Consent Motion to Exclude Time From Calculation Under Speedy Trial Act — USA v. Barabash (Dkt. 15, D. Md.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland · No. 1:22-cr-00232-JKB · Doc. 15 · 2022-12-01 · Docket on CourtListener

Full text

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALEXANDER BARABASH 
 
         Defendant 
 
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CRIMINAL NO. JKB-22-232 
 
 
 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TIME 
PURSUANT TO THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT 
 
 
The United States of America, through undersigned counsel, hereby moves to exclude time 
from calculation under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). 
1. 
On June 29, 2022, the Grand Jury returned an Indictment charging the Defendant, 
Alexander Barabash, with one count of Wire Fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Count One); 
and six counts of Money Laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Counts Two through Seven).  
The Indictment was initially placed under seal. 
2. 
Defendant made an initial appearance on August 22, 2022, and he was subsequently 
released pending trial, subject to certain conditions (see ECF 10).  
3. 
On October 4, 2022, the Government made an initial production of discovery and 
has been in communication with Defendant through his counsel.   
4. 
On October 6, 2022, the Court granted the Government’s motion, filed with the 
Defendant’s consent, to exclude the time period from August 22, 2022, through December 1, 2022, 
inclusive, from calculation under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h).  ECF No. 
14.   
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5. 
The parties are in ongoing discussions about the possibility of resolving this case 
without proceeding to trial. 
6. 
Under the Speedy Trial Act, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), a criminal 
defendant must be brought to trial within seventy days of the later of either the filing of an 
indictment or the first appearance before a judicial officer. 
7. 
Periods of delay which would extend the time within which trial should commence 
include “[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1).  Although § 3161(h)(1) enumerates specific excludable proceedings, the list 
is not exhaustive, and has been interpreted to include a number of different proceedings and events 
concerning a defendant.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has interpreted “other 
proceedings” to include plea negotiations.  U.S. v. Keita, 742 F.3d 164, 188 (4th Cir. 2014).  Thus, 
the period during which the parties engage in plea discussions is excludable from the Speedy Trial 
calculation under § 3161(h)(1).  Other proceedings excludable from time calculations under the 
Speedy Trial Act include delay resulting from pretrial motions, including this motion.  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).   
8. 
Other periods of delay that would extend the time within which trial should 
commence include delay resulting from a continuance of the trial date beyond the seventy-day 
speedy trial date, if such continuance is granted by the Court on the basis of a finding that the ends 
of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant 
in a speedy trial.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A).  Factors which the Court must find applicable in 
order to make this finding are listed in § 3161(h)(7)(B) and include the following: 
a. Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely 
to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
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b. Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, 
is not so unusual or complex as to fall within clause (ii), would deny the defendant 
reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the 
Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the 
attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective 
preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. 
 
9. 
The Government respectfully submits that the above factors are applicable to this 
prosecution and justify the scheduling of the trial date beyond the speedy trial date.  Taking into 
account the exercise of due diligence, the failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel for 
the parties the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation of pretrial motions and any 
responses thereto, and for effective preparation for trial.  The requested exclusion of time will also 
provide time for the parties to continue discussions of a potential resolution of the case short of 
trial.  Accordingly, the interests of justice served by the requested exclusion of time outweigh the 
interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. 
10. 
The Government has contacted Defendant’s counsel, who does not oppose the relief 
requested herein.   
Wherefore, the Government requests that this Court enter an Order excluding time under 
the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7), for the period from December 1, 2022, 
through March 1, 2023, inclusive. 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Erek L. Barron 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Attorney 
 
 
 
By: 
/s/                                      
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Darryl L. Tarver 
 
 
Assistant United States Attorney 
Office of the United States Attorney  
36 S. Charles Street, 4th Floor  
 
 
Baltimore, MD 21201  
 
Case 1:22-cr-00232-JKB     Document 15     Filed 12/01/22     Page 3 of 3

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