defendant then forwarded 
his own email to Benoit.  See Exhibit 2.  Moreover, the affidavit omits 
that Benoit had already told the agent in a recorded interview that 
Defendant was his friend, that he had known Defendant for a while, and 
that he had provided his business information to Defendant to be 
provided to Knight.  Ex. 1 at ¶ 34. 
 On June 15, 2020, after the TMS loan was funded, Defendant, using an 
email other than the target email account, forwarded Benoit an email 
from Knight with the subject line “disbursement time” and instructions 
from Knight “for the purpose of keeping [Benoit] legal and safe” with 
regard to the disbursement of loan proceeds.  On its face, this email 
included instructions for disbursements related to rent and payroll, among 
other things. Id. at ¶ 51. The affidavit does not allege any additional facts 
regarding the payments referenced in the email.   
 In May and June 2020 Benoit exchanged emails with Defendant’s email 
account, and that during this period Benoit, via TMS, transferred money 
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to Defendant’s bank account. Id. at ¶ 53. The affidavit does not allege 
any facts regarding the purpose of such transfers.   
 In May and June 2020, Defendant’s email address and defendant Knight 
exchanged “many emails” in May and June 2020, including “19 emails” 
on or about June 15, 2020, the date of the disbursement and “safe and 
legal” email described above. Id. at ¶54.   
 
Similarly, other allegations regarding Defendant and Defendant’s email 
account are merely conclusory statements.  See, e.g., id. at ¶34 (“Based on text 
messages and other information provided by [Benoi] on behalf of [TMS] both 
[Defendant] and [Knight] were involved in the preparation and submission of 
[TMS’s] fraudulent PPP loan application.”).  Nowhere does the affidavit allege 
specific facts regarding Defendant, his business or activities, his alleged 
involvement in the TMS loan, the use of or relationship of Defendant’s email 
account to any loans other than the TMS loan, or any relationship or activities 
with Benoit or Knight.  
 
 
The government’s affidavit includes several allegations based on the agent’s 
“training and experience,” albeit only regarding how the records sought would 
reveal the identity of the user of the email accounts sought by the warrant, i.e., 
attribution evidence.  Although the government knew and had already alleged 
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that Defendant was the user of the target email account, the affidavit explained 
that the agent’s training and experience supported probable cause because: 
 “[I]nformation can be used to identify the account’s user or users.” Id. at 
¶ 59. 
 “[E]vidence of who was using an email account” may be found in the 
records sought. Id. at ¶ 60. 
 The information maintained by Google “often provides clues to their 
identity, location, or illicit activities.”  Id. at ¶ 61. 
 Transactional information “can help to identify which computers or other 
devices were used to access the email account.” Id. at ¶ 62. 
 “[T]he information can be used to identify the account’s user or users.” 
Id. at ¶ 63. 
 “[T]he information stored in connection with an email account can 
indicate who has used or controlled an account.” Id. at ¶ 64. 
 The information sought may reveal “user attribution” evidence. Id. at ¶ 
65. 
 Subsequent paragraphs include the bald allegation, with no reference to 
the agent’s training and experience and no nexus between the TMS loan 
and any other activity or conduct, that the target email account “may 
provide direct evidence” of the offenses under investigation, that search 
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history maintained by Google (which is not related to the contents of 
emails) may be relevant, and that Google may be able to identify other 
accounts used by the user(s) of the target email account (which again is 
not related to the contents of emails).  Id. at ¶¶ 66-68. 
 
Confirming that alleged “training and experience” supports at most probable 
cause only for the seizure of attribution evidence, the affidavit concludes by 
alleging that “therefore, [Google’s] servers are likely to contain” stored 
information “concerning subscribers and their use of email services.” Id. at ¶ 69.  
Nowhere does the affidavit allege facts regarding the agent’s training and 
experience in other matters establishing a nexus between the use of emails, 
Defendant’s email account, and any loans or other activity other than the TMS 
loan.  
LEGAL STANDARDS 
 
“A search warrant must ‘particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.’” United States v. Alford, 744 F. App'x 650, 652 
(11th Cir. 2018) (quoting U.S. Const. amend IV) (alterations in original). “The 
Fourth Amendment requires searches be as limited as possible, and the goal is to 
prevent ‘rummaging’ through a person’s belongings by requiring warrants to 
include a particular description of the things to be seized.” Id. (quoting United 
States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 973 (11th Cir. 2017)). “Thus, the Fourth 
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Amendment requires that a warrant particularly describe both (1) the place to be 
searched and (2) the persons or things to be seized.” United States v. Soviravong, 
No. 1:19-CR-146-AT-CMS, 2019 WL 7906186, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2019), 
report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 709284 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 12, 2020) 
(internal citations omitted).  “A general order to explore and rummage through a 
person’s belongings is not permitted.”  United States v. Cook, 657 F.2d 730, 733 
(5th Cir. Sept. 30, 1981). 
 
“Probable cause to support a search warrant exists when the totality of the 
circumstances allow a conclusion that there is a fair probability of finding 
contraband or evidence at a particular location.” United States v. Brundidge, 170 
F.3d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). “[T]he affidavit should establish a connection 
between the defendant and the residence to be searched and a link between the 
residence and any criminal activity.” United States v. Rhame, No. 1:16-CR-00067-
SCJ-CMS, 2016 WL 11164144, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 6, 2016), report and 
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1082327 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 28, 2018) (alteration 
in original and quoting United States v. Martin, 297 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 
2002)). “The Eleventh Circuit instructs that the particularity requirement ‘be 
applied with a practical margin of flexibility, depending on the type of property to 
be seized, and that a description of property will be acceptable if it is as specific as 
the circumstances and nature of activity under investigation permit.’” United States 
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v. Capote, No. 1:15-CR-00338-MHC-CMS, 2016 WL 11650552, at *2 (N.D. Ga. 
May 5, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3086412 (N.D. Ga. 
May 31, 2016) (quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th 
Cir. 1982)). “[A] conclusory statement [in a search warrant affidavit], without 
more, of course has no probative value.” United States v. Lockett, 674 F.2d 843, 
845 (11th Cir. 1982); see also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (holding 
that a warrant affidavit cannot rely on “mere conclusory statement[s]”). 
 
“To be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress based on 
misrepresentations or omissions in a search warrant affidavit, a defendant must 
make a substantial preliminary showing that: (1) the affiant made false statements; 
(2) the false statements were made either intentionally or with reckless disregard 
for the truth; and (3) the false statements were necessary to the finding of probable 
cause. Material omissions from a supporting affidavit may also give rise to 
entitlement to a Franks hearing.” Rhame, 2016 WL 11164144, at *5 (citing Franks, 
438 U.S. at 171-72 and United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th 
Cir. 2009)). “When assessing whether the alleged false statements and omissions 
were material, the trial court is to disregard those portions of the affidavit which 
the defendant has shown are arguably false and misleading.” United States v. 
Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1309 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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The Leon good faith exception does not apply, among other circumstances, 
where the magistrate “‘in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an 
affidavit that the affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for 
his reckless disregard of the truth[;]’ . . . . where the affidavit supporting the 
warrant is ‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable;’ and [] where, depending upon the circumstances 
of the particular case, a warrant is ‘so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to 
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized—that the executing 
officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.’” United States v. Martin, 297 
F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 
922 (1984)). 
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITY 
I. 
The Affidavit Included False and Misleading Allegations And Material 
 
Omissions.  
 
The affidavit alleges only two specific emails from Defendant’s email 
account, one of which is incorrectly alleged in a way that is misleading and 
portrays the email as evidence of knowing criminal activity. Specifically, the 
affidavit falsely alleged that the May 29, 2020, email listing expenses for TMS 
originally came from Knight, who sent it to Defendant and that Defendant then 
forwarded that email to Benoit. In doing this and alleging that the expenses were 
“purported” expenses, the affidavit creates the inference that this was nefarious 
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activity in furtherance of the alleged TMS loan – i.e., why else would information 
about Benoit’s company originate with Knight? The affidavit made this allegation 
“based on documentation provided by [Benoit] on behalf of [TMS].”  Ex. 1 at ¶ 34.  
Additionally, the false statement about this email dovetails with the allegation 
regarding the second email alleged regarding Defendant’s email account – the 
email allegedly sent by Knight with disbursement instructions to keep Benoit “safe 
and legal.” Thus, the false description bolsters the inference that Knight is sending 
in both instances information to Benoit and Defendant about Benoit’s company 
TMS.   
But in truth and fact, the TMS expenses were coming the other direction, 
that is from Benoit to Defendant and on to Knight. Attached at Exhibit 2 is the 
email from TMS’s grand jury production on which the government was relying in 
alleging the May 29, 2020 email at issue.  In that email Defendant sent Knight the 
list of expenses, and then forwarded the email he had sent Knight on to Benoit.   
Indeed, that is what Benoit told the agent on July 7, 2020, about a month 
before the agent obtained the warrant at issue.  Benoit told the agent that he knew 
and had dealings with Defendant, and had provided his business information to 
Defendant to be passed on to Knight.  When these statements are considered with 
the true and correct email, this episode does not support the inference of alleged 
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criminal activity involving Defendant’s email account as it is alleged in the 
affidavit.   
Similarly, there are no allegations supporting the characterization of the 
expenses as “purported” expenses or the inference created by the affidavit that they 
were not true – no allegations that is other than the false description that such 
expenses had originated with a third party and not Benoit. The government simply 
wrongly portrayed the information as coming from Knight to create the inference 
and allegation that such expenses were not true. 
Disregarding the email and related allegations in paragraph 34 of the 
affidavit leaves the Court with the following regarding Defendant’s email account: 
an alleged email that on its face states its purpose as keeping Benoit “safe and 
legal” with regard to disbursements relating to rent and payroll, conclusory 
statements about Defendant and his email account, and unexplained money 
transfers. The Court should conclude that these remaining allegations do not 
establish probable cause for the sweeping search of Defendant’s email account 
authorized by warrant.   
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should order a Franks hearing and 
suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the warrant.  
 
   
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II. 
The Warrant is an Impermissible General Warrant. 
 
The Court should conclude that the warrant is an impermissible general 
warrant because it both requires Google to produce the entire contents of 
Defendant’s email account from a particular date forward and did not allege a 
sufficient nexus between the one alleged TMS loan, Defendant, his email account, 
and evidence of any other loans or activity. The affidavit did not allege sufficient 
facts to sufficiently connect the target email account to any other activity, much 
less any other loans.  As a result, the warrant allowed agents to rummage through 
Defendant’s email and conduct a general search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 
In United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960, 973-75 (11th Cir. 2017), the 
Eleventh Circuit found that the two-step seizure process employed here violates the 
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement in the absence of meaningful 
limitations on the scope of the first step, here Google’s production of “virtually 
every kind of data that could be found” in Defendant’s email account.  In reaching 
this conclusion, Blake relied on the absence of any time period limitation or 
limitation on the seizure of “messages sent to or from persons suspected at that 
time of being” involved in the criminal activity.  Id. at 974.3 Subsequently, the 
Eleventh Circuit applied Blake in reviewing a warrant that, unlike here, “was as 
                                                 
3 Blake ultimately concluded that the Leon good faith exception applied to the warrant. 868 F.3d at 974-75. That 
decision, however, came five years ago and should not be made here as to this warrant as explained below.   
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specific as the circumstances and nature of the activity under investigation 
permitted.” United States v. Alford, 744 F. App'x 650, 653 (11th Cir. 2018).  In 
Alford, the Court held that “the warrant was as limited as possible because all of 
the evidence seized could have helped identify the owner of the Google account.” 
Id.  
 
At least one lower court has applied Blake to a similar two-step warrant and 
imposed restrictions not present here on the government’s review.  In United States 
v. Matter of Search of Info. Associated With Fifteen Email Addresses, No. 2:17-
CM-3152-WC, 2017 WL 4322826, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2017), the 
Magistrate Judge denied the government’s applications for 15 two-step search 
warrants for individual email accounts because the applications did not have a 
temporal limitation and allowed the government to retain indefinitely the entire 
contents of the email accounts.  The District Court approved the warrant 
applications only after imposing a temporal limitation and the requirement that 
“the searches be conducted through keyword searches and other appropriate 
protocols so as to limit the universe of data to be reviewed to that which is more 
likely to be pertinent.” Id. at *10. On the government’s motion for reconsideration, 
the District Court removed the keyword search in favor of a sealed search protocol 
or framework submitted by the government, because “the users of the accounts are 
intentionally hiding their personal lives from their digital ones,” thus justifying a 
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“broader search than what otherwise might be reasonable.”  United States v. Matter 
of Search of Info. Associated with Fifteen Email Addresses Stored at Premises 
Owned , Maintained, Controlled or Operated by 1&1 Media, Inc., No. 2:17-CM-
3152-WKW, 2017 WL 8751915 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 1, 2017). 4 
 
The affidavit here is most notable for what it does not contain – any facts 
regarding Defendant, any business or work that he may have conducted, or any 
facts regarding any relationship he may have had to the other individuals that are 
alleged in connection with his email account, Knight or Benoit.  Rather, the 
affidavit alleges a purported fraud scheme involving PPP loans obtained using 
similar or the same fake bank statements and tax forms, one allegedly fraudulent 
loan that Benoit obtained for TMS, one email purportedly relating to disbursement 
of proceeds of that loan, and conclusory statements regarding Defendant’s alleged 
connection to the TMS loan.5  This is an insufficient basis to conduct a general 
search of Defendant’s email for evidence related to any other activity.   
 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that in cases “involving complex financial 
transactions and widespread allegations of various types of fraud,” the warrant 
should be read with “an awareness of the difficulty of piecing together the ‘paper 
                                                 
4 Undoubtedly, numerous federal courts have approved two-step email search warrants.  See, e.g., In re Search of 
Recs., Info., & Data Associated with 14 Email Addresses Controlled by Google, LLC, 438 F. Supp. 3d 771, 778 
(E.D. Mich. 2020) (collecting cases).  Those cases are distinguishable because in this case the two-step process here 
was overbroad in both steps – that is, the government was allowed to obtain the entire contents of Defendant’s email 
account from a specific date forward and then in the second step, search for evidence relating to loans other than the 
TMS loan, despite an insufficiently alleged factual nexus between Defendant, his account, and any such other loans. 
5 As explained above, the Court should disregard the falsely alleged email and the related facts.  
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puzzle.’” United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11th Cir. 1982).  The 
Court should not give the government the benefit of Wuagneux in this case.  First, 
the straightforward alleged fraud scheme is hardly “complex” and does not involve 
“widespread allegations of various types of fraud” as in Wuagneux. Second, the 
government did not provide sufficient “pieces” of the “puzzle” to fit together here 
as it relates to anything beyond the TMS loan.  The Court should not supply the 
missing pieces, i.e., the nexus between the target email account and any other 
activity that the Government failed to allege.   
 
Significantly, the agent did not aver anywhere in the affidavit that in his 
training and experience evidence of any other loans, whether PPP, fraudulent, or 
any other kind, would be found in Defendant’s email account.  The only training 
and experience allegations relate to the discovery of attribution evidence, which 
the government already knew for Defendant’s email account.   
 
The affidavit is insufficient to warrant a search broader than for TMS loan 
related items.  Although the affidavit contained a date limitation, the warrant and 
affidavit at issue were not “as specific as the circumstances and nature of the 
activity under investigation permitted” and as it was alleged in the affidavit. See, 
e.g., Alford, 744 F. App’x. at 653.  In United States v. Christine, 563 F. Supp. 62, 
66 (D.N.J. 1983), the court found that the warrant affidavit “established probable 
cause to believe that the defendants had bribed an officer of Collective Federal 
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Savings and Loan (“Collective”) to approve [title loans] for a limited number of 
uncreditworthy individuals.” The court also found that the affidavit  
did not establish probable cause to believe that the suspect dealings 
extended to other loan officers or to other lending institutions. The 
affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that the suspect 
dealings involved other than [title loans]. The affidavit did not 
establish probable cause to believe that the defendants were engaged 
in widescale fraud.   
 
Id. Assessing each of the items to be seized against the articulated probable cause, 
the Court held invalid four clauses that failed to “tie the items sought” to either the 
savings and loan at issue, Collective, or to the types of loans at issue, “title” loans. 
Id. at 67.  Because these four clauses were not tied to the basis for probable cause 
in the affidavit, the court found these clauses “unjustifiably overbroad” and 
ordered a hearing to determine which items had been legitimately seized, without 
regard to the invalid clauses. Id. at 67-68. 
 
Similarly, the Court here should order suppressed any items seized beyond 
what was authorized by the limited probable cause in the affidavit.  The warrant 
and affidavit were overbroad in each of the two steps, in the first instance for 
ordering Google to produce the entire contents of Defendant’s email account from 
a date forward and in authorizing the government to seize evidence for which no 
probable cause basis was alleged.  As a result, the warrant permitted government 
agents to rummage generally through Defendant’s email.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Shah, No. 5:13-CR-328-FL, 2015 WL 72118, at *12 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 6, 2015) 
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(“In order to satisfy particularity, the warrant must ‘at least minimally confine[ ] 
the executing officers' discretion by allowing them to seize only evidence of a 
particular crime.’”) (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 693 (4th Cir. 1999). 
IV.  The Leon Good Faith Exception Does Not Apply. 
 
The Leon good faith exception does not apply in the first instance because 
the government obtained this warrant based on a deliberately or recklessly false 
affidavit. United States v. Leon,  468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).  But even if the Court 
does not conclude that this exception to the Leon rule applies here, the good faith 
exception should still not apply.  It has been four years since Blake and Alford, in 
which the Eleventh Circuit made it clear that two step warrants must be 
accompanied by limitations “as specific as the circumstances and nature of the 
activity under investigation permitted.”  Alford, 744 F. App'x at 653. 
 
As shown above, in extending to evidence other than in relation to the TMS 
loan, this warrant and affidavit were far from as specific as the circumstances and 
nature of the activity under investigation permitted.  As such, the government 
agents who executed the warrant here could not have reasonably believed them to 
be valid because of the missing nexus between Defendant, the target email 
account, and any activity other than in relation to the TMS loan.   
 
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439     Filed 03/14/22     Page 20 of 22

21 
 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should order a Franks hearing and 
grant this Motion To Suppress Evidence And Fruits Seized Pursuant To The 
Search Warrant Directed To Google Regarding netbasedstudios@gmail.com. 
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of March, 2022. 
/s/ Douglas W. Gilfillan  
Douglas W. Gilfillan 
Georgia Bar No. 294713 
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton, LLP 
Suite 2800 
1100 Peachtree Street NE 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 
(404) 815-6019 (Phone) 
(404) 795-9047 (Facsimile) 
dgilfillan@kilpatricktownsend.com  
 
Counsel to Jerry Baptiste 
 
 
 
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439     Filed 03/14/22     Page 21 of 22

22 
 
LOCAL RULE 7.1D CERTIFICATE 
 
 
The undersigned hereby certifies that the foregoing has been formatted in 
Times New Roman font, 14 point type, which complies with the font size and point 
requirements of Local Rule 5.1C. 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
I hereby certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed with the 
Clerk of Court using the CM/ECF system, which automatically serves notification 
of such filing to all counsel of record, including: 
Tal C. Chaiken 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Nathan P. Kitchens 
Assistant United States Attorney 
U.S. Attorney’s Office 
75 Ted Turner Drive, Suite 600 
Atlanta, GA 30303 
 
This 14th day of March, 2022. 
/s/ Douglas W. Gilfillan 
Douglas W. Gilfillan 
Georgia Bar No. 294713 
dgilfillan@kilpatricktownsend.com 
 
 
Case 1:20-cr-00296-JPB-CMS     Document 439     Filed 03/14/22     Page 22 of 22

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