Plaintiffs' Reply Brief on Remand — East Bay Sanctuary v. Trump

Record facts

N.D. Cal. · No. 4:18-cv-06810-JST · Doc. 223 · 2025-08-22 · Docket on CourtListener

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Omar C. Jadwat* 
 
Lee Gelernt* 
ACLU FOUNDATION 
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
T: (212) 549-2660 
ojadwat@aclu.org 
lgelernt@aclu.org 
 
 
Morgan Russell (SBN 296137)                         
Spencer Amdur (SBN 320069) 
Oscar Sarabia Roman (SBN 341385) 
ACLU FOUNDATION  
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
425 California Street, Suite 700 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
T: (415) 343-0770 
mrussell@aclu.org 
samdur@aclu.org 
osarabia@aclu.org 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs (additional counsel listed on following page) 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
East Bay Sanctuary Covenant, et al., 
 
Plaintiffs, 
 
v. 
 
Donald J. Trump, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
  
Case No.: 18-cv-06810-JST 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
PLAINTIFFS’ REPLY BRIEF ON REMAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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i 
 
Melissa Crow* 
CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES 
1121 14th Street, NW, Suite 200 
Washington, DC 20005 
T: (202) 355-4471 
F: (415) 581-8824 
crowmelissa@uclawsf.edu 
 
Anne Peterson (SBN 258673) 
Blaine Bookey (SBN 267596) 
Karen Musalo (SBN 106882) 
CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES 
200 McAllister Street 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
T: (415) 610-5729 
F: (415) 581-8824 
petersonanne@uclawsf.edu 
bookeybl@uclawsf.edu 
musalok@uclawsf.edu 
 
Robert Pauw** 
CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES 
c/o Gibbs Houston Pauw 
1000 Second Avenue, Suite 1600 
Seattle, WA  98104 
T: (206)682-1080 
F: (206)689-2270 
rpauw@ghp-law.net         
 
 
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
*Admitted Pro hac vice  
** Application for admission pro hac vice 
forthcoming  
Keren Zwick* 
Colleen Cowgill (SBN 321542) 
Mary Georgevich* 
NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE 
CENTER  
111 W. Jackson Blvd., Suite 800 
Chicago, IL 60604 
T: (312) 660-1370  
F: (312) 660-1364 
kzwick@immigrantjustice.org 
ccowgill@immigrantjustice.org 
mgeorgevich@immigrantjustice.org  
 
Michelle (Minju) Y. Cho (SBN 321939) 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION OF NORTHERN 
CALIFORNIA, INC. 
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
T: (415) 621-2493 
F: (415) 255-1478 
mcho@aclunc.org 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 1 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1 
        I.  Plaintiffs Continue To Have Standing To Challenge The Rule .......................................... 1 
        II. The Termination Of The “Lawful Pathways” Underscores The   
             Rule’s Illegality .................................................................................................................. 6 
 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................... 8 
 
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1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court should reaffirm its prior summary judgment order but amend it to hold that FDA 
v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (“Alliance”), 602 U.S. 367 (2024), does not alter the Court’s 
conclusions that Plaintiffs have standing; and that Defendants’ elimination of the CBP One 
appointment system and parole programs underscore the Rule’s illegality.  
As to standing, the Ninth Circuit recently held that one of the Plaintiffs here—ImmDef—
had standing under Alliance to challenge a separate asylum policy, echoing Plaintiffs’ explanation 
in their opening brief on remand that “[a]s is relevant here, the Supreme Court’s decision in Alliance 
reaffirmed Havens [Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)].” ECF No. 217 at 4; see 
Immigrant Defs. L. Ctr. v. Noem (“ImmDef”), No. 25-2581, ___ F.4th ____, 2025 WL 2080742, at 
*9 (9th Cir. July 18, 2025) (reasoning that Alliance “reinforced the holding in Havens Realty”). In 
any event, multiple Plaintiffs have independently demonstrated standing based on financial harm. 
And the Supreme Court’s decision concerning the scope of injunctive relief in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 
145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025), has no bearing here because it explicitly did not address vacatur—the relief 
that this Court previously ordered and that Plaintiffs seek again now.  
On the merits, the elimination of CBP One and the parole programs further illustrate why 
the Rule violates the asylum statute and has always been arbitrary and capricious.   
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Plaintiffs Continue To Have Standing To Challenge The Rule. 
Standing Under Havens and Alliance. As the Ninth Circuit recently explained, Alliance 
“reinforced the holding in Havens Realty” that a “plaintiff may assert organizational standing” 
“when a defendant’s actions ‘directly affect[] and interfere with[] with’ [the] plaintiff’s ‘core 
business activities.’” ImmDef, 2025 WL 2080742, at *9 (some alterations in original) (quoting 
Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395). The plaintiffs in Alliance alleged only that the FDA’s actions caused 
them to incur costs to oppose those actions through lobbying, advocacy, and education. 602 U.S. 
at 394-95. Here, by contrast, Plaintiffs have explained in detail how the Rule directly obstructs 
their core work of counseling and representing asylum seekers, in addition to requiring them to 
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2 
 
divert resources. Pls.’ Br. on Remand, ECF No. 217, at 4-6 (citing plaintiff declarations). As in 
ImmDef, this showing of concrete interference with Plaintiffs’ “core business activities” of 
“providing direct representation, counseling, and legal assistance to noncitizens” goes far beyond 
the kind of “‘issue-advocacy’ work that was found insufficient” to establish standing in Alliance. 
See ImmDef, 2025 WL 2080742, at *9. 
The Fifth Circuit reached the same conclusion on analogous facts in another decision 
issued after Plaintiffs filed their opening brief on remand. In United States v. Texas, 144 F.4th 632 
(5th Cir. July 3, 2025), the court held that an organization whose “core activity” includes 
“providing legal representation and legal counseling” to asylum seekers had standing under 
Havens and Alliance to challenge a state immigration law. Id. at 649. Indeed, like the Ninth Circuit 
in ImmDef, the court reasoned that Alliance “reinforces, rather than undermines, [that] 
conclusion.” Id. at 648. As with the plaintiff in the Fifth Circuit’s decision, Plaintiffs here are not 
just “issue-advocacy organization[s]” but instead “provide legal services and legal counseling to 
low-income immigrants”—much as the plaintiff in Havens was “[‘]not only was an issue-
advocacy organization, but also operated a housing counseling service.’” See id. (quoting Alliance, 
602 U.S. at 395). And as with the law challenged in the Fifth Circuit case, the Rule here impairs 
Plaintiffs’ core work because it “decrease[s] the overall number” of noncitizens that Plaintiffs can 
“successfully assist in asserting asylum . . . claims.” See id. at 649.  
None of Defendants’ contrary arguments have merit. First, Defendants claim that Plaintiffs 
cannot assert “third-party standing.” ECF No. 222 at 8-9. But Plaintiffs are not asserting third-
party claims on behalf of their clients; they instead rely on harm to themselves. Defendants’ 
reliance on Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004)—which concerned an assertion of third-
party standing is misplaced for the same reason. As the Ninth Circuit just reiterated in ImmDef, 
“‘[o]rganizations are entitled to sue on their own behalf for injuries they have sustained.’” 2025 
WL 2080742, at *8 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. at 379 n.19). 
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Second, Defendants argue that “education and outreach expenditures . . . taken in response 
to a government policy . . . cannot satisfy standing.” ECF No. 222 at 9. But even assuming such 
outreach-related harms on their own might be insufficient, Plaintiffs have demonstrated much 
more than that. Because of the Rule, Plaintiff EBSC has been able to represent far fewer clients in 
its core affirmative asylum practice than it could before. ECF No. 217 at 5 (citing Suppl. Smith 
Decl. ¶¶ 7-9, ECF 217-1). And the Rule “has similarly impaired the affirmative asylum programs” 
of Plaintiffs Tahirih, NCLR, and American Gateways by cutting off “their ability to serve people 
who would have been previously able to file affirmatively asylum applications.” Id. at 5-6 (citing 
declarations). Similarly, “the Rule impedes th[e] core work” of “Plaintiffs that represent asylum 
seekers in removal proceedings in immigration court, as many do,” “by making it much more 
difficult and resource-intensive to effectively provide that representation.” Id. at 6 (same). In 
addition to requiring Plaintiffs to divert resources, the Rule has therefore “‘perceptibly 
impaired[’]” their “core business activities.” Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395 (quoting Havens, 455 U.S. 
at 395); see ImmDef, 2025 WL 2080742, at *9; United States v. Texas, 144 F.4th at 648-49.  
Third, Defendants incorrectly claim that reduction in the number of asylum seekers that 
Plaintiffs can serve does not constitute impairment of their activities. See ECF No. 222 at 10-11. 
But just as the Havens defendant’s “racial steering” practices “‘perceptibly impaired [the plaintiff 
organization]’s ability to provide counseling and referral services for low- and moderate-income 
homeseekers,’” the unlawful Rule perceptibly interferes with Plaintiffs’ ability to do their core 
day-to-day work of representing asylum seekers. See Alliance, 602 U.S. at 395 (quoting Havens, 
455 U.S. at 379). It is hard to imagine clearer evidence that this interference is “perceptible” than 
the fact that the Rule has caused Plaintiffs to represent fewer asylum seekers than they could 
otherwise. See Texas, 144 F.4th at 649 (holding that plaintiff organization established standing 
under Alliance where its affidavit explained that the challenged law would “decrease the overall 
number of low- and moderate-income immigrants [the organization] could successfully assist in 
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asserting asylum and other federal immigration claims”).1  
Financial Injury. In any event, Plaintiffs EBSC and ImmDef have established standing 
based on financial injury independent of Havens and Alliance. EBSC “has already suffered 
economic injury in the form of lost funding,” and ImmDef similarly “faces a loss of funding.” 
ECF No. 217 at 4, 6-7. And Defendants’ suggestion that these Plaintiffs’ evidence of financial 
harm is too vague, ECF No. 222 at 11-12, is foreclosed by precedent. The Ninth Circuit has 
already held that evidence of prospective loss of government funding equivalent to that offered by 
ImmDef is sufficient to confer standing to challenge a rule like that at issue here. EBSC v. Biden, 
993 F.3d 640, 663 (9th Cir. 2021).2  
Moreover, EBSC’s concrete showing of financial harm goes well beyond what the Ninth 
Circuit previously held to be sufficient: “From May 2023 to May 2025, the number of affirmative 
asylum cases EBSC has filed decreased by more than 50 cases per year on average compared to 
the last year before the Rule took effect, leading to an average loss of over $100,000 of [its] per-
case funding each year” from the California Department of Social Services. ECF 217 at 7 (citing 
Suppl. Smith Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 217-1); cf. ECF No. 222 at (Defendants complaining that 
 
1 Defendants also repeat arguments concerning United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670 (2023), and 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973), that this Court already rejected. See Defs.’ Suppl. 
Opp. Br. on Remand, ECF No. 222, at 6-7; see also Defs.’ Cross-MSJ & Opp., ECF No. 176-1, at 
9; Defs.’ MSJ Reply, ECF No. 182 at 1-2. Those previously addressed arguments go beyond the 
scope of the Court’s remand briefing order. ECF No. 209 at 1. And in any event, those arguments 
fail because, unlike the actions challenged in those cases, the Rule does not “implicate the 
Executive’s exercise of enforcement discretion over whether to arrest or prosecute” and does 
implicate the “provision of legal benefits or legal status.” SJ Order, ECF No. 187, at 11. 
 
2 Compare EBSC v. Biden, 993 F.3d at 663 (“The funding on which the Organizations critically 
depend is also jeopardized by the Rule. . . . CARECEN receives from [the California Department 
of Social Services] a flat amount of funding per client it assists, and because more of its clients are 
being put into more time- and resource-intensive withholding proceedings, it will assist less clients 
and receive less funding.”), with Suppl. Toczylowski Decl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 217-3 (“As a result of 
assisting clients subject to [the Rule], ImmDef has been forced to handle fewer removal cases than 
we would otherwise accept, which promises to impact our funding and in turn our ability to 
provide representation in removal proceedings more generally. As panel attorneys through a 
program with the Public Defender Office in San Diego, if we are unable to take on new matters, 
we will not receive any of our budgeted funding from that source.”) 
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5 
 
“ImmDef does not quantify the number of cases it is currently handling versus those it handled 
previously”); Alliance, 602 U.S. at 385-86 (noting that the plaintiffs had not asserted any monetary 
harm).  
These are not downstream effects on Plaintiffs, but rather direct “injuries to their own 
pocketbooks.” Washington v. Trump, No. 25-807, ___ F.4th ____, 2025 WL 2061447, at *5 (9th 
Cir. July 23, 2025). And they are precisely the injuries that these same Plaintiffs foresaw at the 
outset of this case. See Decl. of Michael Smith ¶¶ 16-17, ECF No. 169-6 (predicting loss of 
funding from the California Department of Social Services); Decl. of Lindsay Toczylowski ¶¶ 36-
37, ECF No. 169-4 (predicting loss of funding from the San Diego panel attorney program); SJ 
Order, ECF No. 187, at 10 (holding that EBSC’s first declaration provided “uncontroverted 
evidence that the Rule” would “substantially affect [its] funding” sufficient to confer standing). 
Trump v. CASA, Inc. Is Inapposite. Finally, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, ECF No. 
222 at 12-14, the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 145 S. Ct. 2540 (2025), has 
no bearing here. CASA concerned injunctive relief, which Plaintiffs do not seek. And the Court in 
CASA expressly noted that “[n]othing” in its opinion “resolves the distinct question whether the 
Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal courts to vacate federal agency action.” Id. at 
2554 n.10. As Justice Kavanaugh has explained, “‘[w]hen a reviewing court determines that 
agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that their 
application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.’” Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of 
Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 831 (2024) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The 
government’s “newly minted position” to the contrary “is both novel and wrong.” Id. at 827. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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II. 
The Termination Of The “Lawful Pathways” Underscores The Rule’s Illegality. 
The Rule Violates the Asylum Statute. Termination of the CBP One appointment system 
and parole programs underscores that the Rule is inconsistent with the asylum statute. See Pls.’ Br. 
on Remand, ECF No. 217, at 7-8. In response, Defendants argue that those “two pathways were not 
the only means of avoiding” the Rule’s asylum bar and that noncitizens “still could have sought 
protection in a third country” or could seek to show “exceptionally compelling circumstances” for 
crossing the border between ports of entry. ECF No. 222 at 15-16. But the Rule’s exceptions based 
on the purported availability of the CBP One and parole “pathways” were central to Defendants’ 
argument that the Rule is distinguishable from the entry-based asylum ban held unlawful in EBSC 
v. Biden, 993 F.3d 640 (9th Cir. 2021). See SJ Order, ECF No. 187, at 17; see also, e.g., Defs.’ 
Cross-MSJ & Opp, ECF 176-1, at 14 (asserting that the Rule’s asylum bar “can be avoided entirely 
if noncitizens receive authorization to travel to the United States under a DHS-approved parole 
process, present at a port of entry at a pre-scheduled time and place (including through use of CBP 
One), or apply for and are denied asylum or other protection in another country”).  
In any event, the transit-country-denial requirement and the exceptionally compelling 
circumstances exception alone cannot save the Rule. As this Court correctly explained, the transit-
country-denial requirement is contrary to the asylum statute under EBSC v. Garland, 994 F.3d 962 
(9th Cir. 2020). See SJ Order, ECF No. 187, at 16-19. And the fact that a noncitizen’s “failure to 
present at a port of entry may be excused upon a showing of exceptionally compelling 
circumstances[] does not address the reason why restricting asylum eligibility based on place of 
entry conflicts with the law.” Id. at 18. Moreover, the Supreme Court has held “that where the 
government cannot make an action ‘mandatory,’ it equally cannot require a showing of 
‘extraordinary circumstances to justify’ a departure from that action.” Pls.’ Br. on Remand, ECF 
No. 217, at 11 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46-47 (2007)). That Defendants have 
eliminated CBP One and the parole programs simply reinforces this Court’s prior ruling.3  
 
3 The rest of Defendants’ purported response concerning whether termination of CBP One and the 
parole programs affects the Court’s statutory analysis instead rehashes their failed statutory 
arguments more generally. ECF No. 222 at 14-15. That strays far beyond the narrow merits issue 
on which this Court granted leave for additional briefing: “the impact of Executive Order 14165 
 
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The Rule Is Arbitrary and Capricious. The termination of CBP One and the parole programs 
also reinforce this Court’s conclusion that the Rule is arbitrary and capricious, particularly with 
respect to noncitizens who crossed the southern border between January 20 and May 11, 2025. See 
Pls.’ Br. on Remand, ECF No. 217, at 8-9.  
In response, Defendants note that whether a rule is arbitrary and capricious is assessed based 
on the record at the time the rule was issued. ECF No. 222 at 16. But as Plaintiffs argued from the 
start, the Rule’s reliance on the availability of the purported pathways was always arbitrary and 
capricious because those programs were “completely discretionary,” were “not incorporated into 
the Rule,” and “could be rescinded (or enjoined) at any time.” Pls. MSJ Br., ECF No. 169-1, at 18-
19; accord Pls.’ MSJ Reply, ECF No. 181, at 14-15. Indeed, in response to comments that the parole 
programs could end, the Rule claimed that the CBP One “pathway” would still be available. See 
Rule, 88 Fed. Reg. 31314, 31410 (May 16, 2023) (“If these parole processes are enjoined, Ukrainian 
and CHNV [Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, and Venezuelan] nationals would still be able to avoid the 
rebuttable presumption if they present at a POE [POE] pursuant to a pre-scheduled time and place” 
using CBP One.). And when Defendants claimed that the Rule “‘provides alternative pathways’ to 
asylum,” Pls.’ MSJ Reply, ECF No. 181 at 5 (quoting ECF No. 176-1 at 14), Plaintiffs explained 
that “the Rule itself says exactly the opposite: ‘this rule does not create, expand, or otherwise 
constitute the basis for any lawful pathways,’” id. (quoting 88 Fed. Reg. at 31370). The elimination 
of CBP One and the parole programs therefore further illustrates the fallacy in the Rule’s core 
assumption “that [its] exceptions will, at the very least, present meaningful options to noncitizens 
subject to the Rule.” SJ Order, ECF No. 187, at 24.  
 
§ 7(a)-(b), which terminated the ‘lawful pathways’ on which the Rule relies in part.” Scheduling 
Order Following Remand, ECF No. 209, at 1 (cleaned up). In any event, Defendants’ arguments 
lack merit for the reasons this Court previously explained. See SJ Order, ECF 187, at 15-19. And 
insofar as Defendants stress the Rule’s purported “focus” on “systemic efficiency,” ECF No. 222 at 
14-15, that goal does not cure the Rule’s illegality. The prior bans asserted the same goal, but the 
Ninth Circuit nonetheless held them unlawful. See EBSC v. Garland, 994 F.3d at 982 (transit ban 
was intended to “relieve[] strain” in “overburdened asylum system”); id. at 989 (Miller, J., 
concurring) (systemic efficiency was transit ban’s “stated purpose”); Entry Ban Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 
55934, 55934 (Nov. 9, 2018) (purpose to “channel inadmissible aliens to ports of entry” to ensure 
“controlled, orderly, and lawful” processing); id. at 55944-48 (purpose to address the “inefficiencies 
of the current asylum system”).  
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Meanwhile, it is Defendants who seek to avoid the “foundational principle of administrative 
law that judicial review of agency action is limited to the grounds that the agency invoked when it 
took the action.” DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 20 (2020) (cleaned up). They 
argue that “the fact that certain of those pathways no longer exist does not undermine the lawfulness 
of the Rule,” because the Rule “would be lawful” even if it “included no exceptions at all.” ECF 
No. 222 at 16. Defendants cite no such assertion in the Rule itself. To the contrary, as the Court 
observed, the Rule itself claims that it would “[‘]generally offer opportunities for those with valid 
claims to seek protection[’]”; “justifies the breadth of its presumption of ineligibility by reference 
to its multiple exceptions and the opportunity to rebut it”; and points “to the other exceptions and 
opportunity for rebuttal to justify the scope of each exception.” ECF No. 187 at 23 (collecting 
citations to the Rule). 
Finally, Defendants argue that “the elimination of any pathways discussed in the Rule had 
little to no practical impact” because “Proclamation 10888 was in effect” between January 20 and 
May 11, 2025 “and cut off access to the asylum process altogether for aliens who crossed the border” 
during that period. ECF No. 222 at 17. As Defendants acknowledge, however, that Proclamation 
has been held unlawful. Refugee & Immigrant Ctr. for Educ. & Legal Servs. (“RAICES”) v. Noem, 
No. 25-cv-306, 2025 WL 1825431, at *31-43 (D.D.C. July 2, 2025). The existence of another illegal 
policy does not cure the illegality of the Rule.4  
CONCLUSION 
 
The Court should reaffirm its prior summary judgment order and modify its opinion to hold 
that Plaintiffs continue to have standing and that the termination of CBP One and the parole 
programs further confirm the Rule’s illegality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Although the district court’s order in RAICES has been partially stayed pending appeal with 
respect to asylum, the decisive vote on the motions panel on that issue acknowledged that it was a 
“close” question that “remains open to definitive resolution by a merits panel.” RAICES v. Noem, 
No. 25-5243, Doc. 2128457, at 35 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 2025) (Millett, J., concurring). Moreover, the 
appeal in that litigation has been expedited. Id. at 2 (Order). Accordingly, the injunction against 
the Proclamation’s override of asylum may soon be upheld, such that the Rule at issue in this case 
will stand as the principal obstacle to asylum for noncitizens still in the United States who crossed 
the southern border between June 20 and May 11, 2025. 
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Dated: August 22, 2025 
 
 
Keren Zwick* 
Colleen Cowgill (SBN 321542)  
Mary Georgevich* 
NATIONAL IMMIGRANT JUSTICE 
CENTER  
224 S. Michigan Ave., Suite 600 
Chicago, Illinois 60604 
T: (312) 660-1370  
F: (312) 660-1505  
kzwick@immigrantjustice.org 
ccowgill@immigrantjustice.org 
mgeorgevich@immigrantjustice.org  
 
Melissa Crow* 
CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES 
1121 14th Street, NW, Suite 200 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
T: (202) 355-4471 
F: (415) 581-8824 
crowmelissa@uclawsf.edu 
 
Anne Peterson (SBN 258673) 
Blaine Bookey (SBN 267596 
Julie Bourdoiseau (SBN 340462) 
Karen Musalo (SBN 106882) 
CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES 
200 McAllister Street 
San Francisco, CA  94102 
T: (415) 610-5729 
F: (415) 581-8824 
petersonanne@uclawsf.edu 
bookeybl@uclawsf.edu 
bourdoiseaujulie@uclawsf.edu 
musalok@uclawsf.edu 
 
Robert Pauw** 
CENTER FOR GENDER & REFUGEE 
STUDIES 
c/o Gibbs Houston Pauw 
1000 Second Avenue, Suite 1600 
Seattle, WA  98104 
T: (206) 682-1080 
F: (206) 689-2270 
rpauw@ghp-law.net         
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
 
*Admitted Pro hac vice  
** Application for pro hac vice admission 
forthcoming  
Respectfully submitted,  
 
/s/ Lee Gelernt 
Lee Gelernt* 
Omar Jadwat* 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION  
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
125 Broad St., 18th Floor 
New York, NY 10004 
T: (212) 549-2660 
lgelernt@aclu.org 
ojadwat@aclu.org 
 
Morgan Russell (SBN 296137)                         
Spencer Amdur (SBN 320069) 
Oscar Sarabia Roman (SBN 341385) 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION 
FOUNDATION  
IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS PROJECT 
425 California Street, Suite 700 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
T: (415) 343-1198 
mrussell@aclu.org 
samdur@aclu.org 
osarabia@aclu.org 
 
Michelle (Minju) Y. Cho (SBN 321939) 
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF 
NORTHERN CALIFORNIA, INC.  
39 Drumm Street 
San Francisco, CA 94111 
T: (415) 621-2493 
F: (415) 255-1478 
mcho@aclu.org 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 4:18-cv-06810-JST     Document 223     Filed 08/22/25     Page 12 of 12

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