Sentencing Submission by USA as to Adedayo Ilori — USA v. Ilori et al. (Dkt. 120, S.D.N.Y.)

Record facts

U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York · No. 1:21-cr-00746-MKV · Doc. 120 · 2023-05-01 · Docket on CourtListener

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[Type text] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
May 1, 2023 
 
BY ECF 
 
The Honorable Mary Kay Vyskocil 
United States District Court Judge 
Southern District of New York 
500 Pearl Street 
New York, New York 10007 
 
 
Re: 
United States v. Adedayo Ilori, S1 21 Cr. 746 (MKV) 
 
Dear Judge Vyskocil: 
 
The defendant in this case, Adedayo Ilori (“Ilori” or “the defendant”), is scheduled to be 
sentenced on May 8, 2023 at 10:00 a.m., having been convicted at trial of major fraud against the 
United States, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1031, 2, and 3147; conspiracy 
to commit wire and bank fraud, in violation of Title 18, United State Code, Sections 1349 and 
3147; wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343, 2, and 3147; bank 
fraud,  in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1344, 2, and 3147; aggravated identity 
theft, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1028A, 2, and 3147; and conspiracy to 
commit money laundering, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1956(h) and 3147.  
The Government respectfully submits this letter in advance of sentencing.  For the reasons 
explained below, the Government believes that a serious sentence of at least 25 years’ 
imprisonment (to run consecutive to the defendant’s pending sentence) is warranted in this case. 
 
I. 
Background 
 
A. The Defendant’s Criminal History 
 
For more than two decades, the defendant has engaged in fraud and identity theft crimes.  
In 1997, at the age of 18, the defendant was arrested twice in short succession for state fraud 
offenses, involving stolen identities, stolen credit card information, and fraudulent checks.  (See 
Presentence Investigation Report revised February 14, 2023 (“PSR”) ¶¶ 92, 93.)  These arrests 
were shortly followed by his November 1997 federal arrest, in this District.  Giving rise to this 
prosecution, for several months, the defendant had opened bank accounts using stolen and 
fraudulent identifying information, into which he deposited counterfeit checks.  (See PSR ¶ 81.)  
Ilori was convicted of bank fraud for this conduct, and the Honorable Deborah A. Batts, United 
 
The Silvio J. Mollo Building 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One Saint Andrew’s Plaza 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New York, New York 10007 
U.S. Department of Justice 
United States Attorney 
Southern District of New York 
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States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sentenced Ilori to 15 months’ 
incarceration. 
 
Ilori soon violated his supervised release.  In July 1999, at the age of 20, Ilori was arrested 
for using a fraudulent credit card to purchase a retail item.  (PSR ¶¶ 81, 82.)  The defendant’s 
federal supervised release was revoked, and he received a twenty-four-month sentence for the 
violation.  He was also convicted of the crime in state court. 
 
In September 1999, after the defendant’s July 1999 arrest but before his supervised release 
was revoked, he was again arrested for similar fraud conduct.  He was arrested attempting to steal 
a computer through the use of a stolen identity and fraudulent ID and bank cards.  (PSR ¶ 83.) 
 
In May 2004, the defendant was arrested while using a stolen credit card to purchase 
merchandise.  He was found in possession of a forged ID when he was arrested during his 
attempted flight from apprehension.  (PSR ¶ 84.)  He was sentenced to a term of probation for this 
offense.  
 
In January 2006, while he was still under probation for his 2004 conviction, the defendant 
was again arrested using a fraudulent credit card and utilizing a stolen identity.  (PSR ¶ 85.)  For 
this offense, his fifth conviction, the defendant was sentenced to between 42 months’ and 7 years’ 
incarceration.   
 
On June 8, 2006, less than one week after he entered a guilty plea in the case described in 
the preceding paragraph, the defendant was again arrested while attempting to use stolen identities 
to open bank accounts.  (PSR ¶ 86.)  The defendant was convicted following a jury trial for this 
offense and received a sentence of 30 months’ to 5 years’ incarceration.  During the period of his 
incarceration, he was cited for numerous disciplinary infractions.  He was released from prison in 
2010. 
 
Beginning in approximately March 2019, the defendant took part in a scheme to submit 
fraudulent loan applications.  The defendant partnered with a crooked bank manager, Herode 
Chancy.  The plan involved creating falsified bank statements and business documents to convince 
the bank to extend what bank employees believed would be legitimate loan funds, but that the 
defendant never had any intention of repaying.  The defendant’s role in the scheme involved 
creating the fake documents and obtaining the stolen identity information required to execute the 
scheme. 
 
While this bank fraud and identity scheme was in progress, the defendant was engaged in 
additional fraud and identity theft crimes.  In June 2019, the defendant was arrested while 
attempting to open bank accounts under stolen identities.  During his arrest, law enforcement 
recovered numerous ID cards and bank cards in the names of identity theft victims.  Some of the 
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ID cards used the information of these identity theft victims, but displayed Ilori’s photograph.  Ilori 
was charged for this conduct in state court, although the case was later dismissed.   
 
As a result of this June 2019 arrest, Ilori was incarcerated at Rikers Island.  While on 
Rikers, Ilori met co-defendant Chris Recmier (“Recamier”), who was himself incarcerated as a 
result of drug charges.  In or about fall 2019, Ilori and Recamier were both released from prison, 
following the implementation of New York State’s bail reform law. 
 
With the defendant out of prison, he returned to the bank fraud conspiracy that had been 
initiated in spring 2019 with Chancy.  Ilori recruited Recamier to take part in this scheme, and 
Recamier used stolen identities and forged bank cards to advance the scheme.  Ilori and his co-
conspirators ultimately submitted fraudulent applications for more than $1 million in business 
loans.  In or about March 2020, Ilori, Chancy, and Michael Albarella were arrested and charged in 
United States v. Chancy, 20 Cr. 378 (LJL); however, law enforcement had not identified Recamier 
during the earlier investigation, and he therefore was not charged in that case.  (PSR ¶ 58.)  Ilori 
was released on bail conditions between his arrest on or about March 4, 2020 and his arrest rising 
out of the instant case on or about October 8, 2021.  (PSR ¶ 87.) 
 
B. Offense Conduct 
 
Despite Ilori’s 2020 arrest and Ilori’s release pursuant to federal bail conditions, the 
defendant took part in broad criminal activity, utilizing the stolen identities of dozens of victims 
and taking advantage of programs intended to assist the country in responding to the COVID-19 
pandemic, with co-defendant Recamier.   
 
 
Beginning in or about August 2020, Ilori and Recamier worked together to commit yet 
more crimes—engaging in the instant fraud, identity theft, and money laundering scheme.  Ilori 
and Recamier chose to defraud the federal government and two emergency programs intended to 
assist the nation in weathering the COVID-19 pandemic.  In the process, Ilori and Recamier 
fraudulently used the stolen identities of dozens of victims.  
 
The Small Business Administration (“SBA”) is responsible for the federal relief programs 
in question.  (PSR ¶ 16.)  The Coronavirus Air, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act 
provided emergency financial assistance to the millions of Americans who were suffering the 
economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  (PSR ¶ 17.)  One source of relief provided 
by the CARES Act was the authorization of hundreds of billions of dollars in forgivable loans to 
small businesses to pay for payroll, mortgage interest, rent, and/or utilities through the Paycheck 
Protection Program (“PPP”).  Pursuant to the CARES Act, the amount of PPP funds a business 
was eligible to receive was determined by the number of employees employed by the business and 
the business’s average payroll costs.  (PSR ¶ 18.)  A business applying for a PPP loan was required 
to provide documentation to confirm that it had, in the past, paid employees the amount of 
compensation represented in the business’s loan application.  The CARES Act also expanded the 
separate Economic Injury Disaster Loan (“EIDL”) Program, which provided small businesses with 
low-interest loans of up to $150,000 to help overcome the temporary loss of revenue that they were 
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experiencing due to COVID-19.  To qualify for an EIDL loan under the CARES Act, the applicant 
must have suffered “substantial economic injury” from COVID-19, based on the applicant’s actual 
economic injury, as determined by the SBA.   
 
Together, Ilori and Recamier applied for at least 14 different COVID-relief loans, under 
both the EIDL program and PPP.  They applied for these loans under the stolen names of various 
business entities and using the stolen identities of at least nine different individuals.  In total, Ilori 
and Recamier applied for at least $10 million in fraudulent loans, and they successfully obtained 
more than $1 million in federal relief loans.  (PSR ¶ 56.) 
 
Ilori and Recamier generally followed the same approach with each fraudulent loan 
application they filed.  They used the stolen identities of real people and businesses.  They 
submitted falsified tax documents and bank records, claiming that the applications had been 
completed by business entities that, in some cases, purportedly employed dozens of people and 
had substantial monthly payroll.  All said, the defendants represented that they ran companies 
employing more than 300 employees and paying more than $3 million in monthly wages.  (PSR 
¶ 22.)  Many of the accounts and applications involved the use of fake IDs, many bearing 
Recamier’s photograph but with the names and identifying information of identity theft victims.  
 
Of the more than $1 million in relief funds successfully obtained, Ilori and Recamier 
transferred the money to accounts they controlled, in the names of identity theft victims.  These 
funds were used to purchase more than $400,000 in cryptocurrency; at least approximately $50,000 
in stocks; and at least approximately $60,000 in cash.  (PSR ¶ 21.) 
 
Law enforcement identified particular investment accounts utilized by Ilori and Recamier 
to invest fraudulently obtained funds.  Between at least in or about May 2021 and in or about July 
2021, a particular IP address was used to access at least one of these investment accounts on 
multiple occasions.  Subscriber records reflect that IP Address-1 was assigned to a particular 
apartment in Long Island City (the “LIC Apartment”).  The LIC Apartment had been rented by 
Ilori and Recamier, in or about March 2021, under name of an identity theft victim named Mark 
Heffron.  (PSR ¶ 48.)  During the investigation, law enforcement conducted surveillance of the 
LIC Apartment and observed both Ilori and Recamier present in the vicinity of the LIC Apartment.   
 
Ilori and Recamier also used a particular phone number as the primary contact phone 
number on their loan applications and/or fraudulent bank accounts (the “0642 Number”).  (PSR 
¶ 37.)  During the investigation, law enforcement obtained a GPS tracking warrant for the 0642 
Number.  In conducting surveillance concerning the location of the 0642 Number, law enforcement 
observed Ilori (alone) at a particular coffee shop located in Manhattan.  During the approximate 
time that Ilori was in that coffee shop, the credit card in the name of identity theft victim Jonathan 
Herttua was used to purchase coffee.  Based in large part on the results of this physical and 
electronic surveillance, law enforcement identified Ilori as a subject of their investigation.  In 
addition, law enforcement determined that the 0642 Number was located in the vicinity of Ilori’s 
home address every night between approximately midnight and 5 a.m.  (Trial Transcript (“Trial 
Tr.”) at 239-40.)  
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C. The Searches and Arrests 
 
On October 7, 2021, the Honorable Peggy Kuo, U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Eastern 
District of New York, signed a search warrant, authorizing law enforcement to search: (a) the LIC 
Apartment, and (b) Ilori’s person and the area in his immediate control.  On October 7, 2021, at 
approximately 9:45 p.m., law enforcement officers executed the search at the LIC Apartment. 
Recamier was present at the LIC Apartment when the search warrant was executed, and law 
enforcement officers placed him under arrest.  (PSR ¶ 51.)  During the search of the LIC 
Apartment, law enforcement recovered evidence of Ilori’s and Recamier’s fraud, including 
notebooks meticulously documenting the names and personally identifiable information of specific 
victims and the names of companies in whose name Ilori and Recamier had submitted fraudulent 
SBA loan applications. 
 
Following his arrest, Recamier was advised of his Miranda rights, waived those rights, and 
engaged in an audio-recorded interview with law enforcement.  During that interview, Recamier 
inculpated both himself and Ilori in the charged crimes.  Recamier stated, in substance and in part, 
that he had used fake IDs in other people’s names; that he and Ilori had been working to submit 
fraudulent applications for COVID-19 relief loans; and that he and Ilori had used 15 to 20 fake ID 
cards and fraudulent credit cards in the names of those individuals.  Ilori maintained the fake ID 
cards and fraudulent credit cards that were used over the course of the scheme and would give 
Recamier particular cards to use as needed.  For example, in September 2021, Ilori gave Recamier 
a fake ID and fraudulent credit card in the name of victim Thomas Hockenberry and directed 
Recamier to lease a Mercedes (the “Mercedes”) in Hockenberry’s name (for Ilori’s use), which 
Recamier did.  Recamier also generally described his and Ilori’s respective roles in the scheme as 
follows, in sum and substance:  Recamier was responsible for creating false tax documents and 
physically going into banks to open accounts using fake IDs with his photograph, and Ilori 
purchased the fake ID cards and victims’ personal information from the dark web; found the 
company names and EINs under which Ilori and Recamier submitted the fraudulent loan 
applications; falsified bank statements and the other supporting documents; and controlled all the 
stolen money. 
 
The day after Recamier’s arrest, on October 8, 2021, at approximately 10:15 a.m., Ilori left 
his Queens home and entered the Mercedes, which was parked outside.  Law enforcement officers 
approached and executed the search warrant, as it pertained to Ilori’s person and the area within 
his immediate control.  From Ilori’s person, law enforcement recovered, among other things, a key 
to the LIC Apartment, bank cards in the name of ID theft victim Jonathan Herttua, and three 
cellular phones.  From the Mercedes’s passenger compartment, law enforcement recovered, among 
other things, an additional cellular phone. Law enforcement also searched the Mercedes’s trunk, 
and recovered, among other things, an additional cellular phone; ID cards in the name of identity 
theft victims and bearing Recamier’s photograph; and bank cards in the name of identity theft 
victims.  Many of the electronic devices recovered during the arrests of Ilori and Recamier 
provided additional evidence of the defendants’ involvement in the charged offenses.  For 
example, a cellphone recovered from Ilori’s person at the time of his arrest was the cellphone that 
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law enforcement had first identified as associated with the fraud scheme, and the location of which 
law enforcement had been tracking in its efforts to identify the perpetrators of the fraud.   
 
D. The Trial 
 
On October 25, 2022, trial began against Ilori.  The evidence presented at trial illustrated 
the sophistication of Ilori’s and Recamier’s fraud scheme.  Ilori and Recamier were deliberate in 
how they used their victims’ identities for purposes of submitting the fraudulent SBA loan 
applications and stealing government funds.  They engaged in successively escalating identity 
theft—for example, they first registered the 0642 cellphone number in Herttua’s name; then they 
set up an email account linked to Herttua’s name and the 0642 Number; then they falsified 
corporate and other documents for companies they had fraudulently associated with Herttua 
(including Appserd Inc. and BRS Consulting Corp.) to reflect Herttua’s name, the 0642 Number, 
and the email account; then they opened bank accounts using Herttua’s name, the 0642 Number, 
the email account, and the respective company.  It was later—after all those layers of identity theft 
and fraudulent supporting documentation was in place—that they submitted the fraudulent loan 
applications. 
 
Ilori and Recamier also carefully documented their fraud.  Notebooks recovered from the 
LIC Apartment contained lists of the various identity theft victims, with annotations and notes of 
what appeared to be information about the victims’ credit and where they may have held bank 
accounts already in their true names.  (See, e.g., Trial Tr. at 323.)  A desktop computer that was 
recovered from the LIC Apartment, which reflected login information to various of Ilori’s personal 
electronic accounts, also contained electronic versions of falsified documents, including 
documents in the names of specific identity theft victims and/or the business entities in whose 
name Ilori and Recamier submitted the fraudulent SBA loan applications.  (See Trial Tr. at 612-
46.) 
 
One loan application claimed the name of Appserd Incorporated (“Appserd”), which was 
purportedly run by Jonathan Herttua.  (PSR ¶¶ 20-26, 32, 35.)  Ilori and Recamier claimed that 
Appserd employed 79 employees with an average monthly payroll of more than $1.7 million.  The 
defendants cast Mr. Herttua as the owner and victim of the company, and they represented that the 
more than $4.4 million loan they were seeking would be used only for authorized business 
expenses.  In support of the application, the defendants submitted multiple fraudulent tax 
documents to back up their fraudulent representations.  Recamier personally impersonated Mr. 
Herttua, interacting with bank employees as Mr. Herttua (including one bank employee who 
testified at trial and positively identified Recamier as the person she knew as “Jonathan Herttua”) 
to attempt to get the loan approved.  (Trial Tr. at 423-29.)  Ultimately, the bank denied the loan.   
 
Three of Ilori’s and Recamier’s victims testified at trial.  All of the victims confirmed that 
they had not applied for SBA loans and that their personal information was used without their 
authorization to, among other things, register email addresses, open bank accounts, rent cars or 
apartments, and apply for (and, in some cases, received funded) SBA loans. 
 
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The true Jonathan Herttua testified about the following, among other things: (i) he learned 
in October 2021 that he had been the victim of identity theft; (ii) the various documents Ilori and 
Recamier created and/or used in Mr. Herttua’s name in connection with their fraud—including a 
fake ID, registered email and cellphone accounts, bank account applications, rental car agreements, 
and SBA loan applications—leveraged Mr. Herttua’s true name, date of birth, and social security 
number but falsified other details, including Mr. Herttua’s address, photograph, and business (see 
Trial Tr. at 62-80); (iii) Mr. Herttua’s purported signature on various of those documents, including 
a rental car agreement in his name, was not in fact his signature (id. at 80); (iv) Mr. Herttua never 
authorized anyone to use his personal information, including for any transactions or to rent any 
cars (id. at 88); (v) Ilori’s and Recamier’s theft of Mr. Herttua’s identity damaged his credit score 
and required him to change all his credit cards, bank accounts, and passwords, and to undertake 
efforts to prove to various companies that he was, in fact, the true Jonathan Herttua (id. at 88-89); 
and (vi) the theft of his identity was personally stressful and left him with “that feeling of 
helplessness and did I do something wrong to bring this on.”  (Id. at 89.)     
 
The true Gerald Hanson testified that the consequences stemming from Ilori’s and 
Recamier’s theft of his identity—including the damage to his credit history and banking 
relationships—required him to delay, by a full year, his retirement and his associated move to be 
near his son and grandchildren.  (Trial Tr. at 49-50.)    
 
The true William Jamieson testified that his true name (sometimes misspelled), date of 
birth, and social security number were used to rent an apartment in Brooklyn, to open a bank 
account, and to apply for an SBA loan in the name of a company that Mr. Jamieson had never 
heard of.  (Trial Tr. at 443-51.)  Mr. Jamieson never authorized anyone to use his personal 
information in any of those manners.  Ilori held himself out as William Jamieson; Ilori’s 
photograph was on the fake William Jamieson ID, and it was Ilori who met with a leasing agent 
and rented a Bushwick, Brooklyn apartment in Jamieson’s name.  (Trial Tr. at 559-60.) 
 
 
E. Procedural History 
 
On October 8, 2021, Ilori was arrested on the basis of his violation of pretrial release and  
appeared before the Honorable Lewis J. Liman, who ordered his bail revoked.  Recamier was 
presented on the same day on the basis of a criminal complaint.   
 
On December 9, 2021, a grand jury returned indictment 21 Cr. 746 (MKV), charging Ilori 
and Recamier with Major Fraud Against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1031; 
conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349; wire fraud, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1343; bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344; aggravated identity theft, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A; and conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1956.  On June 22, 2022, a grand jury returned a superseding Indictment adding a 
statutory enhancement to each of the six Counts, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3147, due to Ilori’s having 
committed the charged offenses while he was released under conditions of bail imposed in the case 
before Judge Liman.  On October 25, 2022, the defendant proceeded to a jury trial on the charges 
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contained in the Superseding Indictment.  (PSR ¶ 10.)  On November 1, 2022, the jury returned a 
guilty verdict on all six counts in the Superseding Indictment.  (Id.)  
 
II. 
The Application of the Guidelines 
 
The Government largely concurs with the Probation Department in its calculation of the 
Guidelines to the defendant’s case.  (See PSR ¶¶ 66-77.)  However, although the PSR appears to 
reach the proper total offense level of 40, the PSR misses one component of the Guidelines 
calculation.  Because the defendant was convicted of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 
2S1.1(b)(2)(B), the offense level should be increased by two levels.  With this correction, the PSR 
is correct that the total offense level is 40, the defendant is in Criminal History Category IV, and 
he is subject to a Guidelines Range of 360 months’ to life imprisonment, with a mandatory 
consecutive term of two years’ imprisonment for his conviction of aggravated identity theft. 
 
The defendant objects to numerous Guidelines enhancements.  The Court should reject 
these arguments. 
 
First, utilizing the out of Circuit case of United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022), 
the defendant argues that only actual loss should be considered under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1).  In 
Banks, the Third Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 
(2019), to find that “loss” in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 is unambiguously limited to actual loss and there is 
thus no reason to consult the commentary to the provision, which defines loss as both actual and 
intended loss.  Banks, 55 F.4th at 255-57.    
 
The Banks argument can be easily dismissed.  Banks is inconsistent with Second Circuit 
precedent, under which the law is clear that, “[f]or the purposes of calculating the Guidelines range, 
loss is defined as ‘the greater of actual loss or intended loss.’” United States v. Powell, 831 F. 
App’x 24, 25 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Certified Envtl. Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 
103 (2d Cir. 2014)).  This makes sense because “the larger intended amount is a better measure 
for the defendant’s culpability.” United States v. Lacey, 699 F.3d 710, 720 (2d Cir. 2012).  Indeed, 
in three post-Kisor cases, the Second Circuit has reaffirmed its deference to the Sentencing 
Guidelines commentary in its decisions that have held that the commentary to a different 
Guideline, U.S.SG. § 4B1.2, remains valid. See United States v. Wynn, 845 F. App’x 63, 65 (2d 
Cir. 2021) (distinguishing Kisor and applying the Sentencing Guidelines commentary’s statement 
that “controlled substance offenses” includes inchoate offenses), as amended (Apr. 1, 2021), cert. 
denied, 211 L. Ed. 2d 570, 142 S. Ct. 865 (2022); United States v. Richardson, 958 F.3d 151, 154-
55 (2d Cir. 2020); United States v. Tabb, 949 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 
2793 (2021).  It is thus unsurprising that the Honorable Edgardo Ramos, United States District 
Judge, Southern District of New York, was unimpressed with a similar Banks argument at a recent 
sentencing.  See United States v. Almaleh, 17 Cr. 25 (ER) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2023), Tr. at 10-11 
(“To state the obvious, we’re not in the Third Circuit, we’re in the Second Circuit.  And my 
understanding is that in this circuit, loss under the guidelines does include intended loss.  That has 
been the case from forever.”). 
 
In addition to its conflict with Second Circuit law, Banks also rests on flawed analysis and 
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is wrongly decided.  In interpreting “loss,” the Third Circuit overlooked at least two Guidelines 
provisions that shed light on how to interpret the word:  (1) the relevant-conduct Guideline, which 
states that specific offense characteristics like those in U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 “shall be determined on 
the basis of . . . all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(3); 
and (2) the attempt and conspiracy Guideline, which says that the base offense level is calculated 
using the base offense level from the Guideline for the substantive offense “plus any adjustments 
from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable 
certainty,” id. § 2X1.1(a) (emphasis added).  Those provisions show that the word “loss” in § 
2B1.1 encompasses intended loss—or, at a minimum, that the term is “genuinely ambiguous” 
under Kisor. 
 
The Court should apply the 20-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. §2B1.1(b)(1)(K) 
because the intended loss amount was more than $9.5 million and less than $25 million. 
 
Second, the defendant objects to the application of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)’s 
sophisticated means enhancement.  In this case, the defendant utilized dozens of stolen identities, 
fraudulent ID and bank cards, falsified bank records, numerous corporations, and multiple 
electronic devices and accounts in order to advance the fraud scheme, in a broad conspiracy 
involving multiple participants.  The Second Circuit has routinely held that repeated and 
coordinated criminal conduct and “the creation and use of false documents, and other tactics to 
conceal offense conduct, are indicia of the sophistication of an offense.”  United States v. Fofaneh, 
765 F.3d 141, 146-47 (2d Cir. 2014) (affirming imposition of sophisticated means enhancement); 
see also, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 820 F. App’x 57, 62 (2d Cir. 2020) (transferring money 
between multiple bank accounts and use of corporations as “fronts for criminal activity”); United 
States v. Fiumano, 721 F. App’x 45, 48 (2d Cir. 2018) (using tactics to evade victims and law 
enforcement).  The defendant again points to an out-of-Circuit case for support.  But that case, 
United States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2014), provides him no aid.  Beyond lacking 
application within the Second Circuit, which has routinely upheld the enhancement’s application 
in similar cases, Adepoju involved the Fourth Circuit vacating and remanding sentence because 
the district court failed to explain the bases for the enhancement’s application.  756 F.3d at 257-
59.  The case has no bearing here, where there are ample bases to support the application of the 
sophisticated means enhancement. 
 
Finally, the defendant objects to the application of the enhancement for receiving 
$1,000,000 or more in gross receipts from financial institutions under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(17)(A).  
(Def. Sent Sub. at 2-3.)  The defendant argues that the defendant did not individually receive the 
more than $1 million fraud proceeds obtained from banks in this case.  But, as described in greater 
detail above and as proven at trial, the defendant had access to and control over the fraudulent 
bank accounts, in the names of identity theft victims, that received the fraud proceeds.  And as 
Recamier stated during his post-arrest interview, it was Ilori who controlled the bank accounts and 
the fraud proceeds.  Ilori therefore individually received more than $1 million from banks.  
 
Accordingly, the Court should reject the defendant’s Guidelines arguments and adopt the PSR’s 
calculation with the correction outlined above.   
 
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III. 
Discussion 
 
1. Applicable Law 
 
Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) and United States v. Crosby, 397 
F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005), the Guidelines continue to provide a critical touchstone.  Indeed, while 
the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, they remain in place, and district courts must “consult” 
them and “take them into account” when sentencing.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 264.  As the Supreme 
Court has stated, “a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating 
the applicable Guidelines range,” which “should be the starting point and the initial benchmark.” 
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007). 
 
After calculating the Guidelines range, a sentencing judge must consider seven factors 
outlined in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a): (1) “the nature and circumstances of the 
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) the four legitimate purposes of 
sentencing, as set forth below; (3) “the kinds of sentences available”; (4) the Guidelines range 
itself; (5) any relevant policy statement by the Sentencing Commission; (6) “the need to avoid 
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants”; and (7) “the need to provide restitution to 
any victims,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l)-(7).  See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50 & n.6.  
 
In determining the appropriate sentence, the statute directs judges to “impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing, which are: 
 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense; 
 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; 
 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, 
or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.  
 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
 
2. A Significant, Consecutive Sentence of at Least Twenty-Five Years Is Sufficient, 
but Not Greater Than Necessary 
 
A significant sentence of at least twenty-five years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutive 
to the sentence imposed by Judge Liman , is sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply 
with the purposes of sentencing.  Specifically, such a sentence is appropriate to reflect the nature 
and seriousness of Ilori’s offense, to provide just punishment for the offense and promote respect 
for the law, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct (including, in particular, individual 
deterrence), to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and to protect the public from the 
defendant’s further crimes.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B). 
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Seriousness of the Offense, Providing Just Punishment, Promoting Respect for the Law 
 
The conduct at issue is extremely serious.  The defendant took part in more than a year of 
criminal activity, trading in the stolen identities of many identity theft victims and defrauding the 
SBA and banks into issuing loans on the basis of fraudulent applications.  While small businesses 
across the United States were struggling to make ends meet, the defendant had the audacity to lie 
to loan processors and to the federal government in order to obtain millions of dollars in pandemic 
relief—purportedly for hundreds of struggling employees.   
 
The defendant knowingly took part in these crimes, in which he attempted to fraudulently 
obtain more than $10 million, of which he and Recamier successfully received more than $1 
million.  These funds were intended to assist in the pandemic emergency, to allow for people to 
keep their jobs and for businesses to keep operating.  The defendant stole, and attempted to steal, 
from the public, taxpayers, and the people and entities these funds were intended to support.  This 
scheme was sophisticated, involving a web of financial accounts, electronic accounts, and 
numerous corporations.  
 
Alongside the defendant’s fraud related to the COVID-19 relief loans, he also engaged in 
numerous additional fraud and identity theft schemes to benefit himself, including the fraudulent 
leasing of the LIC Apartment, the Mercedes, and an apartment in Bushwick, Brooklyn.  
 
But he did not just rob the Government and deceive banks, he also utilized dozens of stolen 
identities in the course of his fraudulent loan applications and to maintain accounts and obtain 
property, such as the LIC Apartment and the Mercedes.  His conduct harmed the victims whose 
identities were stolen and misused.  As one victim writes to the Court in a victim-impact statement,  
“The stress of being put in this position was untenable.  I have been constantly afraid my credit 
rating would be impacted.  I no longer trust using any form of payment, except cash, will be 
secure.”  (Ex. A.)  Identity theft victim Jonathan Herttua testified that the theft of his identity was 
akin to being burglarized and left him with a “feeling of helplessness.”  (Trial Tr. 89.)  These 
consequences, and others, are shared by other victims of the defendant’s crimes.   
 
The seriousness of the defendant’s conduct is exponentially multiplied when considered 
against both his criminal history and his separate federal fraud and identity theft prosecution, to 
which he was subject to pretrial release while he committed these separate crimes.  The defendant 
had even pleaded guilty, purporting to accept responsibility for criminal conduct, when he 
committed these fraud and identity theft offenses.  He exhibited absolute disdain for the law.  
 
The defendant’s arguments for leniency do not hold water.  He blames his recent slew of 
criminal conduct on the COVID-19 pandemic and traumatic triggers from his childhood.  (Def. 
Sent. Sub at 5.)  But this is false.  The defendant’s recent criminal activity predates the pandemic.  
Indeed, in March 2019, approximately a year before the imposition of first pandemic lockdowns 
in the United States, the defendant began plotting to commit bank fraud and identity theft with 
Chancy.  It was also in 2019 that the defendant was arrested committing additional fraud and 
identity theft and incarcerated at Rikers Island, where he met and recruited Recamier to take part 
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in fraud schemes.  The pandemic and Ilori’s purportedly traumatic childhood, offer no explanation 
for the defendant’s crimes.1   
 
 
 
Ilori also argues that he “was already punished for the crime in the case before Judge 
Liman.”  (Def. Sent. Sub. at 8.)  But that is false.  In sentencing Ilori, Judge Liman stated, “I 
specifically am not considering your involvement in the paycheck protection program fraud 
scheme that is the subject of the case before Judge Vyskocil.  That charge and the facts underlying 
it have no impact on the sentence I am going to impose.”  March 3, 2022 Sent. Tr., at 26, United 
States v. Ilori, 20 Cr. 378 (LJL) (S.D.N.Y.), attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
 
Deterrence 
 
 
 
A substantial sentence is necessary to deter future criminal conduct of both the defendant 
and other similarly situated individuals.   
 
 
 
Specific deterrence is extremely relevant to the defendant.  The defendant took part in this 
serious and sophisticated fraud, identity theft, and money laundering crimes after he had been 
convicted and served jail sentences for numerous similar offenses.  He engaged in these crimes 
after his prior Southern District of New York arrest and while he was subject to pretrial release.  
This case represents the defendant’s third conviction in this District alone.  None of the defendant’s 
prior contacts with the criminal justice system nor his prior sentences appear to have deterred him 
in any way.  A weighty sentence is required to work to accomplish the ends of specific deterrence, 
if it is even possible to deter Ilori from criminal conduct.   
 
General deterrence is also a very important consideration in the defendant’s case.  The 
defendant took part in these serious fraud and identity theft crimes.  These crimes hurt real victims.  
The defendant’s conduct lasted over the course of a year.  And Recamier’s and Ilori’s crimes show 
how easy it is for others to commit similar COVID-19 relief fraud and identity theft crimes.  The 
defendant apparently believed that the institutions and individuals he was defrauding—whether 
identity theft victims, banks, or the EIDL program and PPP—were asleep at the switch and would 
not detect his premeditated and major fraud.   
 
Identity theft itself is rampant.  The Federal Trade Commission received more than 1 
million complaints of identity theft each year from 2020 through 2022.  See 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/CSN-Data-Book-2022.pdf, at 10.  Each case of 
identity theft causes extensive harms to its victims, who face the possibility of financial injury, 
damaged credit scores, and feelings of emotional insecurity.  Identity theft takes place at such a 
high volume, and the dollar amount in loss associated with identity theft cases can be insignificant 
 
1 The Government is highly skeptical that the defendant’s lack of arrests between 2010 and 2019 
reflects a lack of criminal conduct.  The defendant has repeatedly engaged in flagrant fraud and 
identity theft crimes.  And when the defendant began conspiring with Chancy in 2019, the 
defendant was, from the outset, prepared to obtain the fraudulent identities and forged documents 
necessary to complete the crime.  If the defendant were truly engaged in only legitimate activity, 
it is unlikely that he would have been able to obtain and provide these fraudulent materials. 
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compared to the other costs of identity theft crimes, such as the reputational and emotional harms 
that can haunt identity theft victims for years.  It would be impossible for law enforcement to 
identity, investigate, and prosecute every instance of identity theft, but, in a case like the present 
one, the Court should send a clear message of general deterrence.  Identity theft is a terrible crime 
that should be met with real consequences.  
 
As is clear from this case, it is all too easy to do what the defendant did, all too attractive, 
and all too difficult to detect until the fraud has reached a substantial scale.  This means that a 
meaningful sentence is warranted.  See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (“Because economic and fraud-based crimes are ‘more rational, cool, and calculated 
than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity,’ these crimes are ‘prime candidate[s] for general 
deterrence.’ (quoting Stephanos Bibas, White-Collar Plea Bargaining and Sentencing After 
Booker, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 721, 724 (2005)) (alteration in original)); United States v. 
Heffernan, 43 F.3d 1144, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Considerations of (general) deterrence argue for 
punishing more heavily those offenses that either are lucrative or are difficult to detect and punish, 
since both attributes go to increase the expected benefits of a crime and hence the punishment 
required to deter it.”); Francesco, Galbiati & Vertova, The Deterrent Effects of Prison: Evidence 
From a Natural Experiment, 117 J. of Political Econ. 257, 278 (2009) (“Our findings provide 
credible evidence that a one-month increase in expected punishment lowers the probability of 
committing a crime.  This corroborates the theory of general deterrence.”).  The Court’s sentencing 
determination should send a strong message to others about the serious consequences of engaging 
in such flagrant criminal conduct.  
 
Sentencing Disparities 
 
 
 
The defendant argues that a sentence of the sort recommended by the Probation Department 
or the Guidelines, would result in unwarranted sentencing disparities.  Not so.  The defendant 
stands nearly alone given the severity of his criminal background and criminal conduct. 
 
 
 
First, the defendant argues that a lengthy sentence would be disparate from Recamier, who 
the Court sentenced to 9-years’ incarceration, even invoking racism as a possible reason for any 
potential divergence.  (Def. Sent. Sub. at 7.)  The defendant refers to Recamier as the “primary 
offender,” but that is wrong.  Recamier was the face of the criminal operation, but the defendant 
was the actor in control.  Ilori is the one who recruited Recamier to take part in fraud, and Ilori is 
the one who possessed the primary tools of the fraud schemes—fake IDs, bank cards, and the 
cellular phones used to advance the fraud scheme.  In addition, unlike Ilori, Recamier had no 
criminal history at sentencing.  By contrast, Ilori is subject to Criminal History Category IV and 
also has numerous prior convictions and arrests that are not factored into the Guidelines’s Criminal 
History computation. 
 
 
 
Second, the defendant points to other purportedly similar defendants who received lesser 
sentences.  (Def. Sent. Sub. at 7.)  But Ilori’s aggravating factors are relatively unique.  He cannot 
simply be compared to other fraud defendants.  His criminal history, his pretrial release status 
during the commission of these offenses, and his total lack of acceptance of responsibility sets him 
apart. 
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Hon. Mary Kay Vyskocil 
May 1, 2023 
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Protecting the Public 
 
This is the relatively rare case where the Court must consider the importance of 
incapacitating the defendant to protect the public from his further crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a)(2)(C).  Given the defendant’s track record, there is no reason to conclude the defendant 
will ever stop committing fraud and identity theft crimes.  He appears to have been engaged in 
such activity for at least approximately twenty-five years, and his entire adult life.  Even as he has 
aged and had children, his devotion to crime has apparently not wavered.  Each crime the defendant 
commits harms additional innocent victims of identity theft, as well as those who might lose 
valuable funds and goods as a result of the defendant’s crimes.  A substantial sentence is necessary 
to protect the public from the defendant, who is an unrepentant, inveterate fraudster and identity 
thief. 
 
IV. 
Forfeiture and Restitution 
 
In addition to a substantial sentence, the Government seeks the imposition of financial 
penalties.  Based on conversations with defense counsel, the Government understands that the 
defendant may contest the applicability of these financial penalties. 
 
As to forfeiture, the Government seeks the entry of a proposed forfeiture order, attached as 
Exhibit C, forfeiting the Coinbase Account, Robinhood Account, and Schwab Account, 
enumerated in the Superseding Indictment, as well as a money judgment in the amount of 
$1,039,424.  The listed enumerated accounts received deposits of fraud proceeds and were used to 
launder the criminal proceeds.  They are thus forfeitable as the proceeds of fraud, pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 982(a)(2)(A), and as property involved in money laundering, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
982(a)(1).  The money judgment reflects the actual proceeds the defendant obtained through his 
fraudulent loan applications, and is forfeitable as the proceeds of fraud, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
982(a)(2)(A). 
 
As to restitution, the Government seeks the entry of a proposed restitution order, attached 
as Exhibit D, with a Schedule of Victims submitted to the Court under seal.  The restitution order 
seeks restitution in the amount of $1,120,462.47.  This restitution figure reflects the loss to victims 
as a result of the defendant’s crimes and includes: (1) the money paid out as a result of the 
defendant’s fraudulent loan applications; (2) interest due on those loans; and (3) the amount of rent 
owed to a New York City landlord as a result of the fraudulent leasing by the defendant of an 
apartment in Bushwick, New York, under the name William Jamieson. 
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Hon. Mary Kay Vyskocil 
May 1, 2023 
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V. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the Government respectfully requests that the Court impose 
a period of imprisonment of at least 25 years, to be served consecutive to the sentence imposed by 
Judge Liman, as such a sentence would be sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to serve the 
legitimate purposes of sentencing. 
 
 
 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DAMIAN WILLIAMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
United States Attorney 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by:  /s/ 
 
Juliana N. Murray 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Daniel G. Nessim 
David R. Felton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(212) 637-2314/-2314/-2486/-2299 
 
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